

Web Security

Thierry Sans

Securing the web architecture means securing ...

- The network
- The operating system
- The administration
- The web architecture
- The database
- The web application

Our focus here!

Facebook closes hole that let spammers auto-post to walls, friends

Social-networking site plugs a second hole that allowed spammers to automatically post to people's pages.

by **Elinor Mills**  @elinormills / September 7, 2010 12:37 PM PDT / Updated: September 7, 2010 4:00 PM PDT

CNET › Security › GhostShell claims breach of 1.6M accounts at FBI, NASA, and more

GhostShell claims breach of 1.6M accounts at FBI, NASA, and more

The hacktivist group says it obtained the records via SQL injection at government sites.

by **Casey Newton**  @CaseyNewton / December 10, 2012 3:13 PM PST / Updated: December 10, 2012 3:19 PM PST

Researchers find security holes in NYT, YouTube, ING, MetaFilter sites

Attackers could have used vulnerabilities on several Web sites to compromise people's accounts, allowing them to steal money, harvest e-mail addresses, or pose as others online.

by Elinor Mills  @elinormills / October 2, 2008 1:02 PM PDT / Updated: October 2, 2008 2:31 PM PDT

The vulnerability arises from a coding flaw that could allow someone to do a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attack in which a "malicious Web site causes a user's Web browser to perform an unwanted action on a trusted site," according to the report.

Yahoo Mail hijacking exploit selling for \$700

XSS vulnerability allows attacks to steal and replace tracking cookies, as well as read and send e-mail from a victim's account.

by Steven Musil  @stevenmusil / November 26, 2012 6:02 PM PST / Updated: November 27, 2012 3:32 PM PST

Researchers point out holes in McAfee's Web site

McAfee says it is working to fix three holes researchers found in its Web site.

by Elinor Mills  @elinormills / March 28, 2011 7:28 PM PDT

Cross Site Scripting in download.mcafee.com. "In a worst case scenario this vulnerability could allow attacks that spoof the McAfee brand by presenting a URL that looks like it directs to a McAfee Web site but in fact directs elsewhere."

Researcher finds serious Android Market bug

Google applies technical fix to bug, but Jon Oberheide says Android Market should be alerting phone owners when an app is being remotely downloaded via the Web site.

Oberheide described the XSS vulnerability as "low-hanging fruit" and said he was surprised no one had discovered it before. Such bugs are very common in Web sites.

Twitter hit by multiple variants of XSS worm

Summary: During the weekend and early Monday, at least four separate variants of the original StalkDaily.com XSS worm hit the popular micro-blogging site Twitter, automatically hijacking accounts and advertising the author's web site by posting tweets on behalf of the account holders, by exploiting cross site scripting flaws at the site.



By Dancho Danchev for Zero Day | April 14, 2009 -- 02:19 GMT (03:19 BST)

 Follow @danchodanchev

New security holes found in D-Link router

Security researcher reveals multiple Web-based security vulnerabilities in the D-Link 2760N.

by Seth Rosenblatt  @sethr / November 11, 2013 12:54 PM PST / Updated: November 12, 2013 4:54 PM PST



A new spate of vulnerabilities have been found in a D-Link router, a security researcher said Monday.

The D-Link 2760N, also known as the D-Link DSL-2760U-BN, is susceptible to **several cross-site scripting (XSS) bugs** through its Web interface, **reported ThreatPost**.

<https://owasp.org/Top10/>

The 2021 OWASP Top 10 list



A01:2021

Broken
Access Control

A02:2021

Cryptographic
Failures

A03:2021

Injection

A04:2021

Insecure Design

A05:2021

Security
Misconfiguration

A06:2021

Vulnerable
and Outdated
Components

A07:2021

Identification
and Authentication
Failures

A08:2021

Software and
Data Integrity
Failures

A09:2021

Security Logging
and Monitoring
Failures

A10:2021

Server-Side
Request Forgery

- Risks are ranked according to the frequency of discovered security defects, the severity of the uncovered vulnerabilities, and the magnitude of their potential impacts


A02 Cryptographic Failure

Insufficient Transport Layer Protection

How to steal user's credentials


- Brute force the user's password or session ID  
- Steal the user's password or session ID 

Do you trust the network?



- Threat I : an attacker **can eavesdrop** messages sent back and forth

Do you *really* trust the network?



- Threat 2 : an attacker **can tamper with** messages sent back and forth

Confidentiality and Integrity

- Threat 1 : an attacker **can eavesdrop** messages sent back and forth

Confidentiality: how do exchange information secretly?


- Threat 2 : an attacker **can tamper** messages sent back and forth

Integrity: How do we exchange information reliably?


Generic solution - HTTPS

- ✓ $\text{HTTPS} = \text{HTTP} + \text{TLS}$
- Transport Layer Security (TLS previously known as SSL) provides
 - **confidentiality:** end-to-end secure channel
 - **integrity:** authentication handshake

Generating and using (self-signed) certificates



who are you?



I am example.com

Self-signed certificates are not trusted by your browser



Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from [bitbucket.org](#) (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards).

[Hide advanced](#)

[Reload](#)

bitbucket.org normally uses encryption to protect your information. When Chrome tried to connect to bitbucket.org this time, the website sent back unusual and incorrect credentials. Either an attacker is trying to pretend to be bitbucket.org, or a Wi-Fi sign-in screen has interrupted the connection. Your information is still secure because Chrome stopped the connection before any data was exchanged.

You cannot visit bitbucket.org right now because the website [uses HSTS](#). Network errors and attacks are usually temporary, so this page will probably work later.

NET::ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID



This Connection is Untrusted

You have asked Firefox to connect securely to [www.domainname.tld](#) but we can't confirm that your connection is secure.

Normally, when you try to connect securely, sites will present trusted identification to prove that you are going to the right place. However, this site's identity can't be verified.

What Should I Do?

If you usually connect to this site without problems, this error could mean that someone is trying to impersonate the site, and you shouldn't continue.

[Get me out of here!](#)

► Technical Details

▼ I Understand the Risks

If you understand what's going on, you can tell Firefox to start trusting this site's identification. **Even if you trust the site, this error could mean that someone is tampering with your connection.**


Don't add an exception unless you know there's a good reason why this site doesn't use trusted identification.

[Add Exception...](#)




Signed Certificate


Certificate Authority (CA)



who are you?



I am example.com



Your browser trusts many CAs **by default**

Keychain Access

Click to unlock the System Roots keychain.

Keychains	Name	Kind	Expires	Keychain
login	Echoworx Root CA2	certificate	Oct 7, 2030, 1:49:13 PM	System Roots
Microsoft_Intermediate_Certificates	EE Certification Centre Root CA	certificate	Dec 18, 2030, 2:59:59 AM	System Roots
Local Items	Entrust Root Certification Authority	certificate	Nov 27, 2026, 11:53:42 PM	System Roots
System	Entrust Root Certification Authority - EC1	certificate	Dec 18, 2037, 6:55:36 PM	System Roots
System Roots	Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2	certificate	Dec 7, 2030, 8:55:54 PM	System Roots
	Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048)	certificate	Dec 24, 2019, 9:20:51 PM	System Roots
	Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048)	certificate	Jul 24, 2029, 5:15:12 PM	System Roots
	ePKI Root Certification Authority	certificate	Dec 20, 2034, 5:31:27 AM	System Roots
	Federal Common Policy CA	certificate	Dec 1, 2030, 7:45:27 PM	System Roots
Category	GeoTrust Global CA	certificate	May 21, 2022, 7:00:00 AM	System Roots
All Items	GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority	certificate	Jul 17, 2036, 2:59:59 AM	System Roots
Passwords	GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G2	certificate	Jan 19, 2038, 2:59:59 AM	System Roots
Secure Notes	GeoTrust Primary Certification Authority - G3	certificate	Dec 2, 2037, 2:59:59 AM	System Roots
My Certificates	Global Chambersign Root	certificate	Sep 30, 2037, 7:14:18 PM	System Roots
Keys	Global Chambersign Root - 2008	certificate	Jul 31, 2038, 3:31:40 PM	System Roots
Certificates	GlobalSign	certificate	Mar 18, 2029, 1:00:00 PM	System Roots
	GlobalSign	certificate	Jan 19, 2038, 6:14:07 AM	System Roots
	GlobalSign	certificate	Jan 19, 2038, 6:14:07 AM	System Roots
	GlobalSign	certificate	Dec 15, 2021, 11:00:00 AM	System Roots
	GlobalSign Root CA	certificate	Jan 28, 2028, 3:00:00 PM	System Roots
	Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority	certificate	Jun 29, 2034, 8:06:20 PM	System Roots
	Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2	certificate	Jan 1, 2038, 2:59:59 AM	System Roots
	Government Root Certification Authority	certificate	Dec 31, 2037, 6:59:59 PM	System Roots
	Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2011	certificate	Dec 1, 2031, 4:49:52 PM	System Roots
	Hongkong Post Root CA 1	certificate	May 15, 2023, 7:52:29 AM	System Roots

177 items

Real attacks

Google Security Blog

The latest news and insights from Google on security and safety on the Internet

Google Security Blog

The latest news and insights from Google on security and safety or

Enhancing digital certificate security

January 3, 2013

Posted by Adam Langley, Software Engineer

Late on December 24, Chrome detected and blocked an unauthorized digital certificate for the "`*.google.com`" domain. We investigated immediately and found the certificate was issued by an [intermediate certificate authority](#) (CA) linking back to TURKTRUST, a Turkish certificate authority. Intermediate CA certificates carry the full authority of the CA, so anyone who has one can use it to create a certificate for any website they wish to impersonate.

An update on attempted man-in-the-middle attacks

August 29, 2011

Posted by Heather Adkins, Information Security Manager

Today we received reports of attempted SSL man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks against Google users, whereby someone tried to get between them and encrypted Google services. The people affected were primarily located in Iran. The attacker used a fraudulent SSL certificate issued by DigiNotar, a root certificate authority that should not issue certificates for Google (and has since revoked it).

Google Chrome users were protected from this attack because Chrome was able to [detect](#) the fraudulent certificate.

Why and when using HTTPS?

HTTPS = HTTP + TLS

- TLS provides
 - confidentiality: end-to-end secure channel
 - integrity: authentication handshake
- HTTPS protects any data send back and forth including:
 - login and password
 - session ID
- ✓ **HTTPS everywhere**
HTTPS must be used during the entire session

Be careful of mixed content

Mixed-content happens when:

1. an HTTPS page contains elements (ajax, js, image, video, css ...) served with HTTP
 2. an HTTPS page transfers control to another HTTP page within the same domain
- authentication cookie will be sent over HTTP
- ✓ browsers provide a mix-content protection now


Secure cookie flag

- ✓ The cookie will be sent over HTTPS exclusively
- ➡ Prevents authentication cookie from leaking in case of mixed-content

Do/Don't with HTTPS

- Always use HTTPS exclusively (in production)
- Always have a valid and signed certificate (no self-signed cert)
- Always avoid using absolute URL (mixed-content)
- Always use **secure** cookie flag with authentication cookie


Limitation of HTTPS



Problem

You have **absolutely no control** on the client and the network

Client Side




Web Browser


Server Side



Web Server



Database



Beyond HTTPS - attacking the web application

Frontend Vulnerabilities

- Cross-Site Scripting
- Cross-site Request forgery

Backend Vulnerabilities


- Incomplete Mediation
- SQL injection

A01 Broken Access Control

Incomplete Mediation

The Shopping Cart Attack

The total is calculated by
a script on the client



*

order=(#2956,10,1,10)

The order is generated
based on the request

amazon.com



Thank you for your order!

Client Trusted Domain

Server Trusted
Domain

The backend is the **only trusted domain**

- Data coming from the frontend cannot be trusted
- ✓ Sensitive operations must be done on the backend

A03 Injection

SQL Injection

Problem

- An attacker can inject SQL/NoSQL code
 - Retrieve, add, modify, delete information
 - Bypass authentication

Checking password

signin.html

Login

Username:

Password:


Remember me

Login »

/signin/

name=Alice&pwd=pass4alice

Access Granted!



SQL Injection

```
db.run("SELECT * FROM users  
WHERE USERNAME = ' " + username + "'  
AND PASSWORD = ' " + password + "'")
```

username: alice

password: paslice

blah' OR '1'='1

NoSQL Injection

```
db.find( { username: username,  
          password: password } );
```


username: alice
password: paslice

{gt: " "}


A03 Injection

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Cross-Site Scripting Attack (XSS attack)




XSS Attack = Javascript Code Injection



Problem

- An attacker can inject **arbitrary javascript code** in the page that will be executed by the browser
- **Inject illegitimate content** in the page
(same as content spoofing)
- **Perform illegitimate HTTP requests** through Ajax
(same as a CSRF attack)
- **Steal Session ID** from the cookie
- **Steal user's login/password** by modifying the page to forge a perfect scam



Forging a perfect scam



GET /?videoid=527

<html ...

comment = "<script> ...



GET /?videoid=527

<html ...

login=Alice&password=123456



The script contained in the comments
modifies the page to look like the login page!

* Notice that YouTube is **not** vulnerable to this attack

It gets worst - XSS Worms

Spread on social networks

- Samy targeting MySpace (2005)
- JTV.worm targeting Justin.tv (2008)
- Twitter worm targeting Twitter (2010)

Variations on XSS attacks

- **Reflected XSS**

Malicious data sent to the backend are immediately sent back to the frontend to be inserted into the DOM

- **Stored XSS**

Malicious data sent to the backend are stored in the database and later-on sent back to the frontend to be inserted into the DOM

- **DOM-based attack**

Malicious data are manipulated in the frontend (javascript) and inserted into the DOM

Solution

- ✓ Data inserted in the DOM must be validated

HttpOnly cookie flag

- ✓ The cookie is not readable/writable from the frontend
- ➡ Prevents the authentication cookie from being leaked when an XSS attack (cross-site scripting) occurs



A05 Security Misconfiguration

Cross-Site Request Forgery

Ajax requests across domains

The browser does not allow js code from domain A to access resources from B

→ Only HTTP response is blocked



http://B.com



http://A.com



Same origin policy

→ **Resources must come from the same domain
(protocol, host, port)**

Elements under control of the same-origin policy

- Ajax requests
- Form actions

Elements **not** under control of the same-origin policy

- Javascript scripts
- CSS
- Images, video, sound
- Plugins

Examples

	client	server
same protocol, port and host	<code>http://example.com</code>	<code>http://example.com</code>
top-level domain	<code>http://example.com</code>	<code>http://example.org</code>
host	<code>http://example.com</code>	<code>http://other.com</code>
sub-host	<code>http://www.example.com</code>	<code>http://example.com</code>
sub-host	<code>http://example.com</code>	<code>http://www.example.com</code>
port	<code>http://example.com:3000</code>	<code>http://example.com</code>
protocol	<code>http://example.com</code>	<code>https://example.com</code>

[digression] relaxing the same-origin policy


- Switch to the superdomain with javascript
`www.example.com` can be relaxed to `example.com`
- iframe
- JSONP
- Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS)

Problem

- An attacker can executes unwanted but yet authenticated actions on a web application by either
 - setting up a malicious website with cross-origin requests
 - or by injecting malicious urls into the page

Generic solution - CSRF tokens

- ✓ Protect legitimate requests with a CSRF token




SameSite cookie flag

- ✓ The cookie will not be sent over cross-site requests
- ➡ Prevents forwarding the authentication cookie over cross-origin requests (cross-site request forgery)

Conclusion


You have **absolutely no control** on the client

Client Side



Web Browser

Server Side



Web Server

Database

References

- OWASP Top 10
<https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>
- Mozilla Secure Coding Guideline
https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebAppSec/Secure_Coding_Guidelines
- Node Express - Production Best Practices: Security
<https://expressjs.com/en/advanced/best-practice-security.html>