



#### **SPONSOR PLATINUM**























#### **SPONSOR GOLD**













#### **SPONSOR SILVER**





# **Enrico Russo Andrea Valenza**

Università di Genova enrico.russo@unige.it andrea.valenza@dibris.unige.it



## Weaknesses




https://cybersecnatlab.it

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- Confused Deputy
  - SetUID/SetGID
- Race Conditions
  - > TOCTOU Race Conditions





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# **Confused Deputy**

- A specific type of Privilege escalation
- Exploits the Access Control List (ACL) model
  - Capability based systems are not affected





#### The Confused Deputy

(or why capabilities might have been invented)

Norm Hardy Senior Architect

https://zoo.cs.yale.edu/classes/cs422/2010/bib/hardy88confused.pdf






- A program provides compilation services to other programs
- The compiler service is pay-per-use: the compiler service stores billing information a BILL file
- Only the program has access to BILL.












- Clients can compile and set the output file name
- A malicious client calls the output BILL
- Clients cannot open BILL, but the program can
- The program overwrites the BILL file with the compilation output











# Protection against Confused Deputy

- Use capability based systems
  - Access Control List based systems are ineffective





- Confused Deputy
  - SetUID/SetGID
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  - > TOCTOU Race Conditions





# SetUID/SetGID

- Open SetUID programs let users run as the owner
- If the program is vulnerable, users can run arbitrary commands as the owner
- The program should only offer the right capabilities
  - > E.g., only running predefined commands





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### **Race Conditions**

- Concurrency
  - Execution of multiple control flows (e.g., threads)
  - Can lead to non-deterministic behavior
- Race conditions
  - Software can change the intended instruction order
    - > E.g., two processes try to write the same file





### **Race Conditions**

Task 1

Op 1

Op 2

Op 3

Task 2

Op 1

Op 2

Op 3

Trace 1

Op 1

Op 1

Op 2

Op 3

Op 2

Op 3

Trace N

Op 1

Op 1

Op 2

Op 2

Op 3

Op 3

One of the N traces at random (depending on the scheduler)





## Properties for race conditions

- Concurrency property
  - Two (or more) concurrent control flows
- Shared object property
  - Concurrent control flows access a shared race object
- Change state property
  - > At least one flow alters the state of the race object





#### Race window

- Code segment that accesses the race object in an insecure way
  - Also called critical section
- Traditional approach
  - Never overlap critical sections (mutual exclusion)
  - Synchronization primitives (SP)
- Misusing SPs may lead to deadlock





- Confused Deputy
  - SetUID/SetGID
- Race Conditions
  - > Time of Check, Time of Use





## Time of Check, Time of Use

- Creates a race window by
  - > First *checking* the race object
  - > Then *using* the race object
- Concurrent operations can fit between checking and using






# Time of Check, Time of Use

Read file as root

Get file path

Check real user permissions

Read file



Trace 1

Get file path

Check real user permissions

Read file

Change file

Trace N

Get file path

Check real user permissions

Change file

Read file

Run multiple times concurrently to get the trace you want (i.e., the one that triggers the vulnerability)





### **TOCTOU**

- How can I change a file? "Get file path" passed already
  - Create a symbolic link to a valid file A
  - Make the program read the symbolic link path
  - Change the symbolic link to point to file B
  - > The program returns the content of file B





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