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Inventor(s)	Juliato; Marcio et al.

Time recovery from attacks on delayed authentication

Abstract

Techniques to perform time recovery from attacks on delayed authentication in a time synchronized network are described. One embodiment comprises a method for decoding time information and a message authentication code (MAC) from a time message, the time information to synchronize a local clock for a device to a network time of a time synchronized network (TSN), and the MAC to authenticate the time message, determining whether the time message is authentic using the MAC, discarding the time information when the time message is not authentic, performing a bounded search to identify authentic time information using the MAC, and passing the authentic time information to a clock manager to synchronize the local clock to the network time of the TSN when the authentic time information is identified. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Inventors: Juliato; Marcio (Portland, OR), Sastry; Manoj (Portland, OR), Gutierrez; Christopher (Hillsboro, OR), Lesi; Vuk (Cornelius, OR), Ahmed; Shabbir (Portland, OR)

Applicant: Intel Corporation (Santa Clara, CA)

Family ID: 1000008767337

Assignee: Intel Corporation (Santa Clara, CA)

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Primary Examiner: Simitoski; Michael

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Background/Summary

BACKGROUND

(1) Many computing systems require real-time safety critical features. For example, many autonomous systems, industrial systems, etc., require such systems to have real-time safety-critical features. This often necessitates that timekeeping performance within the system has higher levels of security relative to other aspects of the system. For example, factories employ synchronized robots to accomplish coordinated tasks, often in the presence of human beings. In another example, robots utilize coordination to perform surgeries on humans. As yet another example, self-driving vehicles require synchronization of networked sensing elements to build a precise perception of the environment around the vehicle, including other vehicles, objects, hazards, and persons. Tools

relied on to achieve the necessary time performance, synchronization, and bounded latency communication for such time sensitive systems to perform as needed is often referred to as time-sensitive networking (TSN).

(2) In general, TSN defines a set of standards (and amendments) with the aim to enable time synchronization and deterministic data delivery in converged networks where time-critical (TC) traffic coexists with other types of traffic. Thus, there is a need to provide security for TSN devices to mitigate the risks associated with disruption in TSN operation from attacks on the timing of the network.

Description

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL VIEWS OF THE DRAWINGS

- (1) To easily identify the discussion of any particular element or act, the most significant digit or digits in a reference number refer to the figure number in which that element is first introduced.
- (2) FIG. 1A illustrates an aspect of a time synchronized network (TSN) **102** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (3) FIG. 1B illustrates an aspect of a TSN **102** for sensors in accordance with one embodiment.
- (4) FIG. 1C illustrates an aspect of a TSN **102** for actuators in accordance with one embodiment.
- (5) FIG. 2A illustrates an aspect of a TSN **200a** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (6) FIG. 2B illustrates an aspect of a timing diagram **200b** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (7) FIG. 3A illustrates an aspect of a TSN **300a** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (8) FIG. 3B illustrates an aspect of a timing diagram **300b** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (9) FIG. 4 illustrates an aspect of a TSN node **104** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (10) FIG. 5 illustrates an aspect of an apparatus **500** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (11) FIG. 6 illustrates an aspect of a TSN node **104** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (12) FIG. 7 illustrates an aspect a set of operating environment **700** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (13) FIG. 8A illustrates an aspect of an apparatus **800** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (14) FIG. 8B illustrates an aspect of the apparatus **800** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (15) FIG. 9 illustrates an aspect of a clock recovery manager **816** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (16) FIG. 10 illustrates an operating environment **1000** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (17) FIG. 11 illustrates a logic flow **1100** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (18) FIG. 12 illustrates a logic flow **1200** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (19) FIG. 13A illustrates an aspect of a clock leader (CL) **1300a** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (20) FIG. 13B illustrates an aspect of a clock follower (CF) **1300b** in accordance with one embodiment.
- (21) FIG. 14 illustrates an aspect of a computer-readable medium **1400** in accordance with one embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

(22) In the following description, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of various embodiments. However, various embodiments may be practiced without the specific details. In other instances, well-known methods, procedures, components, and circuits have not been described in detail so as not to obscure the particular embodiments. Further, various aspects of embodiments may be performed using various means, such as integrated semiconductor circuits (“hardware”), computer-readable instructions organized into one or more programs (“software”), or some combination of hardware and software. For the purposes of this disclosure reference to “logic” shall mean either hardware (such as logic circuitry or more

generally circuitry or circuit), software, firmware, or some combination thereof.

(23) The present disclosure is generally directed to time management and recovery techniques for systems operating on strict time requirements, such as systems based on time synchronized networks (TSNs). As noted, TSN defines a set of standards (and amendments) with the aim to enable time synchronization and deterministic data delivery in converged networks where time sensitive traffic coexists with other types of traffic. Various standards have been developed to address time-synchronized or time-sensitive communications. By way of example and not limitation, some standards for enabling time-synchronized communications include those promulgated by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and/or the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). For example, IEEE 1588, IEEE 802.1AS, IEEE 802.1Qbv and IEC/IEEE 60802 provide systems and methods for synchronizing device clocks. In one example, IEEE 1588 defines a precision time protocol (PTP) for time synchronization across a network. In another example, IEEE 802.1AS defines a time-sensitive networking protocol referred to as a generic PTP (gPTP) for time synchronization across a network, where time sensitive devices (e.g., clock followers) synchronize to a leader clock (e.g., clock leader). In yet another example, IEEE 802.1Qbv defines time-sensitive networking for deterministic latency through traffic scheduling. In still another example, IEC/IEEE 60802 defines time-sensitive networking profiles for industrial automation. Other examples include a network time protocol (NTP) which is a networking protocol for clock synchronization between computer systems over packet-switched, variable-latency data networks, network time security (NTS) which is a secure version of NTP, and other time-synchronized network protocols. Embodiments are not limited to these examples.

(24) Time synchronization in a TSN requires tight software-hardware interplay. A device (or node) in a TSN may implement a clock manager as a software component and a hardware clock as a hardware component. The clock manager adjusts timing for the hardware clock to ensure synchronization with a common network time for the TSN. In one embodiment, for example, a precision time protocol (PTP) hardware clock (PHC) is periodically adjusted by a PTP for Linux (PTP4L) software module to account for time offset between a clock leader and a clock follower in PTP-synchronized nodes. When a software component receives incorrect time information, such as a time offset bias within messages carrying time synchronization information, the software can misconfigure or mis-control hardware for the PHC, thereby leading to incorrect timekeeping. For instance, attackers located external to a TSN-capable platform along a network path can tamper with messages carrying time information to synchronize the hardware clock. Examples include malicious switches and/or relays tampering with time-related messages, or external attackers injecting messages into the network, which ends up impacting a time of the nodes downstream. Consequently, system and applications depending on TSN capabilities will consume incorrect time. Accordingly, early detection of a corrupted messages and/or software components for a TSN node is critical within a TSN.

(25) One solution to address this problem is to implement one or more authentication techniques to protect information as it is transported through a TSN. For example, assume a sender node sends a message to a receive node. The sender node employs a secret key to generate and verify a message authentication code (MAC) for the message. The secret key is known only by the sender and a recipient. The sender node uses a cryptographic algorithm, such as a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) or Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC), or any other cryptographic message authentication mechanism, to calculate the MAC value for the message. This involves applying the secret key and the message to the chosen algorithm, which produces a fixed-size MAC output. The sender node sends both the original message and the MAC value along with it to the receiver node. Upon receiving the message and MAC, the receiver node independently calculates the MAC of the message using the same cryptographic algorithm and secret key. The receiver node compares the received MAC value with the calculated MAC value. If they match, it confirms the authenticity and integrity of the message. If they do not match, it

indicates that an attacker has altered or tampered with the message. By using a secret key known only to the sender and the recipient, the MAC ensures that the message has not been tampered with during transit and was indeed sent by the legitimate sender. If the MAC values match, it provides strong evidence of message integrity and authentication.

(26) In some cases, the sender node may send the secret key to the receiver node in a separate message from the one protected by the MAC. For example, a TSN may implement an authenticated time distribution scheme as defined in IEEE 802.1AS. Authenticated time distribution refers to a mechanism for ensuring the integrity and authenticity of time synchronization information in a TSN. IEEE 802.1AS is a standard that defines the precision time protocol (PTP), also known as IEEE 1588, for time synchronization in Ethernet-based networks. PTP allows network devices to synchronize their clocks with high precision, enabling coordinated actions in time-sensitive applications. Authenticated time distribution enhances the security of PTP by introducing mechanisms to verify the authenticity of time synchronization messages exchanged between devices. It helps to prevent unauthorized or malicious entities from manipulating or injecting false timing information into the network. The authenticated time distribution mechanism typically involves the use of digital signatures or MACs to protect the PTP messages. By employing cryptographic techniques, the integrity and authenticity of the timing information exchanged between PTP devices are ensured. This authentication mechanism can prevent various attacks, including spoofing, tampering, or replay attacks, which could compromise the accuracy and reliability of time synchronization within the network. By incorporating authenticated time distribution into a time-sensitive network, IEEE 802.1AS aims to enhance the overall security and trustworthiness of time synchronization, ensuring the time-sensitive applications can rely on precise and authentic timing information for their operations.

(27) While authenticated time distribution improves detection of an attack on one or more nodes of a TSN, a TSN node affected by the attack may not have the ability to compensate for the attack before it is critically compromised. Assume a TSN implements authenticated time distribution, such as defined by IEEE 802.1AS or other authentication protocols, to protect time information distributed from a clock leader to a clock follower in the TSN. A failed MAC indicates a lack of integrity, and therefore the receiver node must drop the received time message carrying the time information. For example, an active man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack in the network may tamper with the time information being distributed to cause a MAC mismatch and therefore cause a denial of service (DOS) by the receiver node. This results in a TSN node failing or becoming quarantined from the TSN, thereby causing any TSN applications reliant on timing from the TSN node to fail as well. The failure of a TSN node and/or TSN application may cause damage to equipment (e.g., robotic arms), vehicles (e.g., self-driving cars), or in some cases a loss of human life. Current solutions lack an efficient method to recover from attacks in time synchronization and traffic scheduling in modern TSNs.

(28) To solve these and other problems, embodiments implement techniques to perform time recovery from attacks made on authenticated time distribution in a TSN. In one embodiment, for example, a TSN node may implement a clock recovery manager to recover time information using a MAC from a time message. A receiver node receives a time message from a sender node. The receiver node decodes the time information and a MAC from the time message received from a sender node. The time information is used to synchronize a local clock of the receiver node to a network time of a TSN. The MAC is used to authenticate the time message. The receiver node determines whether the time message is authentic using the MAC. When the time message is authentic, the receiver node passes the time information from the time message to the clock manager to perform normal time synchronization operations. When the message is not authentic, however, the receiver node discards the time information when the time message is not authentic. Control is passed to the clock recovery manager to perform a search to identify authentic time information using the MAC and previous state information for the clock circuitry. Once the search

identifies authentic time information, it passes the authentic time information to the clock manager. The clock manager then synchronizes the local clock to the network time of the TSN using the authentic time information. In this manner, the TSN node can continue normal operations supporting TSN applications within the TSN without disruption or failure, even in the presence of an ongoing attack.

(29) FIG. 1A depicts a time sensitive network (TSN) **102** implemented according to a TSN standard (e.g., IEEE 1588, IEEE 802.1AS, IEEE 802.1Qbv, IEEE 802.15.4, or the like). As depicted, TSN **102** includes various TSN nodes **104**, such as TSN nodes **104a-d**. The TSN nodes **104** may be implemented as different types of nodes for a TSN, such as an origination node, relay nodes, switch nodes or end node. The TSN nodes **104a-d** are communicatively coupled via a TSN fabric **114**. The TSN fabric **114** can connect the TSN nodes **104a-d** using various types of network topology (e.g., mesh, star, etc.) and various types of communications channels (e.g., wired, wireless, fiber optic, buses, etc.). It is noted that the number of nodes in the TSN **102** is selected for purposes of clarity and not limitation. In practice, the TSN **102** can include any number and combination of nodes (e.g., origination nodes, switches, relay nodes, access points, end devices, etc.).

(30) The TSN nodes **104** can communicate with each other via the TSN fabric **114**. For instance, the TSN nodes **104** can send messages **112** to each other over one or more communication channels provided by the TSN fabric **114**. The messages **112** can include control information and payload information. One type of control information may include time information. The time information may comprise synchronization messages, time update messages, time compensation, or time follow-up messages (among other time protocol messages) for a time protocol used by the TSN **102**.

(31) Each TSN node **104** in the TSN **102** includes various hardware, software and/or firmware components. As depicted in FIG. 1A, a TSN **104** includes a clock manager **106**, a clock **108**, and a clock recovery manager **152**. For instance, the TSN node **104a** includes a clock manager **106a**, a clock **108a**, and a clock recovery manager **152a**. The TSN node **104b** includes a clock manager **106b**, a clock **108b**, and a clock recovery manager **152b**. The TSN nodes **104c**, **104d** are similarly configured. It may be appreciated that these are just a few components for a TSN **104**, and the TSN **104** can include other standard components for an electronic device, such as network interfaces, radio transceivers, input/output (I/O) components, memory units, processing circuits, controllers, sensors, actuators, mechanical parts, application software, operating system software, TSN-enabled platforms, and so forth.

(32) In various embodiments, the clock manager **106** is implemented as a software component, and the clock **108** is implemented as a hardware component (e.g., “hardware clock” or “clock circuitry”). The clock recovery manager **152** can be implemented as a software component, a hardware component, or a combination of both software and hardware components. The clock manager **106** and the clock recovery manager **152** may be implemented in the same execution environment or separate execution environments isolated from each other. For instance, the clock manager **106** and the clock recovery manager **152** can be implemented by processing circuitries, processors, logic circuits, chips, dies, systems on a chip (SoC), apparatus, devices, systems, and so forth.

(33) The clock manager **106** generally manages a time (e.g., clock signals) generated by the clock **108**. A key component in clock synchronization mechanisms is the clock manager software. In a time-sensitive network such as the TSN **102**, this component tightly interacts with network hardware (e.g., Ethernet/Wi-Fi) to obtain Precision Time Protocol (PTP) message timestamps, as well as with PTP clock hardware to implement suitable phase/frequency corrections in order to synchronize with a clock leader. The clock manager **106** typically implements a “clock servo.” A clock servo is a control algorithm that periodically takes as input some measurement (or estimate) of clock offset to a reference clock, and computes as output either time (e.g., phase) or frequency

adjustment to compensate for the given offset.

(34) The clock **108** is generally a hardware clock that implements clock circuitry to generate signals for digital electronics implemented by the TSN node **104**. In electronics and especially synchronous digital circuits, a clock signal oscillates between a high and a low state and is used to coordinate actions of the digital circuits. A clock signal is produced by a clock generator. Although more complex arrangements are used, the most common clock signal is in the form of a square wave with a 50% duty cycle, usually with a fixed, constant frequency. Circuits using the clock signal for synchronization may become active at either the rising edge, falling edge, or, in the case of double data rate, both in the rising and in the falling edges of the clock cycle. The clock **108** generates clock signals under control of the clock manager **106**. The clock **108** can be implemented using any suitable hardware having a timing accuracy required by a given device or network. In the TSN **102**, the clock **108** can be implemented as a PHC, although other hardware clocks can be implemented as well. Embodiments are not limited in this context.

(35) In normal operation, a network interface (not shown) for a TSN node **104** can receive messages **112** that include time information representative of a network time for the TSN **102**. The clock manager **106** can receive the time information from the network interface, analyze the time information, and determine whether time adjustments are needed for the clock **108**. When time adjustments are needed, the clock manager **106** generates control information and sends the control information to the clock **108**. The clock **108** receives the clock manager control information, and adjusts a parameter for the clock **108**, such as a phase or frequency for the clock signals generated by the clock **108**.

(36) The clock recovery manager **152** performs clock recovery operations to recover authentic time information in the event values carried by a time message has been tampered, modified or spoofed. Each time message is authenticated by a receiver node, such as a clock follower, using a cryptographic algorithm, such as HMAC or CMAC. When a time message fails authentication, the time information it carries is deemed untrustworthy and is discarded. This may cause the clock follower to starve for time updates, slowly desynchronizing from a network time, until the time-dependent operations of the clock follower are compromised. The clock recovery manager **152** implements techniques to recover authentic or valid time information to replace the discarded time information. The clock recovery manager **152** is further described with reference to FIG. 6.

(37) FIG. 1B illustrates an example of a TSN node **104a** of the TSN **102** designed to control one or more sensors **144**. As depicted in FIG. 1B, the TSN node **104** manages various types of sensors **144**, such as a signal sensor **116**, a biometric sensor **118**, a power sensor **120**, an acoustic sensor **122**, a sound sensor **124**, a visual sensor **126**, a speed sensor **128**, a temperature sensor **130**, and so forth.

(38) FIG. 1C illustrates an example of a TSN node **104b** of the TSN **102** designed to control one or more actuators and/or host controllers **146**. As depicted in FIG. 1C, the TSN node **104b** manages various types of actuators/controllers **146**, such as a robotic controller **136**, a server controller **138**, a mechanical actuator **148**, a circuit controller **140**, a device controller **142**, a video controller **132**, a computer controller **134**, and so forth. As with FIG. 1B, the TSN node **104b** shown in FIG. 1C may be suitable for implementing a physics-based model for the AADT **152**, as discussed in more detail herein.

(39) In time sensitive networks, such as the TSN **102** depicted in FIGS. 1A-1C, it becomes important for all the TSN nodes **104** to synchronize to a common or shared network time for the TSN **102**. For instance, the TSN nodes **104** may operate in accordance with IEEE 802.1AS which implements a hierarchical network to synchronize one or more clock followers (CFs) to a clock leader (CL) through relays or switch nodes. Synchronization is performed through communication of time messages, such as the messages **112**. The time messages may comprise, for example, time synchronization messages, time update messages and/or time follow-up messages for a PTP.

(40) In some cases, an attacker may simply attempt to disrupt timing of a single TSN node **104**

handling critical functions, such as disrupting one or both of the TSN node **104a** managing the sensors **144** and/or the TSN node **104b** managing the actuators/controllers **146**. Rather than attempting to disrupt timing for the entire TSN **102**, the attacker may attempt to attack timing of a single TSN node **104** to disrupt key operations for the TSN node **104**, such as an electronic control unit (ECU) to control speed sensing for a vehicle or a controller for a robotic arm in a factory.

(41) In other cases, an attacker may attempt to disrupt timing across the entire TSN **102**. To attack or disrupt the TSN **102**, an attacker may attempt a timing attack or desynchronization attack to compromise timing for one or more of the TSN nodes **104** in the TSN **102**. Assume the TSN node **104c** operates as a clock leader (CL) in the TSN **102**, and the TSN node **104d** operates as a clock follower (CF) in the TSN **102**. If an attacker located on a network device (e.g., switch or relay) modifies a critical attribute on a specific port, then all downstream nodes from that network device will suffer a desynchronization event. In this example, if the attacker successfully compromises the TSN node **104c**, then the TSN node **104d** is vulnerable to a timing attack in the form of receiving messages **112** from the TSN node **104c** with erroneous time information. Therefore, it becomes important to detect and localize an attack as quickly as possible. Furthermore, upon detection, it becomes important for the TSN **102** to quickly isolate the compromised network device and thereby prevent the desynchronization attack from spreading to other downstream nodes.

(42) In all cases, a time sensitive network such as the TSN **102** is vulnerable to a timing attack or a desynchronization attack. If a single network node is compromised, it may cause a cascade failure across the entire TSN **102**. An example of such an attack is further described with reference to FIGS. 2A, 2B, 3A and 3B.

(43) FIG. 2A depicts a TSN **200a** implemented according to a TSN standard (e.g., IEEE 1588, IEEE 802.1AS, IEEE 802.1Qbv, or the like). As depicted, the TSN **200a** includes talker node **202**, relay nodes **204a**, **204b**, and **204c**, and listener node **206**, all communicatively coupled via communication channel **208**. It is noted that the number of nodes in the TSN **200a** is selected for purposes of clarity and not limitation. In practice, the TSN **200a** can include any number and combination of nodes (e.g., origination nodes, talker nodes, listener nodes, switches, relay nodes, end devices, etc.). Nodes in the TSN **200a** (e.g., talker node **202**, listener node **206**, relay node **104a**, relay node **104b**, and relay node **104c**, etc.) are provided in a GCL table, which specifies timing for windows in which the nodes can transmit packets on communication channel **208**. It is also noted that the terms “switch node” and “relay node” are used interchangeably. For instance, the IEEE 802. AS defines protocol-aware switches as relays.

(44) Relay nodes **204a**, **204b**, and **204c** are time-aware switching nodes and can be any number of devices in a network arranged to communicate information. A talker node **202** sends or originates information and a listener node **206** receives or consumes information. Examples of a talker node **202** or a listener node **206** include devices such as electronic control units in an autonomous vehicle, an industrial system, a medical system, or the like. Additionally, communication channel **208** can be any of a variety of communication channels, including wired or wireless communication channels. In some implementations, all devices in the TSN **200a** will receive GCL tables. However, in some implementations, only talker nodes **202** and switching nodes (e.g., relay node **204a**, etc.) receive GCL tables while destination devices (e.g., listener node **206**) do not receive a GCL table.

(45) FIG. 2B depicts a timing diagram **200b** depicting communication windows (e.g., Qbv windows, or the like) for switches of TSN **200a** based on GCL tables. Typically, GCL tables are generated in a network controller (not shown) and are designed to prioritize time critical (TC) traffic and prevent lower priority traffic from accessing communication channel **208**, thus guaranteeing the timely delivery of TC packets within pre-configured time windows. In particular, timing diagram **200b** depicts Qbv windows **210a**, **210b**, and **210c** in which packets **212**, **214**, and **216** are transmitted. It is noted that the communication windows referred to herein are referred to as Qbv windows or protected windows for clarity. However, other standard or techniques for

forming protected communication windows to facilitate time synchronization can be used besides Qbv windows. Examples are not limited in this context.

(46) To facilitate transmission of packets (e.g., packet **212**, etc.) during protected windows (e.g., Qbv window **210a**, etc.), nodes in the TSN **200a** are time synchronized and scheduled to transmit TC packets (e.g., packet **212**, etc.) using non overlapping protected windows (e.g., Qbv window **210a**, etc.). It is to be appreciated that providing latency bounded communication (e.g., as depicted in timing diagram **200b**) requires tight synchronization of time between nodes in TSN **200a**. With such dependency on time synchronization, reliable TSN operation can be disrupted by attacking the timing of the network, sometimes referred to as a desynchronization attack or event.

(47) FIG. 3A depicts a TSN **300a**, which is like TSN **200a** except that the relay node **302** is depicted as compromised. In particular, the clock (not shown) of relay node **302** can be attacked and compromised, thereby causing the Qbv window **210b** associated with relay node **302** to be misaligned with respect to, and even overlap with, the protected windows of the other switch nodes in the data stream path (e.g., along communication channel **208**).

(48) FIG. 3B depicts timing diagram **300b** illustrating Qbv window **210b** misaligned with Qbv window **210a** and Qbv window **210c** and overlapping with Qbv window **210a**. As such, packets (e.g., packet **214** in the figure) arrive too late with respect to the attacked switch protected window (e.g., Qbv window **210b**) causing them to be buffered and sent in the next protected window. As a result of the delay in transmitting packet **214**, relay node **302** breaks the latency bound of the stream that it is serving and can result in errors or comprise the safety of the system in which the nodes are operating.

(49) FIG. 4 illustrates an apparatus **400**. The apparatus **400** is a more detailed view of part of a TSN node **104** that implements one or more TSN protocols or standards. The TSN node **104** may be implemented as any network devices suitable for operation within a TSN, such as TSN **102**, **200a**, **300a**, and so forth. The TSN node **104** may be implemented as part of a vehicle, robot, industrial machine or any other devices suitable for a TSN. The TSN node **104** may be implemented as an origination node **202**, relay nodes **204a-204c**, relay node **302** and/or end node **206**. The TSN node **104** may be implemented as either a clock leader (CL) or a clock follower (CF) in a TSN. The TSN node **104** may include interfaces to communicate information with other TSN nodes **104** in the TSN **102**, such as messages **112**, for example.

(50) The TSN node **104** may operate in accordance with a timing protocol, such as a precision time protocol (PTP) for IEEE 1588, IEEE 802.1AS, IEEE 802.15.4, and so forth. For instance, the TSN node **104** may operate in accordance with IEEE 802.1AS which implements a hierarchical network to synchronize clock followers (CFs) to a clock leader (CL) through relays or switch nodes. Synchronization is performed through communication of time messages, such as the messages **112**. The time messages may comprise, for example, time synchronization messages, time update messages or time follow-up messages (among others) for a PTP. The time messages may include, among other fields and attributes, a correction field, which accumulates a network residence, and an origin timestamp for a CL. The time message may also comprise, for example, a packet delay message type with additional fields and attributes.

(51) As depicted in FIG. 4, the apparatus **400** may include a software platform **402** and a hardware platform **408**. The software platform **402** may include, among other software components, one or more applications **404**, a clock manager **422**, and a kernel **406**. The clock manager **422** is similar to the clock manager **106** described with reference to FIG. 1. The hardware platform **408** may include, among other hardware components, a network interface such as a transceiver **410**, clock circuitry **412**, processing circuitry **414** and memory **416**.

(52) The processing circuitry **414** may include circuitry or processor logic, such as, for example, any of a variety of commercial processors. In some examples, the processing circuitry **414** may include multiple processors, a multi-threaded processor, a multi-core processor (whether the multiple cores coexist on the same or separate dies), and/or a multi-processor architecture of some

other variety by which multiple physically separate processors are in some way linked. Additionally, in some examples, the processing circuitry **414** may include graphics processing portions and may include dedicated memory, multiple-threaded processing and/or some other parallel processing capability. In some examples, the processing circuitry **414** may be an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or a field programmable integrated circuit (FPGA). In some examples, the processing circuitry **414** may be circuitry arranged to perform computations related to TSN, such as switching, clock leader, clock follower, routing, security, and so forth.

(53) The memory **416** may include logic, a portion of which includes arrays of integrated circuits, forming non-volatile memory to persistently store data or a combination of non-volatile memory and volatile memory. It is to be appreciated, that the memory **416** may be based on any of a variety of technologies. In particular, the arrays of integrated circuits included in memory **406** may be arranged to form one or more types of memory, such as, for example, dynamic random-access memory (DRAM), NAND memory, NOR memory, or the like.

(54) The transceiver **410** may include logic and/or features to support a communication interface. For example, the transceiver **410** may include one or more interfaces that operate according to various communication protocols or standards to communicate over direct or network communication links. Direct communications may occur via use of communication protocols or standards described in one or more industry standards (including progenies and variants). For example, the transceiver **410** may facilitate communication over a bus, such as, for example, peripheral component interconnect express (PCIe), non-volatile memory express (NVMe), universal serial bus (USB), system management bus (SMBus), SAS (e.g., serial attached small computer system interface (SCSI)) interfaces, serial AT attachment (SATA) interfaces, or the like. In some examples, transceiver **410** may be arranged to support wireless communication protocols or standards, such as, for example, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, ZigBee, LTE, 5G, or the like.

(55) The TSN node **104** may also include where the network is a controller area network (CAN) or a vehicle area network (VAN). The TSN node **104** may be implemented as a device that manages a sensor, actuator or a controller. The sensors may comprise a speed sensor, a direction sensor, a global positioning system (GPS) sensor, a gas pedal sensor, a brake pedal sensor, a positioning sensor, an object detection sensor, a lane detection sensor, a radar sensor, a light detection and ranging (LIDAR) sensor, an ultrasound sensor, an inertial measurement unit (IMU) sensor, a temperature sensor, a pressure sensor, an altitude sensor, an acoustic sensor, and so forth.

(56) In one aspect, the TSN node **104** may be implemented as a CL or CF for the TSN **102**. As previously discussed, the clock manager **422** may ensure that the clock circuitry **412** maintains a network time for the TSN **102**. When operating in a CL role, the clock manager **422** may send a message **112** with time information **418** representing a current network time to one or more nodes operating in a CF role for the TSN **102**. When operating in a CF role, the clock manager **422** may receive a message **112** from a CL node. The clock manager **422** may use the time information **418** from the message **112** to synchronize a local device time with the current network time maintained by the clock circuitry **412**. The clock manager **422** analyzes the time information **418**, and determines whether to adjust a parameter (e.g., phase or frequency) of the clock circuitry **412** to synchronize the clock circuitry **412** to the current network time.

(57) FIG. 5 illustrates a more detailed view for a clock manager **106** suitable to implement various aspects of the embodiments. As previously discussed, the clock manager **422** is a key component in clock synchronization mechanisms. The clock manager **422** tightly interacts with the transceiver **410** to obtain PTP message timestamps from the time information **418** received via messages **112** from a CL node in the TSN **102**. The clock manager **422** then outputs clock control information **420** to the hardware platform **408**. The clock control information **420** may represent suitable phase/frequency corrections in order to synchronize the clock circuitry **412** with a network time maintained by the CL.

(58) As depicted in FIG. 5, the clock manager **422** is an example of a PTP4L implementation that

includes delay measurement circuitry **502** with a time stamp processor **504**. The clock manager **106** further includes a proportional-integral clock servo **506** that maintains a servo state **508**. The clock manager **106** also includes a saturation component **510**.

(59) The proportional-integral clock servo **506** is generally a control algorithm that periodically takes as input some measurement (or estimate) of clock offset to a reference clock, and computes as output either time (e.g., phase) or frequency adjustment to compensate for the given offset. When the kernel **406** is implemented as a Linux operating system, for example, the clock manager **422** and the proportional-integral clock servo **506** can be implemented as a PTP4L clock management module. However, embodiments are not limited to this example.

(60) The delay measurement circuitry **502** and/or the proportional-integral clock servo **506** periodically takes as input a correction feature from a correction field in the time information **418** contained within messages **112** received by the transceiver **410**.

(61) The delay measurement circuitry **502** receives as input raw time measurements (e.g., path or link delay (pdelay) or sync/follow-up message talker origin/listener ingress timestamps) from the time information **418** and performs filtering operations to reduce measurement noise from the raw time measurements. This is because using raw or unfiltered measurements may adversely impact decisions made by the proportional-integral clock servo **506**. In one embodiment, filtering is implemented as a sliding window average, where a default window length is set as 10 seconds or 80 samples for a default synchronization/follow-up period.

(62) Filtered pdelay measurements of the time stamp processor **504** may be used to compute time offsets from a CL clock, such as clock circuitry **412** for a TSN node **104** that operates in a CF role for the TSN **102**. In some cases, however, the time stamp processor **504** may alternatively give raw pdelay measurements where the filtering component is disabled. Additionally, the delay measurement circuitry **502** can compute a rate ratio, or ratio of CL clock and CF clock frequencies, based on synchronization/follow-up message timestamps (e.g., $t_1, t_2, t_3, \dots, t_n$).

(63) The proportional-integral clock servo **506** may receive the filtered pdelay measurements, rate ratio, and time offset as inputs, and use the inputs to compute clock control information **420** for the clock circuitry **412**. The clock control information **420** may comprise, for example, a phase or frequency adjustment for the clock circuitry **412**.

(64) Before the proportional-integral clock servo **506** sends the clock control information **420** to the clock circuitry **412**, the proportional-integral clock servo **506** outputs the clock control information **420** to the saturation component **510**. The saturation component **510** performs final adjustments to clock control information **420**, such as ensuring the clock control information **420** does not adjust a frequency parameter for the clock circuitry **412** too quickly or beyond a maximum frequency. The saturation component **510** then outputs the clock control information **420** to the hardware platform **408**.

(65) FIG. 6 illustrates an apparatus **600**. The apparatus **600** may be implemented by a TSN node in a TSN, such as a TSN node **104** of a TSN **102**, for example. In one embodiment, the apparatus **600** is implemented by a clock follower that consumes time information from a clock leader of the TSN **102**.

(66) The apparatus **600** is similar to the apparatus **400**. In addition, the apparatus **600** includes a security manager **624**. The security manager **624** is generally responsible for implementing one or more security measures to protect the apparatus **600**. The security manager **624** comprises a message authenticator **626** and a clock recovery manager **630**. The message authenticator **626** implements one or more authentication techniques for a clock follower to authenticate time messages, such as messages **112**, received from a clock leader. The clock recovery manager **630** implements one or more clock recovery techniques for the clock follower to recover authentic time information to synchronize the clock circuitry **612** with a network time for the TSN **102**. The security manager **624** may activate the clock recovery manager **630** to recover the network time when the message authenticator **626** determines that a time message is not authentic, e.g., it has

been altered, tampered or spoofed by an attacker prior to arriving at the apparatus **600**.

(67) In one embodiment, the message authenticator **626** is compliant to operate in accordance with a given authentication protocol suitable for the TSN **102**, such as authenticated time distribution as defined in IEEE 802.1AS. However, embodiments are not limited to this example. As previously described, the authenticated time distribution defined by IEEE 802.1AS protects messages **112** using cryptographic techniques. A clock leader generates a secret key to generate and verify a different MAC for each of the messages **112**. The secret key is known only by the sender and a recipient. The clock leader uses a cryptographic algorithm, such as a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) or Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC), to calculate the MAC value for the message. The clock leader applies the secret key and the message to the chosen algorithm, which produces a fixed-size MAC output. The clock leader sends both the message and the MAC value along with it to the clock follower.

(68) Upon receiving the message and MAC, the message authenticator **626** of the security manager **624** of the clock follower independently calculates the MAC of the message using the same cryptographic algorithm and secret key. The security manager **624** compares the received MAC value with the calculated MAC value. If they match, it confirms the authenticity and integrity of the received message. If they do not match, it indicates that an attacker has altered or tampered with the received message. By using a secret key known only to the clock leader and the clock follower, the MAC ensures that the message has not been tampered with during transit and was indeed sent by the legitimate clock leader. If the MAC values match, it provides strong evidence of message integrity and authentication. By employing cryptographic techniques, the integrity and authenticity of the timing information exchanged between PTP devices are ensured. This authentication mechanism can prevent various attacks, including spoofing, tampering, or replay attacks, which could compromise the accuracy and reliability of time synchronization within the network. By incorporating authenticated time distribution into a time-sensitive network, IEEE 802.1AS aims to enhance the overall security and trustworthiness of time synchronization, ensuring the time-sensitive applications can rely on precise and authentic timing information for their operations. The message authenticator **626** and associated authentication operations are further described with reference to FIG. 7.

(69) When the message authenticator **626** authenticates a MAC for a given time message, the security manager **624** sends a control directive to the hardware platform **608** and/or the software platform **602** to indicate that the time information **418** is authentic and it may be safely consumed by the clock manager **622**. The clock manager **622** receives the time information **418**, and it outputs clock control information **620** to the hardware platform **608**. The hardware platform **608** then updates the clock circuitry **612** to synchronize the local clock to the network time of the TSN **102**. This is the same procedure as described with reference to FIG. 4 and FIG. 5.

(70) When the message authenticator **626** does not authenticate a MAC for the message, however, the security manager **624** assumes the message has been compromised, and as such, the time information **418** carried by the message is not accurate or reliable. In this case, the security manager **624** sends a control directive to the hardware platform **608** and/or the software platform **602** to indicate that the time information **418** is not authentic and it may not be safely consumed by the clock manager **622**. The security manager **624** also sends a control directive to the clock recovery manager **630** to begin clock recovery operations to recover authentic time information **618** for the clock manager **622**. In one embodiment, the clock recovery manager **630** uses a portion of the information carried by the non-authentic message, such as the MAC. The clock recovery manager **630** and associated clock recovery operations are further described with reference to FIG. 8A and FIG. 8B.

(71) FIG. 7 illustrates a set of operating environment **700** that provides an example of operations for a message authenticator **626** of the security manager **624**. In one embodiment, the message authenticator **626** may comprise instructions executed by the processing circuitry **614**.

(72) Authenticated time distribution in the TSN **102** relies on cryptographic techniques to protect a reference time distributed by a clock leader. The clock leader periodically sends time information **706** in different types of TSN messages according to a given protocol to a clock follower. In the context of IEEE 802.1AS, for example, the clock leader sends time information **706** in time synchronization messages (e.g., Sync messages) using a Sync Message Format and FollowUp messages (e.g., Follow_Up messages) in a FollowUp Message Format, as defined in Sections 11.4.3 and 11.4.4, respectively, of 802.1AS. These messages are used in a PTP network for clock synchronization. The messages are sent between clocks in the TSN **102** to establish and maintain time synchronization. The messages contain precise timing information, such as a timestamp of the clock leader and a time the message was transmitted. By exchanging these messages, clocks can adjust their local clocks to align with the reference time provided by the GrandLeader clock or other higher-level clocks, leading to consistent time distribution throughout the network.

(73) In one embodiment, for example, the reference time comprises an origin timestamp from a time message **702** implemented as a Sync message. The time sync message has an information field referred to as originTimestamp. The originTimestamp field has a length of 10 bytes and is set to a value representing a time in nanoseconds (ns), with fractions truncated. As defined in 802.1AS section 11.4.3.2.1, the value of the originTimestamp field is the source Time of a ClockLeader entity of the GrandLeader PTP Instance, when the time sync message was sent by that GrandLeader PTP Instance, with any fractional nanoseconds truncated (see Section 10.2.9). Embodiments are not limited to the example of an originTimestamp as a reference time.

(74) In one embodiment, for example, the reference time comprises a precise origin timestamp from a time message **702** implemented as a Follow_Up message. The Follow_Up message has an information field referred to as preciseOriginTimestamp. The preciseOriginTimestamp field has a length of 10 bytes and is set to a value representing a time in nanoseconds (ns), with fractions truncated. As defined in 802.1AS section 11.4.4.2.1, the value of the preciseOriginTimestamp field is the sourceTime of a ClockLeader entity of the GrandLeader, when the associated Sync message was sent by the GrandLeader, with any fractional nanoseconds truncated (see Section 10.2.9). Embodiments are not limited to the example of a preciseOriginTimestamp as a reference time.

(75) Authenticated time distribution in TSN using IEEE 802.1AS relies on a MAC to protect a reference time distributed by a clock leader. A failed MAC indicates lack of integrity, and the received time synchronization message carrying time information **706** such as the originTime or preciseOriginTime update must be dropped. An active MITM attacker may tamper with the time information **706**, which is different from time biasing, to cause a MAC mismatch and therefore cause a DoS. Due to the lack of a time update, the clock follower local clock will start to drift in time. This presents a challenge of how to mitigate a DOS attack launched by an attacker tampering with the integrity of time synchronization messages.

(76) For example, assume a clock leader sends a time message **702** to a clock follower. The operating environment **700** illustrates a case where the time message **702** arrives at the clock follower at time t . The time message **702** comprise a set of information fields **718**, with each information field carrying parameters used for time synchronization, such as values representing time information **706** and values representing a MAC **710**. The clock follower uses the time information **706** to update its local clock. The clock follower uses the MAC **710** to authenticate the time message **702**.

(77) Further assume the clock leader sends a security message **722** to the clock follower subsequent to the time message **702**. At time $t+\Delta t_1$, a security message **722** arrives at the clock follower from the clock leader. The security message **722** comprises a set of information fields **720**, with each information field carrying parameters for security mechanisms, such as values for the security key **714**. The clock leader generates or selects the security key **714** based on a key schedule specified by IEEE 802.1AS, which is based on a reverse hash expansion, which it then uses to generate the MAC **710**. The security key **714** should be known only by the clock leader and the clock followers.

The clock leader uses a cryptographic algorithm, such as a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) or Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC), to calculate the MAC **710** for the time message **702**. This involves applying the security key **714** and the time message **702** to the chosen algorithm, which produces a fixed-size MAC output. The clock follower uses the security key **714** (when it is disclosed) to verify the MAC **710** for the time message **702**.

(78) Theoretically, if a clock follower has the security key **714**, it can use it to embed a new false originTime. However, what forbids that is the timing so that the time message **702** must propagate to the very last clock follower before the key is disclosed. This way, it is not possible for an attacker to forge the time message **702** with the security key **714** that has just been disclosed, since the protected message has already propagated all the way downstream. The name of this mechanism is delayed authentication.

(79) At time $t+\Delta t_2$, the message authenticator **626** retrieves and decodes the time information **706** and the MAC **710** from the time message **702**, as well as the security key **714** from the security message **722**. Assume the clock leader uses a cryptographic algorithm such as HMAC. The message authenticator **626** implements an HMAC **730** that receives as input the time information **706** and the security key **714**, and it outputs a MAC **744**. A comparator **732** receives the MAC **744** and the MAC **710** as input, it compares both to determine whether they match, and it outputs a result **740**. If the result **740** indicates a match, it confirms the authenticity and integrity of the time message **702**. If the result **740** indicates there is no match, it indicates that an attacker has altered or tampered with the time message **702**. By using the security key **714** known only to the clock leader and the clock follower, the MAC **710** ensures that the time message **702** has not been tampered with during transit and was indeed sent by the clock leader. If the MAC **710** and the MAC **744** match, it provides strong evidence of message integrity and authentication.

(80) FIG. **8A** illustrates an apparatus **800**. The apparatus **800** may be implemented by a TSN node in a TSN, such as a TSN node **104** of a TSN **102**, for example. In one embodiment, the apparatus **800** is implemented by a clock follower that consumes time information from a clock leader of the TSN **102**. The FIG. **8A** illustrates a benign operating case for the clock follower.

(81) As depicted in FIG. **8A**, the apparatus **800** comprises an example of a security manager **624**. In one embodiment, the security manager **624** may comprise instructions executed by the processing circuitry **614**. The security manager **624** receives the time message **702** and the security message **722**, and decodes the time information **706**, the MAC **710** and the security key **714**. The message authenticator **626** uses this information to independently calculate the MAC **710** using operations described with reference to FIG. **7**. The message authenticator **626** then takes one of two processing paths. As depicted in FIG. **8A**, when the MAC **710** matches the MAC **744**, the message authenticator **626** outputs the time information **706** to the clock manager **622**. The clock manager **622** uses the time information **706** to generate clock control information **620**, and it outputs the clock control information **620** to the clock circuitry **612** to adjust a local time to the network time of the TSN **102**.

(82) FIG. **8B** illustrates another view of the apparatus **800**. The apparatus **800** may be implemented by a TSN node in a TSN, such as a TSN node **104** of a TSN **102**, for example. In one embodiment, the apparatus **800** is implemented by a clock follower that consumes time information from a clock leader of the TSN **102**. The FIG. **8B** illustrates a malicious operating case for the clock follower.

(83) Similar to FIG. **8A**, the apparatus **800** comprises an example of a security manager **624**. In one embodiment, the security manager **624** may comprise instructions executed by the processing circuitry **614**. The security manager **624** receives the time message **702** and the security message **722**, and decodes the time information **706**, the MAC **710** and the security key **714**. The message authenticator **626** uses this information to independently calculate the MAC **710** using operations described with reference to FIG. **7**. The message authenticator **626** then takes one of two processing paths. As depicted in FIG. **8B**, when the MAC **710** fails to match the MAC **744**, the message authenticator **626** does not output the time information **706** to the clock manager **622**.

Instead, the message authenticator **626** sends the MAC **710** and the security key **714** to the clock recovery manager **630**.

(84) The clock recovery manager **630** performs a bounded search for authentic time information **618** using the MAC **710**, the security key **714** and a valid time sample. For example, the valid time sample may comprise a last valid time sample from a previous time synchronization cycle, such as a time message **702** where the MAC **710** matched the MAC **744**. The clock manager **622** uses the authentic time information **618** to generate clock control information **620**, and it outputs the clock control information **620** to the clock circuitry **612** to adjust a local time to the network time of the TSN **102**.

(85) FIG. **9** illustrates an example of a clock recovery manager **630** suitable for the apparatus **600** or apparatus **800**. In one embodiment, the clock recovery manager **630** may comprise instructions executed by the processing circuitry **614**.

(86) The clock recovery manager **630** utilizes a system time that is prior to the attack to serve as a starting point in the search to uncover the authentic time information **618** (e.g., `originTimestamp` or `preciseOriginTime`). To efficiently perform the search, the clock recovery manager **630** leverages a unique binding of the MAC **710** to the actual time information **706** sent by the clock leader. Variance of the historical time, along with the attack amplitude, bounds the search space and makes the search feasible. An expected variance may refer to a measurement or estimate of natural variations in time that occur during normal operations of a TSN. An expected amplitude (or expected attack amplitude) may refer to a measurement or estimate of unnatural variations in time that occur as a result of an attack on a TSN, such as when under a time desynchronization or time bias attack, for example. If a MAC **710** matches a MAC **744**, that is proof that the authentic time information **618** is indeed the authentic origin time, therefore making it safe to be provided to the clock manager **622**.

(87) In general, matching authentic time information **618** to a MAC **710** using a brute-force attempt is infeasible given the large search space established by the cryptographic mechanism. For example, assume the authentic time information **618** is a time value represented using 10 bytes or 80 bits. A brute-force search on an 80-bit search range would require a search of 2^{80} possible values. Using a system that can check 1 billion values per second, it would take approximately 38 million years to perform a brute-force search over an 80-bit range.

(88) However, an expected amplitude gives an estimate of the search space, or stated another way, defines a bounded search space. The expected amplitude is an estimate of how much time bias an attacker added (or subtracted) to the origin time. There is a relatively high probability that an attacker would introduce a relatively small amount of time bias to an origin time in order to remain undetected by various network security mechanisms, such as an IDS, for example. Large amplitude attacks are easily caught as they represent a large gap in the time continuum, which should not naturally occur in a given TSN, in spite of the time drift of the followers. The combination of these factors are relevant to bound the feasibility of the search space. While conducting a reverse search for a message from a cryptographic MAC is generally infeasible due to the general size of the search space, it becomes feasible once the search is bounded based on these key observations.

(89) Consequently, some embodiments assume a relatively small tampering with time to evade IDS and other security mechanisms, which means a small change in the least significant part of an information field for a reference time. For example, an attack of 50 μ s or less would impact the least significant 16 bits of the reference time. A brute-force search on a bounded search range of 16-bits would require a search of only 2^{16} possible values, where the 16-bit number can represent 65,536 distinct values, rather than a search across the entire search range of potential 2^{80} distinct values. Embodiments attempt to leverage this assumption to search a bounded search range for an expected amplitude based on smaller time bias attacks, thereby making a brute-force search on the bounded search range more feasible.

(90) As depicted in FIG. **9**, the clock recovery manager **630** performs a bounded search for

authentic time information **618** using the MAC **710**, the security key **714** and a valid time update **950**. A bounded search represents search operations conducted within a defined search range. The defined search range may comprise a number of bits (n) of an information field of a time message used to represent a time value. For example, a time message **702** may comprise a Sync message or a Follow_Up message as defined by 802.1AS. In this case, the time information **706** may comprise a time value represented using one of the information fields **718** or the information fields **720**, which is defined by 802.1AS as 10 bytes or 80 bits. The defined search range may comprise n number of bytes of the 10 bytes or n number of bits from the 80 bits. In one embodiment, the defined search range may be set to 3 to 6 least significant bits of one of the information fields **718** or information fields **720** used to carry the time information **706**. Embodiments are not limited to these examples.

(91) A boundary for the bounded search is defined by one or more parameters, with one parameter to represent an estimated number of bits affected by introduction of a time bias to the time information **706** due to a desynchronization attack.

(92) An extractor **952** extracts a valid time reference from the last valid time update **950**. For example, the valid time update **950** may comprise a last valid time sample from a previous time synchronization cycle, such as a time update from a previous time message **702** where the MAC **710** matched the MAC **744**. The valid time update **950** comprises two parts: (1) a base time **954**; and (2) a suffix **958**. The base time **954** directs a starting point and prioritizes a search range based on an expected attack amplitude. The feasibility of a brute-force search is in part guaranteed by a bounded search range based on the expected attack amplitude. For example, assume an attacker introduces a time bias attack of 1 micro-second (μs). An exhaustive brute-force search would require 1000 HMAC computations to determine an authentic time information **618** associated with a given MAC **710**. However, small tampering with time to evade IDS and other security mechanisms means a small change in the least significant part of an information field for a reference time. The suffix **958** represents a bounded search range for the expected amplitude based on smaller time bias attacks.

(93) A reference time is a value that is typically expressed in terms of bytes or bits. In the case of an originTimestamp or preciseOriginTime, the field length is 10 bytes or 80 bits, where the left-most bits represent the most significant digits (MSDs) and the right-most bits represent the least significant digits (LSDs). The LSDs refer to the digits in the numerical value that provide the least contribution to the overall precision or accuracy of the number, while the MSDs provide the most contribution to the overall precision or accuracy of the number. The extractor **952** is programmed to estimate a number of LSDs potentially affected by a time-based attack, such as a desynchronization attack. For instance, a very aggressive attack would modify the reference time by introducing a time bias of higher values (e.g., $>50 \mu\text{s}$) while a stealthier attack would modify the reference time by introducing a time bias of lower values (e.g., $<50 \mu\text{s}$).

(94) In many cases, an attacker would attempt a stealthier attack to avoid detection by other security monitors in the TSN **102**, such as an intrusion detection system (IDS). Consequently, the extractor **952** may be programmed to detect stealthy attacks with smaller amplitudes, such as $50 \mu\text{s}$ or less. An attack of $50 \mu\text{s}$ or less would impact the least significant 16 bits of the reference time. In this case, the extractor **952** retrieves the last valid time update **950**, and it extracts a base time **954** of 64 bits and a suffix **958** of 16 bits, where the 64 bits represent the MSDs and the 16 bits represent the LSDs of the valid time update **950**.

(95) In some cases, however, an IDS has some difficulty in detecting attacks introducing a time bias lower than 100 ns. Accordingly, the extractor **952** may be programmed to detect stealthy attacks with even smaller amplitudes, such as 100 ns or less, which means tampering with the least significant 7 bits of the information field. In this case, the extractor **952** retrieves the last valid time update **950**, and it extracts a base time **954** of 73 bits and a suffix **958** of 7 bits, where the 73 bits represent the MSDs and the 7 bits represent the LSDs of the valid time update **950**.

(96) It may be appreciated that the extractor **952** can be programmed to detect different types of attacks with different estimated amplitudes, with attacks with lower estimated amplitudes impacting a lower number of LSDs, and attacks with higher estimated amplitudes impacting a higher number of LSDs. The lower number of LSDs shortens a search range and search time for the authentic time information **618**, while a higher number of LSDs lengthens a search range and search time for the authentic time information **618**. Embodiments are not limited to a particular set of values for the base time **954** and the suffix **958**.

(97) The extractor **952** extracts a base time **954** and a suffix **958** from a last valid time update **950**. The suffix **958** identifies a search range defined by a number of bits (n) representing the suffix **958**, where n represents any positive integer. For example, if the suffix **958** is a field of 16 bits (n=16), then the search range is 2.sup.16 or 65,536 different numbers (0000000000000000 to 1111111111111111).

(98) Once a suffix **958** is extracted, the clock recovery manager **630** modifies a value for one or more bits in the suffix **958** to generate a modified suffix **964**. The clock recovery manager **630** then begins a MAC evaluation procedure. A combiner **960** receives the base time **954** and the modified suffix **964**, and it outputs the combination to an HMAC **966**. The HMAC **966** receives as input the modified suffix **964** and the security key **714** from the security message **722**. The HMAC **966** calculates a MAC **744** from the two inputs, and it outputs the MAC **744** to a comparator **968**. The comparator **968** receives as input the MAC **744** and the MAC **710** from the time message **702**. The comparator **968** compares the MAC **744** and the MAC **710**, and it outputs a result **970**. The clock recovery manager **630** determines whether a combination of the base time **954** and the modified suffix **964** is authentic by evaluating the result **970**. When the result **970** indicates a match between the MAC **744** and the MAC **710**, it flags the combination as authentic time information **618**. When the result **970** does not indicate a match (e.g., a mis-match), the clock recovery manager **630** modifies the suffix **958** again to generate a new modified suffix **964**, and it repeats the MAC evaluation procedure in an iterative manner. The bounded search may be performed using sequential processing or parallel processing, depending on resources and configuration of a device implementing the clock follower.

(99) The MAC evaluation procedure continues until the result **970** indicates a match is found or a terminating condition occurs. When the result **970** indicates a match, the clock recovery manager **630** identifies the combination of the base time **954** and the modified suffix **964** as the authentic time information **618**. In some cases, however, a match is not found before a terminating condition occurs. A terminating condition could be a defined time interval, a synchronization cycle, an arrival of a new time message **702**, a signal from an IDS, and so forth. For example, given that a time message **702** has a predetermined period, this represents a time window in which the time information **706** remains current. As such, a terminating condition could be set as a defined time interval, where the defined time interval is based on a synchronization cycle for the TSN **102**. For example, the defined time interval may be set to a value that is less than or equal to a synchronization cycle for the TSN **102**. In another example, the defined time interval may be set to a value that is less than or equal to multiple synchronization cycles, depending on a latency tolerance by the clock follower or a TSN application reliant upon the clock follower. Another example of a terminating condition could be an arrival of a new time message **702** and/or associated security message **722** at the clock follower. When this occurs, the clock recovery manager **630** may stop the current search, and it initiates a new search based on the new values for the new time message **702** and/or associated security message **722**. These are merely a few examples for terminating conditions, and others exist as well. Embodiments are not limited in this context.

(100) In some cases, an attack may continue beyond a single synchronization cycle before the attack is detected by an IDS or other security mechanism in the TSN **102**. In such cases, the authentic time information **618** may be used as a last valid time update **950** to initiate operations for

the clock recovery manager **630** for each subsequent synchronization cycle.

(101) FIG. **10** illustrates an operating environment **1000**. The operating environment **1000** illustrates an example of operations for the clock recovery manager **630**.

(102) As depicted in FIG. **10**, the clock follower decodes time information **706** and a MAC **710** from a time message **702**, the time information **706** to synchronize a local clock for the clock follower to a network time of the TSN **102**, and the MAC **710** to authenticate the time message **702**. The clock follower also decodes a security key **714** from a security message **722** received sometime after (or before) the time message **702** that is associated with the time message **702**.

(103) The message authenticator **626** determines whether the time message **702** is authentic using the MAC **710** and the security key **714**. When the message authenticator **626** determines the time message **702** is authentic, the message authenticator **626** passes the time information **706** to a multiplexer **1020**. The multiplexer **1020** outputs the time information **706** as valid time information **706** to update a local clock for the clock follower and/or pass the time information **706** in an outgoing time message **702** to a downstream TSN node. When the message authenticator **626** determines the time message **702** is not authentic, the message authenticator **626** discards the time information **706** from the time message **702**, and it sends a control directive to the clock recovery manager **630** to begin clock recovery operations.

(104) The clock recovery manager **630** performs a bounded search to identify authentic time information **618** using the MAC **710**. The extractor **952** extracts a base time **954** and a suffix **958** from a last valid time update **950** to the local clock. The suffix **958** identifies a search range **1030** defined by a number of n bits representing the suffix **958**. The clock recovery manager **630** modifies a value for one or more bits in the suffix **958** to form a modified suffix **964**. The combiner **960** combines the base time **954** and the modified suffix **964**. The HMAC **966** generates a MAC **744** from the security key **714** and the time information **706**. The comparator **968** compares the MAC **744** to the MAC **710**, and it outputs a result **970**.

(105) The result **970** indicates whether the combination is authentic or not authentic, where a 1 value represents a match and authentic as indicated by the check mark, and a 0 value indicates a mismatch and not authentic as indicated by the X mark. The clock recovery manager **630** identifies the combination of the base time **954** and the modified suffix **964** as authentic time information **618** when the results **970** indicate a match between the MAC **710** and the MAC **744**. When the results **970** indicate a mismatch, however, the clock recovery manager **630** modifies the suffix **958** to generate a new modified suffix **964**, and it generates a new MAC **744**. This procedure continues in an iterative manner until a match is found or a terminating condition is met. The values from the result **970** for each iteration are fed into an OR gate, such as OR **1026**, which outputs a 1 when a match is found and a 0 when a mismatch is found. The output of the OR **1026** is fed as a status signal to an input of the multiplexer **1020**. The multiplexer **1020** selects the input line to pass the authentic time information **618** to the clock manager **622** and/or pass the authentic time information **618** in an outgoing time message **702** to a downstream TSN node. The clock recovery manager **630** passes the authentic time information **618** to the clock manager **622** to synchronize the local clock to the network time of the TSN **102** based on the authentic time information **618**.

(106) Operations for the disclosed embodiments may be further described with reference to the following figures. Some of the figures may include a logic flow. Although such figures presented herein may include a particular logic flow, it can be appreciated that the logic flow merely provides an example of how the general functionality as described herein can be implemented. Further, a given logic flow does not necessarily have to be executed in the order presented unless otherwise indicated. Moreover, not all acts illustrated in a logic flow may be required in some embodiments. In addition, the given logic flow may be implemented by a hardware element, a software element executed by a processor, or any combination thereof. The embodiments are not limited in this context.

(107) FIG. **11** illustrates an embodiment of a logic flow **1100**. The logic flow **1100** may be

representative of some or all of the operations executed by one or more embodiments described herein. For example, the logic flow **1100** may include some or all of the operations performed by devices or entities within the TSN **102**, such as the apparatus **400**, apparatus **600**, and apparatus **800**. More particularly, the logic flow **1100** illustrates a use case where a clock follower node implements the apparatus **600** or the apparatus **800** to perform clock recovery operations via the clock recovery manager **630**.

(108) In block **1102**, logic flow **1100** decodes time information and a message authentication code (MAC) from a time message, the time information to synchronize a local clock for a device to a network time of a time synchronized network (TSN), and the MAC to authenticate the time message. In block **1104**, logic flow **1100** determines whether the time message is authentic using the MAC. In block **1106**, logic flow **1100** discards the time information when the time message is not authentic. In block **1108**, logic flow **1100** performs a bounded search to identify authentic time information using the MAC. In block **1110**, logic flow **1100** passes the authentic time information to a clock manager to synchronize the local clock to the network time of the TSN when the authentic time information is identified.

(109) By way of example, with reference to apparatus **600** and apparatus **800**, a clock follower node receives a time message **702** from a clock leader in the TSN **102**, where the time information **706** represents a reference time from the clock leader, the reference time to comprise an origin time for the time message **702**, such as an originTimestamp or a preciseOriginTime, for example. The message authenticator **626** decodes time information **706** and a MAC **710** from the time message **702**, the time information **706** to synchronize a local clock for a device to a network time of a TSN **102**, and the MAC **710** to authenticate the time message **702**. The clock follower receives a security message **722** at a separate time from the time message **702**, where the security message **722** is associated with the time message **702**. The clock follower decodes a security key **714** for the MAC **710** of the time message **702** from the security message **722** received separately from the time message **702**. The message authenticator **626** determines whether the time message **702** is authentic using the MAC **710** and a security key **714** from the security message **722**. The message authenticator **626** discards the time information **706** when the time message **702** is not authentic. The clock recovery manager **630** performs a bounded search to identify authentic time information **618** using the MAC **710** and the security key **714**.

(110) The bounded search continues until authentic time information **618** is found or a terminating condition occurs, such as a timer reaching an upper bound of a defined time period or a second time message **702** arriving at the clock follower. In the latter case, the clock recovery manager **630** decodes second time information **706** and a second MAC **710** from the second time message **702**, stops the current bounded search to identify the authentic time information **618** using the first MAC **710**, and it performs a second bounded search to identify authentic time information **618** using the second MAC **710**.

(111) Once the authentic time information **618** is found, the clock recovery manager **630** passes the authentic time information **618** to the clock manager **622** to synchronize the local clock to the network time of the TSN **102** when the authentic time information is identified.

(112) When the message authenticator **626** fails to authenticate a time message **702** using a MAC **710**, it may be a challenge to determine which of the information fields **718** an attacker **822** has modified. One embodiment assumes that when a time message **702** is deemed non-authentic, the attacker **822** has modified the time information **706**. However, it may be possible that the attacker **822** modified another field, such as the MAC **710** itself. If an authentic time information **618** for the associated MAC **710** was found, then the attacker **822** tampered with the time information **706**. If not, either an amplitude of attack was above of a defined (tolerable) searchable range or the attacker **822** tampered with the MAC **710** itself. When this occurs, the message authenticator **626** and/or an IDS can tighten the evaluation by inspecting how close the authentic time information **618** was from the expected range. Thus, it can be possible to affirm with some level of accuracy

that the attacker **822** tampered with the MAC **710** instead.

(113) To determine which field the attacker **822** has modified, the message authenticator **626** may estimate an amplitude of an attack as a difference between the time information **706** and the authentic time information **618**, comparing the amplitude of the attack to a defined threshold value, and determining whether the time information for the message is modified by the attack or the MAC is modified by the attack based on results of the comparison. Other technical features may be readily apparent to one skilled in the art from the following figures, descriptions, and claims.

(114) FIG. **12** illustrates an embodiment of a logic flow **1200**. The logic flow **1200** may be representative of some or all of the operations executed by one or more embodiments described herein. For example, the logic flow **1200** may include some or all of the operations performed by devices or entities within the TSN **102**, such as the apparatus **400**, apparatus **600**, and apparatus **800**. More particularly, the logic flow **1200** illustrates a use case where a clock follower node implements the apparatus **600** or the apparatus **800** to perform clock recovery operations via the clock recovery manager **630**.

(115) In block **1202**, logic flow **1200** decodes time information and a message authentication code (MAC) from a time message, the time information to synchronize a local clock for a device to a network time of a time synchronized network (TSN), and the MAC to authenticate the time message. In block **1204**, logic flow **1200** determines whether the time message is authentic using the MAC. In block **1206**, logic flow **1200** discards the time information when the time message is not authentic. In block **1208**, logic flow **1200** performs a bounded search to identify authentic time information using the MAC. In block **1210**, logic flow **1200** passes the authentic time information to a clock manager to synchronize the local clock to the network time of the TSN when the authentic time information is identified. In block **1212**, logic flow **1200** extracts a base time and a suffix from a last valid time update to the local clock. In block **1214**, logic flow **1200** identifies a search range defined by a number of bits representing the suffix. In block **1216**, logic flow **1200** modifies a value for one or more bits in the suffix. In block **1218**, logic flow **1200** determines whether a combination of the base time and the modified suffix is authentic using the MAC. In block **1220**, logic flow **1200** identifies the combination of the base time and the modified suffix as the authentic time information when the combination is authentic.

(116) By way of example, with reference to apparatus **600** and apparatus **800**, the message authenticator **626** decodes time information **706** and a MAC **710** from a time message **702**, the time information **706** to synchronize a local clock for a device to a network time of a TSN **102**, and the MAC **710** to authenticate the time message **702**. The message authenticator **626** determines whether the time message **702** is authentic using the MAC **710** and a security key **714** from a security message **722**. The message authenticator **626** discards the time information **706** when the time message **702** is not authentic. The clock recovery manager **630** performs a bounded search to identify authentic time information **618** using the MAC **710** and the security key **714**. The clock recovery manager **630** passes the authentic time information **618** to the clock manager **622** to synchronize the local clock to the network time of the TSN **102** when the authentic time information is identified.

(117) To perform the bounded search, the extractor **952** of the clock recovery manager **630** extracts a base time **954** and a suffix **958** from a last valid time update **950** to the local clock. The suffix **958** identifies a search range **1030** defined by a number of n bits representing a length of an information field for the suffix **958**. The clock recovery manager **630** modifies a value for one or more bits in the suffix **958**. The clock recovery manager **630** determines whether a combination of the base time **954** and the modified suffix **964** is authentic using the MAC **710**, a MAC **744** resulting from the combination, and the security key **714**. The clock recovery manager **630** identifies a given combination of the base time **954** and a modified suffix **964** as the authentic time information **618** when result **970** indicates the combination is authentic.

(118) FIG. **13A** depicts a device **1316**. The device **1316** could be a network node or one of the

switches in a TSN network (e.g., TSN nodes **104**, talker node **202**, relay nodes **204a-c**, listener node **206**, relay node **302**, etc.). Device **1316** includes a processing circuit **1302**, a clock **1304**, memory **1306**, radio circuitry **1308**, an antenna **1310**, a network interface circuitry **1318**, and a wired connection **1320**. Memory **1306** stores instructions **1312** and CL instructions **1314**. During operation, processing circuit **1302** can execute instructions **1312** and/or CL instructions **1314** to cause device **1316** to send timing messages as a clock leader or grand clock leader (e.g., from time measurements from a global clock for a TSN network) to other devices in the TSN network. In some examples, processing circuit **1302** can execute instructions **1312** and/or CL instructions **1314** to cause device **1316** to send time synchronization messages, time update messages, and other timing messages defined by various IEEE standards as discussed herein. Furthermore, processing circuit **1302** can execute instructions **1312** to cause device **1316** to send, via radio circuitry **1308** and antenna **1310** or network interface circuitry **1318** timing messages as the CL for a CF in a TSN network.

(119) FIG. **13B** depicts a device **1336**. The device **1336** could be one of the network nodes or switches in a TSN network (e.g., TSN nodes **104**, talker node **202**, relay nodes **204a-c**, listener node **206**, relay node **302**, etc.). Device **1336** includes a processing circuit **1322**, a clock **1324**, memory **1326**, radio circuitry **1328**, an antenna **1330**, a network interface circuitry **1338**, and a wired connection **1340**. Memory **1326** stores instructions **1332** and CF instructions **1334**. During operation, processing circuit **1322** can execute instructions **1332** and/or CF instructions **1334** to cause device **1336** to receive timing messages as a clock follower (e.g., from time measurements from a global clock for a TSN network) from other devices in the TSN network, such as the device **1316**. In some examples, processing circuit **1322** can execute instructions **1332** and/or CF instructions **1334** to cause device **1336** to receive time synchronization messages, time update messages, and other timing messages defined by various IEEE standards as discussed herein. Furthermore, processing circuit **1322** can execute instructions **1332** and/or CF instructions **1334** to cause device **1336** to receive, via radio circuitry **1328** and antenna **1330** or network interface circuitry **1338** timing messages as the CF for a CL in a TSN network. In addition, processing circuit **1322** can execute instructions **1332** and/or CF instructions **1334** to cause device **1336** to send, via radio circuitry **1328** and antenna **1330** or network interface circuitry **1338** security messages in response to a security attack, such as alert messages, notification messages, network reconfiguration messages, device isolation messages, model update messages, and other messages in a TSN network.

(120) FIG. **14** illustrates computer-readable storage computer-readable medium **1400**. Computer-readable storage computer-readable medium **1400** may comprise any non-transitory computer-readable storage medium or machine-readable storage medium, such as an optical, magnetic or semiconductor storage medium. In various embodiments, computer-readable storage computer-readable medium **1400** may comprise an article of manufacture. In some embodiments, computer-readable storage computer-readable medium **1400** may store computer executable instructions **1402** with which circuitry (e.g., processing circuitry **414**, processing circuit **1302**, processing circuit **1322**, radio circuitry **1308**, radio circuitry **1328**, network interface circuitry **1318**, network interface circuitry **1338**, clock manager **106**, clock circuitry **412**, or the like) can execute. For example, computer executable instructions **1402** can include instructions to implement operations described with respect to logic flows **1900** and **2000**. Examples of computer-readable storage computer-readable medium **1400** or machine-readable storage medium may include any tangible media capable of storing electronic data, including volatile memory or non-volatile memory, removable or non-removable memory, erasable or non-erasable memory, writeable or re-writeable memory, and so forth. Examples of computer executable instructions **1402** may include any suitable type of code, such as source code, compiled code, interpreted code, executable code, static code, dynamic code, object-oriented code, visual code, and the like.

(121) The various elements of the devices as previously described with reference to the figures

include various hardware elements, software elements, or a combination of both. Examples of hardware elements include devices, logic devices, components, processors, microprocessors, circuits, processors, circuit elements (e.g., transistors, resistors, capacitors, inductors, and so forth), integrated circuits, application specific integrated circuits (ASIC), programmable logic devices (PLD), digital signal processors (DSP), field programmable gate array (FPGA), memory units, logic gates, registers, semiconductor device, chips, microchips, chip sets, and so forth. Examples of software elements include software components, programs, applications, computer programs, application programs, system programs, software development programs, machine programs, operating system software, middleware, firmware, software modules, routines, subroutines, functions, methods, procedures, software interfaces, application program interfaces (API), instruction sets, computing code, computer code, code segments, computer code segments, words, values, symbols, or any combination thereof. However, determining whether an embodiment is implemented using hardware elements and/or software elements varies in accordance with any number of factors, such as desired computational rate, power levels, heat tolerances, processing cycle budget, input data rates, output data rates, memory resources, data bus speeds and other design or performance constraints, as desired for a given implementation.

(122) One or more aspects of at least one embodiment are implemented by representative instructions stored on a machine-readable medium which represents various logic within the processor, which when read by a machine causes the machine to fabricate logic to perform the techniques described herein. Such representations, known as “intellectual property (IP) cores” are stored on a tangible, machine readable medium and supplied to various customers or manufacturing facilities to load into the fabrication machines that make the logic or processor. Some embodiments are implemented, for example, using a machine-readable medium or article which may store an instruction or a set of instructions that, when executed by a machine, causes the machine to perform a method and/or operations in accordance with the embodiments. Such a machine includes, for example, any suitable processing platform, computing platform, computing device, processing device, computing system, processing system, processing devices, computer, processor, or the like, and is implemented using any suitable combination of hardware and/or software. The machine-readable medium or article includes, for example, any suitable type of memory unit, memory device, memory article, memory medium, storage device, storage article, storage medium and/or storage unit, for example, memory, removable or non-removable media, erasable or non-erasable media, writeable or re-writeable media, digital or analog media, hard disk, floppy disk, Compact Disk Read Only Memory (CD-ROM), Compact Disk Recordable (CD-R), Compact Disk Rewriteable (CD-RW), optical disk, magnetic media, magneto-optical media, removable memory cards or disks, various types of Digital Versatile Disk (DVD), a tape, a cassette, or the like. The instructions include any suitable type of code, such as source code, compiled code, interpreted code, executable code, static code, dynamic code, encrypted code, and the like, implemented using any suitable high-level, low-level, object-oriented, visual, compiled and/or interpreted programming language.

(123) As utilized herein, terms “component,” “system,” “interface,” and the like are intended to refer to a computer-related entity, hardware, software (e.g., in execution), and/or firmware. For example, a component is a processor (e.g., a microprocessor, a controller, or other processing device), a process running on a processor, a controller, an object, an executable, a program, a storage device, a computer, a tablet PC and/or a user equipment (e.g., mobile phone, etc.) with a processing device. By way of illustration, an application running on a server and the server is also a component. One or more components reside within a process, and a component is localized on one computer and/or distributed between two or more computers. A set of elements or a set of other components are described herein, in which the term “set” can be interpreted as “one or more.”

(124) Further, these components execute from various computer readable storage media having various data structures stored thereon such as with a module, for example. The components

communicate via local and/or remote processes such as in accordance with a signal having one or more data packets (e.g., data from one component interacting with another component in a local system, distributed system, and/or across a network, such as, the Internet, a local area network, a wide area network, or similar network with other systems via the signal).

(125) As another example, a component is an apparatus with specific functionality provided by mechanical parts operated by electric or electronic circuitry, in which the electric or electronic circuitry is operated by a software application or a firmware application executed by one or more processors. The one or more processors are internal or external to the apparatus and execute at least a part of the software or firmware application. As yet another example, a component is an apparatus that provides specific functionality through electronic components without mechanical parts; the electronic components include one or more processors therein to execute software and/or firmware that confer(s), at least in part, the functionality of the electronic components.

(126) Use of the word exemplary is intended to present concepts in a concrete fashion. As used in this application, the term “or” is intended to mean an inclusive “or” rather than an exclusive “or”. That is, unless specified otherwise, or clear from context, “X employs A or B” is intended to mean any of the natural inclusive permutations. That is, if X employs A; X employs B; or X employs both A and B, then “X employs A or B” is satisfied under any of the foregoing instances. In addition, the articles “a” and “an” as used in this application and the appended claims should generally be construed to mean “one or more” unless specified otherwise or clear from context to be directed to a singular form. Furthermore, to the extent that the terms “including”, “includes”, “having”, “has”, “with”, or variants thereof are used in either the detailed description or the claims, such terms are intended to be inclusive in a manner similar to the term “comprising.” Additionally, in situations wherein one or more numbered items are discussed (e.g., a “first X”, a “second X”, etc.), in general the one or more numbered items may be distinct or they may be the same, although in some situations the context may indicate that they are distinct or that they are the same.

(127) As used herein, the term “circuitry” may refer to, be part of, or include a circuit, an integrated circuit (IC), a monolithic IC, a discrete circuit, a hybrid integrated circuit (HIC), an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), an electronic circuit, a logic circuit, a microcircuit, a hybrid circuit, a microchip, a chip, a chiplet, a chipset, a multi-chip module (MCM), a semiconductor die, a system on a chip (SoC), a processor (shared, dedicated, or group), a processor circuit, a processing circuit, or associated memory (shared, dedicated, or group) operably coupled to the circuitry that execute one or more software or firmware programs, a combinational logic circuit, or other suitable hardware components that provide the described functionality. In some embodiments, the circuitry is implemented in, or functions associated with the circuitry are implemented by, one or more software or firmware modules. In some embodiments, circuitry includes logic, at least partially operable in hardware. It is noted that hardware, firmware and/or software elements may be collectively or individually referred to herein as “logic” or “circuit.”

(128) Some embodiments are described using the expression “one embodiment” or “an embodiment” along with their derivatives. These terms mean that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment. The appearances of the phrase “in one embodiment” in various places in the specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment. Moreover, unless otherwise noted the features described above are recognized to be usable together in any combination. Thus, any features discussed separately can be employed in combination with each other unless it is noted that the features are incompatible with each other.

(129) Some embodiments are presented in terms of program procedures executed on a computer or network of computers. A procedure is here, and generally, conceived to be a self-consistent sequence of operations leading to a desired result. These operations are those requiring physical manipulations of physical quantities. Usually, though not necessarily, these quantities take the form of electrical, magnetic or optical signals capable of being stored, transferred, combined, compared,

and otherwise manipulated. It proves convenient at times, principally for reasons of common usage, to refer to these signals as bits, values, elements, symbols, characters, terms, numbers, or the like. It should be noted, however, that all of these and similar terms are to be associated with the appropriate physical quantities and are merely convenient labels applied to those quantities.

(130) Further, the manipulations performed are often referred to in terms, such as adding or comparing, which are commonly associated with mental operations performed by a human operator. No such capability of a human operator is necessary, or desirable in most cases, in any of the operations described herein, which form part of one or more embodiments. Rather, the operations are machine operations. Useful machines for performing operations of various embodiments include general purpose digital computers or similar devices.

(131) Some embodiments are described using the expression “coupled” and “connected” along with their derivatives. These terms are not necessarily intended as synonyms for each other. For example, some embodiments are described using the terms “connected” and/or “coupled” to indicate that two or more elements are in direct physical or electrical contact with each other. The term “coupled,” however, also means that two or more elements are not in direct contact with each other, but yet still co-operate or interact with each other.

(132) Various embodiments also relate to apparatus or systems for performing these operations. This apparatus is specially constructed for the required purpose or it comprises a general purpose computer as selectively activated or reconfigured by a computer program stored in the computer. The procedures presented herein are not inherently related to a particular computer or other apparatus. Various general-purpose machines are used with programs written in accordance with the teachings herein, or it proves convenient to construct more specialized apparatus to perform the required method steps. The required structure for a variety of these machines are apparent from the description given.

(133) It is emphasized that the Abstract of the Disclosure is provided to allow a reader to quickly ascertain the nature of the technical disclosure. It is submitted with the understanding that it will not be used to interpret or limit the scope or meaning of the claims. In addition, the following claims are hereby incorporated into the Detailed Description, with each claim standing on its own as a separate embodiment. In the appended claims, the terms “including” and “in which” are used as the plain-English equivalents of the respective terms “comprising” and “wherein,” respectively. Moreover, the terms “first,” “second,” “third,” and so forth, are used merely as labels, and are not intended to impose numerical requirements on their objects.

(134) The following aspects and examples pertain to further embodiments, from which numerous permutations and configurations will be apparent.

(135) In one independent example, a method, includes decoding time information and a message authentication code (MAC) from a time message, the time information to synchronize a local clock for a device to a network time of a time synchronized network (TSN), and the MAC to authenticate the time message, determining whether the time message is authentic using the MAC, discarding the time information when the time message is not authentic, performing a bounded search to identify authentic time information using the MAC, and passing the authentic time information to a clock manager to synchronize the local clock to the network time of the TSN when the authentic time information is identified.

(136) The independent example may further include any one of the following dependent examples or any combination of the following dependent examples. For example, further to the independent example, the method may also have a configuration or further includes performing the bounded search within a defined search range represented by a number of bits of an information field of the time message used to carry the time information.

(137) The method may also have a configuration or further includes receiving the time message from a clock leader in the TSN, where the time information represents a reference time from the clock leader, the reference time to comprise an origin time for the time message.

(138) The method may also have a configuration or further includes receiving a security message associated with the time message, and decoding a security key for the MAC of the time message from the security message.

(139) The method may also have a configuration or further includes receiving the MAC, a security key for the MAC, and the time information as input to a hash-based MAC (HMAC) cryptographic algorithm used to generate the MAC, calculating a second MAC using the HMAC cryptographic algorithm, determining the time message is authentic when the MAC matches the second MAC, and determining the time message is not authentic when the MAC does not match the second MAC.

(140) The method may also have a configuration or further includes extracting a base time and a suffix from a last valid time update to the local clock, identifying a search range defined by a number of bits representing the suffix, modifying a value for one or more bits in the suffix, determining whether a combination of the base time and the modified suffix is authentic using the MAC and a security key for the MAC, and identifying the combination of the base time and the modified suffix as the authentic time information when the combination is authentic.

(141) The method may also have a configuration or further includes terminating the bounded search to identify the authentic time information using the MAC when the authentic time information is identified or a timer for the search reaches an upper boundary of a defined time period.

(142) The method may also have a configuration or further includes performing the bounded search to identify the authentic time information using parallel processing operations to decrease a search time to within a single synchronization cycle. Other technical features may be readily apparent to one skilled in the art from the following figures, descriptions, and claims.

(143) In one independent example, a computing apparatus includes a processing circuitry. The computing apparatus also includes a memory storing instructions that, when executed by the processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to decode time information and a message authentication code (MAC) from a time message, the time information to synchronize a local clock for a device to a network time of a time synchronized network (TSN), and the MAC to authenticate the time message, determine whether the time message is authentic using the MAC, discard the time information when the time message is not authentic, perform a bounded search to identify authentic time information using the MAC, and pass the authentic time information to a clock manager to synchronize the local clock to the network time of the TSN when the authentic time information is identified.

(144) The independent example may further include any one of the following dependent examples or any combination of the following dependent examples. For example, further to the independent example, the computing apparatus may also have a configuration or further the processing circuitry to perform the bounded search within a defined search range represented by a number of bits of an information field of the time message used to carry the time information.

(145) The computing apparatus may also have a configuration or further the processing circuitry to receive the time message from a clock leader in the TSN, where the time information represents a reference time from the clock leader, the reference time to comprise an origin time for the time message.

(146) The computing apparatus may also have a configuration or further the processing circuitry to receive a security message associated with the time message, and decode a security key for the MAC of the time message from the security message.

(147) The computing apparatus may also have a configuration or further the processing circuitry to receive the MAC, a security key for the MAC, and the time information as input to a hash-based MAC (HMAC) cryptographic algorithm used to generate the MAC, calculate a second MAC using the HMAC cryptographic algorithm, determine the time message is authentic when the MAC matches the second MAC, and determine the time message is not authentic when the MAC does

not match the second MAC.

(148) The computing apparatus may also have a configuration or further the processing circuitry to extract a base time and a suffix from a last valid time update to the local clock, identify a search range defined by a number of bits representing the suffix, modify a value for one or more bits in the suffix, determine whether a combination of the base time and the modified suffix is authentic using the MAC and a security key for the MAC, and identify the combination of the base time and the modified suffix as the authentic time information when the combination is authentic. Other technical features may be readily apparent to one skilled in the art from the following figures, descriptions, and claims.

(149) In one independent example, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, the computer-readable storage medium including instructions that when executed by a processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to decode time information and a message authentication code (MAC) from a time message, the time information to synchronize a local clock for a device to a network time of a time synchronized network (TSN), and the MAC to authenticate the time message, determine whether the time message is authentic using the MAC, discard the time information when the time message is not authentic, perform a bounded search to identify authentic time information using the MAC, and pass the authentic time information to a clock manager to synchronize the local clock to the network time of the TSN when the authentic time information is identified.

(150) The independent example may further include any one of the following dependent examples or any combination of the following dependent examples. For example, further to the independent example, the computer-readable storage medium may also have a configuration or further includes instructions that when executed by a processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to perform the bounded search within a defined search range represented by a number of bits of an information field of the time message used to carry the time information.

(151) The computer-readable storage medium may also have a configuration or further includes instructions that when executed by a processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to receive the time message from a clock leader in the TSN, where the time information represents a reference time from the clock leader, the reference time to comprise an origin time for the time message.

(152) The computer-readable storage medium may also have a configuration or further includes instructions that when executed by a processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to receive a security message associated with the time message, and decode a security key for the MAC of the time message from the security message.

(153) The computer-readable storage medium may also have a configuration or further includes instructions that when executed by a processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to receive the MAC, a security key for the MAC, and the time information as input to a hash-based MAC (HMAC) cryptographic algorithm used to generate the MAC, calculate a second MAC using the HMAC cryptographic algorithm, determine the time message is authentic when the MAC matches the second MAC, and determine the time message is not authentic when the MAC does not match the second MAC.

(154) The computer-readable storage medium may also have a configuration or further includes instructions that when executed by a processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to extract a base time and a suffix from a last valid time update to the local clock, identify a search range defined by a number of bits representing the suffix, modify a value for one or more bits in the suffix, determine whether a combination of the base time and the modified suffix is authentic using the MAC and a security key for the MAC, and identify the combination of the base time and the modified suffix as the authentic time information when the combination is authentic. Other technical features may be readily apparent to one skilled in the art from the following figures, descriptions, and claims.

Claims

1. A method, comprising: decoding time information and a message authentication code (MAC) from a time message, the time information to synchronize a local clock for a device to a network time of a time synchronized network (TSN), and the MAC to authenticate the time message; determining whether the time message is authentic using the MAC; discarding the time information when the time message is not authentic; performing a bounded search to identify authentic time information using the MAC; and passing the authentic time information to a clock manager to synchronize the local clock to the network time of the TSN when the authentic time information is identified.
2. The method of claim 1, comprising performing the bounded search within a defined search range represented by a number of bits of an information field of the time message used to carry the time information.
3. The method of claim 1, comprising receiving the time message from a clock leader in the TSN, wherein the time information represents a reference time from the clock leader, the reference time to comprise an origin time for the time message.
4. The method of claim 1, comprising: receiving a security message associated with the time message; and decoding a security key for the MAC of the time message from the security message.
5. The method of claim 1, comprising: receiving the MAC, a security key for the MAC, and the time information as input to a hash-based MAC (HMAC) cryptographic algorithm used to generate the MAC; calculating a second MAC using the HMAC cryptographic algorithm; determining the time message is authentic when the MAC matches the second MAC; and determining the time message is not authentic when the MAC does not match the second MAC.
6. The method of claim 1, comprising: extracting a base time and a suffix from a last valid time update to the local clock; identifying a search range defined by a number of bits representing the suffix; modifying a value for one or more bits in the suffix; determining whether a combination of the base time and the modified suffix is authentic using the MAC and a security key for the MAC; and identifying the combination of the base time and the modified suffix as the authentic time information when the combination is authentic.
7. The method of claim 1, comprising terminating the bounded search to identify the authentic time information using the MAC when the authentic time information is identified or a timer for the search reaches an upper boundary of a defined time period.
8. The method of claim 1, comprising performing the bounded search to identify the authentic time information using parallel processing operations to decrease a search time to within a single synchronization cycle.
9. A computing apparatus comprising: a processing circuitry; and a memory storing instructions that, when executed by the processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to: decode time information and a message authentication code (MAC) from a time message, the time information to synchronize a local clock for a device to a network time of a time synchronized network (TSN), and the MAC to authenticate the time message; determine whether the time message is authentic using the MAC; discard the time information when the time message is not authentic; perform a bounded search to identify authentic time information using the MAC; and pass the authentic time information to a clock manager to synchronize the local clock to the network time of the TSN when the authentic time information is identified.
10. The computing apparatus of claim 9, the processing circuitry to perform the bounded search within a defined search range represented by a number of bits of an information field of the time message used to carry the time information.
11. The computing apparatus of claim 9, the processing circuitry to receive the time message from a clock leader in the TSN, wherein the time information represents a reference time from the clock

leader, the reference time to comprise an origin time for the time message.

12. The computing apparatus of claim 9, the processing circuitry to: receive a security message associated with the time message; and decode a security key for the MAC of the time message from the security message.

13. The computing apparatus of claim 9, the processing circuitry to: receive the MAC, a security key for the MAC, and the time information as input to a hash-based MAC (HMAC) cryptographic algorithm used to generate the MAC; calculate a second MAC using the HMAC cryptographic algorithm; determine the time message is authentic when the MAC matches the second MAC; and determine the time message is not authentic when the MAC does not match the second MAC.

14. The computing apparatus of claim 9, the processing circuitry to: extract a base time and a suffix from a last valid time update to the local clock; identify a search range defined by a number of bits representing the suffix; modify a value for one or more bits in the suffix; determine whether a combination of the base time and the modified suffix is authentic using the MAC and a security key for the MAC; and identify the combination of the base time and the modified suffix as the authentic time information when the combination is authentic.

15. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, the computer-readable storage medium including instructions that when executed by a processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to: decode time information and a message authentication code (MAC) from a time message, the time information to synchronize a local clock for a device to a network time of a time synchronized network (TSN), and the MAC to authenticate the time message; determine whether the time message is authentic using the MAC; discard the time information when the time message is not authentic; perform a bounded search to identify authentic time information using the MAC; and pass the authentic time information to a clock manager to synchronize the local clock to the network time of the TSN when the authentic time information is identified.

16. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 15, comprising instructions that when executed by a processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to perform the bounded search within a defined search range represented by a number of bits of an information field of the time message used to carry the time information.

17. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 15, comprising instructions that when executed by a processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to receive the time message from a clock leader in the TSN, wherein the time information represents a reference time from the clock leader, the reference time to comprise an origin time for the time message.

18. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 15, comprising instructions that when executed by a processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to: receive a security message associated with the time message; and decode a security key for the MAC of the time message from the security message.

19. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 15, comprising instructions that when executed by a processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to: receive the MAC, a security key for the MAC, and the time information as input to a hash-based MAC (HMAC) cryptographic algorithm used to generate the MAC; calculate a second MAC using the HMAC cryptographic algorithm; determine the time message is authentic when the MAC matches the second MAC; and determine the time message is not authentic when the MAC does not match the second MAC.

20. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 15, comprising instructions that when executed by a processing circuitry, cause the processing circuitry to: extract a base time and a suffix from a last valid time update to the local clock; identify a search range defined by a number of bits representing the suffix; modify a value for one or more bits in the suffix; determine whether a combination of the base time and the modified suffix is authentic using the MAC and a security key for the MAC; and identify the combination of the base time and the modified suffix as the authentic time information when the combination is authentic.
