

# **The Complete Treatise on Warfare Economics: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of Conflict and Resource Allocation**

Soumadeep Ghosh

Kolkata, India

## **Abstract**

This treatise examines the complex economic dimensions of warfare through integrated analysis of resource allocation, strategic decision-making, and macroeconomic impacts. The study synthesizes classical economic theory with modern conflict analysis, addressing production functions of military capability, cost-benefit frameworks for strategic decisions, and the broader economic consequences of armed conflict. Key findings demonstrate that warfare economics operates under unique constraints that challenge traditional economic assumptions, requiring specialized models that account for uncertainty, asymmetric information, and non-market valuations of strategic objectives.

The treatise ends with "The End"

## **1 Introduction**

The economics of warfare represents one of the most complex applications of resource allocation theory, where traditional market mechanisms intersect with strategic imperatives under conditions of extreme uncertainty. This treatise examines warfare through the lens of economic analysis, integrating insights from microeconomic theory, macroeconomic modeling, game theory, and strategic studies to develop a comprehensive framework for understanding how nations allocate resources for military purposes and the broader economic implications of these decisions.

The fundamental premise underlying warfare economics is that military conflict, despite its unique characteristics, remains subject to economic constraints and optimization principles. Nations must make strategic choices about resource allocation under conditions of scarcity, uncertainty, and competitive pressure. These decisions involve complex trade-offs between current consumption and future security, between offensive and defensive capabilities, and between military investment and civilian economic development.

The analytical framework developed in this treatise draws upon multiple theoretical traditions. From microeconomic theory, we employ concepts of production functions, cost minimization, and efficiency analysis to examine how military resources are transformed into strategic capabilities. Macroeconomic perspectives inform our analysis of how military spending affects aggregate demand, fiscal policy, and long-term economic growth. Game-theoretic models provide insight into strategic interactions between adversaries, while historical analysis offers empirical validation of theoretical predictions.

## **2 Theoretical Foundations**

### **2.1 Production Functions in Military Economics**

The production of military capability can be modeled using modified Cobb-Douglas production functions that account for the unique characteristics of defense production. The basic military

production function takes the form:

$$M = A \cdot K^\alpha \cdot L^\beta \cdot T^\gamma \quad (1)$$

where  $M$  represents military capability,  $K$  denotes capital inputs (equipment, infrastructure),  $L$  represents labor inputs (personnel),  $T$  captures technological factors, and  $A$  represents total factor productivity in military production.

The parameters  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , and  $\gamma$  reflect the elasticities of military capability with respect to each input category. Unlike civilian production, military production functions exhibit several distinctive characteristics. First, they demonstrate significant economies of scale in certain domains, particularly in research and development, logistics, and command systems. Second, they show complementarity effects between different input categories that exceed those typically observed in civilian production.




Figure 1: Military Capability Production Functions Under Different Technological Regimes

The technological parameter  $T$  deserves particular attention in military contexts due to the rapid pace of innovation in defense technologies and the winner-take-all nature of many military competitions. Technological superiority can provide decisive advantages that cannot be compensated through increases in traditional inputs, leading to discontinuous production functions where small technological advantages translate into disproportionate capability improvements.

## 2.2 Cost Structures and Optimization

Military cost structures differ fundamentally from civilian production costs due to several factors: the indivisibility of many military assets, the requirement for redundancy and resilience, and the need to maintain capabilities across extended periods of non-use. The total cost function for military capability can be expressed as:

$$C(M) = F + V(M) + R(M) + U(M) \quad (2)$$

where  $F$  represents fixed costs (infrastructure, command systems),  $V(M)$  denotes variable costs that scale with capability level,  $R(M)$  captures redundancy costs required for operational reliability, and  $U(M)$  represents uncertainty costs arising from the need to prepare for unknown future contingencies.

The optimization problem facing military planners involves minimizing costs subject to capability constraints:

$$\min_{K,L,T} w_K K + w_L L + w_T T \quad (3)$$

$$\text{s.t. } A \cdot K^\alpha \cdot L^\beta \cdot T^\gamma \geq M^* \quad (4)$$

where  $w_K$ ,  $w_L$ , and  $w_T$  represent the prices of capital, labor, and technology inputs, respectively, and  $M^*$  denotes the required minimum capability level.

### 3 Strategic Resource Allocation

#### 3.1 Portfolio Theory Applied to Military Assets

Military force structure decisions can be analyzed using portfolio theory adapted for strategic applications. Unlike financial portfolios, military asset portfolios must account for complementarity effects, operational constraints, and the discrete nature of many military capabilities. The optimal military portfolio balances effectiveness across multiple scenarios while managing resource constraints.

The expected utility of a military portfolio can be expressed as:

$$EU = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i U(M_i) \quad (5)$$

where  $p_i$  represents the probability of scenario  $i$ , and  $U(M_i)$  denotes the utility derived from military capability  $M_i$  in that scenario. The portfolio optimization problem becomes:

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^n p_i U(M_i) \quad (6)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \sum_{j=1}^m c_j x_j \leq B \quad (7)$$

$$M_i = f_i(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m) \quad (8)$$

where  $x_j$  represents the quantity of military asset type  $j$ ,  $c_j$  denotes its cost,  $B$  represents the budget constraint, and  $f_i$  captures how different asset combinations contribute to capability in scenario  $i$ .

#### 3.2 Dynamic Programming in Military Planning

Military planning inherently involves sequential decision-making under uncertainty, making dynamic programming particularly relevant for strategic resource allocation. The Bellman equation for military investment decisions takes the form:

$$V(S_t) = \max_{a_t} [R(S_t, a_t) + \beta \mathbb{E}[V(S_{t+1}) | S_t, a_t]] \quad (9)$$

where  $V(S_t)$  represents the value function at state  $S_t$ ,  $a_t$  denotes the action (resource allocation decision) at time  $t$ ,  $R(S_t, a_t)$  captures immediate returns, and  $\beta$  represents the discount factor.

The state space  $S_t$  includes current military capabilities, threat assessments, budget constraints, and technological possibilities. Actions  $a_t$  encompass investment decisions across different military domains, research and development allocations, and force structure modifications.

## 4 Game-Theoretic Analysis of Military Competition

### 4.1 Arms Race Dynamics

Military competition between nations can be modeled as a dynamic game where each player's optimal strategy depends on the actions of competitors. The Richardson model provides a foundation for understanding arms race dynamics:

$$\dot{X} = aY - bX + c \quad (10)$$

$$\dot{Y} = dX - eY + f \quad (11)$$

where  $X$  and  $Y$  represent the military expenditures of two competing nations,  $a$  and  $d$  capture reaction coefficients,  $b$  and  $e$  represent fatigue or budget constraint parameters, and  $c$  and  $f$  denote autonomous expenditure levels.

The equilibrium of this system occurs when  $\dot{X} = \dot{Y} = 0$ , yielding:

$$X^* = \frac{aef + bc}{be - ad} \quad (12)$$

$$Y^* = \frac{dec + bf}{be - ad} \quad (13)$$

provided that  $be > ad$  for stability. The stability condition requires that the product of fatigue parameters exceeds the product of reaction parameters, indicating that budget constraints dominate competitive pressures in equilibrium.

### 4.2 Strategic Deterrence Models

Deterrence represents a fundamental concept in warfare economics where the threat of retaliation influences adversary behavior. The credibility of deterrent threats depends on both capability and resolve, creating complex signaling games between potential adversaries.

Consider a two-stage game where Player 1 (potential aggressor) first decides whether to challenge the status quo, and Player 2 (defender) subsequently chooses whether to resist. The payoff structure creates a commitment problem where Player 2's optimal response after a challenge may differ from its ex-ante optimal strategy.

Let  $c_1$  represent Player 1's cost of challenging,  $c_2$  denote Player 2's cost of resistance,  $B$  capture the benefit to Player 1 from successful challenge, and  $L$  represent Player 2's loss from unsuccessful resistance. The subgame perfect equilibrium depends on the relative magnitudes of these parameters.




Figure 2: Deterrence Game Tree Structure

## 5 Macroeconomic Impacts of Military Spending

### 5.1 Multiplier Effects and Crowding Out

Military expenditure affects aggregate economic activity through multiple channels. The military spending multiplier can be expressed using the standard Keynesian framework:

$$\frac{dY}{dG_m} = \frac{1}{1 - c(1 - t) + m} \quad (14)$$

where  $Y$  represents aggregate output,  $G_m$  denotes military spending,  $c$  captures the marginal propensity to consume,  $t$  represents the tax rate, and  $m$  denotes the marginal propensity to import.

However, military spending multipliers differ from civilian spending multipliers due to several factors. Military procurement often involves specialized suppliers with limited civilian applications, potentially reducing the scope for multiplier effects. Additionally, military spending may crowd out private investment if it competes for the same resources or if increased government borrowing raises interest rates.

The net effect of military spending on economic growth depends on the relative magnitudes of demand stimulus, resource crowding out, and productivity effects. Empirical studies suggest that military spending multipliers are typically smaller than civilian spending multipliers, particularly in peacetime conditions where military procurement has limited spillover effects to civilian production.

### 5.2 Innovation and Technology Transfer

Military research and development generates technological spillovers that can enhance civilian productivity growth. The innovation production function for military R&D can be modeled as:

$$I = \alpha R_m^\beta \cdot S^\gamma \quad (15)$$

where  $I$  represents innovation output,  $R_m$  denotes military R&D spending,  $S$  captures spillover effects from civilian research, and  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma$  are parameters determining the productivity of innovation inputs.

The rate of technology transfer from military to civilian applications depends on the technological distance between military and civilian domains, the presence of institutional mechanisms for knowledge transfer, and market incentives for commercialization. Historical analysis suggests that military innovation has been particularly important in areas such as computing, communications, materials science, and logistics.

## 6 Resource Constraints and Allocation Efficiency

### 6.1 Budget Constraints and Opportunity Costs

Military spending operates under absolute budget constraints that create opportunity costs in terms of foregone civilian consumption and investment. The social welfare function must balance security benefits against economic costs:

$$W = U(C, S) = \alpha \ln(C) + (1 - \alpha) \ln(S) \quad (16)$$

where  $W$  represents social welfare,  $C$  denotes civilian consumption,  $S$  represents security level, and  $\alpha$  captures the relative weight placed on consumption versus security.

The budget constraint takes the form:

$$C + G_m = Y \quad (17)$$

where  $Y$  represents total output and  $G_m$  denotes military spending. Security is produced according to:

$$S = f(G_m, T, E) \quad (18)$$

where  $T$  represents threats and  $E$  captures external security contributions (alliances, international cooperation).

The optimal allocation balances marginal utilities:

$$\frac{\alpha}{C} = \frac{(1 - \alpha)}{S} \cdot \frac{\partial S}{\partial G_m} \quad (19)$$

This condition states that the marginal utility of consumption should equal the marginal security benefit of military spending weighted by relative preferences.

## 6.2 Efficiency in Military Procurement

Military procurement faces unique efficiency challenges due to monopsony power, technological uncertainty, and the absence of competitive markets for many defense goods. The procurement problem can be modeled as a principal-agent relationship where the government (principal) contracts with defense suppliers (agents) under conditions of asymmetric information.

The optimal contract design must balance efficiency incentives with risk allocation. Using mechanism design theory, the optimal procurement contract takes the form:

$$t(c) = \alpha + \beta c \quad (20)$$

where  $t(c)$  represents the payment to the contractor as a function of reported costs  $c$ ,  $\alpha$  denotes a fixed payment component, and  $\beta$  captures the cost-sharing parameter.

The optimal cost-sharing parameter balances efficiency incentives against risk premiums:

$$\beta^* = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{r\sigma^2}{f''(e^*)}} \quad (21)$$

where  $r$  represents the contractor's risk aversion,  $\sigma^2$  denotes cost uncertainty, and  $f''(e^*)$  captures the curvature of the effort cost function.

## 7 Economic Warfare and Financial Strategy

### 7.1 Economic Sanctions and Trade Warfare

Economic warfare represents an alternative to military conflict that operates through market mechanisms and financial pressure. The effectiveness of economic sanctions depends on trade dependencies, substitution possibilities, and coordination among sanctioning nations.

The welfare loss from sanctions can be modeled using trade theory. For a small open economy facing export restrictions, the welfare loss is:

$$\Delta W = -\frac{1}{2}\eta \left(\frac{\Delta p}{p}\right)^2 pq \quad (22)$$

where  $\eta$  represents the price elasticity of demand,  $\Delta p$  denotes the price change, and  $pq$  captures the initial value of affected trade.

Comprehensive sanctions create more complex effects through input disruptions, technology transfer restrictions, and financial market access limitations. The total economic impact depends on the target economy's resilience, diversification, and ability to develop alternative relationships.

## 7.2 Financial Warfare Mechanisms

Modern financial systems create new domains for economic conflict through currency manipulation, payment system restrictions, and capital flow controls. The weaponization of financial infrastructure represents a growing dimension of international competition.

Currency warfare can be modeled through exchange rate impacts on trade competitiveness. A deliberate currency devaluation affects the terms of trade according to:

$$\frac{d(ToT)}{de} = \frac{X_e - M_e}{X + M} \quad (23)$$

where  $ToT$  represents terms of trade,  $e$  denotes the exchange rate,  $X_e$  and  $M_e$  capture export and import elasticities, and  $X$  and  $M$  represent export and import volumes.

The strategic use of financial sanctions operates through network effects in the international financial system. The impact on target nations depends on their integration into the sanctioning nation's financial networks and the availability of alternative financial infrastructure.

## 8 Historical Case Studies and Empirical Analysis

### 8.1 World War II Production Economics

World War II provides the most comprehensive historical example of total war economics, where entire national economies were reorganized for military production. The United States achieved remarkable production increases through several mechanisms: rapid capacity expansion, resource reallocation from civilian to military production, technological innovation under pressure, and organizational improvements in production efficiency.

U.S. military production increased from \$1.5 billion in 1940 to \$42.7 billion in 1944, representing approximately 40% of GDP at peak production. This expansion was achieved through multiple channels: new plant construction increased manufacturing capacity by 67% between 1940 and 1945, labor force participation rates reached historical highs as women entered the workforce in unprecedented numbers, and productivity growth accelerated due to learning-by-doing effects and technological spillovers.

The conversion process from civilian to military production demonstrated both the flexibility and constraints of industrial economies. Industries with similar production technologies, such as automotive manufacturing converting to aircraft and tank production, achieved successful transitions. However, completely specialized military products required dedicated production facilities and supply chains.

### 8.2 Cold War Arms Race Dynamics

The Cold War period from 1945 to 1991 represents the longest sustained military competition in modern history, providing extensive data on arms race dynamics and resource allocation under competitive pressure. Both superpowers maintained military expenditures between 4% and 10% of GDP for extended periods, demonstrating the sustainability of high military spending in developed economies.

The nuclear dimension of the Cold War created unique economic dynamics where relatively small investments in strategic weapons could provide decisive military advantages. The development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems required massive initial investments but created persistent deterrent effects, changing the cost-benefit calculations of military investment.

Technological competition became a central feature of the Cold War, with both sides investing heavily in research and development. Military R&D spending reached 2-3% of GDP in both nations, generating significant technological spillovers to civilian sectors including computing, communications, materials science, and space technology.

### **8.3 Modern Asymmetric Conflict Economics**

Contemporary conflicts increasingly feature asymmetric warfare where conventional military advantages face challenges from non-traditional tactics and technologies. The economic implications of asymmetric conflict differ substantially from conventional warfare models.

Low-cost asymmetric tactics can impose disproportionate costs on conventional forces. Improvised explosive devices costing hundreds of dollars can destroy vehicles worth millions, creating unfavorable cost-exchange ratios for technologically superior forces. This dynamic challenges traditional assumptions about the relationship between military investment and battlefield effectiveness.

The proliferation of commercial technologies with military applications has democratized access to sophisticated capabilities. Commercially available drones, communications equipment, and cyber tools provide non-state actors with capabilities previously available only to major military powers, altering the economics of conflict and the barriers to entry for military competition.

## **9 Future Trends and Technological Disruption**

### **9.1 Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems**

Artificial intelligence represents a transformative technology for warfare economics, potentially altering fundamental relationships between human resources, capital investment, and military capability. AI systems can process information, make decisions, and execute actions at speeds and scales that exceed human capabilities, creating new production functions for military capability.

The economics of AI-enabled warfare demonstrate strong increasing returns to scale due to the fixed costs of AI development and the marginal costs of deployment. Once developed, AI systems can be replicated and deployed at relatively low marginal costs, potentially creating winner-take-all dynamics in military competition.

Autonomous weapons systems raise complex economic questions about the substitution of capital for labor in military production. If autonomous systems can perform many functions currently requiring human operators, the optimal factor proportions in military production may shift dramatically toward capital-intensive configurations.

### **9.2 Space and Cyber Domains**

Space and cyber domains represent new frontiers for military competition with distinctive economic characteristics. Both domains exhibit high fixed costs for initial capability development but relatively low marginal costs for additional operations, creating economies of scale and scope.

Space-based military capabilities require substantial initial investments in launch capacity, satellite systems, and ground-based control infrastructure. However, once established, space-based systems can provide persistent global coverage and multiple mission capabilities, generating economies of scope across intelligence, communications, navigation, and strike functions.

Cyber warfare demonstrates extreme asymmetries in cost structures. Cyber attacks can be developed and deployed at relatively low costs but can impose substantial damages on target systems. The economics of cyber defense require continuous investment in security measures that may not provide visible returns, creating challenges for optimal investment decisions.

### **9.3 Biotechnology and Chemical Defense**

Advances in biotechnology create new categories of threats and defensive requirements that challenge traditional military economic models. The dual-use nature of biological research means



that civilian scientific advances can create new military threats, requiring continuous adaptation of defensive measures.

The economics of biological defense involve significant uncertainty about threat vectors and the effectiveness of countermeasures. Unlike conventional military systems with predictable performance characteristics, biological defense systems must prepare for unknown and evolving threats, complicating cost-benefit analysis and resource allocation decisions.

Investment in biological defense capabilities requires coordination between military, public health, and research institutions, creating complex organizational and incentive structures that differ from traditional military procurement models.

## **10 Policy Implications and Strategic Recommendations**

### **10.1 Optimal Defense Spending Levels**

Determining optimal defense spending levels requires balancing security benefits against opportunity costs in a framework that accounts for uncertainty, technological change, and strategic interactions with potential adversaries. The analysis suggests several key principles for defense spending decisions.

First, defense spending should be evaluated using portfolio approaches that consider effectiveness across multiple scenarios rather than optimization for single threat models. This approach provides robustness against uncertainty about future security challenges while avoiding over-investment in scenario-specific capabilities.

Second, the timing of defense investments matters significantly due to technological change and strategic dynamics. Investments in rapidly evolving technologies should be timed to capture maximum advantage while avoiding premature commitment to technologies that may become obsolete.

Third, alliance relationships and burden-sharing arrangements can provide substantial economies of scale and scope in defense production. Coordinated procurement and capability development among allies can reduce costs while enhancing overall security effectiveness.

### **10.2 Innovation Policy and Technology Transfer**

Military innovation policy should balance security benefits against economic opportunity costs while maximizing beneficial spillovers to civilian sectors. The analysis suggests several policy recommendations for optimizing military R&D investments.

Research investments should focus on fundamental technologies with broad applications rather than narrow military-specific systems. Technologies such as artificial intelligence, advanced materials, and quantum computing offer both military advantages and substantial civilian applications, maximizing the social return on public investment.

Technology transfer mechanisms should be designed to facilitate rapid commercialization of military innovations while protecting sensitive capabilities. Dual-use research programs, industry partnerships, and intellectual property policies can enhance the civilian benefits of military R&D while maintaining security advantages.

International cooperation in military R&D can provide cost efficiencies while strengthening alliance relationships. Joint research programs reduce duplication, share costs, and create interoperability benefits that enhance coalition effectiveness.

### **10.3 Procurement Reform and Efficiency Enhancement**

Military procurement systems require fundamental reforms to address efficiency challenges and adapt to rapid technological change. The analysis suggests several directions for procurement reform.

Competition should be enhanced through market-making interventions that create viable alternatives to incumbent suppliers. This may require government investment in supplier development, standardization of interfaces, and modular system architectures that enable competitive supply of components.

Risk allocation between government and contractors should be optimized based on comparative advantage in risk management. Government should bear risks that it can manage more effectively, such as requirements uncertainty and geopolitical risks, while contractors should bear risks related to technical performance and cost control.

Procurement timelines should be accelerated to keep pace with technological change in civilian markets. Traditional acquisition cycles that span decades are incompatible with technology sectors where product lifecycles measure in years or months.

## 11 Conclusion

This treatise has examined warfare economics from multiple analytical perspectives, integrating microeconomic optimization, macroeconomic impact analysis, game-theoretic modeling, and empirical historical evidence. The analysis demonstrates that warfare economics operates under unique constraints and exhibits distinctive patterns that require specialized theoretical frameworks and policy approaches.

The fundamental insight emerging from this analysis is that military competition remains subject to economic constraints and optimization principles, but these operate under conditions of extreme uncertainty, asymmetric information, and strategic interaction that challenge standard economic assumptions. Traditional market mechanisms often fail in military contexts, requiring government intervention and institutional innovation to achieve efficient outcomes.

Several key findings emerge from the analysis. First, military production functions exhibit strong complementarities and economies of scale that create winner-take-all dynamics in many domains. Second, technological change represents the primary driver of military advantage, creating persistent pressure for innovation investment despite uncertain returns. Third, alliance relationships and cooperative arrangements can provide substantial efficiency gains while enhancing security effectiveness.

The policy implications suggest the need for fundamental reforms in defense planning, procurement, and innovation systems to address the challenges of modern security environments. These reforms should emphasize flexibility, technological adaptation, and international cooperation while maintaining the analytical rigor necessary for effective resource allocation under uncertainty.

Future research should focus on developing more sophisticated models of technological change in military systems, better understanding of strategic interaction effects in multipolar competitive environments, and empirical analysis of the effectiveness of different organizational and institutional approaches to defense management. The intersection of warfare economics with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology will require continued theoretical development and empirical investigation.

The complete understanding of warfare economics requires integration of insights from economics, political science, military studies, technology analysis, and historical research. This interdisciplinary approach provides the comprehensive perspective necessary for addressing the complex challenges of resource allocation for national security in an uncertain and rapidly changing strategic environment.

## References

- [1] Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. 1832/1976.
- [2] Kennedy, Paul M. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. 1987.
- [3] Hitch, Charles J., and Roland N. McKean. *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*. 1960.
- [4] Richardson, Lewis Fry. *Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War*. 1960.
- [5] Schelling, Thomas C. *The Strategy of Conflict*. 1960.
- [6] Olson, Mancur, and Richard Zeckhauser. "An Economic Theory of Alliances." *The Review of Economics and Statistics*. 1966
- [7] Smith, Ron P. "Military Economics: The Interaction of Power and Money." 2009.
- [8] Brito, Dagobert L., and Michael D. Intriligator. "A Game Theoretic Model of the Arms Race." *Papers of the Peace Research Society*. 1972.
- [9] Sandler, Todd, and Keith Hartley. *The Economics of Defense*. 1995.
- [10] Harrison, Mark, ed. *The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison*. 1998.
- [11] Tirole, Jean. *The Theory of Industrial Organization*. 1988.
- [12] Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. *Economics, Organization and Management*. 1992.
- [13] Kreps, David M. *Game Theory and Economic Modelling*. 1990.
- [14] Arrow, Kenneth J. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention." In *The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity*. 1962.
- [15] Solow, Robert M. "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 1956.
- [16] Romer, Paul M. "Endogenous Technological Change." *Journal of Political Economy*. 1990
- [17] Acemoglu, Daron, and Joshua Linn. "Market Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- [18] Stiglitz, Joseph E. "The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 2000.
- [19] Myerson, Roger B. *Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict*. 1991.
- [20] Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. *Game Theory*. 1991.

## The End