

Security of DES - DES Challenges (brute force contests)

1998 *Deep Crack*, the EFF's DES cracking machine used 1,856 custom chips

- Speed : matter of days
- Cost : \$250,000

2006 *COPACOBANA*, the Cost-optimized Parallel CodeBreaker used 120 FPGAs

- Speed : less than 24h
- Cost : \$10,000

How about 2DES ?

$$2DES_{k_1, k_2}(m) = E_{k_2}(E_{k_1}(m))$$

Meet-in-the-middle attack - known-plaintext attack

1. Brute force $E_{k_1}(m)$ and save results in a table called TE (2^{56} entries)
2. Brute force $D_{k_2}(c)$ and save results in a table called TD (2^{56} entries)
3. Match the two tables together to get the key candidates
 - ➡ The more plaintext you know, the lesser key candidates
 - ➡ Effective key-length (entropy) is **57 bits**
 - ➡ This attacks applies to every encryption algorithm used as such