




Jaap van Ginkel



Security of Systems and Networks

10 October 2024, Biometrics

Would you use Biometrics

Biometrics



Something You Are

- Biometric
 - “**You are your key**” — Schneier
- Examples
 - Fingerprint
 - Handwritten signature
 - Facial recognition
 - Speech recognition
 - Gait (walking) recognition
 - “Digital doggie” (odor recognition)
 - Many more!



Biometrics in Movies

Why Biometrics?

- Biometrics seen as desirable replacement for passwords
 - Cheap and reliable biometrics needed
 - Today, a very active area of research
- Biometrics are used in security today
 - Thumbprint mouse
 - Palm print for secure entry
 - Fingerprint to unlock car door, etc.
 - Face-ID on phone



The Register
Biting the hand that feeds IT

Business ► Policy

Carjackers swipe biometric Merc, plus owner's finger


Sometimes you might not want such great security...

23,136 views | May 23, 2017, 11:14am

Samsung Galaxy S8 Iris Scanner Hacked In Three Simple Steps



Ian Morris Contributor ⓘ



WIRED

SUBSCRIBE

ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY 11.14.17 07:00 AM

WATCH A 10-YEAR-OLD'S FACE UNLOCK HIS MOM'S IPHONE X



Developments in face biometrics



Motive: General limited understanding of the processing of facial images by man and machine.

Goal: Improve the understanding of factors influencing the (im)possibilities of facial recognition and facial comparison by man and machine.

Content: Overview of different applications of face biometrics by man and machine depending on operational setting.



Biometric recognition:

“**Automated recognition of individuals** based on their biological and behavioral characteristics”

Biometric recognition encompasses **biometric verification** and **biometric identification**.

Biometric recognition allows to distinguish human beings and to recognize them to a certain degree depending on the:

Modality


Application

Quality of the data

ISO, – Information technology — Vocabulary — Part 37: Biometrics, 2012, ISO/IEC: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012(E).



Definitions as used in this presentation:



List of candidates

Facial recognition (1:N):


Man: Do I remember this person (as being person X)?

Machine: Biometric identification. Is a picture, similar to the picture of person X, in my database?

Facial comparison (1:1):

Man: Do these images depict the same person?

Machine: Biometric verification. Are these face images similar (to a pre-defined level)?





Facial comparison: man and machine

Machine:

- + Objective? Depending on training set!
- + Reproducible on conditioned material
- Poor performance in unconditioned circumstances
- Highly dependent on lighting, pose and position, facial expression, etc



Man:

- + Great (?) pattern recognition system
- Reproducibility/performance mostly unknown
- Bias/subjective



Challenge: inter-person comparable (look-alikes)



<http://multiples.about.com>



<http://www.nypost.com>




<http://www.tujefetevigila.com>





Challenge: intra-person variation





Case material: Unconditioned images





Confounding factors: subject


- Pose
- Occlusion
- Expression
- Ageing
- Weight change
- Makeup
- Hair
- Jewelry
- Clothing
-





Confounding factors: imaging

- Camera position
- Lighting
- Distortion
 - Distance
 - Lens
- Dynamic range
- Sharpness
- Resolution
- Compression
- Noise
- Artifacts
-





Central questions security and safety

Is this the person we are looking for?
Is this the person he/she says to be?

Challenges:


1. Controlled/un controlled environment
2. Distortion image, fingerprint, speech,
3. Modalities
4. Level of proof
5. Person & identity





Face Biometrics applications:



1) Intelligence Gathering for Identity Management



2) Screening and Access Control




3) Investigative and Operational Tool



List of candidates

4) Forensic Biometrics: Evidence



Ideal Biometric

- **Universal** — applies to (almost) everyone
 - In reality, no biometric applies to everyone
- **Distinguishing** — distinguish with certainty
 - In reality, cannot hope for 100% certainty
- **Permanent** — physical characteristic being measured never changes
 - In reality, want it to remain valid for a long time
- **Collectable** — easy to collect required data
 - Depends on whether subjects are cooperative
- Safe, easy to use, etc., etc.

Biometric Modes

- **Identification** — Who goes there?
 - Compare one to many
 - Example: The FBI fingerprint database
- **Authentication** — Is that really you?
 - Compare one to one
 - Example: Thumbprint mouse
- Identification problem more difficult
 - More “random” matches since more comparisons
- We are interested in authentication

Enrollment vs Recognition

- Enrollment phase
 - Subject's biometric info put into database
 - Must carefully measure the required info
 - OK if slow and repeated measurement needed
 - Must be very precise for good recognition
 - A weak point of many biometric schemes
- Recognition phase
 - Biometric detection when used in practice
 - Must be quick and simple
 - But must be reasonably accurate

Cooperative Subjects

- We are assuming cooperative subjects
- In identification problem often have uncooperative subjects
- For example, facial recognition
 - Proposed for use in Las Vegas casinos to detect known cheaters
 - Also as way to detect terrorists in airports, etc.
 - Probably do not have ideal enrollment conditions
 - Subject will try to confuse recognition phase
- Cooperative subject makes it much easier!
 - In authentication, subjects are cooperative

Biometric Errors

- **Fraud rate** versus **insult rate**
 - Fraud — user A mis-authenticated as user B
 - Insult — user A not authenticate as user A
- For any biometric, can decrease fraud or insult, but other will increase
- For example
 - 99% voiceprint match \Rightarrow low fraud, high insult
 - 30% voiceprint match \Rightarrow high fraud, low insult
- **Equal error rate:** rate where fraud == insult
 - The best measure for comparing biometrics

guten Tag, mein Name ist
Dr. von der Leyen



ΘICΘ
S 1 SD
ΘICΘ
a new dawn



ΘICΘ

Fingerprint History

- 1823 — Professor Johannes Evangelist Purkinje discussed 9 fingerprint patterns
- 1856 — Sir William Hershel used fingerprint (in India) on contracts
- 1880 — Dr. Henry Faulds article in *Nature* about fingerprints for ID
- 1883 — Mark Twain's *Life on the Mississippi* a murderer ID'ed by fingerprint

Fingerprint History

- 1888 — Sir Francis Galton (cousin of Darwin) developed classification system
 - His system of “minutia” is still in use today
 - Also verified that fingerprints do not change
- Some countries require a number of points (i.e., minutia) to match in criminal cases
 - In Britain, 15 points
 - In US, no fixed number of points required

Fingerprint Comparison

- Examples of loops, whorls and arches
- Minutia extracted from these features



Loop (double)



Whorl




Arch

Fingerprint Biometric



- Capture image of fingerprint
- Enhance image
- Identify minutia

Fingerprint Biometric



- Extracted minutia are compared with user's minutia stored in a database
- Is it a statistical match?

Hand Geometry




- Popular form of biometric
- Measures shape of hand
 - Width of hand, fingers
 - Length of fingers, etc.
- Human hands not unique
- Hand geometry sufficient for many situations
- Suitable for authentication
- Not useful for ID problem



Hand Geometry

- Advantages
 - Quick
 - 1 minute for enrollment
 - 5 seconds for recognition
 - Hands symmetric (use other hand backwards)
- Disadvantages
 - Cannot use on very young or very old
 - Relatively high equal error rate

Iris Patterns








- Iris pattern development is “chaotic”
- Little or no genetic influence
- Different even for identical twins
- Pattern is stable through lifetime

Iris Recognition: History

- 1936 — suggested by Frank Burch
- 1980s — James Bond films
- 1986 — first patent appeared
- 1994 — John Daugman patented best current approach
 - Patent owned by Iridian Technologies

Iris Scan

- Scanner locates iris
- Take b/w photo
- Use polar coordinates...
- Find 2-D wavelet trans
- Get 256 byte iris code



Measuring Iris Similarity

- Based on Hamming distance
- Define $d(x,y)$ to be
 - # of non-match bits / # of bits compared
 - $d(0010,0101) = 3/4$ and $d(101111,101001) = 1/3$
- Compute $d(x,y)$ on 2048-bit iris code
 - Perfect match is $d(x,y) = 0$
 - For same iris, expected distance is 0.08
 - At random, expect distance of 0.50
 - Accept iris scan as match if distance < 0.32


Iris Scan Error Rate

distance Fraud rate

0.29	1 in 1.3×10^{10}
0.30	1 in 1.5×10^9
0.31	1 in 1.8×10^8
0.32	1 in 2.6×10^7
0.33	1 in 4.0×10^6
0.34	1 in 6.9×10^5
0.35	1 in 1.3×10^5



 : equal error rate



ROC Curve

receiver operating characteristic

Attack on Iris Scan

- Good **photo** of eye can be scanned
- And attacker can use photo of eye
- Afghan woman was authenticated by iris scan of old photo
- Story is [here](#)
- To prevent photo attack, scanner could use light to be sure it is a “live” iris




Photo credit: National Geographic Explorer on MSNBC

Equal Error Rate Comparison

- Equal error rate (EER): fraud == insult rate
- **Fingerprint** biometric has EER of about 5%
- **Hand geometry** has EER of about 10^{-3}
- In theory, **iris scan** has EER of about 10^{-6}
 - But in practice, hard to achieve
 - Enrollment phase must be extremely accurate
- Most biometrics much worse than fingerprint!
- Biometrics useful for authentication...
- But ID biometrics are almost useless today

Biometrics: The Bottom Line

- Biometrics are hard to forge
- But attacker could
 - Steal Alice's thumb
 - Photocopy Bob's fingerprint, eye, etc.
 - Subvert software, database, "trusted path", ...
- Also, how to revoke a "broken" biometric?
- **Biometrics are not foolproof!**
- Biometric use is limited today
- That should change in the future...



~28 BITS OF ENTROPY

$2^{28} = 3 \text{ DAYS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$


(PLAUSIBLE ATTACK ON A WEAK REMOTE WEB SERVICE. YES, CRACKING A STOLEN HASH IS FASTER, BUT IT'S NOT WHAT THE AVERAGE USER SHOULD WORRY ABOUT.)

DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: EASY

WAS IT TROMBONE? NO, TROUBADOR. AND ONE OF THE 0s WAS A ZERO?

AND THERE WAS SOME SYMBOL...

DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: HARD



~44 BITS OF ENTROPY

$2^{44} = 550 \text{ YEARS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$

DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: HARD

THAT'S A BATTERY STAPLE.

CORRECT!

DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: YOU'VE ALREADY MEMORIZED IT

THROUGH 20 YEARS OF EFFORT, WE'VE SUCCESSFULLY TRAINED EVERYONE TO USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS.

Mind effectiveness

