The Complete Treatise on Obtaining Private Information in Co-operative Games

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Abstract

This treatise provides a comprehensive overview of the theory and practice of obtaining private information in co-operative games. We review the mathematical foundations of co-operative game theory, analyze the role of information asymmetry, and present the principal methods for eliciting private information, including signaling, screening, and mechanism design. The treatise also discusses the integration of privacy concerns into mechanism design and illustrates key concepts with vector graphics.

The treatise ends with 'The End'

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1 Introduction

Co-operative game theory studies how groups of rational agents (players) can form coalitions and share the resulting collective gains. A central challenge in such games is the presence of *private information* - when some players possess knowledge relevant to the game that others do not. This treatise surveys the theoretical underpinnings and practical methods for obtaining private information in co-operative games, with a focus on signaling, screening, and mechanism design. We also address the growing importance of privacy in modern applications.

2 Fundamentals of Co-operative Game Theory

2.1 Characteristic Function and Coalitions

A co-operative game with transferable utility (TU) is defined by a set of players $N = \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$ and a characteristic function $v : 2^N \to \mathbb{R}$, where $v(S)$ denotes the value that coalition $S \subseteq N$ can guarantee for itself. The main question is how to allocate $v(N)$ among the players in a way that is fair and stable [1].

2.2 Solution Concepts

- **Core:** The set of allocations where no coalition can improve upon by breaking away.
- **Shapley Value:** A unique allocation rule based on each player's average marginal contribution.
- **Nucleolus:** Focuses on minimizing the maximum dissatisfaction among coalitions.

2.3 Vector Graphic: Coalition Structure



Figure 1: Coalition structure in a 3-player co-operative game.

3 Information Asymmetry in Co-operative Games

3.1 Types of Information Asymmetry

- **Private Information:** Players have information (e.g., costs, valuations) unknown to others.
- **Incomplete Information:** Players lack knowledge of the full game structure or others' preferences [2].

3.2 Implications

Information asymmetry complicates coalition formation, bargaining, and payoff division. It can lead to instability (e.g., an empty core) and disputes over fairness [3].

4 Methods for Obtaining Private Information

4.1 Signaling

In signaling, informed players take actions (signals) to credibly convey private information to others. Signals may be costly or costless, and the resulting equilibria can be separating, pooling, or semi-separating [4].

Figure 2: Basic structure of a signaling game.

4.2 Screening

Screening is initiated by the uninformed party, who offers a menu of contracts or choices designed so that each type of agent self-selects the option intended for them, thus revealing their private information [4].

4.3 Mechanism Design

Mechanism design constructs rules or protocols that incentivize agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Key concepts include incentive compatibility and the revelation principle. Modern mechanism design also incorporates privacy, using tools like differential privacy to ensure that mechanisms do not reveal too much about any individual's private information [5].



Figure 3: Mechanism design.

Agents report private information to a designer, who allocates resources.

5 Privacy and Modern Mechanism Design

Recent advances integrate privacy into mechanism design, ensuring that agents' private information is protected even as it is elicited for efficient outcomes. Differential privacy and joint differential privacy are key tools in this area [5].

6 Applications

- **Market Games:** Buyers and sellers form coalitions, but asymmetric information about valuations or costs affects bargaining power and outcomes.
- **Voting Games:** Voters with different information or preferences form coalitions to pass measures.
- **Cost Allocation:** Joint projects where parties have private information about their costs or benefits [1].

7 Summary Table

Method	**Initiator**	**How Information is Revealed**
Signaling	Informed agent	Sends (possibly costly) signals
Screening	Uninformed agent	Menu of contracts, self-selection
Mechanism Design	Designer/principal	Incentivizes truthful reporting

Table 1: Summary of methods for obtaining private information in co-operative games.

8 Conclusion

Obtaining private information in co-operative games is a central challenge in economic theory and multi-agent systems. Signaling, screening, and mechanism design each offer distinct but complementary approaches to overcoming information asymmetry. Modern research increasingly integrates privacy concerns, ensuring that mechanisms are not only efficient and incentive-compatible but also respect agents' preferences for privacy.

References

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