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Figure 1





Figure 2



Transaction
from Alice to Bob



Validated by running: Alice's locking script (from output of Tx_0), together with Alice's unlocking script (as input to Tx_1). This checks that Tx_1 meets the condition(s) defined in Alice's locking script.


Figure 3



Figure 4

Figure 5

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**CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY LINKED
IDENTITIES****CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED
APPLICATIONS**

This application is the U.S. National Stage of International Application No. PCT/IB2020/057766 filed on Aug. 18, 2020, which claims the benefit of United Kingdom Patent Application No. 1913318.0, filed on Sep. 16, 2019, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference in their entireties.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present disclosure relates to methods for linking first and second parties using cryptographic public-private key pairs and for verifying that link. In particular, the methods enable a first party to prove that their public-private key pair is cryptographically linked with the second party's public-private key pair.

BACKGROUND

A blockchain refers to a form of distributed data structure, wherein a duplicate copy of the blockchain is maintained at each of a plurality of nodes in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. The blockchain comprises a chain of blocks of data, wherein each block comprises one or more transactions. Each transaction may point back to a preceding transaction in a sequence which may span one or more blocks. Transactions can be submitted to the network to be included in new blocks by a process known as "mining", which involves each of a plurality of mining nodes competing to perform "proof-of-work", i.e. solving a cryptographic puzzle based on a pool of the pending transactions waiting to be included in blocks.

Conventionally the transactions in the blockchain are used to convey a digital asset, i.e. data acting as a store of value. However, a blockchain can also be exploited in order to layer additional functionality on top of the blockchain. For instance, blockchain protocols may allow for storage of additional user data in an output of a transaction. Modern blockchains are increasing the maximum data capacity that can be stored within a single transaction, enabling more complex data to be incorporated. For instance this may be used to store an electronic document in the blockchain, or even audio or video data.

Each node in the network can have any one, two or all of three roles: forwarding, mining and storage. Forwarding nodes propagate transactions throughout the nodes of the network. Mining nodes perform the mining of transactions into blocks. Storage nodes each store their own copy of the mined blocks of the blockchain. In order to have a transaction recorded in the blockchain, a party sends the transaction to one of the nodes of the network to be propagated. Mining nodes which receive the transaction may race to mine the transaction into a new block. Each node is configured to respect the same node protocol, which will include one or more conditions for a transaction to be valid. Invalid transactions will not be propagated nor mined into blocks. Assuming the transaction is validated and thereby accepted onto the blockchain, the additional user data will thus remain stored at each of the nodes in the P2P network as an immutable public record.

Identity management and verification is critical in many business-to-business and business-to-consumer communications in order to avoid problems such as money laundering,

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identity theft, and corruption. However, it is not always possible to directly confirm the identity of a party (e.g. an individual or a business). Instead, trust in a party can be ascertained through verified information and endorsements from a trusted third party. That way, even anonymous peers can establish enough trust to communicate sensitive information. One such example of this is transport layer security (TLS) certificates which provide security over the internet.

SUMMARY

Blockchains provide a form of identification via public keys and addresses. These public keys and addresses are unique within the blockchain address space and as such are unique to an individual blockchain user. However, the keys and addresses do not reveal information about that user's identity and are usually insufficient to comply with regulations, e.g. know your customer (KYC) regulations. In addition, blockchain keys and addresses typically do not interface with non-blockchain systems, which is required if blockchains are to be widely used and integrated within enterprise systems.

According to one aspect disclosed herein, there is provided a computer-implemented method of linking a first party and a second party, the method being performed by the first party and comprising: obtaining a first cryptographic public-private key pair comprising a first private key and a corresponding first public key; generating a first shared private key pair known to the first party and the second party; and generating a second cryptographic public-private key pair comprising a second private key and a corresponding second public key, wherein the second private key is generated based on the first private key and the shared private key.

The present disclosure recognizes a way in which one party can be cryptographically linked with another party using public-key cryptography. Due to the cryptographic nature of public and private keys, a link between the first and second parties cannot be forged and furthermore, the link can be verified by a third party. The second private key is generated based on the first private key and the shared private key. Only the first party knows the second private key, and only the first and second parties know the shared private key. Therefore, only the first party can generate the second private key, but the first party can prove, if required, that the second public key has been generated based on information that can be attested to by the second party. If the second party is a trusted party, their trust can be associated with the first party by the fact that they have established a shared private key with the first party. This enables the identity of the first party to be trusted.

The public-private key pairs may be blockchain key pairs. That is, the public key may be used as, or may be used to generate, an identity (i.e. address) of a blockchain user. However, the present disclosure is not limited to a blockchain system. That is, the first and/or second party need not be blockchain users, and their respective public-private key pairs need not be used to transact via the blockchain.

According to another aspect disclosed herein, there is provided a computer-implemented method of verifying a link between a first party and a second party, the method being performed by a third party and comprising: obtaining, from the second party, i) a message signed with a first signature based on a first private key of the second party, and ii) a first public key corresponding to the first private key; obtaining, from the second party, iii) the message signed with a second signature based on a second private key of the

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second party, and iv) a second public key corresponding to the second private key; obtaining, from the first party, v) the message signed with a third signature based on a shared private key known only to the first party and the second party, and a corresponding shared public key; and determining whether the second public key of the second party has been generated based on the first public key of the second party and the shared public key.

In this aspect, the third party wants to prove that there is a link between the first party and the second party. For example, the third party may trust the first party. By verifying the link between the first and second party, the third party can use its trust in the first party's identity to trust the identity of the second party. The third party obtains (e.g. receives) two messages from the second party, one signed with a signature based on a first private key known only to the second party, and one signed with a signature based on a second private key known only to the second party. The third party also obtains (e.g. receives) a message signed with a signature based on a private key known to both the first and second party. If the public key corresponding to the second private key has been generated based on the public key corresponding to the first private key and the public key corresponding to the shared private key, the third party can be sure that the first party established the shared private key with the second party. The third party can then use their trust in the first party to trust the second party.

According to another aspect disclosed herein, there is provided a computer-implemented method of attesting to a first signature used by a first party to sign a first message, wherein the blockchain comprises a recorded transaction, the recorded transaction comprising a registered value generated by applying a one-way function to a first value; the method being performed by the first party and comprising: generating the first signature by applying a one-way function to at least the first value and the message; transmitting a first transaction to one or more nodes of a blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the first transaction comprising the message signed with the first signature; and transmitting a second transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the second transaction comprising the first value.

In public key cryptography, signatures are usually generated using a private key and checked using the corresponding public key. The present disclosure provides a way in which signatures can be generated without using a party's private key, and a way in which that party can prove that only they could have provided the signature. The recorded value has been recorded (i.e. mined) to the blockchain and is therefore immutable. At this point, the first value is not recorded on the blockchain and is known only to the first party. The first party can generate a signature using the first value, sign a message using that signature and submit a transaction comprising the message to the blockchain. The first party can then follow up with a second transaction that comprises the first value, thereby attesting to the signature. This enables another party to apply the one-way function to the first value. If the result of applying the one-way function to the first value is the recorded value, the verifying party can be sure that only the first party could have generated the signature.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

To assist understanding of embodiments of the present disclosure and to show how such embodiments may be put

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into effect, reference is made, by way of example only, to the accompanying drawings in which:

FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of a system for implementing a blockchain;

FIG. 2 schematically illustrates some examples of transactions which may be recorded in a blockchain;

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram of another system for implementing a blockchain;

FIG. 4 schematically illustrates a method for cryptographically linking a first party and a second party; and

FIG. 5 schematically illustrates a method for verifying whether a first party is cryptographically linked with a second party.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS

Example System Overview

FIG. 1 shows an example system **100** for implementing a blockchain **150** generally. The system **100** comprises a packet-switched network **101**, typically a wide-area inter-network such as the Internet. The packet-switched network **101** comprises a plurality of nodes **104** arranged to form a peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay network **106** within the packet-switched network **101**. Each node **104** comprises computer equipment of a peers, with different ones of the nodes **104** belonging to different peers. Each node **104** comprises processing apparatus comprising one or more processors, e.g. one or more central processing units (CPUs), accelerator processors, application specific processors and/or field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Each node also comprises memory, i.e. computer-readable storage in the form of a non-transitory computer-readable medium or media. The memory may comprise one or more memory units employing one or more memory media, e.g. a magnetic medium such as a hard disk; an electronic medium such as a solid-state drive (SSD), flash memory or EEPROM; and/or an optical medium such as an optical disk drive.

The blockchain **150** comprises a chain of blocks of data **151**, wherein a respective copy of the blockchain **150** is maintained at each of a plurality of nodes in the P2P network **106**. Each block **151** in the chain comprises one or more transactions **152**, wherein a transaction in this context refers to a kind of data structure. The nature of the data structure will depend on the type of transaction protocol used as part of a transaction model or scheme. A given blockchain will typically use one particular transaction protocol throughout. In one common type of transaction protocol, the data structure of each transaction **152** comprises at least one input and at least one output. Each output specifies an amount representing a quantity of a digital asset belonging to a user **103** to whom the output is cryptographically locked (requiring a signature of that user in order to be unlocked and thereby redeemed or spent). Each input points back to the output of a preceding transaction **152**, thereby linking the transactions.

At least some of the nodes **104** take on the role of forwarding nodes **104F** which forward and thereby propagate transactions **152**. At least some of the nodes **104** take on the role of miners **104M** which mine blocks **151**. At least some of the nodes **104** take on the role of storage nodes **104S** (sometimes also called "full-copy" nodes), each of which stores a respective copy of the same blockchain **150** in their respective memory. Each miner node **104M** also maintains a pool **154** of transactions **152** waiting to be mined into blocks **151**. A given node **104** may be a forwarding node **104F**, miner **104M**, storage node **104S** or any combination of two or all of these.

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In a given present transaction **152j**, the (or each) input comprises a pointer referencing the output of a preceding transaction **152i** in the sequence of transactions, specifying that this output is to be redeemed or “spent” in the present transaction **152j**. In general, the preceding transaction could be any transaction in the pool **154** or any block **151**. The preceding transaction **152i** need not necessarily exist at the time the present transaction **152j** is created or even sent to the network **106**, though the preceding transaction **152i** will need to exist and be validated in order for the present transaction to be valid. Hence “preceding” herein refers to a predecessor in a logical sequence linked by pointers, not necessarily the time of creation or sending in a temporal sequence, and hence it does not necessarily exclude that the transactions **152i**, **152j** be created or sent out-of-order (see discussion below on orphan transactions). The preceding transaction **152i** could equally be called the antecedent or predecessor transaction.

The input of the present transaction **152j** also comprises the signature of the user **103a** to whom the output of the preceding transaction **152i** is locked. In turn, the output of the present transaction **152j** can be cryptographically locked to a new user **103b**. The present transaction **152j** can thus transfer the amount defined in the input of the preceding transaction **152i** to the new user **103b** as defined in the output of the present transaction **152j**. In some cases a transaction **152** may have multiple outputs to split the input amount between multiple users (one of whom could be the original user **103a** in order to give change). In some cases a transaction can also have multiple inputs to gather together the amounts from multiple outputs of one or more preceding transactions, and redistribute to one or more outputs of the current transaction.

The above may be referred to as an “output-based” transaction protocol, sometimes also referred to as an unspent transaction output (UTXO) type protocol (where the outputs are referred to as UTXOs). A user’s total balance is not defined in any one number stored in the blockchain, and instead the user needs a special “wallet” application **105** to collate the values of all the UTXOs of that user which are scattered throughout many different transactions **152** in the blockchain **151**.

An alternative type of transaction protocol may be referred to as an “account-based” protocol, as part of an account-based transaction model. In the account-based case, each transaction does not define the amount to be transferred by referring back to the UTXO of a preceding transaction in a sequence of past transactions, but rather by reference to an absolute account balance. The current state of all accounts is stored by the miners separate to the blockchain and is updated constantly. In such a system, transactions are ordered using a running transaction tally of the account (also called the “position”). This value is signed by the sender as part of their cryptographic signature and is hashed as part of the transaction reference calculation. In addition, an optional data field may also be signed the transaction. This data field may point back to a previous transaction, for example if the previous transaction ID is included in the data field.

With either type of transaction protocol, when a user **103** wishes to enact a new transaction **152j**, then he/she sends the new transaction from his/her computer terminal **102** to one of the nodes **104** of the P2P network **106** (which nowadays are typically servers or data centres, but could in principle be other user terminals). This node **104** checks whether the transaction is valid according to a node protocol which is applied at each of the nodes **104**. The details of the node protocol will correspond to the type of transaction protocol

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being used in the blockchain **150** in question, together forming the overall transaction model. The node protocol typically requires the node **104** to check that the cryptographic signature in the new transaction **152j** matches the expected signature, which depends on the previous transaction **152i** in an ordered sequence of transactions **152**. In an output-based case, this may comprise checking that the cryptographic signature of the user included in the input of the new transaction **152j** matches a condition defined in the output of the preceding transaction **152i** which the new transaction spends, wherein this condition typically comprises at least checking that the cryptographic signature in the input of the new transaction **152j** unlocks the output of the previous transaction **152i** to which the input of the new transaction points. In some transaction protocols the condition may be at least partially defined by a custom script included in the input and/or output. Alternatively it could simply be a fixed by the node protocol alone, or it could be due to a combination of these. Either way, if the new transaction **152j** is valid, the current node forwards it to one or more others of the nodes **104** in the P2P network **106**. At least some of these nodes **104** also act as forwarding nodes **104F**, applying the same test according to the same node protocol, and so forward the new transaction **152j** on to one or more further nodes **104**, and so forth. In this way the new transaction is propagated throughout the network of nodes **104**.

In an output-based model, the definition of whether a given output (e.g. UTXO) is spent is whether it has yet been validly redeemed by the input of another, onward transaction **152j** according to the node protocol. Another condition for a transaction to be valid is that the output of the preceding transaction **152i** which it attempts to spend or redeem has not already been spent/redeemed by another valid transaction. Again if not valid, the transaction **152j** will not be propagated or recorded in the blockchain. This guards against double-spending whereby the spender tries to spend the output of the same transaction more than once. An account-based model on the other hand guards against double-spending by maintaining an account balance. Because again there is a defined order of transactions, the account balance has a single defined state at any one time.

In addition to validation, at least some of the nodes **104M** also race to be the first to create blocks of transactions in a process known as mining, which is underpinned by “proof of work”. At a mining node **104M**, new transactions are added to a pool of valid transactions that have not yet appeared in a block. The miners then race to assemble a new valid block **151** of transactions **152** from the pool of transactions **154** by attempting to solve a cryptographic puzzle. Typically this comprises searching for a “nonce” value such that when the nonce is concatenated with the pool of transactions **154** and hashed, then the output of the hash meets a predetermined condition. E.g. the predetermined condition may be that the output of the hash has a certain predefined number of leading zeros. A property of a hash function is that it has an unpredictable output with respect to its input. Therefore this search can only be performed by brute force, thus consuming a substantive amount of processing resource at each node **104M** that is trying to solve the puzzle.

The first miner node **104M** to solve the puzzle announces this to the network **106**, providing the solution as proof which can then be easily checked by the other nodes **104** in the network (once given the solution to a hash it is straightforward to check that it causes the output of the hash to meet the condition). The pool of transactions **154** for which the

winner solved the puzzle then becomes recorded as a new block **151** in the blockchain **150** by at least some of the nodes **104** acting as storage nodes **104S**, based on having checked the winner's announced solution at each such node. A block pointer **155** is also assigned to the new block **151_n** pointing back to the previously created block **151_{n-1}** in the chain. The proof-of-work helps reduce the risk of double spending since it takes a large amount of effort to create a new block **151**, and as any block containing a double spend is likely to be rejected by other nodes **104**, mining nodes **104M** are incentivised not to allow double spends to be included in their blocks. Once created, the block **151** cannot be modified since it is recognized and maintained at each of the storing nodes **104S** in the P2P network **106** according to the same protocol. The block pointer **155** also imposes a sequential order to the blocks **151**. Since the transactions **152** are recorded in the ordered blocks at each storage node **104S** in a P2P network **106**, this therefore provides an immutable public ledger of the transactions.

Note that different miners **104M** racing to solve the puzzle at any given time may be doing so based on different snapshots of the unmined transaction pool **154** at any given time, depending on when they started searching for a solution. Whoever solves their respective puzzle first defines which transactions **152** are included in the next new block **151_n**, and the current pool **154** of unmined transactions is updated. The miners **104M** then continue to race to create a block from the newly defined outstanding pool **154**, and so forth. A protocol also exists for resolving any "fork" that may arise, which is where two miners **104M** solve their puzzle within a very short time of one another such that a conflicting view of the blockchain gets propagated. In short, whichever prong of the fork grows the longest becomes the definitive blockchain **150**.

In most blockchains the winning miner **104M** is automatically rewarded with a special kind of new transaction which creates a new quantity of the digital asset out of nowhere (as opposed to normal transactions which transfer an amount of the digital asset from one user to another). Hence the winning node is said to have "mined" a quantity of the digital asset. This special type of transaction is sometime referred to as a "generation" transaction. It automatically forms part of the new block **151_n**. This reward gives an incentive for the miners **104M** to participate in the proof-of-work race. Often a regular (non-generation) transaction **152** will also specify an additional transaction fee in one of its outputs, to further reward the winning miner **104M** that created the block **151_n** in which that transaction was included.

Due to the computational resource involved in mining, typically at least each of the miner nodes **104M** takes the form of a server comprising one or more physical server units, or even whole a data centre. Each forwarding node **104M** and/or storage node **104S** may also take the form of a server or data centre. However in principle any given node **104** could take the form of a user terminal or a group of user terminals networked together.

The memory of each node **104** stores software configured to run on the processing apparatus of the node **104** in order to perform its respective role or roles and handle transactions **152** in accordance with the node protocol. It will be understood that any action attributed herein to a node **104** may be performed by the software run on the processing apparatus of the respective computer equipment. Also, the term "blockchain" as used herein is a generic term that refers to the kind of technology in general, and does not limit to any particular proprietary blockchain, protocol or service.

Also connected to the network **101** is the computer equipment **102** of each of a plurality of parties **103** in the role of consuming users. These act as payers and payees in transactions but do not necessarily participate in mining or propagating transactions on behalf of other parties. They do not necessarily run the mining protocol. Two parties **103** and their respective equipment **102** are shown for illustrative purposes: a first party **103_a** and his/her respective computer equipment **102_a**, and a second party **103_b** and his/her respective computer equipment **102_b**. It will be understood that many more such parties **103** and their respective computer equipment **102** may be present and participating in the system, but for convenience they are not illustrated. Each party **103** may be an individual or an organization. Purely by way of illustration the first party **103_a** is referred to herein as Alice and the second party **103_b** is referred to as Bob, but it will be appreciated that this is not limiting and any reference herein to Alice or Bob may be replaced with "first party" and "second party" respectively.

The computer equipment **102** of each party **103** comprises respective processing apparatus comprising one or more processors, e.g. one or more CPUs, GPUs, other accelerator processors, application specific processors, and/or FPGAs. The computer equipment **102** of each party **103** further comprises memory, i.e. computer-readable storage in the form of a non-transitory computer-readable medium or media. This memory may comprise one or more memory units employing one or more memory media, e.g. a magnetic medium such as hard disk; an electronic medium such as an SSD, flash memory or EEPROM; and/or an optical medium such as an optical disc drive. The memory on the computer equipment **102** of each party **103** stores software comprising a respective instance of at least one client application **105** arranged to run on the processing apparatus. It will be understood that any action attributed herein to a given party **103** may be performed using the software run on the processing apparatus of the respective computer equipment **102**. The computer equipment **102** of each party **103** comprises at least one user terminal, e.g. a desktop or laptop computer, a tablet, a smartphone, or a wearable device such as a smartwatch. The computer equipment **102** of a given party **103** may also comprise one or more other networked resources, such as cloud computing resources accessed via the user terminal.

The client application or software **105** may be initially provided to the computer equipment **102** of any given party **103** on suitable computer-readable storage medium or media, e.g. downloaded from a server, or provided on a removable storage device such as a removable SSD, flash memory key, removable EEPROM, removable magnetic disk drive, magnetic floppy disk or tape, optical disk such as a CD or DVD ROM, or a removable optical drive, etc.

The client application **105** comprises at least a "wallet" function. This has two main functionalities. One of these is to enable the respective user party **103** to create, sign and send transactions **152** to be propagated throughout the network of nodes **104** and thereby included in the blockchain **150**. The other is to report back to the respective party the amount of the digital asset that he or she currently owns. In an output-based system, this second functionality comprises collating the amounts defined in the outputs of the various **152** transactions scattered throughout the blockchain **150** that belong to the party in question.

The instance of the client application **105** on each computer equipment **102** is operatively coupled to at least one of the forwarding nodes **104F** of the P2P network **106**. This enables the wallet function of the client **105** to send trans-

actions **152** to the network **106**. The client **105** is also able to contact one, some or all of the storage nodes **104** in order to query the blockchain **150** for any transactions of which the respective party **103** is the recipient (or indeed inspect other parties' transactions in the blockchain **150**, since in embodiments the blockchain **150** is a public facility which provides trust in transactions in part through its public visibility). The wallet function on each computer equipment **102** is configured to formulate and send transactions **152** according to a transaction protocol. Each node **104** runs software configured to validate transactions **152** according to a node protocol, and in the case of the forwarding nodes **104F** to forward transactions **152** in order to propagate them throughout the network **106**. The transaction protocol and node protocol correspond to one another, and a given transaction protocol goes with a given node protocol, together implementing a given transaction model. The same transaction protocol is used for all transactions **152** in the blockchain **150** (though the transaction protocol may allow different subtypes of transaction within it). The same node protocol is used by all the nodes **104** in the network **106** (though it may handle different subtypes of transaction differently in accordance with the rules defined for that subtype, and also different nodes may take on different roles and hence implement different corresponding aspects of the protocol).

As mentioned, the blockchain **150** comprises a chain of blocks **151**, wherein each block **151** comprises a set of one or more transactions **152** that have been created by a proof-of-work process as discussed previously. Each block **151** also comprises a block pointer **155** pointing back to the previously created block **151** in the chain so as to define a sequential order to the blocks **151**. The blockchain **150** also comprises a pool of valid transactions **154** waiting to be included in a new block by the proof-of-work process. Each transaction **152** (other than a generation transaction) comprises a pointer back to a previous transaction so as to define an order to sequences of transactions (N.B. sequences of transactions **152** are allowed to branch). The chain of blocks **151** goes all the way back to a genesis block (Gb) **153** which was the first block in the chain. One or more original transactions **152** early on in the chain **150** pointed to the genesis block **153** rather than a preceding transaction.

When a given party **103**, say Alice, wishes to send a new transaction **152j** to be included in the blockchain **150**, then she formulates the new transaction in accordance with the relevant transaction protocol (using the wallet function in her client application **105**). She then sends the transaction **152** from the client application **105** to one of the one or more forwarding nodes **104F** to which she is connected. E.g. this could be the forwarding node **104F** that is nearest or best connected to Alice's computer **102**. When any given node **104** receives a new transaction **152j**, it handles it in accordance with the node protocol and its respective role. This comprises first checking whether the newly received transaction **152j** meets a certain condition for being "valid", examples of which will be discussed in more detail shortly. In some transaction protocols, the condition for validation may be configurable on a per-transaction basis by scripts included in the transactions **152**. Alternatively the condition could simply be a built-in feature of the node protocol, or be defined by a combination of the script and the node protocol.

On condition that the newly received transaction **152j** passes the test for being deemed valid (i.e. on condition that it is "validated"), any storage node **104S** that receives the transaction **152j** will add the new validated transaction **152** to the pool **154** in the copy of the blockchain **150** maintained

at that node **104S**. Further, any forwarding node **104F** that receives the transaction **152j** will propagate the validated transaction **152** onward to one or more other nodes **104** in the P2P network **106**. Since each forwarding node **104F** applies the same protocol, then assuming the transaction **152j** is valid, this means it will soon be propagated throughout the whole P2P network **106**.

Once admitted to the pool **154** in the copy of the blockchain **150** maintained at one or more storage nodes **104**, then miner nodes **104M** will start competing to solve the proof-of-work puzzle on the latest version of the pool **154** including the new transaction **152** (other miners **104M** may still be trying to solve the puzzle based on the old view of the pool **154**, but whoever gets there first will define where the next new block **151** ends and the new pool **154** starts, and eventually someone will solve the puzzle for a part of the pool **154** which includes Alice's transaction **152j**). Once the proof-of-work has been done for the pool **154** including the new transaction **152j**, it immutably becomes part of one of the blocks **151** in the blockchain **150**. Each transaction **152** comprises a pointer back to an earlier transaction, so the order of the transactions is also immutably recorded.

Utxo-Based Model

FIG. 2 illustrates an example transaction protocol. This is an example of an UTXO-based protocol. A transaction **152** (abbreviated "Tx") is the fundamental data structure of the blockchain **150** (each block **151** comprising one or more transactions **152**). The following will be described by reference to an output-based or "UTXO" based protocol. However, this not limiting to all possible embodiments.

In a UTXO-based model, each transaction ("Tx") **152** comprises a data structure comprising one or more inputs **202**, and one or more outputs **203**. Each output **203** may comprise an unspent transaction output (UTXO), which can be used as the source for the input **202** of another new transaction (if the UTXO has not already been redeemed). The UTXO specifies an amount of a digital asset (a store of value). It may also contain the transaction ID of the transaction from which it came, amongst other information. The transaction data structure may also comprise a header **201**, which may comprise an indicator of the size of the input field(s) **202** and output field(s) **203**. The header **201** may also include an ID of the transaction. In embodiments the transaction ID is the hash of the transaction data (excluding the transaction ID itself) and stored in the header **201** of the raw transaction **152** submitted to the miners **104M**.

Say Alice **103a** wishes to create a transaction **152j** transferring an amount of the digital asset in question to Bob **103b**. In FIG. 2 Alice's new transaction **152j** is labelled "Tx₁". It takes an amount of the digital asset that is locked to Alice in the output **203** of a preceding transaction **152i** in the sequence, and transfers at least some of this to Bob. The preceding transaction **152i** is labelled "Tx₀" in FIG. 2. Tx₀ and Tx₁ are just an arbitrary labels. They do not necessarily mean that Tx₀ is the first transaction in the blockchain **151**, nor that Tx₁ is the immediate next transaction in the pool **154**. Tx₁ could point back to any preceding (i.e. antecedent) transaction that still has an unspent output **203** locked to Alice.

The preceding transaction Tx₀ may already have been validated and included in the blockchain **150** at the time when Alice creates her new transaction Tx₁, or at least by the time she sends it to the network **106**. It may already have been included in one of the blocks **151** at that time, or it may be still waiting in the pool **154** in which case it will soon be included in a new block **151**. Alternatively Tx₀ and Tx₁ could be created and sent to the network **102** together, or Tx₀

could even be sent after Tx₁ if the node protocol allows for buffering “orphan” transactions. The terms “preceding” and “subsequent” as used herein in the context of the sequence of transactions refer to the order of the transactions in the sequence as defined by the transaction pointers specified in the transactions (which transaction points back to which other transaction, and so forth). They could equally be replaced with “predecessor” and “successor”, or “antecedent” and “descendant”, “parent” and “child”, or such like. It does not necessarily imply an order in which they are created, sent to the network **106**, or arrive at any given node **104**. Nevertheless, a subsequent transaction (the descendent transaction or “child”) which points to a preceding transaction (the antecedent transaction or “parent”) will not be validated until and unless the parent transaction is validated. A child that arrives at a node **104** before its parent is considered an orphan. It may be discarded or buffered for a certain time to wait for the parent, depending on the node protocol and/or miner behaviour.

One of the one or more outputs **203** of the preceding transaction Tx₀ comprises a particular UTXO, labelled here UTXO₀. Each UTXO comprises a value specifying an amount of the digital asset represented by the UTXO, and a locking script which defines a condition which must be met by an unlocking script in the input **202** of a subsequent transaction in order for the subsequent transaction to be validated, and therefore for the UTXO to be successfully redeemed. Typically the locking script locks the amount to a particular party (the beneficiary of the transaction in which it is included). I.e. the locking script defines an unlocking condition, typically comprising a condition that the unlocking script in the input of the subsequent transaction comprises the cryptographic signature of the party to whom the preceding transaction is locked.

The locking script (aka scriptPubKey) is a piece of code written in the domain specific language recognized by the node protocol. A particular example of such a language is called “Script” (capital S). The locking script specifies what information is required to spend a transaction output **203**, for example the requirement of Alice’s signature. Unlocking scripts appear in the outputs of transactions. The unlocking script (aka scriptSig) is a piece of code written the domain specific language that provides the information required to satisfy the locking script criteria. For example, it may contain Bob’s signature. Unlocking scripts appear in the input **202** of transactions.

So in the example illustrated, UTXO₀ in the output **203** of Tx₀ comprises a locking script [Checksig PA] which requires a signature Sig PA of Alice in order for UTXO₀ to be redeemed (strictly, in order for a subsequent transaction attempting to redeem UTXO₀ to be valid). [Checksig PA] contains the public key PA from a cryptographic public-private key pair of Alice. The input **202** of Tx₁ comprises a pointer pointing back to Tx₁ (e.g. by means of its transaction ID, TxID₀, which in embodiments is the hash of the whole transaction Tx₀). The input **202** of Tx₁ comprises an index identifying UTXO₀ within Tx₀, to identify it amongst any other possible outputs of Tx₀. The input **202** of Tx₁ further comprises an unlocking script < Sig P_A > which comprises a cryptographic signature of Alice, created by Alice applying her private key from the key pair to a predefined portion of data (sometimes called the “message” in cryptography). What data (or “message”) needs to be signed by Alice to provide a valid signature may be defined by the locking script, or by the node protocol, or by a combination of these.

When the new transaction Tx₁ arrives at a node **104**, the node applies the node protocol. This comprises running the

locking script and unlocking script together to check whether the unlocking script meets the condition defined in the locking script (where this condition may comprise one or more criteria). In embodiments this involves concatenating the two scripts:

$$<Sig P_A><P_A>||[Checksig P_A]$$

where “||” represents a concatenation and “< . . . >” means place the data on the stack, and “[. . .]” is a function comprised by the unlocking script (in this example a stack-based language). Equivalently the scripts may be run one after another, with a common stack, rather than concatenating the scripts. Either way, when run together, the scripts use the public key P_A of Alice, as included in the locking script in the output of Tx₀, to authenticate that the locking script in the input of Tx₁ contains the signature of Alice signing the expected portion of data. The expected portion of data itself (the “message”) also needs to be included in Tx₀ order to perform this authentication. In embodiments the signed data comprises the whole of Tx₀ (so a separate element does to need to be included specifying the signed portion of data in the clear, as it is already inherently present).

The details of authentication by cryptographic public-private cryptography will be familiar to a person skilled in the art. Basically, if Alice has signed a message by encrypting it with her private key, then given Alice’s public key and the message in the clear (the unencrypted message), another entity such as a node **104** is able to authenticate that the encrypted version of the message must have been signed by Alice. Signing typically comprises hashing the message, signing the hash, and tagging this onto the clear version of the message as a signature, thus enabling any holder of the public key to authenticate the signature.

If the unlocking script in Tx₁ meets the one or more conditions specified in the locking script of Tx₀ (so in the example shown, if Alice’s signature is provided in Tx₁ and authenticated), then the node **104** deems Tx₁ valid. If it is a mining node **104M**, this means it will add it to the pool of transactions **154** awaiting proof-of-work. If it is a forwarding node **104F**, it will forward the transaction Tx₁ to one or more other nodes **104** in the network **106**, so that it will be propagated throughout the network. Once Tx₁ has been validated and included in the blockchain **150**, this defines UTXO₀ from Tx₀ as spent. Note that Tx₁ can only be valid if it spends an unspent transaction output **203**. If it attempts to spend an output that has already been spent by another transaction **152**, then Tx₁ will be invalid even if all the other conditions are met. Hence the node **104** also needs to check whether the referenced UTXO in the preceding transaction Tx₀ is already spent (has already formed a valid input to another valid transaction). This is one reason why it is important for the blockchain **150** to impose a defined order on the transactions **152**. In practice a given node **104** may maintain a separate database marking which UTXOs **203** in which transactions **152** have been spent, but ultimately what defines whether a UTXO has been spent is whether it has already formed a valid input to another valid transaction in the blockchain **150**.

Note that in UTXO-based transaction models, a given UTXO needs to be spent as a whole. It cannot “leave behind” a fraction of the amount defined in the UTXO as spent while another fraction is spent. However the amount from the UTXO can be split between multiple outputs of the next transaction. E.g. the amount defined in UTXO₀ in Tx₀ can be split between multiple UTXOs in Tx₁. Hence if Alice does not want to give Bob all of the amount defined in

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UTXO₀, she can use the remainder to give herself change in a second output of Tx₁, or pay another party.

In practice Alice will also usually need to include a fee for the winning miner, because nowadays the reward of the generation transaction alone is not typically sufficient to motivate mining. If Alice does not include a fee for the miner, Tx₀ will likely be rejected by the miner nodes 104M, and hence although technically valid, it will still not be propagated and included in the blockchain 150 (the miner protocol does not force miners 104M to accept transactions 152 if they don't want). In some protocols, the mining fee does not require its own separate output 203 (i.e. does not need a separate UTXO). Instead any difference between the total amount pointed to by the input(s) 202 and the total amount of specified in the output(s) 203 of a given transaction 152 is automatically given to the winning miner 104. E.g. say a pointer to UTXO₀ is the only input to Tx₁, and Tx₁ has only one output UTXO₁. If the amount of the digital asset specified in UTXO₀ is greater than the amount specified in UTXO₁, then the difference automatically goes to the winning miner 104M. Alternatively or additionally however, it is not necessarily excluded that a miner fee could be specified explicitly in its own one of the UTXOs 203 of the transaction 152.

Note also that if the total amount specified in all the outputs 203 of a given transaction 152 is greater than the total amount pointed to by all its inputs 202, this is another basis for invalidity in most transaction models. Therefore such transactions will not be propagated nor mined into blocks 151.

Alice and Bob's digital assets consist of the unspent UTXOs locked to them in any transactions 152 anywhere in the blockchain 150. Hence typically, the assets of a given party 103 are scattered throughout the UTXOs of various transactions 152 throughout the blockchain 150. There is no one number stored anywhere in the blockchain 150 that defines the total balance of a given party 103. It is the role of the wallet function in the client application 105 to collate together the values of all the various UTXOs which are locked to the respective party and have not yet been spent in another onward transaction. It can do this by querying the copy of the blockchain 150 as stored at any of the storage nodes 104S, e.g. the storage node 104S that is closest or best connected to the respective party's computer equipment 102.

Note that the script code is often represented schematically (i.e. not the exact language). For example, one may write [ChecksipP_A] to mean [ChecksipP_A]=OP_DUP_OP_HASH160<H(P_A)> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG. "OP_..." refers to a particular opcode of the Script language. OP_CHECKSIG (also called "Checksig") is a Script opcode that takes two inputs (signature and public key) and verifies the signature's validity using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). At runtime, any occurrences of signature ('sig') are removed from the script but additional requirements, such as a hash puzzle, remain in the transaction verified by the 'sig' input. As another example, OP_RETURN is an opcode of the Script language for creating an unspendable output of a transaction that can store metadata within the transaction, and thereby record the metadata immutably in the blockchain 150. E.g. the metadata could comprise a document which it is desired to store in the blockchain.

The signature P_A is a digital signature. In embodiments this is based on the ECDSA using the elliptic curve secp256k1. A digital signature signs a particular piece of data. In embodiments, for a given transaction the signature

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will sign part of the transaction input, and all or part of the transaction output. The particular parts of the outputs it signs depends on the SIGHASH flag. The SIGHASH flag is a 4-byte code included at the end of a signature to select which outputs are signed (and thus fixed at the time of signing).

The locking script is sometimes called "scriptPubKey" referring to the fact that it comprises the public key of the party to whom the respective transaction is locked. The unlocking script is sometimes called "scriptSig" referring to the fact that it supplies the corresponding signature. However, more generally it is not essential in all applications of a blockchain 150 that the condition for a UTXO to be redeemed comprises authenticating a signature. More generally the scripting language could be used to define any one or more conditions. Hence the more general terms "locking script" and "unlocking script" may be preferred.

Optional Side Channel

FIG. 3 shows a further system 100 for implementing a blockchain 150. The system 100 is substantially the same as that described in relation to FIG. 1 except that additional communication functionality is involved. The client application on each of Alice and Bob's computer equipment 102a, 102b, respectively, comprises additional communication functionality. That is, it enables Alice 103a to establish a separate side channel 301 with Bob 103b (at the instigation of either party or a third party). The side channel 301 enables exchange of data separately from the P2P network. Such communication is sometimes referred to as "off-chain". For instance this may be used to exchange a transaction 152 between Alice and Bob without the transaction (yet) being published onto the network P2P 106 or making its way onto the chain 150, until one of the parties chooses to broadcast it to the network 106. Alternatively or additionally, the side channel 301 may be used to exchange any other transaction related data, such as keys, negotiated amounts or terms, data content, etc.

The side channel 301 may be established via the same packet-switched network 101 as the P2P overlay network 106. Alternatively or additionally, the side channel 301 may be established via a different network such as a mobile cellular network, or a local area network such as a local wireless network, or even a direct wired or wireless link between Alice and Bob's devices 1021, 102b. Generally, the side channel 301 as referred to anywhere herein may comprise any one or more links via one or more networking technologies or communication media for exchanging data "off-chain", i.e. separately from the P2P overlay network 106. Where more than one link is used, then the bundle or collection of off-chain links as a whole may be referred to as the side channel 301. Note therefore that if it is said that Alice and Bob exchange certain pieces of information or data, or such like, over the side channel 301, then this does not necessarily imply all these pieces of data have to be sent over exactly the same link or even the same type of network.

Public Key Cryptography

Public key cryptography per se is well known and as such it will be only briefly described here. Public key cryptography is used as a basis for securing messages, e.g. transactions in a number of different blockchain architectures. Uses of public key cryptography include public key encryption and digital signature schemes. Public key cryptography is founded on the principle that certain functions are easy to compute but hard to reverse without some special knowledge. Easy to compute means it is computationally feasible to compute the result of the function for a given input (or set of inputs) in a reasonable time frame, and hard to reverse

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means that it is computationally infeasible to infer that input (or those inputs) from the result without knowledge of the input(s).

In the context of public key cryptography, a key public-private pair means a public key (which can be made freely available to anyone) and a corresponding private key (which is assumed to be secret in the sense that it is only known to a specific entity or group).

In a public key encryption context, encryption is performed using a public key whilst decryption is performed using the corresponding private key. In a digital signature context, signature generation is performed using a private key, whilst signature verification is performed using the corresponding public key.

In a blockchain context, digital signatures based on public key cryptography are used as a basis for cryptographically signing transactions and verifying transaction signatures.

Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is a form of public key cryptography which harnesses the mathematical properties of elliptical curves. The “Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm” (ECDSA) refers to a class of digital signature schemes which use ECC as a basis for digital signature generation and verification.

In the context of ECC, the addition, subtraction and multiplication operations are, respectively, elliptic curve point addition, denoted “+” herein, elliptic curve point subtraction, denoted “−” herein, and elliptic curve scalar multiplication, denoted “ \cdot ” herein. The addition and subtraction operations are each applied to two points on an elliptic curve and return a third point on the elliptic curve; however, the multiplication operation is applied to a scalar and a single point on an elliptic curve, and returns a second point on the elliptic curve. Elliptic curve arithmetic provides unique capabilities in obscuring a secret value and forms the basis of many contemporary cryptographic systems. In particular, reversing scalar multiplication of elliptic curve points over finite fields is an intractable problem (it is computationally infeasible to perform).

A private key V takes the form of an integer, and the corresponding public key P is a point P on the elliptic curve derived from a “generator point” G, which is also a point on the elliptic curve, as:

$$P = V \cdot G = \underbrace{G + \dots + G}_{V \text{ times}}$$

where “ \cdot ” denotes elliptic curve scalar multiplication on the elliptic curve defined elliptic curve parameters. For a sufficiently large V, actually performing V elliptic curve additions to derive P is hard, i.e. computationally infeasible. However, if V is known, then P can be computed much more efficiently by exploiting the algebraic properties of the elliptic curve operations. An example of an efficient algorithm that can be used to compute P is the “double and add” algorithm—crucially, this can only be implemented if V is known.

Conversely, if V is not known, then there is no computationally feasible way of deriving V (i.e. reversing the scalar multiplication) even if both G and P are known (this is the so-called “discrete-logarithm problem”). An attacker could attempt to “brute force” P by starting from G and repeatedly performing elliptic curve point additions until he gets to P; at that point, he would know V to be the number of elliptic curve point additions he had to perform; but that turns out to be computationally infeasible. Hence, V satisfies

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the requirements of a trapdoor in the above sense. In ECC, the public key P, generator key G and elliptic curve are public and assumed to be known, whereas the private key V is secret.

In a blockchain system, a user or other entity will typically hold a private key V that is used to prove their identity and the corresponding public key P would be calculated by:

$$P = V \cdot G$$

The private key V can be used sign a piece of data m (“the message”) using the ECDSA. Further details of the ECDSA may for example be found in the following, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety: “RFC 6979-Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)”, Tools.ietf.org, 2019.

Cryptographically Linked Identities

Reference is now made to FIG. 4 which illustrates a method for cryptographically linking two parties. The following will be described in terms of the actions performed by the first party (e.g. Alice) 103a, but it will be appreciated that the second party (e.g. Bob) 103b may perform some or all of the same actions. The first and second party may be the same first and second party as described with reference to FIGS. 1 to 3. Alternatively, the first and/or second party may be non-blockchain users. In general, each party operates respective computer equipment configured to perform the actions of the respective party.

The two parties can be linked by exploiting the cryptographic properties of public key cryptography. The following will be described in terms of elliptic curve cryptography, but it will be appreciated that the teaching applies in general to other forms of public-key cryptography. Elliptic curve arithmetic can be used to provably link the identities of two parties using only their public keys and a public key generated from a shared secret key. As shown in FIG. 4, Alice 103a and Bob 103b each possess a respective public-private key pair. Alice 103a has a first private key S_{A0} and a corresponding first public key P_{A0} . Similarly, Bob has a first private key S_{B0} and a corresponding first public key P_{B0} . Alice 103a and Bob 103b also establish a shared secret key S_{AB0} and a corresponding first public key P_{AB0} . The shared secret may be established using a side channel 301, as shown in FIG. 3. As implied by the name, a public key is assumed to be accessible by either party and/or an external third party. In contrast, a private key is assumed to be kept secret to the owner(s) of the private key.

Shared secret keys can be established using a Diffie-Hellman key-exchange or an extension thereof. One technique for establishing the shared secret key is for each party to generate the shared secret key using their own private key (which may or may not be their first private key) and the other parties public key (which may or may not be the their first public key). For instance, Alice 103a uses her private key S_A and Bob’s public key P_B , and likewise Bob uses his private key S_B and Alice’s public key P_A as follows:

$$S_{AB0} = [S_A S_B G]_x = [S_A P_B]_x = [S_B P_A]_x$$

where $[]_x$ denotes the x coordinate of the elliptic curve point.

Given that only Alice 103a knows her private key S_A and only Bob 103b knows his private key S_B , only Alice 103a and Bob 103b can calculate S_{AB0} . The shared private key S_{AB0} can be established without divulging sensitive information, namely the private keys.

The following table illustrates the public and private keys owned by Alice 103a and Bob 103b. In this example, the

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public key is related to the private key by elliptic curve multiplication, $P=S \cdot G$, where G is an elliptic curve generator point.

Party	Private Key (S)	Public Key (P)
Alice	S_{A0}	$P_{A0} = S_{A0} \cdot G$
Bob	S_{AB0} S_{B0}	$P_{AB0} = S_{AB0} \cdot G$ $P_{B0} = S_{B0} \cdot G$

Alice **103a** can then generate a second private key S_{A1} , referred to herein as an identity-linked key, using both her first private key S_{A0} and the shared private key S_{AB0} . For instance, Alice's identity-linked key may be generated as $S_{A1} = S_{A0} + S_{AB0}$. Since only Alice **103a** knows S_{A0} , only Alice can generate S_{A1} and P_{A1} .

However, the public key can be verified by anyone since the public keys P_{A0} and P_{AB0} can be publicly known. The following equations show one example of how P_{A1} can be derived by Alice **103a** using her private keys and by another party using the publicly known keys:

$$P_{A1} = S_{A1} \cdot G$$

$$P_{A1} = (S_{A0} + S_{AB0}) \cdot G$$

$$P_{A1} = (S_{A0}G) + (S_{AB0}G)$$

$$P_{A1} = P_{A0} + P_{AB0}$$

Similarly, Bob **103b** can generate an identity-linked key S_{B1} using both his first private key S_{B0} and the shared private key S_{AB0} . For instance, Bob's identity-linked key may be generated as $S_{B1} = S_{A0} + S_{B0}$. Since only Bob knows S_{B0} , only Bob can generate S_{B1} and P_{B1} . More complex equations of S_{A0} and S_{AB0} may be used to generate S_{A1} . Similarly, more complex equations of S_{B0} and S_{AB0} may be used to generate S_{B1} .

Using the shared secret S_{AB0} , each party can verify the other party's identity. Since only Alice **103a** and Bob **103b** know the shared secret S_{AB0} , if Alice receives a message signed with P_{AB0} , she can be sure that the message is from Bob. Similarly, if Bob **103b** receives a message signed with P_{AB0} , she can be sure that the message is from Alice. Remember that the corresponding private key is required to sign a message with a public key.

For security reasons, an identity-linked key should only be used once. To update an identity-linked key, Alice **103a** and Bob **103b** must establish an updated shared private key. Alice **103a** and Bob **103b** could communicate with each other to establish the updated shared private key. Alternatively, Alice **103a** and Bob **103b** could each apply the same one-way function (e.g. a hash function) to the initial shared private key. Applying the one-way function a pre-determined number of times (e.g. once) generates an updated shared private key. Applying the one-way function a pre-determined number of times (e.g. once) to the first updated shared private key generates a second updated private key. This method allows Alice **103a** and Bob **103b** to generate updated shared private keys on low-power devices using computationally efficient techniques. This method also generates a hierarchy of shared private keys, wherein each updated private key can be linked back to the initial shared private key.

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One way to generate a sequence of shared public-private key pairs is by repeatedly hashing the initial shared secret:

$$P_{AB0} = S_{AB0} \cdot G$$

$$P_{AB1} = h(S_{AB0}) \cdot G$$

$$P_{AB2} = h^2(S_{AB0}) \cdot G$$

$$\vdots$$

$$P_{ABi} = h^i(S_{AB0}) \cdot G$$

Other ways of generating a sequence of updated shared keys are:

$$1. P_i = [h^i(S_0) + h^i(P_{A-1} - P_{B-1})] \cdot G$$

$$2. P_i = h(S_{i-1} | S_{i-2}) \cdot G$$

Each updated shared private key can be used to generate a respective updated identity-linked key. For example, the identity-linked keys of Alice **103a** and Bob **103b** can be updated as follows:

$$P_{A(i+1)} = P_{AB1} + P_{A0}$$

$$P_{B(i+1)} = P_{AB1} + P_{B0}$$

As these keys are updated, the respective parties will not be aware of the identity of the other party knowing only $P_{A(i+1)}$ or $P_{B(i+1)}$. However, the identity of one party (say Alice **103a**) can be linked at any stage via a signature challenge if required.

Alice **103a** can use any one of her identity-linked keys P_{Ai} to sign a message and transmit the message to Bob **103b** or a third party. In a blockchain context, Alice **103a** can use one of her identity-linked keys to sign part or all of a blockchain transaction. For instance, Alice **103a** may sign an input of a transaction. Alice **103a** can then transmit the transaction to Bob, a third party, or one or more nodes of a blockchain network such that the transaction can be mined to the blockchain **150**. An identity linked key allows Alice **103a** to sign any part of a blockchain transaction. Furthermore, an identity linked key allows more than one party to sign part of a transaction. For instance, Alice **103a** may sign the (part of) the transaction, then transmit the transaction to Bob **103b** who also signs the same (part of) the transaction, and then Alice **103a** or Bob can transmit the transaction to the blockchain network.

Verifying Cryptographically Linked Parties

FIG. 5 illustrates a method that a third party (Charlie) **103c** can use to verify if a first and second party are linked cryptographically. Whilst not shown in FIG. 5, Charlie comprises computer equipment comprising processing apparatus comprising one or more processors, e.g. one or more central processing units (CPUs), accelerator processors, application specific processors and/or field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). The computer equipment also comprises memory, i.e. computer-readable storage in the form of a non-transitory computer-readable medium or media. The memory may comprise one or more memory units employing one or more memory media, e.g. a magnetic medium such as a hard disk; an electronic medium such as a solid-state drive (SSD), flash memory or EEPROM; and/or an optical medium such as an optical disk drive.

As shown in FIG. 5, Alice **103a** possesses her first private key S_{A0} , the shared private key S_{AB0} and her second private key (i.e. her identity linked key) S_{A1} . Similarly, Bob **103b** possesses his first private key S_{B0} , the shared private key S_{AB0} and his second private key (i.e. her identity linked key) S_{B1} . In this example, one of Alice **103a** or Bob **103b** may be

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a trusted party. If Alice **103a** is a trusted party, Charlie **103c** can use his trust in Alice's identity to trust Bob's identity. To do this, Charlie **103c** can verify that Bob has an identity-linked key linked with Alice. Charlie **103c** can have Bob **103b** prove his relationship with Alice **103a** using the dependence of the identity linked key on the shared secret. Charlie **103c** obtains a message from Bob **103b** which is signed using Bob's first public-private key pair. Charlie **103c** also obtains a message from Bob **103b** which is signed with his identity-linked public-private key pair. Bob **103b** may choose the message to transmit to Charlie **103c**. Alternatively, Charlie **103c** may transmit a message (e.g. a challenge) to Bob **103b** for him to sign. Charlie **103c** also obtains the message from Alice **103a** which is signed with the shared public-private key pair. Again, Alice **103a** may transmit the message by deciding on the message with Bob **103b**, or Charlie **103c** may transmit the message to Alice **103a**. Charlie **103c** may first obtain the messages from Bob **103b** or from Alice **103a**. Once Charlie **103c** has the signed messages, Charlie **103c** verifies that Bob's identity-linked key has been generated based on the shared private key. Charlie **103c** verifies this by determining checking whether the identity-linked public key has been generated based on Bob's first public key and the shared public key, e.g. $P_{B1} = P_{AB0} + P_{B0}$.

Charlie may obtain the signed messages from Alice and/or Bob over the internet, e.g. using a side channel **301** as shown in FIG. 3.

Once verified, this proves an unforgeable connection between Alice **103a** and Bob **103b**. Charlie **103c** may also perform checks to verify that the signatures produced by Alice and Bob are valid signatures. Furthermore, Charlie **103c** can have Alice **103a** and Bob **103b** transmit the messages using one or more blockchain transactions. For instance, the signed messages may be included in an output of a blockchain transaction. Charlie **103c** can then create a transaction having the output as an input to his transaction. The input may contain script for verifying the relationship between Alice **103a** and Bob's public keys. Once verified, the relationship will be stored immutably on the blockchain **150**.

Whilst the techniques above have been described with reference to Alice **103a** and Bob **103b**, in general the first and second parties may be the same entity (e.g. the same person, company, organisation, etc.). For example, the first party may want to cryptographically link their (trusted) identity with another identity, e.g. by linking one of their public keys with a secret that only they know. Similarly, the first private key of each party need not utilize the same public key cryptography system. For instance, Alice **103a** may utilize elliptic curve cryptography whilst Bob utilizes RSA encryption or DSA encryption. Similarly, the first private key of Alice and/or Bob and the shared private key may utilize different cryptography systems. In some examples, if different cryptography systems are used, at least one of the private keys may require padding or truncating to reflect the other private scheme.

Take for example a non-blockchain system such as a government or bank with a sufficiently rigorous know your customer (KYC) system. A known user, say Alice **103a**, will have a private key (S_{A0}) connected to her identity via a public key P_{A0} . This may be verified by the bank or government and can be publicly attested. Alice **103a** can provably link her blockchain identity (S_{B0} , P_{B0}) to this off-chain system using the methods described above and derive subsequent keys or a hierarchy of keys that can all be linked to her off-chain identity by calculating her identity

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linked key as $P_{B1} = (S_{B0} + S_{AB0}) \cdot G$ as above. This can then be used as her blockchain identity and can be provably linked to P_{A0} using P_{AB0} . This not only gives KYC features to her blockchain identity but also gives blockchain capabilities to her off-chain account with the government and bank. That is, she can use the identity-linked key to participate in blockchain systems and this can be used to update (e.g. credit or debit) her off-chain account without the bank or government publishing to the blockchain **150**.

Access Chains

Using the data-storage capabilities of blockchains allows a party to leverage the intrinsic cryptographic signature schemes to act as signatures for the encapsulating data. However, usually the underlying protocol of a blockchain **150** is be fixed and thus cannot be tailored for specific applications. This requires parties to have a valid private key restricting use to those that are already a part of the system. As well, there is no way to delegate the ability to sign without exposing a party's private key. The present disclosure provides a second-layer signature protocol that can be included within a blockchain transaction allowing multiple parties to be included in a single transaction.

One-way functions (e.g. cryptographic hash functions) provide an efficient, deterministic method of obscuring an input such that given an output it is infeasible to find the input. Hash functions (or one-way functions in general) can be used to generate "tokens" which can be supplied to parties, redeemed by said parties and transferred between different parties. Tokens can be generated through repeated hashing of a seed value to form what is termed an access chain.

Using a pre-agreed number (n) of events requiring a token for access the user applies the hash function (h) to a secret key (K) n times ($h^n(K)$). This value is then registered, e.g. with a service provider, by publishing it on the blockchain **150**. A party can then redeem a token by providing the pre-image of the registered value on a blockchain **150**, which becomes the new registered value. For instance, if the token $t_n = h^n(K)$ is currently published on the blockchain **150**, the token can be redeemed by supplying $t_{n-1} = h^{n-1}(K)$.

At any point the token owner can transfer the remaining tokens to another party, e.g. by finding a willing buyer and agreeing on a price for the tokens. If Alice **103a** is owner of the currently registered token, Alice **103a** provides her latest pre-image to prove her identity to the service provider along with the new party's newly generated registered value of their access chain.

These tokens can also be provably linked to public keys by generating a new private key S_i with each redemption as the sum of the root private key S_0 and the next pre-image in the chain t_i , ($S_i = S_0 + t_i$).

In addition to providing tokens, access chains provide a way of linking signatures for a pre-determined number of messages. These signatures can be applied directly to a chunk of data rather than an entire transaction. Take, for example, a hash chain of length n. That is:

$$t_n = h^n(K)$$

$$t_{n-1} = h^{n-1}(K)$$

$$\vdots$$

$$t_i = h^i(K)$$

$$\vdots$$

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-continued

$$t_1 = h(K)$$

$$t_0 = K$$

In such a chain, $t_n = h(t_{n-1})$ forms the chain of hashes. The final value t_n is registered to a given public key (or address) by publishing it to the blockchain **150**. Providing the pre-image that solves the latest registered value can act as a signature to a message or other data that may be included within a transaction. This signature is publicly verifiable and can only be provided by the token owner. However, this method is susceptible to a replay attack, where an attacker can create a malicious transaction once viewing the signature value.

Techniques described herein provide a secure, two-stage signing process where one transaction is used to provide a signature, and another transaction is used to attest to the signature.

A first party, e.g. Alice **103a**, has the pre-image (first value) to a token (recorded value) that is recorded on the blockchain **150**. The recorded value is generated by applying a one-way function (e.g. a hash function) to the first value. Alice **103a**, when wanting to sign a message, can generate a signature for the message by applying a one-way function to at least the first value and the message. Alice **103a** can then construct a transaction containing the signed message and transmit the transaction to the blockchain network **106**. Alice **103a** can then construct a second transaction that comprises the first value (i.e. the pre-image to the recorded value) and transmit the transaction to the blockchain network. The first and second transactions may either be the same transaction or different transactions.

Now, the first value is also recorded on the blockchain **150** and thus is a newly registered value (or an updated registered value). Alice **103a** can repeat the above process to sign a second message. That is, Alice **103a** generates a signature by hashing the pre-image of the newly registered value and the message. Alice **103a** transmits a transaction (this transaction may be the same as the second transaction or a different transaction) comprising the signed message to the blockchain network **106**. Alice **103a** then transmits a transaction comprising the pre-image to the updated registered value to the blockchain network. This process can be repeated until the seed value is revealed.

In some examples, instead of hashing the pre-image and the message, Alice **103a** hashing the pre-image and a hash of the message. For example, Alice **103a** may have generated an access chain with t_0, \dots, t_n as defined above and the n^{th} message m_n to be signed. The value $t_{n+1} = h(t_n)$ is currently registered on the blockchain **150** and, as such, Alice can construct the signature of the message m_n using both the hash of the message and the pre-image of the latest registered value as:

$$h(t_n + h(m_n))$$

Where, again, $t_0 = h^n(K)$. At this point, if and when the transaction including the signature is included in a block, the signature cannot be verified. To do this, Alice **103a** constructs an attestation transaction where t_0 is provided and registered as the latest value in the access chain registered on the blockchain **150**.

By providing this value, both the access chain can be verified by checking that $h(t_n) = t_{n+1}$ as well that $h(t_n + h(m_n))$ agrees with the data provided in the signature (first) trans-

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action. This two-stage signing process where the user attests nominally and when it is complete, sends a verification and attestation.

The one-way function used by Alice **103a** may be a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC). A HMAC is a tabulated value taking a message m and key K to provide a verification of the message. HMACs are a category of message authentication codes (MACs) exploiting the pre-image and collision resistance of cryptographic hash functions to prevent exposure of the key used to calculate the HMAC. This is widely applied in secure message transmission and transmission error detection as a small change in the input typically results in a significant change in the output of a hash function.

Let $h(x)$ be the hash function evaluated at the value x . The HMAC is defined as:

$$HMAC(K, m) = h\{(K' \oplus Opad) || h[(K' \oplus Ipadd) || m]\}$$

$$K' = \begin{cases} h(K), & \text{if } K \text{ is larger than block size} \\ K, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

This can serve as a secure signature scheme that can be applied directly to a piece of data (in this case the message m). This can be published to a blockchain **150** followed by an attestation by providing the key K that can verify the signature.

Using a secret key, K , an access chain n levels deep can be formed. That is:

$$t_1 = h(K)$$

$$t_2 = h^2(K)$$

$$\vdots$$

$$t_n = h^n(K)$$

where K is the ultimate secret and t_n is the initial registered value on the blockchain **150**. Alice **103a** can then use $HMAC(t_{n-1}, m)$ as a signature of m . A verifying party (e.g. Bob) can then use the newly exposed value to check that indeed $H(t_{n-1}) = t_n$ and calculate that $HMAC(K_{n-1}, m)$ matches the registered value. The exposure of the pre-image acts as an attestation to the signature. Again, this process can be repeated to generate and attest to a new signature for each message to be signed.

This relationship gives the signatures a finite lifetime until the next value in the access chain is exposed. It also allows for delegation of signatures as the signer (Alice **103a**) can provide the next one or more values in the access chain (without revealing the root of the access chain) to a second party (e.g. Bob **103b**) who can submit the signatures on her behalf. This process requires a degree of trust between the access chain holder and the delegate as the raw key would be possessed by the delegate. The delegate may be required to submit at least one transaction signed using their public key which can be connected to them. Therefore, if the delegate should abuse the key, they can be identified using the transaction signature.

As an example use case, in many legal scenarios, contract conditions may change regularly to accommodate new legislation introduced in various jurisdictions. This often requires alterations of many contracts in similar or nearly identical ways. The schemes presented above provide methods to apply signatures to a finite and pre-determined

number of documents using access chains. Take for example a legally binding contract m_0 and a signee with a secret K . The signee can publish $t_n = h^n(K)$ to the blockchain **150**. Using the preimage of the published $h^n(K)$, a signature can be generated using either the hash of the pre-image of the message ($h(t_{n-1} + h(m_0))$) followed by an attestation by providing t_{n-1} or by using the HMAC scheme $HMAC(t_{n-1}, m)$ for additional security. If the contract needs to be amended the amendment (m_1) can then be signed by the signee using the next value in the chain. Thus, a full record of all contract states will be recorded immutably and time-stamped on the blockchain **150**. As they are applied to the data (in this case the contract amendment) directly and subsequently attested to, multiple signatures can also be batched into a single transaction for efficient management of a large number of contracts.

Identity-Linked Access Chains

As set out above, Alice **103a** and Bob **103b** can each derive an identity-linked key that is provably related to the other party. Instead of using the identity-linked key directly, Alice and Bob can each use their respective identity-linked key to derive a new shared secret. As set out above, Alice and Bob's respective identity-linked keys are generated as:

$$P_{A1} = (S_{A0} + S_{AB0}) \cdot G$$

$$P_{B1} = (S_{B0} + S_{AB0}) \cdot G$$

From this, Alice **103a** and Bob **103b** can each calculate a derived shared secret ("a first derived shared private key") as:

$$S_{AB1} = [S_{A1} S_{B1} G]_x = [S_{A1} P_{B1}]_x = [S_{B1} P_{A1}]_x,$$

where $[\]_x$ denotes the x coordinate of the elliptic curve point. This newly derived shared secret or a key derived from it can then serve as a seed in an access chain. As, ultimately, the root of an access chain is exposed, using a derived key does not compromise the initial shared secret S_{AB0} so a new chain can be created again. For instance, a new chain can be calculated using S_{AB1} .

Taking, for example, a **100** level deep access chain, with $t^n = h^n(S_{AB1})$, Alice **103a** can generate:

$$t_{100} = h^{100}(S_{AB1})$$

$$t_{99} = h^{99}(S_{AB1})$$

⋮

$$t_1 = h(S_{AB1})$$

$$t_0 = S_{AB1}$$

Alice can publicly register t_{100} by including it in a transaction and transmitting the transaction to the blockchain network to be stored on the blockchain **150**. Bob **103b** can then verify Alice's identity by calculating the value himself (as he also knows S_{AB1} as well).

Should one party suspect that the other party has been compromised by exposure of S_{AB1} , they can require a challenge solution that requires the next value required that only the two original parties can perform. Bob **103b** can send a challenge message (m_c) and the expected form to Alice **103a**, both encrypted using S_{AB0} or a key derived from it. Since S_{AB0} was not used in the compromised access chain there is no way for it be compromised as well, and as such no way for anyone other than Alice **103a** to know the challenge message and the required form of response. If t^{n+1}

is the latest value recorded on the blockchain **150**, the required response can take a form such as one of the following:

$$y = h(h^n(S_{AB1}) \| m_c)$$

$$y = h(h^n(S_{AB1}) \oplus m_c)$$

where $\|$ denotes concatenation and \oplus refers to an XOR operation. Here, $h^n(S_{AB1})$ is the value in the sequence immediately preceding the latest value recorded on the blockchain. E.g. if t^{100} is recorded on the blockchain, $h^n(S_{AB1}) = t^{99}$. If Alice **103a** reports with this key Bob **103b** can be sure of her identity. However, Bob **103b** may also require Alice **103a** to answer in this form for the remainder of the chain. The chain can be continued to be used despite the potential security breach. However, a new access chain can also be created using a newly derived key if desired by either party.

An example use case will now be described. Audits provide an independent evaluation of a wide range of business processes including financial reporting, regulatory compliance, and product quality. Third-party auditors may form an essential part of a supply chain, particularly if a business is producing products that will end up in the hands of consumers. Currently, many of these auditors do not have the option to integrate with blockchain systems. Using an identity-linked access chain, the authenticity of the attestation can be verified using the linked identity and updated at whatever frequency is required by the auditing body.

The auditing body must declare a public key P_m , which would have sufficiently rigorous KYC procedures. An auditor can link his or her identity to the auditing body via a calculated shared key pair (S_{AB1}, P_{AB1}) , e.g. calculated via a Diffie-Helman exchange. This can act as the root of an access chain $t_n = h^n(S_{AB1})$ where the initial value t_n is registered by the auditing body. The individual auditor can then perform the required compliance investigation and provide certification of the compliance m_0 using a signature method as described above, recording the pre-image of the latest registered value on the blockchain **150**. This certification can be given an expiry where another compliance audit must take place. At each renewal, the required reporting conditions can be verified, and the signature is withheld if the conditions are not satisfied. This provides an immutable record of compliance, traceable back to the individual auditor and with a verifiable connection to the auditing body.

CONCLUSION

It will be appreciated that the above embodiments have been described by way of example only.

More generally, according to a first instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a computer-implemented method of linking a first party and a second party, the method being performed by the first party and comprising: obtaining a first cryptographic public-private key pair comprising a first private key and a corresponding first public key; generating a first shared private key pair known to the first party and the second party; and generating a second cryptographic public-private key pair comprising a second private key and a corresponding second public key, wherein the second private key is generated based on the first private key and the shared private key.

According to an optional, second instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with the first instantiation, comprising: generating one or more updated shared private keys, each

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updated shared private key known to the first party and the second party; and generating one or more updated second cryptographic public-private key pairs, each comprising a respective updated second private key and a corresponding updated second public key, wherein each respective updated second private key is generated based on the first private key and a different one of the one or more updated shared private keys.

In some embodiments, a plurality of updated shared private key pairs are generated, and a plurality of updated second cryptographic public-private key pairs are generated, and wherein each respective updated second private key is generated based on the first private key and a different one of the plurality of updated shared private keys.

According to an optional, third instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with the second instantiation, wherein the one or more updated shared private keys form a sequence of keys starting with the first shared private key, and wherein each next private key in the sequence is generated by applying a one-way function to at least the previous shared private key in the sequence.

According to an optional, fourth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with any of the first to third instantiations, comprising: obtaining a second public key of the second party, wherein the second public key of the second party is generated based on a first private key of the second party and the first shared private key; and generating a derived shared private key based on the second private key of the first party and the second public key of the second party.

According to an optional, fifth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with the fourth instantiation, comprising: generating a sequence of values, wherein an initial value in the sequence is the derived shared private key or is generated by applying a one-way function to the derived shared private key, and wherein each next value in the sequence is generated by applying the one-way function to at least the previous value in the sequence.

According to an optional, sixth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with the fifth instantiation, comprising: transmitting a blockchain transaction to one or more nodes of a blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, wherein the blockchain transaction comprises a latest value in the sequence of values.

For example, the latest value in the sequence may be final (i.e. last) value. Alternatively, the latest value in the sequence may a previous value in the sequence. For instance, the final n^{th} value may be submitted to the blockchain, then the $n-1^{th}$ value, then the $n-2^{th}$ value, and so on.

According to an optional, seventh instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with the sixth instantiation, comprising: receiving a challenge message from the second party, the challenge message being encrypted based on the first shared private key; generating a response to the challenge message, wherein the response is based on the challenge message and a value immediately preceding the latest value in the sequence of values; and transmitting the response to the second party.

According to an optional, eighth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with the seventh instantiation, comprising: receiving an expected form of the response from the second party, the expected form being encrypted based on the first

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shared private key, and wherein the generated response is further based on the expected form.

According to an optional, ninth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with any of the first to eighth instantiations, wherein the first shared private key is generated based on a private key of a third cryptographic public-private key pair of the first party and a public key of a cryptographic public-private key pair of the second party.

The first shared private key can also be generated from a third public key of the third cryptographic public-private key pair of the first party and a private key of the cryptographic public-private key pair of the second party.

According to an optional, tenth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with any of the first to ninth instantiations, wherein the first and second parties are a same party.

According to an optional, eleventh instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with any of the first to ninth instantiations, wherein the first and second parties are different parties.

According to an optional, twelfth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with any of the first to eleventh instantiations, comprising: signing a message with a signature based on the second private key of the first party; and transmitting the signed message to the second party and/or a third, different party.

According to an optional, thirteenth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with any of the first to twelfth instantiations, comprising: signing at least part of blockchain transaction with a signature based on the second private key of the first party; and transmitting the blockchain transaction to one or more nodes of a blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain.

According to a fourteenth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there is provided a computer-implemented method of verifying a link between a first party and a second party, the method being performed by a third party and comprising: obtaining, from the second party, i) a message signed with a first signature based on a first private key of the second party, and ii) a first public key corresponding to the first private key; obtaining, from the second party, iii) the message signed with a second signature based on a second private key of the second party, and iv) a second public key corresponding to the second private key; obtaining, from the first party, v) the message signed with a third signature based on a shared private key known only to the first party and the second party, and a corresponding shared public key; and determining whether the second public key of the second party has been generated based on the first public key of the second party and the shared public key.

According to an optional, fifteenth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with the fourteenth instantiation, wherein said determining comprises determining whether the first, second and third signatures are valid signatures.

According to an optional, sixteenth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with the fourteenth or fifteenth instantiations, comprising: transmitting the message to the first and second parties.

According to an optional, seventeenth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with the fourteenth or sixteenth instantiations, wherein the first and second parties are a same party.

According to an optional, eighteenth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with the fourteenth or sixteenth instantiations, wherein the first and second parties are different parties.

According to a nineteenth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there is provided a computer-implemented method of attesting to a first signature used by a first party to sign a first message, wherein the blockchain comprises a recorded transaction, the recorded transaction comprising a registered value generated by applying a one-way function to a first value; the method being performed by the first party and comprising: generating the first signature by applying a one-way function to at least the first value and the message; transmitting a first transaction to one or more nodes of a blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the first transaction comprising the message signed with the first signature; and transmitting a second transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the second transaction comprising the first value.

According to an optional, twentieth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with the nineteenth instantiation, wherein the first value is an updated registered value and is generated by applying a one-way function to a second value, and wherein the method comprises: generating a second signature by applying a one-way function to at least the second value and the second message; transmitting a third transaction to one or more nodes of a blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the third transaction comprising the second message signed with the second signature; and transmitting a fourth blockchain transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the fourth transaction comprising the second value.

According to an optional, twenty first instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with the nineteenth or twentieth instantiations, wherein the first signature is generated by applying a one-way function to at least i) the first value, and ii) a result of applying a one-way function to the first message.

For instance, the first signature may be generated by hashing the first message, and then hashing a combination of the first value and the hash of the first message.

According to an optional, twenty second instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with any of the nineteenth to twenty first instantiations, wherein the first signature is a hash-based message authentication code.

According to an optional, twenty third instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with any of the nineteenth to twenty second instantiations, wherein said transmitting of the second transaction comprises transmitting the second transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network after the first transaction is included in the blockchain.

According to an optional, twenty fourth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with any of the nineteenth to twenty third instantiations, wherein the recorded value and the first value are part of a sequence of values, and wherein each next value in the sequence is generated by applying a one-way function to a previous value in the sequence.

According to an optional, twenty fifth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with the twenty fourth instantiation, comprising transmitting one or more values in the sequence of values to a second party.

According to an optional, twenty sixth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with any of the nineteenth to twenty fifth instantiations, wherein the first and third transactions are a same transaction, and/or wherein the second and fourth transactions are a same transaction.

According to an optional, twenty seventh instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method in accordance with any of the first to twenty sixth instantiations, wherein the one-way function is a cryptographic hash function.

According to a twenty eighth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there is provided computer equipment of the first party, comprising: memory comprising one or more memory units; and processing apparatus comprising one or more processing units, wherein the memory stores code arranged to run on the processing apparatus, the code being configured so as when on the processing apparatus to perform the method of any of the first to thirteenth instantiations.

According to a twenty ninth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there is provided a computer program embodied on computer-readable storage and configured so as, when run on computer equipment of the first party, to perform the method of any of the first to thirteenth instantiations.

According to a thirtieth instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there is provided computer equipment of the third party, comprising: memory comprising one or more memory units; and processing apparatus comprising one or more processing units, wherein the memory stores code arranged to run on the processing apparatus, the code being configured so as when on the processing apparatus to perform the method of any of the fourteenth to eighteenth instantiations.

According to a thirty first instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there is provided a computer program embodied on computer-readable storage and configured so as, when run on computer equipment of the third party, to perform the method of any of the fourteenth to eighteenth instantiations.

According to a thirty second instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there is provided computer equipment of the first party, comprising: memory comprising one or more memory units; and processing apparatus comprising one or more processing units, wherein the memory stores code arranged to run on the processing apparatus, the code being configured so as when on the processing apparatus to perform the method of any of the nineteenth to twenty seventh instantiations.

According to a thirty third instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there is provided a computer program embodied on computer-readable storage and configured so as, when run on computer equipment of the first party, to perform the method of the nineteenth to twenty seventh instantiations.

According to another instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a method comprising the actions of the first party, the second party, and/or the third party.

According to another instantiation of the teachings disclosed herein, there may be provided a system comprising the computer equipment of the first party, the second party, and/or the third party.

Other variants or use cases of the disclosed techniques may become apparent to the person skilled in the art once

given the disclosure herein. The scope of the disclosure is not limited by the described embodiments but only by the accompanying claims.

The invention claimed is:

1. A computer-implemented method of attesting to a first signature used by a first party to sign a first message, wherein a blockchain comprises a recorded transaction, and the recorded transaction comprises a registered value generated by applying a one-way function to a first value, the method being performed by the first party and comprising:
 - generating the first signature by applying a first one-way function to at least the first value and the first message; transmitting a first transaction to one or more nodes of a blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the first transaction comprising the first signature; and transmitting a second transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the second transaction comprising the first value, wherein a second party is configured to verify the first signature was generated by the first party by:
 - generating a candidate first signature by applying the first one-way function to the at least the first value and the first message; and
 - verifying that the candidate first signature matches the first signature.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the first value is an updated registered value and is generated by applying a one-way function to a second value, and wherein the method comprises:
 - generating a second signature by applying a second one-way function to at least the second value and a second message;
 - transmitting a third transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the third transaction comprising the second signature; and
 - transmitting a fourth blockchain transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the fourth blockchain transaction comprising the second value.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the first and third transactions are a same transaction, and/or wherein the second and fourth transactions are a same transaction.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the first signature is generated by applying the first one-way function to at least i) the first value, and ii) a result of applying a third one-way function to the first message.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the first signature is a hash-based message authentication code.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein said transmitting of the second transaction comprises transmitting the second transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network after the first transaction is included in the blockchain.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the registered value and the first value are part of a sequence of values, and wherein each next value in the sequence is generated by applying a fourth one-way function to a previous value in the sequence.
8. The method of claim 7, comprising transmitting one or more values in the sequence of values to a second party.
9. Computer equipment comprising:
 - memory comprising one or more memory units;
 - processing apparatus comprising one or more processing units; and
 - a network interface comprising one or more network interface;

- wherein the memory stores code arranged to run on the processing apparatus, the code being configured so as when run on the processing apparatus, the processing apparatus operates the computer equipment to perform a method of attesting to a first signature used by a first party to sign a first message, wherein a blockchain comprises a recorded transaction, and the recorded transaction comprises a registered value generated by applying a one-way function to a first value, the method being performed by the first party and comprising:
- generating the first signature by applying a first one-way function to at least the first value and the first message;
 - transmitting a first transaction to one or more nodes of a blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the first transaction comprising the first signature; and
 - transmitting a second transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the second transaction comprising the first value, wherein a second party is configured to verify the first signature was generated by the first party by:
 - generating a candidate first signature by applying the first one-way function to the at least the first value and the first message; and
 - verifying that the candidate first signature matches the first signature.
10. The computer equipment of claim 9, wherein the first value is an updated registered value and is generated by applying a one-way function to a second value, and wherein the code is configured so as when run on the processing apparatus, the processing apparatus operates the computer equipment to:
- generate a second signature by applying a second one-way function to at least the second value and a second message;
 - transmit a third transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the third transaction comprising the second signature; and
 - transmit a fourth blockchain transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the fourth blockchain transaction comprising the second value.
11. The computer equipment of claim 9, wherein the first signature is generated by applying the first one-way function to at least i) the first value, and ii) a result of applying a third one-way function to the first message.
12. The computer equipment of claim 9, wherein the first signature is a hash-based message authentication code.
13. The computer equipment of claim 9, wherein said transmitting of the second transaction comprises transmitting the second transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network after the first transaction is included in the blockchain.
14. The computer equipment of claim 9, wherein the registered value and the first value are part of a sequence of values, and wherein each next value in the sequence is generated by applying a fourth one-way function to a previous value in the sequence.
15. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium comprising a computer program configured so as when run on one or more processors, the one or more processors perform a method of attesting to a first signature used by a first party to sign a first message, wherein a blockchain comprises a recorded transaction, and the recorded transaction comprises a registered value generated by applying a one-way function to a first value, the method being performed by the first party and comprising:

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generating the first signature by applying a first one-way function to at least the first value and the first message;
 transmitting a first transaction to one or more nodes of a blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the first transaction comprising the first signature; and
 transmitting a second transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the second transaction comprising the first value,
 wherein a second party is configured to verify the first signature was generated by the first party by:
 generating a candidate first signature by applying the first one-way function to the at least the first value and the first message; and
 verifying that the candidate first signature matches the first signature.

16. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim **15**, wherein the first value is an updated registered value and is generated by applying a one-way function to a second value, and wherein the computer program is configured so as when run on the one or more processors, the one or more processor is configured to:

generate a second signature by applying a second one-way function to at least the second value and a second message;

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transmit a third transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the third transaction comprising the second signature; and transmit a fourth blockchain transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network for inclusion in the blockchain, the fourth blockchain transaction comprising the second value.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim **15**, wherein the first signature is generated by applying the first one-way function to at least i) the first value, and ii) a result of applying a third one-way function to the first message.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim **15**, wherein the first signature is a hash-based message authentication code.

19. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim **15**, wherein said transmitting of the second transaction comprises transmitting the second transaction to one or more nodes of the blockchain network after the first transaction is included in the blockchain.

20. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim **15**, wherein the registered value and the first value are part of a sequence of values, and wherein each next value in the sequence is generated by applying a fourth one-way function to a previous value in the sequence.

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