

What incentive, if any, will induce wealthy nation-states to share the resources necessary for climate adaptation with poorer subnational populations? Will increased energy efficiency beget reduced fossil fuel use, or will a consequent rise in productivity engender further carbon emissions? Will the demand that production be movable to inexpensive labour ensure that mobile fossil-fuelled infrastructure remains hegemonic? Will the real realities of land necessary to transition to renewable energy sources be removed from private use, and by whom will they be requisitioned? Will poorer nation-states deem themselves unable to rely on the richer states to share the climate change burden, and will they seek global political action? What, if anything, will curtail the resurgence of coal as a cheap but carbon-intensive energy source? Will the extensive ineffectuality of electricity consumption beget greater coal use? Will northern-hemisphere states agree to tax themselves to support the relocation of millions flooded out of heavily populated delta regions? Will the Global North's citizens' waning commitment to the economic status quo beget a reduction in climate denialism? Will the expanding horizontal footprint of urban environments be halted to make efficiency savings in transport? Will wealthier citizens' demands for private urban space be denied to create efficient, compact and clean cities? Will the appeal of democratically coordinated low-carbon urban lifestyles – characterized by dense, low energy leisure pursuits and evenly distributed amenities – prove any match for a profit motive oriented to the privatisation of public space? Will temperate rise provide short-term benefits to European and North American agro-business sufficient to deter climate change policy? Will reduced farm output in the Middle East, South Asia and the Caribbean further increase the profitability of agro-business in Europe and North America? Will the profits accrued from rising fossil fuel prices be channelled into renewable energy sources or be transferred to carbon-wasteful enterprises? Will the exigencies of climatic transformation prompt a de-escalation of US-China hostilities in order to manage environmental change and global accumulation? Will mass migration from regions rendered uninhabitable through climate change expedite the intensification of border regimes within richer states, and how will they respond to the diminished mobility of variable capital? Will increased awareness of planetary finitude engender a widespread denunciation of economic growth? Will the world's most powerful states resort to interstate violence to enforce reductions in carbon use, and what domestic imperative will provide them to do so? Will vast geo-engineering projects be undertaken to reconcile capitalist demands for growth with environmental limitations, and which actor will assume the authority to commence and continue such work? Will the devastation wrought by global warming sufficiently affect labour in the Global South to intensify continued accumulation in the Global North? Will persistent inequality between nation-states inhibit international cooperation on climate change? For how much longer will "business as usual" continue, and what will come next?

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T J Watson 15.12.2018

The photo-like three-dimensional visualisation constitutes a now-ubiquitous supplement to bespoke and mass-produced goods alike. Manufactured as ostensibly discrete components, digital models expedite the construction of further images, with the imaged commodity transposable to a seemingly infinite array of settings. Once contextualised – within virtual home, workplace or retailer – the potential buyer beholds a projection of the commodity's future, whether of inter-capitalist exchange or terminal domestic consumption.

The best visualisations betray little evidence of manufacture: when successful, audiences fail to recognise artificiality; rather, models appear as if lens-captured. Paradoxically, the more work invested in visualisation – or the more advanced the techniques deployed (itself indexical of accreted labour time) – the less apparent the specificities of production become. Consequently, labour is more readily identified with the model's imagined referent than the visualisation itself: generally, viewers are quicker to envisage a depicted object's fictive realisation – a house's building or wardrobe's assembly, for instance – than to identify computer-based work.

As movable, manipulable images, three-dimensional visualisations proffer a seamless surface world. Whereas physical facades might be rotated to locate a putatively deeper reality, digital models exhibit no obvious verso analogue. "Depth", however, might be found in lines of code or modified silicone or in light emitting display components, or across the totality of all such relations of dependence. But, for those inclined to puncture the image skin, it remains unclear where penetrative inquiry ought to begin or end.

The enclosed works are digital models of previous works: *Untitled (Hauser and Wirth)*, *Untitled (Sadie Coles)* and *Untitled (Marian Goodman)*. Those works – physically built from wood and plastic – further comprised press release-like literature; similarly, these works possess A4 documents. Digitally fused yet abstractable, the words are new.

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