

Demystifying Fraudulent Transactions and Illicit Nodes in the Bitcoin Network for Financial Forensics

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ABSTRACT

Blockchain provides the unique and accountable channel for financial forensics by mining its open and immutable transaction data. A recent surge has been witnessed by training machine learning models with cryptocurrency transaction data for anomaly detection, such as money laundering and other fraudulent activities. This paper presents a holistic applied data science approach to fraud detection in the Bitcoin network with two original contributions. First, we contribute the *Elliptic++ dataset*, which extends the Elliptic transaction dataset to include over 822k Bitcoin wallet addresses (nodes), each with 56 features, and 1.27M temporal interactions. This enables both the detection of fraudulent transactions and the detection of illicit addresses (actors) in the Bitcoin network by leveraging four types of graph data: (i) the transaction-to-transaction graph, representing the money flow in the Bitcoin network, (ii) the address-to-address interaction graph, capturing the types of transaction flows between Bitcoin addresses, (iii) the address-transaction graph, representing the bi-directional money flow between addresses and transactions (BTC flow from input address to one or more transactions and BTC flow from a transaction to one or more output addresses), and (iv) the user entity graph, capturing clusters of Bitcoin addresses representing unique Bitcoin users. Second, we perform fraud detection tasks on all four graphs by using diverse machine learning algorithms. We show that adding enhanced features from the address-to-address and the address-transaction graphs not only assists in effectively detecting both illicit transactions and illicit addresses, but also assists in gaining in-depth understanding of the root cause of money laundering vulnerabilities in cryptocurrency transactions and the strategies for fraud detection and prevention. The *Elliptic++ dataset* is released at <https://www.github.com/git-disl/EllipticPlusPlus>.

CCS CONCEPTS

- Security and privacy → Intrusion/anomaly detection and malware mitigation;
- Applied computing → Network forensics;
- Computing methodologies → Machine learning.

KEYWORDS

Blockchain, Anomaly Detection, Financial Forensics

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1 INTRODUCTION

The emergence of cryptocurrency, initiated by Bitcoin [29], has kindled an adoption of a new exchange system in which financial transactions can be completed without an intermediary. This popularity has been perceived as a catalyst for the integration of cryptocurrencies into the payment systems of traditional financial institutions, enabling processing of exchanges between fiat money and cryptocurrency. To allow for immense volumes of such exchanges, financial institutions must provide rigid security against high risk transactions from fraudulent activities and assure compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) regulations. Although machine learning (ML) models have become a popular tool for anomaly detection and risk assessment of cryptocurrency transactions in recent years, we argue that fraud detection models trained for financial forensics should revolve around two goals: (i) prioritizing higher recall with a (reasonable) trade-off on precision, since the penalty of classifying an illicit transaction/account as licit far outweighs that of the reverse, and (ii) allowing explainability (and derivation of proof) on the risk of transactions/accounts.

Bitcoin [29] is the most widely used cryptocurrency. Analyzing its blockchain will provide a basis of reference. The Elliptic dataset [40] is the largest labelled Bitcoin transaction data publicly available. The dataset consists of over 203k transactions labelled illicit, licit, and unknown. It provides a good entry into fraudulent transaction analysis. However, the Elliptic dataset [40] consists of only Bitcoin transactions, without features of the addresses involved and the different interactions between pairs of addresses. Hence, the forensic analysis using the Elliptic dataset suffers from a prominent downfall: when a model predicts an illicit transaction, the addresses responsible cannot be clearly identified since a transaction may be associated with several input and output addresses.

The first contribution of this paper is the *Elliptic++ dataset*, which extends the Elliptic dataset to include all the Bitcoin wallet addresses (actors) and their temporal interactions associated to the transactions in the Elliptic dataset. Hence, forensics performed using the *Elliptic++ dataset* can identify fraudulent transactions and dishonest actors in the Bitcoin network and will also allow explainability as to why a wallet address associated with a transaction is illusive and dishonest. The construction of the *Elliptic++ dataset* contributes a novel way in collecting and visualizing Blockchain data, using wallet addresses as the center of a risk detection model. We collect Blockchain data associated with the Elliptic dataset (transactions). We first augment each transaction in the *transactions dataset* with

17 additional features, then we crawl the Blockchain to create the Elliptic++ dataset, consisting of the *feature-enhanced transactions dataset* and the *actors (wallet addresses) dataset*. The actors dataset includes over 822k labelled wallet addresses, each described with 56 features, and over 1.27M temporal occurrences (interactions) across the same time steps (as those recorded in the Elliptic dataset). With our Elliptic++ dataset, one can perform anomaly detection of fraudulent activities, such as illicit transactions and fraudulent actors. We also include four types of graphs: the *Money Flow Transaction Graph*, the *Actor Interaction Graph*, the *Address-Transaction Graph*, and the *User Entity Graph*. These graphs contribute to both mining and visualization of the connections of transactions and the interactions among wallet addresses through their transactions.

The second contribution of the paper is performing fraud detection using the Elliptic++ dataset and the four graph representations by combining diverse ML algorithms and feature optimizations. We observe that Random Forest (RF) with feature refinement offers the best-performing model: on the transactions dataset, it achieves 98.6% precision and 72.7% recall compared to 97.5% precision and 71.9% recall when using RF without feature refinement; on the actors dataset, RF with feature refinement achieves 92.1% precision and 80.2% recall, compared to 91.1% precision and 78.9% recall when using RF without feature refinement. Furthermore, the fraud detection using the Elliptic++ dataset allows for in-depth understanding of the root cause of fraudulent activities in cryptocurrency transactions through semantic and statistical explainability, shining light on the strategies for fraud detection and prevention.

2 RELATED WORK

Since the introduction of the Elliptic dataset in 2019 by Weber et al. [40], there have been numerous efforts on data labelling and anomaly detection using ML models. Lorenz et al. [25] assumed minimal access to labels, and proposes an active learning solution by leveraging a smaller subset of the available labels. Oliveira et al. [30] proposed GuiltyWalker, a detection method that computes new features based on the structure of a transaction-to-transction graph and the distance to known illicit transactions. Alarab et al. [3] presented a comparative analysis of the Elliptic dataset using different supervised learning methods. Loa et al. [24] proposed Inspection-L, a graph neural network framework for anomaly detection, and similarly, Alarab et al. [2] proposed a graph-based LSTM with a graph convolutional network to detect illicit transactions.

More generally, there is increasing interest in AML in the context of financial transactions and cryptocurrency networks, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. Combinatorial optimization methods for identifying transactions from graphs, including statistical deviation and dense subgraph discovery methods, have been explored in [11, 38]. The lack of labelled data and the imbalanced data are two major challenges for fraud detection when using supervised learning [6, 17, 28] or unsupervised learning [14, 27, 28, 31, 32]. Some efforts have also focused on de-anonymizing mixed transactions by Bitcoin-dedicated graph-based approaches [7, 8, 19, 41]. Regarding Bitcoin account profiling, Michalski et al. [33] built a small dataset of 9,000 addresses and applied supervised learning to characterize nodes in the Blockchain as miner or exchange, indicating the need of countermeasures for preserving the desired level of anonymity.

To the best of our knowledge, our Elliptic++ dataset is the largest public Bitcoin account dataset with 822,942 addresses.

Existing works on Ethereum account profiling and phishing account detection exclusively focus on graph representation learning methods [36, 37]. For Ethereum account profiling, [35] and [46] applied either Graph Convolution Network (GCN) [18] or a hierarchical graph attention encoder (HGATE) to infer the identity of Ethereum accounts based on learning latent features using node-embedding and subgraph-embeddings. TTAGNN [21] generate node embedding by combining LSTM encoder and Graph Attention Network (GAT) [39]. For detecting phishing accounts, Trans2Vec [42] and its variants [22, 23] utilize a graph based random walk algorithm on transaction time and amount information. The cascade method [13] leverages statistical feature extraction and a lightGBM-based ensemble algorithm. It is worth to note that given the difference in fundamental settings (UTXO and account models), it is not straightforward to apply the existing graph representation learning models developed for profiling Ethereum accounts to profiling Bitcoin accounts on the Bitcoin network.

Compared to the literature, this paper presents novel contributions from two perspectives. First, it describes and makes publicly available a labelled dataset with Bitcoin blockchain transactions and wallet addresses. The main benefit of this dataset is that it allows more accurate fraud detection models and algorithms to be developed. Second, it uses the dataset to showcase the detection of illicit blockchain transactions, illicit actors, and the risks of de-anonymizing users based on address clustering. For this, it utilizes a number of baseline machine learning models.

3 THE ELLIPTIC++ DATASET

The Elliptic++ dataset consists of 203k Bitcoin transactions and 822k wallet addresses. It leverages elements from the Elliptic dataset¹ [40], a published dataset deanonymizing 99.5% of Elliptic transaction data², and the Bitcoin addresses dataset obtained by using our Bitcoin Blockchain³ scraping pipeline. A detailed description of the data collection pipeline is included in the Appendix.

3.1 Transactions Dataset

The *transactions dataset* consists of a time-series graph with 49 distinct time steps, 203,769 transactions (nodes), and 234,355 directed edges representing the payment flows. Each transaction node is labelled as illicit, licit, or unknown; with 2% (4,545) labelled as class-1 (illicit), 21% (42,019) as class-2 (licit), and the remaining transactions are unknown with regard to licit/illicit, hence labelled as class-3. Three csv files are used, as shown in Table 1. Each transaction node has an entry in `txs_features.csv`, with numerical data for 183 transaction features, and an entry in `txs_classes.csv`, representing its class label (1: *illicit*, 2: *licit*, 3: *unknown*). Each edge has an entry in `txs_edgelist.csv` (indexed by two transaction IDs), representing money flow from one transaction to another. Among the 183 node features, 166 features are inherited from the Elliptic dataset, i.e., the time step, 93 *local features*, representing local information about the transaction, and 72 *aggregate features*, obtained by

¹www.kaggle.com/datasets/ellipticco/elliptic-data-set

²www.kaggle.com/datasets/alexbenzik/deanonymized-995-pct-of-elliptic-transactions

³www.blockchain.com

Table 1: Data structure for an example transaction node in the transactions dataset: (1) *features*, row of all 183 feature values for txId, (2) *edgelist*, all incoming and outgoing edges involving txId, and (3) *classes*, the class label for txId.

txs_features.csv										
txId	Time step	LF_1	...	LF_93	AF_1	...	AF_72	TXS_in	...	BTC_out_total
272145560	24	-0.155493	...	1.135279	-0.159681	...	1.521399	1	...	2.77279994


txs_edgelist.csv									
txId1	txId2								
272145560	296926618								
272145560	272145556								
299475624	272145560								

txs_classes.csv									
txId	class								
272145560	1								

Table 2: Transactions dataset augmented features.

Feature	Description
BTC_{in}	Total BTC incoming
BTC_{out}	Total BTC outgoing
each has 5 values:	total, min, max, mean, median
Txs_{in}	Number of incoming transactions
Txs_{out}	Number of outgoing transactions
$Addr_{in}$	Number of input addresses
$Addr_{out}$	Number of output addresses
BTC_{total}	Total BTC transacted
$Fees$	Total fees in BTC
$Size$	Total transaction size
single value	

Figure 1: Number of transactions by time step.



aggregating transaction information one-hop forward/backward. The remaining 17 node features are gathered by our Elliptic++ data collection pipeline (with the exception of the 0.5% of transactions that were not deanonymized) as *augmented features* and are shown in Table 2. Figure 1 shows the distribution of transactions across the three classes in each of the 49 time steps.

3.2 Actors (Wallet Addresses) Dataset

The *actors (wallet addresses) dataset* is a graph network of 822,942 wallet addresses, each with 56 features as shown in Table 3. Five csv files are used, as shown in Table 4. Each address has an entry in *wallets_features.csv*, with numerical data for the time

Table 3: Actors (wallet addresses) dataset features.


Feature	Description
Transaction related:	
$BTC_{transacted}$	Total BTC transacted (sent+received)
BTC_{sent}	Total BTC sent
$BTC_{received}$	Total BTC received
$Fees$	Total fees in BTC
$Fees_{share}$	Total fees as share of BTC transacted
Time related:	
$Blocks_{txs}$	Number of blocks between transactions
$Blocks_{input}$	Number of blocks between being an input address
$Blocks_{output}$	Number of blocks between being an output address
$Addr_{interactions}$	Number of interactions among addresses
each has 5 values:	total, min, max, mean, median
Class	class label: {illicit, licit, unknown}
Transaction related:	
Txs_{total}	Total number of blockchain transactions
Txs_{input}	Total number of dataset transactions as input address
Txs_{output}	Total number of dataset transactions as output address
Time related:	
$Timesteps$	Number of time steps transacting in
$Lifetime$	Lifetime in blocks
$Block_{first}$	Block height first transacted in
$Block_{last}$	Block height last transacted in
$Block_{first\ sent}$	Block height first sent in
$Block_{first\ receive}$	Block height first received in
$Repeat_{interactions}$	Number of addresses transacted with multiple times
single value	

Table 4: Data structure for an example address in the actors dataset: (1) *features*, row of 56 feature values for address, (2) *classes*, the class label for address, (3) *AddrAddr*, all edges involving address in the actor interaction graph, (4) *AddrTx*, all edges as involving address as the input address in the address-transaction graph, and similarly (5) *TxAddr*, as the output address.

wallets_features.csv

address	time step	txs_input	...	lifetime_blocks	...	Addr_interactions_median
39sfuA8pY4UfybgEZi7uvA13jkGzZpsg5K	23	420	...	18145	...	1
AddrAddr_edgelist.csv						
input_address	output_address					
39sfuA8pY4UfybgEZi7uvA13jkGzZpsg5K	1ML...kTL					
AddrTx_edgelist.csv						
input_address	txId					
39sfuA8pY4UfybgEZi7uvA13jkGzZpsg5K	272145560					
TxAddr_edgelist.csv						
txId	output_address					
322554634	39sfuA8pY4UfybgEZi7uvA13jkGzZpsg5K					

Figure 2: Number of wallet addresses by time step.



step and 56 address features listed in Table 3 for each transaction it was involved in, and an entry in wallets_classes.csv, representing its class label (1: *illicit*, 2: *licit*, 3: *unknown*). A wallet address is labelled *illicit* if it has at least 1 edge with an illicit transaction, otherwise it is labelled *licit* if the ratio of its total unknown transactions (edges) to its total *licit* transactions (edges) is > 3.7 or *unknown* if ≤ 3.7 . The ratio "3.7" is calculated using the total ratio of unknown transactions to *licit* transactions in the transactions dataset. We also create AddrAddr_edgelist.csv to record the pairwise interactions of input and output addresses through Bitcoin transactions. Each entry represents the input address and output address relationship of one transaction. If there are multiple transactions between a pair of addresses, then there are multiple entries in this table. Additionally, we create AddrTx_edgelist.csv, where each entry represents the relationship between an input address and a transaction, and TxAddr_edgelist.csv, with each entry representing a directed connection between a transaction and an output address. With these data structures, the Elliptic++ dataset can be used to build the address-to-address graph (Section 3.3.2), and the address-transaction graph (Section 3.3.3), in addition to the transaction-to-transaction money flow graph (Section 3.3.1).

The distribution of address classes are 2% (14, 266) class-1 (*illicit*), 31% (251, 088) class-2 (*licit*), and the remaining are unknown (class-3). When populated using temporal information provided by the time steps in the transactions dataset, we obtain 1,268,260 wallet address occurrences across all time steps, including 2% (28, 601) illicit addresses, 27% (338, 871) *licit* addresses, and 71% (900, 788) unknown addresses, as shown in Figure 2.

3.3 Graph Visualization


In this section, we provide a detailed explanation with visualization of the Elliptic++ dataset using four types of graphs: Money Flow Transaction Graph, Actor Interaction Graph, Address-Transaction Graph, and User Entity Graph. Each graph has its own unique importance.

- The **Money Flow Transaction Graph** shows BTC flow from one transaction to the next, allowing exploration of the spatial and temporal patterns surrounding a given transaction.
- The **Actor Interaction Graph** shows the pairwise interactions among input and output addresses of transactions, showing the density of the k-hop neighborhoods of wallet addresses.
- The **Address-Transaction Graph** is a heterogenous graph showing flow of BTC across transactions and addresses, allowing an evaluation of purposes of a transaction and the relationships among addresses of the same transaction.
- The **User Entity Graph** is an address cluster graph that allows for potential linking of addresses controlled by a specific user, which further de-anonymizes their identity and purpose.

3.3.1 Money Flow Transaction Graph. This is a directed graph where nodes represent transactions and edges represent directed BTC flows from one transaction to the next. Figure 3 visualizes the distribution of all transactions in time step 32. We choose three transactions (one per class) representing the unknown (yellow), illicit (blue), and licit (red) classes, and display sub-graphs of their four-hop neighbourhoods as shown in the left, middle, and right of Figure 3. All neighbour nodes are shown, though for visual clarity, some edges are abbreviated with dotted arrows signifying that a particular node has two (or more) outgoing edges of the same pattern as the graph is traversed further. This displays the potential utility of exploring the spatial and temporal patterns surrounding a given transaction.

It is important to note that some time steps produce sparse transaction graphs, e.g. time step 14, while others produce dense transaction graphs, e.g. time step 32. We provide a comparison in the Appendix (see Figure 14). This difference in graph density drastically affects the node neighborhood patterns, with some time steps creating shallow, wide money flow transaction graphs, while


Figure 3: Money flow transaction graphs for selected unknown (left), illicit (middle), and licit (right) transactions in time step 32 (top shows distribution of TS 32 transactions).



other time steps creating deep, narrow money flow transaction graphs. Moreover, although there are only 2% illicit transactions within the dataset, they are evidently spread out across each time step and hence the ML model trained for anomaly detection over the earlier sequence of time steps can be leveraged to perform forensics on the later part of the sequence of time steps.


3.3.2 Actor Interaction Graph. This is a directed graph where nodes represent addresses and edges represent pairwise interactions among input and output addresses of transactions. Figure 4 visualizes the distribution of all addresses in time step 32. Unlike Figure 3 where transaction interactions are captured in terms of money flows, Figure 4 displays the interactions at the address level as opposed to transaction level. The grey area is due to the density of edges. Here, the density of the address graphs at a given time step impact the density of the k -hop neighborhood of a wallet address node. We provide a comparison of actor interaction graphs at time steps 14 and 32 in the Appendix (see Figure 15).

Figure 4: Distribution of wallet addresses in time step 32.



3.3.3 Address-Transaction Graph. This is a heterogeneous directed graph supported by our Elliptic++ dataset. It has two types of nodes, the transaction node (circle) and the address node (square), and two types of edges, the sender-to-transaction edges, each of which represents the BTC flow from an input address (sender) to a transaction, and the transaction-to-receiver edges, each of which represents the BTC flow from a transaction to an output address. Figure 5 shows an address-transaction graph of selected transactions and addresses anchored at a given actor (i.e., the Illicit Actor 13) in time step 32. The flow and quantity of input and output addresses provide

Figure 5: An address-transaction graph for selected nodes in time step 32 featuring Illicit Actor 13 at the root.



information regarding the purposes of a transaction and the relationships among addresses connected by the same transaction. We provide a visual comparison of the distributions of all transactions and addresses at both time steps in the Appendix (see Figure 16).

3.3.4 User Entity Graph. This graph is generated by address clustering analysis rather than direct construction using the Elliptic++ dataset. Clustering addresses involves taking the set of all addresses \mathcal{A} as training data to build a clustering model which creates a set of disjoint subsets $\mathcal{U} = \{U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n\}$ (where U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n represents n clusters of addresses in \mathcal{A}) such that $\bigcup_{i=1}^n C_i = \mathcal{A}$. By treating each cluster (sub-graph) as one user, we construct a user-entity graph of n nodes, where each node represents a user in the Bitcoin network and the edges represent interactions between unique users

Figure 6: A user entity graph created by grouping transactions with ≥ 1 common element in each set into unique users and adding edges across users if a path existed between groups of transactions.




Table 5: The distribution of the number of illicit actors (that appear in 1, 2 – 4, and ≥ 5 time steps) by time step.

Time step	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
illicit actor appears in 1 time step	68	69	42	186	36	8	233	116	384	26	185	47	342	74	193	174	118
illicit actor appears in 2 – 4 time steps	5	1	3	15	2	1	28	7	21	11	7	2	4	0	6	8	8
illicit actor appears in ≥ 5 time steps	0	0	0	0	2	2	5	4	3	3	2	1	2	0	2	1	6
Time step	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
illicit actor appears in 1 time step	77	122	405	612	692	376	532	1096	704	43	97	372	130	131	759	270	447
illicit actor appears in 2 – 4 time steps	4	5	20	16	18	17	40	9	21	1	7	52	11	24	23	7	11
illicit actor appears in ≥ 5 time steps	2	4	5	4	5	3	12	1	9	2	1	9	4	6	8	5	2
Time step	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49		
illicit actor appears in 1 time step	427	588	428	180	127	436	168	395	93	277	23	505	193	370	631		
illicit actor appears in 2 – 4 time steps	9	5	5	9	0	14	8	12	11	6	9	4	11	17	20		
illicit actor appears in ≥ 5 time steps	6	4	7	5	2	3	6	3	1	1	1	0	0	1	1		

through Blockchain transactions. Address clustering is performed in four steps. First, for each transaction, the set of input addresses associated with the transaction is collected. Second, transactions whose address sets are overlapping with one or more addresses are grouped into a unique user. Third, the address-transaction graph is searched to highlight all transactions corresponding to each user. Finally, the highlighted address-transaction graph is converted into a user entity graph. Figure 6 shows the resulting user graph from the same subset of addresses and transactions in Figure 5. Refer to Section A.4 in the Appendix (Figure 17) for a detailed explanation and visualization of the clustering process. Bitcoin address clustering is a hot research topic [4, 26, 34, 45] due to its potential of linking addresses controlled by a specific user, effectively deanonymizing the identity of those users.


4 FRAUD DETECTION METHODOLOGY

4.1 Dataset Preprocessing

We used an effective 70/30 train-test split with respect to time steps for both the transactions and actors datasets, with time steps 1 to 34 for training and time steps 35 to 49 for testing. Figure 7 graphically shows the distribution of data points (top for transactions, bottom for actors) of all three classes by time step for both the training and testing sets. We provide a detailed distribution of the number of transactions and addresses for all three classes in each of the 49 steps in the Appendix (Tables 12 and 13 respectively). Due to the underlying class imbalance across illicit and licit classes, normalization and standardization transformations are applied. The augmented features in the transactions dataset and all features in the actors dataset are transformed by scaling each feature using the MinMaxScaler to the range (0, 1), reducing imbalance and assisting with model convergence [20].


4.2 Machine Learning Models

Previous studies [30, 40] indicate that ensemble methods perform better than graph neural networks, hence the ML models used

Figure 7: The distribution of the number of transactions and addresses by time step for training and testing sets.

for evaluation included Random Forest (RF) [10], Multilayer Perceptrons (MLP) [9], Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [15], and Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGB) [12]. We also include Logistic Regression (LR) [16] as the baseline. LR is a single layer neural network which estimates the probability of an event, such as licit or illicit, based on independent variables. RF is an ensemble of classification trees trained on samples with random subsets of features for each decision, evaluating a final decision from averaging all decision trees. MLP is an artificial neural network with at least three layers where data features are fed into input neurons that assign probability vectors for classes as outputs. The Scikit-learn python library was used for LR (default parameters with 1000 max iterations), RF (default parameters with 50 estimators), and MLP (parameters: 1 hidden layer with 50 neurons, 500 epochs, Adam optimizer, 0.001 learning rate). LSTM is a recurrent neural network that has feedback connections and is capable of learning long-term dependencies (sequences of data as compared to single data points). The TensorFlow python library was used for LSTM (hyper-parameters: sigmoid activation, Adam optimizer, 30 epochs, binary cross-entropy loss function, 15 embedding output dims).

Figure 8: Trend comparison for selected features from the transactions (left) and actors (right) datasets. Green highlight shows good correlation, red shows unclear correlation.



XGB is a supervised learning algorithm which predicts variables by combining estimates of prior models. The XGBoost python library was used for XGB (default parameters with "multi:softmax" objective and 2 classes).

4.3 Fraud Detection Evaluation Metrics


The metrics used to verify the models were Precision (ratio of correct classifications), Recall (proportion of actual positive labels correctly classified), F1 Score (harmonic mean of precision and recall), and Micro-Avg F1 (Micro-F1) Score (ratio of correct classifications to total classifications). In some cases to distinguish between classifiers with close performance, the Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) is used due to its suitability for unbalanced datasets and its prior use on financial fraud and cryptocurrency-related studies [1, 5, 44, 47]. We provide the formal definition of these metrics in Section A.2 of the Appendix. In addition, to gain deeper understanding of the different ML models and their classification performance for illicit transactions and illicit addresses, we conduct the following three case studies: (i) EASY cases: *all models classify an illicit transaction correctly*; (ii) HARD cases: *all models classify an illicit transaction incorrectly*; and (iii) AVERAGE cases: *some models failed to classify an illicit transaction but ≥ 1 models classified correctly*.

5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

5.1 Statistical Analysis of the Dataset

The building blocks of the Elliptic++ dataset are the transaction features and address features, which directly impact the quality of information gained by the models and quality of classification explainability into the root cause of fraudulent activities. Figure 8 shows three chosen features for the transactions (left) and actors (right) datasets, with feature values in y-axis and time steps in x-axis. We conjecture that important dataset features will show a reflective trend that clearly distinguishes between the illicit and licit classes. Such features will provide a level of interpretation into the risk assessment of a transaction or an actor. In Figure 8, the green curves of the features in the top two rows show the trend of licit transactions (left) and licit actors (right), which are


Figure 9: Timeline of illicit actors in ≥ 5 time steps, each point represents at least one illicit transaction involved in.



distinctly different from the red curves of illicit transactions (left) and dishonest actors (right). Conversely, some features may not contribute to the detection of illicit transactions and actors, such as the two features in the bottom row. For example, the curves for the illicit and licit transactions in Local Feature 53 can be clearly differentiated through visual analysis, while Local Feature 15 does not display any visual clue on illicit v.s. licit transactions over all time steps. Similar observations are found in the actors dataset.

We can further expand the statistical analysis on the behavioral trends of actors by their features captured in our Elliptic++ dataset, e.g., life span, number of transactions involved, and distribution of actors, which provide additional level of explainability to both the dataset and the classification/detection model performance for illicit/licit/unknown actors. Figure 9 shows the timeline of 15 illicit actors that transact in ≥ 5 time steps. For instance, Illicit Actor 1 transacts in 15 time steps, while Illicit Actor 15 transacts in only 6 time steps. A similar figure for illicit actors existing in only 1 time step (14,007 illicit actors) is included in the Appendix (see Figure 19). Moreover, the number of involved transactions within each time step varies across illicit actors as shown in Figure 10 for the five selected actors. Table 5 (shown on the previous page) provides the distribution of illicit actors across time steps categorized into 3 sets.

Figure 10: Number of transactions per time step for Illicit Actor 13 (purple), 1 (green), 5 (orange), 14 (Lblue), and 8 (Dblue).



Regarding the Bitcoin users, clustering addresses using the previously discussed four steps in Section 3.3.4 created 146,783 user entities. Table 6 shows some relevant statistics. Each user controlled a varying number of addresses, with 98.72% of users controlling ≤ 10 addresses, while only 0.02% of users controlled ≥ 1K addresses.

Table 6: Statistics for Bitcoin users in the Elliptic++ Dataset.

# Users	146,783
# Addresses per User: Min	1
# Addresses per User: Median	1
# Addresses per User: Mean	2.73
# Addresses per User: Max	14,885
% Users w/ 1 – 10 Addresses	98.72%
% Users w/ 11 – 1K Addresses	1.26%
% Users w/ 1K – max Addresses	0.02%

5.2 Model Evaluation and Analysis

Table 7 and Table 8 show the results of all models trained on the transactions dataset and the actors dataset respectively. From Table 7, the results for the transactions dataset in Elliptic++ (labelled TX) show an increase in performance in most of the metrics for all of the models, compared to the Elliptic dataset (labelled EC). This can be attributed to our addition of 17 augmented features to each transaction, which in turn improves the generalization performance and the explainability of both the transaction dataset and the fraudulent transaction detection models. It is observed that RF^{TX} is the

Table 7: Illicit transactions results using individual/ensemble of classifiers. EC refers to classification on Elliptic dataset [40], TX is on our Elliptic++ transactions dataset.

Model	Precision	Recall	F1 Score	Micro-F1
LR^{EC}	0.326	0.707	0.446	0.886
LR^{TX}	0.328	0.707	0.448	0.884
RF^{EC}	0.940	0.724	0.818	0.979
RF^{TX}	0.975	0.719	0.828	0.980
MLP^{EC}	0.476	0.673	0.558	0.931
MLP^{TX}	0.611	0.613	0.612	0.949
$LSTM^{EC}$	0.665	0.350	0.459	0.946
$LSTM^{TX}$	0.709	0.223	0.339	0.942
XGB^{EC}	0.812	0.717	0.761	0.971
XGB^{TX}	0.793	0.718	0.754	0.969
<i>2 classifiers ensemble, selecting top 3 classifiers</i>				
$RF+MLP^{EC}$	0.987	0.624	0.765	0.975
$RF+MLP^{TX}$	0.989	0.635	0.773	0.975
$RF+XGB^{EC}$	0.960	0.704	0.812	0.979
$RF+XGB^{TX}$	0.977	0.706	0.820	0.979
$MLP+XGB^{EC}$	0.457	0.737	0.564	0.926
$MLP+XGB^{TX}$	0.974	0.596	0.739	0.972
<i>3 classifiers ensemble, selecting top 3 classifiers</i>				
$RF+MLP+XGB^{EC}$	0.947	0.719	0.817	0.979
$RF+MLP+XGB^{TX}$	0.962	0.723	0.826	0.980

best-performing model (followed by XGB^{TX} and MLP^{TX}) with a precision of 97.5% and recall of 71.9%. Although RF^{TX} and RF^{EC} have comparable precision and recall performance, RF^{TX} is better as the MCC values are 0.83 vs 0.81. Table 7 also shows the results of 2– and 3–classifier ensembles by selecting the top 3 models (RF, XGB, MLP). The best performing 2– and 3–classifier ensembles are those using Elliptic++. In comparison, the LR , MLP^{EC} , and $LSTM$ models are ineffective with < 50% precision/recall (highlighted in red). Table 8 shows the results for the actors dataset. It is observed that RF^{AR} is the best-performing model (followed by XGB^{AR} and MLP^{AR}) with a precision of 91.1% and recall of 78.9%. Also, the best 2– and 3–classifier ensembles ($RF+XGB^{AR}$ and $RF+MLP+XGB^{AR}$) show increases in precision (95.9%, 93.3% vs 91.1%), but decreases in recall (53.0%, 57.2% vs 78.9%), indicating the member models of 2– and 3–classifier ensembles are not complimentary and have high negative correlation [43]. The LR^{AR} and $LSTM^{AR}$ models are ineffective with extremely low recall (highlighted in red).

5.3 EASY, HARD, and AVERAGE cases Analysis

To further understand the performance of RF models against other models, and the performance results of their best performing 2– and 3–classifier ensembles, we analyze their performance in terms of the EASY, HARD, and AVERAGE cases as defined in Section 4.3. Table 9 (shown on the next page) provides a temporal split of the classification results across the test time steps of 35 to 49 for the EASY case, HARD case, and AVERAGE case respectively. It is important to note that AVERAGE cases present the opportunities for further optimizations. For the AVERAGE cases (correct classification by $1 \leq x \leq 4$ models), all combinations are shown for each individual model, for the 2/3 models scenario we show top 2 combinations, and for the 4 models scenario we show top 1 combination. First, the case where the 4 models RF, MLP, XGB, and LR correctly classify the transaction accounts for 71% of the AVERAGE cases. Second, the cases where RF classifies incorrectly only make up for < 1% of the AVERAGE cases. This motivates us to focus on optimization of the RF model with feature refinement.


Table 8: Illicit actors results using individual/ensemble of classifiers. AR is classification on our Elliptic++ actors dataset.

Model	Precision	Recall	F1 Score	Micro-F1
LR^{AR}	0.477	0.046	0.083	0.964
RF^{AR}	0.911	0.789	0.845	0.990
MLP^{AR}	0.708	0.502	0.587	0.974
$LSTM^{AR}$	0.922	0.033	0.064	0.965
XGB^{AR}	0.869	0.534	0.662	0.980
<i>2 classifiers ensemble, selecting top 3 classifiers</i>				
$RF+MLP^{AR}$	0.967	0.403	0.568	0.978
$RF+XGB^{AR}$	0.959	0.530	0.682	0.982
$MLP+XGB^{AR}$	0.929	0.324	0.481	0.975
<i>3 classifiers ensemble, selecting top 3 classifiers</i>				
$RF+MLP+XGB^{AR}$	0.933	0.572	0.709	0.983

Table 9: Classification results on the testing dataset showing distributions of EASY, HARD, AVERAGE cases among time steps 35 to 49. Total of each case is 49, 243, and 791 respectively. For the AVERAGE case, distributions are shown for cases where only 1 model (all shown), only 2 models (top 2 shown), only 3 models (top 2 shown), and only 4 models (top 1 shown) classified correctly.

Time Step	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	TOTAL
EASY	32	0	2	5	5	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	49
HARD	4	0	10	7	4	28	6	36	22	20	4	1	21	27	53	243
AVERAGE	LR	0	0	3	0	2	3	0	6	2	3	1	0	1	9	2
	RF	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	MLP	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	LSTM	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	XGB	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	RF,XGB	4	0	0	1	2	1	17	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	LR,MLP	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	RF,MLP,XGB	5	6	0	8	3	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	LR,RF,XGB	6	1	10	27	18	10	5	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	RF,MLP,XGB,LR	124	24	12	57	45	55	81	159	0	1	0	1	0	0	0

Figure 11: Top 10 and bottom 10 features for the transactions dataset (left) and actors dataset (right).



5.4 Model Optimization by Feature Refinement

Given that the RF is the best performing model, we explore feature refinement to further optimize RF. By examining the results from decision trees, we combine feature importance, permutation feature importance, and drop column feature importance to show the top 10 and bottom 10 features by importance on both transactions dataset and actors dataset, as shown in Figure 11a for TX and Figure 11b for AR. For the transactions dataset, the 17 augmented features produced a collective 12% importance, with the transaction size feature alone responsible for 4.1%. For the actors dataset, 35% of the features were responsible for 80% of the importance, with the total address interaction as the most important feature. Interestingly, a connection can be made to the set of top and bottom 10 features with the features highlighted in Figure 8. It can be seen that there is a link from the green highlight to the top 10 features, and likewise with the red highlight and bottom 10 features. This solidifies that features providing visual proof of the risk attribute to a larger classification importance, and vice versa. The top and bottom 2 of each feature type in both datasets are included in the Appendix Section A.5 for reference. Using this analysis, we run

Table 10: Illicit transactions classification results using selected features, labelled as ψ , Micro-F1 denotes Micro-Avg F1.

Model	Precision	Recall	F1 Score	Micro-F1
RFTX	0.975	0.719	0.828	0.980
RFTX ψ	0.986	0.727	0.836	0.981
RF+XGBTX	0.977	0.706	0.820	0.979
RF+XGBTX ψ	0.987	0.717	0.826	0.980
RF+MLP+XGBTX	0.962	0.723	0.826	0.980
RF+MLP+XGBTX ψ	0.968	0.729	0.834	0.980

the best 1-/2-/3-classifiers ensembles with selected features instead of the full set of features. Tables 10 and 11 show the model performance results for transactions and wallet addresses (actors) respectively. Interestingly, the feature refined models show an average improvement of 0.92%, 1.17%, and 0.89% for precision, recall, and F1 score respectively on the transactions dataset, and similarly 1.07%, 3.1%, and 1.13% on the actors dataset.

The increase in recall is also evident in the RF trees voting. Figures 12a and 12b show the cumulative votes of 50 RF trees for 9 chosen transactions/addresses before (left) and after (right) selecting important features for both the transactions and actors datasets respectively. This demonstrates a trend that when some non-contributing features are dropped, those transactions/addresses that are close to the correct manifold in classification will in turn be classified correctly by more trees, increasing in the number of correct votes.

Figure 12: Cumulative votes for 50 RF trees for (a) chosen transactions and (b) addresses before (left) and after (right) feature selection and refinement.



6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

With the rapid growth of the cryptocurrency ecosystem, there is a growing demand for robust financial forensics on the blockchain networks. This paper makes three original contributions.

First, we collect and contribute the Elliptic++ dataset, combining over 203k transactions and 822k addresses, and providing four graph representations (Money Flow Transaction Graph, Actor Interaction Graph, Address-Transaction Graph, User Entity Graph) that allow for mining and visualizations of connections for anomaly detection. This enables the detection of both illicit transactions and illicit accounts in Bitcoin networks.

Second, we leverage the four unique graph representations to showcase the fraud detection of illicit transactions, illicit actors (wallet addresses), and the risks of de-anonymization of users using clustering of addresses. We demonstrate the utility of the Elliptic++ dataset for detecting fraudulent transactions and illicit accounts using representative machine learning approaches, including Random Forest, Logistic Regression, Multilayer Perceptrons, LSTM, and Extreme Gradient Boosting. We analyze why Random Forest (RF) is the best-performing model for fraud detection, achieving 97.5% precision and 71.9% recall on the transactions dataset, and 91.1% precision and 78.9% recall on the actors dataset. We also provide comparative analysis of their performance and provide the explainability of the ML algorithms through visualization of all four types of graphs. In addition, we also provide explainability of the performance comparison through detailed analysis on the

Table 11: Illicit actors classification results using selected features, labelled as ψ and compared with AR. Micro-F1 denotes Micro-Avg F1.

Model	Precision	Recall	F1 Score	Micro-F1
RF ^{AR}	0.911	0.789	0.845	0.990
RF ^{ARψ}	0.921	0.802	0.858	0.990
RF+XGB ^{AR}	0.959	0.530	0.682	0.982
RF+XGB ^{ARψ}	0.967	0.543	0.686	0.982
RF+MLP+XGB ^{AR}	0.933	0.572	0.709	0.983
RF+MLP+XGB ^{ARψ}	0.945	0.601	0.718	0.984

time series of selected transaction features, and the time series of account features over the time steps of the Elliptic++ dataset.

Third, to further improve the accuracy of the ML algorithms for detecting fraudulent transactions and illicit accounts, we employ ensemble methods to improve the generalization performance of individual ML algorithms. We study ensemble learning with two and three member models, with detailed analysis on the effectiveness of ensemble methods through EASY, HARD and AVERAGE cases. Motivated by our ensemble learning analysis, we show that model training using selective features instead of all extracted features of transactions and of addresses can further improve RF precision and recall performance by 0.92% and 1.17% respectively for the transactions dataset, and 1.07% and 3.1% respectively for the actors dataset. The combination of ensembles and importance-based feature pruning not only demonstrates the utility of the Elliptic++ dataset for fraud detection in Bitcoin network, but also showcases the importance of root cause analysis of fraudulent activities through semantic and statistical explainability of ML algorithms.


The Bitcoin blockchain is the first and the largest cryptocurrency network, boasting as the most widely used cryptocurrency. We believe that the methodology used for collecting the Elliptic++ dataset and the approach developed to exhibit the utilities of this dataset for fraud detection in Bitcoin network can be leveraged to analyze other types of currencies and blockchain networks, including Monero, ZCash, and Ethereum, to name a few. Moreover, the graph representations and the use of time series representations of transaction/account features over the time steps provides guidelines for developing financial forensics models that can be beneficial to other blockchains with high performance and explainability.

The Elliptic++ dataset and its tutorials are made publicly available at <https://www.github.com/git-disl/EllipticPlusPlus>. We conjecture that making this dataset publicly available will enable the applied data science researchers to conduct financial forensics on the Bitcoin cryptocurrency network and develop more effective fraud detection models and algorithms.

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Figure 13: Elliptic++ dataset collection pipeline using our blockchain parsers and extractors.

A APPENDIX

A.1 Dataset Collection

The Bitcoin blockchain contains a huge number of transactions since its inception. Given that our goal of data collection is for fraud detection on the Bitcoin network, we use the 203k transactions collected in the Elliptic dataset as the seeds of our crawling module for two reasons. First, the Elliptic dataset is the largest labelled Bitcoin transaction data publicly available. Second, the Elliptic dataset only contains transactions in the Bitcoin network labeled as licit, illicit, and unknown. To enable detection of both fraudulent transactions and illicit accounts, we need to collect all accounts involved in the Elliptic transaction dataset. The data acquisition pipeline for the Elliptic++ dataset is shown in Figure 13 and is described as follows.

First, we design and implement a blockchain parser which takes de-anonymized transactions as input, scrapes the public Blockchain, and augments additional features to the transactions. The augmented features include information regarding the transaction including number of incoming/outgoing edges, number of input/output addresses, amount of incoming/outgoing BTC, and much more

Next, the output from the blockchain transactions parser is fed into our extractor that parses the addresses involved in the transactions and scrapes the public Blockchain to gather the corresponding address-related features. These features include transaction and time related information.

We define the transaction data structure (see Table 1) and account data structure (see Table 4) such that the parsers and extractors will organize, clean, and store the data based on these structures. Furthermore, we collect those account features that are needed in the construction of the four types of graph representations: (a) Money Flow Transaction Graph, (b) Actor Interaction Graph, (c) Address-Transaction Graph, and (d) User Entity Graph. These graphs enable mining and visualizations of account and transaction connections for anomaly detection.

In addition, to identify and define the important features for all accounts involved in the Elliptic transaction dataset, as outlined

above, a major technical challenge was the resource demand. The collection, cleaning, parsing, and labeling of the dataset were computation and storage intensive. We leveraged the High Performance Computing (HPC) Clusters at the Georgia Institute of Technology (the PACE clusters⁴), taking several weeks to complete the extraction of all accounts and their features present in the Elliptic++ dataset.

A.2 Fraud Detection Evaluation Metrics

The accuracy of the models is verified using five metrics: Precision, Recall, F1 Score, Micro-Avg F1 Score, and Matthews Correlation Coefficient. The explanations have the following components: true positive (TP), false positive (FP), false negative (FN), and true negative (TN).

- (1) *Precision* - the fraction of positive points that were correctly classified. It is calculated by:

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{\text{TP}}{\text{TP} + \text{FP}}$$

- (2) *Recall* - the fraction of actual positive points that were correctly classified. It is calculated by:

$$\text{Recall} = \frac{\text{TP}}{\text{TP} + \text{FN}}$$

- (3) *F1 Score* - the harmonic mean of precision and recall. It is calculated by:

$$F1 = 2 \cdot \frac{\text{precision} \cdot \text{recall}}{\text{precision} + \text{recall}}$$

⁴www.pace.gatech.edu

Figure 14: Distribution of transactions in time steps 14 (left) and 32 (right).




Figure 15: Distribution of wallet addresses in time steps 14 (left) and 32 (right).





Figure 16: Distribution of transactions and wallet addresses in time steps 14 (left) and 32 (right).



- (4) *Micro-Avg F1 Score* - similar to F1 Score, but using the total number of TP, FP, and FN instead of individually for each class. It is calculated by:

$$\text{MicroAvg F1} = \frac{TP}{TP + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (FP + FN)}$$

- (5) *Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC)* - measures the quality of binary classifications, taking into account the difference between predicted values and actual values. It ranges from $[-1, +1]$ with the extreme values -1 and $+1$ in cases of perfect misclassification and perfect classification respectively. It is calculated by:

$$MCC = \frac{(TP \cdot TN) - (FP \cdot FN)}{\sqrt{(TP + FP) \cdot (TP + FN) \cdot (TN + FP) \cdot (TN + FN)}}$$

A.3 Graph Visualization

Figures 14, 15, and 16 show the distributions of transactions and/or wallet addresses for the Money Flow Transaction Graph, the Actor

Interaction Graph, and the Address-Transaction Graph respectively. Specifically, they show a comparison between distributions in time step 14, which produce more sparse graphs, and time step 32, which produce more dense graphs. The grey area is due to the density of the edges.

A.4 Bitcoin Address Clustering

The Bitcoin address clustering process discussed in this study is referred to as the *multiple input addresses heuristic*. This heuristic takes advantage of the fact that in order to transact correctly, a user must provide the signatures corresponding to the private keys and the public key wallet addresses for all the input addresses, thus, a user must have access over all private keys. Hence, allowing for the assumption that all input addresses of a transaction can be attributed to the same user. This is demonstrated in Figure 18, where the input addresses $addr1$, $addr2$, $addr3$, and $addr4$ are grouped into User U_1 , while input addresses $addr5$ and $addr6$ are grouped into User U_2 . Figure 17 shows the address clustering process using the four steps discussed in Section 3.3.4, producing a user graph on the right.

Figure 17: Clustering Bitcoin addresses: (a) collect the set of input addresses for each transaction in the address-transaction graph; (b) group transactions with ≥ 1 common element in each set into unique users; and (c) highlight transactions within each user in the original graph; and (d) convert highlighted address-transaction graph into a user graph, with edges across users if a path existed between groups of transactions in the original graph.





Figure 18: Bitcoin address clustering based on multiple input addresses heuristic in an address-transaction graph.



A.5 Statistical Analysis of the Dataset

Figure 19 shows illicit actors that exist in only 1 time step (14,007 total illicit actors). Aside from providing information about the timeline of the illicit actors, it displays the distribution of the illicit actors among the dataset for these types of actors. For example, in time step 6 there are 8 illicit actors, in time step 14 there are 74 illicit actors, and in time step 32 there are 759 illicit actors.

Figure 20 is an extension of the dataset feature analysis and feature refinement by displaying the top 2 and bottom 2 of each feature class in (a) the transactions dataset (left: local features, right: aggregate features), and (b) the actors dataset (left: transactions features, right: time features). This further solidifies the explainability behind the risk of transactions and actors through the visual (and numerical) distinction among the illicit and licit classes. In all green highlighted figures, one can clearly classify between both classes. Though, this is unlike the red highlighted figures where there is no characteristic trend among both classes.

A.6 Data Distribution

Tables 12 and 13 show the numerical distribution within each class by time step for the transactions and actors datasets respectively.

Figure 19: Number of transactions for illicit actors appearing in only 1 time step. Each point is a unique illicit actor. Y-axes are in log scale.




Figure 20: Trend comparison for features in the transactions dataset (left) and actors dataset (right). Green highlight shows good correlation (top 2 rows), while red highlight shows unclear correlation (bottom 2 rows).

(a) Comparison of local features (left) and aggregate features (right) in the transactions dataset.



(b) Comparison of transaction features (left) and time features (right) in the actors dataset.




Table 12: Numerical distribution of the number of transactions of each class by time step. First two tables are for the training set and the third table is for the testing set.

Time step	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
Unknown	5733	3427	5342	4253	4921	3843	4845	3292	4218	5755	3600	1541	3719	1605	3021	2445	2574
Illicit	17	18	11	30	8	5	102	67	248	18	131	16	291	43	147	128	99
Licit	2130	1099	1268	1410	1874	480	1101	1098	530	954	565	490	518	374	471	402	712
Time step	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
Unknown	1587	2761	3391	2896	4131	2978	3466	1720	2006	883	1369	3101	1959	2106	3202	2710	1971
Illicit	52	80	260	100	158	53	137	118	96	24	85	329	83	106	342	23	37
Licit	337	665	640	541	1605	1134	989	476	421	182	199	845	441	604	981	418	478
Time step	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49		
Unknown	4166	4685	2808	2135	1577	3270	4210	4986	3693	3384	4377	2807	4275	2483	1978		
Illicit	182	33	40	111	81	112	116	239	24	24	5	2	22	36	56		
Licit	1159	1675	458	645	1102	1099	1016	1915	1346	1567	1216	710	824	435	420		

Table 13: Numerical distribution of the number of wallet addresses of each class by time step. First two tables are for the training set and the third table is for the testing set.

Time step	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
Unknown	26465	15878	26213	31035	24621	17029	23357	17631	23819	38271	18250	10343	26813	5912	11500	9064	17066
Illicit	96	99	58	266	54	17	463	267	960	120	494	77	918	156	447	427	321
Licit	24547	16292	4835	8647	10465	1957	7902	16229	3894	8454	10576	2875	3288	1941	6671	2315	4039
Time step	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
Unknown	6413	11633	32483	21725	28827	14101	19396	12231	16434	9130	6489	17180	8882	13328	15679	10109	9914
Illicit	189	320	950	1256	1491	734	1083	2243	1334	89	219	979	287	312	1730	561	908
Licit	1643	3220	6315	16576	9693	7301	3518	8314	2360	1000	920	3811	2931	5119	4873	7675	5546
Time step	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49		
Unknown	23898	34887	16578	16820	9679	23564	22123	31496	24953	16255	22201	17719	19726	13638	10030		
Illicit	943	1226	804	400	282	801	454	967	156	497	42	626	256	433	789		
Licit	6229	11130	3455	4039	4881	10233	7033	11142	7302	10631	11057	4723	8106	8783	4385		