



CSEC Week 05 Lab 04

Task 1 - SYN Flood Attack




1.



2. We can see from the screenshots that as soon as the SYN flooding attack is initiated from the attacker, the client gets flooded with ARP packets (there are also some DNS queries from the Ubuntu app store, but those are not part of the attack).
3. While a DOS attack attempts to overwhelm a server due to the sheer number of requests, this can be somewhat mitigated by simply improving the hardware. A SYN flood attack exploits the queue size of the target server, which means improving the hardware may not protect against SYN flood attacks - you also need to increase the queue size (or even better, use key hashes to prevent using the queue altogether for unfinished requests). This attack is easily mitigated now, but can be quite impactful to availability.

Task 2 - ARP cache poisoning

1.



2. We can see that after running the attack, the server's ARP cache points the Clients IP address to the Attackers MAC address, effectively spoofing the client.

3. To mitigate this attack we can:
 1. Prevent the Attacker from entering the network - this is usually standard practice, but passwords on your networks!
 2. Checking for duplicate MAC addresses - this can help detect an ARP spoofing attempt, but can be circumvented by the Attacker.
 3. Static ARP table - impossible to scale and maintain.
 4. Detecting and preventing with automated tools - probably best bet.

Task 3 - ICMP Redirect Attack

1.

The screenshot displays a network traffic analysis tool with two main windows. The top window shows a list of network packets with columns for No., Time, Source, Destination, Protocol, Length, and Info. The bottom window shows the configuration for the 'netwag' tool, including parameters for sniffing and sending ICMP4/ICMP6 redirects. The configuration includes Lo0 as the device, Eth0 as the filter, 10.0.2.7 as the gateway, and 10.0.2.6 as the source IP address. The bottom status bar shows the command 'Running "80 --eth 00:0c:29:7f:70:21 --ip 10.0.2.8 --device "Eth0"' and the message 'Tool successfully interrupted'.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
258	258.4960400	Vmware: c0:00:00	Broadcast	ARP	60	Who has 192.168.100.2? Tell 192.168.100.1
259	259.5893050	Vmware: c0:00:00	Broadcast	ARP	60	Who has 192.168.100.2? Tell 192.168.100.1
260	260.8952700	Vmware: c0:00:00	Broadcast	ARP	60	Who has 192.168.100.2? Tell 192.168.100.1
261	261.4970600	Vmware: c0:00:00	Broadcast	ARP	60	Who has 192.168.100.2? Tell 192.168.100.1
262	262.4985020	Vmware: c0:00:00	Broadcast	ARP	60	Who has 192.168.100.2? Tell 192.168.100.1
263	303.4212200	10.0.2.8	10.0.2.8	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request 10.0.2.8 seq=1/256, ttl=64 (request in 264)
264	303.4212200	10.0.2.8	10.0.2.8	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply 10.0.2.8 seq=1/256, ttl=64 (request in 263)
265	303.4513560	Vmware: 7f:70:21	Broadcast	ARP	60	Who has 10.0.2.8? Tell 10.0.2.7
266	303.4513560	Vmware: 7f:70:21	Vmware: 7f:70:21	ARP	42	10.0.2.8 is at 00:0c:29:e8:83:c1
267	303.5615780	10.0.2.8	10.0.2.8	ICMP	70	Redirect (Redirect for host)
268	303.5615780	10.0.2.8	10.0.2.8	ICMP	70	Redirect (Redirect for host)
269	304.4221300	10.0.2.8	10.0.2.8	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request 10.0.2.8 seq=2/512, ttl=64 (reply in 270)
270	304.4221300	10.0.2.8	10.0.2.8	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply 10.0.2.8 seq=2/512, ttl=64 (request in 269)
271	304.4377600	10.0.2.8	10.0.2.8	ICMP	70	Redirect (Redirect for host)
272	304.4377600	10.0.2.8	10.0.2.8	ICMP	70	Redirect (Redirect for host)
273	305.4242480	10.0.2.8	10.0.2.8	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) request 10.0.2.8 seq=3/768, ttl=64 (reply in 274)
274	305.4242480	10.0.2.8	10.0.2.8	ICMP	98	Echo (ping) reply 10.0.2.8 seq=3/768, ttl=64 (request in 273)
275	305.4261200	10.0.2.8	10.0.2.8	ICMP	70	Redirect (Redirect for host)
276	305.4261200	10.0.2.8	10.0.2.8	ICMP	70	Redirect (Redirect for host)
277	306.4227400	Vmware: 9d:94:e2	Vmware: e8:83:c1	ARP	60	Who has 10.0.2.8? Tell 10.0.2.8
278	306.4228100	Vmware: e8:83:c1	Vmware: 9d:94:e2	ARP	42	10.0.2.8 is at 00:0c:29:e8:83:c1
279	306.4287000	192.168.100.1	192.168.100.1	HTTP	84	Microsoft Word/MSWord - 278 - Microsoft Word - 278 - Local - 7000 - Microsoft

2. After launching the attack, the client starts receiving redirects, prompting an update to its routing.
3. Biggest mitigation seems to just be not using ICMP at all.