

The Complete Theory of Corruption:

An Interdisciplinary Framework for Understanding

Systemic Institutional Decay

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Abstract

In this paper, I present a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding corruption as a complex, multidimensional phenomenon that transcends simple moral categorizations. Drawing from economics, political science, sociology, psychology, and organizational behavior, I develop an integrated model that explains corruption's origins, mechanisms, persistence, and consequences. The theory encompasses individual-level psychological factors, organizational dynamics, institutional frameworks, and societal conditions that enable or constrain corrupt behavior. I propose that corruption represents a systematic deviation from institutional integrity that emerges through predictable patterns of incentive misalignment, information asymmetries, and collective action problems. This framework provides foundations for evidence-based anti-corruption strategies and policy interventions.

The paper ends with "The End"

1 Introduction

Corruption represents one of the most persistent and destructive challenges facing human institutions across all societies and historical periods. Despite extensive research and countless reform efforts, corrupt practices continue to undermine economic development, democratic governance, and social cohesion worldwide. The persistence of corruption suggests fundamental gaps in our theoretical understanding of its underlying mechanisms and dynamics.

Traditional approaches to corruption have often relied on overly simplistic models that treat it as either a moral failing of individuals or a technical problem of institutional design. These frameworks have proven inadequate for explaining corruption's complexity, adaptability, and resilience across diverse contexts. A complete theory of corruption must integrate insights from multiple disciplines to capture the phenomenon's multifaceted nature and provide actionable guidance for prevention and remediation.

This article develops such a comprehensive framework by synthesizing economic models of rent-seeking behavior, political theories of institutional decay, sociological analyses of network effects, psychological research on moral disengagement, and organizational studies of normative change. The resulting theory explains corruption as an emergent property of complex systems characterized by specific structural vulnerabilities and behavioral dynamics.

2 Defining Corruption: Beyond Simple Categorizations

2.1 The Definitional Challenge

Corruption defies simple definition because it manifests differently across contexts while sharing common underlying characteristics. Traditional definitions focusing on "abuse of public

office for private gain" capture important elements but fail to encompass corruption in private organizations, informal institutions, and complex modern governance arrangements.

We define corruption as the systematic deviation from established institutional norms and procedures through the exercise of discretionary power for unauthorized benefits. This definition encompasses several key elements: institutionalization of deviant practices, exploitation of positional advantages, violation of formal or informal rules, and extraction of benefits not sanctioned by legitimate institutional frameworks.

2.2 Typological Framework

Corruption manifests across multiple dimensions that create a complex typological space. The primary dimensions include:

Scope Dimension: Corruption ranges from petty interactions involving small-scale norm violations to grand corruption involving systematic capture of major institutional processes. This dimension reflects the scale of resources involved and the breadth of institutional impact.

Systemic Dimension: Isolated incidents of corrupt behavior differ fundamentally from systemic corruption where deviant practices become normalized and institutionalized. Systemic corruption involves the transformation of organizational cultures and the creation of parallel informal institutions.

Network Dimension: Corruption can involve bilateral exchanges between specific actors or complex multi-party networks spanning multiple organizations and sectors. Network corruption often exhibits emergent properties that transcend individual transactions.

Temporal Dimension: Corruption varies from one-time exchanges to ongoing relationships characterized by repeated interactions and mutual dependencies. Temporal patterns affect the development of trust, enforcement mechanisms, and adaptation strategies.

3 Theoretical Foundations

3.1 Economic Theory of Corruption

Economic analysis provides the foundational framework for understanding corruption through the lens of rational choice theory, principal-agent relationships, and market failures. The basic economic model treats corruption as a form of rent-seeking behavior where individuals exploit their positional advantages to extract economic benefits.

The principal-agent framework illuminates how information asymmetries and monitoring difficulties create opportunities for corrupt behavior. Agents with discretionary authority can exploit their informational advantages to extract unauthorized benefits from their positions, particularly when principals face high costs of monitoring and verification.

Game-theoretic models reveal how corruption can become an equilibrium outcome when multiple actors face similar incentive structures. The coordination problem inherent in anti-corruption efforts means that individual actors may find it rational to engage in corrupt practices even when collective welfare would be enhanced by their elimination.

Market failure analysis demonstrates how corruption emerges in situations characterized by monopoly power, information asymmetries, and externalities. Public officials often exercise monopoly control over specific services or decisions, creating opportunities for extracting rents from citizens or businesses seeking access to these services.

3.2 Political Science Perspectives

Political science contributes essential insights into how institutional structures, democratic processes, and governance arrangements affect corruption patterns. The quality of democratic

institutions, including electoral competition, legislative oversight, judicial independence, and press freedom, significantly influences corruption levels.

Institutional design theory explains how formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement mechanisms interact to create varying levels of institutional integrity. Effective anti-corruption institutions require not only well-designed formal structures but also supporting informal norms and reliable enforcement mechanisms.

The concept of state capacity reveals how government effectiveness and administrative competence affect corruption vulnerability. Weak state capacity creates opportunities for corruption while also limiting the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. The relationship between state capacity and corruption exhibits complex dynamics that vary across different institutional contexts.

Political economy analysis demonstrates how corruption interacts with broader patterns of economic and political power distribution. Elite capture, regulatory capture, and policy distortions represent systematic forms of corruption that can fundamentally alter economic and political outcomes.

3.3 Sociological Analysis

Sociological theory provides crucial insights into how social networks, cultural norms, and collective behavior patterns influence corruption dynamics. Social network analysis reveals how corruption often occurs within embedded social relationships characterized by trust, reciprocity, and mutual obligation.

The concept of social capital demonstrates how community ties and civic engagement can either facilitate or constrain corrupt behavior. Dense social networks can enable corruption through information sharing and mutual protection, but they can also generate social sanctions and reputational costs that deter corrupt behavior.

Cultural analysis explains how different societies develop varying tolerance levels for corrupt practices based on historical experiences, value systems, and social norms. Cultural factors influence not only individual attitudes toward corruption but also the effectiveness of different anti-corruption strategies.

Organizational sociology illuminates how corruption becomes institutionalized within organizations through processes of normalization, routinization, and cultural transmission. Once corrupt practices become embedded in organizational cultures, they can persist even when formal rules and leadership change.

3.4 Psychological Foundations

Psychological research reveals the cognitive and motivational processes that enable individuals to engage in corrupt behavior while maintaining positive self-concepts. Moral disengagement theory explains how people use cognitive mechanisms to justify unethical behavior to themselves and others.

The psychology of decision-making under risk and uncertainty helps explain why individuals choose to engage in corrupt practices despite potential consequences. Behavioral biases such as overconfidence, temporal discounting, and probability neglect affect corruption-related decisions.

Social psychological research on conformity, obedience, and group dynamics explains how organizational and social contexts influence individual behavior. The power of situational factors often overwhelms individual moral intentions, leading otherwise ethical individuals to participate in corrupt systems.

Research on moral psychology demonstrates how different moral frameworks lead to varying assessments of corrupt behavior. Understanding these moral foundations is essential for designing effective anti-corruption messages and interventions.

4 The Integrated Corruption Model

4.1 Structural Preconditions

Corruption emerges within specific structural contexts that create both opportunities for corrupt behavior and incentives for actors to exploit these opportunities. The key structural preconditions include:

Discretionary Authority: Corruption requires that individuals possess discretionary power over resources, decisions, or access to valuable goods and services. Without such authority, individuals lack the capacity to provide unauthorized benefits to others.

Information Asymmetries: Corrupt exchanges typically occur in contexts where principals have limited ability to monitor agent behavior or verify the appropriateness of specific decisions. Information asymmetries enable agents to exploit their informational advantages.

Weak Accountability Mechanisms: Corruption flourishes when formal oversight systems are weak, ineffective, or compromised. This includes judicial systems, audit institutions, legislative oversight bodies, and civil society monitoring organizations.

Resource Scarcity: Environments characterized by artificial scarcity or monopolistic control over valuable resources create incentives for corruption. When legitimate channels for accessing resources are limited or unreliable, corruption provides alternative access mechanisms.

4.2 Individual-Level Dynamics

At the individual level, corruption involves complex psychological processes that enable people to reconcile corrupt behavior with their moral self-concepts. Key psychological mechanisms include:

Moral Disengagement: Individuals employ various cognitive strategies to avoid moral self-sanctions when engaging in corrupt behavior. These include euphemistic labeling, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, and dehumanization of victims.

Incremental Escalation: Corruption often begins with minor norm violations that gradually escalate as individuals become desensitized to ethical boundaries. This slippery slope effect helps explain how people become involved in serious corruption despite initial moral reservations.

Social Learning: Individuals learn corrupt practices through observation, imitation, and social reinforcement. When corrupt behavior is modeled by respected figures and appears to be rewarded, it becomes normalized and spreads through social networks.

Risk Assessment: Individual decisions to engage in corruption involve complex calculations of potential benefits, costs, and probabilities of detection and punishment. Systematic biases in risk perception can lead to suboptimal decision-making.

4.3 Organizational Dynamics

Organizations play crucial roles in either preventing or facilitating corruption through their structures, cultures, and management practices. Key organizational factors include:

Ethical Climate: Organizations develop ethical climates that either support or undermine integrity. Strong ethical climates are characterized by clear values, consistent leadership behavior, effective communication, and alignment between stated values and actual practices.

Control Systems: Internal control systems including financial controls, operational procedures, and compliance monitoring can either prevent or enable corrupt behavior. Poorly designed control systems may create opportunities for corruption while ineffective monitoring allows corrupt practices to persist undetected.

Incentive Alignment: Organizational incentive systems profoundly influence behavior by rewarding certain outcomes and penalizing others. Misaligned incentives that reward short-term results without considering means employed can encourage corrupt behavior.

Cultural Transmission: Organizations transmit values and behavioral norms through formal and informal mechanisms. Once corrupt practices become embedded in organizational cultures, they can persist across generations of employees and leaders.

4.4 Systemic Integration

Corruption becomes systemic when corrupt practices become institutionalized across multiple organizations and sectors within a society. Systemic corruption exhibits several characteristics:

Network Effects: Corrupt actors form networks that provide mutual protection, information sharing, and coordination mechanisms. These networks can span multiple organizations and create barriers to reform efforts.

Institutional Capture: Corrupt interests can capture formal institutions responsible for oversight and enforcement, creating self-reinforcing cycles where corruption protects itself from accountability.

Normative Change: Systemic corruption involves the transformation of social norms so that corrupt practices become accepted or even expected behavior. This normative change makes corruption appear legitimate and necessary.

Adaptive Capacity: Systemic corruption develops adaptive capacity that enables it to evolve in response to anti-corruption efforts. This includes developing new methods, exploiting regulatory gaps, and neutralizing oversight mechanisms.

5 Corruption Mechanisms and Processes

5.1 Initiation Processes

Corruption typically begins through specific initiation processes that bring together willing participants and create opportunities for corrupt exchanges. Common initiation mechanisms include:

Opportunistic Encounters: Random interactions between individuals with complementary needs and capabilities can lead to corrupt exchanges when appropriate opportunities arise and risk levels appear acceptable.

Network Recruitment: Existing corrupt networks actively recruit new participants through social connections, professional relationships, and strategic targeting of individuals in key positions.

Institutional Pressures: Organizational cultures or external pressures can push individuals toward corrupt behavior even when they lack initial inclination to engage in such practices.

Gradual Escalation: Many individuals enter corruption through gradual escalation from minor norm violations to more serious corrupt practices as they become desensitized to ethical boundaries.

5.2 Maintenance Mechanisms

Once established, corrupt relationships require ongoing maintenance through various mechanisms that ensure continued cooperation and mutual benefit:

Trust Development: Corrupt relationships develop trust through repeated interactions, mutual vulnerability, and demonstration of reliability. Trust reduces transaction costs and enables more complex corrupt arrangements.

Information Sharing: Corrupt networks share information about opportunities, risks, enforcement activities, and potential participants. This information sharing enhances network effectiveness and reduces individual risks.

Mutual Protection: Network members provide mutual protection through alibi creation, evidence destruction, intimidation of potential witnesses, and coordination of responses to investigations.

Benefit Distribution: Effective corrupt networks develop mechanisms for fairly distributing benefits among participants based on contributions, risks, and relative power positions.

5.3 Adaptation and Evolution

Corrupt systems demonstrate remarkable adaptive capacity that enables them to survive and evolve in response to changing conditions and anti-corruption efforts:

Method Innovation: Corrupt actors continuously develop new methods for conducting corrupt exchanges that avoid detection by existing oversight mechanisms. This includes exploiting new technologies, regulatory gaps, and procedural loopholes.

Institutional Penetration: Sophisticated corrupt networks work to penetrate and influence oversight institutions, creating insider information sources and neutralizing potential threats.

Legitimacy Construction: Corrupt systems develop narratives and justifications that make their practices appear legitimate or necessary. This includes appeals to cultural traditions, economic necessity, and institutional efficiency.

Defensive Coordination: When faced with anti-corruption efforts, corrupt networks coordinate defensive responses including evidence destruction, witness intimidation, and political pressure to halt investigations.

6 Consequences and Impacts

6.1 Economic Consequences

Corruption generates multiple negative economic consequences that compound over time and create significant development barriers:

Resource Misallocation: Corruption distorts resource allocation by directing resources toward corrupt actors rather than their most productive uses. This reduces overall economic efficiency and productivity.

Investment Deterrence: High corruption levels deter both domestic and foreign investment by increasing business costs, creating uncertainty, and reducing returns on legitimate business activities.

Market Distortion: Corruption creates unfair competitive advantages for corrupt actors while penalizing honest businesses. This distorts market mechanisms and reduces overall market efficiency.

Innovation Suppression: Corrupt systems often favor established interests and resist changes that might threaten existing corrupt arrangements. This suppresses innovation and entrepreneurship.

6.2 Political Consequences

Corruption undermines democratic governance and political legitimacy through several mechanisms:

Democratic Erosion: Corruption weakens democratic institutions by reducing their effectiveness, credibility, and responsiveness to citizen needs. This can lead to democratic backsliding and authoritarian tendencies.

Policy Distortion: Corrupt influence distorts policy-making processes, leading to policies that serve corrupt interests rather than public welfare. This reduces government effectiveness and public trust.

Institutional Decay: Widespread corruption weakens institutional capacity and effectiveness across all sectors of government. This creates cascading failures that further undermine governance quality.

Legitimacy Crisis: High corruption levels erode government legitimacy and citizen trust, potentially leading to political instability and social unrest.

6.3 Social Consequences

Corruption generates profound social consequences that affect community cohesion and individual well-being:

Inequality Amplification: Corruption typically benefits wealthy and powerful actors while imposing costs on ordinary citizens. This exacerbates existing inequalities and creates new forms of disadvantage.

Social Trust Erosion: Corruption undermines social trust by demonstrating that formal rules are unreliable and that success depends on corrupt connections rather than merit or effort.

Norm Degradation: Widespread corruption degrades social norms around honesty, fairness, and civic responsibility. This creates cultures of cynicism and moral relativism.

Service Delivery Failure: Corruption reduces the quality and accessibility of public services, particularly affecting vulnerable populations who cannot afford corrupt payments.

7 Anti-Corruption Strategies and Interventions

7.1 Prevention Strategies

Effective anti-corruption efforts must focus primarily on prevention through institutional design and cultural change:

Institutional Design: Well-designed institutions include clear rules, appropriate incentive structures, effective oversight mechanisms, and robust enforcement systems. Institutional design must consider both formal structures and informal norms.

Transparency Enhancement: Increasing transparency through open government initiatives, public disclosure requirements, and citizen access to information reduces opportunities for corruption and enables public oversight.

Accountability Mechanisms: Strong accountability mechanisms include independent oversight bodies, judicial systems, audit institutions, and civil society monitoring organizations. These mechanisms must be adequately resourced and protected from political interference.

Cultural Change: Long-term anti-corruption success requires cultural change that strengthens norms supporting integrity and creates social sanctions for corrupt behavior. This includes education, public awareness campaigns, and leadership modeling.

7.2 Detection and Enforcement

Effective detection and enforcement systems are essential for deterring corrupt behavior and demonstrating that corruption carries real consequences:

Intelligence Systems: Sophisticated intelligence systems use multiple information sources including financial monitoring, communication analysis, and whistleblower reports to detect corrupt activity.

Investigation Capacity: Professional investigation capacity requires specialized skills, adequate resources, and protection from political interference. Investigators must understand both corruption mechanisms and legal requirements for successful prosecutions.

Judicial Integrity: Independent and competent judicial systems are essential for ensuring that corruption cases are fairly adjudicated and appropriate penalties are imposed.

Asset Recovery: Effective asset recovery systems trace, freeze, and recover proceeds of corruption, both deterring future corruption and providing resources for victim compensation or public benefit.

7.3 Systemic Reform

Addressing systemic corruption requires comprehensive reform approaches that simultaneously target multiple dimensions of the problem:

Political Reform: Democratic reforms including electoral system improvements, campaign finance regulation, and legislative oversight enhancement can reduce opportunities for political corruption.

Administrative Reform: Civil service reforms including merit-based recruitment, adequate compensation, performance management, and career development can strengthen administrative integrity.

Economic Reform: Economic reforms including deregulation, privatization, and market competition can reduce opportunities for rent-seeking while improving economic efficiency.

Social Reform: Social reforms including education system improvements, civil society strengthening, and media freedom enhancement can create social conditions that support integrity and resist corruption.

8 Future Directions and Conclusions

8.1 Emerging Challenges

The digital transformation of society creates new opportunities and challenges for both corruption and anti-corruption efforts:

Digital Corruption: New technologies enable novel forms of corruption including algorithmic manipulation, data misuse, and cyber-enabled rent-seeking. Anti-corruption efforts must adapt to address these emerging threats.

Globalization Effects: Increasing global interconnectedness creates opportunities for cross-border corruption while complicating enforcement efforts. International cooperation mechanisms must evolve to address these challenges effectively.

Complexity Increases: Modern governance arrangements are becoming increasingly complex, creating new opportunities for corruption while making detection and prevention more difficult.

8.2 Research Priorities

Future research should focus on several key areas that remain poorly understood:

Measurement Improvement: Better measurement tools are needed to capture corruption's multiple dimensions and track changes over time. This includes both objective indicators and subjective assessments.

Causal Mechanisms: More research is needed on the specific causal mechanisms through which different factors influence corruption levels and anti-corruption intervention effectiveness.

Cultural Variation: Greater attention must be paid to how cultural factors influence corruption patterns and anti-corruption strategy effectiveness across different contexts.

Intervention Evaluation: Rigorous evaluation of anti-corruption interventions is needed to identify which approaches work best under different conditions.

8.3 Theoretical Integration

The complete theory of corruption presented here integrates insights from multiple disciplines to provide a comprehensive framework for understanding this complex phenomenon. Key theoretical contributions include:

The recognition that corruption represents a systematic deviation from institutional integrity rather than simply individual moral failure. This perspective emphasizes the importance of structural factors and systemic dynamics while acknowledging individual agency and responsibility.

The identification of corruption as an emergent property of complex systems characterized by specific vulnerabilities and behavioral dynamics. This systems perspective explains corruption's persistence and adaptability while providing guidance for intervention design.

The development of an integrated model that explains corruption across multiple levels of analysis from individual psychology to institutional design to societal conditions. This multi-level approach captures corruption's complexity while maintaining theoretical coherence.

The emphasis on prevention through institutional design and cultural change rather than relying primarily on detection and enforcement. This perspective recognizes that sustainable anti-corruption success requires addressing root causes rather than merely treating symptoms.

8.4 Practical Implications

This theoretical framework generates several important practical implications for anti-corruption efforts:

Anti-corruption strategies must be comprehensive and multi-dimensional, addressing individual, organizational, and systemic factors simultaneously. Narrow approaches that focus on single dimensions are unlikely to achieve lasting success.

Prevention must be prioritized over detection and enforcement, though all three elements are necessary. Effective prevention requires careful attention to institutional design, incentive alignment, and cultural factors.

Context matters significantly for anti-corruption strategy design. Approaches that work well in one context may fail in others due to different structural conditions, cultural norms, and institutional capabilities.

Long-term commitment and persistence are essential for anti-corruption success. Corruption often takes decades to become entrenched and requires similarly long-term efforts to eliminate.

International cooperation and knowledge sharing can enhance anti-corruption effectiveness by enabling learning from diverse experiences and coordinating responses to cross-border corruption.

The complete theory of corruption provides a foundation for evidence-based policy making and intervention design that can enhance the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts worldwide. By understanding corruption's complex dynamics and multiple dimensions, societies can develop more effective strategies for building and maintaining institutional integrity.

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