Protection

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Why code written in assembly code or C are subject to memory corruption attacks?

- ➡ Because C has primitives to manipulate the memory directly (pointers ect ...)

Choosing a better programming language

Some languages are type-safe (i.e memory safe)

- Pure Rust, Lisp, pure Java, ADA, ML …

Some languages isolate potentially unsafe code

- Modula-3, Java with native methods, C# …

Some languages are hopeless

- Assembly, C, C++ …

Type-Safe Programs

➡ Cannot access arbitrary memory addresses

➡ Cannot corrupt their own memory

✓ Do not crash

So why are we still using unsafe programming languages?

If other programming languages are “memory safe”, why are we not using them instead?

➡ Because C and assembly code are used when a program requires high performances (audio, vide, calculus …)
or when dealing with hardware directly (OS, drivers ….)

How to write better programs with unsafe programming languages?

- Defensive Programming
- Penetration testing
- Formal testing
- Formal development

How to run programs written with unsafe programming languages?

- Fortify Source Functions
- Stack Canaries
- DEP/NX - Non Executable Stack
- ASLR - Address Space Layout Randomization
- PIC/PIE - Position Independent Executables

How to run programs written with unsafe programming languages?

Fortify Source Functions

➡ GCC macro FORTIFY_SOURCE provides buffer overflow checks for unsafe C libraries

`memcpy, mempcpy, memmove, memset, strcpy, stpcpy, strncpy, strcat, strncat, sprintf, vsprintf, snprintf, vsnprintf, gets`

Checks are performed

- some at compile time (compiler warnings)
- other at run time (code dynamically added to binary)

Canaries

- The compiler modifies every function's prologue and epilogue regions to place and check a value (a.k.a a canary) on the stack
- When a buffer overflows, the canary is overwritten. The programs detects it before the function returns and an exception is raised
- Different types:
  - random canaries
  - xor canaries
- Disabling Canary protection on Linux
  `$ gcc ... -fno-stack-protector`
- Bypassing canary protection : *Structured Exception Handling (SEH)* exploit overwrite the existing exception handler structure in the stack to point to your own code

DEP/NX - Non Executable Stack

- The program marks important structures in memory as non-executable
- The program generates an hardware-level exception if you try to execute those memory regions
- This makes normal stack buffer overflows where you set `eip` to `esp+offset` and immediately run your shellcode impossible

- Disabling NX protection on Linux
  `$ gcc ...-z execstack`

- Bypassing NX protection :
  - *Return-to-lib-c*
    return to a subroutine of the lib C that is already present in the process' executable memory
  - *Return-Oriented-Programming (ROP)*
    use instruction pieces of the existing program (called "gadgets") and chain them together to weave the exploit

ASLR - Address Space Layout Randomization

- The OS randomize the location (random offset) of the stack, the heap and the standard libraries

- Harder for the attacker to guess buffer addresses and the address of a lib-c subroutine

- Disabling ASLR protection on Linux
  `$ sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space=0`

- Bypassing ASLR protection :
  - Brute-force attack to guess the ASLR offset
  - Get the offset with targeted data leak

PIC/PIE - Position Independent Code/Executables

- **Without PIC/PIE**
  library or code is compiled with absolute addresses and must be loaded at a specific location to function correctly

- **With PIC/PIE**
  library or code is compiled with relative addressing that are resolved dynamically when executed by calling a function to obtain the return value on stack

- Disabling PIE protection on Linux
  `$ gcc ...-z -no-pie`

➡ Works complementarily of the ASLR

Confined execution environment - Sandbox

A sandbox is tightly-controlled set of resources for untrusted programs to run in

➡ Sandboxing servers - virtual machines

➡ Sandboxing programs

- Chroot and AppArmor in Linux
- Sandbox in MacOS Lion
- Metro App Sandboxing in Windows 8

➡ Sandboxing applets - Java and Flash in web browsers

Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems

- Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
- Host-based Intrusion Prevention systems (IPS)

✓ Based on signatures (well known programs)

✓ Based on behaviors (unknown programs)

➡ Example : Syslog and Systrace on Linux

◉ Vulnerable to malicious programs residing in the kernel called "rootkits"

How to write better programs with unsafe programming languages?

Defensive programming (1)
Adopting good programming practices

Modularity

➡ Have separate modules for separate functionalities

✓ Easier to find security flaws when components are independent

Encapsulation

➡ Limit the interaction between the components

✓ Avoid wrong usage of the components

Information hiding

➡ Hide the implementation

◉ Black box model does not improve security

Defensive programming (2)
Being security aware programmer

- ✓ Check the inputs, even between components that belongs to the same application (mutual suspicion)
- ✓ Be "fault tolerant" by having a consistent policy to handle failure (managing exceptions)
- ✓ Reuse known and widely used code by using design patterns and existing libraries

Penetration Testing

Testing the functionalities

✓ Unit test, Integration test, Performance test and so on …

Testing the security

✓ Penetration tests

➡ Try to make the software fail by pushing the limits of a "normal" usage i.e test what the program is not supposed to do

Vulnerability Detection

- **Static analysis (SAST)**
  Analyze source or binary without running it

- **Fuzzing**
  Automatically input generation to crash/trigger bugs

- **AI** (newest trend)
  Uses LLM to understand code behavior and identify vulnerabilities
  Aardvark (OpenAI) and Big Sleep (Google)

Using formal methods to verify a program

Static analysis - analyzing the code to detect security flaws

- Control flow - analyzing the sequence of instructions
- Data flow - analyzing how the date are accessed
- Data structure - analyzing how data are organized

➡ Abstract interpretation [Cousot]

✓ Verification of critical embedded software in Airbus aircrafts

Using formal methods to generate a program

Mathematical description of the problem

Refinement steps

Proof of correctness

Executable code
or hardware design

Examples

Hardware design (VHDL, Verilog)

- ✓ Used by semi-conductor companies such as Intel

Critical embedded software (B/Z, Lustre/Esterel)

- ✓ Urban Transportation
  (METEOR Metro Line 14 in Paris by Alstom)
- ✓ Rail transportation (Eurostar)
- ✓ Aeronautic (Airbus, Eurocopter, Dassault)
- ✓ Nuclear plants (Schneider Electric)

Pros and cons of using formal methods

- ✓ Nothing better than a mathematical proof
- ➡ A code "proven safe" is safe

- ◉ Development is time and effort (and so money) consuming
- ➡ Should be motivated by the risk analysis

- ◉ Do not prevent from specification bugs
- ➡ Example of network protocols