A Missile Theory of Annihilation of a Common Target Nation
(Extended Version)

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Abstract

In this paper, I extend the mathematical framework for analyzing survival probability and financial implications of missile attacks on a target nation, as introduced in the original "A Missile Theory of Annihilation of a Common Target Nation".

I develop four critical extensions: (1) a model for correlated attack strategies using copula theory; (2) a game-theoretic framework for coalition formation among attacking nations; (3) an optimal defense allocation strategy based on stochastic control theory; and (4) an integrated macroeconomic model that incorporates conflict risk into standard growth frameworks.

For each extension, I provide rigorous mathematical formulations, derive key theoretical results, and demonstrate applications through simulated scenarios.

The analysis reveals that attack correlation structures significantly impact survival probabilities, coalition formation follows a threshold pattern dependent on military capabilities, optimal defense strategies exhibit nonlinear responses to threat profiles and macroeconomic growth trajectories display regime-switching behavior under conflict risk.

These extensions enhance the quantitative tools available for geopolitical risk assessment and strategic decision-making.

1 Introduction

My paper "A Missile Theory of Annihilation of a Common Target Nation" [1] introduced a mathematical framework for analyzing the survival probability and financial implications when a target nation faces missile attacks from multiple adversaries. The original model derived the concept of the *eliminant* as the overall survival probability and established closed-form expressions for risk-adjusted interest rates incorporating annihilation risk.

While the original framework provided significant insights into geopolitical risk assessment, it relied on several simplifying assumptions that limit its applicability to complex real-world scenarios. In particular, the model assumed independence of attack strategies across nations, static coalition structures, uniform defense capabilities, and isolated macroeconomic effects.

This paper addresses these limitations by developing four key extensions:

1. **Correlated Attack Strategies:** I employ copula theory to model dependencies between missile launches across different nations, allowing for coordinated attack scenarios.

2. **Coalition Formation Analysis:** I develop a game-theoretic framework to analyze the conditions under which nations form attack coalitions and how these coalitions affect survival probabilities.

3. **Optimal Defense Allocation:** I formulate the target nation's defense resource allocation as a stochastic control problem and derive optimal strategies under various threat profiles.

4. **Macroeconomic Integration:** I incorporate conflict risk into standard macroeconomic growth models, analyzing how the threat of annihilation affects consumption, investment, and long-term growth trajectories.

For each extension, I provide rigorous mathematical formulations, derive key theoretical results, and demonstrate practical applications through simulated scenarios. These extensions significantly enhance the quantitative tools available for geopolitical risk assessment and strategic decision-making.

2 Correlated Attack Strategies

The original model assumed independence of missile attacks across nations. In reality, attacking nations may coordinate their strategies or respond to each other's actions. I extend the model to incorporate such correlations using copula theory.

2.1 Mathematical Framework

Definition 2.1 (Attack Process)**.** For each nation N_i, $i \neq j$, let $X_i(t)$ be the counting process representing the number of missiles fired by time t:

$$X_i(t) = \sum_{k=1}^{m_i} \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_i^k \leq t\}} \tag{1}$$

where τ_i^k is the launch time of the k-th missile from nation N_i.

To model dependencies between attack processes, I introduce a copula function that links the marginal distributions.

Definition 2.2 (Attack Copula)**.** The joint distribution of attack processes $(X_1(t), \dots, X_n(t))$ is given by:

$$F(x_1, \dots, x_n; t) = C(F_1(x_1; t), \dots, F_n(x_n; t); \theta) \tag{2}$$

where $F_i(x_i; t) = \mathbb{P}(X_i(t) \leq x_i)$ is the marginal distribution of $X_i(t)$, C is a copula function, and θ is the dependence parameter vector.

Theorem 2.3 (Correlated Eliminant)**.** *Under the correlated attack model, the eliminant at time t is given by:*

$$E(t) = \mathbb{E}\left[\prod_{i=1, i\neq j}^{n} (1 - s_i)^{X_i(t)}\right] \tag{3}$$

which depends on the joint distribution of $(X_1(t), \dots, X_n(t))$ characterized by the copula C.

Proof. Given the realizations $X_i(t) = x_i$ for each nation $i \neq j$, the conditional eliminant is:

$$\mathrm{E}(t | \{X_i(t) = x_i\}_{i \neq j}) = \prod_{i=1, i\neq j}^{n} (1 - s_i)^{x_i} \tag{4}$$

Taking the expectation over the joint distribution of $(X_1(t), \dots, X_n(t))$:

$$\mathrm{E}(t) = \mathbb{E}\left[\prod_{i=1, i\neq j}^{n} (1 - s_i)^{X_i(t)}\right] = \int \prod_{i=1, i\neq j}^{n} (1 - s_i)^{x_i} \, dF(x_1, \dots, x_n; t) \tag{5}$$

This integral depends on the joint distribution characterized by the copula C. □

2.2 Gaussian Copula Specification

For analytical tractability, I specify a Gaussian copula for the attack processes:

$$C(u_1, \dots, u_n; \Sigma) = \Phi_\Sigma(\Phi^{-1}(u_1), \dots, \Phi^{-1}(u_n)) \tag{6}$$

where Φ_Σ is the multivariate normal CDF with correlation matrix Σ, and Φ^{-1} is the inverse of the standard normal CDF.

Proposition 2.4. *For Poisson attack processes with intensities λ_i and Gaussian copula with correlation matrix Σ, the eliminant can be approximated as:*

$$E(t) \approx \exp\left(-\sum_{i=1, i\neq j}^{n} \lambda_i t(1-(1-s_i)) - \sum_{i<k, i,k\neq j} \rho_{ik}\sqrt{\lambda_i\lambda_k}\, t\, s_i s_k \right) \tag{7}$$

where ρ_{ik} is the correlation between nations i and k.

2.3 Simulation and Analysis



Figure 1: Impact of attack correlation on the eliminant for different success probabilities. Two nations with equal attack intensities $\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = 0.5$ and varying correlation parameter ρ.

Figure 1 illustrates the impact of correlation on the eliminant. Positive correlation (coordinated attacks) reduces survival probability, while negative correlation (alternating attacks) increases it. The effect is more pronounced with higher success probabilities.

Proposition 2.5 (Elasticity of Eliminant to Correlation)**.** *The elasticity of the eliminant with respect to the correlation parameter ρ is given by:*

$$\varepsilon_{E,\rho} = \frac{\partial \log E}{\partial \log \rho} = -\frac{\rho}{E(t)}\frac{\partial E(t)}{\partial \rho} \tag{8}$$

which is negative for positive ρ and positive for negative ρ.

3 Coalition Formation Analysis

In the original model, nations act independently. In reality, they may form coalitions to enhance their collective effectiveness. 1 develop a game-theoretic framework to analyze coalition formation dynamics.

3.1 Coalition Game Setup

Definition 3.1 (Coalition Structure). A coalition structure $\mathcal{C} = \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_k\}$ is a partition of the set of attacking nations $N \setminus \{N_j\}$ such that:

1. $\cup_{l=1}^{k} C_l = N \setminus \{N_j\}$
2. $C_l \cap C_{l'} = \emptyset$ for $l \neq l'$

Definition 3.2 (Coalition Value Function). For each coalition $C \subseteq N \setminus \{N_j\}$, the value function $v(C)$ represents the effectiveness of the coalition in terms of reducing the target nation's survival probability:

$$v(C) = 1 - \prod_{i \in C} (1 - s_i)^{m_i} \tag{9}$$

which is the probability that at least one nation in the coalition successfully annihilates the target.

Theorem 3.3 (Superadditivity of Coalition Value). *The coalition value function $v(C)$ is superadditive, i.e., for disjoint coalitions C_1 and C_2:*

$$v(C_1 \cup C_2) \geq v(C_1) + v(C_2) - v(C_1)v(C_2) \tag{10}$$

with equality if and only if $v(C_1) = 0$ or $v(C_2) = 0$.

Proof. For disjoint coalitions C_1 and C_2:

$$\begin{align}
v(C_1 \cup C_2) &= 1 - \prod_{i \in C_1 \cup C_2} (1 - s_i)^{m_i} \tag{11}\\
&= 1 - \prod_{i \in C_1} (1 - s_i)^{m_i} \prod_{i \in C_2} (1 - s_i)^{m_i} \tag{12}\\
&= 1 - (1 - v(C_1))(1 - v(C_2)) \tag{13}\\
&= v(C_1) + v(C_2) - v(C_1)v(C_2) \tag{14}
\end{align}$$

Since $v(C_1), v(C_2) \in [0, 1]$, we have $v(C_1)v(C_2) \geq 0$, with equality if and only if $v(C_1) = 0$ or $v(C_2) = 0$. ∎

3.2 Core Stability and Nash Equilibrium

Definition 3.4 (Core Coalition Structure). A coalition structure $\mathcal{C}^* = \{C_1^*, C_2^*, \dots, C_k^*\}$ is in the core if there is no coalition C' such that:

$$\sum_{i \in C'} u_i(C') > \sum_{i \in C'} u_i(\mathcal{C}^*) \tag{15}$$

where $u_i(C)$ is the utility of nation i in coalition C.

Theorem 3.5 (Grand Coalition Stability). *If the cost of coalition formation is subadditive and the sharing rule is proportional to military capability, then the grand coalition $N \setminus \{N_j\}$ is stable if and only if:*

$$\frac{v(N \setminus \{N_j\})}{\sum_{i \neq j} c_i} \geq \max_{C \subset N \setminus \{N_j\}} \frac{v(C)}{\sum_{i \in C} c_i} \tag{16}$$

where c_i is the military capability of nation i.

Proof. Under proportional sharing, nation i receives utility:

$$u_i(C) = \frac{c_i}{\sum_{k \in C} c_k} v(C) - \kappa_i(C) \tag{17}$$

where $\kappa_i(C)$ is the cost of nation i joining coalition C.

The grand coalition is stable if for all coalitions C:

$$\sum_{i \in C} u_i(N \setminus \{N_j\}) \geq \sum_{i \in C} u_i(C) \tag{18}$$

This simplifies to the condition in the theorem when costs are subadditive. □

3.3 Threshold Dynamics and Visualization



Figure 2: Coalition formation thresholds as a function of military capability ratio and cost-benefit parameter β. The regions above each curve represent parameter combinations where coalition formation is beneficial.

Figure 2 illustrates the threshold dynamics of coalition formation between two nations. Coalitions form when the military capability ratio and synergy factor exceed certain thresholds.

Proposition 3.6 (Coalition Size Dynamics)**.** *In a system with $n-1$ potential attacking nations with equal success probabilities s and costs c, the optimal coalition size k^* is given by:*

$$k^* = \min \left\{ k \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n-1\} : \frac{1-(1-s)^{mk}}{kc} \geq \frac{1-(1-s)^{m(k+1)}}{(k+1)c} \right\} \tag{19}$$

where m is the number of missiles per nation.

4 Optimal Defense Allocation Strategies

The target nation must allocate limited defense resources across multiple potential threats. I formulate this as a stochastic control problem and derive optimal strategies.

4.1 Defense Effectiveness Model

Definition 4.1 (Defense System)**.** Let $d_j(t) \in [0, 1]$ represent the defense effectiveness of nation N_j at time t, which reduces the success probability of incoming missiles:

$$s_i^{\text{eff}}(t) = s_i \cdot (1 - d_j(t)) \tag{20}$$

Definition 4.2 (Defense Resource Constraint)**.** The target nation has a total defense budget B that must be allocated across different defense systems:

$$\sum_{k=1}^{K} a_k(t) \leq B \tag{21}$$

where $a_k(t)$ is the resource allocated to defense system k at time t.

Definition 4.3 (Defense Effectiveness Function)**.** The effectiveness of the defense system is a function of the allocated resources:

$$d_j(t) = f\left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} a_k(t)\right) = 1 - \exp\left(-\gamma \sum_{k=1}^{K} a_k(t)\right) \tag{22}$$

where $\gamma > 0$ is the efficiency parameter.

4.2 Stochastic Control Formulation

The target nation's objective is to maximize its survival probability over a planning horizon T:

$$\max_{a(\cdot)} \mathbb{E}[\mathrm{E}(T)] \tag{23}$$

subject to the resource constraint and defense effectiveness dynamics.

Theorem 4.4 (Optimal Defense Allocation)**.** *Given attack intensities $\lambda_i(t)$ for each nation $i \neq j$, the optimal defense allocation at time t is:*

$$a_k^*(t) = \frac{B}{\sum_{l=1}^{K} \beta_l(t)} \beta_k(t) \tag{24}$$

where $\beta_k(t)$ is the marginal effectiveness of defense system k against the weighted threat:

$$\beta_k(t) = \frac{\partial d_j}{\partial a_k} \sum_{i \neq j} \lambda_i(t) s_i \tag{25}$$

Proof. The Hamiltonian for this control problem is:

$$H(t, d_j, a) = -\sum_{i \neq j} \lambda_i(t) s_i (1 - d_j) + \mu(t) \frac{\partial d_j}{\partial a} \cdot a \tag{26}$$

where $\mu(t)$ is the costate variable.
The first-order condition $\frac{\partial H}{\partial a_k} = 0$ yields:

$$\mu(t) \frac{\partial d_j}{\partial a_k} = \nu(t) \tag{27}$$

where $\nu(t)$ is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint.
Solving this system of equations gives the optimal allocation formula. □

4.3 Dynamic Response to Threat Evolution



Figure 3: Optimal defense resource allocation over time as threat profiles evolve. The allocation shifts dynamically in response to changing attack probabilities and patterns.

Figure 3 illustrates the dynamic adjustment of defense resources in response to evolving threat profiles. The allocation shifts toward missile defense during periods of increased missile attack probability and toward air defense during periods of increased aerial threats.

Proposition 4.5 (Defense Elasticity)**.** *The elasticity of the eliminant with respect to the defense budget B is:*

$$\varepsilon_{E,B} = \gamma B \sum_{i \neq j} \lambda_i s_i \exp(-\gamma B) \tag{28}$$

which is decreasing in B beyond a certain threshold, indicating diminishing returns to defense spending.

5 Integration with Macroeconomic Models

I incorporate annihilation risk into standard macroeconomic growth models to analyze how conflict affects economic trajectories.

5.1 Stochastic Growth Model with Annihilation Risk

Consider a standard Ramsey growth model extended to include annihilation risk:

$$\max_{c(t)} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} u(c(t)) \mathbf{1}_{\{t<\tau\}} dt \right] \tag{29}$$

where τ is the random time of annihilation, ρ is the discount rate, and $u(c)$ is the utility function.

Theorem 5.1 (Consumption under Annihilation Risk)**.** *The optimal consumption path $c^*(t)$ satisfies the modified Euler equation:*

$$\frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} = \frac{1}{\sigma} \left[f'(k(t)) - \rho - \lambda(t) \right] \tag{30}$$

where σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, $f'(k)$ is the marginal product of capital, and $\lambda(t)$ is the hazard rate of annihilation.

Proof. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for this problem is:

$$\rho V(k,t) = \max_c \{u(c) + V_k(k,t)(f(k) - c) - \lambda(t)V(k,t)\} \tag{31}$$

The first-order condition yields:

$$u'(c) = V_k(k,t) \tag{32}$$

Differentiating with respect to time and using the envelope theorem:

$$\frac{d}{dt}u'(c) = \frac{d}{dt}V_k(k,t) = -V_{kk}(k,t)(f(k) - c) + V_k(k,t)(\rho + \lambda(t) - f'(k)) \tag{33}$$

For CRRA utility $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma}-1}{1-\sigma}$, this simplifies to the modified Euler equation. □

5.2 Regime-Switching Growth Dynamics



Figure 4: Capital accumulation trajectories under different levels of annihilation risk. Higher risk leads to lower long-term capital levels due to increased precautionary savings and reduced investment.

Figure 4 shows how different levels of annihilation risk affect capital accumulation trajectories. Higher risk leads to lower long-term capital levels due to precautionary behavior.

Proposition 5.2 (Growth Impact of Annihilation Risk)**.** *An increase in annihilation risk $\lambda(t)$ has the following effects:*

1. *Reduces steady-state capital k^* by $\frac{dk^*}{d\lambda} = \frac{1}{f''(k^*)} < 0$*
2. *Increases current consumption relative to future consumption*
3. *Reduces investment in long-term projects with payoffs beyond expected survival time*

5.3 Asset Price Implications

Theorem 5.3 (Asset Pricing with Annihilation Risk). *The price of a perpetual claim to dividend stream $D(t)$ is:*

$$P(0) = \int_0^\infty D(t) \cdot E(t) \cdot \exp\left(-\int_0^t r_0(s)ds\right) dt \tag{34}$$

where $E(t)$ is the eliminant and $r_0(t)$ is the baseline interest rate.

Corollary 5.4 (Equity Premium). *The equity risk premium π under annihilation risk includes a jump component:*

$$\pi = \gamma\sigma_m^2 + \mathbb{E}[\lambda(t)] \cdot (\mathbb{E}[J] - \gamma \cdot Cov(J, R_m)) \tag{35}$$

where γ is risk aversion, σ_m^2 is market volatility, $\mathbb{E}[J]$ is expected jump size, and $Cov(J, R_m)$ is the covariance between jumps and market returns.

6 Conclusion

This paper has developed four significant extensions to the "Missile Theory of Annihilation of a Common Target Nation" framework:

1. I introduced a copula-based approach to model correlated attack strategies, showing that positive correlation significantly reduces survival probabilities.
2. I developed a game-theoretic framework for coalition formation, demonstrating that coalitions emerge when the military capability ratio and synergy factors exceed certain thresholds.
3. I formulated the defense allocation problem as a stochastic control problem and derived optimal dynamic strategies that respond to evolving threat profiles.
4. I incorporated annihilation risk into macroeconomic growth models, showing that higher conflict risk leads to lower capital accumulation and distorted consumption-investment decisions.

These extensions significantly enhance the analytical toolkit for geopolitical risk assessment and strategic decision-making. They provide more realistic modeling of complex conflict scenarios and offer quantitative guidance for defense planning and economic policy under existential threats.

7 Future Research

Future research can further extend this framework by incorporating:

1. Informational asymmetries and signaling in attack and defense strategies
2. Learning dynamics where nations update their beliefs about others' capabilities
3. Multi-layer defense systems with interdependencies and vulnerabilities
4. Political economy considerations in defense resource allocation

The mathematical framework presented here bridges multiple disciplines, including probability theory, game theory, control theory, and macroeconomics, to provide a comprehensive approach to analyzing annihilation risk and its implications.

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