

The Role of Hardware in Security

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Acknowledgments

➤ The presentation includes material from

- Nicolò MAUNERO
- Gianluca ROASCIO

whose valuable contribution is here acknowledged and highly appreciated.

Goal

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- Understanding why hardware plays a key role in the protection of any system.
- Introducing a clear distinction between the 3 main roles of hardware when dealing with security, and namely:
 - *Hardware Security*
 - *Hardware-based Security*
 - *Hardware Trust.*

Prerequisites

➤ None

Outline

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- The role of Hardware in Security
- Hardware Security
- Hardware-based Security
- Hardware Trust

Why *Hardware & Security*?

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- As with software, data and communication infrastructures, the hardware must be
 - *Designed*
 - *Built*
 - *Tested*
 - *Used*
 - *Maintained*
 - *dismissed*
- considering possible cyber attacks and their consequences.

Motivations

- Hardware runs software and is, in fact, *the last line of defense*

Motivations

- Hardware runs software and is, in fact, *the last line of defense*

Consequences (1)

- If the hardware is corrupted, all the mechanisms introduced to make the software secure (at any level) may become useless

Important side effect

Consequences (2)

- Hardware runs software and is, in fact, *the last line of defence*
- A *trusted and secure* Hardware can effectively be used to protect other system components (e.g., software, data communication infrastructures)

What are we talking about

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What are we talking about

12

➤ A multi-faceted reality



What are we talking about

13

➤ A multi-faceted reality



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What are we talking about

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➤ A multi-faceted reality



➤ A complex puzzle



Hardware & Security: a complex puzzle

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- Hardware Vulnerabilities
- Hardware Attacks
- Hardware Trust
- Hardware Counterfeiting
- Hardware-based Defenses
- Security-oriented Architectures
- Built-in security features
- PUFs (Physically Unclonable Functions)
- ...

For each tile, many dimensions

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- *Technology*
- *Target abstraction level*
- *Types of components*
- *Application domain*
- *System complexity*
- *System criticality*
- ...

The role of Hardware in Cybersecurity


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- Trying to move from a *mess* to a more *rigorous view*, the role of Hardware in security can be seen as follows:

The role of Hardware in Cybersecurity

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- Trying to move from a *mess* to a more *rigorous view*, the role of Hardware in security can be seen as follows:



Outline


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- The role of Hardware in Security
- **Hardware Security**
- Hardware-based Security
- Hardware Trust

Hardware Security: What

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
- Refers to all those aspects of security (i.e., weaknesses, vulnerabilities, countermeasures) that concern *hardware components*, regardless their actual implementations, the exploited design tools, and the target abstraction level.



Hardware Security: What

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- “Everything” related to:
 - *hardware vulnerabilities*:
 - Their analysis, identification, detection, prevention, remediation, patching, ...
 - prevention of their exploitation
 - *hardware attacks*:
 - Any technique and solution aimed at preventing, mitigating, defeating, making them ineffective, regardless the tools and the abstraction levels (e.g., software or any upper level) used to carry them out
 - *protection solutions*:
 - aimed at preventing hardware vulnerabilities and hardware attacks.



Hardware Security: What

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HARDWARE
SECURITY

HARD

➤ “Everything” related to:

➤ *hardware vulnerabilities*:

- Their analysis, identification, detection, prevention, remediation, patching
- prevention of their exploitation

See lecture:

- *CS_1.4 - Vulnerabilities*

➤ *hardware attacks*:

- Any technique and solution aimed at preventing, mitigating, defeating, making them ineffective, regaining control (or any upper level) used

See lecture:

- *HS_1.3 - Hardware Attacks*


➤ *protection solutions*:

- aimed at preventing hardware vulnerabilities and hardware attacks.

Hardware Security: When

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- Hardware Security issues must be faced:
 - During the design and production phases (*Security-by-design*)
 - When hardware is already operating in the field.



Outline

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- The role of Hardware in Security
- Hardware Security
- **Hardware-based Security**
- Hardware Trust

Hardware-based Security

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- Refers to all those solutions aimed at resorting to hardware devices to protect the system from attacks that exploit vulnerabilities of *other* components of the system itself.



HARDWARE-
BASED
SECURITY

WARE

Remark

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- To offer security features to upper layers, hardware itself must be secure at first
- From this point of view, *Hardware Security* play the role of a key *enabler* for *Hardware-based Security*.

Hardware-based Security Role

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- *“Although hardware-based security is not a silver bullet, it does provide a “chain of trust” rooted in silicon that makes the device and extended network more trustworthy and secure.”*

[<https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/solution-briefs/intel-security-essentials-solution-brief.pdf>]

Hardware-based Implementations

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- Hardware-based Implementations can be clustered as:
 - *System level solutions*
 - *Architectural level solutions*
 - *Security-oriented components*
 - *Proprietary Solutions*
 - *Open Security Platforms*
 - *Built-in Security Features*

Hardware-based Implementations

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➤ Hardware-based Implementations can be clustered as:

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System level solutions

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- Two significant standards:
 - *Trusted Platform Module*
 - *Trusted Execution Environments*

System level solutions

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
- Two significant standards:
 - *Trusted Platform Module*
 - *Trusted Execution Environments*

Trusted Platform Module – TPM

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- Standard guideline for developing chips with strong cybersecurity features
- Trustworthiness of TPM is based on different *Root of Trust* components and well-defined interactions among them

Root of Trust



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- Component that needs to always behave in the expected manner because its misbehaviour cannot be detected

Root of Trust

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- Trust in the *Roots of Trust* can be achieved through a variety of means including technical evaluation by competent experts.

Root of Trust - Role

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- Is used as basic block for the construction of a *Chain of Trust*

TPM History

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- Specification initially released by the *Trusted Computing Group* in 2003

[<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/>]


- The current version is TPM 2.0, which is standardized under ISO/IEC 11889

[<https://www.iso.org/standard/66510.html>]

[https://ebrary.net/24701/computer_science/a_practical_guide_to_tpm_20]

TPM 2.0

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[https://ebrary.net/24701/computer_science/a_practical_guide_to_tpm_20]

System level solutions

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- Two significant standards:
 - *Trusted Platform Module*
 - *Trusted Execution Environments*

Trusted Execution Environment

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- TEE is a concept that provides a secure area of the main processor

“to provide end-to-end security by protecting the execution of authenticated code, confidentiality, authenticity, privacy, system integrity and data access rights”

[Global Platform Device Committee, “EE protection profile,” version 1.2, Public Release, November 2014, Document Reference: GPD_SPE_021
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/2/final>]

Trusted Execution Environments

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- TEEs are secure area of a System-on-Chip that guarantee code and data protection
- They typically offer the minimal security required by low-end, closed embedded systems, such as IoT and “bare-metal” (i.e., without any Operating System) solutions.

Hardware-based Implementations

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Architectural level solutions

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- General purpose *Design-for-Security* solutions adopted at the architectural level, mainly to improve the security of the CPUs and of the involved memories.

Architectural level solutions


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- Examples include, among the others:
 - *Memory Protection Units*
 - *Shadow Stacks*
 - *Custom proprietary solutions*
 - ...

Memory Protection Unit - MPU

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- Present in a wider and wider number of processors
- Each memory page can be read, written or executed just by a predefined set of tasks/processes
- Access rights are decided by the kernel, which runs privileged
- Addresses sent to the memory are automatically processed by the MPU without the intervention of the kernel
- Violations cause the immediate abortion of the task



Hardware-based Implementations

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Security-oriented components

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- Set of custom, special-purpose components used for performing specific security-oriented operations, including:
 - *Hardware Cyphers*
 - *Smart Cards & SIM Cards*
 - *Secure storage devices*
 - *Random Number Generators*

Hardware-based Implementations

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Proprietary Solutions

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- *Intel® vPro® Platform*
- *AMD Secure Technology™*
- *ARM® TrustZone®*
- *Microsoft BitLocker*
- *Synopsys DesignWare® tRoot™*
- *Apple Secure Enclave Processor*
- *Google Titan*
- *Cisco® Trust Anchor*
- ...

Hardware-based Implementations

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Open Security Platforms


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- Platforms designed with cybersecurity in mind and packed with strong cybersecurity features:
 - Hardware accelerators for cryptography
 - Anti tamper
 - Secure boot process
- They include:
 - SEcube™
 - USB Armory


Hardware Platform – SEcube™

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- System-In-Package developed by Blu5™ Group
 - Cortex-M4 microcontroller
 - Flexible and fast FPGA
 - SmartCard certified EAL 5+
- Strong Cybersecurity features and capabilities




[<https://www.secube.eu/>]



3D SiP – An Example: SEcube™

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Hardware-based Implementations

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Built-in Security Features

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- Functionalities present in most of modern microcontrollers
- Mostly introduced for safety
- A proper exploitation could significantly increase the system protection against the common threats in the embedded system landscape

Outline

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- The role of Hardware in Security
- Hardware Security
- Hardware-based Security
- **Hardware Trust**

Trust

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
- “A trusted component, operation, or process is one whose behavior is predictable under almost any operating condition, and which is highly resistant to subversion by application software, virus, and a given level or physical interference.”

[ISO/IEC 24000]

Hardware Trust : Role


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- Hardware trust mainly concerns *Hardware Authenticity*



Hardware Trust : What


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- “*Everything*” related to:
 - *hardware counterfeiting*:
 - Counterfeiting types
 - Counterfeiters
 - Counterfeiting detection approaches
 - Counterfeiting consequences
 - *protection from counterfeiting*:
 - Any technique and solution aimed at preventing counterfeiting in all the stages of the product lifecycle.

Hardware Trust : What

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➤ “Everything” related to:

➤ *hardware counterfeiting*:

- Counterfeiting types
- Counterfeiters
- Counterfeiting detection app
- Counterfeiting consequences

See lecture:

HS_1.5 - Hardware Counterfeiting

➤ *protection from counterfeiting*:


- Any technique and the stages of the p

See lecture:

HS_1.6 - Physically Unclonable Functions - PUFs

Alarm

Counterfeiting of integrated circuits has become a major challenge in almost ALL industrial sectors !!



Counterfeiting

Causes

- The complexity of electronic systems significantly increased over the past few decades
- To reduce production cost, they are mostly fabricated and assembled globally

Counterfeiting

Causes

- The complexity of electronic systems significantly increased over the past few decades
- To reduce production cost, they are mostly fabricated and assembled globally

Consequences

- This globalization has led to an illicit market willing to undercut the competition with counterfeit and fake parts


Counterfeiting

Lacks

- Deficiencies in the existing test solutions
- Lack of low-cost and effective avoidance mechanisms in place

Counterfeiting types

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[Ujjwal Guin, Ke Huang, Daniel DiMase, John M. Carulli, Mohammad Tehranipoor, and Yiorgos Makris: "Counterfeit Integrated Circuits: A Rising Threat in the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain", in Proceedings of the IEEE · August 2014 - DOI: 10.1109/JPROC.2014.2332291]

Problems of Recycled ICs


- Financial damage
- Safety
- Security

Problems of Recycled ICs


Safety

- Aging Phenomena (shorter lifetime)

Failure Rate Function (Bathtub curve relationship)



Failure Rate Function (Bathtub curve relationship)



Problems of Recycled ICs

Safety

- Aging Phenomena (shorter lifetime)
- Potential damage, due to the reclaiming process (removal under very high temperature, aggressive physical removal from boards, washing, sanding, repackaging, etc.)
- Lower performances

Problems of Recycled ICs

Safety

- Aging Phenomena (shorter lifetime)
- Potential damage, due to the reclaiming process (removal under very high temperature, aggressive physical removal from boards, washing, sanding, repackaging, etc.)
- Lower performances

Security

- Unpatched vulnerabilities

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