

III. CONGRÈS TERMINÉS

FORMATS FOR REPORTS ON CONFERENCES

Two types of Notices or Reports on *congrès terminés* are published in the *Bulletin*. The first type (a Notice) is schematic, giving the basic information concerning the conference, the list of speakers and the titles of their lectures; the second type is a discursive Report or review, written in essay form. Announcements of up-coming conferences are posted on the SIEPM Web-site.

I. Schematic Notices

- (1) At the head of the notice should be given the dates and place of the meeting and the name(s) of the sponsoring institution(s), organizers, etc.
- (2) Following the full title of the conference, the names of the speakers (and their cities) and the titles of their lectures should be listed.

II. Guidelines for Essay Reports

Essay Reports or reviews of conferences should include these elements:

- (1) The heading of the Report is the same as indicated in I.1 above.
- (2) Authors should state the theme and purpose of the meeting, its rationale, and the scholarly question or problematic it was intended to address.
- (3) Thereafter, authors should summarize briefly each of the lectures delivered at the conference. In principle, the lecture of each speaker should be given a single paragraph. In any conference, however, some lectures reveal new information or make an argument that is especially significant in respect of the theme or question posed by the organizers, or in respect of the *status quaestionis* of the prior scholarship concerning the topic. Authors of the Reports are free to give more space to such signal lectures.
- (4) Likewise, authors of the Reports might comment upon any lively discussion that occurred in the meeting or disputes that arose therein.
- (5) To conclude their Reports, authors should give an overall summary of the results of the meeting in respect of the theme proposed or question posed by the organizers, and in relation to previous scholarship concerning the topic.

Kent EMERY, Jr.
Editor, *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*

III. CONGRÈS TERMINÉS

(1) 18-19 février 2011, Paris (France): Université Paris IV-Sorbonne, Maison de la recherche. In the context of the French-German research project ANR-DFG: “Thomisme et antithomisme au Moyen Âge/Thomismus und Antithomismus im Mittelalter.” *Organizers:* Emanuele COCCIA (Freiburg i.Br.), Maarten J.F.M. HOENEN (Freiburg i.Br.), Ruedi IMBACH (Paris) and Catherine KÖNIG-PRALONG (Paris-Fribourg).

« Thomas d’Aquin et la querelle des universaux »

As is well-known, the problem of universals pervaded the entire mediaeval history of thought. The manifold answers given to the problem somehow concerned the ways one conceives reality and knowledge and the modalities of their interaction. The formulation of the problem touched upon the foundation of science and the legacy of language. In short, the problem of universals involved a reflection upon nature and on the limits and ground of a commonly shared ‘world’. The consequences of its solution for theological discourse are manifest as well. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the question about universality became more and more crucial in the determination of reciprocally opposing positions, which gradually became embodied in institutions and politics. For all these reasons, intersecting the history of the *querelle des universaux* with the reception of Thomas Aquinas’ works and authority seemed to be a particularly fruitful field of investigation. Searching for the legacy of the labels “Thomism” and “anti-Thomism” was one of the ideas that inspired the project and furnished the framework of the colloquium.

An important line of (pseudo-)Thomistic thought, which developed after the death of Thomas Aquinas, was exclusively devoted to logical issues. Four pseudo-Thomistic treatises concerning the problem of universality were thus posited at the centre of the meeting. The discussion of these texts, of their sources and argumentative strategy, was combined with some broader reflections, moving from Thomas Aquinas himself, passing through the complex panorama of fourteenth-century theories about universals, and concluding with the school disputes of the fifteenth century.

The meeting was structured according to an alternation of conferences by Laurent CESALLI (Genève), Mario MELIADÒ (Siena-Freiburg i.Br.), Silvia NEGRI (Siena-Freiburg i.Br.), Pasquale PORRO (Bari); a public lecture by Kent EMERY JR. (Notre Dame, IN); and workshops directed by

Emanuele COCCIA (Freiburg i.Br.), Maarten J.F.M. HOENEN (Freiburg i.Br.), Ruedi IMBACH (Paris) and Catherine KÖNIG-PRALONG (Paris-Fribourg). Each of these workshops was dedicated to the presentation of a pseudo-Thomistic logical treatise. Besides the speakers, a number of scholars were invited as *discussants*: Marta BORGO (Paris), Iacopo COSTA (Paris), Fabio GIBIINO (Paris), Sylvain PIRON (Paris) and Dominique POIREL (Paris) took part in the discussions of the four pseudo-epigraphs; Andrea ROBIGLIO (Leuven) proposed some reflections on the treatise *De negocio logico* by Franciscus Thomae. The moderators of the sessions were Adriano OLIVA, OP (Paris), “Thomas d’Aquin et les universaux”; Matthias LUTZ-BACHMANN (Frankfurt a.M.), “La querelle des universaux au XIV^e siècle”; Andreas SPEER (Köln), “La querelle des universaux au XV^e siècle.”

Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas’ statements on universals are scattered in many topical places of his works: Thomas never intended to write a separate treatise on universals, nor did he write, for example, a commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, as did Albert the Great. Among the *loci* where Thomas discusses universality directly, the treatise *De ente et essentia* has surely furnished Thomas’ mediaeval (and contemporary) readers, followers and detractors some important materials for discussion.

Treating Thomas’ account of universality and predication in *De ente*, as well as in his *Quodlibet VIII*, Pasquale PORRO delivered a precious contribution about Thomas’ employment of Avicennian elements, thus taking a stand on some recent studies concerning this topic. In his talk “Indifferenza e predicabilità delle essenze in Tommaso d’Aquino (o Tommaso d’Aquino sul numero 6),” Porro firstly outlined the Avicennian doctrine that was received by Latin authors as the theory of the ‘indifference of essences’. According to Porro, Avicenna’s account of the *intention* by which universality occurs is distinguished from that of the universal as such, and did not give rise to any doubts about a gnoseological or ontological interpretation of the universal. According to Porro, Avicenna was quite clear in stating, in a rather anti-Platonic way, that absolute essences pertain entirely to the mental realm. They describe the mere or absolute quidditative contents of a concept. This intention would be enacted by the intellect, moreover, through an “intentional analysis” of the concept itself, and not with the same kind of abstraction that leads to the construction of a *universal* as such. In both *De ente* and in *Quodlibet VIII*, as well as in his later works, Thomas pursued the same Avicennian line, according to which the ‘indifference’ of absolute essence with regards to its existence does not imply

any ontological comprehension of it. Differently from what is maintained, for example, by Giorgio Pini, Porro did not interpret the third chapter of the *De ente* as if Thomas were tracing there a *real* distinction between universality, which pertains to the essence in the intellect, and predicability, which would be a feature of the essence or nature absolutely considered, and thus referable to the individual thing independently from mental operations. Porro claimed that for Thomas the mediation of the intellect still grounds predication: it attributes to the absolute nature a *ratio praedicabilitatis*, according to which that nature can be predicated of a single thing. Later, in his *Quodlibet VIII*, where he faced the Avicennian theme of the modes of consideration of an essence, Thomas did not employ an exemplaristic system in order to confer upon the absolute essences *as such* an ontological foundation. Rather, he seemed only to place the *possibility* of essences in the divine intellect. Therefore, according to Porro, Thomas Aquinas did not substantially change his position during his career, passing from an ontological comprehension of absolute essences to a gnoseological declination of the problem. The contrary was rather affirmed by those commentators who interpreted Thomas' earlier works as teaching that the essence is a real constituent of things in the world. According to Porro's interpretation of Aquinas' doctrine, the attribution of a common nature or absolute essence to an individual thing rested, in an Avicennian sense, only upon the quidditative content of the thing itself.

As it has modern scholars, Thomas' account on universals puzzled its mediaeval readers. Porro already noticed that the Avicennian theory of the indifference of essences was received by Latin authors in various ways, and was mixed together with other constellation of themes: the threefold distinction of the universal *ante rem, in re, post rem*; the problem of divine ideas; theories of abstraction. In this sense, also Thomas' reworking of the Avicennian doctrine was liable to being interpreted under external categories. As became clear during the meeting, the problem of the *foundation* of universality remained a crucial and critical problem in the reception of Thomas' doctrine.

The Legacy of Thomas Aquinas: pseudo-Thomistic Treatises

Emanuele COCCIA delivered some general introductory remarks about four pseudo-Thomistic treatises on universals and on logic. In his *Notes préliminaires*,¹ Coccia addressed the problem of studying a pseudo-epigraphic corpus of logical texts *tout court*, and more specifically, of studying a corpus of treatises on logic, which were soon supposed to have been written by Tho-

¹ One can find them also here: <http://thom.hypotheses.org/829>

mas Aquinas. The search for some works concerning logic composed by Thomas began immediately after his death (1274). Moreover, the redaction and diffusion of the four pseudo-Thomistic writings, as well as their ascription to the *Doctor sanctus*, must be understood in terms of the broader process of creation of a true *canon* of Aquinas' works. Therefore, studying this tradition of pseudo-epigraphs would mean following an important pattern in the history of "Thomism." Coccia provided the audience with a detailed *Dossier* concerning the manuscript and printed tradition of the four texts. Generally speaking, extant manuscripts date from the fifteenth century. The treatises are often transmitted in groups, and are sometimes accompanied by other pseudo-Thomistic *opuscula*, or, for example, by the *De ente et essentia* or by Giles of Rome's *Theoremata de esse et essentia*. The attribution to Thomas is not always clear; in the case of the *Tractatus Quoniam secundum Philosophum*, the ascription to Thomas Aquinas is supported by only a very few manuscripts. The *Tractatus Circa* and the *Tractatus Quoniam sicut dicit* were already printed in the late-fifteenth century, and were included in the collection of Thomas' *Opuscula* prepared by Antonius Pizzamanus.

(1) The *Tractatus Circa*, presented by Ruedi IMBACH, consists to a great extent of long, literal passages from extracted chapters two and three of Thomas' *De ente et essentia*, juxtaposed with other reflections—intended to be *ad mentem Thomae*, or paraphrasing other works by Thomas—and with the recourse to Aristotle, Avicenna and Boethius. The text first proposes a quite traditional doxography of the diverse, erroneous opinions on universals by ancient philosophers, declaring in contrast the truth of Aristotle's position. Following the Greek philosopher in the assertion that the universal is in *many* things, but also *one* beyond many, the author of the treatise distinguishes between two types of universals, the first being in the soul and possessing a *ratio praedicandi*, the second being in external things as a nature only potentially universal. Before treating the question about the corporeity or incorporeity of universals, the author of the *Tractatus Circa* definitively maintains that universality *as such* is only in the soul, and not in sensible beings. Noteworthily, the treatise ends with a literal quotation from *De ente*, chapter three, where Thomas makes clear that the *ratio generis* and *speciei* is conveyed to a nature according to that being that it possesses *in the intellect*.

(2) A greater autonomy with respect to Thomas' express teaching is showed by the so-called *Tractatus Quoniam sicut dicit* (or *Quoniam dicit Aristoteles*). Catherine KÖNIG-PRALONG analysed this text in its internal structure, and compared some of its assertion with passages from previous and contemporary sources, and foremost with texts from Aquinas. The

treatise contains two definitions of the universal with their explanations, the first relying on the notion of first and second intention, the other proposing the *adagio* of the simultaneous unity and multiplicity of the universal. Further questions are dedicated to the problem whether the universal is a substance or an accident, and whether a thing subjected to universality can exist outside the soul. Two digressions are devoted to the investigation of the sciences, which alternatively regard universality as such or the thing to which universality occurs, and finally to the epistemic status of logic. Compared with other sciences, the anonymous author affirms, logic is less certain, because its proper objects, second intentions, have a mere being in the soul. Logic also is dependent on metaphysics, and argues only *probabiliter*; nevertheless, it deals with the commonest objects, and is therefore the first discipline to be learned.

(3) The treatise *Universale esse* probably represents the most complete treatment of universality written according to Thomas' doctrine, seemingly in order to fill in a void left by the master. Gnoseological questions, concerning above all the intellectual process of abstraction, in this treatise find a considerable place; long quotations from, for example, Aristotle, pseudo-Aristotle and Albert the Great's *De intellectu et intelligibili* are also present in the writing. Maarten J.F.M. HOENEN expounded a selection of passages from the text, and brought some other fifteenth-century documents to the attention of the audience, in order better to contextualise late-mediaeval logical discussions. Hoenen stressed one point especially. The author of the *Universale esse* repeats in many ways that the universal as a nature, as a thing outside of the soul, is *aptitudinaliter* or *potentialiter* universal, whereas in the soul it is universal *in act*. A complete *ratio universalitatis* in fact requires the intellectual abstraction of an intention from the multiplicity of individuals. Now, this doctrine was a sort of *vulgata* during the fifteenth century, as proved, for example, by the account that the Ingolstädter nominalist Johannes Parreudt at the end of the century gave of the "position of the Thomists." According to this account, the universal is twofold, namely the complete universal, which is the result of abstraction, and the universal as it exists *fundamentally* in external things.

(4) The last pseudo-epigraph on logic discussed, the so-called *Quoniam secundum philosophum*, is the most problematic, with regard both to its ascription and to its contents. Emanuele COCCIA outlined the results of his researches upon the text and its authorship, strongly criticising the marginality of its doctrine within both academic and extra-academic intellectual contexts in fifteenth-century Europe. In 1970 Ladislav Seňko made an edition of the treatise based on three of the nine extant manuscripts of the

work, and attributed it to a pseudo-Giles of Rome, following some sources which ascribed the text to Giles. Coccia, however, noticed that precisely in the manuscript that Seíko used as a guide the treatise is clearly ascribed to the Dominican friar Arnaldus de Prato (cf. Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Cod. Conv. Soppr. B.3.173, ff. 75v and 86v), who was the author of some theological writings and lector in the Dominican convent of Prato. According to Coccia, this ascription must be taken seriously, although it is advanced in only one manuscript. As to its doctrine, the treatise is divided in four parts, dealing respectively with the nature of the universal, its origin, the modality of its mental being, and with the relationship of the universal to individual, subjected things. Far from being a mere reworking of Thomas' (or Giles') arguments, this treatise is very dependent on Albert the Great's account of universality. As Coccia demonstrated, Arnaldus used the typical Albertinian lexicon of *lux intelligentiae* and *influxus* in the third part of the work, which he states to be the *pars potior* and *secretior* of the doctrine on universals. Moreover, Arnaldus quotes or abridges long passages from Albert's works, for example from his *Metaphysics*. Given all of this evidence, the most puzzling question about the strongly Albertist-flavoured treatise remains its contemporary attribution to Giles or to Thomas Aquinas, the treatise being attributed to the latter in only one manuscript.

The Fourteenth Century: A Complex and Manifold Panorama

The complex theories of universality developed in late-thirteenth and throughout the fourteenth century in the most prominent European centres of learning was profusely depicted by Laurent CESALLI in his contribution “La querelle des universaux au 14^e siècle.” Following the list of authorities on the topic presented by Johannes Sharpe in his *Quaestio de universalibus*, Cesalli first focused on the positions of the most well-known thinkers, namely John Buridan, William of Ockham, Peter Auriol, Giles of Rome, John Duns Scotus, Walter Burley and John Wyclif. He then examined a constellation of positions held by such “minor” authors as William Crauthorn, Richard Brinkley, Francis of Prato, Francis of Meyronnes and Nicholas of Autrécourt. The resulting picture was far from being homogeneous. Recurring themes and elements mix in different contexts of discussion and within different conceptions of language, knowledge and reality. On the side of what traditionally has been called ‘realism’, one can find, for example, the moderate position of Giles of Rome, who affirmed a triple existence of the universal (*ante rem*, *in re* and *post rem*), but also stated, following Thomas Aquinas, that the universal possesses its proper unity, as well as its formal being, only in the soul, and the position of Walter Burley,

who argues that universals exist *inside* singular things as logical or metaphysical parts of them, which are really distinct from the whole individuals. Finally, one may include in this broad category the ‘Platonism’ of Nicolas of Autrécourt. On the other side were ‘terminist’ positions, such as that of Buridan, who conceived universality as a semantic relation; the ‘conceptualism’ of Ockham, who first defined the universal as a *fictum*, an artefact with objective being in the soul, and later identified the universal with the act of knowing, possessing a subjective being; the position of Peter Auriol, who described the universal as that being, *esse apparens*, or “intentional” being, which characterizes a thing when it is known. Some other opinions represented an intermediate position, for example the position of the Dominican Francis of Prato, who relied on Thomas Aquinas and on Hervaeus Nedellec in recognizing a *universale fundamentaliter* in the extra-mental and extra-linguistic realm, and a *universale formale*, which thus possesses unity as a mental entity. The point outlined by Cesalli is that using the traditional categories of ‘Realism’, ‘Nominalism’ and ‘Conceptualism’, which are fundamentally based on the dichotomy of recognition or negation of an extra-mental reality to universals, does not permit one to comprehend fully the variety of fourteenth-century views on the topic. In the last part of his contribution, Cesalli concluded his survey with two historical and methodological remarks, aimed at proposing a new paradigm for the study of the *querelle des universaux*. Firstly, he suggested that if one must search for a common denominator for all the positions he sketched, this would be not so much a question about what exists or what can be known or what something signifies, but rather, the common ground would be the necessity of answering the general question “What is sufficient for explaining the phenomenon of universality?” According to Cesalli, therefore, masters thinking about universals moved from a *givenness*, that is, from the fact that thinking and using language necessarily involve some kind of universality, to various metaphysical, epistemological and semantic reflections on that necessity. Accordingly, our understanding of the *querelle* must develop within this very perspective. In light of his second remark, Cesalli criticized the inappropriateness of the historiographical schemes that have traditionally been employed for describing the disputes on universals. Studying mediaeval discussions on the topic of universals as a manifold answer to a fact—the experience of generality in language and thinking—would lead to the recognition and description of different *explaining, non-exclusive models* of the subject.

The Fifteenth Century: School Awareness and Traditions of Thought

Being labelled a ‘realist’ or a ‘nominalist’ or an ‘ancient’ or a ‘modern’ or,

more precisely, a ‘Thomist’ or an ‘Albertist’ or a ‘Scotist’ or a ‘Buridanist’ was a common feature among university masters in the fifteenth century. The division of different schools of thought, which was rooted in the dispute about universals, deeply marked university thinking and philosophic literature, above all in central Europe.

The controversial but fascinating question about the meaning and employment of the banner ‘Thomist’, as well as the validity and applicability of the category of ‘Thomism’, was addressed by Kent EMERY, Jr. in his lecture “What Does it Mean to be a ‘Thomist’? Denys the Carthusian and Thomas Aquinas.” Emery traced salient moments in the intellectual biography of Denys the Carthusian (1402-1471)—from his university years in Cologne, where he was a student in the Thomist *Bursa Montis*, to the mature reflection at the Charterhouse of Roermond—and paused over those passages in Denys’ writings that reveal his attitude towards Aquinas’ authority. Focusing on two topics strictly related to the question of universals, which moreover represented a central topic of discussion between Albertists and Thomists at Cologne, namely the distinction between *esse* and *essentia* and the individuation of substances, Emery highlighted Denys’ critical approach to Thomas. In fact, although he had been educated in the *via Thomae*, Denys the Carthusian did not perceive himself as a Thomist *tout court*, nor did he devote himself entirely to the doctrine of the Dominican master. But it is also true that he recognized Thomas as a great master—in one of his earliest works, he called him “my patron”—making a huge employment of Thomas’ works, mainly his theological writings, during all his life, also with pedagogical intentions. As Emery stressed, Thomas was for Denys the highest authority in the Scholastic mode of theology, but not the supreme authority in theology itself. According to Denys’ theory of a threefold order of wisdom, Aquinas, the “only (Scholastic) doctor to be canonised,” was the preeminent representative for the second grade or “supernatural wisdom naturally acquired,” which nevertheless was surpassed by the mystical mode of theology and contemplation taught by Dionysius the Areopagite. In the realm of rational speculation, Denys tended furthermore to follow Albert the Great in questions of the interpretation of Aristotle, and was very receptive towards Proclean metaphysics. The example of Denys’ change of mind concerning the distinction of *esse* and *essentia* presented by Emery was particularly inspiring. In many of his works, the Carthusian numbered Thomas among the followers of the real distinction between being and essence, together with Bonaventure, Giles of Rome and William of Paris. One of the main arguments for this position was the conviction that an essence can be understood completely without

any knowledge of its *esse* or existence. In an interesting passage, Denys declared that he had followed Thomas in his youth, but then became convinced that Thomas' teaching was false. Generally, Denys recognised the difficulty of the matter, but definitively denied the real distinction, mainly accepting the ‘intentional distinction’ of Henry of Ghent. Within this framework, Emery called into question the label of ‘Thomist’ often attributed to the Carthusian by interpreters. First of all, Emery wondered whether an author could be defined as a ‘Thomist’ on the basis of a core of doctrine which can be recognized as “typically Thomist”? If the answer is positive, what then would be the judgement about Denys, who evidently relied on Thomas on a number of theological questions, paraphrased his works and evoked his authority in pastoral matters, but at the same time refused some of Thomas’ fundamental metaphysical presuppositions? Moreover, as Emery finally suggested, another historical and interpretative question challenges the use of the label ‘Thomist’: are those doctrines that Denys attributed to Thomas in fact really Thomas’ teachings?

Understood in its radicality, the question on universals touches the very core of the foundation of a science. In fact, because Aristotle defined science as a knowledge of universals, determining the nature of these universals meant also making a decision about what science must be. This was surely one of the reason why the *querelle des universaux* was at the origin of the division into different *viae* in the fifteenth century. In Cologne, there were Albertist authors who addressed the question in its deeper meaning, in order to assert that their teaching represented the authentic Peripatetic tradition, and consequently that their opponents, the Thomists, could not be counted among the ranks of true realists.

As clearly shown by Mario MELIADÒ in his contribution “*Scientia peripateticorum*. Heymericus de Campo, the *Book of Causes* and the Debate on Universals in the Fifteenth Century,” the chief of the Cologne Albertists, Heymericus de Campo (1395-1460), pursued quite systematically such a programme, not only in his polemical writings, as in the *Tractatus problematicus*, but also in some other speculative works, as for example in his *Compendium divinorum* and in the *Colliget principiorum*. Heymericus seemed to accuse Thomas and his followers of not being able to provide science with an adequate *fundamentum in re*. Since Thomas characterised the true universal as *post rem*, that is, according to Heymericus, as a *species intelligibilis* or *intentio* in the soul which is a mere similitude with respect to the outer thing, they could not demonstrate the reality of general concepts. In this sense, Heymericus’ move was that of assimilating the Thomists account to that of the nominalists. Against these weaker positions

on universality, the Albertist set his own theory of the three states of universals. The universal *ante rem* represented the ray coming from the light of divine intellect; the universal *in re* consisted in the material individuation of this divine ray; the universal *post rem* was, finally, the mental reproduction of the individuated universal, which irradiates in the intellect in the act of knowing. This tri-partition expressed the idea of an essential identity, and only existential diversity, of universals, and was based on an emanationist model that had been elaborated by Albert the Great. Deeply relying on the hierarchical causal system of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Liber de causis*, Albert forged a metaphysics of the flowing of all forms from God, which was adopted entirely by Heymericus. Meliàdò pointed out that Heymericus appealed to the propositions of the *Liber de causis* in every crucial passage of his exposition about threefold universality. According to Heymericus, in fact, only the type of causality expressed by the *fluxus*-model could support a truly realistic doctrine of universals. This model, rejected by Thomists, had its source in the *Liber de causis*. Therefore, Albert the Great's inclusion of the Proclean-inspired work in the "Peripatetic canon" marked his search for a science that is founded absolutely *in re*. Heymericus presented himself as the restorer of the authentic ancient tradition. It is clear also that Heymericus' battle against Thomas and Thomism revolved around the establishment of a set of masterworks and of leading doctrines, which could fit into the paradigm of 'true philosophy'. In conclusion, Meliàdò also hinted at some evidence about the curricular use of the *Liber de causis* on the part of Albertists, not only in Cologne but perhaps also in Paris and in Cracow, and suggested that the history of the treatise during the fifteenth century could shed yet more light on our understanding of late-mediaeval Albertism.

The necessity to *act* within a fierce scholarly dispute, which ostensibly concerned the correct interpretation of Aristotle but in fact involved the conception of science *tout court*, and therefore to *react* to the intellectual challenge posed by the Albertists, deeply shaped the writings of Thomists in fifteenth-century Cologne. However, the Thomist masters in Cologne, supported by Dominicans, sought also to establish Thomas' teaching as authoritative, canonical and the 'common doctrine'.

In her contribution "Dicitur medium servare beati. The Debate on Universals in the Fifteenth Century and the Thomists of Cologne," Silvia NEGRI outlined some peculiar elements of the treatment of the question on universals by those masters working at the most important Thomist college in Cologne, the *Bursa Montana*, showing how precisely in their answers to that question they developed a more general strategy of "mediation" and "concordism." In their works, the Thomist masters seemed to have ab-

sorbed well that core of ideas on universals attributable to Thomas Aquinas, which were emphasized in the pseudo-Thomistic treatises on logic. Especially they emphasized that the true, complete universal is in the mind, being that concept which represents the plurality of real individuals through its *similarity* with them. Nevertheless, the Thomists could not resolve satisfactorily the consequent necessity of defining the very relationship of the universal with the object to which it refers, or establish to what extent the universal can be said to be “present” also in the extra-mental thing, perhaps because of Thomas’ lack of systematic treatment of that topic, and, moreover, because of Heymericus de Campo’s strong critique of Thomists’ idea of knowledge. In this sense, the masters who operated *ad mentem Thomae* moulded their account on universals either towards a more realistic pattern or, on the contrary, in a more rationalist way. They operated according to the kind of texts on which they were commenting (curricular texts or intended for the teaching in the *Bursa*), and according to the competing doctrines they had to face. In Gerardus de Monte’s commentary on *De ente et essentia*, as well as in the *Positiones metaphysicales* of Henricus de Gorriechem (a commentary to *De ente* prepared for the printing at the end of the fifteenth century, which was based on the lessons of the founder of the *Bursa Montana*) Thomas’ doctrine about universality *post rem* was literally “canonised.” However, the Albertist position on the topic was strongly present in both texts, as testified by the discussion devoted to the problem of the proper meaning of universality *in re*. By proposing a larger significance for *universal* as that *nature* to which universality can pertain, and by according a certain reality to this nature, Thomists tried to establish a common terrain for both Albert and Thomas’ realism. In so doing, they neutralized Albert’s actual doctrine, absorbing it in Aquinas’ teaching. This very line was followed by Gerardus de Monte also in his direct response to Heymericus’ *Tractatus problematicus*, the so-called *Tractatus ostendens*, where he aimed at showing the concordance between Albert and Thomas by stating a *relative* identity between the principle of intellection, the universal concept and the known object. In other academic texts, such as the commentary on Peter of Spain’ *Summulae* prepared by Lambertus de Monte or under his guidance, the necessity of directly facing the Albertists’ doctrines was less binding. The problem of generality was confronted there in a logical context, without discussion about the metaphysical presupposition of universality *in re* or *ante rem*. The universal in the intellect was called the *universale perfectum*, and was said to be only in a “foundational” way in external things. Just in this way some nominalists of the late-fifteenth century described Thomas’ and his followers’ position, placing it between their own opinion and the opinion of Scotists. All in all, despite different textual

references and diverse argumentative goals, as Negri pointed out, Cologne Thomists reworked Thomas Aquinas' doctrine on universals in the sense of highlighting its *mediating* and *harmonizing* nature. This feature was particularly clear in the works composed in the first part of the century, when the doctrinal dispute with Albertists was most lively. In fact, the Thomists aimed at supporting their master's authority not only as superior, but also as the most commonly accepted, that is, as the doctrine that could sum up, without contradictions, the core of the true Aristotelian tradition.

Concluding Remarks

One of the aims of the colloquium, as it was formulated by Emanuele Coccia in his *Notes préliminaires*, was to trace a common methodology for reading and interpreting the four pseudo-Thomistic treatises that were presented. The workshops dedicated to these texts showed that the employment of a standard approach (study of implicit and explicit citations from Thomas' works; reference to other sources; comparison with contemporary debates at the faculty of Arts; study of the strategy of argumentation) must be guided by some specific questions. Scholars must focus on the *intention* of the (almost always) anonymous authors as well as on those *elements* which could have led to the attribution to Thomas. Beyond the more or less fortuitous ascription to the holy doctor, however, the *fact* of this ascription is meaningful for the history of "Thomism." In the broader perspective of the later employment of Aquinas' works and doctrines, the meeting took advantage of analysis and reflection upon the "diversité de reception et transformation receptive" of Thomas' authority, according to the felicitous expression of Ruedi Imbach. In this sense, some key-issues for the very specific reading of the *querelle des universaux* pursued in the colloquium turned out to be these: What actually comes from Thomas Aquinas? What was transmitted *under* his name? What can be traced back to his writings? What was proposed as Thomas' doctrine? What can be maintained according to or against his authority? How did specific doctrines and spurious texts come to be *canonised*?

Silvia NEGRI (Siena-Freiburg i.Br.)

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(2) 7-9 April 2011, Cambridge (England): King's College, Cambridge University. *Sponsors*: the British Academy, King's College, Cambridge, and the Faculty of English, Cambridge University. *Organisers*: Mishtooni BOSE (Oxford), Rita COPELAND (Philadelphia), Dallas G. DENERY II

(Brunswick, ME), Kantik GHOSH (Oxford) and Nicolette ZEEMAN (Cambridge).

“Uncertain Knowledge in the Middle Ages”

The programme for this conference on ideas of uncertainty, relativism and skepticism was made up of papers by invited speakers, with an audience of no more than 50. All sessions were plenary, and papers were pre-circulated, so that the conference could be conducted in the style of a workshop: participants would be able to digest what would in some cases be unfamiliar material, and open-ended dialogue could take place in the sessions themselves. While not wishing to give up on the fresh research and ‘case-study’ aspects of papers, the organizers also wished to be able, at the end of the conference, to make some generalizing claims about the place of uncertainty in mediaeval mentalities and its larger implications.

The organizers’ intention was to create a space for dialogue amongst medievalists working in a variety of disciplines—philosophy and theology, literary and cultural studies, history—but all interested in the history of ideas. The goal was to create a holistic approach to the theme of medieval uncertainty that included questions of form, reception and pragmatics, as well as a variety of contexts, both Latin and vernacular, institutional and extra-mural. In formulating this area of inquiry, the organizers were aware that there exists a whole range of possible rubrics under which one might look at medieval ways of acknowledging and exploring uncertain forms of knowledge: the category of *opinio*; Aristotelian oppositions of certain and uncertain forms of knowledge; notions of contradiction and the role of *disputatio*; the role of the sophist; the practices and techniques associated with *insolubilia*; the notion of hypothetical knowledge in later Scholasticism; a range of possible sceptical or relativistic positions; the impact of views about the mutability of the material world; the possible relation between the recognition of subjectivity in philosophical practice and in textual theory and ‘literary’ contexts; the logico-linguistic analysis of religious text and sacrament and its implications; ‘scientific’ uncertainty; the fifteenth-century *Wegestreit*.

The conference had three broad aims. First, the organizers wished to capitalise on current intense interest in the topic of uncertain knowledge among historians of philosophy. It is also a topic that has large cultural consequences: it was recognised that this project would inevitably have a revisionist dimension, as even scholarship that recognizes scepticism or incertitude in the Middle Ages often nevertheless tends to assume ‘faith’ as the inevitable medieval fallback position.

Second, the organizers noted that until now discussion of medieval scepticism seems to have revolved around whether or not this could have been apprehended as a fully-fledged philosophical position in the later medieval and early modern periods. But equally important might be the question of whether other elements also cumulatively constituted anything like a sceptical undercurrent *throughout the Middle Ages*, accommodating modes of thought and feeling necessarily unable to find open or fully theorized expression elsewhere.

Third, while historians of philosophy have written a great deal on medieval scepticism, attempts to integrate their efforts with work by scholars from other disciplines have been fragmentary at best. The organizers were of the view that a thorough assessment of the kinds of insight that might be generated by considering institutionally produced philosophy in Latin, itself polyvocal and often conflict-ridden, in conversation with a wider range of discourse produced outside these institutions, was long overdue. The conference was therefore intended to consider the articulation of various forms of scepticism and relativism in contexts lay, vernacular and even heterodox. It would address fundamental questions about the conceptual and institutional frameworks within which philosophy—much of it highly secular—was practised, and the consequences of this for our larger understanding of medieval philosophical thought and for medieval culture as a whole.

It was intended that the conference would also address the relationship between medieval philosophical methods and the institutions within which they occurred. Most of what is called medieval philosophy was practised by vocational and institutionally-based ‘philosophers’ within institutions of education and learning, subject to various kinds and degrees of ecclesiastical support and control. Did this delimit the terms of medieval philosophy or not? Furthermore, to what extent did such institutions make space within themselves to accommodate forms of uncertainty? And what are the disciplinary and methodological forms and limits of such accommodations? What does it mean for there to be no work traditionally categorised as ‘philosophical’ outside of this context? What is the relation of institutional philosophy to the intellectual work that is performed in texts written outside the schools and universities, including ‘literary’ texts written in various vernaculars? If it might have been liberating to perform such intellectual work at varying degrees of distance from these educational institutions, to have done so might turn out to have proved an insurmountable obstacle to the recognition of such practices by modern intellectual history.

Session 1: Kantik GHOSH’s (Trinity College, Oxford) paper on “Logic, Scepticism and Heresy in the Later Middle Ages” examined the interface

between the academic examination and censure of ideas and inquisitorial enquiries into the determination of ‘heresy’ and the prosecution of ‘heretics’ at a time of escalating porosity between the domains of academic speculative thought and extramural religio-political controversy. Archbishop Thomas Arundel’s critique of Richard Flemyng of Oxford University in 1409, the examination of Jerome of Prague in Vienna in 1410-1412, and later at the Council of Constance, the condemnation of theses drawn from the writings of John Wyclif, also at the Council of Constance, provided some suggestive but ambiguous case studies. These cases raise questions relating to changing perceptions of the role and limits of institutionalized academic endeavours, and the associated analytic methods, of philosophical theology, and the inter-relationship of such intellectual discourses with the larger question of the nature and meaning of ‘faith’. The basic problematic may be formulated as follows: how ought ‘faith’ to engage with a free attitude of debate and questioning at a time when such intellectuality was no longer the prerogative of the world of the university? The interface between the discursive domains of late-medieval academia and the wider world of religious practice and observance therefore emerged as an increasingly productive site of ‘heresy’. Daniel HOBBINS (The Ohio State University) spoke on “Uncertain Legal Knowledge in the Trials of Joan of Arc,” focusing on the problem of appeal. When Joan appealed to the pope that he should be her judge, the presiding bishop, Pierre Cauchon, countered that Joan’s ordinaries were her proper judges. This principle had been constructed and elaborated in great detail by such contemporary theologians as Pierre d’Ailly and Jean Gerson. By the time of Joan’s trial this vision of authority had been firmly established in the conciliar architecture of the Church put in place at the Council of Constance, which Cauchon had attended. Hobbins considered this appeal and its implications for our understanding of the fluctuations and uncertainties concerning the locus of authority in legal cases.

Session 2: Lesley SMITH (Harris Manchester College, Oxford) lectured on “Uncertainty in the Study of the Bible.” Given its central place in western medieval life as the single most authoritative religious text, it might seem as though the Bible and its study would be open to the least uncertainty in interpretation. This, Smith argued, was far from true. Uncertainty can be charted in a variety of areas relating to the medieval Bible, beginning with the text itself, and including methods for its exposition, the tools which might be used to understand it, and the questions and answers that could be drawn from biblical material. Highlighting some of these facets, Smith’s paper considered in what circumstances uncertainty was allowable and how it might be expressed. In “The Uncertainty of the Marvel: Truth,

Romance, and Natural Philosophy," Karen SULLIVAN (Bard College) investigated twelfth- and the thirteenth-century controversies about Merlin, the British seer. Merlin, it was believed, not only possessed secret knowledge (of the past, present and future, as well as of "marvels" [*mirabilia*], that is, phenomena so rare or extraordinary that they were said to defy comprehension), but also the ability to transform his appearance at will. Rationalist clerics argued that anything that seemed to contradict the laws of nature must either be a miracle from God or a magical illusion from the devil. If Merlin (who was no saint) could perform marvels, they asserted, he must have been inspired by a demon. In contrast, contemplative clerics argued that human beings should wonder at the irreducible mysteriousness of God and his creation. If Merlin could perform marvels, they maintained, perhaps God inspired him, not, admittedly, as he had inspired Moses or Isaiah, but as the pagan Sibyl or Balaam had been illuminated. Differing from both the rationalist and contemplative traditions, Robert de Boron's prose romance *Merlin* argued for the existence of the marvelous in itself, that is, a third category which was neither demonic nor divine. For Boron, marvels were inassimilable into the binary structures of medieval theolo-gico-scientific ways of thinking and, as a result, were simply incomprehensible. Sullivan argued that romances, like *Merlin*, de-centre their characters and their readers, making them realize how much they do not and cannot know. They also demonstrated that, in a world in which so many people were deceived, the realization that one cannot place trust in human understanding itself constitutes a kind of understanding.

Session 3: Sarah KAY (New York University) explored Richard de Fournival's *Bestiaire d'amour* as a thought-experiment concerning the kinds of not-quite knowledge that humans and animals share. In this text, Richard uses the prose format of the bestiary and draws on the thirteenth-century vogue for Aristotle's writings about animals to compare himself, his lady and their love with animals and their natures. Kay discussed the work of memory, imagination, the senses (and concomitant lack of 'sense') and the tensions between the senses. Her concluding examples focused on the role of imagination in error and delusion, allowing her to develop Derrida's claim that Lacan thinks about animals in the context of the imaginary. It was her proposal that Richard was engaged in the radical and serious experiment of trying to capture something of mental life below the level of thought. Dallas G. DENERY II (Bowdoin College) examined the role of "Uncertainty and Deception in the Medieval and Early Modern Court." Denery's paper challenged a popular historical narrative. According to this narrative, an epistemologically confident Middle Ages, in which

all lies are condemned, gives way to a sceptically tinged Renaissance, in which lies become acceptable. Writers such as Castiglione, Machiavelli and Gracian, each of whom promoted practices of deceit, allegedly provide evidence for this transition, as well as for a new early modern conception of the individual rooted in clearer divisions between the exterior and interior self and a closely related emphasis on worldly self-interest. Focusing on the work of the twelfth-century cleric John of Salisbury, Denery recovered medieval rhetorical traditions that emphasize human uncertainty and the possibility of virtuous lies. Putting in question the novelty of Renaissance ethical ideals is, he argued, not simply another example of the historian's trick of proving that everything new is old again. Rather, it suggests that standard accounts of European modernization and secularization need to be re-thought.

Session 4: Dominik PERLER (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) read a paper titled “Can We Trust Our Senses? Fourteenth-Century Debates on Sensory Illusions.” He considered how medieval philosophers analyzed sensory illusions in which our senses sometimes deceive us. Despite these sceptical concerns, they never defended the strong thesis that our senses could always deceive us and that we should never trust them. Why not? Perler discussed this question by focusing on two case studies, namely the analyses of sensory illusions provided by Walter Chatton and William Ockham. Both authors took these illusions seriously, but both tried to explain them within the framework of a ‘naturalist’ and ‘reliabilist’ theory of knowledge, which excluded radical scepticism from the outset. Christophe GRELLARD (Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne) looked at medieval accounts of epistemic failure in “How Is It Possible to Believe Falsey? John Buridan, the *vetula* and the Psychology of Error.” Specifically, Grellard examined the gap between common and scientific knowledge in fourteenth-century philosophy through the writings of the Arts master John Buridan, who developed a cognitive and psychological framework to explain how it is possible for us to give a false assent to appearances, that is, how it is possible to consider a false appearance as true. Since Buridan accepts a naturalized conception of knowledge, he considers that under normal circumstances true judgments are the rule and false ones the exception. But exceptions can and do occur. In the first part of his paper, Grellard examined Buridan’s theory of belief (as an assent or a disposition to assent) from both an epistemological and a psychological point of view. Belief arises from a natural process that usually results in correct judgments, as the intellect is naturally inclined to truth. This need not always be the case and intellect can, over time, become habituated to make false judgments. The passions, a bad education and the primacy of imagination are factors

that can lead the intellect to be mistaken. The second part of Grellard's paper considered how Buridan drew on the traditional figure of the *vetula* (the old woman) to exemplify the process of forming false beliefs.

Session 5: Eileen SWEENEY's (Boston College) paper, "New Standards for Certainty: Early Receptions of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*," focused on some of the earliest moments in the reception of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. Sweeney argued that the *Posterior Analytics* introduced an ideal of science and scientific certainty that became standard for evaluating the epistemological status of existing disciplines, whether natural philosophy, mathematics, dialectic or sacred study. She examined the views of Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon, who focused on the certain and uncertain in the human disciplines, and William of Auvergne and Alexander of Hales, who were concerned to distinguish science from the realm of faith and sacred study. Sweeney argued that what we see taking shape in this first wave of response to Aristotle is a two-tiered system of knowledge, those meeting and those failing to meet or eschewing the scientific standard of certainty. Rita COPELAND (University of Pennsylvania) spoke on "Living with Uncertainty: Reactions to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the Later Middle Ages." The point of departure for her paper was the fact that the greater part of modern scholarship on the *Rhetoric* in its medieval avatars has studied its place within logic or within ethics. These are, of course, its key contributions within medieval thought, but she sought to recover its medieval impact as a rhetoric: how did it significantly change or redirect medieval understandings of rhetoric as an art? This is harder to trace, because of the very nature of Aristotle's text and its medieval traditions. Copeland considered how the clear parameters of rhetoric as a science were unsettled by the appearance and incorporation of the *Rhetoric*, and how the work challenged philosophers to reconsider—not always satisfactorily—the pragmatic and theoretical status of the art.

Session 6: Mishtooni BOSE (Christ Church, Oxford) discussed "Vernacular Opinions," in which she considered the place of opinion in two bodies of vernacular writing by Christine de Pizan and Reginald Pecock respectively. They make a provocative and unusually complementary pairing, given that Christine's position was, as Joel Blanchard has described it, that of "une laïque au pays des clercs," whereas Pecock was not merely a clerk (and for much of his writing career a bishop) but, more precisely, a clerk who deliberately situated himself in the discursive territory of what he called 'the lay partie'. Each derives a distinctive authorial capital from adopting an amphibious position between lay and clerical worlds. As Douglas Kelly has shown, Christine appraises Scholastic culture from an imag-

ined distance in a process most memorably evoked in her discovery of Opinion among the disputing scholars in *L'advision Christine*. For Pecock, the projection of theology not only into a vernacular language but also into a vernacular arena was a fundamentally reformist act because it allowed him to appraise and revise the content and method of theology in the act of vernacularising it. Thus, Bose argued, the topic of Opinion gives us, in the case of each writer, a portal through which to view the different ways in which they represented, and sought to instigate, the reformation of the reader's mind. It is thus necessary to appraise the implications of these writers' vernacular experiments for our own understanding of the thinking mind which, as their writings show, was a fundamental subject, and object, of late-medieval reformist discourse. Hester G. GELBER (Stanford University) read a paper titled "Laughter and Deception: Holcot and Chaucer Stay Cheerful." Gelber argued that while Robert Holcot and Geoffrey Chaucer both held deeply sceptical views of the human capacity for certainty, and explored the terrain of uncertainty with great care, each retained a cheerful hope that human beings are not hopelessly lost on life's pilgrimage. Holcot fell back on the principle of non-contradiction as a constraint on the potential for chaos. If God were not to inform the faithful of what they needed to know for salvation, God could not hold them accountable for what they could not in invincible ignorance know. Chaucer's ironic depiction of human folly relied on the reader's conscience and powers to discern the humorous failings of self and other to make a path over the same quaking ground. Gelber considered Chaucer's *Clerk's Tale* and *Nun's Priest's Tale* against the backdrop of Holcot's views to tease out late-medieval attitudes. While deeply sceptical, both Holcot and Chaucer kept hold of a thread through the maze of late-medieval uncertainty. Indeed, in the person of the foolish rooster Chauntecleer, Chaucer may ironically guide the reader to Holcot "as oon of the gretteste auctour that men rede." Nicolette ZEEMAN's (King's College, Cambridge) paper, titled "Philosophy in Parts: Jean de Meun, Chaucer, Lydgate," concerned literary texts that valorise, or attribute primacy to, certain elements within a philosophical or theological system, but without overtly repudiating that philosophical or theological system. She argued that this move has substantially sceptical implications. This is, she claimed, partly due to the refusal to provide an alternative system that would explain the altered emphasis, but also to the implicit question as to whether such an overarching theoretical system is even necessary. The fact that such moves are often made in oblique and inexplicit ways also has the effect of refusing the claims of systematic epistemologies and their hierarchies. The two philosophical/theological systems that appear in the texts investigated by Zeeman are those of Christian/philosophical Nature and

Boethian Fortune, systems that provide opportunities for the containment of contingency but also for the acknowledgement of its most disruptive implications. Zeeman discussed Jean de Meun's *Roman de la rose*, various works by Chaucer and Lydgate's *Fall of Princes*, arguing that these are just some of the later medieval texts in which a distinctive and reiterated anti-systematising gesture can be seen. The gesture becomes a signature move in the works of Chaucer, but also repeatedly appears in the writings of his contemporaries and successors.

It is hoped that essays resulting from the conference, or addressing its key themes, will be published in a forthcoming volume of the journal *Disputatio*. This volume will be of interest to a broader readership than those specialising in 'intellectual history' narrowly interpreted.

Mishtooni BOSE (Oxford), Rita COPELAND (Philadelphia),
Dallas G. DENERY II (Brunswick, ME), Kantik GHOSH (Oxford)
and Nicolette ZEEMAN (Cambridge)

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(3) 6-7 mei 2011, Leuven (België): Sponsored by the Research Council of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven; the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO); the Institute of Philosophy of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven; and the De Wulf-Mansion Centre. *Organizer:* Russell L. FRIEDMAN (Leuven).

"Workshop on Fourteenth-Century Thought"

It seems fair to say that, over the last twenty years, the study of fourteenth-century Scholastic thought has become a research priority in a way that it has never been before. Clearly indicative of this fact are the critical editions and the ever increasing number of translations and studies devoted to the two giants of the fourteenth century, John Duns Scotus and William Ockham. But the current and widening interest in lesser-known but extremely significant fourteenth-century figures is perhaps a better measure of the importance today accorded to the period's thought. Consider the recently completed or on-going projects to critically edit works of Durand of Saint-Pourçain, Robert Cowton, Radulphus Brito, Walter Chatton, Adam Wodeham, Walter Burley, Peter Auriol, Francis of Marchia, Gerard Odo, Gregory of Rimini, John Buridan, Nicole Oresmes and Peter of Candia, figures who were highly influential in their own time, and some of whom were influential well into the seventeenth century. And this does not begin to exhaust contemporary interest in fourteenth-century university thinkers and the ideas they produced over a broad spectrum of topics, in philosophy of

mind and philosophy of nature, in metaphysics and philosophical theology, in ethics and political theory. Keeping in mind the strong and growing interest in specifically fourteenth-century thought, this small workshop was intended to foster and further that interest by giving fourteenth-century thought a dedicated forum for discussion and debate. Specifically, a group of researchers currently engaged in research on varied aspects of fourteenth-century intellectual production presented their current research-work in progress. This type of arrangement will help make the ongoing projects of especially younger scholars more visible, and help give all participants the best possible comments and criticisms of their work by other specialists, all to the benefit of the study of fourteenth-century thinkers and ideas. It is to be hoped that in 2013 there will be a second “Workshop on Fourteenth-Century Thought,” the major principles of which will be: pay your own way and bring work in progress. No publication is envisaged specifically from the workshop: this is a chance to test and publicize ideas, as well as to acquire a partial overview of the research being conducted right now on the thought of the fourteenth century.

The following papers were delivered at the 2011 Leuven “Workshop on Fourteenth-Century Thought”:

Timothy B. NOONE (The Catholic University of America), ‘Scotus’s *Reportationes Parisienses* on Christic and Angelic Knowledge’; Laurent CESSALI (Université de Lille 3-CNRS) and Joël LONFAT (Université de Genève), ‘Richard Brinkley’s *Summa Logicae*: Puzzling Doctrinal and Historical Issues’; Mark THAKKAR (Oxford University), ‘Do Fourteenth-Century Theories of Sound Rest on a Mistranslation?’; Florian WOELLER (Universität Basel), ‘“Captivating the Intellect” in Paris in 1316: On a Possible Shift in Peter Auriol’s View of the Relation between Faith and Reason’; Martin PICKAVÉ (University of Toronto), ‘Auriol on Freedom, Will, and Morality’; Ulli ZAHND (Universität Freiburg i.Br.), ‘Convention, Necessity, and the Sayings of the Saints: Debating Sacramental Efficacy in the Late Middle Ages’; William DUBA (Université de Fribourg, Suisse), ‘Auriol between the Two Schools (*Quodlibet q.1*)’; Christian RODE (Universität Bonn), ‘Experience and Self in Peter Auriol’; Roberto LAMBERTINI (Università degli studi di Macerata), ‘Philosophy in Poverty: Philosophical Issues in Enrico del Carretto’s Treatise on Franciscan Poverty’; Fabrizio AMERINI (Università degli studi di Parma), ‘Stephen of Rieti’s Criticism of Ockham’s View of Universals’; Christopher D. SCHABEL (University of Cyprus), ‘Diagrams, Flowcharts, and Missing Links in the Early Fourteenth-Century Debate over Atomism: Landolfo Caracciolo on Indivisibles’.

Russell L. FRIEDMAN (Leuven)

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(4) 20 et 24 mai 2011, Paris (France): Université de Paris VII-Diderot and *Commissio Leonina*, Bibliothèque du Saulchoir. *Organized by Richard C. TAYLOR* (Milwaukee, WI), *Cristina CERAMI* (Paris), *Valérie CORDONIER* (Paris) and *Adriano OLIVA*, OP (Paris).

« Thomas d’Aquin et ses sources arabes :
Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ »

Seven major presentations and a short project status-report were presented over the two days of the annual Parisian conference organized by the “Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ International Working Group.”¹

R.E. HOUSER (Center for Thomistic Studies, University of St. Thomas, Houston, TX) in “Avicenna and Aquinas’s *De principiis naturae*, c. 1-3” provided an analysis of Aquinas’ *De principiis naturae* displaying in detail the dependence of this work on the *Physics* of Avicenna’s *Shifā* (Latin: *Liber primus naturalium. Tractatus primus de causis et principiis naturalium*). In the first three sections of *De principiis*, Aquinas covers all of the principles of natural philosophy, its “essential” principles (the four causes), “privation” (its accidental principle) and “prime matter.” Houser showed that Aquinas offers his Dominican brothers principles that are “definitions” of these fundamental terms and also fundamental “hypotheses” (*suppositiones*). In doing so, Aquinas made extensive use of Avicenna’s *Physics I* rather than Aristotle or Averroes, because Avicenna had made it perfectly clear that his *Physics I* was designed to delineate both the subject and the principles of physical science explicitly, and with a precision Aristotle himself had not attained. The purpose of Houser’s lecture was to replace the regnant but incorrect interpretation that in this treatise Aquinas relied primarily on Averroes, whose dominant influence is confined to the last section of the work. Houser also added that the rest of Aquinas’ treatise is drawn straight from the work of Avicenna.

In “From Philoponus to Aquinas: Studies in the Posteriority of John Philoponus in Arabo-Latin Philosophy,” Michael CHASE (CNRS, Paris) surveyed some of the works and doctrines of John Philoponus, insofar as they exerted an influence—through various intermediaries, particularly al-Fārābī and Averroes—on Thomas Aquinas. Chase began with brief surveys of Philoponus in the Greek, Latin and Arabic traditions, followed by an analysis of some of his chief arguments in favor of the world’s temporal creation. The central part of the paper consisted in a study of the text with a

¹ www.AquinasAndTheArabs.org

translation (provided in an appendix) of a selection of Averroes' quotations from, and discussions of, Philoponus' arguments. For a proper understanding of these arguments, Chase argued, it is important to take into consideration the text of Simplicius, which often provides the requisite doctrinal background for understanding Philoponus, and hence the Arabo-Islamic authors who adopted and adapted his doctrines.

In "Making Something of Nothing: Privation, Possibility and Potential in Avicenna and Aquinas," Jon McGINNIS (University of Missouri, St. Louis) showed how privation plays a positive and substantive role in the modal theories of Avicenna and Aquinas, particularly with respect to their analyses of possibility and potentiality. According to McGinnis, both philosophers understood possibility in terms of a causal relation. In the case of Avicenna, this relation involves a certain necessarily existing cause and the corresponding privation of the effect of that cause. When possibility is considered in itself without reference to necessary existence, the possible in itself simply reduces to privation. Interestingly, inasmuch as a cause essentially produces only some positive effect, Avicenna can assert that possibility in itself cannot be caused. The mature Aquinas too identifies possibility and potentiality with a causal relation; however, for him this relation consists in some positively existing cause and the end toward which that cause is directed or ordered. Since both cause and end have determinate being—and so must be caused by God—God for Aquinas can and does create possibility in itself, albeit only together with, and inherent in, the entity related to that possibility. McGinnis concluded that, although Avicenna's and Aquinas' views about possibility and its existence are in many respects close, the irreducible role that Avicenna ascribes to (relative) privation in describing possibility in itself makes his notion of possibility have some ever-so-slight independence from the Creator in a way that it does not for Aquinas.

Luis X. LÓPEZ-FARJEAT (Universidad Panamericana, México D.F.) spoke on "Aquinas on Creation in *II Sent.*, d 1, q 1, art. 1-2 and his Arabic / Islamic Sources." He reasoned that, while the creation of the world has been widely discussed since the Middle Ages until our present time, this doctrine—essential to the Christian faith—had a distinctive development that reached its maturity within the Christian tradition with Thomas Aquinas. Before Thomas, Christian philosophers and theologians understood that the doctrine of the eternity of the world, a proposition coming from Greek philosophers, and mainly from Aristotle, was contrary to, and incompatible with, the doctrine of creation in time and *ex nihilo*. The theological and philosophical basis of Aquinas' doctrine of creation is found in *In II Sent.* d.1 q.1. There, especially in article 2, Aquinas argues for the possibility of an eternal

and created universe with a quite innovative approach considering the whole array of refutations of eternity proposed by most of his Christian predecessors and contemporaries. López-Farjeat argued that Aquinas builds the possibility of an eternal and created universe on the basis of Averroes' notion of continuous production (*ihdāth dā'im*). There are, however, relevant differences between both philosophers. Given that Averroes definitely rejects the possibility of creation out of nothing, Thomas resorts to Avicenna's metaphysics in order to propose a different meaning of the Latin expression *ex nihilo*. In this sense, he offers a doctrine of creation radically different from that of such theologians as Bonaventure and Albert the Great. In addition to the metaphysical differences between these theologians and Aquinas, there is also a notorious contrast in their argumentative strategies. While for most Christian thinkers it is not possible to attain a demonstrative argument for creation, Aquinas himself *seems* to accept, following Maimonides, that the discussion on whether the world is eternal or has been created in a significant sense is a matter of dialectical reasoning and, in this sense, there are no demonstrative arguments in any respect (*In II Sent.* d.1 q.1 a.5 corp.). With this in mind, one should not be surprised to read in *Summa theologiae* Ia q.46 a.2 that the temporal creation of the world is a matter of faith but not demonstrable ("credibile, non autem scibile vel demonstrabile"). Yet we can see in *In II Sent.* d.1 q.1 a.2 corp. that Aquinas affirms that creation is not only a matter of faith but also demonstrable by reason (*ratio demonstrat*). López-Farjeat then went on to provide a detailed analysis of sources and arguments set out by Aquinas in *In II Sent.* d.1 q.1.

Olga LIZZINI (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) spoke on "Possibility and Creation. Some Remarks on the Views of Avicenna and Aquinas." Her lecture focused on the well-known interpretative critique of Avicenna by the late Beatrice Zedler. Lizzini emphasized that in his *Metaphysics* from the *Kitāb al-Shifā'* (*Liber de philosophia prima sive Scientia divina*), Avicenna declares that the cause has power over existence: its action is on the existence of the thing and only on it (*Ilāh*. VI.1, 259.11-263.18). The quiddity (and/or the possibility) of the thing *qua* quiddity (and possibility) is in some way removed from the power of the cause: on the one hand, possibility expresses the necessary distinction between the cause and its effect; on the other hand, it is a sort of condition of causal power. This applies to the nature of the First Cause as the Necessary Being and as the cause of the necessity of existence in all other beings, which have in and of themselves only possible existence. Yet that possibility is a sort of condition in each thing outside the First Cause does not mean either that this possibility is temporally prior to the thing necessitated, or that it has an

essential anteriority (which still pertains to the Cause and never to the caused thing). Instead, argued Lizzini, possibility is a determinant condition of the causal relationship (*in re* or *in intellectu*). This topic is discussed in detail by Thomas Aquinas (*Oq. de potentia*). An interpretation of the relationship between Thomas and Avicenna in this work was provided by Beatrice Zedler some years ago (*Traditio*, 1948; cf. already M. Bouyges, “L’idée génératrice du *de Potentia* de saint Thomas,” in *Revue de philosophie* 2 [1931] 131; 246–68) and to the mind of some scholars of Aquinas remains a powerful and cogent analysis. However, more recently, in his book on Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas (*Talking About God, Talking About Creation*, Leiden 2005), Rahim Acar has given his own interpretation of the question, concluding that the considered views of Thomas are less than adequate on this issue. Without attempting to deal exhaustively with the subject, Lizzini provided remarks stressing some elements that she believes to be essential to the comprehension of the relationship between possibility and the creative power of the Cause in Avicenna. Those remarks focussed on texts in which Avicenna gave clear expression to the view that the notion of possibility does not lie in the things themselves as if they were to exist somehow prior to receiving the necessity of existence from the First Cause.

In “‘First Averroism’ and ‘Second Averroism’: An Analysis,” Richard C. TAYLOR (Marquette University, WI and DeWulf Mansion Centre, Leuven) showed that over the course of several years of study, drawing on the work of Salman, Gómez Nogales and others, R.-A. Gauthier developed and refined the theses of what he came to call ‘First Averroism’ and ‘Second Averroism’. Briefly put, according to this view Averroes’ teaching on the human intellect in the *Long Commentary on the De Anima* was understood by Latin thinkers initially such that the agent intellect and material or possible intellect are powers of the human soul, while it was only later that they came to view Averroes as holding that these intellects are separately existing immaterial substances. For Gauthier this latter position was not the genuine view of Averroes himself but rather a ‘Second Averroism’ created by Christian theologians that surfaced around 1252. Taylor re-examined the problematic sources of Gauthier’s incorrect theses as well as additional sources in order to provide a different view of the reception and use of Averroes by the theologians of the early to mid-thirteenth century. Taylor gave particular attention to the use of Averroes by Albertus Magnus in his *De homine*, where he explicitly developed a natural epistemology from the teachings of Averroes and Avicenna, an epistemology remarkably similar to that set forth in the commentary on the *Sentences* and later works by Thomas Aquinas.

The conference concluded with “Aquinas’ Early Essentialist Realism and the Avicennian Tri-fold Essence” by David B. TWETTEN (Marquette University, WI). According to Twetten, Gilson and Fabro, the greatest interpreters of Thomas Aquinas in the last century, along with nearly everyone else, criticized Aquinas’ early Avicennian arguments for the “real distinction” between essence and *esse* (act of being) in interestingly different ways. Twetten argued, however, that these scholars did not attend to Aquinas’ other early (and also late) discussions of a “real distinction” between individual substance or supposit and essence. Twetten drew out the grounds, textual and philosophical, for this real distinction, especially in the early works of Aquinas, and then explored its background in Avicenna and Albertus Magnus. Thomas took this real distinction as already established within the philosophical tradition that he furthers, and it is within this context that we must read his “Avicennian” distinction between essence and *esse*, Twetten contended.

Richard C. TAYLOR (Milwaukee, WI)
and Luis X. LÓPEZ-FARJEAT (México D.F.)

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(5) 22-24 juni 2011, København (Danmark): Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, Københavns Universitet. *Sponsored by:* Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, The Danish Counsel for Independent Research – Humanities. *Organising Committee:* David BLOCH (København), Jakob FINK (København), Russell L. FRIEDMAN (Leuven), Heine HANSEN (København) and Ana María MORA-MÁRQUEZ (København).

**“Logic and Language in the Middle Ages:
A Symposium in Honour of Sten Ebbesen”**

On 23 June 2011, Sten Ebbesen turned 65. To honour this exceptional scholar, more than forty colleagues and friends from all over the world gathered for a symposium at the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters in Copenhagen. The eighteen lectures delivered over the three days for which the symposium ran treated a wide range of topics reflecting Sten’s many research interests. Although they focused on everything from textual criticism to metaphysics, the lectures nonetheless clearly reflected the fact that if there is one theme that can be said to be central to Sten’s vast and influential scholarly output, it is the strong interest in linguistic and logical analysis.

The first day began with a brief welcome, after which John MAGEE (University of Toronto) presented his paper “The Textual Tradition of Boe-

thius' First *Peri Hermeneias* Commentary.” Magee spoke of his work on a new critical edition of Boethius’ commentary, and discussed some of the complexities involved in establishing the text, focusing among other things on problems concerning the *lemmata*.

In her talk, “Anonymus Aurelianensis III on the *Prior Analytics*,” Christina THÖRNQVIST (Göteborgs Universitet) discussed aspects of the (presumably) earliest known Latin commentary on Aristotle’s *Prior Analytics* (found in Orléans, BM, Ms. 283), the unknown author of which Sten has dubbed ‘Anonymus Aurelianensis III’.¹ Thomsen Thörnqvist is currently preparing a critical edition of this text, which among other things is of great interest because the author appears to have had access to a translation of a Greek commentary.

Thomsen Thörnqvist was followed by Luisa VALENTE (Università di Roma «La Sapienza»), who in her lecture “The Ancient Philosophers in Peter Abelard’s Writings” presented us with Abelard’s understanding of the figure of the ancient philosopher, and with his use of this understanding to develop his own model of an ideal community and of the philosopher’s role in it. Valente showed how Abelard, taking several sources of inspiration (Macrobius, Cicero and the Church Fathers), merged ancient doctrines about cities and philosophers with Christian doctrines about the Church and priests in order to construct his own model for an ideal community and the philosopher’s role in it, a model which was neither pagan nor traditionally Christian but which was of both pagan and Christian inspiration.

In his talk, “Alberic of Paris on Mont Ste Geneviève against Peter Abelard,” Yukio IWAKUMA (Fukui Prefectural University) presented a list of references to named masters in logical texts from ca. 1130-1200 while focusing on the controversies between Alberic of Paris and Peter Abelard. The focus on Alberic and Abelard reflects a curious fact about the material on the list (which is based on all known logical texts from the period): Alberic and Abelard are more frequently referred to than any other named masters and, more noticeably, Alberic is always given the favourable judgement when the two are compared in some way in the texts. Iwakuma’s list also shows that no theses of the so-called *Montani* (identified by De Rijk with *Albricani*) can be confirmed to be Alberic’s. Finally, Iwakuma told us that he has discovered a list of theses of the *Albricani* (*De sententia*

¹ S. EBBESSEN, “Analyzing Syllogisms or Anonymus Aurelianensis III — the (presumably) Earliest Extant Latin Commentary on the *Prior Analytics*, and its Greek Model”, in *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge grec et latin* 37 (1981), 1-20; reprt. in S. EBBESSEN, *Collected Essays 1: Greek–Latin Philosophical Interaction*, Aldershot 2008, 171-85.

magistri nostri Alberici) which along with the other items on his list will facilitate further research and a better understanding of the development of logic in the twelfth century.

The last two lectures of the day dealt with more technical aspects of twelfth-century logic. John MARENBON (University of Cambridge) spoke on “Gilbert of Poitiers’ Philosophy of Language,” while in his talk “Refutation and Resolution: The Theory and Practice of *Instantiae* in the Parisian Schools,” Chris MARTIN (University of Auckland) discussed a set of *instantiae* contained in an anonymous twelfth-century commentary on Aristotle’s *Sophistical Refutations* found in Cambridge, St John’s College Library, Ms. D.12. The commentary is one that Sten worked on in the past and of which he is currently preparing a full edition.²

The second day was Sten’s birthday and began with birthday greetings and a wonderful speech given by his former pupil Russell L. FRIEDMAN (KU Leuven). The first paper of the day was titled “Robert Kilwardby and Albert the Great on *Praedicabilia* and *Praedicamenta*,” in which Alessandro CONTI (Università degli Studi dell’Aquila) presented and compared some of the main theses on categories and universals advanced by the later Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby, and Albert the Great respectively. Since an important article by Sten, it has been widely recognized that Albert drew quite heavily on some of Kilwardby’s logical commentaries when he composed his own paraphrases of the textbooks of the Arts course.³ Despite this demonstrable influence in some contexts, there are, Conti argued, nonetheless important differences in their views both on Aristotle’s theory of categories and on the problem of universals. Most importantly, with respect to the latter, Kilwardby, according to Conti, seems to be more faithful to Aristotle’s claim in Chapter 5 of the *Categories* that the existence of particular substances, that is, concrete objects such as particular men and particular horses, constitute a necessary condition for the existence of all other items, universal substances included. By contrast, Albert seems to attribute some sort of real being to universals, regardless of whether they are actually instantiated or not.

Heine HANSEN’s (Københavns Universitet) lecture “Strange Finds”

² S. EBBESEN and Y. IWAKUMA, “*Instantiae* and 12th Century ‘Schools’”, in *CIMAGL* 44 (1983), 81-85.

³ S. EBBESEN, “Albert (the Great?)’s Companion to the *Organon*”, in *Albert der Grosse: seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung*, hrsg. v. A. ZIMMERMANN (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 14), Berlin 1981, 89-103; reprt. in EBBESEN, *Collected Essays 2: Topics in Latin Philosophy from the 12th-14th centuries*, Farnham 2009, 95-98.

dealt with the theory of relations put forward by Nicholas of Paris, who taught in Paris at some point in the second quarter of the thirteenth century, and appears to have enjoyed considerable renown as a logician at the time. According to Nicholas' novel approach, a relation is a real extra-mental accident inhering in the two (or more) substances that it relates as in one subject. As Hansen showed, the theory was developed partly in response to some problems having to do with the view, which was common at the time, that relations are intrinsic accidents. In addition, Nicholas also held that paternity and filiation (and similar cases) are in fact just one relation to which we refer differently, depending on which term of the relation we are considering. Nicholas' theory has some clear similarities to a view that Sten once discovered in a mid-thirteenth-century sophism and which he referred to on that occasion as his "strangest find."⁴

In his talk, “*Culverbimus somnians*,” Paul THOM (University of Sydney) also touched on the theme of Albert the Great’s use of Robert Kilwardby’s logical commentaries. Thom is currently preparing a critical edition of Kilwardby’s influential commentary on the *Prior Analytics*, on which Albert, as Sten has shown, drew heavily. Thom’s discussion focussed on an interpretative problem relating to chapter 33 of the first book of Aristotle’s text, in which the Stagirite discusses a would-be syllogism involving the middle term *intelligible Aristomenes*. As Thom showed, Albert does not follow Kilwardby’s interpretation of this particular passage but dismisses it with the remark that here somebody had dreamt up a bunch of stuff that he is not going to worry about (“quidam autem somniando hic multa finixerunt de quibus non curamus”). A few centuries later, Kilwardby and Albert both turn up in the commentary by the Italian philosopher Agostino Nifo († 1538), who in turn explicitly rejects the interpretation of the passage offered by Albert (“Albertus multa dicit quae mihi non placent”).

Paloma PÉREZ-ILZARBE’s (Universidad de Navarra) talk, “*Socrates desinit esse non desinendo esse*: Limit-decision Problems in Peter of Auvergne,” dealt with the logic and metaphysics of ‘ceasing’ as found in Peter of Auvergne’s treatment of the sophism, *Socrates desinit esse non desinendo esse*, with special regard to limit-decision problems. Peter offers a logical reading of *desinit* as an ambiguous term, a metaphysical reading concerned with the nature of the instant, and finally a logical discussion of the verbs *incipit* and *desinit*. Pérez-Ilzarbe pointed out that Peter’s treatment of the sophism restricts the scope of *incipit* and *desinit* to successive things, and

⁴ S. EBBESSEN, “*Tantum unum est*: 13th-Century Sophistic Discussions around the Parmenidean Thesis”, in *The Modern Schoolman* 72 (1995), 175-99.

introduces the distinction between a temporal level and an ontic level in limit-decision problems. For Peter, she argued, the ontic level has priority.

Next, Simo KNUUTTILA (Helsingin yliopisto) gave a lecture titled “Concrete Accidental Terms,” in which he discussed themes relating to Sten’s article on late thirteenth-century debates about such terms, which was published in the memorial volume for Jan Pinborg.⁵ The nature of such terms (for example, ‘white’ and ‘coloured’) were of great interest to modist writers and some of their contemporaries, partly because the question was connected to several themes of importance in relation to metaphysical realism. Knuutila commented on some of the issues taken up by Sten, among other things on the question why in Boethius of Dacia’s theory ‘Socrates is white’ is true while ‘Socrates is whiteness’ is false. To these issues, Knuutila added some further examples of questions related to accidental terms in the discussion of the copula ‘is’ and *de re* modalities.

The final paper of the day was Calvin NORMORE’s (UCLA) “Buridan on Time and Possibility.” One of the themes explored by Normore was Buridan’s way of preserving bivalence while remaining a pure ‘divisibilist’ with regard to time. If everything temporal is divisible and there are no instants of time, it cannot be instants at which propositions are true, and so, Buridan argues, they must be true at divisible intervals. The problem is that if propositions are only true at divisible intervals—intervals through which change is possible—then it appears that contraries and even contradictories could be true at the same interval, and so, that they could be true together. Buridan’s strategy is to admit that contraries can be true together but deny that contradictories can by introducing a novel account of what it is to be true at an interval. On this approach, for an affirmative sentence to be true at an interval it need only be true at some part of that interval, while for a negative sentence to be true at an interval it must be true at every part of that interval. Normore further discussed some of the implications that this idea, and Buridan’s view that the present is context-dependent, have for his notion of possibility.

The third and final day began with a lecture on Byzantine philosophy by Katerina IERODIAKONOU (University of Athens), titled “Logical Exercises in Nikephoros Blemmydes’ Autobiography.” Ierodiakonou dealt with a logical joust that the Byzantine scholar Nikephoros Blemmydes (1197/8–1272) had with his professor Demetrios Karykes, and which he described in

⁵ S. EBBESSEN, “Concrete Accidental Terms: Late Thirteenth-Century Debates about Problems Relating to such Terms as *album*”, in *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg*, ed. N. KRETMANN, Dordrecht 1988, 107–74; reprt. in EBBESSEN, *Collected Essays* 2, 109–51.

his own autobiography *The Partial Account*. Ierodiakonou drew our attention to the suggestion by Blemmydes that we can get valid syllogisms in the second and the third figure, which were not recognized as such in the Aristotelian tradition, if the major term is larger or of the same extension as that of the minor. Since the extension of the terms was not taken into consideration by Aristotle in the *Prior Analytics*, Ierodiakonou ended her lecture with questions about the possible sources and underlying intention of this idea of extension of terms in the second and third figures.

The focus of Fabrizio AMERINI's (Università degli studi di Parma) paper was the interconnection between logic and metaphysics in Thomas Aquinas, and the role that (syllogistic) logic is supposed to play in a metaphysical explanation of natural phenomena. Since medieval thinkers normally read Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as a work applying the *Posterior Analytics*' theory of science to the field of metaphysics, (syllogistic) logic is more or less implicitly taken as structuring the way of doing investigation in metaphysics. An interesting example of such interconnection is *Met. Z.17*, the chapter where, according to some contemporary interpreters, Aristotle extends the *Posterior Analytics*' explanation theory to substances. Amerini discussed Thomas Aquinas' interpretation of this chapter and compared it to that recently put forward by David Charles, showing, among other things, that (1) Thomas tends to resist the idea that for Aristotle the formal cause of a phenomenon can be reduced to its efficient or final cause, and (2) that in the case of substantial simple items the procedure of explanation cannot account for the absolute existence of the substance or for the inherence of the essential properties in the substance but only for the belonging of a given substance to a given species.

In his lecture "John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen on the Principle of Non-Contradiction," E.P. BOS (Leiden University) discussed Marsilius of Inghen's interpretation of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC) and compared it to that of his teacher, John Buridan. In spite of obvious common ground between master and student, Bos emphasized that Marsilius deviates from Buridan especially by holding a subjectivist conception of time (apart from past, present and future, Marsilius reckons with possibility and imaginability as 'times' in a broad sense). Bos focused on questions 10-14 of Marsilius' commentary on the *Metaphysics*, in particular on question 14 about contradictory statements and time, and discussed Marsilius' answer to the objection against his subjectivist conception of time that it destroys PNC. As Bos also pointed out, Marsilius fails to represent his old master quite fairly.

There followed two papers on Radulphus Brito, an author to whom Sten, following in the footsteps of his teacher and friend Jan Pinborg, has

devoted much attention.⁶ The first of these two papers was given by Silvia DONATI (Albertus-Magnus-Institut) and bore the title “*Apparentia* and *modi essendi* in Radulphus Brito’s Doctrine of the Concepts: The Case of the Notion of Being.” The central theme of Donati’s talk was Brito’s approach to the question of the univocity of being. As Donati showed, Brito seems to have held that there is a sense in which substance and accident do in fact share a common mode of being, but at the same time he appears not to have taken this to imply that being need be purely univocal (*pure univocum*) with respect to the two.

In “Radulphus Brito as Theologian on the Theory of Relations,” Constantino MARMO (Università di Bologna) discussed various aspects of the theory of relations found in the still unedited commentary on the *Sentences*, which Brito composed in the early fourteenth century. As Marmo was able to show quite convincingly, Brito, not surprisingly, still defends many of the views he had held during his time as a Master of Arts in Paris in the 1290s, but he also develops those views further in several respects, for example by developing in more detail an account of the requirements that a relation must meet in order for it to count as a real relation as opposed to a mere relation of reason.

The symposium ended with a very entertaining paper delivered by Roberto LAMBERTINI (Università degli studi di Macerata), titled ‘Logic, Language, and Medieval Political Thought.’ Lambertini discussed different occurrences of various pieces of logical doctrine in the context of medieval political thought, drawing attention among other things to a passage in Dante’s *Monarchia* in which he employs Aristotle’s theory of categories to argue that items such as ‘Pope’ and ‘Emperor’ belong to the category of relation.

The guest of honour clearly enjoyed these three days of scientific discussion with friends and colleagues very much, and true to form—as anyone who has ever encountered him at a big congress or small colloquium will surely attest—he was constantly asking questions and offering helpful and penetrating comments. The proceedings from the symposium are currently being prepared for publication in the series “Investigating Medieval Philosophy” (E.J. Brill).

Jakob FINK, Heine HANSEN
and Ana Maria MORA-MÁRQUEZ (København)

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⁶ See, for example, Chapters 11 and 12 in EBBESSEN, *Collected Essays* 2.

(6) 6-9 luglio 2011, Padova (Italia): Congress of the Internationale Gesellschaft für Theologische Mediävistik (IGTM). Università di Padova; Università di Ferrara; Centro Studi Antoniani, Padova; Fondazione per le Scienze Religiose “G. Dossetti,” Bologna. *Comitato scientifico:* Riccardo QUINTO (Padova), Silvana VECCHIO (Ferrara), Donato GALLO (Padova), Luciano BERTAZZO, OFM Conv. (Padova), Riccardo BATTOCCHIO (Padova).

“*Fides Virtus. The Virtue of Faith in the Context of the Theological Virtues. Exegesis, Moral Theology and Pastoral Care from the 12th to the Early 16th Century*”

The 2011 Congress of the Internationale Gesellschaft für Theologische Mediävistik (IGTM), which took place in Padua, had two main purposes. The first was to investigate how the topic of faith, first treated in biblical commentaries, was developed into treatises on the theological virtues (which were to become an important part of Moral Theology). The second main purpose was to ascertain whether the three theological virtues became as popular a framework as the four cardinal virtues (or the seven or eight capital sins) were in the literature of pastoral care.

An inaugural speech by Paolo BETTIOLI (Padova) opened the Congress. Bettiolo investigated the concept of faith in the writings of authors of the fourth through the seventh centuries from both the Alexandrine and Antiochen traditions, including Clement of Alexandria, Evagrius Ponticus, Isaac of Nineveh, Nilus and Theodore of Mopsuestia. Bettiolo stressed the exegetical background of these authors’ notions of faith. He also explored the Scholastic discussions of faith taking place in monastic centres, and the way that faith was considered not only to transcend thought and speech, but also to comprise a doctrine.

Bettiolo’s speech was followed by a public lecture by Giuliano PISANI (Padova). Through a detailed analysis of the iconography of the Scrovegni Chapel, Pisani described the sophisticated philosophical and theological plan guiding Giotto’s frescoes in the Chapel. He focused specifically on the Chapel’s iconography concerning faith, which is depicted as one of the seven virtues leading to salvation (*Prudentia, Fortitudo, Temperantia, Iustitia, Fides, Caritas, Spes*). Each virtue opposes (and heals, according to a “therapy of contraries”) a specific vice (*Stultitia, Inconstantia, Ira, Injustitia, Infidelitas, Invidia, Desperatio*).

The following lectures were organised into three sections: (I) *Exegesis*, (II) *Moral Theology*, and (III) *Preaching and Pastoral Theology*. The first section, *Exegesis*, included six lectures, covering topics which ranged from

the twelfth to the mid-sixteenth centuries. Hideki NAKAMURA (Tokyo) opened the section with an analysis of Richard of Saint-Victor's *Benjamin minor*. He explored Richard's tropological interpretation of Jacob's family (Gen 29:15-45:15), according to which Jacob stands for the believer, while the events of his life describe the believer's pathway from the union with *affectio* (Lea) to the union with *ratio* (Rachel). Scriptural exegesis allows for two different anthropological issues to be addressed: first, how virtues are formed in human beings; second, how different degrees of knowledge, up to the highest degree (*contemplatio*), are acquired.

The topic of Marcia COLISH's (New Haven) paper was faith in Peter Lombard's *Collectanea*, the Lombard's commentary on the Pauline epistles. According to Colish, Peter Lombard considers faith primarily as an intellectual virtue, an epistemic state of partial knowledge. Peter labours to define carefully a vocabulary for conceptualizing faith and related, at times opposing, terms. This approach was subsequently used in his systematic theology, too. Among the terms used by Peter and analysed in Colish's paper were *fides*, *perfiditas*, *fiducia*, *infidelitas*, *credulitas*, *incredulitas*, and *diffidatio*.

Mark CLARK (Front Royal, VA) explored the concept of faith in Parisian classes on the Bible in the second half of the twelfth century. Clark focused primarily on Peter Comestor's *Historia scholastica* and Stephen Langton's lectures on Comestor's *Historia*. After showing the close relation between the two authors, Clark chose three examples of the way in which faith is treated in these works. They are: the healing of the centurion (based on a narrative from the Gospels), the healing of the son of Regulus (apocryphal) and the healing of King Abgar (also apocryphal). All of these examples emphasise the communal aspect of faith, that is to say, faith as something concerning a whole group of people rather than a single person.

Clark was followed by Tiziano LORENZIN (Padova), who investigated the concept of faith in Bonaventure's scriptural commentaries. Lorenzin organised his presentation around three aspects of Bonaventure's analyses of faith. He first discussed Bonaventure's description of the difference between the sacred scriptures and the Word of the Lord, the latter comprising revelation more broadly. The speaker next considered the way in which Bonaventure stated that the Word of the Lord is God's way of educating his people to faith, and finally how the theologian stressed the importance of faith as a light for interpreting the Scriptures.

Fortunato IOZZELLI (Roma) considered faith in Peter of John Olivi's *Lectura super Lucam* (written between 1279 and 1295 and recently edited

by Iozzelli himself). He took into account Peter's analysis of faith in the context of commenting on three crucial figures from the Gospel: the Virgin Mary, Peter the Apostle and the Repentant Thief. According to Iozzelli's analysis, faith can be seen both from an objective point of view, as a set of truths to be believed, and from a subjective point of view, as an experience involving both the believers' reasoning and affectivity.

The final section *Exegesis* included a lecture by Matthew GAETANO (Philadelphia-Hillsdale, MI), who examined Domingo de Soto's *Commentary on Romans* (particularly Romans 1:17 and 3:21-25). Gaetano showed the extent to which the Counter-Reformation played a role in shaping Soto's biblical exegesis on faith. Gaetano compared Soto's *Commentary* to Soto's anti-Lutheran treatise *De natura et gratia*. He also considered how Soto's exegesis on the topic of faith differs from other authors' (Aquinas, Cajetan, Jacopo Nacchianti, and Francisco de Toledo).

Section II, *Moral Theology*, comprised eight lectures. The first two were devoted to key authors of the twelfth century. First, a lecture by Constant MEWS (Melbourne) investigated Peter Abelard's concept of faith by taking into account his *Theologia 'Scholarium'*, commentary on Romans, and a disciple's report of Abelard's lectures on all the Pauline epistles (*Commentarius Cantabrigensis*). Mews explored Abelard's controversial definition of faith as *existimatio* (estimation), as well as the relationship between faith and *caritas* in his teaching. Second, Fabrizio MANDREOLI (Bologna) explored faith in Hugh of Saint-Victor's *De sacramentis christiana fidei*. Faith is the focus of the *Opus restauracionis*, through which God brings about men's free involvement in salvation. Mandreoli exposed Hugh's theological and anthropological originality, but also the extent to which Hugh's reflection can enhance our present understanding of men's belief.

Magdalena BIENIAK (Warszawa) and Riccardo SACCENTI (Bologna) presented a joint paper focusing on several masters, writing between the end of the twelfth and the first half of the thirteenth centuries. Bieniak analysed the theory of the *connectio virtutum*, which states that those who have one theological virtue (faith, love or charity) have them all. This theory was widely accepted at the turn of the thirteenth century, and most authors recognized the virtue of charity's preeminent role in the connection among virtues. In contrast, William of Auxerre in his *Summa aurea* stressed the importance of faith over that of charity. Bieniak emphasized that in this William is following Stephen Langton's theological questions. She also described Langton's sophisticated view that faith comes first in *habitu* (that is, in having a certain virtue), and the *motus fidei* (namely the exercise of

faith) precedes the *motus caritatis*; however, the *motus fidei* is possible only if one already has charity (*caritas in habitu*). Saccenti extended Bieniak's analysis and scrutinized the theory of the *connectio virtutum* and the relationship between faith and charity. He examined the writings of masters from the first half of the thirteenth century, specifically Philip the Chancellor, Roland of Cremona, Hugh of Saint-Cher, and anonymous texts from Città del Vaticano, BAV, Codd. Vat. lat. 691 and Vat. lat. 782. Through his investigation, Saccenti showed that the theory of connection among theological virtues progressively developed into a distinct theory from that of connection among moral virtues. Both Bieniak and Saccenti based their presentation on a relevant dossier of unpublished texts.

Thomas MARSCHLER (Augsburg) focused on the sixteen questions concerning faith as a theological virtue in Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae IIaIIae*. Marschler first expounded the structure of Aquinas' treatise on faith and its relationship with the author's previous statements on the same issue. He then highlighted the interaction between cognition and will in the assent of faith, and explored the way that Thomas treated faith in the *Summa*, not only in the questions directly concerning the virtue but also in the questions on grace.

In his presentation Antonino POPPI (Padova) investigated the virtue of faith according to John Duns Scotus. Scotus' view is known through his Oxford lectures of 1303-1304, and through a *reportatio* of his Parisian lectures of 1304-1305 (1302-1303?). Scotus distinguishes between a *fides acquisita*, which is learnt naturally through listening to other faithful people, and a faith that is supernaturally infused by God (*fides infusa*). Scotus argues, however, that in no way can one demonstrate that one possesses *fides infusa*, which only can be an act of faith. Also, against Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, Scotus rejects the view that science (that is, Aristotelian science, described in the *Posterior Analytics*) can be attained concerning the objects of faith. On the whole, Scotus treats faith in an intellectualistic manner, and tends to stress the natural aspect of faith rather than its supernatural character.

Also focusing on the Franciscan tradition, William DUBA (Fribourg, Suisse) examined faith in the commentary on the *Sentences* and the *Treatise on Virtues* by Francis of Meyronnes. Starting from an analysis of the texts' transmission, Duba then described the structure of the section on faith and focused on two doctrines distinctive of Francis' school, namely the non-connection of theological virtues and the compatibility of faith with beatific knowledge.

The lecture delivered by Christophe GRELLARD (Paris) can be seen as a development of Poppi's analysis on Duns Scotus. Grellard investigated faith in the nominalist tradition, and considered particularly the writings of William of Ockham, Robert Holcot, Gabriel Biel and John Mair. These authors were heavily indebted to Scotus' reflections on faith, but also developed their own theories by questioning the relationship between naturalism and voluntarism in the context of faith. Ockham, for instance, developed a general theory of knowledge entirely based on naturalism, but admitted that the *fides acquisita* is based on the first act of will. Ockham also accepted the idea of *fides infusa* which, in his view, is crucial in distinguishing between a faithful and an unfaithful or heretical person. Similarly problematic is the tension between naturalism and voluntarism in Holcot, Biel and Mair.

Finally, Jacob SCHMUTZ (Abu Dhabi) concluded Section II with an analysis of faith in the *tractatus de fide*, beginning with the Council of Trent. These tracts were initially meant to be commentaries on Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae IIaIIae*, but then evolved into treatises of epistemology in their own right. Schmutz showed that these writings sever the link between faith and truth that had been taken for granted since Aquinas. According to Thomas, faith is a virtue because it is about something true. In texts from the time of the Counter-Reformation, however, the faith of both Christians and non-Christians can be analysed in a similar manner. As a consequence, faith can be about something false, and it ceased to be considered a virtue. In a nutshell, Schmutz focused on the crucial moment when the paradigm of faith as a virtue ceased to persist without being questioned.

The last section of the Congress was dedicated to *Preaching and Pastoral Theology*, and included seven lectures. Michael EMBACH's (Trier) lecture focused on Hildegard of Bingen's *Ordo virtutum*, a twelfth-century *Tugendspiel*, and one in which faith plays a crucial role. As Embach showed, two metaphors are used by Hildegard with regard to faith, the *vestimentum salutis* (Is 61:10) and the *speculum* (I Cor 13:12). Through poetry, Hildegard merged two traditions, one heir to the Old Testament's prophets, the other one coming from the New Testament, and particularly from Paul's Epistles.

William Peraldus' *Tractatus de fide*, which opens the second part of his *Summa de virtutibus*, was the focus of Richard NEWHAUSER's (Tempe, AZ) analysis. Newhauser pin-pointed several unusual characteristics of this treatise, which does not simply treat the relationship between faith and other virtues. Peraldus also spoke about the lack of faith, and he presented

heretical errors and several arguments for refuting them.

The virtue of faith in the *Sermons* of Anthony of Padua was addressed by José MEIRINHOS (Porto). Quite surprisingly, Anthony never cites the definition of faith in the Letter to Hebrews (11:1), either as a starting point for the sermon or as a topic to be developed within sermons. As Meirinhos explained, Anthony focused more on the Incarnation, the role of preaching, and above all on the supernatural intervention of God as a source of the believer's faith.

Carlo DEL CORNO (Bologna) investigated the concept of faith in the cycle of sermons on the Creed preached by Giordano of Pisa in Florence in 1305, and recorded by some listeners. Giordano, who was a famous preacher in his time, popularized the theories of Thomas Aquinas, and is well-known (or notorious) for his views on non-Christians (Jews and Muslims in particular), and for his frequent references to Dionysius the Areopagite's *De divinis nominibus*.

Silvia SERVENTI (Bologna) analysed faith in the *laudi* of Bianco of Siena, a Jesuate who lived between 1350 and 1412. Serventi provided an understanding of the conceptions of faith that lay persons could have held during the late Middle Ages. More than forty *laudi*, partly unpublished, deal with faith, while also considering the more general topic of the theological virtues. Serventi identified and analysed the images employed by Bianco to describe faith and the theological virtues, for instance, the chain of virtues and the tree of virtues.

Focusing on the movement of the Modern Devotion, Charles M.A. CASPERS (Nijmegen) shed light on faith in specific sections of Thomas a Kempis' *Imitatio Christi*, especially those concerning the Eucharist and the relationship between the sacraments and grace. Caspers also considered two other texts by Devout authors, the treatise on virtues by Gerard Zerbolt of Zutphen (†1398) and the *Gnotosolitos* by Arnold of Gheyloven (†1442).

Christopher BURGER (Amsterdam) turned to the late fifteenth century and investigated the writings of Johannes von Staupitz and Johannes von Paltz, both Augustinian Hermits. The two men took a very different approach to the way God acts in human affairs, both as far as the gift of grace is concerned and as far as faith is concerned. Johannes von Staupitz, albeit without criticizing the mediating role of sacraments and clergy, understands God's grace to be given immediately; Johannes von Paltz too insists that grace is given immediately, but he gives no role to priests in the communication of grace.

In sum, Section I and II of the Congress deserve recognition for highlighting the interaction between exegesis and systematic theology with respect to the characterization of the virtue of faith in the Middle Ages. These two literary genres were the most powerful instruments for discussing the topic of faith from the twelfth to the early-sixteenth centuries. On the other hand, the role that faith played in pastoral texts and sermons (Section III), despite its importance, does not seem to have been as crucial as the role played by other topics, such as the capital sins. The proceedings of this rich Congress will surely be a valuable contribution to our understanding of the history of theology in the Middle Ages.

Francesco SIRI (Roma)
and Caterina TARLAZZI (Padova-Paris)

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(7) 23.-24. elokuuta [August] 2011, Helsinki (Suomi): Helsingin yliopisto. *Sponsored by:* The Department of Systematic Theology, University of Helsinki; the Philosophical Psychology, Morality and Politics Research Unit (PMP), University of Helsinki; the Institute of Medieval Philosophy and Theology, Boston College. *Organizing Committee:* Olli HALLAMAA (Helsinki), John T. SLOTEMAKER (Boston) and Jeffrey C. WITT (Boston).

“The Adam de Wodeham Workshop”

The Adam Wodeham Critical Edition Project (AWCEP) originated at the XVIth annual Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale in Nijmegen, dedicated to the topic: “Philosophical Psychology in Late-Medieval Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*. ” At Nijmegen, a group of international scholars (Stephen F. BROWN, William J. COURTENAY, Olli HALLAMAA, Severin KITANOV, John T. SLOTEMAKER and Jeffrey C. WITT) discussed the possibility of editing Adam Wodeham’s longest and most mature commentary on the *Sentences*, the *Ordinatio Oxoniensis*. During the course of the colloquium the team agreed that the work would commence with Olli HALLAMAA as the General Editor of the project, and proceeded to divide the distinctions of the first Book of the *Ordinatio Oxoniensis* among the respective editors. Further, it was agreed that the team would begin by editing Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Université de Paris (Sorbonne), Ms. 193 and that a Web-site dedicated to Adam Wodeham would be developed.

In the months after Nijmegen, John Slotemaker and Jeffrey Witt

launched a Web-site (www.adamwodeham.org) dedicated to Wodeham. The Web-site includes a brief biography, a complete bibliography of extant manuscripts, critical editions and secondary literature, and a working transcription of Paris, BU, Ms. 193. As the transcription progressed, Hallamaa, Slotemaker and Witt discussed the possibility of working on the edition in Helsinki during the summer of 2011. It was decided by the team that the AWCEP should sponsor a “Workshop” on the *Ordinatio Oxoniensis* in August of 2011. After securing grants from the Center for International Mobility (CIMO), the Ernest Fortin Memorial Foundation at Boston College and the Philosophical Psychology, Morality and Politics Research Unit (PMP) of the University of Helsinki, members of the AWCEP convened in Helsinki to continue work on the edition.

During the planning stages of the Workshop, it was decided that two teams of scholars editing the respective commentaries on the *Sentences* by Richard FitzRalph and Adam Wodeham would benefit from a more active dialogue and collaboration. For that reason, Michael DUNNE (Maynooth)—the General Editor of Richard FitzRalph’s commentary on the *Sentences*—was invited to the conference.

The Workshop was divided into 6 sessions: (1) Introduction and the *status quaestionis*; (2) Historical Background; (3) Editorial Sessions; (4) Philosophical Topics; (5) Trinitarian Themes; (6) a Paleographical Session. Presented here is a record of the eight papers and collaborative “roundtable” sessions of the Adam Wodeham Workshop.

Sessions and Paper Summaries

(1) The workshop opened with a report on the *status quaestiones* of Wodeham research to date and a statement of our expectations about how the edition of the *Ordinatio* would affect the landscape of Wodeham studies. Jeffrey WITT surveyed the sixty-plus articles and books that treat Wodeham in a significant way. He noted those philosophical and theological topics that have received disproportionate attention in modern scholarship, especially Philosophy of Mind and Epistemology. In contrast such categories as ethics, natural theology and metaphysics have received significantly less attention. Witt then posed an overarching question for the Workshop: he asked the participants to consider whether the proportional break down of interest in Wodeham’s thought was a reflection of Wodeham’s own preoccupations or a reflection of the limited nature of his currently accessible corpus.

In order to help the Workshop approach this question, Witt provided a general comparison of *Ordinatio I* and the *Lectura secunda*. Book I

of the *Ordinatio* is unique in that it is the only part of the *Ordinatio* transcript that has a textual precedent. Witt presented three categories to identify the different ways in which *Ordinatio I* relates to the *Lectura secunda*: ‘new content’, ‘revised content’ and ‘repeated content’. Witt defined ‘new content’ as topical discussions that are not present in the *Lectura secunda*. Witt identified important instances of this kind of content in Wodeham’s Prologue, in his discussion of the will and enjoyment and use (*uti et frui*), and in his later discussions on the Trinity. Witt noted that ‘revised content’ constituted the bulk of *Ordinatio I*. He defined ‘revised content’ as content which is recognizable in the *Lectura secunda* but which has been moved, re-worked and emended in the *Ordinatio*. These kinds of editorial changes are of particular importance since Wodeham significantly re-ordered the structure of the *Ordinatio* even while preserving much of its content. The final category, ‘repeated content’, Witt defined as content that remains unchanged in both works. For example, d.6 q.1, on the non-identity of the divine nature, the divine will and other divine perfections, is not only a discussion that pre-exists in the *Lectura secunda*, but it is one of the few, if only, questions that remains in the same place in the organization of the *Lectura secunda* and *Ordinatio*.

Witt concluded with the following question for the Workshop to consider and discuss: given the initial comparison between the *Lectura secunda* and *Ordinatio I*, what conclusions can be drawn about Wodeham’s changing focus and interests between writing the earlier and later work? What has motivated his concern with new topics? What prompted him to make such large scale organizational changes?

(2) Michael DUNNE and Olli HALLAMAA discussed the benefits of the Adam Wodeham Project and the Richard FitzRalph Project working collaboratively towards a common goal: the publication of both the Wodeham and FitzRalph critical editions. In general, the discussion focused on practical steps that could be taken to improve collaborative work. For example, publishing “preliminary transcripts” of a single manuscript on the Internet proves useful for editors in both projects, as FitzRalph and Wodeham often share common sources and/or are responding to similar arguments.

(3) Along with Mark HENNINGER, SJ (Washington, D.C.), Robert ANDREWS (Stockholm) is currently editing Robert Graystanes’ commentary on the *Sentences*. Thus, Andrews examined the commentary of Graystanes—which dates to the early 1320’s and survives in a single manuscript—looking for evidence that Wodeham engaged with Graystanes either explicitly through direct quotations or implicitly through paraphrases or conceptual borrowings.

The probability of Adam Wodeham's *Ordinatio Oxoniensis* demonstrating some influence of Graystanes initially seemed high, as both authors resided at Oxford and developed their lectures on the *Sentences* between 1320 and 1335. But, despite this historical link, Andrews concluded that Wodeham's *Ordinatio* does not demonstrate any intimate knowledge of Graystanes' commentary. That said, Andrews wisely insisted that any definitive judgments on the matter must await the final editions of Graystanes' and Wodeham's Oxford commentaries on the *Sentences*.

(4) In this session Olli HALLAMAA explained four aims that have guided the Wodeham Project's decision on how the text would be prepared, and Jeffrey Witt explained why Extensible Mark-Up Language (XML) is the ideal format to meet these aims.

The first aim of the Wodeham project is to develop the transcriptions in "standard file formats." This means that editors transcribe texts into files that are "platform- and device-independent." As such, editors are not using file formats tied to Microsoft Word or other specific software programs. Avoiding "application-specific formats" means that our text will have an independent status, and therefore, it will be able to survive the inevitable developments in computer software. The second aim is to have one source-text, which can be used in a variety of ways. The most notable uses Hallamaa observed are print and Web editions. Having one source document means that whether editors are preparing the data for print or Web publication, they only ever have one file. The content of this file, however, needs to be encoded in such a way as to allow for infinite manipulation. Using presentational style-sheets, the raw transcription can be manipulated and displayed according to the purposes of the editors. The third aim is to have raw texts-files that preserve the lineation of each manuscript and allow for automatic collation. The final aim is to be able to run complex computational analyses of the raw source files. This includes multiple indices, key word searches and statistical analysis.

With these four aims in mind Witt explained why the Wodeham Project is transcribing texts into XML files. He noted that every text is encoded in some way. In a normal book that a human reader uses different types of data are encoded visually; headings are usually bold; paragraphs are separated by spaces; footnotes are usually in a smaller font at the bottom of the page; italics are often used to encode several different types of data. But therein lies the problem. While the human reader can discern the difference between italics used to identify the title of a book and italics used to indicate an emphasis or type of variant in the apparatus, the computer cannot tell the difference. When an editor asks the computer to display different types of informa-

tion in different ways, this visual confusion becomes a problem. XML solves this problem by allowing editors to move away from visual encoding to semantic encoding. For instance, when we transcribe the name ‘Ockham’, we surround the name with a tag <name>Ockham</name> declaring that the type of information inside this tag is a name. We do the same thing for <titles>, <paragraphs>, <headings>, <sections>, <variants>, <footnotes>, and so on for all the different types of information imaginable in a complex manuscript. Now if the editors want to display the title in italics, they simply tell the computer to do this through a style-sheet. The key behind XML is the separation of content and form. Witt explained that The Adam Wodeham Project asks its editors to avoid thinking about form and focus on clearly describing the kinds of content they are transcribing, using tags. With a well-tagged document, the possibilities of computer based manipulation are endless.

In the subsequent discussion, Michael Dunne noted that he had at one time been an assistant of Roberto Busa, SJ, a pioneer in the digital humanities and the brains behind the *Index thomisticum*. Dunne noted that it was the reliance on semantic encoding that allowed Busa’s original work to remain useful to the present day. Busa’s separation of content and form enabled the text of Thomas Aquinas to be indexed in a variety of ways. And this text, in turn, was able to be easily transformed into the online text now available at corpusthomisticum.com. The Adam Wodeham Project similarly seeks to use XML to create a text that will survive in the long run. By using semantic coding and an independent file format, the text will be useable in ways that have yet to be imagined.

(5) Stephen F. BROWN’S presentation focused on an overview of Wodeham’s prologue in the *Ordinatio*. As Brown explained, the Prologue of the *Ordinatio* dramatically diverges from the Prologue of the *Lectura secunda* and the prologue-genre in general. Where the *Lectura secunda* has a philosophical and epistemological focus, the text of the *Ordinatio* turns to very theological concerns. Brown illustrated this by listing and describing the two questions that structure the *Ordinatio* prologue: the first question asks “Utrum studium sacrae theologiae sit meritorium vitae aeternae”; the second asks “Utrum studium sacrae Scripturae impositum alicui in foro poenitentiae pro satisfactione omissione contraria sit meritorium.” In both of these questions, the concern for merit stands out. Gone are the concerns about the knowledge of singulars, intuitive and abstractive knowledge, the construction of propositions and the degrees of evidence. In the Prologue of the *Ordinatio* Wodeham focuses on what someone gains through studying the Scriptures. The rest of Brown’s presentation was a survey of the argu-

ments for and against “earned merit” through theological practice.

The uniqueness of Wodeham’s Prologue prompted a lively discussion. Most questions focused on whether Wodeham had undergone some sort of religious conversion, and, more generally, on what might account for this dramatic shift. Some ideas proposed the possible impact of the writings of Robert Holcot on Wodeham at this time. It was also noted that the dramatic shift in the Prologue is balanced against the rest of the *Ordinatio*, which retains much of its philosophical character. While the speculation made for a lively discussion, the consensus was that it is too early to know anything definitive about Wodeham’s motivation. Nevertheless, Brown noted that his primary purpose was to bring this dramatic shift to the attention of the Workshop as it is an important piece of evidence that should guide subsequent investigations into Wodeham’s *Ordinatio*.

(6) In light of Russell Friedman’s recent argument that Oxford theologians in the second and third decade of the fourteenth century were engaged in the “search for simplicity,”¹ John SLOTEMAKER discussed two aspects of Wodeham’s trinitarian thought that support this general claim. Slotemaker developed two arguments for the thesis: the first argument treated Walter Chatton’s and Wodeham’s understanding of the *filioque*; the second argument considered the formal structure (i.e., the organization of distinctions) of Book I of the *Ordinatio*. The first argument treated Walter Chatton’s and Wodeham’s debate about whether or not opposed relations or disparate relations—and the corresponding opposed distinctions and disparate distinctions, respectively—distinguish the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Slotemaker argued that this traditional debate between Dominican and Franciscan masters was adjudicated in the writings of Catton and Wodeham through the lens of absolute divine simplicity. That is, the two theological positions at stake were defended and criticized by articulating how the respective positions violated, or were consistent with, the unity of the divine nature. The “search for simplicity,” Slotemaker argued, is evident in this traditional late thirteenth-century debate; further, divine simplicity was the theological concept employed by both supporters (i.e., Wodeham) and critics (i.e., Chatton) of William of Ockham.

Slotemaker’s second argument turned to the structure of the *Lectura secunda* and the *Ordinatio Oxoniensis* I. He argued that, similarly to Thomas Aquinas, Wodeham eventually rejected the traditional ordering of distinctions in Book I of the *Sentences* (i.e., Trinity in dd.3-33, unity in dd.34-48)

¹ R.L. FRIEDMAN, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham*, Cambridge 2010.

and which he followed in the *Lectura secunda*, favoring instead an order that treated the unity of God before the Trinity of God. Slotemaker noted that in *Ordinatio* I d.2, Wodeham states explicitly that he will treat first the unity of God followed a discussion of the divine Trinity, and further that he will defer all discussions of the Trinity until d.33. But, why are all the trinitarian discussions collected into d.33? Slotemaker argued that Wodeham reorganized the material of the text—from Trinity/unity to unity/Trinity—without explicitly violating the traditional distinctions of the Lombard. In the *Ordinatio* the Trinity is treated in d.33 because that is the final distinction dedicated to the Trinity in the Lombard’s text; Wodeham simply pushed the discussion of the unity of the divine nature before d.33. Thus, Wodeham could “re-arrange” the order, as he indicates in d.2, while retaining the discussion of the Trinity in a distinction that was traditionally dedicated to the Trinity (i.e., d.33). This theory, Slotemaker argued, helps explain the unusual structure of the work and perhaps indicates a “structural” approach to the “search for simplicity” argued by Friedman.

(7) Simo KNUUTTILA spoke about the fourteenth-century debates concerning the tension between Aristotelian logic and trinitarian theology. Textually, he focused on the *Ordinatio Oxoniensis* I q.3: “Utrum aliqua sit certa regula vel ars per quam solvi possint communiter paralogismi facti et talibus similes circa materiam Trinitatis” (Interestingly, the *Lectura secunda* contains no discussion of “trinitarian paralogisms.”). Thematically, Knuutila analyzed in detail the fourteenth-century understanding of predication as identity (*praedicatio identica*) and its application to trinitarian theology. Fourteenth-century logicians, following Abelard, argued that predication should be understood as a form of identity. Identity theories of predication state that a proposition such as ‘the cat is black’ means ‘the same thing which is the cat is also black’ or ‘every A is B’ is read as ‘everything which is A is B’. Knuutila traced the development of *praedicatio identica* from Abelard up through the early fourteenth century, culminating with Wodeham’s use of this theory of predication to solve the question of “trinitarian paralogisms.” Finally, Knuutila argued that while this theory of predication solves the immediate dilemmas caused by “trinitarian paralogisms,” there are some unsavory consequences.

(8) Severin KITANOV spoke (via Skype) on Adam Wodeham’s treatment of beatific enjoyment in the *Ordinatio Oxoniensis*. He began by summarizing the differences between the treatment of beatific enjoyment in the *Lectura secunda* and the *Ordinatio*. In the *Ordinatio*, Wodeham greatly expanded the discussion to include 14 distinctions (cf. 60 folio pages in Sorbonne MS 193), with questions 1 and 6-14 consisting of completely

new material. Further, of the questions that treat the same material (2-5), Kitanov noted that in most cases Wodeham greatly expanded on the text of the *Lectura*. Interestingly, Kitanov argued that the heart of Wodeham's discussion of beatific enjoyment in the *Ordinatio* consists of the new material found in questions 6-10, which treats the liberty of the will and the functioning of the will as a mental power. Thus, the treatment of beatific enjoyment in the *Ordinatio* contains substantial new material that is central for understanding Wodeham's philosophical psychology and his theological understanding of human enjoyment of God.

The Adam de Wodeham Workshop concluded with a group paleography session dedicated to transcribing particularly problematic texts encountered by Slotemaker, Witt and Tuomas Vaura (Helsinki) during their editing throughout the summer. Helpful suggestions were made by members of the Workshop that were eventually posted online.

The Adam de Wodeham Workshop would like to thank Professor Knuutila and the department of Systematic Theology of the University of Helsinki for hosting the workshop, and the institutions cited above, who sponsored the event. It is hoped that as the edition progresses, we will be able to find funding for future Workshops.

John T. SLOTEMAKER and
Jeffrey C. WITT (Boston)

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(8) 5-7 settembre 2011, Pisa (Italia): International conference on medieval ontology sponsored by the Scuola Normale Superiore of Pisa. *Organisers:* Francesco DEL PUNTA (Pisa) and Gabriele GALLUZZO (Pisa).

“The Problem of Universals in the XIIIth Century”

On 5-7 September 2011, the Scuola Normale Superiore of Pisa hosted the international conference “The Problem of Universals in the XIIIth Century.” The conference is part of a large scientific and editorial project, co-ordinated by Francesco Del Punta and Gabriele Galluzzo, the main objective of which is to cast new light on the history of the problem of universals through a survey of the different historical contexts in which the problem has been raised and discussed. The results of the project will be published in a dozen volumes treating the problem in ancient philosophy, the twelfth century, Arabic medieval thought, the thirteenth century, the fourteenth century, late-medieval Scholasticism and the Renaissance, modern philoso-

phy, the nineteenth century and the early analytic debate, contemporary philosophy, in the natural sciences, in ethics and the philosophy of law, and in ‘extra-European’ philosophies. More particularly, the project aims at combining an historical and textual approach to the history of philosophy with a robust understanding of present day metaphysics. Scholars who are invited to take part in the project are also strongly encouraged to overcome the traditional chronological boundaries and to discuss issues and difficulties that are still at the centre of the current philosophical debate. The general assumption behind such a methodological option is that philosophical issues remain fundamentally the same through the different epochs in spite of the significant differences in philosophical techniques and technical jargon that the different historical moments present. In 2010 the Scuola Normale funded the first two conferences of the series on contemporary analytic philosophy (organised by Gabriele Galluzzo, Michael Loux and Jonathan Lowe) and on ancient thought (organised by Riccardo Chiaradonna and Gabriele Galluzzo). Besides the conference on the thirteenth century, another event in the series took place at the Scuola in November 2011, when a group of internationally recognised scholars gathered to discuss the early modern debate on the nature of generality under the direction of Stefano Di Bella. The conference on the fourteenth century is slated for September 2012. The organisation of each conference and volume follows roughly the same pattern: contributions are circulated by participants a couple of months before the conference, so that the common discussion may become a fruitful starting point for the drafting of the final versions of the papers. This two-step procedure ensures as much as possible uniformity and coherence among the different contributions.

Although the medieval controversy over the nature of universals has been at the centre of a revival of interest on the part of both philosophers and historians, most discussions have actually focused on the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, that is, on the beginning of the dispute and on its conclusion. In this historiographical perspective, the thirteenth century has often been regarded as a period of transition, in which no significant progress was made in the controversy and during which no distinctions sufficiently refined to open up a new phase of the discussion were made. Scholarly contributions have therefore concentrated on what seemed to be the dominant theme of the thirteenth-century treatment, namely the reception of Avicenna’s doctrine of essence. Alternatively, scholars have tried to devise sharper definitions of the categories of ‘moderate realism’ or ‘conceptualism’, which represent an intermediate position between the positions of ‘realism’ and ‘nominalism’ that many thirteenth-century thinkers pur-

portedly held. The assumption behind such an approach and interpretation is that it is only in the fourteenth century with the dispute between William of Ockham and his opponents that the problem of universals receives its clearest and, to some extent, its final formulation. In contrast with this general tendency, the participants in the conference at Pisa shared the common assumption that the thirteenth century is an epoch of stimulating philosophical debate, in which new concepts and techniques were employed in investigating the complex relationship between general concepts and terms and the extra-mental, particular things encountered in everyday experience. Far from being a period of transition, the thirteenth century offers new perspectives in a number of crucial areas, including constituent ontology, epistemology and semantics, not to mention the inter-play between philosophy and theology.

The lectures presented at the conference covered a large chronological span, from commentators on the *Sentences* from the first half of the thirteenth century to John Duns Scotus at the end of the century and beginning of the next. The decision to include Scotus in the volume on the thirteenth serves to emphasize the role that he played in pushing ideas that emerged in late thirteenth-century discussions on universals to their extremes. During the conference, particular attention was paid to the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The intuitions as well as the ambiguities of Thomas' views on universals, common natures and concept-formation provided a useful starting point for understanding the status of the debate in the first half of the century and the developments that occurred in the decades after Thomas' death. During the conference, three philosophical topics occupied a predominant position: (1) the epistemic side of the problem of universals (Piché, Knuutila, Goris, Galluzzo, Goehring), including the topics of concept-formation, abstraction and anti-skeptical strategies; (2) the discussions of universals in theological contexts (Borgo, McCord Adams), with particular but not exclusive reference to the issues of the Trinity and of the Incarnation; (3) finally, a number of contributions (Bertolacci, Pickavé, Donati, Cross) addressed such classical ontological problems as the relationships of identity and distinction between universals and particulars, the medieval endorsement of forms of constituent ontology, the metaphysical side of the debate on the unity of genus, and the doctrine of transcendentals.

The Epistemology of Universals

A first group of speakers explored the problem of the relation between general concepts and the extra-mental things from which concepts are drawn. In doing so, they also touched upon a number of ontological issues,

including the extra-mental foundation of generality and the relationship between universals and the particulars that instantiate them.

David PICHE (Montréal) spoke on “Science and Universal in the Prologue of Iohannes Pagus’ Commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*. ” The final version of the paper, which will be written in collaboration with Claude LaFleur, will consist of the critical edition of a substantial part of the Prologue to Pagus’ commentary and a philosophical study of the doctrine of universals that Pagus seems to defend. In his talk at the conference, Piché shed light on Pagus’ views on generality by looking at the specific problem of the scientific status of universals, which receives extensive treatment in the commentary. In particular, Pagus raises four questions concerning the relationship between universals and science: (1) Can there be a science of universals? (2) If there is a science of universals, is it metaphysics or logic? (3) Is this science one or multiple? (4) Are all other sciences subordinate to the science of universals? In particular Piché examined Pagus’ responses to the first two questions. With regard to the first, Pagus answers that there is indeed a science of universals. He lists four characteristics that the object of knowledge must possess (it must be known through its causes; it must be divisible into parts the properties of which can be demonstrated through the formal principles of the object; it must be proportionate to the human intellect; it must be grasped through abstraction), and subsequently shows that universals possess all of these characteristics. As to the second question, Pagus endorses a pluralist approach by arguing that both metaphysics and logic from different perspectives can be identified with the science of universals.

In his paper “Problems in Thirteenth-century Aristotelian Psychology of Concept Formation” Simo KNUUTTILA (Helsinki) investigated the psychological side of the problem of universals by discussing four issues connected with concept-formation: (1) how a species activates cognition, i.e., how to make sense of Aristotle’s claim that the passive potency is actualised by an activator, which already is such as the actualized potency will be; (2) the meaning of the claim that a concept and its external counterpart are formally the same; (3) the role of phantasms in forming and using universals; (4) the importance of empirical observations in reconstructing the mechanism of concept-formation. The second issue in particular is of major importance for understanding thirteenth-century theories of knowledge. Adherents of the doctrine of intelligible species generally endorse the theory of formal sameness as a way to defend some form of ‘realism’: formal sameness somehow brings the world into the mind and bridges the gap between things and concepts. Such ‘realists’ tend to overlook, however,

some problems connected with their modal explanation: What is formally the same as the substantial form in things, the non-relational abstracted species, the relational act of cognition or something else? In his analysis, Knuutila adduced examples drawn from Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant and Duns Scotus. The methodological novelty of his presentation consisted in its general and theoretical character. Instead of focusing on one author or group of authors in particular, Knuutila highlighted some difficulties that befall any attempt at explaining human cognition from within an Aristotelian framework. In so doing, he set constraints on any satisfactory analysis of the psychological side of the problem of universals.

The medieval dispute on the first object of knowledge was the central topic of Wouter GORIS' (Amsterdam) lecture, titled "Genesis and Order. Thomas Aquinas and the Medieval Debate on the First Known." Goris showed that different accounts of knowledge may lead to the identification of different things as the first object of human cognition. Goris focused mainly on Thomas Aquinas, whose discussion represents a characteristic thirteenth-century concern about the order of human cognition. Goris argued that Thomas presents two different and incompatible accounts of the first object of knowledge. One account, which centres on the notion of abstraction, tends to identify the first known with the essence of material things, even though in principle the same account could be used to defend the primacy of being. Indeed, in the other account, which is mainly based on the notion of actuality, the first known is unqualifiedly identified with being. Goris illustrated the ambiguity of Thomas' position by studying a variety of texts belonging to different phases of his intellectual career, including some crucial sections from the *De Veritate*, *Super Boetium De Trinitate* and the *Summa Theologiae*. Goris concluded with a particularly interesting survey of some reactions to Aquinas' position by, e.g., Bernard of Trilia, Duns Scotus and Cajetan. As Goris clearly showed, our evaluation of both criticisms and approvals of Thomas' teaching is interconnected with our assessment of the tensions and ambiguities evident in his texts.

Gabriele GALLUZZO (Pisa) focused on "Aquinas' Metaphysics of Abstraction." Galluzzo's analysis did not primarily concern the description of abstraction as a psychological process, but rather the implications that the process has for the metaphysical structure of objects and our knowledge of their metaphysical constituents. Galluzzo distinguished between a 'realist' and a 'nominalist' interpretation of abstraction, and argued that, all things considered, Thomas ends up defending a 'realist' interpretation. For a 'realist', abstraction is a process of *mental separation*, by which the human

intellect separates the essence of things from the principle of individuation with which an essence exists in the extra-mental world. As a consequence, realist abstraction is not just a way of considering particular things, but is also a means of isolating and thus revealing the existence of a certain kind of metaphysical constituent, namely the essence or common nature of particular things. For a ‘nominalist’, by contrast, abstraction is a process of *selective attention*, by which one considers the aspects in which certain particular things are similar and disregards those in which they are dissimilar. Thus, ‘nominalist’ abstraction is just a certain way of considering particular things, which does not serve to reveal any real commonality among them; in reality there are just things that are primitively particular and primitively similar to one another, and abstraction is a way of selecting such similarities. Although some aspects of Aquinas’ thought may mislead one into thinking that he endorses a ‘nominalist’ view on abstraction, it is the distinction between abstract and concrete modes of signification, Gal-luzo contended, that reveals Thomas’ commitment to a ‘realist’ reading. For in the case of material things the difference between abstract and concrete terms points to a real distinction between the essence of things and the things themselves, and hence between the essence and the principle of individuation.

Bernd GOEHRING (Notre Dame, IN) took up the philosophical challenge of skepticism in his lecture on “Henry of Ghent on the Adequacy of Our Mental Representations.” The problem presents itself in two different orders of generality. In the first order, one may ask how concepts manage to represent extra-mental things accurately? In the second order, it is difficult to see how we can be *sure* that concepts match the extra-mental world, assuming that they do. The second aspect of the problem is made even more acute by Henry’s contention that the definitions of things can be more or less complete, which suggests that we need a standard or criterion to decide when definitions more or less adequately match the extra-mental world. Goehring provided a thorough analysis of Henry’s position by discussing four main issues: (1) Henry’s theory of truth as a relation to the intellect; (2) Henry’s notions of comparison and correspondence, both in pictorial representation and mental representation; (3) Henry’s doubts regarding the ability of the unaided human intellect to grasp the essential characteristics of things; (4) Goehring argued for the view that, according to Henry’s doctrine, only through unchangeable standards can human beings acquire certainty about their concepts and definitions. In his lecture, Goehring paid attention not only to doctrinal issues but also to issues pertaining to the historical development of Henry’s thought.

Universals and Theology

Two papers dealt extensively with the usage of universals in theological contexts, and put into focus the inter-play between the conceptual tools that are devised in order to furnish a philosophical explanation of Christian dogmas and the standard metaphysical machinery at work in the solution to the problem of universals.

In her paper “Universals and the Trinity: Notes on Some Thirteenth-Century Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*, I. dist. 19,” Marta BORGO (Commissio Leonina, Paris) focused on the view, defended by the majority of thirteenth-century theologians, that the relation between the divine essence and the divine Persons cannot be explained by having recourse to the universal-particulars model. Borgo offered a fascinating survey of some important commentaries on the *Sentences* from the first half of the thirteenth century (Alexander of Hales, Hugh of Saint-Cher, Eudes Rigaud, Richard Fishacre), which she studied both in themselves and in their relation to Thomas Aquinas’ innovative approach. From an historical point of view, Borgo brought to the fore a series of assumptions concerning the nature of the relationship between the universal and the particular, which seemed to be shared by all of Thomas’ predecessors, who tend to use the term ‘universal’ to signify both the concept and the extra-mental nature to which the concept refers. None of them reduces the universal to a collection of particulars, but rather they all appeal to mereological jargon to describe the relationship between universals and particulars; moreover, they all take recourse to the distinction between universals and integral wholes. From a theoretical point of view, in contrast, Borgo showed how the difficult case of the Trinity may shed light on the views of Latin theologians on individuation and common nature. In particular, Borgo illustrated Aquinas’ difficulties in accommodating his ontology of the material world to theological issues, and hence uncovered some crucial ambiguities in his treatment of universals and common natures.

In her lecture titled “Authorized Innovations: Universals, Sharable Individuals, and Supposita,” Marilyn McCord ADAMS (Chapel Hill, NC) raised and answered some fundamental questions concerning the relationship between the problem of universals and theology: Did Christian dogmas affect the way medieval Latin theologians dealt with the philosophical problem of universals? Did theological doctrines lead them to favour some approaches and reject others? Did religious commitments drive them to adjust their accounts of universals and individuals in distinctive ways? The theological issues that needed philosophical explanation fundamentally

were four: the relation between the divine essence and the divine Persons, the doctrine of the Incarnation, the presence of an immaterial soul in the human body, and the doctrine of the Eucharist. Adams argued against the view that the way philosophers solve the problem of universals undermines or enhances their ability to formulate difficult theological problems. After all, metaphysical categories were devised mainly to deal with material substances, and so needed revision to be applied to theological questions. Consequently, such theologians as Duns Scotus and Ockham rejected the traditional Boethian understanding of universals, persons and supposita, and created an innovative and more powerful conceptual apparatus, which made it possible to treat theological dogmas. In order to address the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, for instance, Scotus and Ockham abandoned Boethius' equation between being an individual and being a supposit. In the same vein, they also rejected the assumption that only universals are sharable by arguing that individuals are sharable, once a hierarchy of modes of being sharable was established. On the other hand, the dogma of the Eucharist and the problem of the presence of the soul in the body induced Scotus and Ockham to dismiss Boethius' tenet that what is numerically one cannot be wholly and completely numerically many at the same time. Adams presented a fascinating journey into both the mutual interaction between theology and philosophy, and the most subtle aspects of Scotus' and Ockham's metaphysics.

Universals and Ontological Issues

Another group of presentations investigated a wide range of ontological issues, including the problem of transcendental unity, the relation between universals and the particulars that instantiate them, and the structure of material objects.

Amos BERTOLACCI (Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa) discussed “*Maxime Universalia* and Arabic Philosophy. Avicenna and Averroes as Sources of Albertus Magnus’ Doctrine of Transcendentals.” Bertolacci considered at great length Albert’s reaction to Averroes’ criticisms of Avicenna’s understanding of the most universal concepts and their mutual relationships. Albert’s position is reconstructed by means of a careful and detailed analysis of an important passage from Book IV of his *Metaphysics*. According to Averroes, Avicenna is guilty of misconstruing the relationship between being and one, as well as that between being and one, on the one hand, and essence, on the other. By means of close textual analysis, Bertolacci argued that Averroes’ criticisms are based on some crucial miscomprehensions of Avicenna’s original doctrine and are hence unfounded.

Moreover, Bertolacci showed that Averroes' report of Avicenna's position is surprisingly unstructured and irremediably confused. In a second step of his argument, Bertolacci convincingly showed that Albert defends Avicenna against Averroes' critique, thereby restoring the original meaning of the insightful remarks on transcendentals contained in the *Philosophia prima*. All in all, Bertolacci offered a fascinating picture of Albert's reshaping of his Arabic sources, and developed a deeper understanding of the nature and structure of his *Metaphysics*.

Martin PICKAVÉ (Toronto) took up a topic that regrettably has so far received little scholarly attention, "Siger of Brabant on Universals, Species, and Individuals." Through an analysis of a wide range of texts (including the *Quaestiones de Metaphysica*, the *Quaestiones super De anima*, the commentary on the *Liber de causis*, the treatise *De aeternitate mundi*) Pickavé succeeded in clarifying some of the most difficult aspects of Siger's views on universals. At the end of the day, Siger's position seems to be characterised by a series of crucial claims: that the world is populated only by particular substances; the rejection of Platonic realism; the view that universality as such is produced by the intellect; the correlated view that natures do exist in particulars and are not particular of themselves, but rather in virtue of a principle of individuation external to them. Particularly noteworthy was Pickavé's recourse to the issue of generation in order to shed some light on Siger's understanding of the relationship between particulars and their nature. Siger maintains that, since the specific natures of material substances exist only as this or that individual substance, specific natures are generated if individuals are generated. In particular, individuals are generated *per se*, while specific natures are generated *per accidens*. Pickavé convincingly argued that Siger's claim implies that specific natures exist mind-independently. This seems to be confirmed by Siger's distinction between natures and universals: unlike natures, universals are not the product of natural generation, but need the decisive contribution of the mind to come into existence.

Richard CROSS (Notre Dame, IN) presented an original and philosophically stimulating reconstruction of Scotus' theory of material objects in his lecture titled "Duns Scotus on Universals, Sameness, and Identity." Cross began by examining the idea that Scotus rejects abstract universals but admits of abstract particulars. To see what abstract particulars are, Cross reconsidered Scotus' views on common nature and individuation. According to Scotus, there is no extra-mental universal that is numerically the same in all its instances. He accepts, however, that there are some analogues of universals, i.e., natures that are shared by many individuals. Although a

nature as it exists is one or more particulars, it is made particular by a principle of individuation external to it, and so is only accidentally or denominatively particular. The individualised nature is in fact an abstract particular insofar as it is referred to by means of abstract nouns (e.g., ‘Socrates’ humanity’). The first part of Cross’ lecture was devoted to clarifying how abstract particulars are the same as, without being identical with, the concrete particulars to which they are related (e.g., Socrates’ humanity is the same as, but not identical with, the concrete Socrates). Cross carefully analysed Scotus’ various forms of numerical sameness. Noteworthy in this context was Cross’ analysis of the relationship between counting and identity. The second part of Cross’ lecture concerned Scotus’ distinction between cases in which concrete and abstract wholes are simply *identical* with (the collection of) their concrete or abstract parts, and cases in which such wholes are constituted by their parts without being identical with (the collection of) their parts. Particularly significant in this context is the distinction between substances and accidental unities: substances are not identical with the aggregate of their constituents, while accidental unities are identical with the aggregate of their parts.

In her lecture on “Thirteenth-Century Discussions on the Unity of Generic and Transcendental Concepts. The Commentary Tradition of the *Physics*,” Silvia DONATI (Albertus-Magnus-Institut, Bonn) tackled the problem of universals from a particularly original perspective, via a study of a group of commentaries on the *Physics* from the second half of the thirteenth century. The commentaries fall into two broad traditions, Parisian and English. At the conference, Donati presented the result of her survey of the Parisian tradition; in the final version of her paper she will complete the picture by also including an analysis of the English commentaries. There are two aspects of the problem of universals that figure prominently in commentaries on the *Physics*, the problem of the unity of the genus and that of the unity of being. Commentators in the Parisian tradition (most of them anonymous, with the exception of Simon of Faversham, Radulphus Brito and, possibly, Siger of Brabant) seem to share a common approach to both issues. With regard to the unity of the genus, for instance, Parisian commentators hold that the logical unity of the genus conceals the diversity of specific forms existing in the extra-mental world: there are no generic forms in the world corresponding to generic concepts. Still, generic concepts do have some extra-mental foundation insofar as different specific forms may give rise to the same properties and operations, i.e., the properties and operations that are collected in the generic concept. Of particular interest is the explanation that commentators provide of the logical unity of

the genus: the logical unity is explained by the intellect's natural tendency to treat as identical things that are merely similar. The same pattern of epistemic explanation is applied to the transcendental concept of being: the univocal concept of being obscures the difference between substance and accidents, because the intellect is inclined to minimise differences and emphasise similarities. Differently from the case of the genus, however, the univocal concept of being has no extra-mental foundation, and hence derives from the intellect's mistaken assimilation of radically different things.

Since participants in the conference had the chance to go through the papers in advance, the discussion was particularly intense and fruitful. As hoped, participants made an effort not only to comment on the details of the papers presented, but also to raise general questions and doubts about the conceptual categories by which single authors or topics were investigated. The discussion also benefited from the presence of Claude Panaccio (Montréal), who was invited to attend the conference as a guest and will also take an active part in the conference and volume on the fourteenth century. The final versions of the papers presented at the conference will be published in due course.

Gabriele GALLUZZO (Pisa)

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(9) 8-10 września [September] 2011 r., Łódź (Polska): the XVIIIth Annual Colloquium of the Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, Uniwersytet Łódzki. *Sponsors:* SIEPM; the Łódź Municipal Council; the Rector of the University of Łódź; the Faculty of Philosophy and History, University of Łódź. *Organizers:* Elżbieta JUNG and Monika MICHAŁOWSKA (Łódź).

“What is New in the New Universities? Learning
in Central Europe in the Later Middle Ages”

The Colloquium intended to show the uniqueness of Central European universities in shaping the character of European culture and modern models of education. Contemporary universities in Central Europe are descendants of the intellectual tradition of medieval universities, which formed the elite of society. The Colloquium gathered scholars from twelve European countries and the USA interested in the history of European universities. The subject matter of the Colloquium was divided into three sections, history, philosophy and theology, which took place over three days. The conference was opened with a welcoming address by the Rector of the University of

Łódź, Prof. Włodzimierz Nykiel, and the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and History, Zbigniew Anusik, who expressed their satisfaction that a University without any medieval tradition was hosting a meeting of eminent medieval scholars from so many countries.

The first day of the Colloquium started with a lecture by Krzysztof OZÓG (Kraków), on “The Influence of the Old European Universities on the Universities in ‘Younger’ Europe. A Case of Cracow University in the Fifteenth Century.” Ozóg pointed out that the oldest university in East-Central Europe, the University of Prague, which was founded in 1348 by Charles IV of Luxembourg, was modeled on both the University of Paris and the University of Bologna. By contrast, the founders of the Universities of Cracow (1364), Vienna (1365) and Pecs (1367) organized them according to the Bolognese model. However, the Universities of Cracow and Pecs soon collapsed, and the University of Vienna was re-organized according to the Parisian model. The universities which opened later in “younger Europe” were based mainly on either the Parisian model or its Prague variant. In 1400, King Władysław Jagiełło refounded the University of Cracow, adopting the three-faculty structure of Prague. A few dozen Professors of Philosophy, Canon Law and Theology migrated from Prague to Cracow, which fostered the reception of established European intellectual traditions at the new University. The University of Prague played an intermediary role in the reception of these intellectual trends at Cracow. The obligatory curriculum in the faculties of Arts and Theology at Cracow was adopted from the University of Paris, with some elements borrowed from the variant in Prague. After the foundation of the *Collegium minus* for Masters of Arts, the Arts curriculum at Cracow was enriched with new texts of the *via moderna*. The University allowed teaching in both the *via moderna* and the *via antiqua*. The masters discussed the same philosophical and theological issues as their colleagues in other European universities. Intellectuals in Cracow searched for their own solutions to old intellectual disputes of Western Europe, and practiced philosophy and theology in an eclectic way, rejecting extreme approaches such as that of Wycliff and his followers, for example.

Ozóg’s brilliant lecture was followed by Marek GENSLER’s (Łódź) study, “*Semper idem?* Problems of Central European University Rectors in the Middle Ages and Now.” In a somewhat lighter vein, he observed that despite the differences of time some problems are perennial afflictions of people responsible for university affairs. On the basis of fifteenth-century university sermons at Cracow, Gensler presented an analysis of the problems concerning the University’s external and internal relations that troubled medieval Rectors. The external problems concerned finding a balance

between the expectations of political patrons and the lofty ideal of theoretical study, while trying to obtain funds for keeping the University going. The internal problems pertained to disciplining students, while at the same time persuading them to stay at the *Alma mater*, as well as to chastising negligent, stupid and greedy teachers. Finally, Rectors had to struggle with the excessive ambitions of their colleagues.

A different case study was presented by Mikhail KHORKOV (Köln-Moscow). In his lecture “Von Paris über Köln nach Erfurt: interuniversitäre Wissensvermittlung im 2. Hälfte des 14. Jh. am Beispiel der Bibliothek von Johannes de Wasia (um 1350/55 – 1395),” Khorkov analyzed the transmission of ideas and texts in the later Middle Ages on the basis of the exceptional manuscript collection of the Bibliotheca Amploniana in Erfurt, still intact from medieval times. Johannes de Vasia was a student in the Arts faculty at Paris and the faculty of Theology at Cologne; throughout his career he collected theological and philosophical manuscripts. After his death, his library was obtained by Amplonius Rating de Berka, then Rector of the University of Cologne. Johannes’ library contains a collection of works that reflect the discussions and arguments of his time, especially the theological methods *de more geometrico* and of the *sensus litteralis*. After a detailed description of the collection, Khorkov concluded that on the basis of the list of books it is difficult to state whether de Vasia’s own preferences were for the dominant Parisian school, favoring a mathematical approach applied to the natural sciences, or that he was an eclectic reader without any visible intellectual preferences.

Andrzej DĄBRÓWKA (Warszawa) shifted the focus with his study “Outside of the Academy.” Dąbrówka pointed out that the milieu external to universities consisted of educational institutions the functioning of which was a condition for the emergence of the academy, but to some extent they also paralleled the academic curricula and provided for alternative ways of learning. He focused on phenomena of advanced literacy, which allowed educated people self-study, and intellectual work that developed a radical constructivist interpretation of medieval learning as creative instruction promoting the *arbitrium lectoris* and enabling students to perform as authors. The object of such activities were scholarly texts that—more interestingly—were absent from the prescribed canons for study. The most innovative scholarly activity of medieval intellectuals pertained to the study of *grammatica*, the most developed part of the *trivium*, which besides the semantic aspect of grammatical study, in the part of the art of grammar devoted to the writing of *accessus*, emphasized the integrity of content and the analysis and understanding of textual composition. For this reason, one

may best discern changes in methods of thinking and topics of interest over time. Dąbrówka demonstrated his argument lucidly with examples taken from scholarly introductions to poetic works, which in the Middle Ages were regarded as works of applied ethics. One of the functions of the commentaries was preparing readers for the act of understanding and appropriating instructions encoded in literary works. This stronger motivation to involve readers can be attributed to the intensive development and performance-oriented quality of general education, which accompanied the growth of elementary and cathedral schools, the most important scholarly institutions before and outside of the universities.

Mikolaj OLSZEWSKI (Warszawa) spoke about “History at a Medieval University: Analyzing the Case of John of Dąbrówka’s Commentary on Vincent Kadlubek’s *Chronicle*. ” Olszewski argued that it is a cliché to say that history was wholly absent from the medieval university. Even though medieval Scholastics were far from ascribing a scientific status to the study of history, interest in this subject was present throughout the late Middle Ages as a part of moral philosophy. Olszewski showed that a fifteenth-century professor at the University of Cracow, John of Dąbrówka, was a pioneer of the new interpretation of history. In his commentary on the *Chronicle of Poland* by Vincent Kadlubek, which he made a part of student’s curriculum in the faculty of Arts in 1449, John demonstrated his interest in a variety of issues. His commentary, which is literal in form and focuses mostly on explaining difficult paragraphs of the *Chronicle*, also contains fragments devoted to more general questions pertaining to the nature and functions of history. As Olszewski pointed out, it is these passages of the commentary that testify to the birth of history within the Scholastic intellectual tradition and deserve the attention of historians of late-medieval universities.

Jiří STOČES’ (Plzno) lecture, “Die Prager Juristenuniversität als einzige Universität Bologneser Typs in Mitteleuropa,” was devoted to a relatively unknown period in the history of the University of Prague, which pre-dated its decline in the early fifteenth century. After a property dispute between the faculty of Law and other faculties of the University, the lawyers left the University and established a legal faculty in Prague in 1372. The model of this new university was that of Bologna. After the demise of the first University of Cracow, it remained the only school of its type in Central Europe. It existed until 1418 or 1419. Stočes analyzed the reasons why the Bolognese model of a university gradually lost its luster and ceased to inspire founders of universities in Central and Northern Europe in the early fifteenth century. Stočes offered not only institutional but also social and

historical arguments for the change.

Márta FONT (Pécs) delivered a provocatively titled lecture, “Was kann man wissen über die erste Universität von Pécs?” Because of scarce sources, Pécs, the first university in Hungary, is shrouded in mystery. It is still a subject of discussion how long the university functioned, who were its professors and students, where they came from and how numerous they were, and even in which building or buildings the teaching took place. Font made the best of the existing sources in answering these questions. She presented not only assessments of the number of scholars but also of the names of some teachers and students together with biographic information. She spoke about archeological discoveries in the Cathedral quarter of Pécs, which allow for the reconstruction of the University’s original building. On this basis, she concluded that in a dozen or so years of its existence, the University left a mark on the Hungarian society of the time.

The proceedings of the second day started with three presentations focused on the study of astronomy at the new universities in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Michael Shank, Edith D. Sylla and André Goddu illuminated the subject from doctrinal, historical and methodological perspectives. In his talk, “Reflections on the *scientia astrorum* in the New Universities (14th-15th c.), Michael SHANK (Madison, WI) gave a fascinating overview of the ideas discussed in astronomy courses given at late-medieval universities, paying special attention to the attempts of astronomers to overcome the difficulties posed by the Ptolemaic model. Shank’s arguments were supported by a computer demonstration of several models of the motion of the heavenly spheres. The demonstration served as a very useful method of showing their intricacies and showed manifestly that the equant theory was the first that assumed the apparent motion of the heavenly bodies. The ability to see the medieval heavens at work stimulated the participants to consider the revolutionary character of the changes in understanding of astronomy before Copernicus.

André GODDU’s (Easton, MA) lecture, “Celestial Spheres in Fifteenth-Century Cracow. Astronomy and Natural Philosophy,” was devoted to the long neglected area of study in the history of astronomy, namely the Polish contribution in the fifteenth century. Goddu concentrated on the most prominent figure in Cracovian astronomy before Copernicus, Adalbert of Brudzewo, whose *Commentariolum* served as a textbook at the University. Goddu drew attention to some peculiar features in the views of scholars at Cracow, focusing his comments on Brudzewo’s interpretation of Georg Peurbach, whose *Theoricae novae planetarum* was the standard textbook of astronomy for Arts students in late-medieval universities, together with

Sacrobosco's *Sphaera*. Goddu displayed the variety of positions that astronomers took in their commentaries. Apart from 'realist' interpretations there were also 'agnostic' interpretations, such as that of Adalbert and others, which were 'instrumentalist' in their character. Finally, Goddu pointed out some of the consequences that Copernicus drew from those texts for the features of celestial spheres in his major works.

Edith D. SYLLA (Raleigh, NC) spoke about "Adalbert of Brudzewo and Commentaries on Peurbach's New Theories of the Planets in the New Universities of the Fifteenth Century." She said that there can be little doubt that Copernicus came in contact with these books, probably together with commentaries, at the University of Cracow when he was a student there. Adalbert of Brudzewo, a prominent master at Cracow, was the author of the first printed commentary on the *Theoricae novae planetarum*, published in 1495. Another master at Cracow, John of Glogau, published a commentary on the *Sphere*. In the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the writings of John Buridan and other fourteenth-century Parisian *moderni* were taught at several of the new universities. It is apparent, however, that the late sixteenth-century reception of Copernicus' *De revolutionibus* occurred in a context, in which the ideas of the *antiqui* had come into greater favor. The commentaries on the *Sphaera* and on the *Theoricae novae planetarum*, particularly by Adalbert of Brudzewo and other masters at the new universities, reveal much about their authors' views concerning the status of astronomy as a science, and show where they fall on the spectrum between the *antiqui* and the *moderni*. With the help of illustrations taken from medieval prints, Sylla showed the distinction between the empiricist and mathematical approach, stressing the relation of the latter with the *via antiqua*.

The afternoon session of the second day was more diverse in its topics. In their presentation, "What is New in Cracow Modistic Tradition," Krystyna KRAUZE-BŁACHOWICZ and Wojciech WCIÓRKA (Warszawa) focused on the modistic grammar taught at the fifteenth-century University of Cracow, especially on the works by John of Glogau. Although his modistic grammar offers few original solutions, it is possible to find some passages in his texts that allow the reader to gain a fresh perspective on the issues discussed earlier by authors from the old universities, concerning, for instance, the autonomy of the parts of speech, the quality of pronouns, the division of demonstrative pronouns into *ad sensum* and *ad intellectum*, and the transformation of a traditional term *regimen* into a technical term of modistic grammar. Glogau's treatment of the first problem combined two currents of thought. According to the first approach, which the Modists had taken over from the pre-Modist speculative grammarians of the first half of the thirteenth century,

cases are the modes of signifying of the starting and finishing points of activity as expressed by the noun in a sentence. The second current of thought was ‘conceptualist’. John’s views on etymology reflect controversies in the tradition of speculative grammar. The category of quality of nominal parts of speech was such a disputed issue, since it served to distinguish between proper and common names and between demonstrative and anaphoric pronouns. John modified Thomas of Erfurt’s definition of demonstrative pronouns *ad sensum* as those that refer in general to things, which are knowable by the senses. He reserves the category *ad intellectum* for extra-mental things. As far as *regimen* is concerned, Glogau deserves credit for pointing out the need to restore a theoretical model of syntax, while accepting the changes that had taken place since its heyday. He included *regimen* in his description of syntax in such a way that it became an integral part of Modist theory, and thus combined the advantages of an existing didactic paradigm with an ambitious theoretical objective.

Riccardo STROBINO (Pisa-London) spoke on “Truth, Inference and Obligation in Late Fourteenth Century Continental Europe.” He analyzed the relationship between truth, inference and obligation in the logical works of two major thinkers who were active and influential in Central Europe during the second half of the fourteenth century, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen, focusing on Albert’s *Perutilis logica* and *Sophismata* and on Marsilius’ treatise on *obligationes*, with the aim of characterizing their views with respect to the role of truth and consequence as it emerges from their discussions concerning the peculiar context of obligational disputations. Strobino argued that modern logicians should pay attention to the achievements of their medieval forebears, from whom there is much to learn.

Joanna JUDYCKA (Gdańsk) devoted her paper to “Paul of Worczyn as Master of Arts at Cracow University.” Educated in Prague and Leipzig, Paul taught in the Arts faculty in Cracow in 1417-1424. Not without reason, he is regarded as a follower of John Buridan, but one can trace other sources in his Aristotelian commentaries. In the first part of her communiqué, Judycka presented a general characteristics of Paul of Worczyn’s specific choice of authorities in the preparation of his lectures, which survive as *reportata* and were the basis of some of his commentaries, especially those on *De anima* and the *Ethics*. Judycka pointed out that it was a characteristic feature of teaching at the new universities to discuss a commentary of a well-known medieval author rather than the original text of Aristotle, and to insert ideas taken from commentaries of other authors in them. In the second part of her lecture, she showed how Paul’s method worked when he treated a particular problem, e.g., the much-discussed

problem of *reactio*, in his commentary on *De generatione et corruptione*, where both Buridan's and Marsilius of Inghen's influences can be observed, together with some comments by Thomas Aquinas. Judycka's lecture served as an illustration of the eclectic character of teaching at the new universities, which was stressed by Professor Ożóg the day before.

Francesco FIORENTINO (Bari) analyzed "The Theory of Scientific Knowledge According to Marsilius of Inghen and his Inheritance in Central European Universities." Fiorentino presented an interesting case study of diffusion of ideas in late-medieval Europe, focussing on the problem of the nature and object of scientific knowledge and the theory of universals and supposition as treated by Marsilius of Inghen. Marsilius, who was Master at the Universities of Paris (1362-1378) and Heidelberg (1386-1396), wrote a number of treatises on logic, natural philosophy and theology, which were popular at many late-medieval and early modern universities. His commentary on the *Sentences* was known in Cracow in the first half of the fifteenth century, and was used by Thomas de Strampino in his *Principia* (1441-1442). Marsilius' commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Physics* were read in Cracow during the first sixty years of the fifteenth century. Marsilius' commentary on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, quoted by Agostino Nifo, was used in Prague in the 1380s. Jodocus Trutvetter and Bartholomew of Usingen, who consolidated nominalism in Erfurt, repeatedly mentioned Marsilius in their works. His logical works, including the *Obligationes* and the *Consequentialiae*, were used as textbooks in Vienna in the 1390s. The *Obligationes*, printed in 1489 under the name of Pierre d'Ailly, were used by Thomas Briicot, John Major and Domingo de Soto. At the universities of Heidelberg, Erfurt, Basel and Freiburg, Marsilius' works were studied throughout the fifteenth century, in particular as part of the university curriculum.

The last day of the Colloquium was generally devoted to late-medieval theology. Christopher SCHABEL (Nicosia) opened the session with a lecture on "Predestination in German Universities before the Reformation: The Case of Vienna." Schabel said that one of the main doctrinal differences between Martin Luther and the supporters of the Roman Church concerned predestination, a problem long-debated over Middle Ages. Luther's position followed that of his fourteenth-century confrère, Gregory of Rimini, who lectured on the *Sentences* at Paris in the 1340s. Schabel argued that Gregory's theory of predestination was the *opinio communis* at the University of Vienna, the most important 'German' university in the fifteenth century. The standard theological text used there appears to have been compiled by the secular theologian, Nicholas Prunczlein of Dinkelsbühl (1360-1433), who first lectured on the *Sentences* at Vienna slightly before 1400.

Nicholas' *Sentences*-commentary relies heavily on the commentaries of his teachers, Henry Totting of Oyta and Henry of Langenstein. In turn, one of the most important influences on both Oyta and Langenstein was Gregory of Rimini. This is seen especially in the problem of divine foreknowledge. Schabel showed that Luther's doctrine of predestination was in a way "prepared" by Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl's text, even though Nicholas' doctrine was not unorthodox at the time, and, certainly, it was not the only position defended by fifteenth-century university theologians.

William DUBA's (Fribourg, Suisse) talk, "Marginal Realism: Reading and Lecturing on the *Sentences* in the New Universities," was devoted to the problem of the diffusion of ideas seen from the perspective of marginal notes. The flowering of the new universities marked the development of both overlapping and exclusive textual communities, to the point where *reales* and *nominales* had incompatible vocabularies. Those vocabularies needed to be learned and applied. Duba demonstrated how they were learned by examining the diffusion, in Central Europe, of an extremely popular medieval glossary of theological terms particularly useful in the context of Franciscan learning, the *Tractatus terminorum theologicalium*, also known as *De divinis nominibus* and attributed to Peter of Candia (†1410). Duba studied the case of the application of syllogistic reasoning to God to show how the vocabulary of realism was learned and then applied to interpreting Francis of Marchia's unique theses. Duba's presentation was vividly illustrated with specimens of *marginalia* in various manuscripts, with a focus on the relation between the position of marginal notes on a page and their importance.

Robert ANDREWS (Stockholm) spoke on the "Supercommentary on John Buridan's *Quaestiones De anima* by Bero Magni de Ludosia, University of Vienna, 1429-1465." Bero Magni (Björn Magnusson) was a Swedish scholar who studied and taught at the University of Vienna from 1429 to 1465. His commentary on *De anima* illustrates the pervasive influence of John Buridan on the scholars at the new universities. Andrews showed that Bero Magni organized his commentary on the pattern of Buridan's, listing the same question-titles and, atypically, citing Buridan by name and defending him in every debate. As an example of Bero Magni's method, Andrews analyzed a question "Utrum sensus possit decipi circa sensibile sibi proprium," concerning which Buridan defended Aristotle's claim that our senses are never deceived with regard to their proper objects. Andrews went through Bero's impressive list of situations in which our senses are apparently in error, including mysterious phenomena such as rainbows, mirrors, foxfire, cat's eyes, fever and women's unaccountable predilection for overripe apples. He identi-

fied some of Bero Magni's sources besides Buridan, and described how Bero's explanatory tools functioned to save Aristotle.

Monica Brinzei CALMA's (Paris) lecture, "New Perspectives in the Field of Vienna University: The Prologue of Nicholas Prunczlein of Dinkelsbühl to his Commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard," was in a sense continued the lecture by Chris Schabel. Calma spoke about the importance of Nicholas Prunczlein of Dinkelsbühl for later developments in theology, noting that he represents an emblematic case of those medieval theologians who, despite being well-known in their own time, are now barely studied. She focused on the Prologue of Dinkelsbühl's commentary on the *Sentences*; the number of surviving manuscripts which carry that portion of the work in various redactions is more than 200. Calma reckoned it to be the most popular commentary composed after 1350. She tried to analyze the way that he engaged in a dialogue with masters from the University of Paris, especially Gregory of Rimini, nearly two thirds of whose text Nicholas copied, even though he discarded theoretical considerations. Calma concluded that Nicholas continued to be influenced by trends at the faculty of Theology in Paris.

The last speaker of the conference, Ota PAVLÍČEK (Praha), spoke on "Parisian and Prague *Quodlibeta* Compared: The Example of Jerome of Prague." Pavliček drew a basic comparison between the disputation *de quolibet* in the older universities and that in the University of Prague, the first *studium generale* in Central Europe north of the Alps and east of the Rhine. Thanks to its uniqueness, the University attracted many students both from Central Europe and farther abroad. Although the Universities of Paris and Bologna served as its models, the University of Prague made certain important modifications when adopting some of the governing principles of these older universities. These included the quodlibetal disputations, the character of which in Prague as well as in other new universities was considerably different from the famous quodlibetal disputations of the thirteenth and the beginning of fourteenth centuries in the Universities of Paris and Oxford, which were reserved for theologians. Pavliček described the doctrinal dimension of *quodlibeta* in Prague by referring to texts of Jerome of Prague, a member of the Bohemian Nation at the University and a significant participant in quodlibetal disputes not only in Prague but also in Cologne, Heidelberg, Vienna and Cracow.

In her *Schlusswort*, Elżbieta JUNG, the organizer of the Colloquium, thanked all of the participants, moderators and speakers for the lively and inspiring ideas, presented during both the formal as well as informal parts of the meeting. She said that the Colloquium showed the new scope for

interdisciplinary research, which must be pursued in order to illuminate how the various traditions, reflected by the new universities, inspired further development of European culture. She expressed her hope that the Colloquium would open a new forum for discussion and collaboration on those issues.

Marek GENSLER (Łódź)

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(10) 23-24 September 2011, Toronto (Canada): The University of Toronto Colloquium in Mediaeval Philosophy 2011. *Sponsored by:* The Department of Philosophy, the Collaborative Program in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, and the Centre for Medieval Studies at the University of Toronto. *Organizers:* Deborah BLACK, Peter KING and Martin PICKAVÉ (Toronto).

The University of Toronto Colloquium in Mediaeval Philosophy

The past University of Toronto Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy, the seventh since its inception in 2005, opened with a lecture by Jennifer ASHWORTH. In her contribution “Aquinas, Scotus, and Others on Naming, Knowing, and the Origin of Language,” on which Giorgio PINI (Fordham University) commented, Ashworth examined accounts of imposition of names in Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Peter John Olivi and John Duns Scotus. Taking her starting point in the depiction of Adam’s naming of the animals in the book of Genesis and in Aristotle’s remarks that spoken words are *ad placitum*, she focused on the knowledge required of the name-giver at the moment of imposition (not only in the naming of material objects but also in the more peculiar case of naming God), while also dealing with other requirements necessary for a successful imposition of a name. All in all, Ashworth gave a fascinating overview of different attitudes regarding the principle that we signify as we understand. The organizers were especially happy that Jennifer Ashworth took part in the Colloquium, since this was her first visit back to Canada since her retirement from the University of Waterloo.

The second day of the Colloquium was framed by two papers on self-knowledge and consciousness. In the first, titled “Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton,” Susan BROWER-TOLAND (Saint Louis University) examined a debate between William of Ockham and his Franciscan confrère, Walter Chatton. Chatton criticized Ockham on many topics, but the issue discussed by Brower-Toland is especially interesting insofar as it illustrates the variety of accounts of self-knowledge and con-

sciousness among medieval philosophers and theologians; some of these accounts are surprisingly similar to contemporary ones. She explained in remarkable clarity the reasons for Chatton's dismissal of Ockham's higher-order account of self-knowledge and consciousness, and how he replaces it with a same-order account. The paper was commented on by Richard CROSS (University of Notre Dame).

Jack ZUPKO's (University of Winnipeg) closing paper, "Contextualizing the Self-Knowledge Question in Later Medieval Philosophy," took a different approach compared to the one pursued by Brower-Toland. Zupko's aim was to shed some light on the question how and why medieval philosophers and theologians raised the issue of self-knowledge in the first place. For, according to him, a failure to acknowledge the different contexts in which the issue arises is bound to mar any attempt of understanding what is at stake in the debates about self-knowledge. Zupko distinguished two main approaches, one theological and the other philosophical, and then examined how self-knowledge is discussed in later medieval commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*. Comments were presented by Neil LEWIS (Georgetown University).

Between the two papers on self-knowledge there was a session in which promising young scholars presented their work. In "Ockham's Mental Language and the Dispute over the Subject of *Scientia*," Eric HAGEDORN (University of Notre Dame) argued that Ockham's focus on the linguistic nature of thought can best be understood from the viewpoint of his account of *scientia*. In her paper titled "Metaphysics and the Categories in Ockham," Jennifer PELLETIER (Université du Québec à Montréal) examined Ockham's account of the categories and argued that it is essentially metaphysical (and not, as many have argued, purely logical). From this insight she argued further that Ockham is not opposed to metaphysics, as was often assumed. Last but not least, Rachel BAUDER (University of Toronto), "Naming Caesar: Siger of Brabant on Proper Names," explored a puzzle in Siger of Brabant's account of proper names by clarifying how Siger's views on the intellectual cognition of singulars relate to his views on the semantics of proper names.

At this point, the preparations for the 2012 University of Toronto Colloquium in Mediaeval Philosophy (21-22 September) are well under way and the program will be posted soon.

Martin PICKAVÉ (Toronto)

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(11) 13-15 octubre 2011, México D.F. (México): Universidad Panamericana. *Organized by:* Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ International Working Group.

“Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’”

The annual Fall conference of the Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ Project was held in Mexico City at the Universidad Panamericana. The nine presentations over two days analyzed in depth the influence of the Latin translations of the Arabic philosophers on the philosophical and theological thought of Thomas Aquinas and related figures of the thirteenth century. The third day was devoted to the presentation and discussion of a sample translation and commentary of Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on the *Sentences*, with particular emphasis on its Arabic sources. This latter material is part of the project “Aquinas and the Arabic Tradition” on which Richard C. Taylor (Marquette University), Roland E. Houser (University of St. Thomas, Houston), and Luis Xavier López-Farjeat (Universidad Panamericana, México D.F.), are currently working for publication by Cambridge University Press in a two-volume work on the importance of the Arabic philosophical tradition in Thomas’ early commentary on the *Sentences*.

In “Aquinas on Matter. Notes on the Reception of Aristotle’s *Physics* and *Metaphysics* in the 13th century,” Marta BORGO (*Commissio Leonina*, Paris) explored the extent to which Aquinas’ understanding of matter in his early writings is grounded on Aristotle, Avicenna and Averroes, respectively. Borgo started with an outline of mid-thirteenth-century doctrines of matter (Grosseteste, Alexander of Hales, Kilwardby, Bacon, etc.). She then analyzed Aquinas’ conception of matter from different perspectives and in different texts. Her analysis began with the physical perspective in the *De principiis naturae*, and then she moved to the conception of matter from a theological perspective in three passages from Book II of Thomas’ commentary on the *Sentences*.

Her starting point was *In II Sent. d.3 q.1 a.1*, where Aquinas discusses the ontological structure of angels, showing that these entities do not admit a hylomorphic composition. His solution, according to Borgo’s account, has three parts: first, he starts by raising the question of the immateriality of angels in very general terms; secondly, he moves on to show that angels are immaterial creatures (his proof is twofold: [1] Aquinas first infers the immateriality of angels from their intellective nature, and then [2] from their incorporeity); thirdly, he concludes by explaining what kind of immaterial composites angels are. Borgo focused her analysis on the first two steps where the pivotal notion is that of matter. While arguing that any angel is

simple, indivisible and immaterial, Borgo highlighted the way in which Aquinas supports some of his arguments with Avicenna, Maimonides, and mainly with Avicenna and Averroes, while also criticizing some of their philosophical assumptions.

In the second passage analyzed, *In II Sent. d.12 q.1*, Aquinas discusses the different interpretations of Genesis and deals with the ontological status of prime matter. Once again, when discussing this subject, Aquinas evokes the authority of Avicenna and Averroes to refute those positions he considers to be wrong, i.e., that prime matter was created by God on the first day of creation or that prime matter is perhaps an only-relatively-formless matter created by God during the first day of creation. Borgo observed that when drawing his own solution, i.e., prime matter was created by God during the first day being relatively formless but encompassing a plurality of formal determinations that potentially lead to individuals specifically distinct from one another, Aquinas bases his theological resolution on Avicenna's theory of mixture.

The last passage that Borgo analyzed was *In II Sent. d.18 q.1 a.2*, where Aquinas discusses whether God endowed prime matter with some seminal powers, and, if this is the case, what such powers consist in. She explained in detail Aquinas' complex resolution and showed the relevant role of Avicenna within Aquinas' argumentation. What these passages show, according to Borgo's final remarks, is that Thomas Aquinas found in Avicenna's and Averroes' texts powerful philosophical instruments.

Therese CORY (Seattle University) in "The Influence of Avicenna and the *Liber de causis* in Aquinas' *Turn to the Phantasms*" discussed one of the most problematic issues in Aquinas' conception of knowledge: the *conversio ad phantasmata*. The "turn to the phantasms," she explained, is at the heart of Aquinas' thought on the relationship of the embodied human intellect to the world of material being. However, this idea is difficult to interpret. Cory gave a brief account of two models of describing the "turn," which suggests two different conceptual models of "turning." According to the first model, the "turn" seems to be a psychological shift of attention away from the pure abstracted essence back to the senses (this model appears in texts in which Aquinas says that this "turn" occurs *after* the initial abstraction, for instance, in the early commentary on the *Sentences*); therefore, one might conclude that the "turn to the phantasms" is a post-abstractive verification in which the intellect checks the abstracted essence against sensory experience. According to Cory, the second model can be derived from Aquinas' frequent use of spatial metaphors, according to which there is a "connection" (*continuatio*) between the intellect and imagination, so that the intelligible species is "grounded in" the phantasms.

In this case, explained Cory, the “turn to phantasms” seems to imply a static metaphysical relationship between intellect and imagination. Yet, in the end, as Cory argued, those models are really just two sides of the same coin.

Drawing on George Klubertanz’s basic insight of his article “Knowledge of the Singular” (1952) regarding the appearance of the term *continuatio* (a term borrowed from Averroes), Cory argued that the “turn” signifies a metaphysical reality, i.e., a dependence-relation between intellect and imagination. But, as she insisted, because those are cognitive powers, the direction of metaphysical dependence is also the direction of psychological attention. The metaphysical structure is the source of the psychological attention. This connection becomes evident in Thomas’ writings, Cory argued, when we trace the topic of “turning” (*conversio*) to its original sources in the *Liber de causis* and Avicenna.

According to Cory, in his commentary on the *Liber de causis*, Thomas takes the *conversio* as a static image of ontological dependence in two different ways: (1) a form turns to the material substrate that provides the ‘grounding’ for its expression; (2) an effect is directed teleologically or ‘turns’ towards its final cause. Both notions shaped Aquinas’ notion of *conversio ad phantasmata*. Now, although the *Liber de causis* gives relevant clues for understanding the *conversio*, Cory maintained that Aquinas definitely owes a more substantial debt to Avicenna. But this does not mean that he follows Avicenna’s view straightforwardly. According to Cory’s account, like Avicenna, Aquinas takes the human soul’s “turn” as an act of psychological attention to the source and object of cognition but, at the same time, he takes distance from the Persian philosopher. While Avicenna holds that the human soul cognizes intelligible forms by turning in an upward motion, as it were, toward the agent intellect, Aquinas holds that it turns downward toward the phantasms. This is a relevant difference that makes it clear that for Aquinas the only possible way of cognition while we are embodied is the one that proceeds and terminates with the phantasms. In this sense, as Cory observed in her final remarks, Aquinas’ theory of cognition attempts to explain the unity of intellect and senses in ordinary human experience and, at the same time, helps one understand this psychological orientation unifying both paradigms of the “turn,” i.e., the psychological (“turn-as-attention”) and the metaphysical (“turn-as-dependence”).

In “*Sensata communia sunt instrumenta: The Role of Common Sensation in Albert the Great’s De homine,*” Paloma HERNÁNDEZ (Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México) explored the meaning of the *sensibilia communia* as ‘tools’ used by Albert the Great when dealing with the problems this concept was intended to

solve. Hernández explained that in the section of *De homine* where Albert deals with *sensus communis*, he offers an account of how brute sensation becomes sense perception, i.e., how *qualitates* perceived by each proper sense become *species sensibilis*. According to Henryk Anzulewicz, one of the central properties of this *species* is being a concrete thing (*konkretes Ding*), i.e., a cluster of properties from which the intellect would later extract universal content. This means that the *species* or *imago* is not just an image—that is to say, a *picture*—but rather a cluster of properties endowed with an inner structure, which is the basis of intellectual abstraction. In addition, the *species sensibilis* has representational powers before intellectual abstraction, even if they are not ‘conceptual’ ones.

With this in mind, Hernández explained that a *species sensibilis* obtains this structure by means of an activity of the *sensus communis*, which Albert describes in terms of *discernere* or *iudicare* by means of *affirmatio vel negatio*, which, despite this label, is not a rational activity. This judgment (*discernere*) is the generation itself of a structured *species sensibilis*. The product of this activity is then stored in the *imaginatio* and is available to be used by other powers such as *intellectus*, *phantasia* or *aestimativa*. Therefore, it seems that sensory perception is in itself an activity that evokes the structure of *species sensibilis*. But if *affirmatio vel negatio* is not a rational activity, Hernández asked, what is it then? In other words, what exactly does it mean that the *species sensibilis* represents neither a pictorial image nor a concept? According to Hernández, Albert describes affirmation or negation as an activity that points at the identity and difference between each *sensibulum proprium* through *sensibilia communia* (size, shape, unity, motion and rest) that function as “tools” (*instrumenta*) of this judgment.

Francisco O'REILLY (Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay) in “Metaphysics as *Mimesis* of the Divine: an Analysis of the *Philosophia prima* of Avicenna *Latinus*” proposed a new perspective for the analysis of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*. According to O'Reilly, Avicenna's *Philosophia prima* reveals a sort of ontological map on how to attain the divine being. Therefore, the structure and divisions into ontology, etiology and theology represent a way of imitating the activity of celestial bodies and of attaining the knowledge of the divine possessed by heavenly intellects. In other words, while the peculiar activity of the separate intellects is “descending” in nature (as they begin by contemplating the Necessary Being in itself and then contemplate themselves as possible in themselves), metaphysics is, in contrast, an “ascending” account. In this sense, Avicenna starts with the contemplation of oneself as possible (ontology), then goes on to study the existent as necessary by other (the comprehension of causality), and finally

ends with the explanation of the Necessary Being in itself (theology). In this direction, concluded O'Reilly, metaphysics as a theoretical activity embraces the practical neo-Platonic paradigm of return *ad unum*.

In "Thomas Aquinas's Common Good and al-Shatibi's Public Welfare," Deina ALI ABDELKADER (University of Massachusetts-Lowell) examined the similarities and differences between Thomas Aquinas' concept of the common good with a similar concept in Islamic law, namely public welfare. Abdelkader explained that the concept of public welfare, essential to Islamic jurisprudential thought, was developed and thoroughly researched by the Sunni Islamic thinker al-Shatibi. According to Abdelkader, both al-Shatibi and Thomas Aquinas were influenced by Maimonides; this probably explains the resemblance between Thomas Aquinas' notion of "common good" and al-Shatibi's concept of "public welfare." The ideological and theoretical connection, explained Abdelkader, has many implications, because it sheds light on historically shared democratic values in the Western and the Muslim worlds.

Roland E. HOUSER (University of St. Thomas, Houston) in "The Friar and the Vizier on the Range of the Theoretical Sciences" pointed out the influence of Avicenna's introduction to the *Book of the Healing* on the division of the theoretical sciences made by Aquinas in *Super Boetium de Trinitate* q.5 a.1. Houser explained that both the terms and the methodology followed by Aquinas in order to divide the theoretical sciences are contained in the introduction to the *Book of the Healing*. To prove this, he referred to the Aristotelian division of the theoretical sciences (mathematics, physics and theology) found in *Metaphysics* VI.1, and subsequently to Avicenna's account on this matter. According to Houser, Avicenna's innovation consists in considering our subjective or mental ability to understand something without its proper matter. This subjective understanding, for example, is the core of Avicenna's distinction between mathematics and physics, and will be essential to Aquinas' division of the theoretical sciences in *Super Boetium de Trinitate*.

Thomas begins his division, Houser explained, recurring to the intellectual ability of the subject, as he learned from Avicenna, rather than outside the object, as Aristotle did. Nevertheless, Thomas differs from Avicenna because he begins his division with the end of the sciences instead of their subjects, even though his language and doctrine is still inspired by Avicenna's introduction. Another difference, according to Houser, is Aquinas' special interest in explaining why motion and matter are the criteria used to distinguish between sciences.

In "The Reception of Averroes' Theory of Intentionality in the Latin

West,” Francisco ROMERO (Universidad Panamericana, Guadalajara) began by asking: How do we ‘recognize’ people or things? Beyond perceiving the basic data involved in sensation, e.g., color, shape, texture, smell, etc., how do we perceive the cognitive ‘meanings’ or ‘intentions’ whereby we *recognize* objects of perception? According to Romero, it would be difficult to explain how we receive these intentions through the senses, given that our five exterior senses specialize in sense data that are independent of these intentions. Therefore, perhaps we would need to posit a sixth sense, maybe an *inner* sense with the ability to perceive something not contained in ordinary sense data. Romero explained that among medieval philosophers, notably Avicenna, Averroes, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, we find those who employ the notion of ‘interior senses’, the role of which is to cognize ‘intentions’ or ‘meanings’ (*intentio, ma'na*). They employed these notions in order to explain what can be described as the ‘recognition’ of the objects of perception, as something that somehow goes beyond the mere perception of sense data.

Modern research on the medieval doctrines of the interior senses, especially in recent decades, has tended to focus on the number, immediate functions and names that each medieval thinker has assigned to the interior senses, something which Romero called the ‘material’ elements of these theories. Romero argued that we should rather be asking the following ‘formal’ or ‘explanatory’ question: Do these authors offer an ‘abstractionist’ theory of intentionality, that is, an account according to which intentions are received together with the exterior sense data, and are simply abstracted from the sense data by the interior senses? Or are they claiming that intentions are intuited directly by the interior senses without the means of the sense data and without abstraction, an account of intentionality that we could call ‘intuitionist’?

Romero broke down the general question into four sets of more specific questions, which he asked regarding Avicenna, Averroes, Albert the Great and Aquinas: (1) What kind of principles do these authors use to distinguish the interior senses? (2) What is an ‘intention’ and what is its role in distinguishing the interior senses? Do all interior senses perceive intentions, or do only some of them? If some, which do and which do not? (3) Are all interior senses abstractive, that is, do they represent different stages in a hierarchy of abstractive faculties? Or are some of the interior senses not abstractive at all? Or perhaps are none at all abstractive? (4) Is the intention initially received through the senses, and then abstracted or somehow obtained by the interior senses? Or do the interior senses directly intuit it without receiving it first from the senses? This last is the core question that Romero tried to answer.

From the answers he gave to these questions emerged a twofold thesis. First, rather than seeing Avicenna and Averroes as offering opposite theories—as is often supposed—Romero argued that it is Averroes' and Aquinas' accounts of intentionality which truly represent opposite poles of the spectrum, insofar as Averroes is an ‘abstractionist’ through and through, whereas Aquinas appears to be a pure ‘intuitionist’. Also—and this was the second, and perhaps the most important part of Romero's thesis—Albert's account, and not Aquinas', can be accurately described as the most ‘centric’, insofar as he is closest to finding a harmonious synthesis between the doctrines of Avicenna and Averroes, by making Avicenna's intuitionism subservient to Averroes's abstractionism.

In “Primary Causality and *ibdā'* in the *Liber de causis*,” Richard C. TAYLOR (Marquette University and De Wulf-Mansion Centre, Leuven) explored the influence of the *Liber de causis* in the Arabic tradition from the ninth century and in the Latin tradition from the twelfth century. Through a careful reading of the Arabic *Liber de causis* and its neo-Platonic sources, Taylor established that the argumentation in Chapter 1 of the *Liber de causis* is fully devoted to showing that the First Cause is more causally present to any effect than is any intermediate cause. This statement serves as the foundation for another essential argument, i.e., that the First Cause is the one that originates and creates, which means that any intermediate cause acts by form and provides form while depending on the First Cause. Therefore, it can be inferred, as Taylor maintained, that there is but one First Cause or God, and that the origination of being depends absolutely on this First Cause.

After highlighting the dominance of the First Cause in the *Liber de causis*, Taylor examined the uses and the different forms of the terms *fa'ala* (*agere*, to act) and *abda'a* (*creare*, to originate, to create), while simultaneously showing the similarities of language and doctrine between the *Liber de causis* and the *Plotiniana Arabica*. After this comparison, Taylor concluded that the author of the *Liber de causis* was influenced by the *Plotiniana Arabica* when adopting the notion of a thing acting by its very being and not by an act added to its being. According to Taylor's view, in the *Plotiniana Arabica* this notion is associated with the view of the First as above will, choice and decision. Since it is the Good and the One, all things emanate from the First Cause not as an act additional to its essence, but as something directly proceeding from its existence. This notion of creation differs from that whereby creation is understood as dependent upon the divine will. This is why, even though the argument given to sustain the necessity of a First Cause was useful for the Arabic and Latin accounts on creation, including those of al-Kindi, Avicenna, Thomas Aquinas and oth-

ers, at the same time it turned out to be controversial, given that in the *Liber de causis* there is no evidence of a conception of free creation.

Finally, the main assumption in Jörg Alejandro TELLKAMP's (Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, México D.F.) lecture "How Did John of la Rochelle Influence Thomas Aquinas?" was that it seems necessary to take into account authors previous to Aquinas who were influenced by Arabic philosophers. This is certainly true of Albert the Great, but other authors equally betray a heavy, mainly Avicennian influence. Although it is doubtless that Aquinas had a first hand knowledge of the Latin versions of works written by Avicenna and Averroes, his accomplished understanding of both shows that he was able to use and discern an already established vocabulary regarding the interpretation of *De anima*.

John of la Rochelle was one of those authors who introduced a very nuanced approach to the powers of the soul, using not only Christian sources, mainly John Damascene and the pseudo-Augustinian *De spiritu et anima*, but also Avicenna's own *De anima*. John was, in fact, one of the first to draw on Avicenna in order to come to terms with Aristotle's theory of the intellect. Yet his importance can also be seen in such topics as the theory of the passions and the powers of perception, in which he integrates the Arabic and Christian strands regarding the powers of the soul.

This sort of syncretism might have been quite appealing for someone such as Aquinas, and although John of la Rochelle's influence on subsequent thinkers would require further research, it seems clear that his ideas, also through the *Summa Halensis*, were important for Aquinas. This is probably due to his relation with Albert the Great, in whose psychological works several notions that point at a possible influence by John of la Rochelle can be found.

During the third and last day of the Conference, Richard Taylor made a general presentation of the two volumes of translations, with commentary, targeting the importance of Arabic philosophers for understanding the thought of Aquinas, in which Roland E. Houser, Luis Xavier López-Farjeat and Taylor himself are currently working. After indicating the fifty-five selected texts from the commentary on the *Sentences* where the Arabic influence on Aquinas is quite evident, Taylor proceeded to provide a sample, discussing *In II Sent. d.17 q.2 a.1* where Aquinas investigates whether there is one soul or intellect for all human beings. Taylor showed in detail the presence of Avicenna, Avempace and Averroes, in this text, as in so many others.

Luis Xavier LÓPEZ-FARJEAT (México D.F.)

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(12) 28-30 October 2012, St. Louis, MO (USA): The American Catholic Philosophical Association Meeting. *Sponsor*: Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (SIEPM). *Organizer*: Richard C. TAYLOR (Milwaukee, WI).

“Philosophy in the Abrahamic Traditions I-II”

These two sessions at the annual meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association explored aspects of the meeting's theme, “Science, Reason, and Religion,” as addressed by several ‘Arabic’ and Latin authors.

In “Where Does Avicenna Demonstrate the Existence of God?” Daniel DE HAAN (University of St. Thomas, Houston) argued that Avicenna’s discussion of necessary existence through itself in *Ilāhiyyāt* I.6-7 is only a material demonstration of God’s existence, whereas his formal demonstration of God’s existence is not found until VIII.1-3. The final chapters of *Ilāhiyyāt* I “awaken” the mind to the necessary as one of the three important metaphysical principles that are included within all of our concepts. The “necessary” is distinguished from the possible and the impossible as the “assuredness of existence.” Avicenna thus takes “existence” to be “necessary existence,” which is known through itself, while the possible and impossible are known only by comparison to necessary existence. De Haan identified four tensions in this discussion that suggest that it cannot provide a formal demonstration of God’s existence. First, Avicenna there assumes what a formal demonstration for God’s existence would need to prove, i.e., that there is something that necessarily exists. Second, the discussion follows the reverse order of that required for a formal demonstration of God’s existence. Third, Avicenna does not mention infinite regresses in explaining why possible existence must depend on necessary existence. And fourth, he says that he will prove the impossibility of infinite regresses only later. (The rejection of infinite causal regress is essential to Avicenna’s later demonstration of God’s existence.) Further, *Ilāhiyyāt* VIII contains clues that Avicenna considers himself to be demonstrating God’s existence there for the first time in this work. For instance, the demonstration is framed by a formal invocation to God and the words “now that we have arrived at this stage.” It relies on a theory of causality that had not been discussed yet in Book I. Finally, the aspects of a formal demonstration missing from Book I are all present in Book VIII. De Haan concluded by noting three main problems with reading Book I as an early demonstration of God’s existence. First, such a reading overlooks the trajectory of Avicenna’s metaphysical project; second, it disregards Avicenna’s own statements about where he will discuss God’s existence and what principles

are required in order to do so; third, it ignores the fact that Book VIII alone offers the resolution to the four tensions in the discussion in Book I of necessary existence through itself.

In “Medicine as a Subordinate Science,” Emma GANNAGÉ (Georgetown University) explored the debate over the relationship between medicine and physics in the unedited thirteenth-century Arabic literature that grew out of Avicenna’s *Canon*. The debate derives from Aristotle’s discussion of the relation between a superior science and a subordinate science that examines a part of the superior science’s subject not as such but according to some qualification. Subordinate sciences are dependent on superior sciences for their first principles; they provide knowledge of the fact (*hoti*), whereas superior sciences provide knowledge of the why (*di hoti*); and they are perceptual, whereas superior sciences are mathematical. In his *Canon*, Avicenna identifies medicine as a science subordinate to physics, because medicine examines some part of physics (the human body) not *as such* but only under some aspect (i.e., inasmuch as the human body is healthy or sick). Avicenna’s view of medicine thus has potentially devastating implications for the Arabic practice of medicine. Since subordinate sciences only provide knowledge of the fact, the physician depends blindly on principles received from the physicist in seeking the causes of the symptoms he perceives. As a physician, he cannot question the anatomical information received from physics, even if his own experience conflicts with these received principles. His job is merely to discover a link between the symptom and the cause already established by Galen’s physics. It seems that medicine can never go beyond Galen.

Defenders of Avicenna, however, interpreted him in a way that was more beneficial to medical progress. For instance, in response to treatises attacking Avicenna on this point, al-Khunajī writes that medicine need not assume that the first principles it receives from physics have already been demonstrated. Medicine can challenge these principles on the basis of empirical observation, by posing questions to the physicist. Consequently, the subordinate science of medicine contributes something to the superior science of physics, i.e., knowledge of the fact (in this case, the symptom). In the inductive demonstrations carried out by the physician, the middle term is the cause of assent to the conclusion, but not the reason for the existence of the conclusion. This sort of demonstration is useful to physics, because by itself, physics is too universal to provide demonstrative knowledge of medical symptoms. Thus according to this model, the subordinate and superior sciences cooperate in a single physico-medical subject.

Gannagé concluded by noting that this debate was not sparked by a

concern for the relation between experimental scientific method and knowledge but rather by a concern for the constitution of medical epistemology. These thinkers, then, sought to safeguard Aristotelian natural philosophy from the inroads of Galenism and to update Aristotelian biology.

In “Matter in Islamic Philosophy and the Importance of World-Views: Metametaphysics, Contexts over Contents, and the Path From Physical Theory to Existential and Ethical Reflection,” Sarah PESSIN (University of Denver) explored three authors’ perspectives on prime matter—Avicenna’s, Averroes’ and Shahrastani’s—in order to show how each perspective reveals deeper differences in worldview, and more broadly in order to highlight the need for greater sensitivity to differences in historical worldviews. Averroes takes prime matter to be an unspecified of indeterminate three-dimensionality. For Avicenna, prime matter takes on a more determinate character as a capacity or disposition to acquire three-dimensionality. Taking a sharply different, Empedoclean approach, Shahrastani holds that prime matter is the “grounding element” or a “supernal divine principle at the core of being.” For Shahrastani, then, matter is the love that grounds the beings of things that are not God; it is the first effect outside God. Pessin argued that these three theories of prime matter cannot easily be compared with each other, since they represent three strongly divergent worldviews. Shahrastani’s theory represents a pseudo-Empedoclean “Non-Relational Transcendence Method.” Here the primary metaphysical focus is on the interplay between unity and plurality in an emanated universe. In contrasting Avicenna and Averroes, she agrees partly with Arthur Hyman’s characterization of their two ontologies as respectively “formalist” and “empirical,” but concluded that this characterization does not succeed in fully clarifying their respective worldviews. Thus, she argued, Avicenna’s theory of matter as a disposition for form represents a more God-centered approach, the “Transcendence-Relational Method.” Here the primary metaphysical focus is on relationality, i.e., the relationship of a transcendent God to the beings that receive his action. In contrast, Averroes’ theory of matter as indeterminate three-dimensionality indicates a way of approaching material beings “horizontally,” i.e., in their relationship with each other, rather than considering their relationship with God—the “Immanent Empirical Method.”

In the second and third sections of her lecture, Pessin briefly explored the broader implications of the interpretive approach that the first section models. In the second section she sketched ways of exploiting these three worldviews in ethics, theology and phenomenology. For instance, in their focus on transcendence, Shahrastani and Avicenna offer insight into what it

means to live as a “receptive being,” which could connect to virtue ethics, feminist ethics, Levinasian subjectivity or a transcendental philosophy of religion. Pessin concluded in the third section by arguing for what she calls a “new method of charity,” i.e., a reading of historical texts in which the context of an idea is taken into consideration before attempting to assess and criticize its content.

In “Albert the Great and the Development of Thomas Aquinas’ Natural Epistemology,” Richard TAYLOR (Marquette University-Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) took a step toward clarifying a stubbornly obscure point of Thomistic scholarship, namely to what extent did the young Thomas Aquinas borrow positions from his teacher Albert? The paper examined the similarities and differences between Albert the Great’s treatment in *De homine* of the Averroist claim that all humans share only one intellect, and Aquinas’ treatment of the same problem in his commentary on the *Sentences*. Taylor began by summarizing the doctrine in Aquinas’ *In II Sent.* d.17 q.2 a.1 (written c. 1253–54), with special focus on four key points. First, Thomas challenges a mainstay of the Averroist position by arguing (with the support of Avicenna) that it is matter, not particularity, which is the obstacle to intelligibility. Consequently, the particularization of intellects in individual human beings does not prevent them from grasping universal essences. Second, he argues against Avicenna that there cannot be only one agent intellect for all humans, because otherwise human beings would perform abstraction—an essential part of human cognition—only *per accidens* and not *per se*. Third, Aquinas’ theory hinges on his view of what the objects of human cognition are, and how we attain them. And fourth, in fact Aquinas holds that the species are themselves particular mental entities that represent natures. Curiously, his view combines key features from both Avicenna (i.e., the notion that intelligible species are the means, not the objects, of human cognition) and Averroes (i.e., an abstractive mechanism whereby higher forms can be derived from lower images). Improvising on these features, Thomas argues that the human intellect is a power of the human soul, that it attains the true natures of material objects via intelligible species, and that it derives these species by abstracting from sensory experiences of such things. In sum, Thomas Aquinas’ theory of the human intellect is not a pure rejection of Averroes or Avicenna, but is rather a creative reprise of ideas from both thinkers.

From a detailed review of the texts from Albert the Great, Taylor then argued that a substantially identical view to Aquinas’ is found in Albert’s *De homine* (written ca. 1246). Most notably, Albert had already developed the theory of cognition by abstracted intelligible species that is now more

familiarly associated with his student, Thomas Aquinas. Interestingly, however, Albert was led to this theory of human cognition by a systematic misreading of Averroes: he believes that for Averroes, the material intellect is a power of the individual soul rather than a separate universal intellect. This misinterpretation may have led him to believe that his own theory of human cognition was closer to his Arabic sources than in fact it was. The later Albert, as well as the young Aquinas in *In II Sent.* d.17 q.2 a.1, corrected this misinterpretation. Nevertheless, Thomas retained the theory of cognition that it had generated.

Therese Scarpelli CORY (Seattle) and Richard C. TAYLOR (Milwaukee)

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(13) 18-19 novembre 2011, Paris (France) : Institut d'Etudes Médiévales de l'Institut Catholique de Paris. *Comité d'organisation :* A. DE LIBERA, O. BOULNOIS et I. MOULIN (Paris).

« Le Beau et la Beauté au Moyen Âge »

Pour son deuxième colloque international annuel, l'Institut d'Etudes Médiévales de l'Institut Catholique de Paris a choisi de s'intéresser à la question de « l'esthétique » médiévale, à son existence et à son statut dans les différentes traditions. Dans la ligne de la pensée grecque sur le « bel et bien » (*kalos kagathos*), les textes médiévaux abondent en réflexions sur la beauté intelligible. Mieux encore, la beauté apparaît comme l'une des voies d'accès au divin, ainsi que l'enseignent Augustin et Denys. Se pose alors la question du statut du transcendental du Beau : le beau est-il une propriété essentielle de l'être, au même titre que l'un, le vrai ou le bien ? Par ailleurs, la question du statut de la beauté sensible demeure problématique. Celle-ci est rarement valorisée pour elle-même et demeure plutôt une voie d'accès aux réalités supérieures. Enfin, la question des beaux-arts ne semble pas posée au Moyen Âge. La réflexion sur l'art renvoie tantôt aux arts libéraux, tantôt aux arts mécaniques, sans prendre en compte, dans une telle classification, le statut particulier des différentes formes de l'art : art pictural, poésie, musique, etc. réunis dans ce que les modernes appellent les « beaux-arts ». Le colloque avait pour fin de poser une interrogation sur la pratique comme sur la théorie des arts et de la beauté au Moyen Âge. C'est la raison pour laquelle, l'Institut d'Etudes Médiévales a choisi de réunir non seulement des théoriciens (philosophes, théologiens, historiens de l'art), mais également des spécialistes du monde des arts, dans les domaines de la musique, de l'architecture et de l'iconographie.

Pour ouvrir la problématique générale du colloque, Olivier BOULNOIS (EPHE, Paris) a défendu la thèse selon laquelle il fallait rejeter l'idée d'une esthétique médiévale, entendue comme un sens universel donné au plaisir sensible pour lui-même, contre quelques historiens jusqu'à Umberto Eco. Sa conférence intitulée « De l'esthétique médiévale : derechef, qu'elle n'existe pas » avait pour but d'examiner trois questions : le beau est-il un transcendantal ? Existe-t-il une beauté sensible, ou bien celle-ci est-elle réservée à l'intelligible ? La beauté est-elle toujours l'objet d'un jugement et appartient-elle au domaine de l'intelligible ? Afin de montrer qu'il n'existaient pas d'esthétique au Moyen Âge, mais seulement deux théories séparées, l'une de l'art, et l'autre du Beau, Boulnois a développé son argumentation en trois points : au Moyen Âge, le Beau n'est pas un transcendantal ; il n'y a pas de théorie des beaux-arts ; la perception sensible n'est valorisée que comme moyen pour accéder au Beau. En effet, le Beau n'est pas un transcendantal car il n'est pas détaché du Bien, en tant qu'il est lié à la notion de plaisir ; tout art comme la musique, la poésie, la peinture, la sculpture ou l'architecture est référé à un art libéral ou mécanique (mathématiques, grammaire, maçonnerie,...) ; le plaisir du Beau ne constitue pas une fin en soi mais doit s'orienter vers la splendeur du divin.

François CASSINGENA-TREVERDY, OSB (ICP, Paris–Abbaye Saint Martin de Ligugé) a cherché à montrer comment la cantilène représente la matière et l'enjeu d'une véritable philocalie. Son intervention, intitulée « *Speciosus forma* : l'enluminure sonore des mots qui disent la beauté dans le répertoire romano-franc (grégorien) », a permis de montrer l'importance du nombre dans les harmonies, en s'appuyant sur un certain nombre de textes (le *De musica* d'Augustin, l'*Institutio de musica* de Boèce, des citations de Martianus Capella) mais également sur toute une tradition qui met en valeur les représentations symboliques, comme les descriptions du chœur de Cluny III. Le texte chanté est parole de Dieu et élève au sentiment de la Beauté par l'intermédiaire des sens, en particulier le regard, l'ouïe et le goût. Le goût, car Dieu nourrit à mesure qu'il parle ; le regard, car le chant se déclare vision. Enfin, la voix qui chante est, comme le dit Augustin dans ses *Confessions*, « la voix de l'Eglise qui sonne avec suavité ». La voix du psalmiste doit donc être sonore et douce afin de provoquer la componction des auditeurs, sans pour autant s'enchanter elle-même. La Beauté n'est ainsi que protreptique : la performance vocale a pour finalité la conversion, la voix se découvrant même comme au-delà du dicible. L'esthétique n'est pas affranchie de l'éthique.

Grâce à l'intervention de Florian MEUNIER (musée Carnavalet, Paris), qui avait pour titre : « La beauté monumentale. L'architecture et la sculptu-

re à l'époque gothique », les auditeurs ont pu assister à une projection leur permettant de comprendre le passage de l'esthétique romane à l'esthétique gothique, malgré la disparition historique de nombreuses cathédrales romanes mais dont l'architecture a pu être préservée dans les petites églises de campagne. Pour F. Meunier, il s'agissait de comprendre les critères définissant la beauté de l'architecture et de la sculpture, deux domaines classés alors dans le vaste champ des arts mécaniques, malgré le petit nombre des textes médiévaux portant sur cette question. Meunier a ainsi souhaité rapprocher certaines réalisations architecturales de la pensée médiévale qui l'inspire. Dans les réalisations romanes, on note une certaine distance avec les modèles antiques. La pensée cistercienne est clairement marquée dans la réalisation de l'Abbaye du Thoronet mais également dans celle de l'abbaye de Pontigny. En revanche, le rapport de Suger à Saint-Denis ou de l'École de Chartres à la cathédrale est plus problématique.

Philippe SERS (Collège des Bernardins, Paris) a souhaité montrer le rapport étroit et inconditionnel entre la beauté et la vérité. Dans son intervention intitulée « Beauté et vérité. L'expérience spirituelle dans l'icône byzantino-slave traditionnelle », il a soutenu la thèse selon laquelle l'image sainte n'était pas seulement une Bible des illettrés. Dans l'iconographie du Moyen Âge, la beauté a une signification spirituelle ancrée dans la prière de l'artiste, comme cela a pu être établi en particulier par le Père Pavel Florensky dans ses célèbres démonstrations sur les icônes de saint André Roublev. Les représentations du visage du Sauveur sont inspirées de l'icône archétypale de la trace du Christ sur le linge ; le fondement christologique de l'image est l'Incarnation. Pour l'iconographe, le visage du Christ est dévoilement de la beauté de Dieu. C'est dans la rumination du Mystère que l'icône devient, à la fois, support de prière et représentation de la prière de l'iconographe, notamment dans la méditation de la Transfiguration qui est prière de consécration. L'icône byzantino-slave, à partir du XIII^e siècle, marque un moment d'inventivité théologique particulièrement riche qui aide à comprendre la fécondité de l'approche iconique de la vérité et de la beauté divine en utilisant des moyens strictement reliés à l'ordre de l'image qui font de l'ensemble texte-image un double indissociable. Passant de « l'image métaphysique » à la « métaphysique des couleurs » (P. Florensky), P. Sers a montré que l'expérience de la lumière était non seulement une expérience transfigurative, mais aussi l'expérience du processus même de l'Incarnation. De même, les formes sont les figures des réalités spirituelles, comme dans certaines représentations de la philoxénie d'Abraham. L'accès à la vérité et à la beauté dans une double rumination du mystère et dans une double fruition de la gloire de Dieu nous conduit à l'expérience

sensible décisive de la vérité révélée et de l'ultime beauté de Dieu, qui réunit ainsi les transcendantaux.

Dans son intervention intitulée « l'héritage de l'iconographie médiévale dans l'œuvre de Dostoïevski », Arina KOUZNETSOVA (doctorante à l'Université de Lyon III) a montré comment, dans la culture byzantine et russe médiévales, la Beauté n'était pas une catégorie esthétique mais plutôt ontologique. En effet, l'idéal de la Beauté est inséparable de l'idéal de la sainteté, qui est considérée comme un principe constructif et actif, immédiatement lié à l'idée du « blagoobriazie » (l'image ou l'icône du Bien), appliqué aux humains et à l'organisation de l'univers tout entier. La spécificité de la spiritualité russe par rapport à celle de l'Occident consiste en ce que l'expérience philosophique se réalise sous la forme de l'iconographie, c'est-à-dire, sous la forme visuelle de l'apparition du Beau qui est inséparable du Vrai, ce qu'exige une extrême ascèse de l'expression. La Beauté aspire non pas à un élan enthousiaste et sentimental, mais au silence, ήσυχία, ainsi qu'au projet du Salut. Elle a appuyé sa présentation d'une projection, montrant l'influence des icônes russes traditionnelles dans l'œuvre de Dostoïevski, notamment l'icône de la Mère des affligés qui constitue l'emblème de l'œuvre de l'écrivain russe ou encore l'icône de la communion des apôtres dans *Les Frères Karamazov*.

Stephen HEADLEY (Séminaire Russe, Paris) a traité la question suivante : « Le beau et le vrai chez Ephrem le Syrien ». Pour Ephrem le Syrien, se revêtir de beauté, c'est se revêtir de la beauté du créateur. Selon S. Headley, l'abîme séparant le Créateur du créé est franchi par l'Incarnation ; ainsi le domaine de l'intelligence est la création exprimée en syriaque par le mot « galyata », le révélé. La vérité (« shrara » ou « qushta ») n'est saisie que partiellement et d'une manière subjective, lorsque le miroir de l'âme est assez pur pour recevoir la lumière de la Révélation de Dieu, belle en raison de sa vérité.

Terminant la première journée du colloque, Grégoire ASLANOFF (CNRS, Paris) a traité du thème du Christ mort dans l'art byzantin. Lors son intervention intitulée « Sans beauté ni éclat (Is LIII,2). L'image du Christ mort dans l'art byzantin », il a projeté l'image d'une icône double-face, conservée au musée byzantin de la ville de Kastoria, en Grèce, sur laquelle figure le Christ, l'homme de douleur. Ce type iconographique représentant le Christ mort debout dans son tombeau est intitulé « La grande humilité » dans le monde byzantin. L'analyse de cette œuvre permet d'évoquer comment les Byzantins ont cherché à rendre le paradoxe de la « vie descendue au tombeau », pour reprendre une expression empruntée à une hymne liturgique de la semaine sainte.

Pour ouvrir la seconde journée du colloque, Anca VASILIU (CNRS, Paris) a présenté la conception philosophique antique du Beau dans le monde grec afin d'inscrire les interventions médiévales du colloque dans la tradition platonicienne et néoplatonicienne. Dans sa communication, intitulée « Comment parler du beau ? Un modèle érotique pour la beauté intelligible », elle a souligné que chez Platon, le Beau ne possédait pas un statut propre mais était référé à l'amour et à la catégorie de l'*eros*. La seule beauté vraie et parfaite étant la beauté intelligible, le beau sensible, dans un dialogue comme le *Phèdre* ou dans la tradition de ses commentaires (Hermias l'Alexandrin), doit faire l'objet d'une initiation qui permet de passer de la beauté singulière d'un corps à la beauté des *logoi* amoureux, puis à la connaissance de la beauté intelligible. La tradition des médio-platoniciens est davantage tournée vers l'Être. C'est Plotin, grâce à sa conception du discours comme corps et âme, qui reprend la démarche initiatique de la beauté platonicienne tout en lui appliquant le concept de ressemblance qu'il applique, de manière originale, à l'âme. Dans sa vision du beau, l'âme devient elle-même belle. Le principe platonicien de la reconnaissance des formes par similitude devient un principe que Plotin attribue à la beauté.

Pour la période carolingienne, Kristina MITALAITE (Paris), « L'image peut-elle être belle ? L'image matérielle et la conception de la beauté chez les Carolingiens (fin VIII^e-début IX^e s.) », a posé deux questions fondamentales : l'auteur des *Libri* perçoit-il l'image en tant que belle ou réserve-t-il la terminologie du beau à d'autres réalités ? Et comment les idées aniconiques peuvent-elles trouver leur place dans l'image réelle et quel rôle y joue la beauté ? S'appuyant sur Théodulfe et Raban Maur, la conférencière a mis en rapport la question de l'impureté de l'image tout en soulignant le rôle de la figure pour désigner les réalités divines.

Dominique ALIBERT (Institut Catholique de Paris) a choisi de s'intéresser au *Traité de l'administration abbatiale* de Suger, dans lequel ce dernier évoque la reconstruction de l'église abbatiale de Saint-Denis. S'appuyant sur des éléments iconographiques, D. Alibert a souligné le rapport du texte de Suger avec les représentations apocalyptiques du XII^e siècle.

Andreas SPEER (Thomas-Institut der Universität zu Köln), dans sa conférence intitulée « L'esthétique médiévale comme expérience de l'art. Les écrits de l'Abbé Suger à Saint-Denis », a montré comment Suger permettait de mettre en valeur le point d'intersection entre l'archéologie monumentale et l'approche des textes qui caractérise la question d'une esthétique médiévale. Les écrits de Suger sur l'abbaye (*l'Ordinatio*, le *De consecratione* et le *De administratione*) offrent un jugement nuancé. Ainsi, les travaux à Saint-Denis donnent un accès à l'expérience artistique (*Kunstere-*

leben), qui contraste avec la *Meistererzählung* de la naissance du gothique. L'argumentation présentée est fondée sur une approche de cette expérience artistique, qui n'essaie pas de reconstruire, à travers les sources écrites, ses propres conceptions déterminées par des questions esthétiques modernes. Il s'agit d'un accès aux textes qui prend en considération l'horizon de la compréhension médiévale, ce qui implique la prise en compte du contexte des hommes qui ont compris, à leur manière, les objets de leur époque que nous, nous définissons comme « œuvres d'art ».

Dominique POIREL (IRHT-EPHE, Paris) a montré l'omniprésence de la question du beau chez Hugues de Saint-Victor. Dans son intervention intitulée « Dieu, la nature et l'homme : la place de la beauté dans l'œuvre d'Hugues de Saint-Victor », D. Poirel a souhaité montrer la thèse toute simple mais fondamentale dans l'œuvre d'Hugues de Saint-Victor, et en particulier dans son *De tribus diebus* : le Beau mène à Dieu. L'omniprésence du beau hugonien n'est pas seulement celle de la joie devant la surabondance du créé, mais elle atteint également la laideur et le monstrueux. Elle est diversifiée : beauté de la nature créée dans le *De tribus diebus*, beauté « formifique » de Dieu dans le commentaire sur la *Hierarchie céleste*, beauté de la Vierge Marie dans un sermon pour l'Assomption, beauté du geste humain dans un traité sur la formation des novices, mais aussi beauté de l'écriture dans tous ses écrits, au point qu'Hugues est tenu pour l'un des meilleurs prosateurs de son temps.... D. Poirel a ensuite montré l'unité de la beauté chez Hugues de Saint-Victor à partir d'une théologie hugonienne du beau puisée dans l'unité profonde de la beauté visible et invisible, toutes deux créées par Dieu. La Beauté est elle-même signe d'unité permettant de retrouver l'unité de l'être.

Henryk ANZULEWICZ (Albertus-Magnus-Institut, Bonn) s'est intéressé à l'influence néoplatonicienne de Denys pour une théorie du Beau chez Albert le Grand dans sa conférence intitulée : « Strukturelemente der neu-platonisch-dionysischen Theorie des Schönen Alberts des Grossen ». S'appuyant sur les textes du *De pulchro* et du *Commentaire sur les Noms Divins* d'Albert le Grand, H. Anzulewicz a soutenu l'existence d'une esthétique chez Albert le Grand. Le Beau, chez Albert, se définit selon trois critères : la clarté de la forme substantielle ou accidentelle ; la force attractive qui pousse à désirer le beau, en tant que bien et fin ; la puissance d'unification qui vient de la forme dont la splendeur est productrice du beau. L'utilisation de la définition du Beau chez Albert dans sa métaphysique de la lumière, sa conception de l'émanation ou encore, sa théorie de l'intellect, nous montrent l'importance du transcendental du Beau dans la métaphysique albertinienne. La dimension esthétique du Beau chez Albert

s'exprime dans son unité avec le Bien, dans la lignée du *kaloskagathos* grec. Toute Beauté émane du Beau selon le schéma de la triple causalité (formelle-exemplaire, efficiente et finale). Pour terminer, Anzulewicz a montré l'existence d'une certaine théorie des Beaux-Arts chez Albert qui traverse différents ouvrages de son œuvre et que le Colonais classe entre les arts libéraux et les arts mécaniques. Sans emprunter totalement le vocabulaire d'Hans Urs von Balthasar qui parle d'une « esthétique transcendante » chez Albert le Grand, Anzulewicz a conclu sur la dimension esthétique de la métaphysique d'Albert en lien avec la dimension néoplatonicienne de son « péripatétisme ».

Olivier-Thomas VENARD (École Biblique de Jérusalem) a posé la question : « Y a-t-il un ‘problème esthétique’ chez saint Thomas d’Aquin ? » ? Critiquant la position d’Umberto Eco selon lequel, d’une part, le Moyen Âge présentait « une manière cohérente de penser les problèmes du beau et de l’art » mais que d’autre part, il existait une « contradiction épicentrique qui mine de l’intérieur le système esthétique thomiste » (*Le problème esthétique chez Thomas d’Aquin*, Milan 1956, 1970), Venard a souhaité montrer que la conclusion de l'impossibilité de l'esthétique chez saint Thomas d'Aquin reposait sur une compréhension non théologique de l'expérience esthétique de Thomas qui se fonde sur les concepts de *proprietas*, *integritas* et *claritas*. Si seul Dieu peut voir *sub specie pulchri*, l'homme a cependant accès à l'expérience de la beauté puisque, dans une vision du monde imprégnée d’Écritures Saintes, le signe est lui-même un processus de révélation et possède une dimension théophanique, et même théologique. La connaissance rationnelle, la parole, sont des lieux dans lesquels le beau se donne à voir et à entendre, à l'image du Christ qui enseigne. Chez Thomas, la relation de la théologie à la science divine est fondée sur une certaine connaturalité affective qui tient au réalisme divin et qui rend la beauté performative.

Le colloque s'est achevé sur l'intervention de Félicité SCHULER-LAGIER (Centre international du Vitrail, France) qui représentait l'École Internationale du Vitrail et du Patrimoine à Chartres. Dans sa projection de vitraux de la cathédrale de Chartres (« Le langage symbolique des images médiévales de Chartres »), elle a montré comment le sens traditionnel et symbolique des images déroulées autour des portails et dans les verrières des cathédrales s'estompait depuis des siècles. S'appuyant sur des images choisies, la conférencière a rappelé la symbolique et le langage des vitraux de la cathédrale de Chartres.

Isabelle MOULIN (Paris)

(14) 27-30 December 2011, Washington, D.C. (USA): American Philosophical Association: Eastern Division Meeting. Group meeting on 29 December. *Sponsored by:* Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale. *Organizer:* Martin PICKAVÉ (University of Toronto).

"New Perspectives on Later Medieval Ontology"

Looking at the program of the upcoming SIEPM conference in Freising and the complete absence of speakers from the English speaking world from the list of plenary speakers, one could get the impression that the SIEPM ignores a vibrant section of its membership. But that this impression is inadequate should become clear from the fact that the Société is now sponsoring for many years sessions at meetings of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, the world's largest association of professional philosophers. This year's session was dedicated to later medieval ontology, an area that recently has undergone a quiet renaissance, due in part to the interest contemporary metaphysicians and scholars of early modern philosophy have developed in medieval ontology.

In his paper "Aquinas on Prime Matter: Prospects and Pitfalls," Jeffrey BROWER (Purdue University) examined Thomas Aquinas' conception of prime matter as pure potentiality. He contrasted the ways in which Aquinas approaches prime matter from the points of view of metaphysics and natural philosophy, and concluded that, despite his insistence on prime matter as pure potentiality, Aquinas is a realist with respect to prime matter. After a careful analysis of anti-realist arguments and their aim and strength, Brower concluded that for Aquinas prime matter is one of three fundamental types of beings. Brower closed with some remarks about individuation and prime matter as non-individual stuff.

In his contribution "Aquinas on Substance and Anti-Realism," Gabriele GALLUZZO (Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa) argued for a different understanding of Aquinas' account of material substances. His point of departure was Aquinas' own discussion of various forms of part-whole relations (i.e., mixtures, relational wholes, and hylomorphic composites). Stressing the fundamentally different nature of hylomorphic composites, Galluzzo came to the conclusion that hylomorphic unities are not mereological composites, for the simple reason that material objects, strictly speaking, have no really distinct metaphysical parts. He further attempted to elucidate Aquinas' anti-reductionism by contrasting it with the full-blown rejection of parts characteristic of 'holism' and by referring to the problems that 'holism' encounters in accounting for substantial change.

The last talk of the session was presented by Giorgio PINI (Fordham University). The focus of his lecture, “The Ontological Status of Objects of Thought,” was the notion of ‘objective being’, which was introduced to distinguish the subjective being that an accident has in its subject from the being an object is supposed to have insofar as it is intellect. Pini traced the origins of this notion from Aquinas’ discussions of the Beatific Vision via Henry of Ghent to John Duns Scotus. Contrary to the fact that the notion of ‘objective being’ is commonly associated with Scotus’ thought, Scotus does not actually hold, as some have believed, that ‘objective being’ is a mode of being distinct from real being. According to Scotus, being objectively in the mind is, as Pini demonstrated, nothing else than for an object to be related to the intellect.

The session sponsored by the SIEPM was very well-attended, and together with two sessions organized by the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy (one of the sessions was in the memory of Gareth Matthews), it provided a great occasion for a stimulating exchange among a large group of scholars of medieval philosophy present at the APA meeting.

Martin PICKAVÉ (University of Toronto)

