

# Introduction to Cryptography

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# Word of Warning

- This is a short, simplified introduction to cryptography
- We will only introduce what is needed for systems security discussions

# What is cryptography (alt. cryptology)?


## Definition

- The study of techniques to allow secure communication and data storage in presence of attackers

## Features provided

- Confidentiality**: data can be accessed only by chosen entities
- Integrity/freshness**: detect/prevent tampering or replays
- Authenticity**: data and their origin are certified
- Non-repudiation**: data creator cannot repudiate created data
- Advanced features**: proofs of knowledge/computation → DEMONSTRATE TO KNOW SOMETHING WITHOUT SHARING COMPUTATION OF MY KNOWLEDGE, NOT ← EXPLICITY TELLING IT SHARING THE KNOWLEDGE ITSELF

# The Problem to Solve: Confidentiality and Integrity



# A Brief History of Cryptography

- From Greek: *kryptos*, hidden, and *graphein*, to write (i.e., “*art of secret writing*”)
- Ancient history: writing itself was already a “secret technique”.
- Cryptography born in Greek society, when writing became more common, and hidden writing became a need.

# Cryptographic prehistory


## As old as written communication

- Born for commercial (recipe for lacquer on clay tablets) or military (Spartans) uses
- Designed by humans, for human computers
- Algorithms computed by hand, with pen and paper



## Original approach

- A battle of wits between
  - cryptographers: ideate a secret method to obfuscate a text
  - cryptanalysts: figure out the method, break the “cipher”
- Bellaso (1553) [1] separates the encryption method from the key



# A Brief History of Cryptography

- Medieval and renaissance studies
  - **Gabriele de Lavinde**, who wrote a manual in 1379, copy available at the Vatican archives.
  - The mirror writing of **Leonardo da Vinci**.
- Mostly a *military interest*
  - Italian Army General **Luigi Sacco** wrote a famous “*Nozioni di crittografia*” book in 1925, one of the last “non-formalized” exercises in cryptography.


1883 - Kerchoff's six principles for a good cipher (apparatus)

- ① It must be practically, if not mathematically, unbreakable
- ② It should be possible to make it public, even to the enemy
- ③ The key must be communicable without written notes and changeable whenever the correspondants want
- ④ It must be applicable to telegraphic communication
- ⑤ It must be portable, and should be operable by a single person
- ⑥ Finally, given the operating environment, it should be easy to use, it shouldn't impose excessive mental load, nor require a large set of rules to be known

# Cryptographic modern history


## The advent of the machines

- Mechanical computation changes cryptography
  - First rotor machine in 1917 by Ed Hebern
  - Design “popularized” in WWII by German Enigma
- Cryptanalyst at Bletchley park (Turing among them) credited for a decisive effort in winning the war by Eisenhower



# When Math Won a War

- During WWII, **Alan Turing** worked at Bletchley Park to **break** Axis ciphers, in particular the **Enigma cipher**.




Bundesarchiv, DVM 10 Bild-23-63-65  
Foto: o. Ang. | 1936/1939 ca.



# When Math Won a War

- During WWII, Alan Turing worked at Bletchley Park to **break** Axis ciphers, in particular the **Enigma cipher**.
- Birth of the first universal computers was stimulated by this effort.



THE BOMBE (replica)

AN UNBREAKABLE CIPHER IS ONLY IDEOLOGICAL, BUT

## An end to the battle of wits

- Shannon (1949) [4] - Proves that a mathematically unbreakable cipher exists
- Nash (1955) [2] - Argues that **computationally secure** ciphers are ok
  - Considers a cipher with a finite,  $\lambda$  bit long, key
  - Conjecture: if "*parts of the key interact complexly [...] in the determination of their effects on the ciphertext*", the attacker effort to break the cipher would be  $\mathcal{O}(2^\lambda)$
  - The owner of the key takes  $\mathcal{O}(\lambda^2)$  to compute the cipher
  - The computational gap is unsurmountable for large  $\lambda$

SOMETHING  
NOT PERFECT  
BUT STRONG  
ENOUGH IS  
ACCEPTABLE

WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A  
BREAKABLE CIPHER BUT  
IN AN INCONVENIENT  
AMOUNT OF TIME

# Key Concepts in Cryptography

- First formalized by Claude Shannon in his 1949 paper “*Communication theory of secrecy systems*”.
- **Cryptosystem**: a system that takes in input a message (known as **plaintext**) and transforms it into a **ciphertext** with a reversible function that usually takes a **key** as a further input.
- The use of “text” is historical, and today we mean “string of bits”. A diagram illustrating the cryptosystem process. It shows three components: PLAINTEXT (in green) and CIPHERTEXT (in purple), each with a KEY (in red) below it. A blue double-headed arrow labeled FUNCTION connects them. The word TO ENCRYPT is written above the plaintext, and OUTPUT is written above the ciphertext.

# Kerckhoffs' Principle

- *The security of a cryptosystem relies only on the secrecy of the key, and never on the secrecy of the algorithm.*
  - Auguste Kerckhoffs, “La cryptographie militaire”, 1883
- **This means that:**
  - In a secure cryptosystem we cannot retrieve the plaintext from the ciphertext without the key.
  - Also, we cannot retrieve the key from analyzing ciphertext-plaintext pairs.
  - Algorithms must always be assumed known to the attacker, no secret sauce!

# Outline of the topics

## In this course

- Definitions of ciphers as components with functionalities
- How to obtain confidentiality, integrity, data/origin authentication
- An overview of protocols (combinations of ciphers)
- Goal: be able to **use** cryptographic components properly

## In Cryptography and Architectures for Computer Security

- Design and cryptanalysis techniques for ciphers
- Cryptographic protocols and their inner workings
- Efficient, side channel attack resistant implementations
- Goal: be able to **engineer** cryptographic components

# Before we start...

```
int getRandomNumber()
{
    return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll.
               // guaranteed to be random.
}
```

<https://xkcd.com/221/>

## A word on randomness

- Randomness (in this course) characterizes a generative process
- Stating: “00101 is a random string” actually makes little sense

RANDOMNESS IS RELATED TO  
A PROCESS THAT GENERATE  
RANDOM NUMBERS

A “PURE RANDOM” NUMBER  
DOESN’T EXIST

# Definitions

## Data


- Plaintext space  $\mathbf{P}$ : set of possible messages  $\text{ptx} \in \mathbf{P}$ 
  - Old times: words in some human-readable alphabet, modern times  $\{0, 1\}^l$
- Ciphertext space  $\mathbf{C}$ : set of possible ciphertexts  $\text{ctx} \in \mathbf{C}$ 
  - Usually  $\{0, 1\}^{l'}$ , not necessarily  $l = l'$  (ciphertexts may be larger)
- Key space  $\mathbf{K}$ : set of possible keys
  - $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$ , keys with special formats are derived from bitstrings

TO ENCRYPT

# Definitions

## Functions

- Encryption function  $\mathbb{E} : \mathbf{P} \times \mathbf{K} \rightarrow \mathbf{C}$
- Decryption function  $\mathbb{D} : \mathbf{C} \times \mathbf{K} \rightarrow \mathbf{P}$
- Correctness: for all  $\text{ptx} \in \mathbf{P}$ , we need  $k, k' \in \mathbf{K}$  s.t.  $\mathbb{D}(\mathbb{E}(\text{ptx}, k), k') = \text{ptx}$



# Providing confidentiality

THE ATTACKER SHOULD NOT HAVE THE KEY

## Goal

- Prevent anyone not authorized from being able to understand data

## Possible attacker models

- The attacker simply eavesdrops (ciphertext only attack)
- The attacker knows a set of possible plaintexts
  - Limit case: the attacker chooses the set of plaintexts **CHOOSE-PLAINTEXT ATTACK**  
*SOMEONE THAT SIMPLY SPIES AND OBSERVES A CONVERSATION BETWEEN 2 USERS*
- The attacker may tamper with the data and observe the reactions of a decryption-capable entity
  - Limit case: the attacker sees the actual decrypted value