

Secure Boot Template

Q1. Extract the Microsoft certificate that belongs to the key referred to in Step 1 from the UEFI firmware and show its text representation on your log Hint mokutil openssl x509

The command “mokutil -export” produced the output:

- MOK-0001.der
- MOK-0002.der

The command “mokutil -export -db” produced the output:

- DB-0001.der
- DB-0002.der

```
Certificate:
  Data:
    Version: 3 (0x2)
    Serial Number:
      61:08:d3:c4:00:00:00:00:00:04
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
    Issuer: C = US, ST = Washington, L = Redmond, O = Microsoft
Corporation, CN = Microsoft Corporation Third Party Marketplace Root
Validity
  Not Before: Jun 27 21:22:45 2011 GMT
  Not After : Jun 27 21:32:45 2026 GMT
  Subject: C = US, ST = Washington, L = Redmond, O = Microsoft
Corporation, CN = Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011
  Subject Public Key Info:
    Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
    Public-Key: (2048 bit)
    Modulus:
      00:a5:08:6c:4c:c7:45:09:6a:4b:0c:a4:c0:87:7f:
      06:75:0c:43:01:54:64:e0:16:7f:07:ed:92:7d:0b:
      b2:73:bf:0c:0a:c6:4a:45:61:a0:c5:16:2d:96:d3:
      f5:2b:a0:fb:4d:49:9b:41:80:90:3c:b9:54:fd:e6:
      bc:d1:9d:c4:a4:18:8a:7f:41:8a:5c:59:83:68:32:
      bb:8c:47:c9:ee:71:bc:21:4f:9a:8a:7c:ff:44:3f:
      8d:8f:32:b2:26:48:ae:75:b5:ee:c9:4c:1e:4a:19:
      7e:e4:82:9a:1d:78:77:4d:0c:b0:bd:f6:0f:d3:16:
      d3:bc:fa:2b:a5:51:38:5d:f5:fb:ba:db:78:02:db:
      ff:ec:0a:1b:96:d5:83:b8:19:13:e9:b6:c0:7b:40:
      7b:e1:1f:28:27:c9:fa:ef:56:5e:1c:e6:7e:94:7e:
      c0:f0:44:b2:79:39:e5:da:b2:62:8b:4d:bf:38:70:
      e2:68:24:14:c9:33:a4:08:37:d5:58:69:5e:d3:7c:
      ed:c1:04:53:08:e7:4e:b0:2a:87:63:08:61:6f:63:
      15:59:ea:b2:2b:79:d7:0c:61:67:8a:5b:fd:5e:ad:
      87:7f:ba:86:67:4f:71:58:12:22:04:22:22:ce:8b:
      ef:54:71:00:ce:50:35:58:76:95:08:ee:6a:b1:a2:
```

```
01:d5
  Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
  1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.1:
    . . . . .
  1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.2:
    ....k..wSJ.%7.N.&{. p.
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
  13:AD:BF:43:09:BD:82:70:9C:8C:D5:4F:31:6E:D5:22:98:8A:1B:D4
  1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2:
    .
.S.u.b.C.A
  X509v3 Key Usage:
    Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
  X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
    CA:TRUE
  X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
    45:66:52:43:E1:7E:58:11:BF:D6:4E:9E:23:55:08:3B:3A:22:6A:A8
  X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
    Full Name:
URI:http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCorThiParMarRoo_2010-10-05.
crl
    Authority Information Access:
      CA Issuers -
URI:http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCorThiParMarRoo_2010-10-05.crt
  Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
  Signature Value:
    35:08:42:ff:30:cc:ce:f7:76:0c:ad:10:68:58:35:29:46:32:
    76:27:7c:ef:12:41:27:42:1b:4a:aa:6d:81:38:48:59:13:55:
    f3:e9:58:34:a6:16:0b:82:aa:5d:ad:82:da:80:83:41:06:8f:
    b4:1d:f2:03:b9:f3:1a:5d:1b:f1:50:90:f9:b3:55:84:42:28:
    1c:20:bd:b2:ae:51:14:c5:c0:ac:97:95:21:1c:90:db:0f:fc:
    77:9e:95:73:91:88:ca:bd:bd:52:b9:05:50:0d:df:57:9e:a0:
    61:ed:0d:e5:6d:25:d9:40:0f:17:40:c8:ce:a3:4a:c2:4d:af:
    9a:12:1d:08:54:8f:bd:c7:bc:b9:2b:3d:49:2b:1f:32:fc:6a:
    21:69:4f:9b:c8:7e:42:34:fc:36:06:17:8b:8f:20:40:c0:b3:
    9a:25:75:27:cd:c9:03:a3:f6:5d:d1:e7:36:54:7a:b9:50:b5:
    d3:12:d1:07:bf:bb:74:df:dc:1e:8f:80:d5:ed:18:f4:2f:14:
    16:6b:2f:de:66:8c:b0:23:e5:c7:84:d8:ed:ea:c1:33:82:ad:
    56:4b:18:2d:f1:68:95:07:cd:cf:f0:72:f0:ae:bb:dd:86:85:
    98:2c:21:4c:33:2b:f0:0f:4a:f0:68:87:b5:92:55:32:75:a1:
    6a:82:6a:3c:a3:25:11:a4:ed:ad:d7:04:ae:cb:d8:40:59:a0:
    84:d1:95:4c:62:91:22:1a:74:1d:8c:3d:47:0e:44:a6:e4:b0:
    9b:34:35:b1:fa:b6:53:a8:2c:81:ec:a4:05:71:c8:9d:b8:ba:
    e8:1b:44:66:e4:47:54:0e:8e:56:7f:b3:9f:16:98:b2:86:d0:
    68:3e:90:23:b5:2f:5e:8f:50:85:8d:c6:8d:82:5f:41:a1:f4:
    2e:0d:e0:99:d2:6c:75:e4:b6:69:b5:21:86:fa:07:d1:f6:e2:
    4d:d1:da:ad:2c:77:53:1e:25:32:37:c7:6c:52:72:95:86:b0:
    f1:35:61:6a:19:f5:b2:3b:81:50:56:a6:32:2d:fe:a2:89:f9:
```

```
42:86:27:18:55:a1:82:ca:5a:9b:f8:30:98:54:14:a6:47:96:
25:2f:c8:26:e4:41:94:1a:5c:02:3f:e5:96:e3:85:5b:3c:3e:
3f:bb:47:16:72:55:e2:25:22:b1:d9:7b:e7:03:06:2a:a3:f7:
1e:90:46:c3:00:0d:d6:19:89:e3:0e:35:27:62:03:71:15:a6:
ef:d0:27:a0:a0:59:37:60:f8:38:94:b8:e0:78:70:f8:ba:4c:
86:87:94:f6:e0:ae:02:45:ee:65:c2:b6:a3:7e:69:16:75:07:
92:9b:f5:a6:bc:59:83:58
```

Q2. Is this certificate the root certificate in the chain of trust? Is it the ultimate root of trust? What is the role of the Platform Key (PK)?

Yes, it is the root certificate in the chain of trust, but it is not the ultimate root of trust. The ultimate root of trust is the Platform Key (PK). Only updates signed by the PK can modify the Key Exchange Key (KEK) database, which in turn manages updates to the signature database (DB) and the forbidden signature database (DBX). The PK's role is to ensure that any changes to the KEK are properly authorized, thereby maintaining the integrity of the boot process. Since the PK is typically owned and managed by the platform manufacturer, it establishes a reliable and secure foundation for the system.

Q3. Verify that the system indeed boots the shim boot loader in the first stage What is the full path name of this boot loader?

```
sudo efibootmgr -v
BootCurrent: 0003
Timeout: 0 seconds
BootOrder: 0003,0000,0001,0002
Boot0000* ubuntu
HD(1,GPT,8d3dcf8c-8350-49fc-85eb-9315bc22579e,0x800,0x219800)/File(\EFI\ubuntu\shimx64.efi)
Boot0001* Onboard NIC(IPV4)
PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x19,0x0)/MAC(b8ca3a92d9bf,0)/IPv4(0.0.0.00.0.0.0,0,0)AMBO
Boot0002* Onboard NIC(IPV6)
PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x19,0x0)/MAC(b8ca3a92d9bf,0)/IPv6([::]:<->[::]:,0,0)AMBO
Boot0003* debian HD(1,GPT,6c2720cf-9e7d-41d6-be26-9ebdcfef086c,0x800,0x100000)/File(\EFI\debian\shimx64.efi)
```

We can see that we are using boot 0003 and the shim can be found in the following folder:

```
sudo ls /boot/efi/EFI/debian
BOOTX64.CSV fbx64.efi grub.cfg grubx64.efi mmx64.efi shimx64.efi
```

PATH: /boot/efi/EFI/debian/shimx64.efi

Q4. Verify that the shim boot loader is indeed signed with the Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA key Hint sbsigntool PEM format

Convert the certificate from .der (raw format) to .pem (plain text)

```
openssl x509 -in DB-0002.der -inform DER -out DB-0002.pem
```

Verify if the shim boot loader is signed with the certificate.

```
sudo sbverify --cert DB-0002.pem /boot/efi/EFI/debian/shimx64.efi
warning: data remaining[833960 vs 960080]: gaps between PE/COFF sections?
Signature verification OK
```

Q5. Read the first 9 pages of the specification (up to Authenticode-Specific Structures) Focus on the structure of the binaries What is the name of the part of the binary where the actual signing info is stored?

The specification shows that inside the section Attribute Certificate Table (ACT) the signing information can be found on the SignerInfos part. Which can be seen below.

```
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version,
    issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
    digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
    authenticatedAttributes
        [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL,
    digestEncryptionAlgorithm
        DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
    encryptedDigest EncryptedDigest,
    unauthenticatedAttributes
        [1] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL }
IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
    issuer Name,
    serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING
```

Q6. In what standard cryptographic format is the signature data stored?

The Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard (CMS) format is used as the standard format in which the signature data is store. The supported digestedAlgorithm are SHA1 and MD5.

Internet Engineering Task Force took over the CMS specification and this was how they described it during their introduction. "" This syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content. [Specification](#) ""

Q7. Extract the signature data from the shim binary using dd Add 8 bytes to the location as given in the data directory to skip over the Microsoft WIN structure header (see page 14 of the specification if you are interested) Show the command you used

Ive installed the pev package and used the readpe for the following questions.

```
dmarque@desktop-46:~/Documents$ sudo readpe -d
/boot/efi/EFI/debian/shimx64.efi
Data directories
  Directory
    IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY: 0xe80a8 (9640 bytes)
  Directory
    IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC: 0x82000 (10 bytes)
```

This is the entry I changed “IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY: 0xe80a8 (9640 bytes)” \$\$ 0xe80a8 + 8 = 0xE80B0 = 950448 \$\$

```
dmarque@desktop-46:~/Documents$ sudo dd if=/boot/efi/EFI/debian/shimx64.efi
bs=1 skip=950448 count=9632 of=shim.bin
9632+0 records in
9632+0 records out
9632 bytes (9.6 kB, 9.4 KiB) copied, 0.0243956 s, 395 kB/s
```

Which created a new file cert.pem with the content.

```
dmarque@desktop-46:~/Documents$ openssl pkcs7 -inform der -in shim.bin -
print_certs -out cert.pem of=shim.bin
dmarque@desktop-46:~/Documents$ cat cert.pem
subject=C = US, ST = Washington, L = Redmond, O = Microsoft Corporation, CN
= Microsoft Windows UEFI Driver Publisher
issuer=C = US, ST = Washington, L = Redmond, O = Microsoft Corporation, CN =
Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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```

MWVJdsG3Yq9Jxohxkt8WzIPpBX0Gd0D05X9pzz3u/BQrr4+FkBVe10GPO2+IGmEN
iWVBGs4dJrsAc/X06AHwPr7l8qxkk5uiSIk0FhT9xiJnE7eeEwjVVR/NLISOHNmk
CkQ+AdYCgCr63Dd0y9iannvuAWYzrYVsXo/cEY0iL4Wlhwnb0ysjv1HFQRJ7807
D8Ew1mErHbKaf19GI5LeMMs2U0M4Lhp0BJc/aXec0l6NHRWy/w7ci78NQQcR+fnC
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

```
subject=C = US, ST = Washington, L = Redmond, O = Microsoft Corporation, CN
= Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011
issuer=C = US, ST = Washington, L = Redmond, O = Microsoft Corporation, CN =
Microsoft Corporation Third Party Marketplace Root
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
```

MIIGEDCCA/igAwIBAgIKYQjTxAAAAAABDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCBkTELMAKGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBAgTCldhc2hpbmdd0b24xEDA0BgNVBACTB1JlZG1vbmdQX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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

Q8. Show the subject and issuer of any X 509 certificates stored in the signature data

Draw a diagram relating these certificates to the Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA certificate
Hint openssl strongswan-starter

```
cert#1
subject=C = US, ST = Washington, L = Redmond, O = Microsoft Corporation, CN = Microsoft Windows UEFI Driver Publisher
issuer=C = US, ST = Washington, L = Redmond, O = Microsoft Corporation, CN = Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011

cert#2
subject=C = US, ST = Washington, L = Redmond, O = Microsoft Corporation, CN = Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011
issuer=C = US, ST = Washington, L = Redmond, O = Microsoft Corporation, CN = Microsoft Corporation Third Party Marketplace Root
```

Issuers Diagram 

Q9. BONUS Using your new knowledge about Authenticode binaries extract the signing certificates from the GRUB boot loader and show the subject and issuer

Q10. Why is storing the certificate X in the shim binary secure?

When a certificate is stored within the shim binary modifications are not possible which means that any change on the binary signature would invalidate it. During the system boot the shim binary is checked and when there are changes found on the signature it wont boot.

Q11. What do you think is the subject CommonName (CN) of this X certificate?

I think the subject CommonName is "Debian Secure Boot Signer 2022 - grub2".

Q12. Obtain the X certificate used by shim to verify the GRUB binary

```
sudo openssl asn1parse -i -inform DER -in /boot/efi/EFI/debian/shimx64.efi -
length 1080 -dump -offset 701514
    0:d=0  hl=2 l= 21 prim: PRINTABLESTRING      :Debian Secure Boot CA
   23:d=0  hl=2 l= 30 cons: SEQUENCE
   25:d=1  hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME                :160816180918Z
   40:d=1  hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME                :460809180918Z
   55:d=0  hl=2 l= 32 cons: SEQUENCE
   57:d=1  hl=2 l= 30 cons: SET
   59:d=2  hl=2 l= 28 cons: SEQUENCE
   61:d=3  hl=2 l=  3 prim: OBJECT                  :commonName
   66:d=3  hl=2 l= 21 prim: PRINTABLESTRING      :Debian Secure Boot CA
   89:d=0  hl=4 l= 290 cons: SEQUENCE
   93:d=1  hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
```

95:d=2	hl=2	l= 9	prim: OBJECT	:rsaEncryption
106:d=2	hl=2	l= 0	prim: NULL	
108:d=1	hl=4	l= 271	prim: BIT STRING	
0000	-	00 30 82 01 0a 02 82 01-01 00 9d 95 d4 8b 9b da		
.0.....				
0010	-	10 ac 2e ca 82 37 c1 a4-cb 4a c3 1b 42 93 c2 7a		
.....7...J..B..z				
0020	-	29 d3 6e dd 64 af 80 af-ea 66 a2 1b 61 9c 83 0c		
).n.d....f..a...				
0030	-	c5 6b b9 35 25 ff c5 fb-e8 29 43 de ce 4b 3d c6		
.k.5%....)C..K=.				
0040	-	12 4d b1 ef 26 43 95 68-cd 04 11 fe c2 24 9b de		
.M..&C.h.....\$..				
0050	-	14 d8 86 51 e8 38 43 bd-b1 9a 15 e5 08 6b f8 54		
...Q.8C.....k.T				
0060	-	50 8b b3 4b 5f fc 14 e4-35 50 7c 0b b1 e2 03 84		
P..K_...5P				
0070	-	a8 36 48 e4 80 e8 ea 9f-fa bf c5 18 7b 5e ce 1c		
.6H.....{^...				
0080	-	be 2c 80 78 49 35 15 c0-21 cf ef 66 d5 8a 96 08		
..,xI5...!...f....				
0090	-	2b 66 2f 48 17 b1 e7 ec-82 8f 07 e6 ca e0 5f 71		
+f/H....._q				
00a0	-	24 39 50 0a 8e d1 72 28-50 a5 9d 21 f4 e3 61 ba		
\$9P...r(P...!..a.				
00b0	-	09 03 66 c8 df 4e 26 36-0b 15 0f 63 1f 2b af ab		
..f..N&6...c.+..				
00c0	-	c4 28 a2 56 64 85 8d a6-55 41 ae 3c 88 95 dd d0		
.(.Vd...UA.<....				
00d0	-	6d d9 29 db d8 c4 68 b5-fc f4 57 89 6b 14 db e0		
m.)...h...W.k...				
00e0	-	ef ee 40 0d 62 1f ea 58-d4 a3 d8 ba 03 a6 97 2e		
..@.b..X.....				
00f0	-	c5 6b 13 a4 91 77 a6 b5-ad 23 a7 eb 0a 49 14 46		
.k...w...#...I.F				
0100	-	7c 76 e9 9e 32 b4 89 af-57 79 02 03 01 00 01		
v..2...Wy.....				
383:d=0	hl=3	l= 210	cons: cont [3]	
386:d=1	hl=3	l= 207	cons: SEQUENCE	
389:d=2	hl=2	l= 65	cons: SEQUENCE	
391:d=3	hl=2	l= 8	prim: OBJECT	:Authority Information
Access				
401:d=3	hl=2	l= 53	prim: OCTET STRING	
0000	-	30 33 30 31 06 08 2b 06-01 05 05 07 30 02 86 25		
0301...+.....0..%				
0010	-	68 74 74 70 73 3a 2f 2f-64 73 61 2e 64 65 62 69		
https://dsa.debi				
0020	-	61 6e 2e 6f 72 67 2f 73-65 63 75 72 65 2d 62 6f		
an.org/secure-bo				


```

0030 - 6f 74 2d 63 61                                ot-ca
456:d=2 hl=2 l= 31 cons: SEQUENCE
458:d=3 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT                        :X509v3 Authority Key
Identifier
463:d=3 hl=2 l= 24 prim: OCTET STRING
0000 - 30 16 80 14 6c ce ce 7e-4c 6c 0d 1f 61 49 f3 dd
0...l...~Ll..aI..
0010 - 27 df cc 5c bb 41 9e a1-                        '...\A..
489:d=2 hl=2 l= 20 cons: SEQUENCE
491:d=3 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT                        :Netscape Cert Type
502:d=3 hl=2 l= 1 prim: BOOLEAN                      :255
505:d=3 hl=2 l= 4 prim: OCTET STRING
0000 - 03 02 00 f7                                      ....
511:d=2 hl=2 l= 19 cons: SEQUENCE
513:d=3 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT                        :X509v3 Extended Key Usage
518:d=3 hl=2 l= 12 prim: OCTET STRING
0000 - 30 0a 06 08 2b 06 01 05-05 07 03 03            0...+.....
532:d=2 hl=2 l= 14 cons: SEQUENCE
534:d=3 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT                        :X509v3 Key Usage
539:d=3 hl=2 l= 1 prim: BOOLEAN                      :255
542:d=3 hl=2 l= 4 prim: OCTET STRING
0000 - 03 02 01 86                                      ....
548:d=2 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SEQUENCE
550:d=3 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT                        :X509v3 Basic Constraints
555:d=3 hl=2 l= 1 prim: BOOLEAN                      :255
558:d=3 hl=2 l= 5 prim: OCTET STRING
0000 - 30 03 01 01 ff                                  0....
565:d=2 hl=2 l= 29 cons: SEQUENCE
567:d=3 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT                        :X509v3 Subject Key
Identifier
572:d=3 hl=2 l= 22 prim: OCTET STRING
0000 - 04 14 6c ce ce 7e 4c 6c-0d 1f 61 49 f3 dd 27 df
..l...~Ll..aI...'..
0010 - cc 5c bb 41 9e a1                                .\.\A..
596:d=0 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
598:d=1 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT                        :sha256WithRSAEncryption
609:d=1 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL
611:d=0 hl=4 l= 257 prim: BIT STRING
0000 - 00 77 96 3e 47 c9 ce 09-cf 8b 89 ce 59 ed 26 0e
.w.>G.....Y.&.
0010 - 26 0b b9 ad a9 2b bd a1-eb 88 79 02 ff 31 de fe
&....+....y..1..
0020 - f5 6a 07 ef 61 13 11 70-1e bf 9c 4e 66 6c e1 62
.j..a..p...Nfl.b
0030 - 12 97 01 57 65 47 dd 4a-c6 f7 f4 de a8 f1 13 62
...WeG.J.....b
0040 - cc 83 57 ac 3c a6 91 15-af 55 26 72 69 2e 14 cd
..W.<....U&ri...
0050 - dd 4d b3 d1 60 24 2d 32-4f 19 6c 11 5e f2 a3 f2
.M...`$-20.l.^...
0060 - a1 5f 62 0f 30 ae ad f1-48 66 64 7d 36 44 0d 06

```

```
.._b.0...Hfd}6D..  
    0070 - 34 3d 2e af 8e 9d c3 ad-c2 91 d8 37 e0 ee 7a 5f  
4=.....7...z_  
    0080 - 82 3b 67 8e 00 8a c4 a4-df 35 16 c2 72 2b 4c 51  
.;g.....5...r+LQ  
    0090 - d7 93 93 9e ba 08 0d 59-97 f2 e2 29 a0 44 4d ea  
.....Y....).DM.  
    00a0 - ee f8 3e 02 60 ca 15 cf-4e 9a 25 91 84 3f b7 5a  
..>.`...N.%..?.Z  
    00b0 - c7 ee bc 6b 80 a3 d9 fd-b2 6d 7a 1e 63 14 eb ef  
...k.....mz.c...  
    00c0 - f1 b0 40 25 d5 e8 0e 81-eb 6b f7 cb ff e5 21 00  
..@%.....k.....!  
    00d0 - 22 2c 2e 9a 35 60 12 4b-5b 5f 38 46 84 0c 06 9c  
",...5`.K[_8F....  
    00e0 - cf 72 93 62 18 ee 5c 98-d6 b3 7d 06 25 39 95 df  
.r.b..\...}.%9..  
    00f0 - 4e 60 76 b0 06 7b 08 b0-6e e3 64 9f 21 56 ad 39  
N`v...{..n.d.!V.9  
    0100 - 0f  
    872:d=0 hl=2 l= 22 cons: OBJECT  
Error in encoding  
40A7E5C77F7F0000:error:0680007B:asn1 encoding  
routines:ASN1_get_object:header too long:../crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c:105:
```

The last SEQUENCE is the same as the following certificate:

```
SHA1 Fingerprint:  
53:61:0c:f8:1f:bd:7e:0c:eb:67:91:3c:9e:f3:e7:94:a9:63:3e:cb  
Certificate:  
  Data:  
    Version: 3 (0x2)  
    Serial Number:  
      ed:54:a1:d5:af:87:48:94:8d:9f:89:32:ee:9c:7c:34  
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption  
    Issuer: CN=Debian Secure Boot CA  
    Validity  
      Not Before: Aug 16 18:09:18 2016 GMT  
      Not After : Aug  9 18:09:18 2046 GMT  
    Subject: CN=Debian Secure Boot CA  
    Subject Public Key Info:  
      Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption  
      Public-Key: (2048 bit)  
      Modulus:  
        00:9d:95:d4:8b:9b:da:10:ac:2e:ca:82:37:c1:a4:  
        cb:4a:c3:1b:42:93:c2:7a:29:d3:6e:dd:64:af:80:  
        af:ea:66:a2:1b:61:9c:83:0c:c5:6b:b9:35:25:ff:  
        c5:fb:e8:29:43:de:ce:4b:3d:c6:12:4d:b1:ef:26:  
        43:95:68:cd:04:11:fe:c2:24:9b:de:14:d8:86:51:
```

```
e8:38:43:bd:b1:9a:15:e5:08:6b:f8:54:50:8b:b3:
4b:5f:fc:14:e4:35:50:7c:0b:b1:e2:03:84:a8:36:
48:e4:80:e8:ea:9f:fa:bf:c5:18:7b:5e:ce:1c:be:
2c:80:78:49:35:15:c0:21:cf:ef:66:d5:8a:96:08:
2b:66:2f:48:17:b1:e7:ec:82:8f:07:e6:ca:e0:5f:
71:24:39:50:0a:8e:d1:72:28:50:a5:9d:21:f4:e3:
61:ba:09:03:66:c8:df:4e:26:36:0b:15:0f:63:1f:
2b:af:ab:c4:28:a2:56:64:85:8d:a6:55:41:ae:3c:
88:95:dd:d0:6d:d9:29:db:d8:c4:68:b5:fc:f4:57:
89:6b:14:db:e0:ef:ee:40:0d:62:1f:ea:58:d4:a3:
d8:ba:03:a6:97:2e:c5:6b:13:a4:91:77:a6:b5:ad:
23:a7:eb:0a:49:14:46:7c:76:e9:9e:32:b4:89:af:
57:79
```

Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

X509v3 extensions:

Authority Information Access:

CA Issuers - URI:https://dsa.debian.org/secure-boot-ca

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

6C:CE:CE:7E:4C:6C:0D:1F:61:49:F3:DD:27:DF:CC:5C:BB:41:9E:A1

Netscape Cert Type: critical

SSL Client, SSL Server, S/MIME, Object Signing, SSL CA,
S/MIME CA, Object Signing CA

X509v3 Extended Key Usage:

Code Signing

X509v3 Key Usage: critical

Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign

X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical

CA:TRUE

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

6C:CE:CE:7E:4C:6C:0D:1F:61:49:F3:DD:27:DF:CC:5C:BB:41:9E:A1

Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption

Signature Value:

```
77:96:3e:47:c9:ce:09:cf:8b:89:ce:59:ed:26:0e:26:0b:b9:
ad:a9:2b:bd:a1:eb:88:79:02:ff:31:de:fe:f5:6a:07:ef:61:
13:11:70:1e:bf:9c:4e:66:6c:e1:62:12:97:01:57:65:47:dd:
4a:c6:f7:f4:de:a8:f1:13:62:cc:83:57:ac:3c:a6:91:15:af:
55:26:72:69:2e:14:cd:dd:4d:b3:d1:60:24:2d:32:4f:19:6c:
11:5e:f2:a3:f2:a1:5f:62:0f:30:ae:ad:f1:48:66:64:7d:36:
44:0d:06:34:3d:2e:af:8e:9d:c3:ad:c2:91:d8:37:e0:ee:7a:
5f:82:3b:67:8e:00:8a:c4:a4:df:35:16:c2:72:2b:4c:51:d7:
93:93:9e:ba:08:0d:59:97:f2:e2:29:a0:44:4d:ea:ee:f8:3e:
02:60:ca:15:cf:4e:9a:25:91:84:3f:b7:5a:c7:ee:bc:6b:80:
a3:d9:fd:b2:6d:7a:1e:63:14:eb:ef:f1:b0:40:25:d5:e8:0e:
81:eb:6b:f7:cb:ff:e5:21:00:22:2c:2e:9a:35:60:12:4b:5b:
5f:38:46:84:0c:06:9c:cf:72:93:62:18:ee:5c:98:d6:b3:7d:
06:25:39:95:df:4e:60:76:b0:06:7b:08:b0:6e:e3:64:9f:21:
56:ad:39:0f
```

Or using the previous commands for the other questions.

```
dmarque@desktop-46:~/Documents$ sudo readpe -d
/boot/efi/EFI/debian/grubx64.efi
Data directories
  Directory
    IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY: 0x401000 (1472 bytes)
  Directory
    IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC: 0x400000 (4096 bytes)
```

```
dmarque@desktop-46:~/Documents$ sudo dd if=/boot/efi/EFI/debian/grubx64.efi
bs=1 skip=$((0x401000 + 8)) count=1472 of=grub.bin
1464+0 records in
1464+0 records out
1464 bytes (1.5 kB, 1.4 KiB) copied, 0.00523165 s, 280 kB/s
```

Here is the certificate

```
dmarque@desktop-46:~/Documents$ sudo openssl pkcs7 -inform der -in grub.bin
-print_certs -out grub_cert.pem
subject=CN = Debian Secure Boot Signer 2022 - grub2
issuer=CN = Debian Secure Boot CA
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

Q13. Verify that this X certificate's corresponding private key was indeed used to sign the GRUB binary

```
dmarque@desktop-46:~/Documents$ sudo sbverify --cert grub_cert.pem
/boot/efi/EFI/debian/grubx64.efi
```

Signature verification OK

Q14. Verify the kernel you booted against the X certificate

Q15. BONUS Where does GRUB get its trusted certificate from? Hint It is not stored in the binary and it is not stored on the file system

Q16. Draw a diagram that shows the chain of trust from the UEFI PK key to the signed kernel Show all certificates binaries and signing relations involved

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