Security of DES -
DES Challenges (brute force contests)

1998 *Deep Crack,* the EFF's DES cracking machine used 1,856 custom chips

- Speed : matter of days
- Cost : $250,000

2006 *COPACOBANA, the* COst-optimized Parallel COdeBreaker used 120 FPGAs

- Speed : less than 24h
- Cost : $10,000

How about 2DES ?

$$2DES_{k1,k2}(m) = E_{k2}(E_{k1}(m))$$

Meet-in-the-middle attack - known-plaintext attack

1. Brute force $E_{k1}(m)$ and save results in a table called TE (2^{56} entries)

2. Brute force $D_{k2}(c)$ and save results in a table called TD (2^{56} entries)

3. Match the two tables together to get the key candidates

➡ The more plaintext you know, the lesser key candidates

➡ Effective key-length (entropy) is **57 bits**

➡ This attacks applies to every encryption algorithm used as such