Another example - xterm

xterm Provides a terminal window in X-windows - used to run with setuid root privileges

- Requires kernel pseudo-terminal (pty) device
- Required root privileges to change ownership of pty to user
- Also writes protected utmp/wtmp files to record users

Had feature to log terminal session to file

```
if (access (logfile, W_OK) < 0)
  return ERROR;

fd = open (logfile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC, 0666);
/* ... */</pre>
```

- → xterm is root, but should not log to file user cannot write
- √ access call does permission check with real, not effective UID
- but another TOCTOU bug

Another TOCTOU attack

xterm	Attacker
200000 (" /+ /3")	creat ("/tmp/log")
access ("/tmp/log") → OK	unlink ("/tmp/log")
open ("/tmp/log")	symlink ("/tmp/log" → "/etc/passwd")

Attacker changes / tmp/log between check and use

- → xterm unwittingly overwrites /etc/passwd
- OpenBSD man page "CAVEATS : access() is a potential security hole and should never be used."