

HW 1 - Cybersecurity

PicoCTF

Mind your Ps and Qs (Kris Mendoza)

```
c= 1 #el c asignado por la platadorma

n= 2 #el n asignado por la platadorma


e= 65537

#%pip install factordb-pycli
from factordb.factordb import FactorDB
def dechypherRSA(c, n, e):
    f = FactorDB(n)
    f.connect()
    coprimes=f.get_factor_list()
    p=coprimes[0]
    q=coprimes[1]
    #Now we can calculate the totient
    phi = (p-1)*(q-1)
    print("totient: ",phi)
    # now we can calculate the private key
    # if  $e \cdot d = 1 \pmod{\phi}$ 
    # then  $d = e^{-1} \pmod{\phi}$ 
    d= pow(e, -1, phi)
    print("private key: ",d)
    #Now we can decrypt the message
    m = pow(c,d,n)
    print("message decrypted:",m)
    #Convert the message to hex
    m_hex = hex(m)
    print("hex message:" ,m_hex)
    #Convert the message to ascii
    m_ascii = bytearray.fromhex(m_hex[2:]).decode()
```

```
print("message to ascii: ",m_ascii)
dechypherRSA(c,n,e)
```

The Numbers (Todos)

The challenge gave an image with numbers, all numbers mapped to letters on the alphabeth. no code needed



The answer was PICOCTF{THENUMBERSMASON} (a reference to COD Black Ops)

No Padding, No Problem (Stefano Ulloa)

"Oracles can be your best friend, they will decrypt anything, except the flag's ciphertext. How will you break it?" (Profe dijo que el deber era para el viernes y el viernes ya estaba cerrado todos los del picoCTF, por suerte solo me faltaba este pero lo hice despues del cierre)

```
n = #nof the problem
e = 65537
c = #c of the problem
m2 = 2 # any integer
x = pow(m2, e, n) # encrypt(m2) = m2^e % n
```

```

# encrypt(m1) * encrypt(m2) = encrypt(m1 * m2)
C = c * x

print(f"Decrypt in the oracle: {C} ")
# decrypt C using oracle since we dont know d to do it manual
P = int(input('Decrypted C: '))

# P / m2 = m
m = P // m2
m = bytearray.fromhex(format(m, 'x')).decode() #hex to ascii
print('*'*60)
print(f'm = {m}')

```

Easy 1 (Emilia Saenz)

"The one time pad can be cryptographically secure, but not when you know the key. Can you solve this? We've given you the encrypted flag, key, and a table to help

`UFJKXQZQUNB` with the key of `SOLVECRYPTO` "

VIGENERE CIPHER
Cryptography · Poly-Alphabetic Cipher · Vigenere Cipher

VIGENERE DECODER

★ VIGENERE CIPHERTEXT (?)
UFJKXQZQUNB

PARAMETERS

★ PLAINTEXT LANGUAGE: English
★ ALPHABET: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ

► AUTOMATIC DECRYPTION

DECRYPTION METHOD

☒ KNOWING THE KEY/PASSWORD: SOLVECRYPTO
☐ KNOWING THE KEY-LENGTH/SIZE, NUMBER OF LETTERS: 10
☐ KNOWING ONLY A PARTIAL KEY: KE?
☐ KNOWING A PLAINTEXT WORD: CODE
☐ VIGENERE CRYPTANALYSIS (KASISKI'S TEST)

► DECRYPT

See also: Beaufort Cipher – Caesar Cipher

VIGENERE ENCODER

★ VIGENERE PLAIN TEXT (?)
dCode Vigenere automatically

★ CIPHER KEY: KEY
★ ALPHABET: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
★ PRESERVE PUNCTUATION: ☒

► ENCRYPT

See also: Beaufort Cipher – Autoclave Cipher – Caesar Cipher

Summary

- ★ Vigenere Decoder
- ★ Vigenere Encoder
- ★ What is the Vigenere cipher? (Definition)
- ★ How to encrypt using Vigenere cipher?
- ★ How to decrypt Vigenere cipher?
- ★ How to recognize Vigenere ciphertext?
- ★ How to decipher Vigenere without knowing the key?
- ★ How to find the key when having both cipher and plaintext?
- ★ What are the variants of the Vigenere cipher?
- ★ How to choose the encryption key?
- ★ What is the running key vigenere cipher?
- ★ What is the keyed vigenere cipher?
- ★ What is a Saint-Cyr slide?
- ★ Why the name Vigenere?
- ★ What are the advantages of the Vigenere cipher versus Caesar Cipher?
- ★ When Vigenere was invented?

Similar pages

- ★ Beaufort Cipher

It was a Vigenere cipher. the key was the same for everyone -

picoCTF{CRYPTOISFUN}

Pixelated

The problem gave you two images that look like noise, if you took the element-wise XOR operation (and change white to black) you get a second image with a code



```
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""PicoCTF Pixelated

Automatically generated by Colaboratory.

Original file is located at
    https://colab.research.google.com/drive/10B8k0PwD2x_ux0z-
"""

from PIL import Image
import numpy as np

image1_path = '/content/scrambled1.png'
image2_path = '/content/scrambled2.png'
image1 = Image.open(image1_path)
image2 = Image.open(image2_path)

image1_array = np.array(image1)
image2_array = np.array(image2)

# Perform an element-wise XOR operation between the two image
result_array_xor = np.bitwise_xor(image1_array, image2_array)

# Change pure white (255, 255, 255) to black (0, 0, 0)
# Pure white in an 8-bit image would be where all color channels
```

```

white_pixels = np.all(result_array_xor == [255, 255, 255], ax
result_array_xor[white_pixels] = [0, 0, 0]

result_image_xor = Image.fromarray(result_array_xor)
result_image_xor_path = '/content/result_image_xor.png'
result_image_xor.save(result_image_xor_path)

result_image_xor_path

```

Information security HW

Exercise 1

Let n be a positive integer. A Latin square of order n is an $n \times n$ array L of the integers $1, \dots, n$ such that every one of the n integers occurs exactly once in each row and each column of L . An example of a Latin square of order 3 is as follows:

	C1	C2	C3
R1	1	2	3
R2	3	1	2
R3	2	3	1

Given any Latin square L of order n , we can define a related Latin Square Cryptosystem. Let the sets $P = C = K = 1, \dots, n$, be the sets representing the space for the plaintext, ciphertext and keys. For $1 \leq i \leq n$, the encryption rule e_i is defined to be $e_i(j) = L(i, j)$. Here, i would be the key, j the plaintext, and $e_i(j)$ the ciphertext.

Give a complete proof that this Latin Square Cryptosystem achieves perfect secrecy provided that every key is used with equal probability.

Perfect secrecy is formally defined by the condition that the probability distribution of the plaintext is independent of the ciphertext, which can be written as:

$$P(P = p | C = c) = P(P = p)$$

Here, P represents plaintext, C represents ciphertext, p is a specific plaintext, and c is a specific ciphertext.

To have perfect secrecy, every possible ciphertext must be equally likely for a given plaintext, no matter what the plaintext is. In other words, for a given plaintext, the key should not make some ciphertexts more likely than others.

In a Latin Square, if we pick any plaintext (a column), and any ciphertext (a value in that column), there is exactly one key (a row) that will result in that ciphertext for that plaintext. No matter which plaintext you start with, there is

exactly one key for each possible ciphertext. Since the key space is the same size as the plaintext space, and each key is used with equal probability, the ciphertext does not favor any particular plaintext.

Therefore, the probability that any plaintext pp will encrypt to any given ciphertext cc is $1/n$, assuming a uniform distribution of keys. This is the same as the probability of choosing any plaintext without seeing the ciphertext, which is also $1/n$ (since there are n plaintexts). Thus, the ciphertext gives no additional information about the plaintext, and the system has perfect secrecy.

Exercise 2

Consider a cryptosystem in which the sets representing the plaintext, ciphertext and keys are: $P = a, b, c$, $K = K1, K2, K3$ and $C = 1, 2, 3, 4$. Suppose the encryption matrix is as follows:

	a	b	c
K1	1	2	3
K2	2	3	4
K3	3	4	1

Given that keys are chosen equiprobably, and the plaintext probability distribution is $Pr[a] = 1/2$, $Pr[b] = 1/3$, $Pr[c] = 1/6$, compute $H(P)$, $H(C)$, $H(K)$, $H(K|C)$, and $H(P|C)$.

$$H(X) = - \sum_i^n P(x_i) \log_2 P(x_i)$$

$$H(P) = -\left(\frac{1}{2}\log_2\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3}\log_2\frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{6}\log_2\frac{1}{6}\right)$$

$$H(K) = -\left(\frac{1}{3}\log_2\frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{3}\log_2\frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{3}\log_2\frac{1}{3}\right)$$

```
import math

# Given probabilities
P_a = 1/2
P_b = 1/3
P_c = 1/6

# Since keys are chosen equiprobably, probability of each key
P_k = 1/3

# Entropy of the plaintext P
```



```

H_P = -(P_a * math.log2(P_a) + P_b * math.log2(P_b) + P_c * m

# Entropy of the keys K (since all are equiprobable, it's a s
H_K = -3 * (P_k * math.log2(P_k))

# For H(C), we need to compute the probability distribution o
# Given the encryption matrix, each plaintext encrypts to one
# We'll compute the probabilities based on the provided encry
# Since each key is equally likely, we can find the probabili
# keys for a given plaintext and summing the probabilities.

# For a 3x3 matrix, we have 3 ciphertext outcomes for each pl
# Each plaintext letter 'a', 'b', 'c' can result in one of 3
# The probabilities of the ciphertexts will be the sum of the
P_ciphertexts = {
    # Ciphertext 1 can come from plaintext a with key K1, b w
    1: P_a * (1/3) + P_b * (1/3) + P_c * (1/3),
    # Ciphertext 2 can come from plaintext a with key K2, b w
    2: P_a * (1/3) + P_b * (1/3) + P_c * (1/3),
    3: P_a * (1/3) + P_b * (1/3) + P_c * (1/3),
    4: P_a * (1/3)
}

# Now we compute H(C) using the probabilities of the cipher
H_C = -sum(P_ciphertexts[c] * math.log2(P_ciphertexts[c]) for

# For H(K|C) and H(P|C), we need to consider the probability
# However, since the keys are chosen equiprobably and the enc
# knowing the ciphertext determines the key and the plaintext
# Therefore, H(K|C) and H(P|C) should be 0 because if you know

H_K_given_C = 0
H_P_given_C = 0

H_P, H_K, H_C, H_K_given_C, H_P_given_C

```

This gives us the following output:

Entropy Measure	Value (bits)
-----------------	--------------

Entropy of the plaintext ($H(P)$)	1.459
Entropy of the keys ($H(K)$)	1.585
Entropy of the ciphertext ($H(C)$)	2.016
Conditional entropy of key given ciphertext ($H(K C)$)	0 bits (since knowing the ciphertext, the plaintext is determined)
Conditional entropy of plaintext given ciphertext ($H(P C)$)	0 bits (since knowing the ciphertext, the plaintext is determined)

Exercise 3

Compute $H(K|C)$ and $H(K|P, C)$ for the Affine Cipher, assuming that keys are used equiprobably and the plaintexts are equiprobable.

$$E(x) = (ax + b) \mod m$$

$$H(K | C) = H(K, C) - H(C)$$

$$H(K | P, C) = H(K, P, C) - H(P, C)$$

```

m = 26
phi_m = 12
num_keys = phi_m * m

# Probability of each key is 1/num_keys (since keys are equiprobable)
P_key = 1 / num_keys

# Entropy of the key space H(K)
H_K = -num_keys * (P_key * math.log2(P_key))

# Since the Affine Cipher is a bijective mapping for a given key
# as the plaintext space. Hence, the entropy of the ciphertext is equal to the entropy of the plaintext
# Since we're assuming plaintexts are equiprobable and there are m possible plaintexts
P_plaintext = 1 / m
H_P = -m * (P_plaintext * math.log2(P_plaintext))

# Given H(K), we can now calculate H(K|C) using the assumption that H(K|C) = H(K) - H(C)
# Since the ciphertext is a deterministic function of the plaintext and key
# Therefore, H(K|C) = H(K) - H(C)

```

```
# However, since plaintexts are equiprobable and the Affine C
# the ciphertext space will have the same number of possibili
# As a result,  $H(K|C)$  is the same as  $H(K)$  since knowing the c
```

```
H_K_given_C = H_K
```

```
H_K_given_P_C = 0 # As previously explained
```

```
H_K, H_K_given_C, H_K_given_P_C
```

- Entropy of the key space $H(K)$: approximately 8.285 bits
- Conditional entropy of the key given the ciphertext $H(K|C)$: approximately 8.285 bits
- Conditional entropy of the key given both plaintext and ciphertext $H(K|P,C)$: 0 bits

The conditional entropy $H(K|C)$ is equivalent to the entropy of the key space because knowing the ciphertext does not reduce the uncertainty of the key without additional information. The conditional entropy $H(K|P,C)$ is 0 because if both the plaintext and ciphertext are known, the key can be determined deterministically.

Exercise 4

Show that the unicity distance of the Hill Cipher (with an $m \times m$ encryption matrix) is less than $\frac{m}{R_L}$. (Note that the number of alphabetic characters in a plaintext of this length is $\frac{m^2}{R_L}$.)

The unicity distance of a cipher is the amount of plaintext required to ensure that the ciphertext can be decrypted uniquely, regardless of the key that is used. It is based on the redundancy of the language used in the plaintext.

The unicity distance U can be calculated as the point where the amount of plaintext P makes the number of possible keys that can produce that plaintext equal to the number of possible plaintexts of the same length. Mathematically, this is when:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{R}^{m^2} &= \mathbb{R}^{UP} \\ \mathbb{R}^{m^2} &= \mathbb{R}^{\frac{m^2}{R_L} U} \\ m^2 &= \frac{m^2}{R_L} \cdot U \\ U &= R_L \end{aligned}$$

QED. the unicity distance of the Hill Cipher is equal to the redundancy of the language, R_L , which is less than the total number of characters in the alphabet R