

Task 1 : Set Up the example.edu Domain

Task 1a : Generate keys

Creating the ZSK and the KSK for example.edu

```
[03/27/25] seed@VM:~/.../edu.example$ ll
total 24
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 488 Jul 19 2022 example.edu.db
-rw-r--r-- 1 seed seed 431 Mar 27 15:09 Kexample.edu.+008+15358.key
-rw----- 1 seed seed 1012 Mar 27 15:09 Kexample.edu.+008+15358.private
-rw-r--r-- 1 seed seed 605 Mar 27 15:09 Kexample.edu.+008+33034.key
-rw----- 1 seed seed 1776 Mar 27 15:09 Kexample.edu.+008+33034.private
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 86 Jul 18 2022 named.conf.seedlabs
```

Created a signed zone file using the example.edu.db nameserver

```
[03/27/25] seed@VM:~/.../edu.example$ dnssec-signzone -S -o example
.edu example.edu.db
Fetching example.edu/RSASHA256/15358 (ZSK) from key repository.
Fetching example.edu/RSASHA256/33034 (KSK) from key repository.
Verifying the zone using the following algorithms:
- RSASHA256
Zone fully signed:
Algorithm: RSASHA256: KSKs: 1 active, 0 stand-by, 0 revoked
                           ZSKs: 1 active, 0 stand-by, 0 revoked
example.edu.db.signed
[03/27/25] seed@VM:~/.../edu.example$ ll
total 36
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 96 Mar 27 15:11 dsset-example.edu.
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 488 Jul 19 2022 example.edu.db
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 5790 Mar 27 15:11 example.edu.db.signed
```

Task 1b : Sign example.edu domain's zone file

The original zone file simple contained mappings for hostnames to ip addresses.

```
; Records for this nameserver (you need to make changes)
@           IN   NS   ns.example.edu.
ns.example.edu. IN   A   10.9.0.65

; IP addresses for the hostnames in the example.edu domain
@           IN   A   1.2.3.5
www         IN   A   1.2.3.5
xyz         IN   A   1.2.3.6
*           IN   A   1.2.3.7
```

After signing the zone file, we now have DNSkeys and the RRSIGs made with said keys. This can be used to ensure that the data has not been tampered with. Below is the beginning of the signed DNS zone file.

```
; File written on Thu Mar 27 15:11:32 2025
; dnssec_signzone version 9.18.30-0ubuntu0.20.04.2-Ubuntu
example.edu.          259200  IN SOA  ns.example.edu. admin.example.edu. (
                           2008111001 ; serial
                           28800      ; refresh (8 hours)
                           7200       ; retry (2 hours)
                          2419200    ; expire (4 weeks)
                           86400      ; minimum (1 day)
)
259200  RRSIG   SOA 8 2 259200 (
                           20250426181132 20250327181132 15358 example.edu.
                           FM5sgt2n5S1os0GlNtR/AGI9QDvrMI47o6ER
                           LMtyTzs00D/mkLbnBukrCDH91y7Q9tcLJb7R
                           dhw39jEqhqTJtxAJQi37/M/PqK00JMoDvrt1
                           zPrRvaAmPWFIKh/Mwhmg2sqBH1bVJ7TxMgCZ
                           JqIZKXucr2JZ4T8N4x2Yeil+76U= )
259200  NS      ns.example.edu.
259200  RRSIG   NS 8 2 259200 (
                           20250426181132 20250327181132 15358 example.edu.
                           WMOEXSyub/+RzK4EEIfKSv5aNS9AEzjqqqBY
                           9EnfeFQ/w/C3S50vTtSNf3DIiQ5E9buJyWtg
                           D0EXfdmaX0BF5Z2ePsHqo8z6X7DBPwqNN5kR
                           rAHJ+/0M3VW5N5ChDTT7ggEM9HcqTRI4UuIm
                           kGvot089G3+SV7GfJrTkLCKgwBo= )
259200  A       1.2.3.5
259200  RRSTG   A 8 2 259200 (
```

DNS config file modified to use the newly signed zone file

```
[03/27/25] seed@VM:~/.../edu.example$ cat named.conf.seedlabs
zone "example.edu" {
    type master;
    file "/etc/bind/example.edu.db.signed";
};
```

Task 1c : Testing

Looking for the public DNS keys and RRSIG for the various servers in our containers. I outputted the results into files for easier access and readability.

```
/DNSSEC-lab$ dig @10.9.0.65 example.edu DNSKEY +dnssec | cat > example.DNS.results
```

```
$ dig @10.9.0.65 example.edu DNSKEY +dnssec
```

For the command [dig @10.9.0.65 example.edu DNSKEY +dnssec] it brought up the ZSK (zone signing key) and the KSK (key signing key) used by DNSSEC to verify the integrity of the DNSSEC records.

```
; ; ANSWER SECTION:
example.edu. 259200 IN DNSKEY256 3 8 AwEAAcTnFPcedTPoq72
Ily8ASzpS5bgwNZMSiupYG0kd0DKQRXpUwRM2 q30b+7eLT40dGW1Hv3EMJkh9IhUloOgnS1Q
LJZz/wIT5RWkkrecBHG1q aKJidT6GQ5e5rf7DnQFV0YMH6K07ScPbbnBEsIwQuU/1XI/HMmY
A8xNC FiWBZegl
example.edu. 259200 IN DNSKEY257 3 8 AwEAAaDXuXB5YhEBh42
zxpVdQLjagAFvkPXZuH9pqZwtotq91E2UXXbf z99TuldhTnKSAGxPAVCckUeyALf60txiQz8
ELHNobEqX9GBNRp6uTP8b +670Z1/sOT0tWQWlUAHH/LC3JYjYc2j42FwgP8mjg4RMcRlxJp
ZE1qJ cgCWvHou/pGq01E4Hj097W50TdXnRdKQygQsWyzAkhN0IaGzKHhz0DzR 0R8U43RXdr
eDrac1S9AjmatAumTfDR4sPHR280c+9kx9rPY8CA1NmdK hIstvo0h3bv6S11v0HtxHU6fM7
OK3z836aYEExw9z361DRbERpkU5iVb1 FdY1z8bBrTM=
```

Taking a closer look, the first entry has DNSKEY256, which is the zone signed key. The long string is the public key that can be used to authenticate entries. The second entry, DNSKEY257, is the key signing key.

```
example.edu. 259200 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 8 2 259200 202504261
81132 20250327181132 15358 example.edu. V5EEFqW4Ae0UHYdMLvDIkHfCvdbOPCzauxIwBotv12nCdFzr0n1nbWaD IZ6aFDyrdjLFJ7yISHr2sB8emp0Hc8BVZAesh2vFZBbY3Wj0d
ZAHsL2h DpZ/hNdIq35yTlJhibJDKoDpGDlcilVj1Mir309v5QYuuplvqL5KRiB P0o=
example.edu. 259200 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 8 2 259200 202504261
81132 20250327181132 33034 example.edu. XTPeegWnAxlurP8f3pnUddNghGGBonDM0
aG10+ecnT/1sA6xJhzo5rX0 obdI4PKp9swPz/JmQn5VwYIe9D3ERr3XysY6NdmzxD2UHfCzi
knC6DIT lAZjdqp4JxIwFE11NKxBox1im7VP09P02f51GJKVFRQn19tHI/gI7nZ9 pZ3VSjZD
wqBjCb1Zmato3zwoyjLDtmDJP9f7ArLhk3pF7s5/oH4NNUtF 9U3rsTHBr7E7hZ+musTgC3dSpVs
+pVs+nJvetfoAKYcRKtU19MgMfis33Fk HERVSm5Qmg8KGPsSdTybzcGwnLEk25idDPRgC8IV
Whvef3mJ98CCwvos nZBXsw==
```

This second part of the results show two RRSIGs, the signatures made from signing the two keys (known as an RRset). This specific record shows that we signed the RRset with both the ZSK and the KSK. However, in the RRSIGs it actually shows the Key ID used to sign. This Key ID is a hash of the DNSKEY itself. I didn't feel like doing that so it's a good thing the signed zoned file has the computed value already. If we take a look there and compare we find that the first RRSIG entry was signed with the ZSK key while the second was signed with the KSK. The purple is the RRSIG while the dark green is the DNSKey entry in the signed zone file.

```
81132 20250327181132 33034 example.edu. >
) ; KSK; alg = RSASHA256 ; key id = 33034
81132 20250327181132 15358 example.edu.
) ; ZSK; alg = RSASHA256 ; key id = 15358
```

```
$ dig @10.9.0.65 example.edu NS +dnssec
```

With this we get the DNSSEC record of the NS (name server). As shown below, this command returns the NS record and the A record (ip address) as an additional record. Since these are RRSIGs, that means they need to be signed by a DNSKEY, the format is the same as the earlier RRSIGs and so we can see that these signatures are signed using the ZSK (key 15358), which

makes sense. The ZSK is the weaker of the two keys and gets rotated out frequently for security purposes. The KSK is usually stronger and really only used to authenticate the ZSK. This is because PKI (public key infrastructure) is - relatively - computationally expensive.

```
; ; ANSWER SECTION:
example.edu.          259200  IN      NS      ns.example.edu.
example.edu.          259200  IN      RRSIG    NS 2 259200 20250426181
132 20250327181132 15358 example.edu. WM0EXSyub/+RzK4EEIfKSv5aNS9AEzjqqqB
Y9EnfeFQ/w/C3S50vTtSN f3DIiQ5E9buJyWtgDOEXfdmaX0BF5Z2ePsHqo8z6X7DBPwqNN5k
RrAHJ +/0M3VW5N5ChDTT7ggEM9HcqTRI4UuImkGvot089G3+SV7GfJrTkLCKg wBo=
; ; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns.example.edu.       259200  IN      A       10.9.0.65
ns.example.edu.       259200  IN      RRSIG    A 8 3 259200 202504261811
32 20250327181132 15358 example.edu. C4eSdwPyeTTVeKhmL6hxgF6VK7m0UaGRbfJ
fUNQBLP3snqv00ozK/wT LD MYPrzXnbyT9p0xHQ5znzY4q5lA0q9W0izWR15THx8ZEX8bSPLA
eXHG mrsck3X8GTS0ntTrPJo70LWiuFLiGyyB+2+muw2jjHxRtwDfrHmz6BA LYo=
```

```
$ dig @10.9.0.65 www.example.edu A +dnssec
```

This command retrieves the A record for this address. Again, the DNSSEC RRSIG is signed with the ZSK.

```
; ; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.edu.      259200  IN      A       1.2.3.5
www.example.edu.      259200  IN      RRSIG    A 8 3 259200 202504261811
32 20250327181132 15358 example.edu. NKGMr1xAVONxyFUXgt9kNzoPQxyK1jhfhnb
p+qta1cbPtn2/Qxpwpyn pZkWNXcvY7oMQR9VrqCW4HLpUwNvytuqp6UaJ2MJ+99hEJMNHlAk
Qf5e bYU2G+X5qmlrLoQk2vNX6qhyq0VkJRKlcB30z4HBsa2ll8AhRhH09BeK Gms=
```

By using only the ZSK to sign zone records, we minimize the exposure of the KSK, which is far more important than the ZSK. The private key pairs for both are these however, should always be stored in a secure location.

```
[04/09/25] seed@VM:~/.../edu.example$ ll
total 36
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed  96 Mar 27 15:11 dsset-example.edu.
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 488 Jul 19 2022 example.edu.db
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 5790 Mar 27 15:11 example.edu.db.signed
-rw-r--r-- 1 seed seed 431 Mar 27 15:09 Kexample.edu.+008+15358.key
-rw----- 1 seed seed 1012 Mar 27 15:09 Kexample.edu.+008+15358.private
-rw-r--r-- 1 seed seed 605 Mar 27 15:09 Kexample.edu.+008+33034.key
-rw----- 1 seed seed 1776 Mar 27 15:09 Kexample.edu.+008+33034.private
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed   93 Mar 27 15:18 named.conf.seedlabs
```

Currently the key pairs live in the same directory as the signed zone file.

Task 2 : Set up the edu server

Task 2a : Find and add the DS record

Retrieving the DS record, which is stored in the same directory as the signed zone file.

```
[04/09/25] seed@VM:~/.../edu.example$ cat dsset-example.edu.  
example.edu. IN DS 33034 8 2 BACEF2F6890E2FF5C4FB8C1
```

KeyID 33034 indicates that this DS (Delegation Signer) was itself signed by the KSK. The truncated string at the end is the signature to verify the record.

Task 2b : Set up the edu server

This task wants me to add the DS record to the signed zone file. Because this modifies the content of the zone's files, re-signing the zone file is required to maintain validity and functionality..

I did use the [dnssec-dsfromkey] command to see if the current DS record was made correctly. Which they did, as can be seen here.

```
[04/09/25] seed@VM:~/.../edu.example$ cat dsset-example.edu.  
example.edu. IN DS 33034 8 2 BACEF2F6890E2FF5C4FB8C724D42BB9BFF6708A7CE8CEBD60175  
60E8 E649CCD3  
[04/09/25] seed@VM:~/.../edu.example$ dnssec-dsfromkey Kexample.edu.+008+33034.key  
example.edu. IN DS 33034 8 2 BACEF2F6890E2FF5C4FB8C724D42BB9BFF6708A7CE8CEBD6017560E8E649CCD  
3
```

I then attached it to the signed zone file. By using the \$INCLUDE line, we don't have to worry about copying the actual values. Especially good since a robust DNSSEC policy requires keys to be rotated periodically.

The \$INCLUDE must be at the bottom of the file so as to not confuse the RRset for this zone file.

```
[04/09/25] seed@VM:~/.../edu$ cat edu.db  
$TTL 3600  
@ IN SOA ns1.edu. admin.ns1.edu. /  
example.edu. IN NS ns.example.edu.  
ns.example.edu. IN A 10.9.0.65  
  
$INCLUDE ../edu.example/dsset-example.edu.
```

Creating the keys for [edu.db]. At first I had named the keys wrong, using edu.db instead of edu.

```
-rw-r--r-- 1 seed seed 589 Apr  9 05:17 Kedu.+008+12526.key  
-rw----- 1 seed seed 1776 Apr  9 05:17 Kedu.+008+12526.private  
-rw-r--r-- 1 seed seed 415 Apr  9 05:17 Kedu.+008+23029.key  
-rw----- 1 seed seed 1012 Apr  9 05:17 Kedu.+008+23029.private
```

```
[04/09/25] seed@VM:~/.../edu$ dnssec-signzone -S -o edu.edu.db  
Fetching edu/RSASHA256/12526 (KSK) from key repository.  
Fetching edu/RSASHA256/23029 (ZSK) from key repository.
```

A quick look at the newly signed zone file.

```
3600    DNSKEY 256 3 8 (
AwEAAdcSzB1AMLZ5paDMDQ1H6I09Ui42jf1
GaVs07a7RH42r5EiWMPfTC1iuY8x0oBec1KP
MaFGsYXf8iLLHBP/yFDnwLwfHLX1X/BnJ67m
K5prptAKfPUz1X0S4zILMQGI9oUYGc0ZLFs
IMExnIjBBbKw7qLSgpV0dUBFHd80+0GP
) ; ZSK; alg = RSA-HASH256 ; key id = 23029
3600    DNSKEY 257 3 8 (
AwEAAAdN4SKe16pjBawBj1uQMx5ju0GuyHjb
eWrPdtPqgMw2t4D/fvhx61Q05SZ2RYU/kEn
Yd3hc0a/NUi1U7EZJ9LF7fJyGBTwW4W5o/N7
1r1o3Z3xCgtU01zqrFukKRIATRx493sxyNuw
RQ2yr/ARTCnPms3q0vTn1FAFK+TMDNpkFiER
6ZS10xwnHol2V2RJVa4A1MktwlBarJciq9/Z
3tb9rHwcurxuLNDDHAYwFnQ0UJUXblz9fvGs
aLb7/28oyiS4+NIJZkbeKKYmQV9IfKivS7fY
z0VubQruLYC1722LfH+GG3SpB7GTFs0FPT6E
jF1vL3Qk02t+AGgA0jUqGvM=
) ; KSK; alg = RSA-HASH256 ; key id = 12526
3600    DS      3600  1 3600 /
```

example.edu.	3600	IN	NS	ns.example.edu.
	3600	DS		33034 8 2 (BACEF2F6890E2FF5C4FB8C724D42BB9BFF67 08A7CE8CEBD6017560E8E649CCD3)
	3600	RRSIG		DS 8 2 3600 (20250509081811 20250409081811 23029 edu. sTs1UH3p8cgR9yAIQWZ4EGElYUyLEp+iXAXj KAFdJdXssybdW5AefzPUPa2bGz+86s7kQYHM jJkXYVMyKWFocYK6ssCGc2rQL3o2Ify88hzJ WoI0oxqa2PxqzTZs7xb6KB23sdFVmKUsHmJt du8IE6wDWCT3u1Xyn0jfaKAPWG8=)

An important link is between the example.edu NS record which points to the ns.example.edu A record. This properly routes traffic heading for example.edu to the correct zone. The record above is paired with the record below in order to facilitate this.

ns.example.edu.	3600	IN	A	10.9.0.65
ns1.edu	3600	TTL	A	10.9.0.65

Task 2c : Testing

This task took a while to debug, for some reason the named.config.seedlabs - which I modified to point to the edu.db.signed file so that DNSSEC has access to the signed zone file - was not loading into the container properly. After a bunch of dcbuilds and a few restarts of the VM I was able to get it to work. I verified that the file loaded properly by sh'ing into the container and manually checking the /etc/bind/named.config.seedlabs file.

Specifically, at the new zones KSK and ZSK. They differ from the ZSK and KSK used in the example.edu zone.

Scrolling down the file, we can also see the example.edu DS record we included. The key used to sign it (33034), which is the example.edu's KSK and an RRSIG signed with this (edu) zone's ZSK.

```
$ dig @10.9.0.60 edu DNSKEY +dnssec
```

```
edu.          3600   IN    DNSKEY  256  3
8 AwEAAcdsFzBiAMLZ5paMDM01H6I09Ui42jflGaVs07a7RH42r5Ei
WMPf TC1iuY8x0oBec1KPMaFGsYXf8illHBP/yFDnwLwfHLX1X/BnJ
67mK5pr ptAKffPUzlxOS4zILMQGI9oUYGc0ZLFsIMExnIj8BbKw7q
LSgpV0dUBF HD80+oGP
edu.          3600   IN    DNSKEY  257  3
8 AwEAAcdN4SKe16pjkBAbBj1uQMx5jU0GuyHjbeWrfPdtPqgMw2t4D
/fvh x61lQ05SZ2RYU/kEnYd3hc0a/Nui1U7EZJ9LF7fJyGBTwW4W5o
/N71r1o 3Z3xCGTU01zqrFukKRIATRx493sxvNuwRQ2yr/ARTCnPms
3qQvTn1FAF k+TMDNpkFiER6ZS10xwnHo12V2RJVa4A1MktwlBarJC
iq9/Z3tb9rHwc uryuLNDDAHaywFnQ0UJUXblz9fvGsaLb7/28oyiS4
+NIJZkbekkYmQV9I fKivs7FyZoVubQrULYCi722LfH+GG3SpB7GTF
S0FPT6EjF1vL30k02t+ Agga0jUqGvM=
```

```
edu.          3600   IN    RRSIG  DNSKEY
8 1 3600 20250509093702 20250409093702 12526 edu. Z/6
wZs20MjT8oWEWmg8xtMhWVjZ1Nf5EoU+IhA65jVm9VKaufzRtMS1Fn
BZxQbMwc0a46ZTxBJkLystpLmj9VW34lGCfz2ph1LkpKaWJre450f0
p0 McwJUbtS10goKmeDtLVjhQkf3di0Z10g+tnQ8cdp/xN0HS51/5
l4NAAn vimyll8n/K5uoCNd0eHjf93d+0KUJokz4iNF/AH2pVvghXUw
k+M+DF0u y/hZGKKu1vRlm4nZnHC05Z11DKznLk2fzWS6GiIdSdLM6y
02M3/UDvvqU 3YlnR8AOVYBM85B358xdn3IO/NbLsg8Cme0wBjQUZL
PFtu8yjSQkj/VC NaPzXA==
```

```
edu.          3600   IN    RRSIG  DNSKEY
8 1 3600 20250509093702 20250409093702 23029 edu. X2q
+mSmicaT9kdILzAxUKs0Z2Jn1ghvk1uo6E0IIg+9GagzPeZKD2VQ
Puz0iTrGTrcTex7G1p742Tc3SaiFehrBOJGMIGREvGfjxsQaorCL
2i VuQzGF3MqM9dpbw9m+ak08s0g7kEWl3FaeqExyIRCeVsSqLy1/q
fs/Pi aPo=
```

Shows us the public DNSKeys for the edu zone. DNSKEY 256 is edu's ZSK and DNSKEY is edu's KSK. The RRSIGs are the signed RRSets, the first record signed with the KSK (KeyID 12526) while the second record is signed with the ZSK (KeyID 23029)

```
$ dig @10.9.0.60 edu NS +dnssec
```

```
;; ANSWER SECTION:
edu.          3600   IN    NS      ns1.edu.
edu.          3600   IN    RRSIG  NS 8 1 3600 2025
0509093702 20250409093702 23029 edu. Y1rucxxEmk2g39H8vbEkf6NdU9Z
s0XEVAJnDmA90a0Y5GYt3J5XZk4Lw VgAtY0oHjkVJI3jVxw4VC0pmUY1WyXdRGq
pRYws+HHxBzjQKVWd0cA1 8AaZbhsIwg+MXm/109Elsv7Z/nlfzcu6qYbMp6/N1
JwdLsNn6jUnZ+x+ 11U=
```

```
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns1.edu.      3600   IN    A      10.9.0.60
ns1.edu.      3600   IN    RRSIG  A 8 2 3600 2025
0509093702 20250409093702 23029 edu. bdo4FK6wuXU6H8rAbolrIK/dpeZ8
mMrqIUEf0owiK718IbDGUi5UcIos 4DesHoQ99odXH8LizvznWR/C8PalkA1D+H2
+Lt4UcQCH2tZvQA33hpSJ A4fytbIsP1sh0SjFKUV9wSDnR9YU6AQwQMBCJRZUNs
RvTjCMd1tus9YL bX8=
```

Retrieves the name server that this zone uses, which ns1.edu. The additional sections provides the A record for the name server. Both have an attached RRSIG signed using the edu zone's ZSK. `23029.edu.`

```
$ dig @10.9.0.60 example.edu +dnssec
```

```
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.edu. 3600   IN    NS      ns.example.edu.
example.edu. 3600   IN    DS      33034 8 2 BACEF2
F6890E2FF5C4FB8C724D42BB9BF6708A7CE8CEBD6017560E8 E649CCD3
example.edu. 3600   IN    RRSIG  DS 8 2 3600 2025
0509093702 20250409093702 23029 edu. eLC50ae6SDW8XupiUdnvqs0199h
ZbMQ80LInledFDcbHguues7RvWtV4 BS1sFHTwqDJFXIIYNCKyGTJCdy+0Go+zPh
riE7Hl89hGde4u4L2ERF5X epStelUerQ/DpALM47aHDMJ5+SSXevn90WY94k0h
ZZpFYJZNHAe5ezv 524=
```

```
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns.example.edu. 3600   IN    A      10.9.0.65
```

This shows that this zone is directing traffic heading to example.edu to the name server ns.example.edu, the top being the NS record for this. Followed by the DSset, the child (example.edu) zone's KSK KeyID and a signature to verify its authenticity. This is how a parent zone provides authentication for its child zones. We then have an RRSIG of the DS record to then authenticate that too using the parent (edu) zone's ZSK.

Task 3 : Set up the root server

Alright, so the root's ZSK ID is 18178 while its KSK ID is 59155, which I found in the signed zone file.

```
$ dig @10.9.0.30 . DNSKEY +dnssec
```

Same as the last time, this retrieves the roots KSK and ZSK public keys including the RRSIGs of the RRset.

```
; ; ANSWER SECTION:
. 259200 IN DNSKEY 256 3 8 AwEAAC75iU0L0ig6nskAoy00
jo0er7SoN1szD5qcr5L2yMPR6Ucait vWX19hYVDXAibEC8515bx6TK0BwTMTt1G8yRogrCepz3K9Z
H2Lh9n/mE D32V9ynop839E0sGBvh3FySaT3VzPx0EagLBG1VITDtD5wx466vjiipaH d+HT3g/v
. 259200 IN DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAACma1udEXNatAtcyyTN4
6WB5/yM8Xfa+VA753yUpiBxHz5HmWDo5o 05ZKccUkdVgWk0+zD5m8nk0VpGzM+VmU94lEotpDCkW+4b
TYN8qigl TDW2P1I18Qrивz9fPPV3C4G1JPuh1LSJ5uGf+uzf+1tZtdHwopuajeR Ar2uegn1Oon/F
rcdUgh2X/3oSRCxuyj0C+XCjujPRT/5ED03V61DX6 uzgHnm3k6qMGf/8a8TSHRJ0odLa/fsofg94
dDZ+m/gPLRhvIxhBxx3 9Rlz3wx4ZH AwRHtr10tBgKL00HcvxJaWtZ2ItL2v/F7sBiT5ZzWoidpk CS
ha0I0a5wM=
. 259200 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 8 0 259200 20250509105037
20250409105037 18178 . SvxNYPGTL6Jqv4v5FGWRLUGatTZ3RyF+bKTthScTQDlFtaEHZjhkBV
uAhk9esZgfM16rVPFKJMEx5W5176qpiA23GkYQofJXNIkXeRzy7m SzfCrkRVz+45jHUb+8FfaT
UpsI9AKDsZhRdknsEli4npPsnPh1YoKjL p/o=
. 259200 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 8 0 259200 20250509105037
20250409105037 59155 . w04Vng8xQubffp2q6/GeEcp0GZoxnItIhtjnX1Wb2yFEt7y73pkXbzq
EMo/W6v3LVLJN71VuaoZ+p1PEgy9W+0Tnn6WgzDzRxkr35muFdDxA H8ZE3heZ2/5p9yRf8PEa3s
4x8+sh55oG0f695b6rc1FoSpujBEUDrtx Beyn+AU+pov0V25FntseGD1jIT9wUt0lg2rxISnjuv6/M
EV1E4kr2BDH dVQP0BLH8Y6yhUkj8+jcQT0l3xicx77brAEZq3Bod3lML80nG02Gx0+ ZDAPm5z6MCi
1bZSewGsbIy0PjBY1PoyR9etu/3ky2k3luBhcxXpLc32 zMuSWa==
```

```
$ dig @10.9.0.30 . NS +dnssec
```

```
; ; ANSWER SECTION:
. 259200 IN NS root-ns1.net.
. 259200 IN RRSIG NS 8 0 259200 20250509105037 202
50409105037 18178 . m5FYpk93b+lV4I1YE2lMI0dt/8kVo54kVa7mN9Wj+bYnT0q9cWpT2DFe LR+
26+n9i0ZAuHktLIYjWovqYELRXDM3qxJE3X8fB+iBJ+wIR06v/Q/R ZBfKMBiu98KKAugGEQD5L6IG19
9JSzaqn+hGqIQLb8o/mcgNnJxH+k0+ SPo=
```

Different from the others, this record is pointing to a name server that does not live in root's zone. This is the reason why we don't have an attached A record pointing to the address of the NS, since this name server lives elsewhere and we don't blindly send out A records outside our zone.

If someone needed to resolve an address in any of our zones, a higher level DNS server would have a record with the NS of our root and an A record pointing to it, since our server would live inside their zone.

```
$ dig @10.9.0.30 edu +dnssec
```

```
; ; AUTHORITY SECTION:
edu. 259200 IN NS ns1.edu.
edu. 259200 IN DS 12526 8 2 D40AA3615AFD5A06AC0B02
5F38969D6C226F1AB9F622E594E2EB318A B8618F44
edu. 259200 IN RRSIG DS 8 1 259200 20250509105037 202
50409105037 18178 . QuuW19vimAfrW+WM0Yq0os6HHb9Yy1ZZ0BL1B1LCtKjhSkqo0i/5RXya lH/
nMmLI9JtLhzXfGy1qjG3cK0Yi27ZQLroxF0WtXD3JqX5jFVR+SrS6 OhJ2y6vhGlHg9Ih5gDlHXa30tj
1q188q5lniTzaY2bCFlr0W2SHCuYAk Pe8=
; ; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns1.edu. 259200 IN A 10.9.0.60
```

Here we see that we have an entry pointing to name server for edu's zone. It includes the DSset to verify the child's KSK and a RRSIG of the DS record signed with root's ZSK for

authentication. Included is the additional A record pointing to the actual IP address of edu's name server, since this lives within root's zone we have the ability to verify that nothing has been tampered with.

```
$ dig @10.9.0.30 example.edu +dnssec
```

```
;example.edu.           IN      A  
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:  
edu.          259200  IN      NS      ns1.edu.  
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:  
ns1.edu.       259200  IN      A       10.9.0.60
```

Here we see that the command actually returned the NS and A record for edu instead of example.edu. This is because we asked the root zone, which typically does not allow recursion.

```
; flags: qr rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 2  
; WARNING: recursion requested but not available
```

So, because root doesn't know where example.edu lives, but knows where edu does, it returns that and nothing more. In the real world this is done because root servers are incredibly important and shouldn't be looking into every DNS request, it returns the authoritative zone for the next zone down on the hierarchy and has the requester sort the rest.

Task 4 : Set up the local DNS server

Failure after failure kept following around on this task. The dig command was giving everything correct, the records were as they were supposed to be and it could traverse the zones without problem. Except, when using the DNS local server it just wouldn't set the ad flag.

The solution I found, after redoing every key and every signed zone file at least twice, was that the named.conf in the local_dns_server directory needed the line [include "/etc/bind/bind.keys";] to actually use the root's KSK as a trusted authority. After that, I got the ad flag.

```
[04/09/25]seed@VM:~/.../local_dns_server$ dig @10.9.0.53 www.example.edu +dnssec  
;  
; <>> DiG 9.18.30-0ubuntu0.20.04.2-Ubuntu <>> @10.9.0.53 www.example.edu +dnssec  
;(1 server found)  
;; global options: +cmd  
;; Got answer:  
;; ->>HEADER<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 5438  
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1  
  
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:  
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096  
; COOKIE: 0d6dc6f6e897847e0100000067f6a8c80c3dbbb065280f52 (good)  
;; QUESTION SECTION:  
;www.example.edu.           IN      A  
  
;; ANSWER SECTION:  
www.example.edu.       259200  IN      A      1.2.3.5  
www.example.edu.       259200  IN      RRSIG   A 8 3 259200 20250509133856 202504091
```

```
IN NS ns.thomas2025.edu.  
DS 7399 8 2 (304A756269DD5D69B5F  
E6F6C6805B6B36CB01D  
RRSIG DS 8 2 3600 (20250509170238 2025  
HvpTTLg4LSIVCZGynnZ  
pkqgQ2V8FVmKJzLz6A  
9Xt2qvKXau33c640hsY  
vNRyFGBBum+dqiPjU1D
```

```
IN NS ns.thomas2025.edu.  
DS 7399 8 2 (304A756269DD5D69B5F  
E6F6C6805B6B36CB01D  
RRSIG DS 8 2 3600 (20250509170238 2025  
HvpTTLg4LSIVCZGynnZ  
pkqgQ2V8FVmKJzLz6A  
9Xt2qvKXau33c640hsY  
vNRyFGBBum+dqiPjU1D
```

```
; <>> DiG 9.18.30-0ubuntu0.20.04.2-Ubuntu <>> @10.9.0.53 www.thomas2025.edu  
sec  
; (1 server found)  
;; global options: +cmd  
;; Got answer:  
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: SERVFAIL, id: 60378  
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
```

```
; <>> DiG 9.18.30-0ubuntu0.20.04.2-Ubuntu <>> @10.9.0.53 edu DS +  
sec  
; (1 server found)  
;; global options: +cmd  
;; Got answer:  
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 32280  
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0
```

To test if DNSSEC catches inconsistencies, I modified a single Byte in the RRSIG for my site's DS entry in the edu signed zone file.

This causes the dig command to fail, since DNSSEC doesn't trust the information store due to the altered RRSIG for thomas2025's DS record. While accessing edu's DS record can still be done.

Task 5 : Adding another domain nameserver

```
25$ ll  
4:02 dsset-thomas2025.edu.  
3:26 Kthomas2025.edu.+008+07399.key  
3:26 Kthomas2025.edu.+008+07399.private  
3:25 Kthomas2025.edu.+008+56709.key  
3:25 Kthomas2025.edu.+008+56709.private  
4:00 named.conf.seedlabs  
3:40 thomas2025.edu.db  
4:02 thomas2025.edu.db.signed
```

This task was relatively simple considering I already had an example.edu to work with. I generated the requisite keys and modified the db file to reflect this new zone. Below is the db file, modified for this particular zone.

```
[04/09/25]seed@VM:~/.../edu.thomas2025$ cat thomas2025.edu.db  
$TTL 3D  
@ IN SOA ns.thomas2025.edu. admin.thomas2025.edu. (2008111001  
8H  
2H  
4W  
1D)  
;  
; Records for this nameserver (you need to make changes)  
@ IN NS ns.thomas2025.edu.  
ns.thomas2025.edu. IN A 10.9.0.66  
;  
; IP addresses for the hostnames in the thomas2025.edu domain  
@ IN A 3.2.3.5  
www IN A 3.2.3.5  
* IN A 3.2.3.7
```

Big changes - aside from changing the record names to reflect this zone - was pointing the A record to the actual IP address this zone will live on. This container that will implement this zone can be found at the root lab folder, in the docker compose file.

Another important modification was changing the entry and the zone name in the named.conf.seedlabs file. Zone "thomas2025.edu" lets the DNS server know that this db file is good for the thomas2025.edu zone. I was running into troubles because it was still smith20something, even though I had changed the file path.

```
[04/09/25] seed@VM:~/.../edu.thomas2025$ cat named.conf.seedlabs
zone "thomas2025.edu" {
    type master;
    file "/etc/bind/thomas2025.edu.db.signed";
};
```

I then created the signed zone file, which also created the dsset file. I included that path in the edu db file while also including thomas2025's A and NS record to actually allow the zone to be found.

```
; Records for the example.edu domain
example.edu.           IN      NS      ns.example.edu.
thomas2025.edu.        IN      NS      ns.thomas2025.edu.
ns.example.edu.        IN      A       10.9.0.65
ns.thomas2025.edu.     IN      A       10.9.0.66
```


Both the NS and A record are important. At the bottom I also appended the INCLUDE for thomas2025 zone's dsset so that these records can be verified.

```
$INCLUDE ../../edu.example/dsset-example.edu.
$INCLUDE ../../edu.thomas2025/dsset-thomas2025.edu.
```

I then signed the edu zone's file, since it was changed and the new signed file needs to reflect the added zone. This changes the RRSIG in the signed file and the dsset file as well, which means we have to goto the root file and sign that one as well.

It is important that we sign the zones from the lowest node on the hierarchy first, and then move up from there. This is because the upper zones incorporate the information of the zones right below them in their signed zone files.

So for ours, a good way to visualize it would be like so.



So edu incorporates example and thomas2025 in its signed zone file, while root incorporates edu. Thus, you have to start signing from the bottom, else DNSSEC will catch the inconsistency.

```
[04/09/25]seed@VM:~/.../edu.thomas2025$ dig @10.9.0.53 www.thomas2025.edu +dnssec

; <>> DiG 9.18.30-0ubuntu0.20.04.2-Ubuntu <>> @10.9.0.53 www.thomas2025.edu +dnssec
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 59420
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
; COOKIE: f59b8e80013340c10100000067f6b6ad00a97170c9b0aecd (good)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.thomas2025.edu.           IN      A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.thomas2025.edu.      259200  IN      A          3.2.3.5
www.thomas2025.edu.      259200  IN      RRSIG    A 8 3 259200 20250509170231 202504091
70231 56709 thomas2025.edu. AYI41lhIfU7q5UCTgC2Hf8/sV5QF0aM4qx31MRRm77DFPwv3GLAVz26u
N9qUpfvVw7b0CzM8TbhBdtBCjaMs4nZDP1KXCNI080uEHb5dYL4UUBS4 1UAKSc7EJJ0l5agc+jtmsSbgReYp
Nowj8tJhf7cr0fsHRoZ/SzVDS9Rj LFG8
```

The ad flag is set, thus proving that my custom zone within the edu domain is considered trustworthy.