




Jaap van Ginkel



Security of Systems and Networks

2 September 2024, Part 1 Intro and Traditional Crypto



This Block

- Monday and Thursday
 - Security of Systems and Networks (SSN)
 - Jaap van Ginkel (Lucas Hecht, Zhiyang Wang)
- Tuesday and Friday
 - Classical Internet systems (CIA)
 - Yuri Demchenko
- Wednesday
 - Colloquium/Extra Lab or project time



Seating and Ergonomics




- At home and in the lab (Instruction by Jaap at 13:00)
- Seating in groups




Book

- Open book exam
- Information Security: Principles and Practice, 3rd Edition
- Mark Stamp
- ISBN: 978-1119505907



Another book

- Network Security: Private Communication in a Public World, 2/E
 - Charlie Kaufman
 - Radia Perlman
 - Mike Speciner
-
- ISBN-13: 9780130460196





SSN specific rules

- Lecture Presence 10:00-12:15
Lecture starts 10:15-12.xx
- Lab Presence 13:00-16:00
- Presence is mandatory
 - Also when you are finished or already know the material
 - Report absence beforehand
 - If you leave tell the teacher or TA
- All mail for SSN to
SSN.teachers@os3.nl



Labs

- Maintain your Logs !
- Work in different groups for each assignment
- Make sure you show your own input in group work
- Do not copy please...





WIKI

- <https://www.os3.nl/2024-2025/courses/ssn/start>
- UvA learning systems (Canvas) only for grades
- Datanose and SIS only for formal registration of courses

The screenshot shows the course page for 'Security & Network Engineering' at the University of Amsterdam. The page has a green header with the course name and the university logo. Below the header, there is a breadcrumb trail: 'Trace: • Schedule 2019-2020 • Security of Systems and Networks'. A search bar is located on the right side of the header. The main content area is titled 'Security of Systems and Networks'. On the left, there is a table with the following information:

Lecturer	Jaap van Ginkel
Lab teachers	Arno Bakker

On the right, there is a 'Navigation' box with the following links:

- Home
- Info
- 2019-2020



Your own contribution to SSN

- Ask questions
- Debate topics with each other
- If there is a SSN subject you are an expert at...
- And you have the time to prepare a presentation...
- Let me know





Guest lecturers (TBD)

Karst Koymans - Crypto math

Jan Joris Vereijken - Security by Design

Possibly lectures

Post quantum crypto algortims DJB

Cipher machines

Quantum Crypto





House rules

■ Guest lectures

- ☐ Be inquisitive/critical
- ☐ Be polite
- ☐ Don't use your laptop or PC
- ☐ Presence mandatory

■ Jaap

- ☐ You can use your laptop PC for SSN related work
- ☐ Presence mandatory



SSN Project

- Preparation for RP1
- More fun than lab exercises
- You will get graded for it...
- Work in groups of 3 (if needed 4)
- Choose a subject in week 3
- Week 1-3 Lab exercises
- Week 4-7 Work on project





Deadlines

- SSN Lab exercises feedback
- SSN Lab exercises corrections
- SSN first project idea 12 September
- SSN final project proposal 19 September
- SSN project presentations 18 October
- SSN project report 27 October
 - Extension only granted if applied week in advance
- All deadlines 23:59 UTC+1





Exam

- Open book
- Save a tree today
- No electronic aids
- Guest lectures and additional materials are part of the exam





Grading

- Presence: Mandatory
- Labs: Conditional to pass
- Project report: 30 %
- Project presentation: 0 %
- Exam: 70 %
- Minimum grade for exam and report 4.0

Possibly:

- Peer review





Film

- Voluntary participation
- Thursday 17:00 ?
- Suggestions
 - The imitation Game/ Enigma
 - Catch me if you can
 - A Beautiful mind
 - Mr Robot
 - Breaking the code





Planning SSN





Crypto History

- ☐ Cryptology
- ☐ Transposition Substitution
- ☐ Frequency analysis
- ☐ Vigenère
- ☐ Enigma





Authentication

- ☐ AuthN/Authz
- ☐ SSO
- ☐ Kerberos
- ☐ A-Select
- ☐ Shibboleth
- ☐ Biometrics



Passwords

- Cracking
 - Hashcat/John
 - Distributed cracking
 - Rainbow tables
 - Hashes



Practical security

- ☐ Firewalls
- ☐ Wrappers
- ☐ Port knocking
- ☐ SSH SCP
- ☐ LDAP
- ☐ Windows/Unix/Mac





Social Engineering

- Soft side of security



SSL/TLS

- Versions
- Ciphers
- Implementation
- MITM attacks





Smartcards

- Javacard
- GSM, RSA
- OpenPGPcard
- Guest lecture by Riscure





Email security

- ☐ PGP
- ☐ S/MIME X.509



PKI

- ❑ Public key cryptography
- ❑ Trust models
- ❑ Revocation
- ❑ Key management
- ❑ Dutch Diginotar Debacle



IP-SEC

- Design and modes
- IKE/Skip
- Practical Implementations





How knowledgeable do you consider yourself in these SSN topics?

- 1) Total Newbie
- 2) I know some of the topics
- 3) I have followed a course before
- 4) I know most of the topics in detail
- 5) I could deliver this course





Traditional Crypto





Cryptology


- Cryptography
 - Greek *kryptós*, "hidden", and *gráphein*, "to write"
- Cryptanalysis
 - Greek *kryptós*, "hidden", and *analýein*, "to loosen" or "to untie")



Crypto

- **Cryptology** The art and science of making and breaking “secret codes”
- **Cryptography** making “secret codes”
- **Cryptanalysis** breaking “secret codes”
- **Crypto** all of the above (and more)

Schematic



How to Speak Crypto

- A *cipher* or *cryptosystem* is used to *encrypt* the *plaintext*
- The result of encryption is *ciphertext*
- We *decrypt* ciphertext to recover plaintext
- A *key* is used to configure a cryptosystem
- A *symmetric key* cryptosystem uses the same key to encrypt as to decrypt
- A *public key* cryptosystem uses a *public key* to encrypt and a *private key* to decrypt

Crypto

- Basic assumptions
 - The system is completely known to the attacker
 - Only the key is secret
 - That is, crypto algorithms are not secret
- This is known as **Kerckhoffs' Principle**
- Why do we make this assumption?
 - Experience has shown that secret algorithms are weak when exposed
 - Secret algorithms never remain secret
 - Better to find weaknesses beforehand


Definitions

- A *cipher* or *crypto system* is used to encrypt a *plaintext*
- The result is a *ciphertext*
- A *decrypt* gives the plaintext
- A *Key* is the configuration of the cipher



Information Security

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability



More models

- Possession or Control
- Authenticity
- Utility

- Access Control
 - Authentication
 - Authorization



Use of Encryption

- Non-repudiation
- Anti-replay
- Proof of delivery
- Deniable Encryption




A CRYPTO NERD'S IMAGINATION:

HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED.
LET'S BUILD A MILLION-DOLLAR
CLUSTER TO CRACK IT.

NO GOOD! IT'S
4096-BIT RSA!


BLAST! OUR
EVIL PLAN
IS FOILED!



WHAT WOULD ACTUALLY HAPPEN:

HIS LAPTOP'S ENCRYPTED.
DRUG HIM AND HIT HIM WITH
THIS \$5 WRENCH UNTIL
HE TELLS US THE PASSWORD.

GOT IT.



Auguste Kerckhoffs




- 1835-1903
- Dutch Linguist and Cryptographer
- Professor at HEC Paris
- La Cryptographie Militaire
- “A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge”
- No Security by obscurity

Kerckhoffs ideas

- Le système doit être matériellement, sinon mathématiquement, indéchiffrable ;
- Il faut qu'il n'exige pas le secret, et qu'il puisse sans inconvénient tomber entre les mains de l'ennemi
- La clef doit pouvoir en être communiquée et retenue sans le secours de notes écrites, et être changée ou modifiée au gré des correspondants ;
- Il faut qu'il soit applicable à la correspondance télégraphique ;
- Il faut qu'il soit portatif, et que son maniement ou son fonctionnement n'exige pas le concours de plusieurs personnes ;
- Enfin, il est nécessaire, vu les circonstances qui en commandent l'application, que le système soit d'un usage facile, ne demandant ni tension d'esprit, ni la connaissance d'une longue série de règles à observer.

Claude Shannon

- 1916-2001
- Founder of Information Theory
- The enemy knows the system (Shannon's maxim)
- Confusion and diffusion
 - **Confusion** — obscure relationship between plaintext and ciphertext
 - **Diffusion** — spread plaintext statistics through the ciphertext
 - Proved that one-time pad is secure.



What do you see ?

■ HENTEIDTLAEAPMRCMUAK

			H		E		L		P		M	
			E		I		A		M		U	
	N		D		E		R		A			
	T		T		A		C		K			



Scytale





Substitution and Transposition

- Transposition
 - Order of the letters is changed
- Substitution
 - Letters are replaced




What do you see?

gjragl lrnef bs far guvf vf tbvat gb or n sha
lrne



ROT-13





ROT-13/CEASAR

- Only 26 possibilities!
- Exhaustive key search takes microseconds
- Obfuscation
- How to improve?



Ceasar's Cipher Decryption

- Suppose we know a Ceasar's cipher is being used:

Plaintext	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z
Ciphertext	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C

- Given ciphertext:

VSRQJHEREVTXDUHSDQWV

- Plaintext: spongebobsquarepants




Handwritten text in a cursive script, likely a letter or document, featuring various characters and symbols.

Handwritten text in a cursive script, likely a letter or document, featuring various characters and symbols. The text is written on aged paper and includes a signature at the bottom.



Pigpen / Freemasons



A	B	C
D	E	F
G	H	I

J	K	L
M	N	O
P	Q	R

	S	
T		U
	V	

	W	
X		Y
	Z	



Sherlock Holmes Dancing men Cipher



Simple Substitution

□ Plaintext: **fourscoreandsevenyearsago**

□ Key:

Plaintext	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z
Ciphertext	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C

□ Ciphertext:

IRXUVFRUHDQGVHYHQBHDUVDJR

□ Shift by 3 is "Caesar's cipher"



Least-Simple Simple Substitution

- ❑ In general, simple substitution key can be any **permutation** of letters
 - Need not be a shift
- ❑ For example

Plaintext	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z
Ciphertext	J	I	C	A	X	S	E	Y	V	D	K	W	B	Q	T	Z	R	H	F	M	P	N	U	L	G	O





Monoalphabetic substitution

What do you see?

Sqzof: Qsaofrxl; e. 801–873 QR) vql q Dxlsod hgsndqzi qezoct ql q hiosglghitk, dqzitdqzoeoqf, hinloeoqf, qfr dxloe zitgkolz. Qs-Aofro vql zit yoklz gy zit Olsqdoe htkohqztzoe hiosglghitkl, qfr ol iqostr ql zit "yqzitik gy Qkqw hiosglghin".[3][4][5]

Qs-Aofro vql wgkf of Axyq qfr trxeqztr of Wquirqr.[6] It wteqdt q hkgdofthz youxkt of zit lgxlt gy Volrgd, qfr q fxdwtk gy Qwwqlor Eqsosil qhhgofztr iod zg gctkltt zit zkqflsqzogf gy Uktta leotfzoyoe qfr hiosglghioeqs ztbzl ofzg zit Qkqwoe sqfuxqut. Ziöl egfzqez vozi "zit hiosglghin gy zit qfeotfzl" (ql Itsstfolzoe hiosglghin vql gyzt fkytkktr zg wn Dxlsod leigsqkl) iqr q hkgygxfr tyytez gf iod, ql it Infzitolmtr, qrqhztr qfr hkgdgztr Itsstfolzoe qfr Htkohqztzoe hiosglghin of zit Dxlsod vgksr.[7] It lxwltjxtfzsn vkgzt ixfrktrl gy gkouofqs zktqzoltl gy iol gvf gf q kqfut gy lxwptezl kqfuofu ykgd dtzqhinoel, tzioel, sguoe qfr hlnegsgun, zg dtroeft, hiqkdqegsgun,[8] dqzitdqzoel,

qlzkgfgdn, qlzkgsgun qfr ghzoel, qfr yxkzitik qyotsr zg dgkt hkqezoeqs zghoel soat





Substitution

- 26 ! more than 2_{88} possibilities
- Exhaustive search takes ages
- So it is safe ?




Al-Kindi

- أبو يوسف يعقوب ابن إسحاق الكندي
- Abū-Yūsuf Ya'qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī (c. 801–873 CE)



Cryptanalysis

- Impossible to search all 2^{88} keys
- Is there a better method ?
- Frequency analysis !





Frequency tables

English:	ETAONIRSHLDCUPFMWYBGVKQXJZ
Dutch:	ENIARDTOGLSHVRMUWJBZCPFX YQ
Esperanto:	AIEONSLTRJUKMPDGC VBFZHQWXY
French:	EANRSITUOLD C MPVBFGHQJZXY
German:	ENIRSADTUGHOLBMCWFKVZPJQXY
Interlingua:	EAILNOSTRUD C MPVGBFHXQJWYZK
Italian:	EAIOLNRTSCDMPUVGZFBHQ
Latin:	IEUTAMSNRODLVCPQBFGXHJKWYZ
Portuguese:	EAOSIDRTNCPUMLVFGQHJXZBKWY
Spanish:	EAOSRNIDLCTUMPGWBQVHFZ
Swedish:	AENRTSIOMGKLDVFBCHPUYJXQWZ





Frequency analysis

- Language dependent
- Longer text required
- Frequency of letters
- Pairs of letters
- Order of letters



Cryptanalysis: Terminology

- A crypto system is **secure** when the only attack is an “exhaustive search “
- A crypto system is **insecure** when any simplification is known
- Insecure can be safer than secure...




Double Transposition

- Plaintext: **attackxatxdawn**

	col 1	col 2	col 3
row 1	a	t	t
row 2	a	c	k
row 3	x	a	t
row 4	x	d	a
row 5	w	n	x

Permute rows
and columns



	col 1	col 3	col 2
row 3	x	t	a
row 5	w	x	n
row 1	a	t	t
row 4	x	a	d
row 2	a	k	c

- Ciphertext: **xtawxnattxadakc**
- Key: matrix size and permutations
(3,5,1,4,2) and (1,3,2)

Codebook

- Literally, a book with “codewords”
- Zimmerman Telegram encrypted with codebook

Februar	13605
fest	13732
finanzielle	13850
folgender	13918
Frieden	17142
Friedensschluss	17149
:	:





Zimmerman Telegram

4458 gemeinsam
 17149 Friedensschluß.
 14471 ☉
 6706 reichlich
 13850 finanziell
 12224 Unterstützung
 6929 und
 14991 einverständnis
 7382 ausserseits.
 158(5)7 Pa/3
 67893 Mexico.
 14218 in
 36477 Texas
 5670 ☉
 17553 aus
 67893 Mexico.
 5870 ☉
 5454 AR
 16102 IZ
 15217 ON
 22801 A

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED		WESTERN UNION		TELEGRAM	
Fast Day Message	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>				
Day Letter	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Night Message	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Night Letter	<input type="checkbox"/>	Persons should mark on it when they are the ones to which delivery is desired. OTHERWISE THE TELEGRAM WILL BE TRANSMITTED AS A FAST DAY MESSAGE.			
Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to:					
GERMAN LEGATION MEXICO CITY					
via Galveston					
JAN 8 1917					
130	13042	13401	8501	115	3528
18147	18222	21560	10247	11518	23677
98092	5905	11311	10392	10371	0302
23571	17504	11269	18276	18101	0317
22284	22200	19452	21589	67893	5569
1333	4725	4458	5905	17166	13851
13850	12224	6929	14991	7382	15857
5870	17553	67893	5870	5454	16102
21001	17388	7446	23638	18222	6719
3156	23552	22096	21604	4797	9497
23610	18140	22260	5905	13347	20420
6929	5275	18507	52262	1340	22049
10439	14814	4178	6992	8784	7032
21100	21272	9346	9559	22464	15874
2188	5376	7381	98092	16127	13486
5144	2831	17920	11347	17142	11264
10482	97556	3569	3670		
BEPNSTORFF.					
Charge German Embassy.					



Zimmerman Telegram cleartext

RECEIVED
October 1-8-18
Washington, State Dept.
By *Mr. A. Eckhoff*
Date *Oct. 27, 1918*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED.

FROM 2nd from London # 5747.

"We intend to begin on the first of February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you. You will inform the President of the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States of America is certain and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, ~~invite~~ *invite* Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves. Please call the President's attention to the fact that the ruthless employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England in a few months to make peace." Signed, ZIMMERMAN.



Book crypto

- Beale
- Three parts only part II is decrypted
- 115, 73, 24, 807, 37, 52, 49, 17, 31, 62, 647, 22, 7, 15, 140, 47, 29, 107, 79, 84, 56, 239, 10, 26, 811, 5, 196, 308, 85, 52, 160, 136, 59, 211, 36, 9, 46, 316, 554, 122, 106, 95, 53, 58, 2, 42, 7, 35, 122, 53, 31, 82, 77, 250, 196, 56, 96, 118, 71, 140, 287, 28, 353, 37, 1005, 65, 147, 807, 24, 3, 8, 12, 47, 43, 59, 807, 45, 316, 101, 41, 78, 154, 1005, 122, 138, 191, 16, 77, 49, 102, 57, 72, 34, 73, 85, 35, 371, 59, 196, 81, 92, 191, 106, 273, 60, 394, 620, 270, 220, 106, 388, 287, 63, 3, 6, 191, 122, 43, 234, 400, 106, 290, 314, 47, 48, 81, 96, 26, 115, 92, 158, 191, 110, 77, 85, 197, 46, 10, 113, 140, 353, 48, 120, 106, 2, 607, 61, 420, 811, 29, 125, 14, 20, 37, 105, 28, 248, 16, 159, 7, 35, 19, 301, 125, 110, 486, 287, 98, 117, 511, 62, 51, 220, 37, 113, 140, 807, 138, 540, 8, 44, 287, 388, 117, 18, 79, 344, 34, 20, 59, 511, 548, 107, 603, 220, 7, 66, 154, 41, 20, 50, 6,
- I have deposited in the county of Bedford about four miles from Bufords in an excavation or vault six feet below the surface of the ground the following articles belonging jointly to the parties whose names are given in number three herewith. The first deposit consisted of ten hundred and fourteen pounds of gold and thirty eight hundred and twelve pounds of silver deposited Nov eighteen nineteen.



Vigenère Cipher

- Poly alphabetical cipher
- Reinvented over and over



AL L'ECCELLEN. ET
honoratifs. Sig. il S. Giro-
lamo Ruscelli,

GIOVAN BATTISTA BELLASO.



A MOLTI anni, che io incomincio à dar'opera à gli studi, & à conuersare tra persone grandi, hauendo veduto in quanta stima; et di quanta importanza sia la bellissima professione di scriuer segrete per via di quelle che universalmente chiamano Cyfre, io con l'inspiratione datami dalla natura di nō hauer maggior diletto che l'impazare, son venuto di continuo esercitandomi intorno à tal professione; & hauendone ritrouati molti modi, che à persone d'ingegno mostrauano di non dispiacere, mi occorse in questa ultima fide uccante di ritrouarmi luogotamente generale dell'illustriss. & Reuerendiss. Cardinal Durante, nello stato di Camerino.




UNIVE

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
A	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
B	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A
C	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B
D	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C
E	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D
F	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E
G	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F
H	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
I	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
J	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
K	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
L	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
M	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
N	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
O	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N
P	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
Q	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
R	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q
S	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
T	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
U	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T
V	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U
W	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V
X	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W
Y	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X
Z	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y



Frequency in Vigenère



Di-Graph table

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z
a	NG	OG	PG	QG	RG	SG	TG	UG	VG	WG	XG	YG	ZG	AG	BG	CG	DG	EG	FG	GG	HG	IG	JG	KG	LG	MG
b	NF	OF	PF	QF	RF	SF	TF	UF	VF	WF	XF	YF	ZF	AF	BF	CF	DF	EF	FF	GF	HF	IF	JF	KF	LF	MF
c	NE	OE	PE	QE	RE	SE	TE	UE	VE	WE	XE	YE	ZE	AE	BE	CE	DE	EE	FE	GE	HE	IE	JE	KE	LE	ME
d	ND	OD	PD	QD	RD	SD	TD	UD	VD	WD	XD	YD	ZD	AD	BD	CD	DD	ED	FD	GD	HD	ID	JD	KD	LD	MD
e	NC	OC	PC	QC	RC	SC	TC	UC	VC	WC	XC	YC	ZC	AC	BC	CC	DC	EC	FC	GC	HC	IC	JC	KC	LC	MC
f	NB	OB	PB	QB	RB	SB	TB	UB	VB	WB	XB	YB	ZB	AB	BB	CB	DB	EB	FB	GB	HB	IB	JB	KB	LB	MB
g	NA	OA	PA	QA	RA	SA	TA	UA	VA	WA	XA	YA	ZA	AA	BA	CA	DA	EA	FA	GA	HA	IA	JA	KA	LA	MA
h	NZ	OZ	PZ	QZ	RZ	SZ	TZ	UZ	VZ	WZ	XZ	YZ	ZZ	AZ	BZ	CZ	DZ	EZ	FZ	GZ	HZ	IZ	JZ	KZ	LZ	MZ
i	NY	OY	PY	QY	RY	SY	TY	UY	VY	WY	XY	YY	ZY	AY	BY	CY	DY	EY	FY	GY	HY	IY	JY	KY	LY	MY
j	NX	OX	PX	QX	RX	SX	TX	UX	VX	WX	XX	YX	ZX	AX	BX	CX	DX	EX	FX	GX	HX	IX	JX	KX	LX	MX
k	NV	OV	PV	QV	RV	SV	TV	UV	VV	WV	XV	YV	ZV	AV	BV	CV	DV	EV	FV	GV	HV	IV	JV	KV	LV	MV
l	NV	OV	PV	QV	RV	SV	TV	UV	VV	WV	XV	YV	ZV	AV	BV	CV	DV	EV	FV	GV	HV	IV	JV	KV	LV	MV
m	NU	OU	PU	QU	RU	SU	TU	UU	VU	WU	XU	YU	ZU	AU	BU	CU	DU	EU	FU	GU	HU	IU	JU	KU	LU	MU
n	NT	OT	PT	QT	RT	ST	TT	UT	VT	WT	XT	YT	ZT	AT	BT	CT	DT	ET	FT	GT	HT	IT	JT	KT	LT	MT
o	NS	OS	PS	QS	RS	SS	TS	US	VS	WS	XS	YS	ZS	AS	BS	CS	DS	ES	FS	GS	HS	IS	JS	KS	LS	MS
p	NR	OR	PR	QR	RR	SR	TR	UR	VR	WR	XR	YR	ZR	AR	BR	CR	DR	ER	FR	GR	HR	IR	JR	KR	LR	MR
q	NQ	OQ	PQ	QQ	RQ	SQ	TQ	UQ	VQ	WQ	XQ	YQ	ZQ	AQ	BQ	CQ	DQ	EQ	FQ	GQ	HQ	IQ	JQ	KQ	LQ	MQ
r	NP	OP	PP	QP	RP	SP	TP	UP	VP	WP	XP	YP	ZP	AP	BP	CP	DP	EP	FP	GP	HP	IP	JP	KP	LP	MP
s	NO	OO	PO	QO	RO	SO	TO	UO	VO	WO	XO	YO	ZO	AO	BO	CO	DO	EO	FO	GO	HO	IO	JO	KO	LO	MO
t	NN	ON	PN	QN	RN	SN	TN	UN	VN	WN	XN	YN	ZN	AN	BN	CN	DN	EN	FN	GN	HN	IN	JN	KN	LN	MN
u	NN	ON	PN	QN	RN	SN	TN	UN	VN	WN	XN	YN	ZN	AN	BN	CN	DN	EN	FN	GN	HN	IN	JN	KN	LN	MN
v	NL	OL	PL	QL	RL	SL	TL	UL	VL	WL	XL	YL	ZL	AL	BL	CL	DL	EL	FL	GL	HL	IL	JL	KL	LL	ML
w	NK	OK	PK	QK	RK	SK	TK	UK	VK	WK	XK	YK	ZK	AK	BK	CK	DK	EK	FK	GK	HK	IK	JK	KK	LK	MK
x	NJ	OJ	PJ	QJ	RJ	SJ	TJ	UJ	VJ	WJ	XJ	YJ	ZJ	AJ	BJ	CJ	DJ	EJ	FJ	GJ	HJ	IJ	JJ	KJ	LJ	MJ
y	NI	OI	PI	QI	RI	SI	TI	UI	VI	WI	XI	YI	ZI	AI	BI	CI	DI	EI	FI	GI	HI	II	JI	KI	LI	MI
z	NH	OH	PH	QH	RH	SH	TH	UH	VH	WH	XH	YH	ZH	AH	BH	CH	DH	EH	FH	GH	HH	IH	JH	KH	LH	MH



Polyalphabetical substitution

VNRARPBHPAHWTRVFFXWVRKBQWGMERWCASOA EKQNTOSJASUGSTRVAFEFNQWEMUNRYRVENRENXZRQSGMUVEFPVQCX
GYSYVWLNRPSECYLRVKPMWAXAFXZRMKNZAFMLVRYCVGSIKFSJNXUNWSNXJHLJHRAIJFMLLFGPLMZEKJIDYEKNVWFISEGZ
CVGSIKFSJBJUBQHXXWEWUVIFPISGXZRYFVZWEWAGCGSMDYMFMBKNXUUMUNKGOIXBVWGLAFLWJEKNTJBJWFWGETWEW
GBRDVNCUSGTPWEESEMFLWQIHNVLZIFGSXZELUIENXAPWSAHUBQHXXWEWUVIFPISGXZRIA AHZBZWAYFVZWEWAGCGSX
WPLFBPGTCUVXSGMGARWRHWQISEPQYMXRFWERKGIAAELGIFQIVOIDYTGEXZVKZFGZBSDNTMOPAPLATLKPLGBPGAPGAKA
FPSAHYEEVHELVRVYRSGXZREYRSXGLWFEERCWNVZRVSAOWQJASXZVRLUIORWLVRYUSMFIKPMWAGWGEDRRLFISEGZVRS
GXZREYRSXUISPLARZWQELBTJNRCVRYVRLUIOVDPVEEYSORPDCYLAEEZELUIENXAPEDPSECILVXABRTRVFFXWVRWNVFRHS
OEAAQSGLWZELVGKSVGZRWJCGEOMAMNRVKVXQNRVNTZQMFZELUIENXAPWXESEGLWHRAIJFMLLSXPEDVJGERANFWEOW
YIQJLWEIZRWLHHARHMAHWELWAHJVODRRKGVSPMLNXABRFRIVRHTRVFFXWVRNHRAGIVFXSGIKGLWRBHBVLBJUECHGSYE
EHUCXESEGLWHRAGIVFXSGIKJEKPSFGVGYPWQEKQMAMLVSFFXSEXAAKXESEGLWPSDQASEYFGMDEIUNXWTSJVDSGMGA
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AKAAXZRGSFIVRGDNVWQXZNKBJLJEJRASFTJBXWPXWQWHRIUUYFQIJGLWSMJFXSZIFQQWAXOUMUUGGAXJVF MGIVGSJRK
MYELBVQPLSAKWFVWQYUVRYPSFGVG YWGAIFPVQCXABRTRVFFXWVRONWGEMYVRSYPQEIHEIKRRLRHTLXZRIDRGLESFVGX
ESFGMWEJGHRVNXABRZRPSGIJEIHEIKRRLRHZVQKRPXPVQCXGTVSCLQOIJAWLRMFIKVKFRHLUIKNPKNWLEISZGACLWEMF
NRVFTYZMLGIVVXLBIKG VWNQXBVJRZARASAHHBWKVFDRLNVRNVVVDSGMGALWYELRVHHFDVWZRH LUIUUEUENN VANRL
BJKNPKNMFVRZRTJBTGFIVGLWRPDLTVGUHVN RGMEZWNW SOEKVWXBVHHFDVGCRCCKPLWZIKUIOBVCRHSFXZRPWNHJRW
WNVUUIJBRLUIWQZWEWABRGSIQVWSGLWNPYBVAGLEFQS QILUIAEASLMFGSHBTMYEJFSXGASEIXBVWKEECPWFMFPIOUIFB
TAWWKUMKPSECMDRH OVXZBYLBTWAWKYZRCHBAWEQGFXGSMFLSHRVSGMGAWSAHGCIFOWVCEUXEYRWATRAAKAFFSFI
VBRWQRWNVDLEVRGSQIDNXWEIVJEJQWFBVRRVWUYSKRHENWKFYJIIA YPSAGWOCLUIFNXABRSYWWPYJVXQNKWAGQNR
VEIKREJPLWEWVWUBZWEIVNFSPOVBSJVRLUISTIFPCKQYSYIUQVTTEDTSJVXZZXZRWWRZWAXKEEFIVFYKCMUVSFFSXGL
WRPDLTVGUHVNRTSEEERXWEWHESHBWWQFQAWSNRVFXSAHSEHAMIVOCFVWLZEFLVWFISEGZRVKSISEIVGLSGXZRRKNL
SQGZBWWAGMEZWFZXNXYNZWGLWZEUECHGEFNPQGMUNHNNRLNKWTS GTPWFIDRGLRHUUEUUESYSFTAAGLTRVFFXWVR
KCSDLQWFWSTISHXZRRLVGSGMGAGGQIXBVMFIAAXDFAZVGZVWOVHWYCMFIVSSJVRLRVFRXKRGMEMLLQSACHESLBGGYW
TNWWQS FUMKJSJXWZNZWOIWAEBTLRHTLZSEM GHWKGEFQEJQWGEKSAMRNXABRKNRVNVHWWQMFNZSEM WGCSEHC
PAPELVSFFWMPLSFEHCPWWSKGLWYMFHBCRVFRPGC IFFWZNRVGSJVRKCVAAKTRVFFXWVRLNYYUXSPSM EWWBRZVKZFTW
RHUECHGSYEEHUCZRMFGVGQYURHFRAUNGZRELGEUXWSTEAAWL VQHYIERRLN XABRKBJSRWAAXZRWSZILVQWC IJVSVRS
CVAYFWERKGIAAWKG VWNQUVTZR VKNPKNASFWWYIUGIVNWSZIEOIJBLUIXVRSYTGEXXPABSXGLWRWLEISZTJBNWPXHN V
LBJSRYJBTWNRMAMGAVWFISEGZQMJRGLVZWVRTRVFFXWVRHHFDVWZRHJSWTNZSEMSAXGSXZRSJSFXKL RVESERFSFIVUEK
UJMAGLVSFUIAFSFRSXGLWRHAGSJFSXGLWOSGXTGFXIHEFGYEPVQCXGTVSCLQ



One-Time Pad: Encryption

e=000 h=001 i=010 k=011 l=100 r=101 s=110 t=111

Encryption: Plaintext \oplus Key = Ciphertext

h e i l h i t l e r

Plaintext: 001 000 010 100 001 010 111 100 000 101

Key: 111 101 110 101 111 100 000 101 110 000

Ciphertext: 110 101 100 001 110 110 111 001 110 101

s r l h s s t h s r



One-Time Pad: Decryption

e=000 h=001 i=010 k=011 l=100 r=101 s=110 t=111

Decryption: Ciphertext \oplus Key = Plaintext

	s	r	l	h	s	s	t	h	s	r
Ciphertext:	110	101	100	001	110	110	111	001	110	101
Key:	111	101	110	101	111	100	000	101	110	000
Plaintext:	001	000	010	100	001	010	111	100	000	101
	h	e	i	l	h	i	t	l	e	r



One-Time Pad

Double agent claims sender used following "key"

s r l h s s t h s r

Ciphertext: 110 101 100 001 110 110 111 001 110 101

"key": 101 111 000 101 111 100 000 101 110 000

"Plaintext": 011 010 100 100 001 010 111 100 000 101

k i l l h i t l e r

e=000 h=001 i=010 k=011 l=100 r=101 s=110 t=111



One-Time Pad

Double agent claims sender used following "key"

s r l h s s t h s r

Ciphertext: 110 101 100 001 110 110 111 001 110 101

"key": 101 111 000 101 111 100 000 101 110 000

"Plaintext": 011 010 100 100 001 010 111 100 000 101

k i l l h i t l e r

e=000 h=001 i=010 k=011 l=100 r=101 s=110 t=111

One-Time Pad Summary

- ❑ **Provably** secure...
 - Ciphertext provides **no** info about plaintext
 - All plaintexts are equally likely
- ❑ ...but, only when used correctly
 - Pad must be random, used only once
 - Pad is known only to sender and receiver
- ❑ Note: pad (key) is same size as message



Real-World One-Time Pad

❑ Project VENONA

- Encrypted spy messages from U.S. to Moscow in 30's, 40's, and 50's
- Nuclear espionage, etc.
- Thousands of messages

❑ Spy carried one-time pad into U.S.

❑ Spy used pad to encrypt secret messages

❑ Repeats within the “one-time” pads made cryptanalysis possible




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- Import controls
- Export controls
- Domestic Controls
- Wassenaar Arrangement
- Overview Bert Jaap Koops:


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