

# Web Security

Thierry Sans

|99|

Sir Tim Berners-Lee



← → C ⌂ info.cern.ch/hypertext/WWW/TheProject.html ☆

## World Wide Web

The WorldWideWeb (W3) is a wide-area [hypermedia](#) information retrieval initiative aiming to give universal access to a large universe of documents.

Everything there is online about W3 is linked directly or indirectly to this document, including an [executive summary](#) of the project, [Mailing lists](#) , [Policy](#) , November's [W3 news](#) , [Frequently Asked Questions](#) .

[What's out there?](#) Pointers to the world's online information, [subjects](#) , [W3 servers](#), etc.

[Help](#) on the browser you are using

[Software Products](#) A list of W3 project components and their current state. (e.g. [Line Mode](#) ,[X11 Viola](#) ,[NeXTStep](#) ,[Servers](#) ,[Tools](#) ,[Mail robot](#) ,[Library](#) )

[Technical](#) Details of protocols, formats, program internals etc

[Bibliography](#) Paper documentation on W3 and references.

[People](#) A list of some people involved in the project.

[History](#) A summary of the history of the project.

[How can I help ?](#) If you would like to support the web..

[Getting code](#) Getting the code by [anonymous FTP](#) , etc.

2014

Web Portals



Accounting and Billing



E-Learning



Publishing




E-Health



Content Management



Collaboration



Social Networks




The Big Picture

# The web architecture

Client Side

Server Side



# Securing the web architecture means securing ...

- The network
- The DNS (Domain Name System)
- The web server operating system
- The web server application (*Apache* for instance)
- The database application (*Oracle* for instance)
- The web application



Our focus here!

# What is a web application?

program running  
on the browser

+

program running  
on the server



# Anatomy of a web application

# The HTTP protocol

Network protocol for requesting/receiving data on the Web

- Standard TCP protocol on **port 80** (by default)
- **URI/URL** specifies what resource is being accessed
- Different **request methods**


# Let's look at what a web server does

telnet to a web server

```
> telnet whitehat.local 80  
GET /
```

enter HTTP requests

# Anatomy of a URL



# Authentication and Authorization

## ✓ Authentication

- Who are the authorized users?

## ✓ Authorization

- Who can access what and how?

# The simple recipe for user authentication

1. **Ask the user for a login and password** and send it to the server (HTTP/POST request)
2. **Verify the login/password** based on information stored on the server (usually in the database)
3. **Start a session** once the user has been authenticated
4. **Grant access to resources** according to the session

# The concept of session


There is a **session id** (aka token)  
between the browser and the web application

This session id should be **unique** and **unforgeable**  
(usually a long random number or a hash)

→ Stored in the cookie

The session id is bind to **key/value pairs data**

→ Stored on the server




A screenshot of the Firebug developer toolbar, specifically the Cookies panel. The panel has a header with tabs: Console, HTML, CSS, Script, DOM, Net, and Cookies (which is currently selected). Below the header is a toolbar with icons for Cookies, Filter, Default (Accept session cookies), and Tools. The main area is a table with columns: Name, Value, Domain, Size, and Path. There is one row visible in the table:

Name	Value	Domain	Size	Path
sessionid	64313939a9cbde9589fd13ce13a01ff6	localhost	41 B	/

# The big picture

**Session** : key/value pairs stored on the server



The user can **create, modify, delete** the session ID in the cookie

But **cannot access** the key/value pairs stored on the server


# Insufficient Transport Layer Protection

a.k.a the need for HTTPs

# How to steal user's credentials


- Brute force the user's password or session ID  
- Steal the user's password or session ID 

# Do you trust the network?



- Threat I : an attacker **can eavesdrop** messages sent back and forth

# Do you *really* trust the network?



- Threat 2 : an attacker **can tamper with** messages sent back and forth

# Confidentiality and Integrity

- Threat 1 : an attacker **can eavesdrop** messages sent back and forth

**Confidentiality:** how do exchange information secretly?

- Threat 2 : an attacker **can tamper** messages sent back and forth

**Integrity:** How do we exchange information reliably?

# Why and when using HTTPS?

## **HTTPS = HTTP + TLS**

- TLS provides
  - confidentiality: end-to-end secure channel
  - integrity: authentication handshake
- HTTPS protects any data send back and forth including:
  - login and password
  - session ID
- ✓ **HTTPS everywhere**  
HTTPS must be used during the entire session

# Be careful of mixed content

**Mixed-content** happens when:

1. an HTTPS page contains elements (ajax, js, image, video, css ...) served with HTTP
2. an HTTPS page transfers control to another HTTP page within the same domain
  - ◉ authentication cookie will be sent over HTTP
  - ◉ Modern browsers block (or warn of) mixed-content


# Secure cookie flag

- ✓ The cookie will be sent over HTTPS exclusively
- ➡ Prevents authentication cookie from leaking in case of mixed-content


# Do/Don't with HTTPS

- Always use HTTPS exclusively (in production)
- Always have a valid and signed certificate (no self-signed cert)
- Always avoid using absolute URL (mixed-content)
- Always use **secure** cookie flag with authentication cookie

# Limitation of HTTPS




# Stealing passwords from the client



- Social engineering - Phishing
- Keyloggers (keystroke logging)
- Data mining (emails, logs)
- Hack the client's code

# Stealing passwords from the server

- Hack the server
- Hack the server's side code



# Beyond HTTPS - attacking the web application

## Frontend Vulnerabilities

- Content Spoofing
- **Cross-Site Scripting**
- **Cross-site Request forgery**

## Backend Vulnerabilities

- **Incomplete mediation**
- Information leakage
- **SQL injection**

# Backend Vulnerability

## Information Leakage

# Information Leakage

“AT&T Inc. apologized to Apple Inc. iPad 3G tablet computer users whose **e-mail addresses were exposed during a security breach** disclosed last week.”

source *Business Week* - June 14 2010

“There’s no hack, no infiltration, and no breach, **just a really poorly designed web application** that returns e-mail address when ICCID is passed to it.”


source *Praetorian Prefect* - June 9 2010

# Backend Vulnerability

## Incomplete Mediation

# Incomplete Mediation - The Shopping Cart Attack

The total is calculated by a script on the client



\*  
order=(#2956,10,1,10)

The order is generated based on the request

amazon.com



Thank you for your order!

Client Trusted Domain

Server Trusted Domain

\* Notice that Amazon is **not** vulnerable to this attack

# The backend is the **only trusted domain**

- Data coming from the frontend cannot be trusted
- ✓ Sensitive operations must be done on the backend

# Backend Vulnerability

## SQL Injection

# Problem

- An attacker can inject SQL/NoSQL code
  - Retrieve, add, modify, delete information
  - Bypass authentication

# Checking password

signin.html

Login

Username:

Password:


Remember me

Login »

/signin/

*name=Alice&pwd=pass4alice*

Access Granted!



# Bypassing password check

```
db.run("SELECT * FROM users  
WHERE USERNAME = ' " + username + "'  
    AND PASSWORD = ' " + password + " '"")
```

username: alice  
password: paslice

blah' OR '1'='1

# NoSQL Injection

```
db.find( { username: username,  
          password: password } );
```

username: alice  
password: paslice

{gt: " "}

# Frontend Vulnerability

## Content Spoofing



# Content Spoofing



GET /?videoid=527


<html ...

comment = "<a href='myad.com'>Fun stuff ...



GET /?videoid=527

<html ...



The page contains the attacker's ad.

\* Notice that YouTube is **not** vulnerable to this attack

# Problem

- An attacker can inject HTML tags in the page
  - Add illegitimate content to the webpage  
(ads most of the time)


# Generic Solution

- ✓ Data inserted in the DOM must be validated


# Frontend Vulnerability

## Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

# Cross-Site Scripting Attack (XSS attack)




# XSS Attack = Javascript Code Injection






# Problem

- An attacker can inject **arbitrary javascript code** in the page that will be executed by the browser
- **Inject illegitimate content** in the page  
(same as content spoofing)
- **Perform illegitimate HTTP requests** through Ajax  
(same as a CSRF attack)
- **Steal Session ID** from the cookie
- **Steal user's login/password** by modifying the page to forge a perfect scam

# Forging a perfect scam



GET /?videoid=527



GET /?videoid=527




The script contained in the comments  
modifies the page to look like the login page!

\* Notice that YouTube is **not** vulnerable to this attack

# It gets worst - XSS Worms

Spread on social networks

- Samy targeting MySpace (2005)
- JTV.worm targeting Justin.tv (2008)
- Twitter worm targeting Twitter (2010)



XSS attacks are widespread

# Variations on XSS attacks

- **Reflected XSS**

Malicious data sent to the backend are immediately sent back to the frontend to be inserted into the DOM

- **Stored XSS**

Malicious data sent to the backend are stored in the database and later-on sent back to the frontend to be inserted into the DOM

- **DOM-based attack**

Malicious data are manipulated in the frontend (javascript) and inserted into the DOM

# Solution

- ✓ Data inserted in the DOM must be validated

# HttpOnly cookie flag



- ✓ The cookie is not readable/writable from the frontend
- ➡ Prevents the authentication cookie from being leaked when an XSS attack (cross-site scripting) occurs

# Cross-Site Request Forgery

# Ajax requests across domains

The browser does not allow js code from domain A to access resources from B

→ Only HTTP response is blocked



http://B.com



http://A.com

# Same origin policy

→ **Resources must come from the same domain  
(protocol, host, port)**

Elements under control of the same-origin policy

- Ajax requests
- Form actions

Elements **not** under control of the same-origin policy

- Javascript scripts
- CSS
- Images, video, sound
- Plugins

# Examples

	client	server
same protocol, port and host	<code>http://example.com</code>	<code>http://example.com</code>
top-level domain	<code>http://example.com</code>	<code>http://example.org</code>
host	<code>http://example.com</code>	<code>http://other.com</code>
sub-host	<code>http://www.example.com</code>	<code>http://example.com</code>
sub-host	<code>http://example.com</code>	<code>http://www.example.com</code>
port	<code>http://example.com:3000</code>	<code>http://example.com</code>
protocol	<code>http://example.com</code>	<code>https://example.com</code>

## [digression] relaxing the same-origin policy


- Switch to the superdomain with javascript  
`www.example.com` can be relaxed to `example.com`
- iframe
- JSONP
- Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS)

# Problem

- An attacker can execute unwanted but yet authenticated actions on a web application by setting up a malicious website with cross-origin requests

# Generic solution - CSRF tokens

- ✓ Protect legitimate requests with a CSRF token




# SameSite cookie flag

- ✓ The cookie will not be sent over cross-site requests
- ➡ Prevents forwarding the authentication cookie over cross-origin requests (cross-site request forgery)

# Conclusion


You have **absolutely no control** on the client

Client Side



Web Browser

Server Side



Web Server

Database

# References

- OWASP Top 10  
<https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>
- Mozilla Secure Coding Guideline  
[https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebAppSec/Secure\\_Coding\\_Guidelines](https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebAppSec/Secure_Coding_Guidelines)