

Threat Actor Comparision Matrix

| | APT / Group | Characteristics | Technical Capabilities and Preferred TTPs | Historical Targeting Patterns | Capability (0-5) | Motive Alignment (0-5) | Infrastructure Overlap (0-5) | Total | Confidence Level | Notes |
|----|----------------------------|--|---|--|------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|-------|------------------|--|
| 1 | Sandworm (GRU-linked) | Russian state-sponsored destructive threat group attributed to GRU Unit 74455; focuses on sabotage of critical infrastructure. | Custom ICS malware (e.g., Industroyer, BlackEnergy); high sophistication in protocol exploitation; TTPs: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001), Data Destruction (T1485), Firmware Corruption (T1495). | Ukrainian energy sector (2015-2016 power grid attacks), global via NoPetya (2017), French Olympics (2018), Georgian infrastructure. Targets governments, energy, and military in conflict zones. | 5 | 5 | 5 | 15 | High | Known ICS disruption (Ukraine, NoPetya), destructive tooling |
| 2 | APT28 (Fancy Bear) | Russian GRU-linked cyber espionage group known for political interference and intel gathering. | Custom ICS malware (e.g., Industroyer, BlackEnergy); high sophistication in protocol exploitation; TTPs: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001), Data Destruction (T1485), Firmware Corruption (T1495). | NATO countries, Eastern European governments (e.g., German Bundestag 2015), US DNC (2016), WADA, military entities. Focus on espionage during elections and conflicts. | 4 | 3 | 3 | 10 | Medium | Espionage focus, but capable of disruptive ops |
| 3 | APT29 (Cozy Bear) | Russian SVR-linked stealthy espionage group; long-term access specialists. | Custom ICS malware (e.g., Industroyer, BlackEnergy); high sophistication in protocol exploitation; TTPs: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001), Data Destruction (T1485), Firmware Corruption (T1495). | US DNC (2016), US State Dept, global via SolarWinds (2020), political parties, tech firms. Targets governments and tech for intel. | 3 | 3 | 2 | 8 | Low-Medium | Stealthy espionage, limited ICS precedent |
| 4 | Lazarus Group | North Korean state-sponsored; mix of espionage, destruction, and financial crime. | Custom ICS malware (e.g., Industroyer, BlackEnergy); high sophistication in protocol exploitation; TTPs: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001), Data Destruction (T1485), Firmware Corruption (T1495). | Sony Pictures (2014), Bangladesh Bank (2016), WannaCry global (2017), crypto exchanges, governments in South Korea and US. Targets financial and media for profit and disruption. | 4 | 4 | 2 | 10 | Medium | DPRIK-linked, destructive capacity, mixed motives |
| 5 | Revil / DarkSide | Russian-speaking criminal ransomware groups; Raas model with affiliates. | Ransomware variants; double extortion; TTPs: Exploit Remote Services (T1210), Supply Chain Compromise (T1195), Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486). | Colonial Pipeline (DarkSide, 2021), Kaseya supply chain (Revil, 2021), global enterprises in energy and IT. Targets large corporations for financial gain. | 3 | 4 | 3 | 10 | Medium | Ransomware groups, supply-chain proven (Kaseya) |
| 6 | APT40 (Leviathan) | Chinese MSS Hainan-linked espionage group; focus on maritime and regional intel. | Custom RATs; phishing kits; TTPs: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002), Command and Control via Web Protocols (T1071.002), Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567). | Asia-Pacific governments, shipping firms, universities (e.g., South China Sea disputes), biomedical and defense sectors since 2014. | 3 | 3 | 2 | 8 | Low-Medium | Maritime & industrial espionage, less ICS history |
| 7 | Turla (Snake/Uroboros) | Russian FSB-linked advanced espionage group, known for long-term persistence. | Rootkits and Snake Implant; TTPs: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (T1037), Valid Accounts (T1078), Remote Services (T1021). | US DoD, European governments, diplomatic entities since 2004; targets military and intel agencies. | 4 | 3 | 3 | 10 | Medium | Russian-linked, advanced persistence & stealth |
| 8 | Charming Kitten (APT35) | Iranian IRGC-linked cyber espionage; social engineering experts. | Phishing sites, custom malware (e.g., PowerLess); TTPs: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001), Social Engineering (T1566), Credential Access (T1006). | Middle East dissidents, US/Europe governments, COVID vaccine orgs (2020), Israeli entities. Targets political opponents and intel. | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 | Low | Iranian espionage, limited ICS capacity |
| 9 | OilRig (APT34) | Iranian MSS-linked; targets energy and regional governments. | Custom tools (e.g., DNSpionage); TTPs: DNS Hijacking (T1555.004), Web Shell (T1505.003), Supply Chain Compromise (T1195). | Middle East energy sector, governments (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Israel), telecom and finance since 2014. | 3 | 3 | 2 | 8 | Low-Medium | Iranian, regional targeting, some OT focus |
| 10 | Hahnium | Chinese state-sponsored; vulnerability exploitation focus. | Zero-day exploits (e.g., Microsoft Exchange); TTPs: Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190), Web Shell (T1505.003), External Remote Services (T1133). | Microsoft Exchange servers globally (2021), tech and government entities in US/Europe. Targets for espionage and data theft. | 3 | 3 | 2 | 8 | Low-Medium | Chinese state-linked, Exchange exploits, less ICS focus |
| 11 | Mustang Panda | Chinese-sponsored espionage; uses regional lures (e.g., Mongolian-themed). | PlugX RAT; TTPs: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001), Supply Chain Compromise (T1195), Command and Control (T1001). | Asia-Pacific governments, NGOs, minorities (e.g., Myanmar, Southeast Asia); public and private sectors since 2017. | 3 | 3 | 1 | 7 | Low | Chinese, politically targeted espionage |
| 12 | Unknown / False Flag Actor | Deliberate misdirection using mimicked artifacts; variable affiliation. | Shared/open-source tools; planted indicators; TTPs: Mimic other groups' TTPs (e.g., false linguistic clues), Obfuscated Files (T1027). | Historical examples: Olympic Destroyer (2018) mimicking Lazarus but attributed to Sandworm; various nation-state ops to shift blame. Targets depend on true actor. | 2 | 5 | 1 | 8 | Variable | May be deliberate misdirection using open-source tools |