




Jaap van Ginkel



Security of Systems and Networks

September 19, 2024 Public Key Crypto



SSN Projects

- Approval content Today
- Approval/restrictions ECOS3 later



Recap Hashing

■ Is SHA-1 still safe?

A) Yes

B) No

C) It depends



Recap Hashing

■ Is SHA-2 still safe?

A) Yes

B) No

C) It depends





Recap Hashing

Should we switch to SHA 3?

A) Yes

B) No

C) It depends






Public Key Cryptography

- Asymmetric encryption
- Expensive/Slow
- Diffie Hellmann
- RSA
- PGP





Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method




Chocolate key crypto



El Gamal

- Dr. Taher Elgamal
- طاهر الجمل
- Egyptian American cryptographer








Diffie Hellman Merkle



Public Key Encryption







William Stanley Jevons



William Stanley Jevons (September 1, 1835 - August 13, 1882), English economist and logician,



Non Secret Encryption

- James Ellis Clifford Cocks
- Secret research at GCHQ



RSA

- Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir en Len Adleman





Public Key Cryptography

You should not live one way in private, another in public.
— Publilius Syrus

Three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead.
— Ben Franklin



Public Key Cryptography

□ Two keys

- Sender uses recipient's **public key** to encrypt
- Recipient uses **private key** to decrypt

□ Based on "trap door one way function"

- "One way" means easy to compute in one direction, but hard to compute in other direction
- Example: Given p and q , product $N = pq$ easy to compute, but given N , it's hard to find p and q
- "Trap door" used to create key pairs



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Uses for Public Key Crypto



Non-non-repudiation

- ❑ Alice orders 100 shares of stock from Bob
- ❑ Alice computes **MAC** using symmetric key
- ❑ Stock drops, Alice claims she did *not* order
- ❑ Can Bob prove that Alice placed the order?
- ❑ **No!** Since Bob also knows the symmetric key, he could have forged message
- ❑ **Problem:** Bob knows Alice placed the order, but he can't prove it



Non-repudiation

- ❑ Alice orders 100 shares of stock from Bob
- ❑ Alice **signs** order with her private key
- ❑ Stock drops, Alice claims she did not order
- ❑ Can Bob prove that Alice placed the order?
- ❑ **Yes!** Only someone with Alice's private key could have signed the order
- ❑ This assumes Alice's private key is not stolen (revocation problem)



Public Key Notation

- **Sign** message M with Alice's
private key: $[M]_{\text{Alice}}$
- **Encrypt** message M with Alice's
public key: $\{M\}_{\text{Alice}}$
- Then
 - $\{[M]_{\text{Alice}}\}_{\text{Alice}} = M$
 - $[\{M\}_{\text{Alice}}]_{\text{Alice}} = M$





Public Key Infrastructure



Public Key Certificate

- **Certificate** contains name of user and user's public key (and possibly other info)
- It is *signed* by the issuer, a **Certificate Authority (CA)**, such as VeriSign

$M = (\text{Alice}, \text{Alice's public key}), S = [M]_{CA}$

Alice's Certificate = (M, S)

- Signature on certificate is verified using CA's public key:

Verify that $M = \{S\}_{CA}$

Certificate Authority

- Certificate authority (CA) is a trusted 3rd party (TTP) — creates and signs certificates
- Verify signature to verify integrity & identity of **owner of corresponding private key**
 - Does **not** verify the identity of the **sender** of certificate — certificates are public keys!
- Big problem if CA makes a mistake (a CA once issued Microsoft certificate to someone else)
- A common format for certificates is X.509

PKI

- ❑ Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): the stuff needed to securely use public key crypto
 - Key generation and management
 - Certificate authority (CA) or authorities
 - Certificate revocation lists (CRLs), etc.
- ❑ No general standard for PKI
- ❑ We mention 3 generic "trust models"



PKI Trust Models

□ Monopoly model

- One universally trusted organization is the CA for the known universe
- Big problems if CA is ever compromised
- Who will act as CA???
- System is useless if you don't trust the CA!



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Confidentiality in the Real World



Symmetric Key vs Public Key

- Symmetric key +'s
 - **Speed**
 - No public key infrastructure (PKI) needed
- Public Key +'s
 - **Signatures** (non-repudiation)
 - No *shared* secret (but, private keys...)



Notation Reminder

□ Public key notation

- Sign M with Alice's **private key**

$[M]_{\text{Alice}}$

- Encrypt M with Alice's **public key**

$\{M\}_{\text{Alice}}$

□ Symmetric key notation

- Encrypt P with symmetric key K

$C = E(P, K)$

- Decrypt C with symmetric key K

$P = D(C, K)$