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Miranda v. Arizona (1966)

– CASE BRIEF –

Citation: 384 U.S. 436
Docket No.: —
Date Filed: 1966-06-13

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Miranda v. Arizona (1966) – Case Brief

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Unknown Court

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Judges:

Warren, Clark, Stewart, White, Harlan

Procedural History:

Attorneys:

John J. Flynn argued the cause for petitioner in No. 759. With him on the brief was John P. Frank. Victor M. Earle III argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 760. F. Conger Fawcett argued the cause, and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 761. Gordon Ringer, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 584. With him on the briefs were Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, and William E. James, Assistant Attorney General., Gary K. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for respondent in No. 759. With him on the brief was Darrell F. Smith, Attorney General. William I. Siegel argued the cause for respondent in No. 760. With him on the brief was Aaron E. Koota. Solicitor General Marshall argued the cause for the United States in No. 761. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Ralph S. Spritzer, Nathan Lewin, Beatrice Rosenberg and Ronald L. Gainer. William A. Norris, by appointment of the Court, 382 U. S. 952, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 584., Telford Taylor, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the State of New York, as amicus curiae, in all cases. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Barry Mahoney and George D. Zuckerman, Assistant

Attorneys General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States and jurisdictions as follows: RichmondM. Flowers of Alabama, Darrell F. Smith of Arizona, Bruce Bennett of Arkansas, Duke W. Dunbar of Colorado, David P. Buckson of Delaware, Earl Faircloth of Florida, Arthur K. Bolton of Georgia, Allan G. Shepard of Idaho, William G. Clark of Illinois, Robert C. Londerholm of Kansas, Robert Matthews of Kentucky, Jack P. F. Gremillion of Louisiana, Richard J. Dubord of Maine, Thomas B. Finan of Maryland, Norman H. Anderson of Missouri, Forrest H. Anderson of Montana, Clarence A. H. Meyer of Nebraska, T. Wade Bruton of North Carolina, Helgi Johanneson of North Dakota, Robert Y. Thornton of Oregon, Walter E. Alessandroni of Pennsylvania, J. Joseph Nugent of Rhode Island, Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina, Waggoner Carr of Texas, Robert Y. Button of Virginia, John J. O'Connell of Washington, C. Donald Robertson of West Virginia, John F. Raper of Wyoming, Rafael Hernandez Colon of Puerto Rico and Francisco Corneiro of the Virgin Islands., Duane R. Nedrud, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the National District Attorneys Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance in Nos. 759 and 760, and reversal in No. 584. With him on the brief was Marguerite D. Oberto., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Paul J. Mishkin, Raymond L, Bradley, Peter Hearn and Melvin L. Wulf filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, in all cases.

Facts:

In three cases, Ernesto Miranda, Carlos Cruz, and Jose Esquivel-Quintana were arrested and interrogated by police officers without being advised of their constitutional rights. The statements they made were introduced at their trials and they were all convicted (Page 441-443, 452). In a fourth case, Robert Malloy, the defendant had been informed of his right to consult with an attorney but was not advised that he had the right to have one present during interrogation until after questioning had begun. The prosecution introduced his statements at trial and he was convicted (Page 443-445).

Issue:

The primary issue before the court was 'whether the prosecution may use statements stemming from interrogations conducted by state officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way' without first advising him of his rights as required by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (Page 467).

Rule of Law:

The court held that the prosecution may not use statements stemming from interrogation of a defendant in custody unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination (Page 467, 479). These safeguards include the warnings that a person must be told prior to any custodial interrogation: he has the right to remain silent, anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him (Page 479).

Holding & Reasoning:

The court held that 'the prosecution may not use statements stemming from interrogations conducted by state officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination' (Page 467). The court reasoned that 'without proper safeguards the

process of in-custody interrogation... contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so freely' (Page 467).

Disposition:

The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgments of the Arizona Supreme Court and remanded for new trials consistent with its opinions (Page 507).

Dissent:

Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White dissented from the majority opinion. Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stewart and White, arguing that 'the Court's rule is an innovation which overturns a century of judicial history', as 'there was no authority, and certainly no settled practice, for the proposition that a person in custody must be warned that he has a right to remain silent or that his statements may be used against him at a trial' (Page 502).