**UNODC Committee History**

From the 1970’s onward, the sweeping use and trafficking of illicit drugs was a growing and hugely broadcasted issue. With the increased worldwide demand of psychoactive drugs in the 1970’s and the responsive increase in drug production in areas in South America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, the United States and other United Nations (UN) member states began to take larger legal actions against drug use (e.g. the “War on Drugs”)[[1]](#footnote-1). The United Nations realized during this time that it lacked an effective body to combat this illicit drug activity. In 1997, the United Nations created the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to help aid in these international issues by merging the two existing committees who had dealt with these matters separately for years, the United Nations Drug Control Programme and the Centre for International Crime Prevention[[2]](#footnote-2). By combining the two bodies, the UNODC was developed to have a more comprehensive scope and cover both individual policy areas, as well as those cases in which drugs and crime overlap. The resulting mandate of the UNODC was created, and remains today, in order to assist Member States in their struggle against illicit drugs, crime, and terrorism[[3]](#footnote-3).

The UNODC employs around 1,500 people and operates in 21 field offices across the world, two liaison offices, and the headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The UNODC is composed of four central departments: the Division for Operations, the Division for Treaty Affairs, the Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs, and the Division for Management. The Office’s work program functions through three pillars in order to assist member states: field-based technical cooperation projects for capacity enhancement, research and analytical work for increased knowledge and understanding, and normative work to assist in the ratification and implementation of applicable international treaties, development of domestic legislation, and substantive services to governing bodies. A huge majority of the UNODC budget, 90%, comes from voluntary member state and private contributions[[4]](#footnote-4).

One of the largest resources generated by the UNODC’s research pillar is the yearly “World Drug Report”, an asset utilized by other UN bodies, domestic governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)[[5]](#footnote-5). The Office also supplies information on international drug markets and prevalence through an online database. UNODC released a Menu of Services in October 2010, which provides a detailed overview of how different clients can access specific assistance, various publications, and online tools available in order to help with: organized crime and trafficking, corruption, crime prevention and criminal justice reform, drug abuse prevention and health, and terrorism prevention[[6]](#footnote-6). The Office also promotes regional and global initiatives and attempts to spread awareness of the issues it addresses through many campaigns, such as the International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, and International Anti-Corruption Day[[7]](#footnote-7). In order to accomplish goals across all aspects of the mandate, the Office collaborates with other relevant UN and international bodies, as well as NGOs[[8]](#footnote-8). This includes the UNODC participation in a joint initiative on drug dependence with the World Health Organization (WHO), the incorporation of the secretariat of the International Narcotic Control Board (INCB), and many others. Furthermore, the UNODC has several of its own branches and task forces for managing specific topics that fall within the scope of the Office.

The Office continues to work addressing these issues in a post-2015 world through aiding in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals[[9]](#footnote-9). In the modern scope, when these transnational issues are becoming more widely acknowledged as threats to both states and individuals, requests for UNODC aid at the regional, national, and transnational levels are growing continuously. The work of the UNODC enhances security and improves the everyday lives of people across the world.

1. **Alternative Development**

**Introduction**

The UNODC is operated through the framework established in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol; the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. The addition of sustainable development to its agenda came with the Political Declaration of 1998, which was adopted as resolution A/RES/S-20/2 under clause 18. This reaffirmed the need for a “comprehensive approach” to the elimination of drug crops as outlined in the Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crop, while stressing the “special importance of cooperation in alternative development, including the better integration of the most vulnerable sectors involved in the illicit drug market into legal and viable economic activities.”


The UNODC’s efforts to promote alternative development focus on countries in which large portions of agrarian labor is employed in the cultivation of illicit crops. Drug crop cultivation tends to arise in poor regions with little infrastructure, and has created an economic dependency in many rural communities. Illicit crop production not only supports the violence, corruption and rights abuses associated with drug trafficking, but further hinders development and food security in the affected regions. Recognizing the allure which the narcotics market holds for many rural farmers, the UNODC partners with member states to help guide them towards more legitimate and stable markets through evidence-based policy, while promoting the strengthening of infrastructure to ensure the economic viability of these alternatives. The UNODC, particularly the CND (Commission on Narcotic Drugs), hopes to curb the detrimental effects of the global drug market by diverting the resources of drug producing regions towards other crops or industries in keeping with the UN’s post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals.

To facilitate international cooperation on these issue of Alternative Development, the UNODC works with international development institutions, such as the World Bank, as well as regional development banks and governments. The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) is a program that was created in partnership between the World Bank and the UNODC to eliminate safe havens for corrupt funds, By working with regional governments and financial institutions, StAR is able to crack down on the laundering of corrupt funds and return stolen assets in an efficient manner. By implementing the Illicit Crop Monitoring Program (ICMP) in the most heavily affected countries, the UNODC is able to work in partnership with local governments, NGO’s and community councils to compile statistics on drug production, markets, and consumption to help in monitoring and making informed policies to combat drug industries.. Furthermore, the UNODC actively facilitates the production and sale of  alternative development products in cooperation with agrarian communities and local governments. Currently the UNODC supports programs for alternative development in six countries; Afghanistan, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Myanmar.

**Case Studies**

*Afghanistan:*

Afghanistan is the lead producer of opium in the world, accounting for 74% in 2012. In 2013 the World Drug Report announced that some 209, 000 hectare (1 hectare being the equivalent of 10,000 square meters) of land were employed in the cultivation of opium poppies, climbing to 224,000 in 2014. In 2015 this number decreased to 183,000 hectares, though the number of poppy-free provinces also decreased from 15 to 14 out of a total of 34 as it was discovered that the province of Balkh contained 204 hectares. Following thirty years of armed conflict, the opium industry stands as yet another obstacle to the economic and social development of Afghanistan. Opium and related products like Heroin compromise health and security across the Middle East, Europe, and both Eastern and Central Asia. The UNODC’s programs in the country have focused on building a counter-narcotic strategy and strengthening provincial capacity drug control through its four sub-programmes. Sub-programme 1: Research, Policy and Advocacy deals with the monitoring of crops and the advocating for the adoption of evidence based policies by the relevant Afghan ministries. Sub-Programme 2: Law Enforcement provides training and advice to Afghan law enforcement agencies on border security, forensics and intelligence based policy, and the ethics and integrity required in enforcing Afghani drug law. Programme 3: Criminal Justice aims to re-establish the rule of law through juvenile justice reform, prison reform, anti-corruption reform, capacity building and anti-human trafficking measures. Programme 4: Health and Livelihoods deals with the needs of those affected by drug dependency and offering alternative livelihoods to the producers of opium. These efforts, in tandem with those of the government of Afghanistan aim to tackle the world’s heroin epidemic at one of its key sources.




*Global Opium Flows, source: UNODC World Drug Report 2010*

*Myanmar:*

The second largest producer of opium in the world is the country of Myanmar. The South-East Asian Opium Survey for 2015 found that 550,500 hectares were employed in the production of opium, of which 500,300 were located in Myanmar’s eastern Shan state. Myanmar had claimed the title of lead opium producer until the 1980’s, when China began pressuring ethnic groups along its border to cease poppy cultivation, forcing the production into the southern regions of the country. In 2006 poppy production in Southeast Asia’s “Golden Triangle” had nearly been eliminated, experiencing an 87% decrease in production; but a combination of the 2008 financial crisis, compounded by pre-existing extreme poverty and civil war turned many farmers back to the comparatively stable market of opiates, bringing production up by 40% by 2009. Due to economic and political instability, many see the cultivation and refinement of opium as the only means of achieving a steady flow of income. However, the rural populations amongst which this industry flourishes are amongst the poorest in Myanmar. The UNODC found that average incomes of households involved in the production of opium made $1,540 annually, whereas their non-producing counterparts made $1,990. In small impoverished communities where there is little to no power or running water, opium is seen by many as the only way to keep food on the table in. The UNODC estimates that roughly 335,000 households in the war-torn Shan and Kachin states are dependent on opium production. As listed on the website of the UNODC’s office in Myanmar, the points of emphasis for efforts in the regions are: tackling the most pressing drug and crime challenges in Myanmar, including the interrelated issues of corruption, weak law enforcement and criminal justice; providing normative services to assist Myanmar in the adaptation of international norms into national legislation and policy; enhancing data collection and analysis to increase knowledge and understanding of drugs and crime issues; and offering specialized expertise at the regional level to address challenges that are often better dealt with using a common regional or sub-regional approach. In addition, the UNODC has witnessed success in its sponsorship of Green Tea production in Myanmar’s Wa and Lahu regions.

*Colombia:*

Today, Colombia ranks amongst the top three producers of cocaine in the world along with Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.  In 2014 Colombia had 69,000 hectares of coca under production, with a projected 52% growth in 2015 according to UN estimates. Colombia has a long and violent history with the cocaine trade, which ramped up during the 1970’s, 80’s and 90’s under the control of groups like the Medellin and Cali cartels. Operating with impunity, the cartels enlisted immense violence along with agricultural, political, and economic resources to build and maintain their multi-billion dollar empires. Joint efforts of the Colombian government and the the American Drug Enforcement Agency have seen some success in the the reduction of crops through aerial spraying. However, the Colombian government's plans to cease the spraying of coca crops for fear of its carcinogenic properties may allow for resurgence in coca cultivation. Furthermore, many of Colombia’s southern regions are controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which holds a place on the EU and U.S State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations. In 2006 U.S federal prosecutors accused fifty of FARC’s leaders for supplying more than half of the world’s cocaine, though Colombian President Santos claimed this statement was exaggerated. Today cocaine remains at the heart of a lucrative yet dangerous trade, which threatens security throughout the world, but disproportionately the Northern and Southern American countries, as well as the members of the EU. The production of cocaine also has negative impact on the environment owing to the rampant deforestation to make room for coca crops. UNODC efforts in the country include the implementation of the Illicit Crop Monitoring Program, and promotion of coca alternatives such as coffee, cocoa, beans, heart of palm, honey, coconuts, dairy products and gourmet sauces through the “products of peace” program. The Forest Warden Families Program, established by the Presidential Programme for Social Action in Colombia, has been working to remedy the environmental impacts of coca production and lead rural households towards alternative methods of development. The program focuses on the voluntary eradication of illicit crops and the recovery of forest in ecologically and socially vulnerable areas.



*Global Cocaine Flows, source: UNODC World Drug Report 2010*

**II. Maritime Crime and Piracy**

***Introduction***

One of the most unique challenges posed to the UNODC and the United Nations is the policing and regulation of international waters, which make up a majority of the planet’s surface area and do not fall under the official jurisdiction of any member state. Because of their ungoverned nature, international waters, also defined as high seas[[10]](#footnote-10) have consistently played host to a diverse array of crimes covered under the jurisdiction of the UNODC. International waters are a focus for the trade of illicit narcotics[[11]](#footnote-11), human trafficking[[12]](#footnote-12) and human smuggling[[13]](#footnote-13), in a variety of locations around the world. International waters also suffer from a dearth of environmental laws and regulations; illegal or unreported fishing (IUU) continues to deplete fishing stocks around the world[[14]](#footnote-14) and ships are estimated to intentionally dump more fuel over the span of three years than the Deepwater Horizon and Exxon Valdez oil spill combined[[15]](#footnote-15). Basic safety regulations are routinely disregarded, and between 2,000 and 6,000 mariners die annually, often from preventable incidents[[16]](#footnote-16). Violent crime, in the form of piracy, vigilantism, and many other forms of violence often goes unreported or unprosecuted at sea beyond states’ borders. In the Western Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and the Gulf of Guinea, more than 5,200 seafarers were attacked and over 500 were taken hostage[[17]](#footnote-17). The prosecution of crime in international waters faces multiple challenges, including the non-static nature of crime scenes and perpetrators (ships often cross oceans and change crews regularly at ports) and the fact that ships can only be prosecuted in the nation of the flag under which they are registered[[18]](#footnote-18).

The UNODC generally considers maritime crime to include not only criminal activity directed towards a vessel or maritime structure, but also any criminal activity that takes place in international waters[[19]](#footnote-19). The United Nations Third Convention on The Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) defined piracy as “(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers or a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).”[[20]](#footnote-20)

***International Framework***

Freedom to travel unhindered on oceans is an early principle in international law, and was reflected in U.S. president Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Point Plan[[21]](#footnote-21). In 1958, the United Nations introduced its first four treaties on the regulation of the high seas at UNCLOS I[[22]](#footnote-22). The Convention on the Continental Shelf established states’ jurisdiction over the seas above the continental shift extending beyond their shore, changing the previous rule that states exercised jurisdiction only a couple of miles off of their coasts[[23]](#footnote-23). The Convention on the High Seas established much of what remains law on the high seas today, including the definition of “high seas” and “piracy”, the freedom to safely navigate, fish and lay undersea cables, the freedom for landlocked states to navigate the oceans, the freedom of vessels from prosecution in a state other than the one under which they fly their flags, the banning of slavery on vessels, and the repression of piracy, amongst many other things[[24]](#footnote-24). The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas intended defined “living resources” and established rules of arbitration and conservation of fish stocks and other ocean based natural resources that were viewed as vulnerable to overfishing[[25]](#footnote-25). With the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, UNCLOS I broadly defined the area of the ocean that states could claim as their territory, but did not establish a specific length from the coast that limits states’ water claims[[26]](#footnote-26). This lack of defined territorial limit would prove an important point in future negotiations.

Following the unproductive UNCLOS II (1960), the UN convened UNCLOS III in 1973, with the intent of establishing concrete definitions of international water borders and other disputes based around the definition of the high seas. The Convention, which lasted 9 years, established the border between international waters and sovereign territory at 12 nautical miles, or 22 kilometers, off the coast of a state[[27]](#footnote-27). The convention also set a contiguous zone where customs, taxation, immigration and pollution laws can be enforced 12 nautical miles beyond territorial waters, as well as several other special designations, including Exclusive Economic Zones and Archipelagic Waters[[28]](#footnote-28).

Much of the United Nations legislation on Maritime Crime and Piracy focuses specifically on regional piracy. Between 2008 and 2011, the UN Security Council (SC) passed 10 resolutions on the protection of vessels from piracy off the coast of the Federal Republic of Somalia, and 2 resolutions in 2011 and 2012 on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea[[29]](#footnote-29). With Security Council Resolution 1851 in 2008, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was established in order to coordinate actions to protect vessels against piracy around the Horn of Africa, including over 60 countries in its efforts[[30]](#footnote-30).

The United Nations and other non-governmental organizations maintain substantial resources to combat or otherwise address maritime crime. The International Chamber of Commerce maintains the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), which operates the IMB Reporting Center, a facility in Kuala Lumpur designed to locate and report piracy to relevant law enforcement[[31]](#footnote-31). The International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is a United Nations organization that intends to provide standard regulations for international maritime transport, created the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, in order to combat piracy, terrorism, stowaways, and other criminal activities within port[[32]](#footnote-32). The IMO also facilitates the Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, also known as the Djibouti Code of Conduct, under which signatories declare their fullest intent to combat piracy and armed robbery against maritime vessels[[33]](#footnote-33).

***UNODC Action***

The centerpiece of the UNODC’s campaign against maritime crime is the UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP)[[34]](#footnote-34). The GCMP developed as a program focused on east Africa, but expanded to become global since it was established in 2008[[35]](#footnote-35). Through the GMCP, the UNODC has developed the Piracy Prosecution Model (PPM), which develops relationships between prosecuting states, which charge suspected pirates, and interdiction forces, which are often of a different country than the prosecuting state[[36]](#footnote-36). The UNODC assists in training judges, prosecutors, prison staff, police, and coast guard officers through its capacity building programs in Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania[[37]](#footnote-37). The Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme (PPTP) transfers consenting detainees from prosecuting countries to prisons within their own nations[[38]](#footnote-38). The Hostage Support Programme helps provide medical support to hostages take during acts of piracy, and serves as a line of communication between a hostage and their family, and has led to the release of victims[[39]](#footnote-39). The UNODC publishes an annual report on the activities of the GCMP, including the most recent 2015 report[[40]](#footnote-40).

***Case Studies***

*Horn of Africa*

Perhaps the most famous focus of pirating and armed maritime violence is the waters around the Horn of Africa, where instability in the Federal Republic of Somalia and deep poverty amongst the crippled subsistence fishing industry has driven piracy to become a large shadow industry, especially given the region’s high volume of shipping traffic[[41]](#footnote-41). However, due to numerous factors, piracy off the coast of Somalia has fallen considerably, from 237 incidents in 2011 to none in 2015[[42]](#footnote-42).

The international community’s success in repressing piracy in East Africa included heavy contributions from resources directed or facilitated by the UNODC. In Somalia, the GCMP has stationed mentors to assist in capacity building and the strengthening of security around the Somali coast[[43]](#footnote-43). Over 2015, the GCMP trained 40 officers in tactical piracy interdiction operations, 10 officers in engineering and engine maintenance, and 12 officers in radio use[[44]](#footnote-44) in the Somaliland region on Somalia. The GCMP maintains similar programs in other regions of the country[[45]](#footnote-45). Off the coast, the GCMP assists in the international effort to repress piracy with the PPM, and within Somalia with the PPTP[[46]](#footnote-46).

*Slavery in South Asia*

While the UNODC has focused much of its work on the interdiction and repression of piracy around the world, many maritime crimes do not involve the direct attack and robbery of unaffiliated vessels. According to the United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP), thousands of Cambodian citizens are annually trafficked to Thailand for the purpose of labor exploitation, many of which end up on long-haul fishing boats that often do not return to shore for up to two years[[47]](#footnote-47). In a 2009 UNIAP survey, out of 50 Cambodians who had worked as forced laborers, 29 said they had witnessed a captain or other officers kill a worker[[48]](#footnote-48), and in media reports, the workers describe brutality and a complete dearth of any sort of accountability for the actions of leadership[[49]](#footnote-49).

The UNODC has done relatively little in the work to suppress forced labor in international waters. The Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which gives the UNODC the mandate to assist in the prevention of human trafficking, specifically with its Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, as well as its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, would justify the UNODC taking action on this form of maritime crime[[50]](#footnote-50).

*Environmental Crime*

The lack of enforceability of safety and environmental regulations in international waters also has a strong effect on the environment. Between 10 and 15 percent of vessels globally are estimated to illegally dump fuel and petroleum based waste in the ocean, or around 5,000 to 7,500 vessels[[51]](#footnote-51). 810,000 tons of oily waste is deposited in the ocean, intentionally and unintentionally, annually, with significant ramifications on all levels of the ocean ecosystem[[52]](#footnote-52). IUU Fishing is estimated to result in fishery losses at a cost between $10 and $23 billion dollars per year, at a time when 75 percent of ocean fisheries are estimated to be depleted beyond sustainable use[[53]](#footnote-53). Illegal fishing is recognized by the General Assembly to be linked to transnational organized crime, and vessels associated with IUU are often also associated with other organized crime activities, such as human trafficking globally and narcotics trafficking in North America and Europe[[54]](#footnote-54).

Significant contributors to the fight against IUU and other forms of ocean pollution include regional fisheries management organizations, such as the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, which works to identify vessels that do not comply with international tuna regulations[[55]](#footnote-55). However, the difficulty of locating and prosecuting perpetrators, the increasing socio-political impact of depleted fisheries, and ingrained cultural norms all constitute significant challenges to the further mitigation of IUU fishing[[56]](#footnote-56). There is currently no agreement that addresses the discharge of oil as a transnational crime[[57]](#footnote-57).

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