

Private Treaty: The Diplomatic Tool of the Mercenary

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Abstract

The mercenary, a perennial figure in the history of conflict, occupies an ambiguous space between the battlefield and the negotiating table. While typically associated with brute force and transactional loyalty, mercenaries have historically engaged in private treaties—confidential agreements that functioned not only as instruments of employment but also as diplomatic tools. This article examines the private treaty as a mechanism by which mercenaries mediated between sovereign states, rulers, corporations, and non-state actors, tracing its evolution from medieval *condottieri* contracts to modern private military companies (PMCs). It argues that the private treaty, often obscured in the shadow of formal diplomacy, has shaped wars, alliances, and economies, thereby positioning the mercenary as an unconventional but essential diplomatic agent.

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1 Introduction

The concept of diplomacy is conventionally reserved for accredited representatives of the state. Yet, outside the traditional realm of embassies and foreign ministries, the mercenary has often acted as a quasi-diplomat. This paper uses the phrase *private treaty* to denote formal or informal contractual/transactional arrangements through which mercenary forces or PMCs secure political, economic, or diplomatic returns in exchange for force, protection, or political support.

Through private treaties—agreements that defined the terms of service, loyalty, and obligation—mercenaries exercised influence over conflicts and even rulers. Unlike public treaties ratified in parliaments or royal courts, private treaties remained cloaked in secrecy, negotiated directly between patron and fighter. This private diplomacy embodied a different rationality: pragmatic, transactional, and flexible.

The involvement of non-state military actors in diplomacy—negotiating local power arrangements, securing resource concessions, or contracting for state-provided privileges—has deep historical roots and modern echoes. We situate "private treaty" within three analytic registers: (1) historical precedent and institutional continuity, (2) legal and normative constraints, and (3) contemporary empirical patterns.

2 Historical Origins of the Private Treaty

2.1 Ancient Foundations

Mercenaries were ubiquitous in antiquity: Greek hoplites employed by Persian kings, Carthaginian reliance on Numidian cavalry, and Roman use of foreign auxiliaries rested on contractual understandings. For a survey of pre-modern non-sovereign force, see [5]. Though seldom preserved as public law, these agreements were binding private compacts—proto-treaties of war.

2.2 Renaissance Italy and the Rise of the *Condotta*

Renaissance Italy's condottieri (captains of fortune) provide an early model of negotiated private military-political bargains: state actors contracted captains with written *condotte* that combined military employment with rights, rents, and political privileges. These contracts frequently granted broad autonomy to commanders and acted as instruments of bargaining between city-states. The condottieri model demonstrates how contractualized private violence can carry diplomatic weight between polities.

Renaissance Italy perfected the private treaty through the *condotta*, stipulating payment, duration, rules of engagement, and limitations on violence. The ability of a city-state to hire or dismiss *condottieri* altered the balance of regional power as effectively as an alliance treaty, a tension that pervades early modern warfare and is noted in strategic discourse from Machiavelli onward [1, 2].

2.3 Imperial, Corporate, and Colonial Contexts

During the age of chartered companies, private treaties governed the employment of mercenaries by European and corporate actors. The East India Companies and their competitors leveraged such compacts to blend commerce, security, and diplomacy, producing an early form of *private* foreign policy [5].

3 Conceptual Framework

We propose a three-part framework for analyzing private treaties:

1. **Actors and Capacities:** states, client regimes, mercenary/PMC organizations, transnational corporations, and intermediaries (e.g., local elites).
2. **Exchange Objects:** security guarantees, direct payment, resource concessions (mining, concessions), political protection, or propaganda/media support.
3. **Modes of Tie:** explicit written contracts, shadow agreements (oral or mediated), or de facto power-sharing arrangements (e.g., zones of influence guaranteed by armed providers).

4 Anatomy of the Private Treaty

A typical private treaty between a mercenary leader and a patron includes:

- **Scope of service:** offensive, defensive, training, or advisory;
- **Compensation:** salary, retainers, land grants, performance bonuses, resource concessions;
- **Duration and termination:** renewal, exit clauses, sanctions for breach;
- **Loyalty clauses:** non-defection, exclusivity, and conflict-of-interest provisions;
- **Secrecy and deniability:** non-disclosure, indirect payment channels, and cut-outs.

These provisions jointly enable rulers to project power without formal declarations of war, providing *plausible deniability*. In this sense, the private treaty is simultaneously a contract of arms and a diplomatic maneuver [3].

5 Legal and Normative Environment

International law treats mercenaries, PMCs, and their uses in a fragmented fashion: the UN Mercenary Convention (2001) attempts to proscribe recruitment/use/financing of mercenaries, but state practice and definitional ambiguities limit its reach; PMCs often operate through commercial contracts that avoid mercenary definitions and exploit legal gaps. National responses also vary widely.

6 Contemporary Patterns: PMCs, Private Treaties, and Geopolitics

Recent years have shown a proliferation of private-state arrangements in fragile or contested states. Contemporary PMCs-even when not labelled "mercenaries"-frequently secure exclusive concessions, protect regimes, and perform diplomatic bridging functions between sponsor states and local authorities. Case studies of modern actors illustrate how private treaties can be used as tools of influence and resource capture.

7 The Mercenary as Diplomatic Actor

7.1 Negotiators in Armor

Mercenary captains such as John Hawkwood in Italy and Albrecht von Wallenstein in the Thirty Years' War wielded power not only on the battlefield but also at negotiation tables. Their private treaties forced concessions from princes and magistrates, revealing the mercenaries dual role as soldier and diplomat [2].

7.2 The Strategic Value of Ambiguity

Because private treaties are unofficial, they permit actors to bypass formal diplomatic channels. States and corporations can employ mercenaries while maintaining official neutrality, manipulating the balance of power without incurring overt diplomatic costs. This ambiguity persists in contemporary PMCs [4].

8 Modern Parallels: Private Military Companies

Modern PMCs inherit the legacy of private treaties, packaging them as commercial contracts. Typical features include:

1. **Resource diplomacy:** security-for-concessions bargains in extractive sectors;
2. **Proxy warfare:** enabling state deniability in sensitive theaters;
3. **Stability and training:** contracts framed as risk management and institutional capacity building.

The result is a gray zone where commercial law, international humanitarian law, and host-state regulation intersect, often leaving accountability fragmented [3, 4].

9 Legal and Ethical Dimensions

International law stigmatizes *mercenarism* (e.g., Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 1977; UN Mercenary Convention, 1989). Yet many PMCs and their clients avoid the label through status designations (contractors, trainers, consultants, etc.) and careful drafting that navigates elements of the legal definition. The private treaty thus exploits legal ambiguity, reinforcing its role as a diplomatic loophole. For example, the requirement that mercenaries be motivated by "private gain" and not be members of armed forces—are elements that can be obfuscated by corporate structures and host-state commissions.

10 Policy and Normative Implications

Private treaties blur lines between private enterprise and interstate diplomacy, creating accountability gaps. Key policy responses can include:

- Strengthening transparency requirements for security contracts and commercial concessions.
- Clarifying legal definitions to distinguish commercial PMCs from mercenaries covered by treaties.
- International monitoring mechanisms for resource-for-security arrangements.
- Local governance measures to increase accountability of client regimes.

11 Conclusion

Private treaties represent a structural instrument through which non-state armed actors exercise diplomatic influence. Their persistence from *condotte* to modern PMCs suggests a durable logic: armed actors with bargaining power will seek institutionalized returns, and states will leverage such actors where conventional diplomacy or force is politically costly. Addressing the challenges requires legal clarity, transparent contracting, and international cooperation.

The private treaty reveals the mercenary not merely as a hired fighter but as a diplomatic tool in the shadow of official statecraft. From *condottieri* to PMCs, private treaties have shaped wars, shifted alliances, and facilitated covert diplomacy. Understanding this hidden diplomacy is essential to grasp the modern landscape of conflict, where the boundary between public treaty and private contract grows increasingly porous.

Figures




Figure 1: An evolutionary timeline from private war compacts to modern PMCs.




Figure 2: Gray-zone diplomacy: official state relations and private military contracts.




Figure 3: Gray-zone diplomacy network showing official state relations alongside private security arrangements.

Notes on Methodology

This paper synthesizes historical literature, legal texts and commentaries on mercenary law, and contemporary investigative reports on PMCs and private networks of influence using political theory, economic history, and international legal analysis. Figures are original schematic visualizations intended to clarify conceptual relations—not historical maps or archival reproductions.

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The End