

On the ‘grace text’

Tatsuda Noboru

In October 2024, the second creation of the parody of the ‘North Korean grace text’ became a popular topic on the Bilibili.com. What do you think about this? First of all, we can rule out the erroneous view that the popularity of the ‘grace text’ is a conscious effort by the ‘visible hand’ to lift the ban on topics related to the DPRK. In some opinions, the popularity of the ‘grace text’ was a conscious effort by the ‘visible hand’ to lift the ban on topics related to North Korea, and in some opinions, the ban was based on the ‘visible hand’s’ opposition to North Korea’s sending of troops to the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield to help the Russians in the war. (For example, under the question ‘What do you think of the recent North Korean favor text on Bilibili.com?’, an answer posted by Zhihu user @遼河之南 on Oct. 29, with more than 4,000 likes at the time of writing, said, ‘If you look closely, you can see that public opinion on North Korea has changed over the past year. A lot of things that didn’t pass muster before, now do.’ Another example is the answer posted by Zhihu user @Solnice-Mar on Oct. 30: ‘Because the general sent troops to help Russia invade Ukraine, which is something we can’t tolerate.’)

These head-scratching ‘bedside auscultating’ opinions are absurd in themselves, and according to them, the second creation video of the ‘grace text’ is a ‘dagger-throwing gun’ aimed at Kim Jong-un! --It seems that the General is not only on Steam, but also on the Bilibili.com.

Will the video about the ‘grace text’ be able to kill the General by ‘thanking’ him? Apparently not. Regarding the above mentioned point of view of ‘bedside auscultating’, we put forward two points to refute: Firstly, North Korean material itself is a long-term ‘open area’ in the Bilibili.com, such as ‘Grace Song’ and the North Korean Children’s Palace children’s performance artists’ videos have not been banned. Therefore, the video ‘North Korean Elementary School Text <Kim’s Grandfather Knocked Out U.S. Satellites with Stones>,’ which was posted by B site user @HistoryDe on Oct. 19 for the AI reading of a North Korean text with only one image and as the original source of all second-hand videos, was not released as a ‘result of the lifting of the ban,’ but rather as a ‘open zoom.’ Secondly, the reason why these videos are second-hand videos is that they replace North Korean elements with elements from other subcultures, such as ‘Konoha text’, ‘Cambodian text’, ‘Litang text’, and so on. ‘. How can these videos be the result of the so-called ‘lifting of the ban on North Korean topics’ when they don’t even contain North Korean elements?

It’s worth noting that ‘Grace Text’ was not included in @MemeGuide. This is in

line with the aforementioned ‘bedside-auscultating’ comment, because if @MemeGuide wanted to include ‘the grace text’, he would have had to introduce the original video, something that would have made him feel at risk of being ‘stuck in the audit!’ ‘This possible concern shares the same set of ideas as the bedside-auscultators’ theory of ‘unblocking’, which is the idea that ‘censorship’ has long been a part of censorship. It is the ‘self-censorship mechanism’ that people have developed under the long-standing censorship system that is at work. Moreover, how to give a ‘MemeGuide-style’ interpretation of this ‘Meme’? This may also be difficult for @MemeGuide.

What we're trying to do here is what @MemeGuide doesn't dare to do, which is to find out what the popularity of the ‘grace text’ means.

As I have already pointed out, the ‘rhythm’ of the so-called ‘Ryukyu self-determination issue’ on the Chinese Internet over the past two years has essentially emerged as a consequence of the traumatization caused by the news of Pelosi's landing on the island. People talked about how the Ryukyus did not belong to the so-called ‘other small islands decided by us’ in the Potsdam Proclamation, as if they thought that one of the nationals of the ‘victorious bloc’ for thousands of years had suddenly disagrees with this matter, it represents the will of ‘we the people’, and the matter will have to be reconsidered. Those who talk about the Ryukyus in this way do not know any Okinawan, nor do they care about any specific Okinawan, and they do not think about whether Okinawans would be willing to take a Chinese passport, which has visa-free access to only 30-odd countries, and give up their Japanese passports, which have visa-free access to more than 130 countries. --For Okinawans, if they continue to be Japanese, they can go to China visa-free just recently; if they run away to be Chinese, can they go to Japan later?

Pelosi's visit to the island is indeed an event, and Internet historians are splitting China's history into two because of it - a famous paragraph says: ‘Before Pelosi's visit to the island, she shouted that she would not fight the ‘500,000’. ‘500,000’; after Pelosi landed on the island, it was ‘500,000’ who shouted fight; after Pelosi left the island, it was ‘500,000’ who brought up the matter again.’

After Pelosi landed on the island, the issue of Taiwan could no longer be a public issue to channel people's emotions. So much so that the news that Tsai's return flight to Europe flew over mainland airspace between the 19th and 20th of last month barely stirred up any discussion. People with ‘broken hearts’ have learned to ‘bring their own food’ - which in some cases doesn't even mean ‘keeping up with the official caliber’, but means constructing a narrative of one's own to persuade oneself. In this case, the attitude of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the People's Republic of China (TAO) is to ‘urge the countries concerned to abide by the ‘one-China principle’ and not to provide any platform for the dissemination of the separatist fallacy of ‘Taiwan independence’”.

However, the rhetoric of Chinese netizens who brought their own food is that since Tsai Ing-wen has left office, she is just a Taiwanese private citizen, and the fact that a Taiwanese private citizen flew over mainland airspace on a civilian airliner is something that can be treated with equanimity. This is not a statement that is consistent with the official position, as it does not send a 'China's warning' to the US and the West, but merely argues why 'the flight aboard Tsai Ing-wen's plane overflowed mainland airspace' is not a public issue worthy of attention.

Those who are satisfied with this argument are not aware that Tsai's visit to Europe was accompanied by serving Taiwanese dignitaries, such as Huang Chong-ying, an advisory member of the National Security Council of the Republic of China (ROC). In other words, it would be better to say that the 'Tsai Ing-wen's visit to Europe' is a smokescreen designed to deceive those who 'bring their own food' and self-convince themselves. Didn't the European Parliament pass a 'pro-Taiwan resolution' after the visit? The diplomatic achievements of Tsai's visit to Europe will not disappear just because mainland netizens 'bring their own food' and turn a blind eye to them.

To limit the discussion of Tsai's visit to Europe to the flight over mainland airspace on which she was traveling, and to have those who 'brought their own food' state that they would take it lightly is to 'trivialize' the issue. The operation of 'trivializing' is itself a kind of irony. In September of last year, there was a hot topic on the Chinese Internet about how Bashar al-Assad's round-trip flight to China had gone around and around. This was in stark contrast to Tsai Ing-wen's flight.

After all this, we should now return to the topic of 'grace texts'. If the 'rhythm' of the so-called 'Ryukyu self-determination issue' on China's Internet reflects netizens' trauma over Taiwan, then the popularity of the 'grace text' reflects netizens' concern over our own leader. It's easy to say that the Kim Jong-il in the 'grace text' is self-critical: 'But I have to admit that I acted recklessly in shooting down the satellite at that time, and I am here to apologize to the whole nation. I hereby apologize to the people of the country, and I will explain the situation to the people of the country.'

Some netizens pointed out that although North Korea does exist many 'grace text', now popular this Kim Jong Il hand threw stones to hit the satellite 'grace text' but does not exist, is the beginning of the century of Baidu posting bar netizens to create. This, then, is a further reflection of the fact that our people have been traumatized by our leader's inability to self-criticize since that time.

This incident is not isolated, naturally. Nearly midway between the time when the grace texts were rumored to have been produced and today, around 2014 or 2015, Xin Deyong published a book called *Making Han Wu Di*. *Making Han Wu Di* presents some ideas that are at odds with those in Tian Yuqing's 1984 paper, *On the Edict of Luntai*. The difference between 'Making Han Wu Di' and 'On the Luntai Edict', in

short, is reflected in the question of whether 'Luntai Edict' is a 'sinful edict' or not. When Xin Deyong's view was accepted as 'the Luntai edict does not reflect Han Wu Di's orientation to change his ways to the point that it is not a sinful edict,' people felt uncomfortable. According to Xin Deyong, he was told that he should not discuss the issue with the elderly Tian Yuqing, who was 90 years old, died on Dec. 25, 2014.

The fact that 'sin oneself edict' has become a word indicates that there have been a few 'sin oneself edicts' in Chinese history, but most of those not-so-famous ones were written under the concept of 'induction of heaven and man'. Considered to be based on the emperor's own 'militarism, the people hurt money' and under the sin of self edict, 'luntai edict' is afraid to be the only one. If history is true, as Xin Deyong believes, that Han Wu Di did not change his ways, then the Luntai Edict is not a sinful edict. Then there is nothing in our cultural resources that can be called a cultural heritage of 'self-criticism' of rulers.

It seems that Frantz Fanon was right when he said, in *The Sufferers of the World*, that 'self-criticism is first and foremost an African mechanism.'

From Sima Guang's creation of Emperor Wu of Han Dynasty to the creation of 'grace texts' by posters, we have a history of calling on rulers to be 'self-critical' for almost a thousand years.

Since we have been calling on our rulers to be 'self-critical' for a thousand years in our collective unconscious, why did we discover the 'grace text' only last month? It turns out that this is because in the middle of last month, there was a hot search called 'Kim Jong-un indicates the direction of the DPRK's military activities' (this hot search is said to have stayed at the No. 1 position on the Weibo hot search list for 50 minutes on October 15). This was supposed to be the North Korean response to the earlier South Korean drone drop of leaflets on Pyongyang, but the North then sent troops to the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield, perhaps Kim Jong-un's way of sounding out the east and hitting the west.

It's this hot topic that has people once again associating Kim Jong-un with our leader, the 'Finger Star' who has pointed out more than 200 directions. And it was this association that drew attention to the 'grace text'.

It is said that North Korean soldiers who have been deployed to the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield have already suffered casualties. We don't know whether Kim Jong-un will apologize to his countrymen in the future, or pay tribute to the fallen of this military assistance with the same emotion as he did when he buried Hyun Chul-hae. But we all know in our hearts that the 'Finger Star' will not self-criticize even after we have exhausted the second creation of the 'grace text' and have made everyone from George Washington to Senju Tobirama self-criticized.

论“恩情课文”

辰田昇

2024 年 10 月，“朝鲜恩情课文”的仿写二创成为了 B 站的热门题材。如何看待这件事？我们可以首先排除一种错误的看法：这种看法认为，“恩情课文”梗的流行是“有形的手”有意识地对“朝鲜”相关话题的解禁，更有甚者，认为这一解禁是基于“有形的手”对朝鲜派兵前往俄乌战场协助俄军作战这一事件的反对态度。（例如，在“如何看待最近 B 站大火的朝鲜恩情课文？”的问题下，知乎用户@遼河之南 发布于 10 月 29 日的，截止本文写作时已有四千余赞的答案说：“仔细看看就知道，这一年对朝鲜的舆论，发生了变化。很多以前通不过审核的东西，现在都能了。”又例如，知乎用户@Solnice·Mar 发布于 10 月 30 日的答案：“因为将军派兵帮着俄罗斯侵略乌克兰，这是我们所不能忍的。”）

这些拍脑袋想出来的“听床学”观点本身很荒谬，按照这些意见，“恩情课文”的二创视频是射向金正恩的“匕首投枪”——看来将军不止上 Steam，还上 B 站。

“恩情课文”相关视频夜“感恩”到明，明“感恩”到夜，能气死将军否？显然不能。关于上面提到的“听床学”观点，我们提出两点驳斥意见：其一，朝鲜素材本身在 B 站是长期的“开放地带”，“恩情歌曲”和朝鲜的少年宫儿童表演艺术家的素材在 B 站中并没有被禁止。因此，只配了一幅图片的 AI 棒读朝鲜课文的“万恶之源”——B 站用户@历史德先生 在 10 月 19 日发布的视频《朝鲜小学课文<金爷爷用

石子打掉美国卫星>》，能被发出来，不是“解禁的结果”，而是其本身就处在“开放地带”的结果。其二，二创视频之所以是二创视频，是因为这些视频把朝鲜元素替换为了其它亚文化元素，比如“木叶恩情课文”“柬埔寨恩情课文”“理塘恩情课文”。既然这些视频中连朝鲜元素都没有，它们怎么会是所谓的“朝鲜话题解禁”的结果？

值得注意的是，“恩情课文”没有被@梗指南 收录。这一点，倒是和前述的“听床学”意见相表里，因为如果@梗指南 要收录“恩情课文”梗，他就必须介绍本格的原视频，而这件事可能会让他感到有被“卡审核”的风险——这一可能存在的顾虑和“听床党”的“解禁”论共享了同一套观念，是人们在长期的审查制度下所滋生的“自我审查机制”在作祟。况且，要如何给定一个关于这个“梗”的“梗指南”式的阐释？这可能也会令@梗指南 为难。

我们在这里要做的就是@梗指南 所不敢做的事，即看看“恩情课文”梗的流行到底意味着什么？

我已经指出，两年以来的在中国互联网内的关于所谓“琉球自决问题”的“节奏”，本质上是作为人们关于“佩洛西登岛”这一新闻的创伤的后果而出现的。人们大谈特谈什么“琉球”不属于《波茨坦公告》中所谓的“吾人所决定其他小岛之内”这样的话，仿佛觉得千秋万代里“战胜国集团”中有一个国民忽然不同意起这件事，就代表了“吾人”的意志，这件事就要再议。这样谈论“琉球”的人不认识任何一个冲绳人，也不关心任何一个具体的冲绳人，他们不去想，难道说冲绳人会愿意拿只免签三十多个国家的中国护照，而放弃免签一百三十

个国家还不止的日本护照？——对于冲绳人来说，继续当日本人，最近刚刚可以免签去中国了；跑去当中国人，以后还能去日本吗？

“佩洛西登岛”确乎是一个事件，互联网史学家因为这一天要把中国的历史分为两截——一个著名的段子说：“佩洛西登岛前，喊不打的是‘50万’；佩洛西登岛后，喊打的是‘50万’；佩洛西离岛后，再提起这件事的是‘50万’。”

“佩洛西登岛”之后，台湾议题就不再能够成为疏导人民情绪的公共议题。以至于上个月 19 日至 20 日之间，蔡英文访欧的回程班机飞过了大陆领空的新闻，几乎没有掀起什么讨论。“道心破碎”的人们学会了“自带干粮”——“自带干粮”在一些时候甚至不意味着“和官方口径保持一致”，而意味着自行构造一种叙事来自我说服。就拿这件事来说，国台办的态度是“敦促有关国家恪守‘一个中国原则’，不为散布‘台独’分裂谬论提供任何平台。”然而，自带干粮的中国网民的说辞是：蔡英文既然已经卸任，那么她只是一个台湾的民间人士，台湾民间人士搭乘民航客机飞越大陆领空的事情自可以等闲视之。这并不是一个和官方保持一致的表态，因为它没有向美西方发出“China’s warning”，而只是去争辩何以“蔡英文所搭乘班机飞越大陆领空”不值得成为一个受关注的公共议题。

满足于这种说法的人不会知道，蔡英文的访欧是有台湾现职政要陪同的，比如“中华民国国家安全会议”咨询委员黄重谚。换句话说，倒不如说“蔡英文访欧”是一个专骗这些“自带干粮”、自我说服的人的烟雾弹。难道欧洲议会不是在这一行人的访问之后就通过了“挺台决

议”吗？蔡英文一行人访欧的外交成果不会因为大陆网民的“自带干粮”、自我视而不见，就真的不存在。

把“蔡英文访欧”的讨论限制在“蔡英文所搭乘班机飞越大陆领空”的范围内，再由“自带干粮”者表态要等闲视之这种“小事化了”的操作本身也是一种讽刺。因为，在去年的 9 月，中国互联网内有一个热点议题，讲的是巴沙尔·阿萨德访华往返的航程，是如何绕了又绕。这和蔡英文的航班形成了鲜明的对比。

讲了一通前情提要，现在还是要把话题扯回到“恩情课文”上来。如果说中国互联网内的关于所谓“琉球自决问题”的“节奏”反映出网民在台湾议题上的创伤，那么，“恩情课文”的走红，则反映出网民关于我们自己领袖的一种创伤——这话要说也简单，“恩情课文”中的金正日，是会自我批评的：“但我必须承认，我当时击落卫星的行为太鲁莽了，我在这里向全国人民道歉，我将向全国人民说明情况。”

有网友指出，尽管朝鲜确实存在许多“恩情课文”，如今走红的这篇金正日手扔石子打卫星的“恩情课文”却是不存在的，是世纪之初的百度贴吧网民创作出来的。那么，这就更反映出一些问题：我们的人民从那个时候起，对我们的领袖不会自我批评这件事就有着创伤。

这件事自然不是孤立的。在据传恩情课文制作的时代和今天这两个时间点近乎中间的位置，也就是 2014 年、2015 年前后，辛德勇出版了一本书叫做《制造汉武帝》。《制造汉武帝》中提出了一些和田余庆在 1984 年所发表的论文《论轮台诏》中的观点相左的观点。

而《制造汉武帝》和《论轮台诏》的分歧，简言之，就体现在“轮台诏”是否属于“罪己诏”的问题上。当辛德勇的观点被人们接受为“《轮台诏》并未体现出汉武帝改弦更张的取向以至于谈不上是罪己诏”时，人们感到不适。据辛德勇说，他被告知不应该和已经年迈的田余庆讨论有关问题。年届 90 岁的田余庆在 2014 年的 12 月 25 日就去世了。

“罪己诏”能成词，就说明了中国历史上大抵是有过几篇“罪己诏”的，然而，那些并不著名的罪己诏，大多是在“天人感应”的观念下，为灾异而作的。被认为基于皇帝自己的“穷兵黩武，劳民伤财”而下的罪己诏，《轮台诏》恐怕是唯一的。而如果历史确如辛德勇的观点那样，汉武帝并未改弦更张的话，这也就是说，《轮台诏》不是罪己诏。那么，我们的文化资源里就没有什么足以称道关于统治者的“自我批评”的文化遗产。

看来，弗朗茨·法农是对的，在《全世界受苦的人》中，法农说：“自我批评首先是一种非洲机制。”

由是，从司马光制造汉武帝，到贴吧网友制造“恩情课文”，我们呼唤统治者做“自我批评”这一情结的历史，倒有了差不多一千年。

既然，我们已经在集体无意识里呼唤着统治者做“自我批评”呼唤了一千年，那为什么偏偏在上个月，我们才发现“恩情课文”？原来，这是因为上个月中旬，有一个热搜叫做“金正恩指明朝鲜军事活动方向”（这个热搜据说在 10 月 15 日的时候，在微博热搜榜第一名的位置呆了 50 分钟）。本来，这应该是朝鲜方面针对先前韩国向平壤

用无人机空投传单的事情所作的回应，不过，朝鲜随即却派兵前往俄乌战场，也许这是金正恩的声东而击西。

正是这个热搜让人们再一次把金正恩和我们的领袖——那位指出了二百多个方向的“指明星”——联想到一起去。而正是这又一次的联想，让人们注意到了“恩情课文”。

据说，投入到俄乌战场的朝鲜士兵已经有所伤亡。我们不知道金正恩在未来是否会向他的全国人民道歉，或者，像他安葬玄哲海时那样动情地向这次军援的阵亡者致哀。但我们的心里恐怕都知道，当我们穷尽了“恩情课文”的二创，从乔治·华盛顿到千手扉间都自我批评了一遍之后，“指明星”也不会做自我批评的。