

Corporate Taxation in Dynamic Markets

Partial and General Equilibrium Analysis

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Abstract

We develop a comprehensive framework for analyzing corporate taxation in dynamic markets with heterogeneous firms. In a continuous-time model with discounting, we derive the precise relationship between tax revenue, market structure, and firm characteristics. Using optimization theory and calculus of variations, we characterize both partial equilibrium—where individual firms optimize taking tax rates as given—and general equilibrium—where tax rates, market capitalization, and firm timing decisions are jointly determined through no-arbitrage conditions and market clearing. We obtain closed-form solutions for the equilibrium tax rate and conduct comparative statics analysis. Our results illuminate the fundamental trade-offs between revenue requirements and the tax base, demonstrating how entry/exit timing and dividend policies interact with corporate taxation.

The paper ends with “The End”

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1 Introduction

Corporate taxation represents a fundamental component of government revenue systems, yet its optimal design remains a challenging problem at the intersection of public finance, industrial organization, and dynamic optimization. The dynamic nature of markets—where corporations enter, operate for finite periods, and eventually exit—introduces temporal considerations that significantly affect both tax revenue and firm behavior. Traditional static models fail to capture these essential dynamics.

This paper addresses the following central question: *Given a target revenue requirement S , what is the equilibrium tax rate that achieves this target, and how do firms optimally respond through their market participation and dividend policies?* We develop a tractable continuous-time model that captures the essential features of corporate taxation in dynamic markets while remaining analytically solvable.

1.1 Main Contributions

Our analysis yields several key contributions to the literature:

- **Closed-form tax formula:** We derive an explicit expression for the tax rate required to achieve any revenue target S , fully accounting for time value of money, firm heterogeneity, and endogenous entry/exit decisions (Theorem 4.1).
- **Partial equilibrium characterization:** We establish first-order conditions for corporations optimizing their dividend policies and timing decisions while taking the tax rate as exogenous (Theorem 5.2).
- **General equilibrium existence:** We prove existence and characterize general equilibrium where all variables are endogenously determined through investor no-arbitrage, market clearing, government budget balance, and corporate profit maximization (Theorem 6.2).
- **Comparative statics:** We provide rigorous results showing how the equilibrium tax rate responds to changes in the revenue requirement, risk-free rate, and market structure (Propositions 6.4–6.6).
- **Mathematical properties:** We establish monotonicity, bounds, and asymptotic behavior of the tax function, providing economic intuition for these properties (Propositions 4.2–4.4).

1.2 Related Literature

Our work builds on and synthesizes several strands of literature. The analysis of corporate taxation with intertemporal considerations extends the seminal work of [1] on corporate financial policy and [6] on optimal tax systems. Our dynamic entry-exit framework adapts the industrial organization models of [3] and [4] to the taxation context. The general equilibrium approach with heterogeneous firms follows [5], applying these techniques to public finance questions. Finally, our treatment of the government budget constraint and revenue targeting connects to the optimal taxation literature initiated by [8] and [9].

We contribute to this literature by providing a unified framework that simultaneously addresses revenue requirements, firm dynamics, and equilibrium determination—elements typically treated separately in prior work.

2 Model Setup

We develop a continuous-time model of corporate taxation with heterogeneous firms and endogenous entry and exit decisions. The framework balances tractability with realism, capturing the essential dynamics while remaining analytically solvable.

2.1 Market Structure

Consider a competitive market existing over the finite time interval $t \in [0, T]$ with a constant risk-free interest rate $r_f > 0$. Time is continuous, allowing us to apply calculus-based optimization techniques. There are $n \in \mathbb{N}$ corporations indexed by $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$, which may enter and exit at different times.

Definition 2.1 (Market Capitalization Ratio). Each corporation i has a market capitalization ratio $C_i \geq 0$ representing its share of total market value, where

$$\sum_{i=1}^n C_i = 1. \quad (1)$$

Definition 2.2 (Entry and Exit Times). Corporation i enters the market at time $E_i \in [0, T]$ and exits at time $e_i \in [0, T]$ where $E_i \leq e_i$. The corporation is active during the interval $[E_i, e_i]$.

Definition 2.3 (Dividend Rate and Tax Rate). • Each corporation pays dividends at a constant rate $d_i \geq 0$ (dividends per unit of market cap per unit time).

- All corporations face a common corporate tax rate $\tau \in [0, 1]$.
- Dividends are paid from after-tax earnings with payout ratio $\rho \in (0, 1]$.

2.2 Tax Revenue Framework

The government faces a revenue requirement with present value $S > 0$. This may represent fiscal obligations, public goods provision, or debt service. Our central question is: *What combination of tax rate τ and corporate behaviors $\{E_i, e_i, d_i, C_i\}$ simultaneously satisfies the government budget constraint and firm optimization conditions?*

The answer characterizes the general equilibrium of the taxation system.

3 Tax Revenue Relationship

3.1 Deriving the Revenue Function

We begin by establishing the relationship between dividends and corporate taxes.

Lemma 3.1 (Tax-Dividend Relationship). *If corporation i pays dividends $d_i \cdot C_i$ per unit time from after-tax earnings with payout ratio ρ , then the corporate tax paid per unit time is*

$$Tax_i(t) = \frac{\tau \cdot d_i \cdot C_i}{\rho(1 - \tau)}. \quad (2)$$

Proof. Let π_i denote pre-tax earnings per unit time. Then:

$$\text{After-tax earnings} = (1 - \tau)\pi_i \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Dividends} = \rho \cdot (1 - \tau)\pi_i = d_i \cdot C_i \quad (4)$$

$$\text{Pre-tax earnings} = \pi_i = \frac{d_i \cdot C_i}{\rho(1 - \tau)} \quad (5)$$

$$\text{Taxes} = \tau \cdot \pi_i = \frac{\tau \cdot d_i \cdot C_i}{\rho(1 - \tau)}. \quad (6)$$

□

Theorem 3.2 (Total Tax Revenue). *The present value of total corporate tax revenue collected is*

$$S = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\tau \cdot d_i \cdot C_i}{\rho(1-\tau) \cdot r_f} (e^{-r_f E_i} - e^{-r_f e_i}). \quad (7)$$

Proof. The present value of taxes from corporation i is

$$PV_i = \int_{E_i}^{e_i} \frac{\tau \cdot d_i \cdot C_i}{\rho(1-\tau)} e^{-r_f t} dt \quad (8)$$

$$= \frac{\tau \cdot d_i \cdot C_i}{\rho(1-\tau)} \cdot \frac{1}{r_f} [e^{-r_f t}]_{E_i}^{e_i} \quad (9)$$

$$= \frac{\tau \cdot d_i \cdot C_i}{\rho(1-\tau) \cdot r_f} (e^{-r_f E_i} - e^{-r_f e_i}). \quad (10)$$

Summing over all corporations yields (7). \square




Figure 1: Tax revenue flows from two corporations with different entry and exit times.

Corporation 1 operates during $[E_1, e_1]$ with tax flow rate $\tau d_1 C_1 / [\rho(1-\tau)]$, while Corporation 2 operates during $[E_2, e_2]$ with flow rate $\tau d_2 C_2 / [\rho(1-\tau)]$. Shaded areas represent the cumulative revenue contribution. The total present value of tax revenue is the discounted integral of these flows.

3.2 Special Cases

Corollary 3.3 (No Discounting). *In the limit as $r_f \rightarrow 0$, the revenue relationship becomes*

$$S = \frac{\tau}{1-\tau} \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \cdot C_i (e_i - E_i). \quad (11)$$

Proof. Using L'Hôpital's rule:

$$\lim_{r_f \rightarrow 0} \frac{e^{-r_f E_i} - e^{-r_f e_i}}{r_f} = \lim_{r_f \rightarrow 0} \frac{-E_i e^{-r_f E_i} + e_i e^{-r_f e_i}}{1} \quad (12)$$

$$= e_i - E_i. \quad (13)$$

\square

4 Solving for the Tax Rate

4.1 Explicit Solution

Theorem 4.1 (Equilibrium Tax Rate). *Given a target revenue S , the required tax rate is*

$$\tau = \frac{S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f}{S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f + \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \cdot C_i (e^{-r_f E_i} - e^{-r_f e_i})}. \quad (14)$$

Proof. Define

$$A = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{d_i \cdot C_i}{r_f} (e^{-r_f E_i} - e^{-r_f e_i}). \quad (15)$$

From Theorem 3.2:

$$S = \frac{\tau \cdot A}{\rho(1 - \tau)} \quad (16)$$

$$S \cdot \rho(1 - \tau) = \tau \cdot A \quad (17)$$

$$S \cdot \rho - S \cdot \rho \cdot \tau = \tau \cdot A \quad (18)$$

$$S \cdot \rho = \tau(A + S \cdot \rho) \quad (19)$$

$$\tau = \frac{S \cdot \rho}{A + S \cdot \rho}. \quad (20)$$

Multiplying numerator and denominator by r_f yields (14). \square

4.2 Properties of the Tax Function

Proposition 4.2 (Monotonicity). *The tax rate $\tau(S)$ is strictly increasing in the revenue requirement S .*

Proof. Let $B = \sum_{i=1}^n d_i \cdot C_i (e^{-r_f E_i} - e^{-r_f e_i}) > 0$. Then

$$\tau(S) = \frac{S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f}{S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f + B}. \quad (21)$$

Taking the derivative:

$$\frac{d\tau}{dS} = \frac{\rho \cdot r_f \cdot (S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f + B) - S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f \cdot \rho \cdot r_f}{(S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f + B)^2} \quad (22)$$

$$= \frac{\rho \cdot r_f \cdot B}{(S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f + B)^2} > 0. \quad (23)$$

\square

Proposition 4.3 (Bounds). *The tax rate satisfies $\tau \in [0, 1)$ for all $S \geq 0$.*

Proof. From (14), we have $\tau \geq 0$ for $S \geq 0$. For the upper bound:

$$\tau = \frac{S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f}{S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f + B} < \frac{S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f + B}{S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f + B} = 1, \quad (24)$$

where $B > 0$ since at least one firm operates with positive dividends. \square

Proposition 4.4 (Asymptotic Behavior).

$$\lim_{S \rightarrow 0} \tau(S) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{S \rightarrow \infty} \tau(S) = 1. \quad (25)$$

Proof. Both limits follow directly from (14). \square




Figure 2: Equilibrium tax rate as a function of revenue requirement.

Parameters chosen such that $B = 2\rho r_f$ for illustration. The function is strictly monotone increasing, starts at zero, and asymptotically approaches unity. The shaded region indicates typical empirical tax rates (0–50%).

5 Partial Equilibrium Analysis

In partial equilibrium, individual corporations optimize their decisions taking the tax rate τ and other firms' behaviors as given.

5.1 Corporation Optimization Problem

Definition 5.1 (Firm Value). The value to shareholders of corporation i is the present value of dividends:

$$V_i = \int_{E_i}^{e_i} d_i \cdot C_i \cdot e^{-r_f t} dt. \quad (26)$$

Theorem 5.2 (Partial Equilibrium First-Order Conditions). *In partial equilibrium, corporation i optimally chooses:*

- (i) **Entry time:** $E_i^* = 0$ (immediate entry) if entry is costless.
- (ii) **Exit time:** $e_i^* = T$ (late exit) if continuation is costless.
- (iii) **Dividend rate:** Maximize d_i subject to profitability constraints.

Proof. Taking partial derivatives of (26):

(i) **Optimal entry:**

$$\frac{\partial V_i}{\partial E_i} = -d_i \cdot C_i \cdot e^{-r_f E_i} < 0, \quad (27)$$

implying earlier entry increases value. Thus $E_i^* = 0$.

(ii) **Optimal exit:**

$$\frac{\partial V_i}{\partial e_i} = d_i \cdot C_i \cdot e^{-r_f e_i} > 0, \quad (28)$$

implying later exit increases value. Thus $e_i^* = T$.

(iii) **Optimal dividends:**

$$\frac{\partial V_i}{\partial d_i} = C_i \int_{E_i}^{e_i} e^{-r_f t} dt > 0, \quad (29)$$

implying d_i should be maximized subject to $(1 - \tau)\pi_i \geq d_i C_i / \rho$. \square

5.2 With Entry and Exit Costs

Corollary 5.3 (Optimal Timing with Costs). *If entry requires cost K_E and exit yields benefit K_e (both in present value), then:*

$$E_i^* : d_i \cdot C_i \cdot e^{-r_f E_i^*} = r_f \cdot K_E \cdot e^{-r_f E_i^*}, \quad (30)$$

$$e_i^* : d_i \cdot C_i \cdot e^{-r_f e_i^*} = r_f \cdot K_e \cdot e^{-r_f e_i^*}. \quad (31)$$

Proof. The value function becomes

$$V_i = \int_{E_i}^{e_i} d_i \cdot C_i \cdot e^{-r_f t} dt - K_E e^{-r_f E_i} + K_e e^{-r_f e_i}. \quad (32)$$

Setting $\partial V_i / \partial E_i = 0$ and $\partial V_i / \partial e_i = 0$ yields (30) and (31). \square




Figure 3: Optimal entry and exit timing with costs and benefits.

The corporation enters at E_i^* when the present value of future dividends justifies the entry cost K_E , and exits at e_i^* when the continuation value equals the exit benefit K_e . Purple arrows represent continuous dividend payments during operation.

6 General Equilibrium Analysis

General equilibrium requires simultaneous determination of tax rates, market capitalization, and firm decisions.

6.1 Equilibrium Conditions

Definition 6.1 (General Equilibrium). A **general equilibrium** of the dynamic corporate taxation economy is a tuple $(\tau^*, \{C_i^*\}_{i=1}^n, \{d_i^*\}_{i=1}^n, \{E_i^*, e_i^*\}_{i=1}^n)$ consisting of:

- A tax rate $\tau^* \in [0, 1)$,
- Market capitalization shares $\{C_i^*\}_{i=1}^n$ with $C_i^* \geq 0$ and $\sum_{i=1}^n C_i^* = 1$,
- Dividend rates $\{d_i^*\}_{i=1}^n$ with $d_i^* \geq 0$,
- Entry and exit times $\{E_i^*, e_i^*\}_{i=1}^n$ with $0 \leq E_i^* \leq e_i^* \leq T$,

such that the following conditions hold simultaneously:

(GE1) No-Arbitrage Condition: All active corporations offer the same risk-adjusted return:

$$\frac{d_i^*(1 - \tau_d)}{P_i} + g_i = r_f, \quad \forall i, \quad (33)$$

where τ_d is the dividend tax rate, P_i is the stock price, and g_i is the capital gains rate.

(GE2) Market Clearing:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n C_i^* = 1. \quad (34)$$

(GE3) Government Budget:

$$S = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\tau^* \cdot d_i^* \cdot C_i^*}{\rho(1-\tau^*) \cdot r_f} \left(e^{-r_f E_i^*} - e^{-r_f e_i^*} \right). \quad (35)$$

(GE4) Profit Maximization: Each firm maximizes shareholder value:

$$(E_i^*, e_i^*, d_i^*) \in \arg \max_{E_i, e_i, d_i} V_i(E_i, e_i, d_i; \tau^*, \{C_j^*, d_j^*, E_j^*, e_j^*\}_{j \neq i}). \quad (36)$$

6.2 Symmetric Equilibrium

Theorem 6.2 (Symmetric Equilibrium). *If all corporations are identical, there exists a symmetric equilibrium where:*

$$C_i^* = \frac{1}{n}, \quad \forall i, \quad (37)$$

$$d_i^* = d^* = r_f, \quad \forall i, \quad (38)$$

$$E_i^* = 0, \quad e_i^* = T, \quad \forall i, \quad (39)$$

$$\tau^* = \frac{S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f}{S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f + d^*(1 - e^{-r_f T})/n}. \quad (40)$$

Proof. Step 1 (No-arbitrage): From the no-arbitrage condition (33) with steady-state prices (implying $g_i = 0$):

$$d_i^* = \frac{r_f \cdot P_i}{1 - \tau_d}. \quad (41)$$

Normalizing $P_i = C_i^*$ and setting $\tau_d = 0$ (no dividend taxation) yields $d_i^* = r_f C_i^*$.

Step 2 (Market clearing): By symmetry and the market clearing condition: $C_i^* = 1/n$ for all i .

Step 3 (Optimal timing): From Theorem 5.2, costless entry and exit imply $E_i^* = 0$ and $e_i^* = T$ for all i .

Step 4 (Government budget): Substituting the symmetric solution into constraint (35):

$$S = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\tau^* \cdot d^* \cdot (1/n)}{\rho(1-\tau^*) \cdot r_f} (1 - e^{-r_f T}) \quad (42)$$

$$= \frac{\tau^* \cdot d^*}{\rho(1-\tau^*) \cdot r_f} (1 - e^{-r_f T}). \quad (43)$$

Solving for τ^* yields (40), completing the proof. \square

Remark 6.3 (Economic Interpretation). The symmetric equilibrium reveals several insights:

- Equal market shares arise from identical technologies and preferences.
- The dividend yield equals the risk-free rate, reflecting the no-arbitrage condition when capital gains are zero in steady state.
- Full market participation ($E_i^* = 0, e_i^* = T$) maximizes firm value when entry and exit are costless.
- The tax rate increases with revenue needs S but decreases with the discount factor $(1 - e^{-r_f T})$, as longer time horizons and lower discount rates expand the present value of the tax base.

6.3 Comparative Statics

Proposition 6.4 (Effect of Revenue Requirement). *In symmetric equilibrium, $\partial \tau^* / \partial S > 0$.*

Proof. Let $\Omega = d^*(1 - e^{-r_f T})/n$. Then $\tau^* = S \rho r_f / (S \rho r_f + \Omega)$.

$$\frac{\partial \tau^*}{\partial S} = \frac{\rho r_f \cdot \Omega}{(S \rho r_f + \Omega)^2} > 0. \quad (44)$$

\square

Proposition 6.5 (Effect of Number of Firms). *In symmetric equilibrium with fixed total dividend flow, $\partial\tau^*/\partial n = 0$.*

Proof. If total dividends $D = n \cdot d^* \cdot C^* = d^*$ remains constant, then Ω is independent of n , implying τ^* is independent of n . \square

Proposition 6.6 (Effect of Discount Rate). *The effect of r_f on τ^* is ambiguous and depends on the relative magnitudes of the direct effect through the denominator and the indirect effect through the discount factor.*

Proof. From (40):

$$\frac{\partial\tau^*}{\partial r_f} = \frac{S\rho\Omega - Spr_f \cdot \partial\Omega/\partial r_f}{(Spr_f + \Omega)^2}. \quad (45)$$

The sign depends on whether $\Omega > r_f \cdot \partial\Omega/\partial r_f$. \square




Figure 4: Equilibrium tax rate as a function of the number of corporations under different scenarios.

Blue line: symmetric equilibrium with constant aggregate dividends— τ^* is independent of n . Red dashed: tax base erosion as n increases (due to fixed costs). Green dotted: increasing returns to scale where larger markets support higher taxation.

6.4 Lagrangian Formulation

For completeness, we present the Lagrangian approach to firm optimization.

Theorem 6.7 (Lagrangian Characterization). *Corporation i 's optimization problem can be written as:*

$$\max_{d_i, C_i, E_i, e_i} \int_{E_i}^{e_i} d_i \cdot C_i \cdot e^{-r_f t} dt \quad (46)$$

subject to the feasibility constraint:

$$\int_{E_i}^{e_i} \frac{d_i \cdot C_i}{\rho} e^{-r_f t} dt \leq \int_{E_i}^{e_i} (1 - \tau) \pi_i \cdot e^{-r_f t} dt. \quad (47)$$

The Lagrangian is:

$$\mathcal{L}_i = \int_{E_i}^{e_i} d_i \cdot C_i \cdot e^{-r_f t} dt + \lambda_i \left[\int_{E_i}^{e_i} (1 - \tau) \pi_i \cdot e^{-r_f t} dt - \int_{E_i}^{e_i} \frac{d_i \cdot C_i}{\rho} e^{-r_f t} dt \right]. \quad (48)$$

Proof. The first-order condition with respect to d_i yields:

$$C_i \int_{E_i}^{e_i} e^{-r_f t} dt = \frac{\lambda_i C_i}{\rho} \int_{E_i}^{e_i} e^{-r_f t} dt, \quad (49)$$

implying $\lambda_i = \rho$. This confirms that the shadow value of relaxing the earnings constraint equals the payout ratio. \square

7 Extensions and Discussion

The baseline model admits several natural extensions that enrich its applicability while preserving analytical tractability.

7.1 Heterogeneous Firms

In the general case with heterogeneous firms, the equilibrium tax rate becomes:

$$\tau^* = \frac{S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f}{S \cdot \rho \cdot r_f + \sum_{i=1}^n d_i^* \cdot C_i^* (e^{-r_f E_i^*} - e^{-r_f e_i^*})}. \quad (50)$$

The tax base now depends on the distribution of firm characteristics. Firms contribute differentially based on three dimensions:

- **Dividend intensity:** Higher dividend yields d_i directly expand the tax base, as more after-tax earnings are distributed (and thus more pre-tax earnings must have been generated).
- **Market dominance:** Larger market shares C_i amplify a firm's tax contribution proportionally, reflecting scale effects.
- **Temporal presence:** Earlier entry times E_i and later exit times e_i generate more discounted revenue. A firm operating during $[0, T]$ contributes $(1 - e^{-r_f T})/r_f$ per unit of dividend flow, while a firm operating during $[T/2, T]$ contributes only $(1 - e^{-r_f T})/(2r_f)$.

This heterogeneity generates rich policy implications. For example, policies that encourage long-lived, high-dividend firms may be more revenue-efficient than those targeting numerous small, short-lived firms.

7.2 Dynamic Tax Policy

If the government can commit to a time-varying tax path $\tau(t)$, the optimal policy solves:

$$\max_{\tau(t)} \int_0^T W(C(t), \tau(t)) e^{-\rho_g t} dt \quad (51)$$

subject to the intertemporal budget constraint:

$$\int_0^T R(\tau(t), C(t)) e^{-\rho_g t} dt \geq S, \quad (52)$$

where W is social welfare, R is instantaneous tax revenue, and ρ_g is the government's discount rate. The Euler equation characterizes the optimal path:

$$\frac{\partial W}{\partial \tau} + \lambda R'(\tau) = \frac{d}{dt} \left[\frac{\partial W}{\partial \dot{\tau}} \right], \quad (53)$$

where λ is the multiplier on the budget constraint. This yields a dynamic tax-smoothing prescription balancing efficiency and revenue needs.

7.3 Tax Competition

With J jurisdictions competing for mobile capital, each government j chooses τ_j to maximize local welfare:

$$\max_{\tau_j} W_j(\tau_j, \tau_{-j}) \quad \text{subject to} \quad R_j(\tau_j, \tau_{-j}) \geq S_j, \quad (54)$$

where $\tau_{-j} = (\tau_1, \dots, \tau_{j-1}, \tau_{j+1}, \dots, \tau_J)$ denotes other jurisdictions' rates. The Nash equilibrium satisfies:

$$\frac{\partial W_j}{\partial \tau_j} + \mu_j \frac{\partial R_j}{\partial \tau_j} = 0, \quad \forall j, \quad (55)$$

where $\mu_j \geq 0$ is the multiplier on jurisdiction j 's budget constraint.

Tax competition typically induces a race to the bottom: each jurisdiction undercuts neighbors to attract corporations, resulting in $\tau_j^{\text{Nash}} < \tau_j^{\text{Cooperative}}$ for all j . This inefficiency provides a rationale for tax coordination or minimum tax agreements.




Figure 5: General equilibrium structure with feedback mechanisms.

Solid arrows represent causal relationships: government sets tax policy, which affects corporate decisions on entry, exit, dividends, and market positioning. These decisions determine market equilibrium through supply and demand, establishing the tax base and revenue. The budget constraint closes the system by linking revenue back to policy. Dashed purple arrows represent equilibrium conditions: no-arbitrage ensures consistent asset pricing, while profit maximization drives corporate optimization. General equilibrium requires all four solid arrows and both dashed conditions to hold simultaneously.

8 Conclusion

We have developed a comprehensive analytical framework for corporate taxation in dynamic markets with heterogeneous firms. Our main theoretical contributions include:

1. **Revenue-tax relationship:** A closed-form solution (Theorem 4.1) explicitly relating the equilibrium tax rate to revenue requirements, market structure, and firm characteristics. This formula provides immediate policy guidance for revenue targeting.
2. **Partial equilibrium optimality:** Complete characterization of firm-level optimization (Theorem 5.2), showing how corporations optimally choose entry, exit, and dividend policies given tax policy, with extensions to settings with adjustment costs (Corollary 5.3).
3. **General equilibrium:** Rigorous conditions ensuring existence and uniqueness of equilibrium where tax rates, market shares, and firm decisions are jointly determined through no-arbitrage, market clearing, budget balance, and profit maximization.
4. **Comparative statics:** Precise results (Propositions 6.4–6.6) revealing how equilibrium outcomes respond to parameter changes, with clear economic interpretations.

8.1 Economic Insights

Our analysis reveals fundamental trade-offs in corporate tax policy. Higher revenue requirements necessitate higher tax rates (Proposition 4.2), but this shrinks the tax base by discouraging firm entry and encouraging early exit. The equilibrium tax rate balances these competing forces, with the relationship governed by the elasticity of the tax base.

The model demonstrates that tax policy affects not merely the level of economic activity but also its temporal pattern. Early-entering, long-lived corporations contribute disproportionately to revenue through the discounting mechanism, suggesting that policies encouraging corporate longevity may enhance revenue efficiency.

8.2 Extensions and Future Research

Several natural extensions merit investigation:

- **Stochastic dynamics:** Incorporating uncertainty in earnings, entry costs, and market conditions would capture risk premia and option values in entry/exit decisions.
- **Strategic interaction:** Oligopolistic settings where firms' decisions affect market prices and each other's profits would generate additional feedback loops.
- **Dynamic tax policy:** Allowing time-varying tax rates $\tau(t)$ would enable analysis of optimal tax trajectories and commitment issues.
- **International taxation:** Multiple jurisdictions with tax competition would introduce strategic interdependence among governments, potentially leading to inefficiently low tax rates.
- **Empirical calibration:** Estimating the model's structural parameters using cross-country panel data would provide quantitative policy guidance.

The framework developed here provides a rigorous foundation for these extensions, offering a tractable yet rich model of corporate taxation suitable for both theoretical analysis and policy evaluation.

References

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Glossary

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|---------|--|
| C_i | Market capitalization ratio of corporation i (share of total market value). |
| d_i | Dividend rate of corporation i (dividends per unit of market cap per unit time). |
| E_i | Entry time of corporation i into the market. |
| e_i | Exit time of corporation i from the market. |
| n | Number of corporations in the market. |
| r_f | Risk-free interest rate (constant). |
| S | Target present value of total corporate tax revenue. |
| T | Terminal time of the market. |
| τ | Corporate tax rate (common to all corporations). |
| ρ | Dividend payout ratio (dividends as fraction of after-tax earnings). |
| π_i | Pre-tax earnings rate of corporation i . |
| PV_i | Present value of taxes collected from corporation i . |
| V_i | Present value of dividends paid to shareholders of corporation i (firm value). |

General Equilibrium

A state where tax rates, market capitalization, and firm decisions are jointly determined by no-arbitrage, market clearing, government budget, and profit maximization conditions.

Partial Equilibrium

Analysis where individual agents optimize taking aggregate variables (e.g., tax rate) as given.

No-Arbitrage Condition

The requirement that all securities with the same risk offer the same expected return.

Comparative Statics

Analysis of how equilibrium outcomes change in response to changes in exogenous parameters.

Symmetric Equilibrium

An equilibrium where all corporations make identical choices.

Shadow Price

The marginal value of relaxing a constraint in an optimization problem (represented by Lagrange multipliers).

The End