



# LA NUEVA ERA DE LOS BOOTKITS: PERSISTENCIA Y EVASIÓN DESDE EL NÚCLEO

Descifrando el desarrollo de Bootkits UEFI para Windows 10 y 11

[\[in/vazquez-vazquez-alejandro\]](https://twitter.com/in/vazquez-vazquez-alejandro)

VICON 2024, Galicia



# AGENDA

- Conceptos
  - Bootkits, Rootkits
- Protecciones
  - DSE, SecureBoot
- Proceso de Arranque
  - bootmgfw.efi, winload.efi, ntoskrnl.exe
- Bootkit
  - UEFI Application, Kernel-Mode Driver
- Entorno
  - WDK, EDK2
- Demo
  - ???
- Desarrollo
  - MalwareUnderRadarPKG
- Malware
  - Glupteba, Bootkit UEFI
- Bootkits in the Wild
  - FinFisher, SPEcter, BlackLotus
- Máster y Recursos
  - Reversing y Análisis de Malware



# WHOAMI

- **FRIKI** (**F**anático de **R**evolucionar **I**nternamente **K**ernels e **I**nicios de sistema)
- Pastor de ovejas desde los 8 años
- Me gusta el pulpo, de ahí los Bootkits
- Hobbie 1: Desarrollo de Malware
- Hobbie 2: Ciberseguridad Ofensiva
- Docente en Máster de Reversing y Análisis de Malware



[in/vazquez-vazquez-alejandro]

# SENSITIVE CONTENT

## Age Verification

This presentation contains age-restricted materials including malware and explicit hooking techniques. By entering, you affirm that you are at least 18 years of age and you consent to viewing “hacker” stuff.

**Let me In**  
**This is real stuff**


**No**  
**I prefer OSINT**

# CONCEPTOS


- Bootkit: Malicious program designed to load as early as possible in the boot process, in order to control all stages of the operating system start up, modifying system code and drivers before security components are loaded.  
~ Kaspersky
- Rootkit: Sophisticated piece of malware that can add new code to the operating system or delete and edit operating system code. Rootkits may remain in place for years because they are hard to detect, due in part to their ability to block some antivirus software and malware scanner software.  
~ CrowdStrike

# CONCEPTOS

- Bootkit: Malicious program designed to load as early as possible in the boot process, in order to control all stages of the operating system start up, modifying system code and drivers before security components are loaded.  
~ Kaspersky




- Rootkit: Sophisticated piece of malware that can add new code to the operating system or delete and edit operating system code. Rootkits may remain in place for years because they are hard to detect, due in part to their ability to block some antivirus software and malware scanner software.  
~ CrowdStrike



# PROTECCIONES

- Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE)  
Windows won't run drivers not certified by Microsoft
- SecureBoot  
Only software trusted by the Original Manufacturer.  
Firmware checks the signature of UEFI firmware drivers, EFI applications and SO



```
Administrator: Command Prompt
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.22631.3007]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\System32>.\sc.exe create POC type=kernel start=demand binpath=
"C:\Users\user1\Documents\Rootkit\Driver.sys"
[SC] CreateService SUCCESS

C:\Windows\System32>.\sc.exe start POC
[SC] StartService FAILED 577:

Windows cannot verify the digital signature for this file. A recent hardw
are or software change might have installed a file that is signed incorre
ctly or damaged, or that might be malicious software from an unknown sour
ce.

C:\Windows\System32>
```

Secure Boot Violation


Invalid signature detected. Check Secure Boot Policy in Setup

Ok





Power ON



Read Instructions



POST



UEFI Firmware



Boot Information




Boot order

Boot0001 = /EFI/Microsoft/boot/bootmgfw.efi


Boot0002 = /EFI/Ubuntu/shimx64.efi

Boot000x = /EFI/Vendor/bootx64.efi


## Windows Boot Manager \\EFI\\Microsoft\\Boot\\ bootmgfw.efi



## Windows OS Loader %SystemRoot%\system32\\ winload.efi




## Windows NT OS Kernel %SystemRoot%\system32\\ ntoskrnl.exe







Power ON



Read Instructions



POST



UEFI Firmware



Boot Information




Boot order

Boot0001 = /EFI/Microsoft/boot/bootmgfw.efi


Boot0002 = /EFI/Ubuntu/shimx64.efi

Boot000x = /EFI/Vendor/bootx64.efi


### Windows Boot Manager \\EFI\\Microsoft\\Boot\\ bootmgfw.efi




### Windows OS Loader %SystemRoot%\system32\\ winload.efi




### Bootkit UEFI Application bootmgfw.efi





### Windows NT OS Kernel %SystemRoot%\system32\\ ntoskrnl.exe



### Rootkit Kernel-Mode Driver driver.sys







POST




UEFI Firmware





Boot Information






Boot order  
Boot0001 = /EFI/Microsoft/boot/bootmgfw.efi  
Boot0002 = /EFI/Ubuntu/shimx64.efi  
Boot000x = /EFI/Vendor/bootx64.efi





Windows Boot Manager  
\\EFI\\Microsoft\\Boot\\  
bootmgfw.efi













Windows OS Loader  
%SystemRoot%\system32\\  
winload.efi



Windows NT OS Kernel  
%SystemRoot%\system32\\  
ntoskrnl.exe










# ENTORNO



- WDK  
Develop, test and deploy drivers for Windows.  
Software toolset from Microsoft.
- EDK2  
Official development environment for UEFI applications, UEFI Drivers, DXE Drivers.  
Developed by the open-source Tianocore project (Intel, HP and Microsoft)  
Full on implementation of the UEFI specification.
- +  
Visual Studio, C/C++, Reverse Engineering, WinDbg, IDA






## Windows Boot Manager \\EFI\\Microsoft\\Boot\\ bootmgfw.efi



## Windows OS Loader %SystemRoot%\system32\ winload.efi




## Windows NT OS Kernel %SystemRoot%\system32\ ntoskrnl.exe








# DEMO




LOADING...





## Windows Boot Manager \\EFI\\Microsoft\\Boot\\ bootmgfw.efi




## Windows OS Loader %SystemRoot%\system32\ winload.efi




## Bootkit UEFI Application bootmgfw.efi



## Windows NT OS Kernel %SystemRoot%\system32\ ntoskrnl.exe



## Rootkit Kernel-Mode Driver driver.sys




## UEFI Specification


2.10

Search docs


1. Introduction
2. Overview
3. Boot Manager
4. EFI System Table
5. GUID Partition Table (GPT) Disk Layout
6. Block Translation Table (BTT) Layout
7. Services — Boot Services
8. Services — Runtime Services
9. Protocols - EFI Loaded Image
- .....
24. Network Protocols — SNP, PXE, BIS and HTTP Boot
25. Network Protocols - Managed Network
26. Network Protocols — Bluetooth
27. Network Protocols — VLAN, EAP, Wi-Fi and Supplicant
28. Network Protocols — TCP, IP, IPsec, FTP, TLS and Configurations
29. Network Protocols — ARP, DHCP, DNS, HTTP and REST
30. Network Protocols — UDP and MFTP



## Windows Boot Manager \\EFI\\Microsoft\\Boot\\ bootmgfw.efi




## Windows OS Loader %SystemRoot%\system32\\ winload.efi




## Bootkit UEFI Application bootmgfw.efi



## Windows NT OS Kernel %SystemRoot%\system32\\ ntoskrnl.exe



## Rootkit Kernel-Mode Driver driver.sys



# DESARROLLO

## MalwareUnderRadarPkg

MalwareUnderRadarPkg.dec  
MalwareUnderRadarPkg.dsc  
README.md

### Application

MalwareUnderRadarApplicationUEFI.c  
MalwareUnderRadarApplicationUEFI.inf

### Functions

1 FunctionsNetwork.c  
1 FunctionsNetwork.h  
2 FunctionsLayerApplication.c  
2 FunctionsLayerApplication.h

### Utils

1 FunctionsUtilsFiles.c  
1 FunctionsUtilsFiles.h

```
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol(TcpHandle, &gEfiTcp4ProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&TcpListener,  
                             gImageHandle, NULL, EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL);
```

```
if (Status == EFI_NO_MAPPING)  
{
```

```
  do
```

```
  {
```

```
    Status = TcpListener->GetModeData(TcpListener, NULL, NULL,  
                                       &Ip4ModeData, NULL, NULL);
```

```
  } while (!Ip4ModeData.IsConfigured);
```

```
  Status = TcpListener->Configure(TcpListener, &TcpConfigData);
```

```
}
```

```
Status = gBS->CreateEvent(EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL, TPL_CALLBACK, RequestCallback, NULL,  
                          &RequestToken.Event);
```

```
RequestToken.Status = EFI_SUCCESS;  
RequestToken.Message = &RequestMessage;  
gRequestCallbackComplete = FALSE;
```

```
Status = HttpProtocol->Request(HttpProtocol, &RequestToken);
```



## Glupteba Overview

Glupteba is **built to be modular**, which allows it to download and execute additional components or payloads. This modular design makes Glupteba adaptable to different attack scenarios and environments, and it also allows its operators to adapt to different security solutions.

Over the years, malware authors have introduced new modules, allowing the threat to perform a variety of tasks including the following:

- Delivering additional payloads
- **Stealing credentials** from various software
- Stealing sensitive information, including credit card data
- Enrolling the infected system in a **cryptomining botnet**
- Crypto hijacking and delivering miners
- Performing digital advertising fraud
- Stealing Google account information
- Bypassing UAC and having both **rootkit and bootkit components**
- Exploiting routers to gain credentials and remote administrative access

# GLUPTEB A

## Diving Into Glupteba's UEFI Bootkit



By Lior Rochberger and Dan Yashnik

February 12, 2024 at 6:00 AM

Category: Malware

Tags: Advanced Threat Prevention, Advanced URL Filtering, Advanced WildFire, Cloud-Delivered Security Services, coin miner, Cortex XDR, credential stealer, DNS security, next-generation firewall, Prisma Cloud, RedLine infostealer, Smoke Loader


## Executive Summary

**Glupteba** is advanced, modular and multipurpose malware that, for over a decade, has mostly been seen in financially driven cybercrime operations. This article describes the infection chain of a **new campaign that took place around November 2023**.

Despite being active for over a decade, certain capabilities that Glupteba's authors have added have remained undiscovered or unreported – until now. We will focus on one intriguing and previously undocumented feature: a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (**UEFI**) **bootkit**. This bootkit can intervene and control the OS boot process, enabling Glupteba to hide itself and create a stealthy persistence that can be **extremely difficult to detect and remove**.

# GLUPTTEBA

An ESP malware implant executes code before Windows boots, undermining security features. An SPI flash memory implant offers more control, executing earlier in the boot process but requires higher privileges, increasing complexity.  
~ Malware Developers





# GLUPTeba

## Uncovering Glupteba's Bootkit Installer

We start our analysis with a [bootkit installer binary](#) disguised as a [legitimate Windows binary](#) (`csrss.exe`). When analyzing this installer, a clear lack of strings and functions indicates [the file is packed](#) in some way. This means we have some work to do before we can analyze the actual logic of the installer.

## EfiGuard

EfiGuard is an [open-source and portable UEFI bootkit](#) that patches the Windows kernel by executing a [DXE Runtime driver](#) (`EfiGuardDxe.efi`) to disable [PatchGuard](#) and [driver signature enforcement](#) (DSE).

As documented in the GitHub project, `EfiGuardDxe.efi` can be executed either by installing it in a UEFI driver entry or booting a custom loader (`Loader.efi`) that loads the driver and then continues to load Windows. Glupteba uses the latter method.

1. The `main_mountEFI` function mounts the ESP into the B: drive
2. `B:\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\bootmgfw.efi` is renamed to `B:\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\fw.efi`
3. `B:\EFI\Boot\bootx64.efi` is renamed to `B:\EFI\Boot\old.efi`
4. The asset `embedded\bootmgfw.efi` is written to `B:\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\bootmgfw.efi` and to `B:\EFI\Boot\bootx64.efi`
5. The asset `embedded\EfiGuardDxe.efi` is written to `B:\EFI\Boot\EfiGuardDxe.efi`

# BOOTKIT UEFI


UEFI Application	DXE Runtime Driver	Kernel-Mode Driver	Client
UEFI Specification	DXE	Hide processes	IOCTLs
Protocols	Hooking Functions	Block network connections	Input/Output Request Packets
Download Malware	Runtime Services	Keylogger	Communication
User-Mode Components	Persistence Tools	C&C Interface	Additional Malware
HTTP Downloader	Services	Data Encoding	Trojan
Cryptomining	Registry	Encrypted Channel	Spyware
Stealer	Com Hijacking	Protocol Tunneling	Ransomware

## UEFI Specification


2.10

Search docs


1. Introduction
2. Overview
3. Boot Manager
4. EFI System Table
5. GUID Partition Table (GPT) Disk Layout
6. Block Translation Table (BTT) Layout
7. Services — Boot Services
8. Services — Runtime Services
9. Protocols - EFI Loaded Image
- .....
24. Network Protocols — SNP, PXE, BIS and HTTP Boot
25. Network Protocols - Managed Network
26. Network Protocols — Bluetooth
27. Network Protocols — VLAN, EAP, Wi-Fi and Supplicant
28. Network Protocols — TCP, IP, IPsec, FTP, TLS and Configurations
29. Network Protocols — ARP, DHCP, DNS, HTTP and REST
30. Network Protocols — UDP and MFTP



## Windows Boot Manager \\EFI\\Microsoft\\Boot\\ bootmgfw.efi




## Windows OS Loader %SystemRoot%\system32\\ winload.efi




## Bootkit UEFI Application bootmgfw.efi



## Windows NT OS Kernel %SystemRoot%\system32\\ ntoskrnl.exe



## Rootkit Kernel-Mode Driver driver.sys



## UEFI infection

During our research, we found a UEFI bootkit that was loading FinSpy. All machines infected with the UEFI bootkit had the Windows Boot Manager (`bootmgfw.efi`) replaced with a malicious one. When the UEFI transfers execution to the malicious loader, it first locates the original Windows Boot Manager. It is stored inside the `efi\microsoft\boot\en-us\` directory, with the name consisting of hexadecimal characters. This directory contains two more files: the Winlogon Injector and the Trojan Loader. Both of them are encrypted with RC4. The decryption key is the EFI system partition GUID, which differs from one machine to another.

P:\EFI\Microsoft\Boot\en-US		
n	Name	Size
..	Up	
050ad6a5	Encrypted Backdoor Loader	468480
4182b569	Original Windows Boot Manager	1492 K
82056bd2	Encrypted Winlogon Injector	6236
bootmgfw.efi.mui	} Clean files	77112
bootmgr.efi.mui		77112
memtest.efi.mui		44856

*Sample contents of the `\efi\microsoft\boot\en-us\` directory*

Once the original bootloader is located, it is loaded into memory, patched and launched. The patched launcher:

- Patches the function of the OS loader that transfers execution to the kernel
- The patched function hooks the kernel's `PsCreateSystemThread` function, which, when called for the first time, creates an additional thread that decrypts the next loader stage and launches it.

# FINFISHER

- Spyware
- UEFI Bootkit
- Windows, Linux and MacOS
- Obfuscation
- C&C

# ESPECTER

## ESET RESEARCH

### UEFI threats moving to the ESP: Introducing ESpecter bootkit

ESET research discovers a previously undocumented UEFI bootkit with roots going back all the way to at least 2012



Martin Smolár



Anton Cherepanov


ESET researchers have analyzed a previously undocumented, real-world UEFI bootkit that persists on the EFI System Partition (ESP). The bootkit, which we've named **ESpecter, can bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement to load its own unsigned driver**, which facilitates its espionage activities. Alongside Kaspersky's recent discovery of the unrelated **FinSpy bootkit**, it is now safe to say that real-world UEFI threats are no longer limited to SPI flash implants, as used by **Lojax**.

**The days of UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) living in the shadows of the legacy BIOS are gone for good.** As a leading technology embedded into chips of modern computers and devices, it plays a crucial role in securing the pre-OS environment and loading the operating system. And it's no surprise that such a widespread technology has also become a tempting target for threat actors in their search for ultimate persistence.

- Spyware
- UEFI Bootkit
- Windows
- DSE
- Mode-Kernel Driver




# ESPECTER





# ESPECTER



# ESPECTER

## KEYBOARD\_INPUT\_DATA structure (ntddkbd.h)


KEYBOARD\_INPUT\_DATA contains one packet of keyboard input data.

### Syntax

C++

Copy

```
typedef struct _KEYBOARD_INPUT_DATA {
    USHORT UnitId;
    USHORT MakeCode;
    USHORT Flags;
    USHORT Reserved;
    ULONG ExtraInformation;
} KEYBOARD_INPUT_DATA, *PKEYBOARD_INPUT_DATA;
```



```
/**
 * @brief      Function to read keystrokes from keyboard device.
 *
 * @param      pDeviceObject      Pointer to a DEVICE_OBJECT structure representing the device.
 * @param      pIrp               Pointer to the I/O request packet (IRP) for reading keystrokes.
 *
 * @return     A NTSTATUS value indicating success or an error code if operation fails.
 */
```

```
NTSTATUS
DriverReadKeystrokes(
    _In_      PDEVICE_OBJECT  pDeviceObject,
    _In_      PIRP            pIrp
)
{
    IoCopyCurrentIrpStackLocationToNext(pIrp);

    IoSetCompletionRoutine(pIrp, ReadOperationFinished, NULL, TRUE, TRUE, TRUE);

    pendingKey++;

    return IoCallDriver(((PDEVICE_EXTENSION)pDeviceObject->DeviceExtension)->LowerKbdDevice, pIrp);
}
```

ESET RESEARCH

## BlackLotus UEFI bootkit: Myth confirmed

The first in-the-wild UEFI bootkit bypassing UEFI Secure Boot on fully updated UEFI systems is now a reality



Martin Smolár

The number of UEFI vulnerabilities discovered in recent years and the failures in patching them or revoking vulnerable binaries within a reasonable time window hasn't gone unnoticed by threat actors. As a result, the first publicly known UEFI bootkit bypassing the essential platform security feature – UEFI Secure Boot – is now a reality. In this blogpost we present the first public analysis of this UEFI bootkit, which is capable of running on even fully-up-to-date Windows 11 systems with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. Functionality of the bootkit and its individual features leads us to believe that we are dealing with a bootkit known as **BlackLotus**, the UEFI bootkit being sold on hacking forums for \$5,000 since at least October 2022.

UEFI bootkits are very powerful threats, having full control over the OS boot process and thus capable of disabling various OS security mechanisms and deploying their own kernel-mode or user-mode payloads in early OS startup stages. This allows them to operate very stealthily and with high privileges. So far, only a few have been discovered in the wild and publicly described (e.g., multiple **malicious EFI samples** we discovered in 2020, or fully featured UEFI bootkits such as our discovery last year – the **ESpEcter bootkit** – or the **FinSpy bootkit** discovered by researchers from Kaspersky).

# BLACKLOTUS

README


Unlicense license

## baton drop (CVE-2022-21894): Secure Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability

Windows Boot Applications allow the `truncatememory` setting to remove blocks of memory containing "persistent" ranges of serialised data from the memory map, leading to Secure Boot bypass.

- The `truncatememory` BCD element will remove all memory above a specified physical address from the memory map.
- This is performed for each boot application during initialisation, before the serialised Secure Boot policy is read from memory.
- Therefore, such an element can be used to remove the serialised Secure Boot policy from the memory map.
- This will allow dangerous settings to be used in a boot application (`bootdebug`, `testsigning`, `nointegritychecks`), thus breaking Secure Boot.

# BLACKLOTUS



The kernel driver is responsible for four main tasks:

1. Injecting the HTTP downloader into winlogon.exe and reinjecting it in case the thread terminated.
2. Protecting bootkit files deployed on the ESP from being removed.
3. Disarming the user-mode Windows Defender process MsMpEngine.exe.
4. Communicating with the HTTP downloader and if necessary, performing any commands.





# REVERSING Y ANÁLISIS DE MALWARE



Campus Internacional  
de CIBERSEGURIDAD



Campus Internacional de Ciberseguridad

## Master's degree instructor (Reverse Engineering, Malware Analysis and Bug Hunting)

Currently, I am teacher in the prestigious 'Máster en Reversing, Análisis de Malware y Bug Hunting' at the Campus Internacional de Ciberseguridad.

These are some of the topics I cover:

- Windows Architecture (User Mode, Kernel Mode)
- Windows Protections (DSE, KPP)
- Malware Hunting (Sysinternals Tools)
- Windows Kernel Opaque Structures (EPROCESS, ETHREAD)
- Windows Kernel Debugging (WinDbg)
- WinDbg Scripting (Javascript, PyKd)
- Rootkit Hooking Techniques (IDT, SSDT)
- Rootkit Development (Kernel Mode Drivers, IRPs)
- Bootkit Development (UEFI Applications)
- Bootkit Analysis (ESpecter, BlackLotus)
- Kernel Exploitation (Vulnerable Drivers, Write-what-where)



## Máster en Reversing, Análisis de Malware y Bug Hunting

Una de las técnicas por excelencia para analizar el comportamiento de las aplicaciones maliciosas cuando no se tiene el código fuente de la aplicación es el reversing. Los...





# PREGUNTAS

## VICON

- <https://github.com/TheMalwareGuardian/ViconGal>

## Bootkit

- <https://github.com/TheMalwareGuardian/Abismo>

## Rootkits

- <https://github.com/TheMalwareGuardian/Bentico>

## Recursos

- <https://github.com/TheMalwareGuardian/Awesome-Bootkits-Rootkits-Development>

