

# Security Pillars

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- Alessandro ARMANDO
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- Gianluca ROASCIO

whose valuable contributions are here acknowledged and highly appreciated.

# Prerequisites

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## ➤ Lectures:

- *CS\_1.1 – Security: An Introduction*
- *CS\_1.2 – Cybersecurity: Definition & relevance*

# Goal

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- Presenting in details the concepts mostly considered as *Security Pillars*

# Outline

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
- Secure Systems Basic Pillars:
  - CIA Triad
- Additional pillars

# Outline

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- Secure Systems Basic Pillars:
  - CIA Triad
  - Additional pillars

# Cybersecurity



- That practice that allows an entity (organization, citizen, nation, ...) to protect its physical assets and *confidentiality*, *integrity* and *availability* of its information from threats that come from *cyberspace*

[standard ISO/IEC 27000:2014 & ISO/IEC 27032:2012]



# Secure Systems Basic Pillars

## ➤ *Confidentiality*

- Ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized

## ➤ *Integrity*


- Ensuring that information has not been modified

## ➤ *Availability*

- Legitimate users have access when they need it

# The CIA triad

- *Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability* form what is usually referred to as the *CIA triad*



# Secure Systems Basic Pillars

## ➤ *Confidentiality*

- Ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized


## ➤ *Integrity*

- Ensuring that information has not been modified

## ➤ *Availability*

- Legitimate users have access when they need it

# Confidenziality



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- *Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information...*

[US Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) -  
United States Code, 2006 Edition, Supplement 5, Title 44]

# Confidentiality

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It covers 3 related areas:

- *Data*
- *Individuals (Privacy)*
- *Organizations (Secrecy)*

# Confidentiality

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It covers 3 related areas:

- *Data*
  - *Individuals (Privacy)*
  - *Organizations (Secrecy)*
- Assures that confidential information is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals

# Confidentiality

15

It covers 3 related areas:

- *Data*
- *Individuals (Privacy)*
- *Organizations (Secrecy)*

- Assures that individuals control or influence:
  - what information related to them may be collected and stored
  - by whom and to whom that information may be disclosed

# Privacy

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- Freedom from intrusion into the private life or affairs of an individual when that intrusion results from undue or illegal gathering and use of data about that individual

[NISTIR 8053 (ISO/IEC 2382)]



# Confidentiality

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It covers 3 related areas:

- *Data*
- *Individuals (Privacy)*
- *Organizations (Secrecy)*

- Pertains to confidentiality for organizations, such as commercial companies or governments

# Secure Systems Basic Pillars

## ➤ *Confidentiality*

- Ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized


## ➤ *Integrity*

- Ensuring that information has not been modified

## ➤ *Availability*

- Legitimate users have access when they need it

# Integrity



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- Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information *non-repudiation* and *authenticity*.

[US Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) -  
United States Code, 2006 Edition, Supplement 5, Title 44]

# Integrity

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It covers two related concepts:

- *Data integrity*: Assures that information and programs are changed only in a specified and authorized manner
- *System integrity*: Assures that a system performs its operations in unimpaired manner, free from unauthorized manipulation

# Secure Systems Basic Pillars

## ➤ *Confidentiality*

- Ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized

## ➤ *Integrity*

- Ensuring that information has not been modified

## ➤ *Availability*

- Legitimate users have access when they need it



# Availability

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- Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information ...

[US Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) -  
United States Code, 2006 Edition, Supplement 5, Title 44]



# Availability

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- Assures that systems work promptly, and service is not denied to authorized users.



# Availability

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- The probability  $D(t)$  that the system will function correctly at a given instant  $t$ .



# DAD vs CIA


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- Attacks on the CIA are typically referred to as *DAD*:
  - **D**isclosure > **C**onfidentiality
  - **A**lteration > **I**ntegrity
  - **D**estruction > **A**vailability

# A practical example of CIA attack


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- Let's assume an information (or service) move from a source to a destination
- The attacker could subvert this pattern in several ways
- Let's analyse some of them




# Stealing: attack to Confidentiality

- The attacker gets *unauthorized access* to information
- So, he breaks *confidentiality*
- Examples:
  - S is a vulnerable database
  - S sends a credit card number to D “in clear”




# Corrupting: attack to Integrity

- The attacker *maliciously modifies* the transmitted information
- So, he breaks *integrity*
- Example:
  - A redirects S's bank transfer
  - NOTE: The attacker A can be either in the browser or on the network (*Man-in-the-middle*)



# *Inhibiting*: attack to Availability

- The attacker *stops* the information flow
- So, he breaks *availability*
- Examples:
  - DoS on a server
  - Attack to the Ukrainian Power supply network



# Countermeasures

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
- Attacks on the CIA can be taken to any level, from hardware to software to communications.
- To be effective, each application domain has developed and adopts its own specific countermeasures

# Examples of possible countermeasures

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- In the sequel we focus on just two examples of possible countermeasures in the field of protection of transmitted messages
  - *Hash functions*
  - *Encryption*

# Hash Functions



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- A Hash function:
  - gets in input a set of data  $M$  (of variable length)
  - returns a hash value  $h$  (of fixed length):

$$h = H(M)$$



# Hash Functions usage

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
- Hash functions can be used to demonstrate the *integrity* of a message M.

# Hash Functions usage

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- Hash functions can be used to demonstrate the *integrity* of a message  $M$ .
- If  $M$  is sent together with  $h$  (i.e., the result of the hash function applied to it) and an attacker modifies  $M$  in  $M'$ , the receiver, calculating the hash function on  $M'$ , will get a value  $h'$  most likely different from the value  $h$  originally sent together with the message  $M$ .

# Encryption



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- Operation that, resorting to an *encryption algorithm* and a *key*, renders a message "blurred", so that it is not comprehensible/intelligible to persons not authorised to read it.

# Encryption & Decryption

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- Can be exploited to guarantee *confidentiality*.



# Outline

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- Secure Systems Basic Pillars:
  - CIA Triad
- Additional pillars

# Secure Systems Additional Pillars

- *Resilience*
- *Non-repudiation*
- *Authenticity*
- *Access control*

[<https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/cyber-resilience>]

# Secure Systems Additional Pillars

- *Resilience*

- *Non-repudiation*

- *Authenticity*

- *Access control*

- The ability of an information system to continue to:

- operate under adverse conditions or stress, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, while maintaining essential operational capabilities;

- recover to an effective operational posture in a time frame consistent with mission needs.

[NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 under Information System Resilience  
NIST SP 800-39 under Information System Resilience]

# Secure Systems Additional Pillars

- *Resilience*
  - *Non-repudiation*
  - *Authenticity*
  - *Access control*
- The ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack

[NIST SP 800-30 Rev. 1 under Information System Resilience]



# Secure Systems Additional Pillars

- *Resilience*

- *Non-repudiation*

- *Authenticity*

- *Access control*

- Cyber resilience is a measure of how well an organization can manage (i.e., prepare for, respond to and recover from) a cyberattack or data breach, while continuing to operate its business effectively.

# Resilience effects

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- It helps an organisation protect against *cyber risks*, defend against and limit the severity of attacks, and ensure its continued survival despite an attack.

[<https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/cyber-resilience>]

# Risk



- The possibility that human actions or events lead to consequences that have an impact on *what humans value*

[O. Renn, “*The role of risk perception for risk management*,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 49 – 62, 1998,  
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0951832097001191>]

# The four elements of cyber resilience

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➤ *Manage and protect*

➤ *Identify and detect*

➤ *Respond and recover*

➤ *Govern and assure*

➤ Being able to identify, assess and manage the risks associated with network and information systems, including those across the supply chain.

➤ It also requires the protection of information and systems from cyber attacks, system failures, and unauthorised access.

# The four elements of cyber resilience

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- *Manage and protect*
  - *Identify and detect*
  - *Respond and recover*
  - *Govern and assure*
- Continual monitoring of network and information systems to detect anomalies and potential cyber security incidents before they can cause any significant damage.

# The four elements of cyber resilience

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- *Manage and protect*
  - *Identify and detect*
  - *Respond and recover*
  - *Govern and assure*
- Implementing an incident response management programme and measures to ensure business continuity will help you continue to operate even if you have been hit by a cyber attack, and get back to business as usual as quickly and efficiently as possible.

# The four elements of cyber resilience

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- *Manage and protect*
  - *Identify and detect*
  - *Respond and recover*
  - *Govern and assure*
- Ensure that your programme is overseen from the top of the organisation and built into business as usual.
  - Over time, it should align more and more closely with your wider business objectives.

# Secure Systems Additional Pillars

➤ *Resilience*

➤ *Non-repudiation*

➤ *Authenticity*

➤ *Access control*

- Protection against an individual falsely denying having performed a particular action.
- Provides the capability to determine whether a given individual took a particular action such as creating information, sending a message, approving information, and receiving a message.

[CNSSI 4009-2015 (NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4)  
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 under Non-repudiation ]



# Secure Systems Additional Pillars

- *Resilience*
  - *Non-repudiation*
  - *Authenticity*
  - *Access control*
- The property of being genuine and being able to be verified and trusted
  - Confidence in the validity of a transmission, a message, or message originator.

[NIST SP 800-137 under Authenticity (CNSSI 4009)  
NIST SP 800-30 Rev. 1 under Authenticity (CNSSI 4009)  
NIST SP 800-39 under Authenticity  
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 under Authenticity  
NIST SP 800-53A Rev. 4 under Authenticity]

# Authenticity and Trust

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
- “An entity can be trusted if it always behaves in the expected manner for the intended purpose.”

[D. Grawrock, Dynamics of a Trusted Platform: A building block approach.  
Intel Press, 2008]

# Forging: attack to Authenticity

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- The attacker creates a new information item
- So, he breaks *authenticity*
- Examples:
  - Falsifying a signature through a cryptographic vulnerability (e.g., the collisions present in the MD5 protocol)



# Secure Systems Additional Pillars

- *Resilience*
  - *Non-repudiation*
  - *Authenticity*
  - *Access control*
- The process of granting or denying specific requests:
    - for obtaining and using information and related information processing services;
    - to enter specific physical facilities (e.g., Federal buildings, military establishments, and border crossing entrances)

[CNSSI 4009-2015 (FIPS 201-1 - Adapted)]

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