# Modeling Mergers and Acquisitions between Fortune 100 and Fortune 1000 Companies

Soumadeep Ghosh

Kolkata, India

#### Abstract

I compare Fortune 100 vs. Fortune 1000 companies and develop a mathematical model for acquisitions by Fortune 100 firms of Fortune 1000 targets over a 20–50 year horizon. The Fortune 100 are the top 100 U.S. companies by revenue (a subset of the Fortune 500 [1], whereas the Fortune 1000 list extends this ranking to the top 1000 companies [1] [2]. Fortune 100 firms have orders of magnitude higher revenue, market cap, and resources than the smaller Fortune 1000 firms. I propose a probabilistic acquisition model: each potential acquisition event (firm i in Fortune 100 acquiring firm j in Fortune 1000) occurs with a hazard or probability depending on financial and strategic factors. I derive formulas for the expected number of deals, deal probabilities, and post-merger financial impacts (synergy, value creation, etc.). I discuss calibration using Bloomberg, PitchBook and SEC-8K data, and illustrate how to incorporate historical M&A statistics.

#### 1 Fortune 100 vs. Fortune 1000

The Fortune 100 list comprises the largest 100 U.S. companies by annual revenue, essentially the top 100 of the Fortune 500 ranking [1]. The Fortune 1000 list includes the top 1000 U.S. companies by revenue [2], i.e. the Fortune 500 plus an additional 500 firms. In practice, Fortune 1000 firms range from multi-hundred-billion-dollar giants (Walmart, Amazon, etc.) down to firms with revenues around a few billion. For example, in 2025, the Fortune 1000 collectively generated about \$22 trillion in revenue [5], whereas the Fortune 500 (roughly half that list) accounted for about \$19.9 trillion [5]. The top 100 firms alone typically contribute the majority of Fortune 1000 revenues. Thus, Fortune 100 companies have far greater scale, cash reserves, and deal-making capacity than the rest of the Fortune 1000. This difference matters for M&A: larger acquirers (Fortune 100) can pursue sizeable takeovers that smaller Fortune 1000 firms could not.

Because the lists are revenue-ranked, the Fortune 100 is highly concentrated in a few sectors (technology, retail, energy, healthcare), whereas the Fortune 1000 covers a broader range of industries. The Fortune 100 firms tend to be global multinationals, while the lower-ranked Fortune 1000 firms may be regional or niche businesses. In sum, Fortune 100 firms represent the very largest enterprises with extraordinary resources, whereas Fortune 1000 firms include both those giants and many smaller companies (including mid-cap and some private firms) that are potential acquisition targets.

### 2 Probabilistic Model of M&A Events

I model acquisitions by Fortune 100 firms of Fortune 1000 targets as stochastic events. Let there be  $N_A = 100$  potential acquirers (Fortune 100 firms) and  $N_T = 1000$  potential targets (Fortune 1000 firms). We seek the probability that a given target j is acquired by some acquirer over time, and the expected number of deals.

One approach is to model each possible acquirer-target pair (i, j) with a probability  $p_{ij}$  of an acquisition occurring in a given year. A logistic regression or hazard model is natural, since acquisition is a binary event. For example, one might assume

$$p_{ij} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\alpha + \beta^{\mathsf{T}} x_{ij})}},\tag{1}$$

where  $x_{ij}$  includes features such as acquirer size, target valuation, industry complementarity, prior M&A activity, etc. This 'acquisition likelihood model' (based on logistic regression) is standard in M&A prediction [3]. Common predictors include acquirer cash/market-cap, target profit or growth, and industry overlap [3]. Once calibrated on historical data,  $p_{ij}$  gives the annual probability that firm i acquires firm j. Independence assumptions imply the expected number of deals per year is  $\sum_{i=1}^{N_A} \sum_{j=1}^{N_T} p_{ij}$ .

Alternatively, in continuous time each target j can be assigned a hazard rate  $\lambda_j$  of being acquired by any Fortune 100 firm. One might set

$$\lambda_j = e^{\alpha + \gamma^\top y_j},\tag{2}$$

where  $y_j$  are target-specific factors (size, growth rate, etc.). Then the probability that j is acquired by time T is

$$P_j(\text{acq by } T) = 1 - e^{-\lambda_j T}.$$
 (3)

The expected total number of acquisitions by time T is

$$E[N(T)] = \sum_{j=1}^{N_T} P_j(\text{acq by } T) \approx \sum_{j=1}^{N_T} (1 - e^{-\lambda_j T})$$
(4)

For small  $\lambda_j$ , one can approximate  $P_j \approx \lambda_j T$ . If we aggregate, N(T) is approximately Poisson with parameter  $\Lambda T$ , where  $\Lambda = \sum_j \lambda_j$  is the total deal intensity. This Poisson (or more generally Hawkes) process can capture temporal clustering or 'waves' of deals, a known phenomenon in M&A [3].

Merger waves can also be modeled by self-exciting point processes (Hawkes processes) where each deal increases future deal intensity. Recent research on M&A has used such models to reflect peer influence and contagion: an initial shock of deals in one industry can trigger more deals [3]. I do not pursue a full Hawkes model here, but note that in a 50-year horizon it may be appropriate to allow  $\lambda$  to vary with economic cycles or past events.

## 3 Financial Impact Post-Acquisition

Each completed acquisition has financial consequences. Let acquirer i have value  $V_i$  and target j have value  $V_j$  (e.g. measured by enterprise value or discounted cash flows). In a simple net-present-value model, the merged firm's value might be

$$V_{i,j} = V_i + V_j + S_{ij}, \tag{5}$$

where  $S_{ij}$  is the synergy (or anti-synergy) created by the deal. For example,  $S_{ij}$  might represent combined cost savings or additional profit from complementarity. Empirical studies suggest realized synergies are often much lower than initially forecast, with many deals destroying value [4]. If s is the expected synergy fraction of target value, we might set  $S_{ij} = s V_j$ . In expectation, s may be small (1–5%) or even negative if integration fails. For instance, Bain & Company estimate typical scale synergies are on the order of a few percent of combined revenues (see discussion in literature).

We also must subtract acquisition costs: the purchase premium and integration expense. If the acquirer pays  $P_{ij}$  for target j, then the net benefit is  $V_i + V_j + S_{ij} - P_{ij}$ . Assuming  $P_{ij} \approx V_j$  (no large premium) and  $S_{ij}$  small, the net value uplift is modest. In an expected-value model one might set

$$NPV_{ij} = S_{ij} - C_{ij}, (6)$$

where  $C_{ij}$  includes integration costs, opportunity cost of capital, etc. Under standard discounted cash flow,  $S_{ij}$  can be modeled as the present value of future profit increases: e.g.  $S_{ij} = \frac{s \cdot \Delta \text{EBIT}_j}{r}$ , where r is the discount rate.

To link to probability, I introduce a success probability  $p_{\text{succ}}$  (empirically often quoted as 25–30% success [4], i.e. 70–75% of deals fail to create value). We can write expected synergy gain per deal as  $p_{\text{succ}} s V_j$ . Then the expected value effect on acquirer i per deal is roughly  $p_{\text{succ}} s V_j - P_{ij} - C_{ij}$ . Summing over all expected deals yields aggregate impact.

In summary, our model has two parts: (1) a stochastic count of deals (or which targets get acquired) and (2) a value jump for each deal. Combining, one can simulate acquirer balance sheets or market cap over time given parameter values for  $\lambda_j$ , s,  $p_{\text{succ}}$ , and cost ratios. The theory can be formalized with probability and finance equations as above.

### 4 Calibration and Data Testing

To calibrate the model parameters, we would use historical M&A data on Fortune 1000 firms. Useful data sources include Bloomberg and PitchBook deal databases (which record announcements, values, participants, etc.) as well as SEC 8-K filings (which report completed acquisitions for public companies). For each historical merger involving a Fortune 100 acquirer, we can extract features  $x_{ij}$  (size, industry, valuation ratios, etc.) and outcomes to fit the logistic/hazard parameters  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma$ . The estimated  $\lambda_j$  or  $p_{ij}$  can be validated by comparing predicted deal counts with actual data.

For example, aggregate U.S. M&A runs on the order of 1200–1500 deals per year [3]. If Fortune 100 firms were responsible for, say, 10% of those deals, we would calibrate  $\sum_{i \in F100} \sum_{j \in F1000} p_{ij} \approx 0.1 \times 1500$  per year. Empirical studies find that most M&As add little value [4], so we might fit  $p_{\text{succ}}$  around 0.25 and synergy s so that  $p_{\text{succ}}s$  matches observed average acquirer post-deal ROIC (return on invested capital).

In testing the model, we can simulate 20–50 year trajectories. We account for economic growth by allowing revenue scales and discount rates to change, or by parameterizing  $\lambda_j(t)$  as increasing with corporate profits. One could also extend the model by sector: treat each industry cluster separately, given that Fortune 1000 firms span diverse fields. All statistical estimation would rely on rigorous use of financial and deal data (Bloomberg/PitchBook for private valuations, SEC filings for public deals, etc.).

#### 5 Conclusion

I have outlined a comprehensive financial-probabilistic model for M&A in which Fortune 100 firms acquire Fortune 1000 firms. The model differentiates the two groups by size and scale [1] [2], then uses either logistic or Poisson/hazard formulations to predict deal occurrences. Post-merger financial impacts are modeled via synergy S and costs, with success probabilities reflecting historical M&A performance [4]. Calibration requires data from financial databases and filings, and the model can be tested by simulating deal counts and comparing to past M&A waves. This framework provides a quantitative basis for forecasting long-run M&A activity and value creation among the largest U.S. corporations.

### References

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