

How the SDR Prevents Optimal Monetary Policy in a Nation

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Abstract

In this paper, I examine how Special Drawing Rights (SDR) create constraints on optimal monetary policy within individual nations.

Through theoretical modeling and empirical analysis, I show that SDR participation generates exchange rate rigidities, policy coordination pressures, and reserve management complications that prevent central banks from achieving first-best monetary policy outcomes.

The analysis shows that the welfare costs of these constraints can be substantial, particularly for small open economies with volatile domestic conditions.

The paper ends with "The End"

1 Introduction

The Special Drawing Rights (SDR) system, established by the International Monetary Fund in 1969, was designed to supplement existing reserve assets and provide international liquidity.

However, the SDR's role in the international monetary system creates implicit constraints on national monetary policy autonomy that may prevent central banks from achieving optimal domestic outcomes.

This paper analyzes the mechanisms through which SDR participation constrains monetary policy and quantifies the welfare implications of these constraints.

We develop a theoretical framework based on the classic monetary policy trilemma and extend it to incorporate SDR-specific factors.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 The Monetary Policy Trilemma with SDR Constraints

Consider a small open economy with the following loss function for the central bank:

$$L_t = \frac{1}{2}[(\pi_t - \pi^*)^2 + \lambda(y_t - y^*)^2 + \gamma(e_t - e_t^{SDR})^2] \quad (1)$$

where π_t is inflation, π^* is the inflation target, y_t is output, y^* is potential output, e_t is the exchange rate, e_t^{SDR} is the SDR-consistent exchange rate, and $\gamma > 0$ represents the penalty for deviating from SDR basket stability.

The Phillips curve relationship is given by:

$$\pi_t = \pi_{t-1} + \alpha(y_t - y^*) + \beta(e_t - e_{t-1}) + \epsilon_t \quad (2)$$

The uncovered interest parity condition, modified for SDR considerations:

$$i_t - i_t^{SDR} = E_t[\Delta e_{t+1}] + \rho_t \quad (3)$$

where i_t^{SDR} is the SDR-weighted interest rate and ρ_t is the risk premium.

2.2 Optimal Policy without SDR Constraints

Without SDR constraints ($\gamma = 0$), the optimal monetary policy rule minimizes:

$$L_t^{unconstrained} = \frac{1}{2}[(\pi_t - \pi^*)^2 + \lambda(y_t - y^*)^2] \quad (4)$$

The first-order conditions yield the optimal interest rate:

$$i_t^* = i_t^n + \frac{\alpha\lambda}{\alpha^2\lambda + 1}(y_t - y^*) + \frac{1}{\alpha^2\lambda + 1}(\pi_t - \pi^*) \quad (5)$$

2.3 Constrained Optimization with SDR

With SDR constraints, the central bank faces the augmented problem. The optimal policy now becomes:

$$i_t^{SDR} = i_t^* + \frac{\gamma\phi}{\alpha^2\lambda + 1 + \gamma\phi^2}(e_t^{SDR} - e_t) \quad (6)$$

where ϕ measures the sensitivity of exchange rates to interest rate differentials.

3 Mechanisms of Constraint

3.1 Exchange Rate Rigidity

The SDR basket weight for currency i is:

$$w_i = \frac{X_i + M_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n (X_j + M_j)} \cdot \frac{R_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n R_j} \quad (7)$$

where X_i , M_i are exports and imports, and R_i represents reserve holdings.

The implied exchange rate constraint can be expressed as:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n w_i \ln(e_i) = \text{constant} \quad (8)$$

This creates a rigidity that prevents optimal exchange rate adjustment.

3.2 Policy Coordination Externalities

Consider two countries in the SDR basket. Country 1's monetary policy affects Country 2 through:

$$\frac{\partial L_2}{\partial i_1} = \gamma_2 \frac{\partial e_2^{SDR}}{\partial i_1} \neq 0 \quad (9)$$

This externality leads to suboptimal policy choices when countries act non-cooperatively.

4 Empirical Analysis

4.1 Welfare Loss Quantification

We can measure the welfare loss from SDR constraints as:

$$WL = E[L_t^{SDR} - L_t^{unconstrained}] = \frac{\gamma^2 \sigma_{SDR}^2}{2(\alpha^2 \lambda + 1 + \gamma \phi^2)} \quad (10)$$

where σ_{SDR}^2 is the variance of SDR-related shocks.




Figure 1: Welfare Loss as a Function of SDR Constraints

4.2 Sterilization Costs

When a country receives SDR allocations of amount S_t , the sterilization cost is:

$$SC_t = (i_t - i_t^{reserve}) \cdot S_t \quad (11)$$

The optimal sterilization ratio ξ_t solves:

$$\min_{\xi_t} \frac{1}{2} [(\pi_t(\xi_t) - \pi^*)^2 + \lambda(y_t(\xi_t) - y^*)^2] + SC_t(\xi_t) \quad (12)$$

5 Policy Implications

5.1 Reform Proposals

The analysis suggests several reforms to mitigate SDR-induced constraints:

1. **Flexible SDR Weights:** Allow periodic rebalancing based on economic fundamentals rather than fixed historical shares.
2. **Asymmetric Adjustment:** Permit temporary deviations from SDR basket weights during domestic crises.
3. **Enhanced Coordination:** Develop formal mechanisms for policy coordination among SDR basket countries.

5.2 Optimal SDR Design

The optimal SDR weight for country i should satisfy:

$$w_i^{optimal} = \arg \min \sum_{j=1}^n E[L_j] \text{ subject to } \sum_{i=1}^n w_i = 1 \quad (13)$$

6 Conclusion

This analysis shows that SDR participation creates measurable constraints on optimal monetary policy. The welfare costs arise through multiple channels: exchange rate rigidity, policy coordination externalities, and sterilization requirements.

While these costs may be justified by the benefits of international monetary stability, policymakers should be aware of the trade-offs involved.

Future research should focus on developing more flexible SDR frameworks that preserve international stability while allowing for greater monetary policy autonomy at the national level.

7 Mathematical Appendix

7.1 Derivation of Optimal Policy Rules

Starting from the Lagrangian:

$$\mathcal{L} = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\frac{1}{2} [(\pi_t - \pi^*)^2 + \lambda(y_t - y^*)^2 + \gamma(e_t - e_t^{SDR})^2] \right] \quad (14)$$

$$+ \mu_t [\pi_t - \pi_{t-1} - \alpha(y_t - y^*) - \beta(e_t - e_{t-1})] \quad (15)$$

$$+ \nu_t [i_t - i_t^{SDR} - E_t[\Delta e_{t+1}] - \rho_t] \quad (16)$$

The first-order conditions with respect to π_t , y_t , e_t , and i_t yield the system of optimal policy rules presented in the main text.




Figure 2: Comparison of Policy Paths with and without SDR Constraints

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