# The Pigeon-Hole Principle Applied to the Risk-Free Rates and Financial Premia of Economies

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**Abstract**

In this paper, we apply the Pigeonhole Principle - a fundamental result from combinatorics - to the analysis of financial risk premia across economies. Specifically, we examine constraints on the simultaneous optimization of risk-free rates, inflation risk premia, equity risk premia, and liquidity risk premia. Our analysis demonstrates that when central banks and policymakers attempt to minimize all risk premia simultaneously across $n$ economies with fewer than $n$ independent policy instruments, at least one economy must experience suboptimal risk premium configurations. We provide theoretical foundations, mathematical proofs, and empirical implications for international finance, monetary policy coordination, and portfolio allocation strategies.

The paper ends with “The End”

## 1 Introduction

The Pigeonhole Principle (PHP), attributed to Dirichlet [1], states that if $n$ items are placed into $m$ containers with $n > m$, then at least one container must contain more than one item. Despite its simplicity, this principle has profound implications across mathematics, computer science, and increasingly, economics and finance [2, 3].

In modern financial economics, economies face multiple dimensions of risk that manifest as premia: inflation risk, equity risk, liquidity risk, and the baseline risk-free rate. Central banks and policymakers utilize various instruments - interest rate policy, quantitative easing, reserve requirements, and macroprudential regulations - to manage these premia. However, the number of effective policy instruments is often limited relative to the number of risk dimensions requiring management.

This paper formalizes the application of the PHP to demonstrate fundamental constraints in economic policy optimization. We show that when $k$ policy instruments are available to manage $n$ risk premia across $m$ economies, where $mn > k$, perfect optimization across all dimensions becomes impossible, necessitating trade-offs.

## 2 Mathematical Preliminaries

### 2.1 The Pigeonhole Principle

**Definition 1** (Pigeonhole Principle). Let $A$ and $B$ be finite sets with $|A| = n$ and $|B| = m$. If $f : A \to B$ is any function and $n > m$, then there exists at least one element $b \in B$ such that $|f^{-1}(b)| \geq 2$.

**Theorem 1** (Generalized Pigeonhole Principle). *If $n$ objects are distributed among $m$ containers, then at least one container contains at least $\lceil n/m \rceil$ objects.*

### 2.2 Risk Premia Framework

Let $\mathcal{E} = \{E_1, E_2, \ldots, E_m\}$ denote a set of $m$ economies. For each economy $E_i$, we define four fundamental risk metrics:

1. **Risk-Free Rate**: $r_i^f$ representing the baseline return on riskless assets
2. **Inflation Risk Premium**: $\pi_i$ compensating for unexpected inflation
3. **Equity Risk Premium**: $\lambda_i$ representing excess returns on equity over risk-free rate
4. **Liquidity Risk Premium**: $\ell_i$ compensating for asset illiquidity

The state vector for economy $E_i$ is:

$$\mathbf{s}_i = \begin{pmatrix} r_i^f \\ \pi_i \\ \lambda_i \\ \ell_i \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^4 \tag{1}$$




4 policy instruments, 11 risk premia
$\Rightarrow$ At least one instrument manages $\geq 3$ premia

Figure 1: Visual representation of the Pigeonhole Principle applied to policy instruments (holes) and risk premia (pigeons). With 4 instruments and 11 premia from multiple economies, at least one instrument must manage multiple premia, creating policy trade-offs.

# 3 Policy Instruments and Mappings

Central banks and regulators possess a finite set of policy instruments $\mathcal{I} = \{I_1, I_2, \ldots, I_k\}$. Common instruments include:

- $I_1$: Policy interest rate (e.g., federal funds rate)
- $I_2$: Quantitative easing/tightening
- $I_3$: Reserve requirements
- $I_4$: Macroprudential regulations

- $I_5$: Forward guidance
- $I_6$: Foreign exchange interventions

Each instrument $I_j$ affects the state vectors $\{\mathbf{s}_i\}$ through a policy mapping:

$$\Phi : \mathcal{I} \to \prod_{i=1}^{m} \mathbb{R}^4 \tag{2}$$

The critical constraint is that $|\mathcal{I}| = k$ is typically much smaller than $4m$ (the total number of risk premia across all economies).

# 4 Main Results

## 4.1 Fundamental Impossibility Theorem

**Theorem 2** (Risk Premium Pigeonhole Theorem)**.** *Let there be $m$ economies, each with 4 risk premia to be managed, and $k < 4m$ policy instruments. Then it is impossible to independently optimize all $4m$ risk premia simultaneously. Specifically, at least $\lceil 4m/k \rceil$ risk premia must be influenced by the same policy instrument.*

*Proof.* Consider the mapping $\psi : \{\text{all risk premia}\} \to \mathcal{I}$ where each risk premium is assigned to the primary policy instrument affecting it. The domain has cardinality $4m$ and the codomain has cardinality $k$.

By the Generalized Pigeonhole Principle, since $4m > k$, there exists at least one instrument $I_j$ such that:

$$|\psi^{-1}(I_j)| \geq \left\lceil \frac{4m}{k} \right\rceil \tag{3}$$

This means at least one instrument must simultaneously affect $\lceil 4m/k \rceil$ different risk premia. Since these premia may have conflicting optimal values, the policymaker faces an unavoidable trade-off. □

**Corollary 3** (Single Economy Constraint)**.** *Even for a single economy ($m = 1$) with 4 risk premia, if fewer than 4 independent policy instruments exist, perfect independent optimization is impossible.*

## 4.2 International Coordination Constraints

**Theorem 4** (Cross-Border Spillover Theorem)**.** *In a system of $m$ economies with limited capital controls, where each economy has $k_i$ policy instruments and there are $4m$ total risk premia, the minimum number of premia experiencing suboptimal management is:*

$$\max \left\{ 0, 4m - \sum_{i=1}^{m} k_i \right\} \tag{4}$$




5 economies $\times$ 4 premia $=$ 20 dimensions
4 policy instruments shown $\Rightarrow$ 16+ premia constrained

Figure 2: Network of economies with cross-border policy spillovers. Each economy has 4 risk premia, but policy instruments (arrows) are limited and have spillover effects (dashed lines), creating unavoidable optimization conflicts via the Pigeonhole Principle.

### 4.3 Temporal Dynamics

The PHP constraints persist across time. Define the state trajectory:

$$\mathbf{S}(t) = \{\mathbf{s}_1(t), \mathbf{s}_2(t), \ldots, \mathbf{s}_m(t)\} \tag{5}$$

**Proposition 5** (Temporal Impossibility)**.** *For a planning horizon $[0, T]$ discretized into $N$ periods, and $m$ economies with 4 risk premia each, achieving optimal risk premia in all $4mN$ state-time combinations requires at least $4mN$ independent policy adjustments. With $k$ instruments, this necessitates at least $\lceil 4mN/k \rceil$ policy changes per instrument.*

## 5 Applications and Examples

### 5.1 The Trilemma Reconsidered

The Mundell-Fleming trilemma [4, 5] states that a country cannot simultaneously maintain:

1. Fixed exchange rate
2. Free capital movement
3. Independent monetary policy

Our framework generalizes this: with one primary instrument (monetary policy), three objectives cannot all be achieved - a direct application of PHP where $n = 3, m = 1$.

**Example 1** (Federal Reserve 2008-2015)**.** Following the financial crisis, the Fed aimed to:

- Lower risk-free rates (near zero)
- Manage inflation expectations ($\pi \approx 2\%$)
- Reduce equity risk premium (support markets)
- Address liquidity premia (credit spreads)

With primary instruments being the federal funds rate and quantitative easing ($k = 2$), and 4 objectives ($n = 4$), the PHP guarantees at least $\lceil 4/2 \rceil = 2$ objectives must be addressed by a single instrument, creating trade-offs evident in the prolonged low-rate environment.

## 5.2 Emerging Markets Crisis




Figure 3: Number of risk premia that cannot be independently optimized as a function of the number of economies, for different numbers of policy instruments. The constraint grows linearly: $\max\{0, 4m - k\}$ for each configuration.

Consider $m = 10$ emerging economies during a crisis, each facing elevated:

- Inflation risk premia due to currency depreciation
- Liquidity premia due to capital flight
- Equity risk premia due to economic uncertainty

With limited coordinated policy response ($k \approx 5 - 7$ instruments via IMF, regional central banks), we have $4m = 40$ premia and $k < 40$. The PHP guarantees that at least $40 - 7 = 33$ premia remain suboptimally managed, explaining why crises affect multiple countries severely despite policy interventions.

## 5.3 Quantitative Illustration

Table 1 shows the minimum number of risk premia that must share policy instruments across different scenarios.

Table 1: Pigeonhole constraints in various economic configurations

| Economies ($m$) | Instruments ($k$) | Total Premia | Min. Conflicts |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 |
| 3 | 5 | 12 | 8 |
| 5 | 8 | 20 | 13 |
| 10 | 12 | 40 | 29 |
| 20 | 15 | 80 | 66 |

# 6 Policy Implications

## 6.1 Instrument Independence

The analysis suggests that expanding the effective number of independent policy instruments is crucial. This includes:

1. **Institutional separation**: Distinct agencies for monetary policy, macroprudential regulation, and fiscal policy
2. **Technological innovation**: Digital currencies allowing negative rates, programmable money
3. **Market-based instruments**: Allowing market mechanisms to price certain risk premia

## 6.2 International Coordination

The cross-border spillover theorem implies benefits from policy coordination. If $\sum_{i=1}^{m} k_i$ increases through coordination, fewer premia remain constrained. This provides theoretical justification for:

- Central bank swap lines
- Coordinated interest rate policies
- Harmonized regulatory standards

## 6.3 Portfolio Management

For investors, the PHP implies:

**Theorem 6** (Diversification Limits)**.** *In a system with $4m$ risk premia and $k$ policy instruments where $4m > k$, at least $\lceil 4m/k \rceil - 1$ risk premia must be imperfectly hedged by policy, suggesting persistent risk premiums available for harvest.*

This justifies multi-strategy approaches and suggests that certain risk premia will remain elevated due to policy constraints, creating investment opportunities.

# 7 Extensions and Future Research

## 7.1 Continuous State Spaces

The discrete PHP can be extended to continuous settings using measure theory. Define the policy effectiveness measure:

$$\mu : \mathcal{B}(\mathbb{R}^{4m}) \to [0, 1] \tag{6}$$

where $\mathcal{B}(\mathbb{R}^{4m})$ is the Borel $\sigma$-algebra on the risk premium state space.

**Conjecture 1.** If the dimension of the effective policy instrument space (via differential geometry) is less than $4m$, then the measure of achievable optimal states is zero: $\mu(\text{Optimal States}) = 0$.

## 7.2 Stochastic Dynamics

Incorporating uncertainty, let $\mathbf{S}(t)$ follow a stochastic process:

$$d\mathbf{S}(t) = \boldsymbol{\mu}(\mathbf{S}, \mathcal{I}, t)dt + \boldsymbol{\Sigma}(\mathbf{S}, t)d\mathbf{W}(t) \tag{7}$$

where $\mathbf{W}(t)$ is a Wiener process. The PHP constrains the control space, limiting the achievable drift vector $\boldsymbol{\mu}$.

### 7.3 Game-Theoretic Considerations

When multiple policymakers act non-cooperatively, the PHP constraints tighten. With $m$ central banks each controlling $k_i$ instruments, the Nash equilibrium may involve suboptimal allocations even when $\sum_i k_i \geq 4m$ due to strategic interactions.

## 8 Conclusion

The Pigeonhole Principle, despite its elementary nature, provides profound insights into the fundamental constraints facing economic policymakers. Our analysis demonstrates that the simultaneous optimization of risk-free rates, inflation risk premia, equity risk premia, and liquidity risk premia across multiple economies is mathematically impossible when policy instruments are limited.

Key findings include:

- With $k$ policy instruments and $4m$ risk premia across $m$ economies, at least $4m - k$ premia cannot be independently optimized
- International coordination can alleviate but not eliminate these constraints
- The temporal dimension multiplies the constraint problem
- Portfolio managers can exploit systematically mispriced risk premia resulting from policy constraints

This framework provides a rigorous foundation for understanding policy trade-offs and suggests that institutional innovation to expand the effective policy instrument space may be as important as optimal use of existing instruments.

Future research should explore the stochastic dynamics, game-theoretic equilibria, and empirical manifestations of these theoretical constraints in actual financial markets and policy outcomes.

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