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SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR SECURING CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MATERIAL

Abstract

A method for operating secure computer processes includes storing a local encryption key in a register of a processor. The local encryption key is stored in a masked state. The method further includes receiving, from a memory communicating with the processor, an operational encryption key. The method includes encrypting the operational encryption key using the local encryption key and an initialization vector to generate an encrypted operation key. The local encryption key is unmasked prior to encrypting the operational encryption key. Further, the method includes storing the encrypted operational key, the initialization vector, and a verification hash value in the memory. The method includes decryption of symmetric operational keys directly to processor registers without using memory. The method includes decryption of asymmetric operational keys. In the method, the asymmetric key material is decrypted temporarily to memory and that memory is sanitized following the use of the key.

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Background/Summary

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS [0001] This application claims the benefit of priority of U.S. provisional application No. 63/552,987, filed Feb. 13, 2024, titled "SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR SECURING CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MATERIAL," the entire contents of which are herein incorporated by reference.

FIELD
[0002] The present disclosure relates to cryptography, and more particularly, to securing cryptographic keys and materials from a large range of attack vectors.
BACKGROUND
[0003] Current computing systems and methods utilize cryptography as a security measure. However, current systems and methods are tailored to specific attack vectors and do not allow for broad protection against threats. Specifically, current systems and methods are vulnerable to memory safety issues and side-channel attacks that exploit caches and memory.
[0004] As can be seen, there is a need for cryptographic security systems and methods that can protect against a broad range of attack vectors.
SUMMARY
[0005] In one aspect of the present disclosure, a method for operating secure computer processes includes storing a local encryption key in a register of a processor. The local encryption key is stored in a masked state. The method further includes receiving, from a memory communicating with the processor, an operational encryption key. The method includes encrypting the operational encryption key using the local encryption key and an initialization vector to generate an encrypted operation key. The local encryption key is unmasked prior to encrypting the operational encryption key. Further, the method includes storing the encrypted operational key, the initialization vector, and a verification hash value in the memory. Additionally, the method includes removing the operational encryption key from the memory.
[0006] In aspects, the method includes decryption of symmetric operational keys directly to processor registers without using memory. The method also includes using the operational symmetric keys from within the registers directly to perform encryption/decryption on data-preventing the plaintext operational key from being in memory. Thus, the symmetric keys are never put in memory in plaintext following the initial encryption with the local encryption key. In aspects, the method includes decryption of asymmetric key. In the method, the asymmetric key material is decrypted temporarily to memory and that memory is sanitized following the use of the key-limiting the time that the plaintext key is in memory.

Description

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0007] FIG. **1** is a block diagram of a secure key cryptographic library, according to aspects of the present disclosure;
[0008] FIG. **2** is a flow diagram of an initialization/utilization of a secure key cryptographic library, according to aspects of the present disclosure;
[0009] FIG. **3** is a flow diagram of key management functions including key initialization, according to aspects of the present disclosure;

[0010] FIG. **4** is a flow diagram of key management functions including symmetric key encryption, according to aspects of the present disclosure;

[0011] FIG. **5** is a flow diagram of key management functions including symmetric key decryption, according to aspects of the present disclosure;

[0012] FIG. **6** is a flow diagram of key management functions including asymmetric key encryption, according to aspects of the present disclosure;

[0013] FIG. **7** is a flow diagram of key management functions including asymmetric key decryption, according to aspects of the present disclosure;

[0014] FIG. **8** is a flow diagram of shielding an instruction set of a processor, according to aspects of the present disclosure; and

[0015] FIG. **9** is a flow diagram of vector packet processing, according to aspects of the present disclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DISCLOSURE

[0016] The following detailed description is of the best currently contemplated modes of carrying out exemplary embodiments of the disclosure. The description is not to be taken in a limiting sense but is made merely for the purpose of illustrating the general principles of the disclosure, since the scope of the disclosure is best defined by the appended claims.

[0017] As stated above, current systems and methods for cryptographic prevention of attacks on computing systems are specifically tailored to address known attack vectors. Even more, because current systems store cryptographic keys in memory, they are vulnerable to memory safety issues and side-channel attacks.

[0018] Broadly, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a system and methods for providing broad-based protection using a secure key library functionality, according to aspects of the current disclosure. The secure key library has been designed with security at the core. To that end, the secure key library incorporates numerous novel security features that have not previously been incorporated into other commercially available cryptographic libraries. The goal is to not just protect against a few specific attack vectors, but to protect against a broad range of attacks that are exploitable on other libraries. The secure key library enables securing key material and private data to a higher level than any other offering on the market while achieving similar performance.

[0019] The base architecture of the library protects key material by encrypting and authenticating keys using an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with Galois Counter Mode (GCM), for example, AES-256-GCM with a root key called the Local Unique Key (LUK). The library uses isolated cryptographic threads to process requests and only these threads possess (access) the LUK and are capable of decrypting protected keys. The LUK is held securely inside processor registers, and it is not stored in memory or caches after it has been initialized. The crypto threads perform a limited set of functions and all input to the threads is regulated by library function calls. In this way, the most sensitive security parameters are protected and isolated from the application that uses the secure key library.

[0020] In embodiments, the systems and methods include the decryption of symmetric operational keys directly to processor registers without using memory. The systems and methods include using the operational symmetric keys from within the registers directly to perform encryption/decryption on data-preventing the plaintext operational key from being in memory. As such, the symmetric keys are never put in memory in plaintext following the initial encryption with the local encryption key. In embodiments, the systems and methods include decryption of asymmetric key. In the systems and methods, the asymmetric key material is decrypted temporarily to memory and that memory is sanitized following the use of the key-limiting the time that the plaintext key is in memory.

[0021] Referring now to FIGS. **1-9**, FIG. **1** illustrates a block diagram of an embodiment of a Secure Key Cryptographic Library (SKCL) **100**. While FIG. **1** illustrates examples of components of SKCL **100**, additional components can be added and existing components can be removed

and/or modified.

[0022] The SKCL **100** can include several functional modules that perform the cryptographic process described herein. The modules can include software, hardware and/or a combination of both to perform the described functionality. The SKCL **100** includes a Multi-Thread Secure Key Cryptographic Library (MTSKCL) **102**. The MTSKCL **102** can include the functionality to isolate cryptographic threads to process requests and only these threads possess a Local Unique key (LUK) and can be capable of decrypting protected keys. The crypto threads of the MTSKCL **102** can perform a limited set of functions and all input to these threads can be regulated by library function calls. Advantageously, the most sensitive security parameters can be protected and isolated from the application that uses the SKCL **100**.

[0023] The SKCL **100** also includes an AES Core module **104**, a Key Protections Module (KPM) **106**, an Authentication and Signatures Module (ASM) **108**, an Integrity Verification Module (IVM) **110**, a Key Exchange Module (KEM) **112**, and a Random Number Generator Module (RNGM) **114**. The AES Core module **104** can provide the functionality to perform encryption and decryption. In embodiments, the AES Core module **104** can perform AES-256 GCM encryption/decryption for the crypto threads. The KPM **106** can provide the functionality to encrypt/decrypt key material using the LUK, for example, AES-256 encryption/decryption key materials and processes. The ASM **108** can provide the functionality to perform Elliptic Curve, for example, an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), and Public-key, for example, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), cryptography using library function calls, for example, Open Secure Socket Layer (OpenSSL). The decryption key, i.e., private key, for the public-key system can be protected utilizing the KPM **106**, providing an extra-layer of security.

[0024] The IVM **110** can provide the functionality to perform Known Answer Tests (KATs) for algorithms and memory integrity validations. The KATs can measure and verify the signature of executable memory in RAM, which advantageously protects processed keys from hardware and software failures, including: memory corruption attack, return-oriented programming attacks and Jump-oriented programming attacks. The KEM **112** can provide the functionality to perform key generation utilizing variations of Diffie-Hellman, for example, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman and/or Diffie-Hellman key exchange, utilizing library function calls, for example, OpenSSL. In an embodiment, once the KEM **112** performs key exchange, private keys are protected using the KPM **106**.

[0025] The RNGM **114** can provide the functionality of generating non-deterministic random bits utilizing hardware and software components. For example, known functions that utilize variations in processing such as jitter, or noise, as well as Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) can be used to generate non-deterministic random bits. In an embodiment, the jitterentropy library **116** can be used by the RNGM **114** to generate non-deterministic random bits. In some embodiments, the jitterentropy library **116** used for random number generation can be compliant with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-90A, SP 800-90B, and SP 800-90C.

[0026] FIG. **2** illustrates a flow diagram for initialization/utilization of the SKCL **100**. While FIG. **2** illustrates examples of components and data processes of the SKCL **100**, additional components can be added and existing components and data processes can be removed and/or modified.

[0027] The SKCL **100** can be initialized when linked by an application process. Specifically, at data flow **202**, input data **250** from a user thread **252** can be sent to the SKCL **100**. A public functions process **254** can act to segregate the input data **250** from the rest (other modules and processes) of the SKCL **100**, thereby minimizing a potential attack surface. At data flow **204**, the public functions process **254** can provide the input data **250** to a work queue **258**, which can provide the input data **250** to one or more cryptographic threads **260** at data flow **206**.

[0028] In embodiments, upon first use of cryptographic operations by the process, multiple threads **260** can be created. Runtime environment variables control the number of threads created for

cryptographic processing while, for example, two threads are always created for library monitoring **280** and signal handling **282**. The SKCL **100** can be configured for secure redundancy, and in this case a crypto thread (1, 1) can be paired with another duplicate crypto thread (1, 2) that can run identical cryptographic operations, at data flow **206**. The redundant threads can share a common thread used for data verification processes **262**, which occurs at data flow **208**. If the SKCL **100** is not configured for secure redundancy the data flow **208** can be omitted and the crypto thread **260** will copy the output data directly to the requested output buffer at data flow **210**. The number of threads used by the SKCL **100** can be controlled by a user and the process that launches the application by setting environment variables. Some instances may require just a single thread, while other applications like high speed data-plane encryption can optimize the number of threads based on the available resources and other processes running on the system. In embodiments, the SKCL **100** allows for a configurable number of crypto threads based on the use-case.

[0029] FIG. **3** illustrates a flow diagram of an embodiment of key protection for keys utilized for encryption, according to aspects of the disclosure. While FIG. **3** illustrates examples of components and data processes of the SKCL **100**, additional components can be added and existing components and data processes can be removed and/or modified.

[0030] The initialization of the Local Unique Key (LUK) can be performed by every thread used for cryptographic processing, for example, the crypto threads as described in FIG. **2**. The LUK can be a root key used to directly encrypt or derive child keys and/or used to encrypt other keys secured by the SKCL **100**. Erasure of the LUK from cryptographic thread registers is sufficient for zeroization of the SKCL **100**.

[0031] In embodiments, the LUK initialization data flow **300** can begin when a random number seed **352** can be generated and sent to a logic operation **360**, at data flow **302**. The random number seed can be stored in a memory **350**. At data flow **304**, a LUK mask **354** can be generated and sent to the logic operation **360**. In an embodiment, the random number seed **354** and the LUK mask **354** can be generated using non-deterministic random number generators, can be a 256-bits in length, and the logic operation **360** can be an exclusive-or (XOR). At data flow **306**, the seed **352** and the LUK mask **354** are mixed utilizing the logical operation **360** to generate a Masked LUK **362**, which can be stored in local non-memory registers **380**. For example, the registers **380** can be registers of one or more processors. After initialization of all threads, the seed **352** is zeroed out to prevent an attack surface for discovering the Masked LUK **362**. The LUK mask **354** can be saved in private memory, for example, a private area of memory **350**, so as to be able to recreate the Masked LUK **362**, when required.

[0032] FIG. **4** illustrates a flow diagram of an embodiment to encrypt a symmetric key, according to aspects of the disclosure. While FIG. **4** illustrates examples of components and data processes of the SKCL **100**, additional components can be added and existing components and data processes can be removed and/or modified.

[0033] The key encryption process **400** begins at step **402** where a LUK Initialization Vector (LUK IV) **452**, or counter, can be incremented and can be loaded from a memory, e.g., the memory **350**, into AES Core **104**. At step **404**, a plaintext key **454** can also be loaded into AES Core **104**.

[0034] At step **406**, a LUK **470** can be reconstituted and can be used to encrypt the plaintext key **454** at AES Core **104**. For example, the masked LUK **362**, stored in the registers **380**, can be unmasked to access the LUK **470**. The plaintext key **454** can be encrypted using an AES GCM algorithm **480**. As such, the LUK **470** is not in plaintext until it is needed for encryption, e.g., it is masked using some piece from memory and some piece from registers (split). In some embodiments, the LUK **470** can be masked using XOR with random data. In some embodiments, the LUK **470** can be masked using different masking techniques (e.g., hash-based masking).

[0035] At step **408**, the encrypted ciphertext key **456**, a GHASH **458** and LUK IV **452** can be stored to a memory, e.g., the memory **350**, and the plaintext key **454** can be zeroed to prevent an attack surface. GHASH **458** is the mechanism AES-GCM uses for integrity verification. The

GHASH is written to a memory, e.g., the memory **350**, as part of AES-GCM encryption (it is 128-bits) and is used by the SKCL **100** to verify the key when it is later decrypted. The GHASH **458** is used as an integrity check to make sure the memory **350** contents of the encrypted key **456** have not been modified.

[0036] FIG. **5** illustrates a flow diagram of an embodiment to decrypt a symmetric key, according to aspects of the disclosure. While FIG. **5** illustrates examples of components and data processes of the SKCL **100**, additional components can be added and existing components and data processes can be removed and/or modified.

[0037] The symmetric encryption/decryption process **500** can begin at step **502** where the encrypted ciphertext key **456** can be retrieved from a memory, e.g., the memory **350**, and can be loaded into the AES Core **104**. At step **504**, the LUK **470** can be reconstituted and can be used to perform AES Decryption process **550** on the encrypted ciphertext key **456** to form a plaintext key **454**. For example, the masked LUK **362**, stored in the registers **380**, can be unmasked to access the LUK **470**. The plaintext key **454** can be encrypted using an AES GCM algorithm **480**.

[0038] At step **506**, the plaintext key **454** can be temporarily stored into a different set of registers, for example, the registers **380**. In embodiments, the plaintext key **454** is never stored to the memory **350**. At step **508**, the plaintext key **454** can be loaded into an encryption process **560** and, at step **510**, input data **570** can be loaded into the encryption process **560**. The encryption process **560** uses the key from registers and specifically does not store or use the plaintext key **454** from memory. The plaintext key **454** can be used to encrypt the input data **570** using an AES GCM algorithm. At step **512**, output data **572**, which is encrypted, can be formed and output to a memory, e.g., the memory **350**.

[0039] While the symmetric encryption/decryption process **500** is described as encrypting the input data **570**, in embodiments, the symmetric encryption/decryption process **500** can be used to decrypt the input data **570** if it was previously encrypted with the plaintext key **454**.

[0040] FIG. **6** illustrates a flow diagram of an embodiment to encrypt an asymmetric private key, according to aspects of the disclosure. While FIG. **6** illustrates examples of components and data processes of the SKCL **100**, additional components can be added and existing components and data processes can be removed and/or modified.

[0041] Key encryption process **600** begins at step **602** where a Key Encryption Key Initialization Vector (KEK IV) **652** can be loaded from a memory, e.g., the memory **350**, into the AES Core **104**. At step **604**, a plaintext private key **654** can also be loaded from a memory, e.g., the memory **350**, into the AES Core **104**. At step **606**, a unique key encryption key (KEK) **656** can be loaded from registers, e.g., the registers **380**, into the AES Core **104**.

[0042] At step **608**, the plaintext private key **654** can be encrypted using the KEK IV **652** and the unique KEK **656**. The encrypted private key **658** can then be stored to a memory, e.g., the memory **350**, with the KEK IV **652** and a GHASH **660**. As part of step **608**, the plaintext private key **654** can be zeroed to prevent an attack surface. The KEK **656** is a key generated by the SKCL library **100** itself (using random number generator) and can be used for AES-256-GCM encryption of the Asymmetric Private key. The KEK **656** is itself encrypted as described in FIG. **4** (Symmetric Key Encryption). The encrypted private key **658** is written to a memory, e.g., the memory **350**, (along with the parameters needed to decrypt it in the future) which includes the KEK IV and a reference to the encrypted KEK.

[0043] That is, the LUK is used to encrypt the KEK **656** (which is referenced in FIG. **4**), and the KEK **656** is used to encrypt the private Key as shown in **600**. When SKCL **100** is used to encrypt a Private Key, first the library generates a random AES key (the KEK) and encrypts that with the LUK (the master key). Then the KEK is used to encrypt the plaintext private key, e.g., LUK.fwdarw.encrypts AES KEK.fwdarw.encrypts Private Key

[0044] FIG. **7** illustrates a flow diagram of an embodiment to decrypt an asymmetric key, according to aspects of the disclosure. While FIG. **7** illustrates examples of components and data

processes of the SKCL **100**, additional components can be added and existing components and data processes can be removed and/or modified. Additionally, while FIG. **7** illustrates examples of asymmetric key protection, this method can be used to protect generic data of varying length or any general secret or data that is to be protected in memory. The SKCL **100** can be used to encrypt data using SKCL **100** protected AES keys. The data can be decrypted by SKCL **100**, used by the process, and memory can be sanitized after processing has completed.

[0045] An unillustrated aspect of the mechanism of FIG. **7** can be that a LUK has been initialized at some time prior to execution of the data flow of FIG. **7**. The decryption process **700** begins at step **702** where an encrypted private key **750**. The encrypted private key **750** can be stored with an Initialization Vector, GHASH, (as described above with reference to FIG. **6**) and encrypted data, can be loaded into the AES Core **104**.

[0046] At step **704**, a context key **752**, for example, the KEK described above with reference to FIG. **6**, preferably previously decrypted, can be loaded from registers, e.g., the registers **380**, into AES Core **104** and can be used to decrypt the encrypted private key **750**. In an embodiment, GHASH verification is performed during step **704**. As part of AES-GCM decryption a GHASH is generated and this must match the input GHASH (calculated when it was encrypted) to verify the integrity of the decrypted data.

[0047] At step **706**, the decrypted private key **754** can be stored in a memory, e.g., the memory **350**. At step **708**, a signature generation process **780** can utilize the decrypted private key to perform key exchange and signature generation with input data **770**. In an embodiment, the signature generation process **780** can be OpenSSL. At step **710**, the signature generation process **780** can write output data **772** to a memory, e.g., the memory **350**. For example, the output data **772** can be a digital signature of the input data **770**. ECDSA or RSA may use the private key along with the input data to generate a digital signature (the output data). Likewise, the private key can also be used for other things like key exchange, or in the case of RSA for decryption. Once the process is complete the decrypted private key **754** can be cleared from memory to prevent an attack surface.

[0048] FIG. **8** is an illustration of an embodiment of processor instruction set shielding, according to aspects of the present disclosure. While FIG. **8** illustrates examples of components and data processes of the SKCL **100**, additional components can be added and existing components and data processes can be removed and/or modified.

[0049] The shielding introduces "dummy" operations, or random noise variances, into normal algorithm flow to provide cover, i.e. mask, true encryption operations. Advantageously, the shielding can mitigate side channel disclosure of data and key material due to timing, power, thermal, acoustic, and electromagnetic radiation analysis. The exemplary shielding method **800** begins at step **802** where encryption block operations can be called from AES Core **104**. At step **804**, a compression round is started where a register is filled with random bits due to process noise can be shifted and checked against a pre-defined mask. Furthermore at step **804**, a result of the check between the random bits register and mask can yield a result, preferably zero or non-zero.

[0050] The method **800** proceeds to step **806** if the result of the check is non-zero, where a dummy operation can be introduced using noise for instruction set operations. The method proceeds to step **808** if the result of the check is zero, then no dummy operation can be added. At step **810**, it is determined whether the encryption cycle is complete, and if not, the flow returns to **804**. In an embodiment, dummy operations can use the noise register as input for a single operation, where the output is also stored to the noise register, effectively stirring the random register each time it is used.

[0051] FIG. **9** is an illustration of an embodiment of vector packet processing, according to aspects of the present disclosure. While FIG. **9** illustrates examples of components and data processes of the SKCL **100**, additional components can be added and existing components and data processes can be removed and/or modified.

[0052] Vectorization has been shown to improve performance in applications making optimal use

of modern processor architectures and caching mechanisms. Vector processing process **900** begins at step **902** where encryption operations **950**, e.g., AES op 1, AES Op 2 . . . . AES Op N, stored in a memory, e.g., the memory **350** can be combined into an array of encryption operations by an application and provided to a vector sorting mechanism. The vector sorting mechanism can take the array and sort the operations into groups that use the same key.

[0053] At step **904**, each grouping of operations **950** that use the same key can be sent to the AES core **104**, serially, on the same cryptographic thread for performing decryption operations. At step **906**, a group operation key **952** can be decrypted using the LUK and temporarily held in the AES core **104** registers, e.g., the registers **380**. Furthermore, the decrypted key can be cached in registers, e.g., the registers **380**, while processing the entire group of packets that use it. Advantageously, this can improve performance as normal operations require a full key decryption process to occur before the requested operation is performed.

[0054] At step **910**, the decrypted key can be zeroed from registers, e.g., the registers **380**, after the last operation using that key is completed to prevent an attack surface. At step **912**, all operations can be completed for the entire vector input and the output can be available to the calling thread which can be waiting for the result.

[0055] The novel system and methods include additional functions to support, monitoring, verification, and validation, and are further described below. The mechanism to isolate memory for use by the SKCL **100** is described. Following initialization, the library can allocate a pool of memory that can be private to the SKCL **100** and can be accessible by internal library methods. Next, caller operations can be received, and memory can be allocated from the private memory pool and caller input data can be copied to the private memory buffer. Output buffers can then be reserved from a different memory pool. All library cryptographic operations can be performed using the private memory input and output buffers, protecting against buffer overflow and memory corruption that may result from caller managed memory. Library private output data can be copied to the caller output buffer following successful processing and ensuring only finalized data is returned. After the memory isolated operation has completed, all library private memory can be sanitized and returned to the private memory pool.

[0056] A mechanism to isolate and protect the SKCL **100** memory used to store security parameter data is described. Following the SKCL **100** initialization, the SKCL **100** can allocate private memory used to store security parameters which can include encrypted keys. When the SKCL **100** stores a security parameter to memory it can allocate memory from the private key pool and return an opaque reference to the caller. The opaque data structure can have limited information about the security parameter and can include an index, cryptographic hash, and usage information. Caller operations can reference the security parameter using the opaque pointer, and the library can validate the cryptographic hash and usage permissions before using the security parameter. These checks can be used to verify that the caller has permissions to use the security parameter and that the data has not been modified to prevent an attack surface. When requested or upon library termination, the SKCL **100** can securely zeroize the memory used to hold security parameters that have been created throughout the lifetime of the library.

[0057] A mechanism to generate non-deterministic random bits using both hardware and software-based entropy is described below. Once the SKCL **100** has been initialized, a processor instruction can be used to generate **64** random bits at a time which can be stored in a buffer until the requested number of bytes is reached. In an embodiment, the processor instruction can come from the x86 line of instructions, and can be an RDRAND instruction. A software library for generating process noise can then be used to generate random bits in a buffer until the requested number of bytes is reached. In an embodiment, the SKCL **100** is the jitterentropy library. Finally, the outputs from the processor instruction and software library can be combined, using a logical operation, into the request output buffer. In an embodiment the logical operation is an exclusive-OR (XOR). After the process is complete the random bit buffer are zeroed to prevent an attack surface.

[0058] In one example, a mechanism to provide Trusted Execution Environment integration and protections for the SKCL **100** is described. The SKCL **100** can use certificate-based signature verification to verify platform integrity and security settings. In an embodiment, AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Secure Nested Paging (SNP) can be used. Once the SKCL **100** has been initialized, but before cryptographic operations can be performed and when enabled by configuration settings, the library can perform processor security verification on supported platforms. The SKCL **100** can request a system attestation report to be generated by a secure processor. An operating system kernel can perform operations involving a Host Hypervisor (e.g., KVM) and system security processor platform to generate the attestation report. The SKCL **100** can read data results from the operating system kernel and can perform signature verifications. A certificate chain including certificate authority (CA) and Root CA can be built into the library executable, a Versioned Chip Endorsement Key (VCEK) can be provided in a file format at runtime using environment variables to supply the filename. Finally, If the system attestation report passes verification, then the SKCL **100** can be allowed to perform operational Cryptographic operations. In an embodiment, the process can be repeated during runtime periodically as part of the continuous Monitoring thread.

[0059] In one example, a mechanism to provide novel memory integrity verifications is described. Memory integrity checks can be performed as part of Power On Self-Test (POST) and continually during runtime within the monitor thread. Memory integrity checks can include a SHA-384 hash over all of the executable memory in RAM that can be part of the core cryptographic code, and also an ECDSA-384 signature check over the hash. In this way memory corruption can be detected using cryptographically strong algorithms. Prior to integrity verification, compile time measurements of the SKCL **100** can be taken and a SHA-384 hash+ECDSA-384 signature can be generated. A Public key for the Integrity signature can be stored in the executable image and/or provided at runtime. Once a library constructor is called, Power On Self-Test initiates memory integrity verifications. The SKCL **100** can call commands to locate the memory address used to hold the executable memory. The SKCL **100** can read the memory from RAM and can generate a SHA-384 hash using OpenSSL functions. The SHA-384 hash can be verified to match the one that was calculated at compile time. The SHA-384 hash value can be used as input to an ECDSA-384 signature verification OpenSSL function along with the hardcoded image signing Public Key. Both the Hash and the signature verification must pass to continue power on self-test. These steps are repeated continuously as part of the monitor thread processing.

[0060] In one example, a mechanism used to monitor system health and verify algorithm correctness by performing self-tests and algorithm known answer tests (KAT) is described. The monitor thread can run continuously and can perform KATs and self-tests on a periodic basis. Any failure can result in termination of the crypto library process. Once a SKCL **100** is initialized, a Monitor Thread can wake and perform an incremental self-test. First, a memory integrity check can be performed, described above. Next, Known Answer Tests can be performed to validate algorithm correctness. Known Answer Test operations can be input into the crypto thread queues as all normal input is and no indication is made that these are for the purpose of self-tests. An output can be verified to pass the self-test, statistics can be gathered and updated, and monitor thread can sleep for a set amount of time. Finally, monitor thread can run periodically until the SKCL **100** is terminated.

[0061] A mechanism to provide novel software fail safety and fatal signal handling is described. Once a SKCL **100** is called, signal handlers can be installed for all fatal signals on each thread that the library creates. Non-fatal signals can be masked in all threads except the signal handling thread. The signal handling thread can be created to listen for all signals. When a signal is delivered to the process the signal thread can wake up and can process the signal. Fatal signals can indicate a failure condition has been encountered and the SKCL **100** can be securely terminated as follows: secure termination of threads can be performed by installing a thread cancellation handler at thread startup

which can unconditionally sanitize the registers used to hold security parameters upon thread termination; when a thread is terminated the cleanup function can be called and a thread local counter can be incremented to indicate sanitization has completed on the thread; the signal handler thread can wait for all other threads to terminate and sanitize fully before exiting; and finally, proof of sanitization can be saved in a file. After exit, the SKCL **100** threads can be terminated and all protected key material can be rendered safe since the LUK and other security parameters are cleared.

[0062] It should be understood, of course, that the foregoing relates to exemplary embodiments of the disclosure and that modifications may be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the disclosure as set forth in the following claims.

Claims

1. A method for operating secure computer processes, comprising: storing a local encryption key in one or more registers of a processor, wherein the local encryption key is stored in a masked state; receiving, from a memory of a computing device communicating with the processor, an operational encryption key; encrypting the operational encryption key using the local encryption key and an initialization vector to generate an encrypted operational key, wherein the local encryption key is unmasked prior to encrypting the operational encryption key; storing the encrypted operational key, the initialization vector, and a verification hash value in the memory; and removing the operational encryption key from the memory.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: receiving, from the memory, input data to be encrypted and the encrypted operational key; decrypting the encrypted operational key to recover the operational encryption key; storing the operational encryption key in the one or more registers of the processor, and encrypting the input data using the operational encryption key.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the operational encryption key is a symmetric key and the operational encryption key is never stored in the memory of the computing device.

4. The method of claim 2, further comprising: decrypting a private key of an asymmetric key pair using the operational encryption key, wherein the private key is temporarily stored in the memory of the computing device, and the memory of the computing device is sanitized after the use of the private key.

5. The method of claim 4, further comprising: generating one or more digital signatures using the private key.

6. The method of claim 1, further comprising: generating a random number seed; and performing a logical combination function on the random number seed and a mask to generate the local encryption key in a masked state.

7. A method for operating secure computer processes, comprising: receiving, from a memory of a computing device communicating with a processor, an operational encryption key that is encrypted; decrypting the operational encryption key using a local encryption key stored in one or more registers of the processor; maintaining the operational encryption key, which was decrypted, in the one or more registers of the processor, wherein the operational encryption key is never stored in the memory of the computing device; receiving input data to be encrypted or decrypted using the operational encryption key; and encrypting or decrypting the input data using the operational encryption key of one or more registers of the processor.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein the input data is a private key of an asymmetric key pair.

9. The method of claim 7, wherein the local encryption key is masked when stored in the one or more registers of the processor.

10. A computer system for encrypting data, comprising: a memory; and a processor coupled to the memory and comprising one or more registers, wherein the processor is configured to execute instructions to perform a method comprising: receiving, from the memory, an operational

encryption key that is encrypted, decrypting the operational encryption key using a local encryption key stored in the one or more registers, maintaining the operational encryption key, which was decrypted, in the one or more registers of the processor, wherein the operational encryption key is never stored in the memory, receiving input data to be encrypted or decrypted using the operational encryption key, and encrypting or decrypting the input data using the operational encryption key of the one or more registers.

11. A computer readable medium storing instructions for causing a processor to perform a method, the method comprising: receiving, from a memory of a computing device communicating with the processor, an operational encryption key that is encrypted; decrypting the operational encryption key using a local encryption key stored in one or more registers of the processor; maintaining the operational encryption key, which was decrypted, in the one or more registers of the processor, wherein the operational encryption key is never stored in the memory of the computing device; receiving input data to be encrypted or decrypted using the operational encryption key; and encrypting or decrypting the input data using the operational encryption key of one or more registers of the processor.