

# Smart meter security: a survey by Ross Anderson

Specialization Course in Distributed Systems

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# Agenda

## Introduction

- Smart Meter

## Prepayment

- Prepayment

## Security Economics

- Smart Meter Fraud

## Privacy

## Architecture

- Differences in Europe

- Strategic Vulnerabilities

- Opportunities

## Possible Solution

# Introduction



- ▶ Overview
- ▶ Context
- ▶ Examples

# Smart Meter



- ▶ A device that records electricity, gas or water consumption in a household



# South African Example

## Prepayment



- ▶ Why prepayment?
  - ▶ Poor households
  - ▶ Informal accommodation
- ▶ Parties
  - ▶ Eskom - state owned
  - ▶ Local electricity distributors
  - ▶ Token vending agents
  - ▶ Customers vendors
  - ▶ Equipment vendors
- ▶ Issues
  - ▶ Brownout
  - ▶ Token vending machines

# South African Example

## Security Economics



- ▶ Going from credit to prepayment resulted in 10% reduced energy usage
- ▶ Same in Northern Ireland, Russia and Brazil
- ▶ People care more about their usage because they have to go to the vending station and use their ATM card or cash
- ▶ Easy debt management - no court order, no replacement of meter

# Smart Meter Fraud

## General



- ▶ Vulnerabilities will get industrialised
- ▶ The South African example shows this
- ▶ Fixing a bug is very expensive
- ▶ Replacing 100 million meters in Europe would take 5 years and cost \$20bn

# Smart Meter Data

## Privacy issues



- ▶ Smart meter data in Europe is recorded in fine granularity
- ▶ Extract personal information by analysing the meter data
  - ▶ How many live in the house?
  - ▶ When are they asleep?
  - ▶ Are they home at the moment?
- ▶ Home appliance vendors, burglars etc.
- ▶ Customer vs energy company owned data



# Smart Meter Data

Who owns it?



- ▶ Most countries move toward customer owned data
- ▶ The tussle is the granularity one should share
- ▶ Energy company: 48 readings per 24h
- ▶ Customer: Only enough for billing
- ▶ European Convention on Human Rights: European citizens have the right to respect for the privacy of their family life.



# Differences in Europe

- ▶ Italy - monopoly
- ▶ Germany - a customer can choose an energy company
  - ▶ Company sets up smart meter
  - ▶ Disliked because fewer smart meters were sold
- ▶ United Kingdom - centralised system by a Data Communication Company
  - ▶ Same smart meter
  - ▶ Easy switch of energy company
  - ▶ Wash now or later - privacy, smart meter support
- ▶ When the wind blows in Germany
- ▶ There needs to be some sort of communication between the market and the smart meter

# Centralised Metering System

## Pros and cons



- ▶ Used in the UK
- ▶ Avoid rolling out a truck to the customer
- ▶ When countries are in conflict - energy is a target
- ▶ Remote computer exploits, vulnerabilities:
  - ▶ Software upgrade
  - ▶ Tariff setting
  - ▶ Billing
  - ▶ API attacks
  - ▶ Applets
- ▶ General problem: Replacing hardware is expensive

# Opportunities



- ▶ Air-condition example
- ▶ Customer web-interface
- ▶ Control the data granularity and when devices are used

- ▶ Open Home Controller
- ▶ Apache server - A way for the customer to manage appliances
- ▶ The situation right now:



# Questions



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