

SOCIAL OPTIMA IN ECONOMIES WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS  
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**Beyond macro**

# MOTIVATION AND MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK

- *Continuous-time framework* to compute the *social optimum* in models with *heterogeneous* agents subject to *idiosyncratic shocks*.
- Reduce the problem to a *MFG*.
  - ▶ *HJB* coupled with a *KF*.
  - ▶ Market clearing conditions
  - ▶ Incomplete markets  $\Rightarrow$  restrictions on the control set.
- Mathematical ingredients:
  - ① *Hilbert space* ( $\approx$  scalar product) to compute infinite dimensional *Gateaux derivatives* ( $\approx$  directional derivative).
  - ② *Duality* approach to reduce the SP problem to a competitive problem through the use of a *Lagrange* multiplier (captures the externality)
- Use sparse matrices to compute the equilibrium (Achdou et al.(2017)).

# ECONOMY: INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM

- Deterministic (no shocks!) aggregate variable  $Z_t \in \mathbb{R}^p$
- Continuum of agent  $i \in [0, 1]$  with constant death (and birth) rate  $\eta$ .
  - ▶ Controls  $\mu(t, X_t^i) \in \mathbb{R}^m$
- Individual state  $X_t^i \in \mathbb{R}^n$

$$dX_t^i = b\left(X_t^i, \mu\left(t, X_t^i\right), Z_t\right) dt + \sigma\left(X_t^i\right) dB_t^i \quad (1)$$

- Admissible set of control  $\mu(t, x) \in \mathcal{M}(t, x)$  that solves uniquely (1)
  - ▶ Encompasses restriction on market completeness for example.

# ECONOMY: MFG FORMULATION

- Value function  $V(t, x)$  maximizes utility under (1):

$$V(t, x) = \max_{\mu(t, X_s) \in \mathcal{M}(t, X_s)} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^\infty e^{-(\rho+\eta)(s-t)} u(X_s, \mu) ds \middle| X_t = x \right]$$

- ▶ Transversality condition:

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\rho t} V(t, x) = 0$$

- Individual's problem summarized by the HJB:

$$\rho V(t, x) = \frac{\partial V(t, x)}{\partial t} + \max_{\mu(t, x) \in \mathcal{M}(t, x)} \{u(x, \mu(x, t)) + \mathcal{A}V\} \quad (2)$$

- ▶ *Infinitesimal generator* of the process (1):

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t} + \mathcal{A}V = \frac{\partial}{\partial t} + \sum_{i=1}^n b_i(x, \mu, Z) \frac{\partial V}{\partial x_i} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{k=1}^n [\sigma(x) \sigma(x)']_{i,k} \frac{\partial^2 V}{\partial x_i \partial x_k} - \eta V$$

# ECONOMY: MFG FORMULATION

- Random initial state  $x_0 \sim \psi(x)$
- Distribution  $g(t, x)$  solves the KF equation:

$$\begin{cases} \frac{\partial g}{\partial t} &= \mathcal{A}^* g + \eta \psi \\ \int g(t, x) dx &= 1 \\ g(0, t) &= g_0(x) \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

- $\mathcal{A}^*$  is the adjoint ( $\approx$  transpose through integration by part) of  $\mathcal{A}$ :

$$\mathcal{A}^* g = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i} [b_i(x, \mu, Z) g(t, x)] + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{k=1}^n \frac{\partial^2}{\partial x_i \partial x_k} \left[ [\sigma(x) \sigma(x)']_{i,k} g(t, x) \right] - \eta g$$

- Market clearing:

$$\forall k \in \{1, \dots, p\}, Z_k(t) = \int f_k(x, \mu) g(t, x) dx \quad (4)$$

# COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM

- A **competitive equilibrium** is a vector of *aggregate variables*  $Z(t)$ , a *value function*  $V(t, x)$ , a *control*  $\mu(t, x)$  and a *density*  $g(t, x)$  such that:
  - ① Given  $Z(t)$ ,  $V(t, x)$  is the solution of the HJB equation (2) and the optimal control is  $\mu(t, x)$ .
  - ② Given  $\mu(t, x)$  and  $Z(t)$ ,  $g(t, x)$  is the solution to the KF system (3)
  - ③ Given  $\mu(t, x)$  and  $g(t, x)$ , the aggregate variables  $Z(t)$  satisfy the market clearing conditions (4)
- The recursive structure is helpful to solve numerically:

$$\{Z(t)\} \xRightarrow{(2)} \{Z(t), \mu(t, x)\} \xRightarrow{(3)} \{g(t, x), \mu(t, x)\} \xRightarrow{(4)} \{Z(t)\}$$

## SOCIAL PLANNER (SP) PROBLEM

- Infinitely lived SP maximizes a Social Welfare Function (SWF) with Pareto weights  $\omega(t, x)$  to get a value function  $J(g_0(x))$ :

$$\max_{g(t,x), Z(t), \mu(t,x) \in \mathcal{M}(t,x)} \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \left[ \int_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \omega(t, x) u(x, \mu) g(t, x) dx \right] dt$$
$$\text{s.t } \rho V(t, x) = \frac{\partial V(t, x)}{\partial t} + \max_{\mu(t,x) \in \mathcal{M}(t,x)} \{u(x, \mu(x, t)) + \mathcal{A}V\} \quad (2)$$

$$\begin{cases} \frac{\partial g}{\partial t} &= \mathcal{A}^* g + \eta \psi[j(t, x)] \\ \int g(t, x) dx &= 1 \\ g(0, t) &= g_0(x) \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

$$\forall k \in \{1, \dots, p\}, Z_k(t) = \int f_k(x, \mu) g(t, x) dx \quad (4) [\lambda_k(t)]$$

# NECESSARY CONDITIONS: FROM SP TO COMPETITIVE

- After a lot of Gateaux derivatives... The main result!

## PROPOSITION 1: NECESSARY CONDITIONS

- If a solution to the SP problem exists with  $(e^{-\rho t}g, e^{-\rho t}\mu, e^{-\rho t}j) \in L^2 \Rightarrow \exists$  Competitive equilibrium (HJB, complementary slackness, SP objective from HJB):

$$\rho j(t, x) = \max_{\mu(t, x) \in \mathcal{M}(t, x)} \omega(t, x) u(x, \mu) + \sum_{k=1}^p \lambda_k(t) [f_k(x, \mu) - Z_k] + \mathcal{A}j(t, x) + \frac{\partial j(t, x)}{\partial t}$$

$$\forall k \in \{1, \dots, p\} \lambda_k(t) = \sum_{i=1}^n \int \frac{\partial j}{\partial x_i} \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial Z_k} g(t, x) dx$$

$$J(g(0, x)) = \int j(0, x) g(0, x) dx + \eta \int_{t=0}^{\infty} \left[ \int e^{-\rho t} j(t, x) \psi(x) dx \right] dt$$



## FINITE DIFFERENCE SCHEME: AIYAGARI EXAMPLE

- Discrete grids of asset  $a$  ( $x$  before) and idiosyncratic productivity  $z$  ( $B$  before):

$$(a, z) \in \{a_1, a_2 + \Delta a, \dots, a_I\} \times \{z_1, z_2 + \Delta z, \dots, z_J\}$$

- Planner value function ( $j$  before) is  $V_{ij} \equiv V(a_i, z_j)$
- Saving function  $s_{ij}$

$$s_{i,j} = wz_j + (r + \eta) a_i - c_{ij}$$

- Define *forward* and *backward* derivatives in asset  $a$ :

$$\partial_{a,F} V_{ij} = \frac{V_{i+1,j} - V_{i,j}}{\Delta a}$$

$$\partial_{a,B} V_{ij} = \frac{V_{i,j} - V_{i-1,j}}{\Delta a}$$

- Forward derivative for idiosyncratic productivity  $z$ :

$$\partial_z V_{i,j} = \frac{V_{i,j+1} - V_{i,j}}{\Delta z}$$

$$\partial_{zz} V_{i,j} = \frac{V_{i,j+1} - 2V_{i,j} + V_{i,j-1}}{(\Delta z)^2}$$

# UPWIND SCHEME

- The utility, including the multiplier is  $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \lambda(a - K)$
- The discretized HJB is:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{V_{i,j}^{n+1} - V_{i,j}^n}{\Delta} + \rho V_{i,j}^{n+1} = & u(c_{i,j}^n) + \partial_{a,F} V_{i,j}^{n+1} s_{i,j,F}^n \mathbf{1}_{s_{i,j,F}^n > 0} + \partial_{a,B} V_{i,j}^{n+1} s_{i,j,B}^n \mathbf{1}_{s_{i,j,B}^n < 0} \\ & + \theta(\hat{z} - z_j) \partial_z V_{i,j}^{n+1} + \frac{\sigma_z^2 z_j}{2} \partial_{zz} V_{i,j}^{n+1} - \eta V_{i,j}^{n+1} \end{aligned}$$

- With savings given by:

$$\begin{aligned} s_{ij,F}^n &= wz_j + (r + \eta)a_i - (u')^{-1} \left( \partial_{a,F} V_{i,j}^n \right) \\ s_{ij,B}^n &= wz_j + (r + \eta)a_i - (u')^{-1} \left( \partial_{a,B} V_{i,j}^n \right) \end{aligned}$$

# SOLVING THE HJB: SPARSE MATRICES

- Can rewrite the previous HJB as:

$$\frac{\mathbf{V}^{n+1} - \mathbf{V}^n}{\Delta} + \rho \mathbf{V}^{n+1} = \mathbf{u}^n + \mathbf{A}^n \mathbf{V}^{n+1}$$

- Rearranging:

$$\left[ \left( \frac{1}{\Delta} + \rho \right) \mathbf{I}^n - \mathbf{A}^n \right] \mathbf{V}^{n+1} = \mathbf{u}^n + \frac{\mathbf{V}^n}{\Delta}$$

- Algorithm:

▶ Starts with  $V_{i,j}^0 = \frac{u(r a_i + w z_j)}{\rho}$

① Compute  $\partial_{a,F} V_{ij}$   $\partial_{a,B} V_{ij}$   $\partial_z V_{i,j}$   $\partial_{zz} V_{i,j}$  using finite diff.

② Compute  $c_{i,j}^n$  using:

$$c_{i,j}^n = (u')^{-1} \left( \partial_{a,F} V_{i,j}^n \mathbf{1}_{s_{i,j,F}^n > 0} + \partial_{a,B} V_{i,j}^n \mathbf{1}_{s_{i,j,B}^n < 0} + u' (w z_j + r a_i) \mathbf{1}_{s_{i,j,F}^n < 0, s_{i,j,B}^n > 0} \right)$$

③ Solve the previous system to find  $\mathbf{V}^{n+1}$

④ Iterates until  $|\mathbf{V}^{n+1} - \mathbf{V}^n| < \epsilon$

# SOLVING THE KF AND FINDING THE AGGREGATE CAPITAL

- Discretized KF can be written taking advantage of the self adjoint property as:

$$\mathbf{A}' \mathbf{g} = \begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \mathbf{A}^n = \mathbf{A}$$

- ▶ We solve the system and renormalize:

$$g_{ij} = \frac{g_{ij}}{\sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^J g_{ij} \Delta a \Delta z}$$

- Finding the equilibrium aggregate capital is the standard Aiyagari algorithm.

## FINDING THE LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER

- Choose a constant  $\vartheta \in (0, 1)$ , begin with an initial guess of the Lagrange multiplier  $\lambda^0 = 0$ , set  $m = 0$ :
- ① Compute the value function  $V^m$ , consumption  $C^m$ , density  $g^m$  and aggregate capital  $K^m$  given  $\lambda^m$ .
- ② Update  $\tilde{\lambda}^{m+1}$ :

$$\tilde{\lambda}^{m+1} = \frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{(K^m)^{2-\alpha}} \sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^J \left[ g_{i,j}^m + a_i \frac{g_{i+1,j}^m - g_{i,j}^m}{\Delta a} - K^m z_j \frac{g_{i+1,j}^m - g_{i,j}^m}{\Delta a} \right] V_{i,j}^m \Delta a \Delta z$$

- ③ If  $\tilde{\lambda}^{m+1} \neq \lambda^m$ , set  $\lambda^{m+1} = \vartheta \tilde{\lambda}^{m+1} + (1 - \vartheta) \lambda^m$
- ④ If  $|\lambda^{m+1} - \lambda^m| > \epsilon$ , keep iterating

# AIYAGARI: FINDING AGGREGATE CAPITAL

- Choose  $\nu \in (0, 1)$ , and  $K^0$
- ① Compute  $r^n$  and  $w^n$  as a function of  $K^n$
- ② Given  $r^n$  and  $w^n$  solve the HJB numerically to get  $V^n$  and  $c^n$
- ③ Given  $c^n$  solves the KF to get  $g^n$
- ④ Compute aggregate capital  $S^n = \sum_{(i,j)} a_i g_{ij} \Delta a \Delta z$
- ⑤ Update  $K^{n+1} = \nu S^n + (1 - \nu) K^n$
- ⑥ f  $|K^{n+1} - K^n| > \epsilon$ , keep iterating

- Choose as Hilbert *space* the space of Lebesgue-integrable functions  $L^2$  with the inner product:

$$\langle f, g \rangle = \int f(x) g(x) dx$$

- Let's  $T$  an operator, its *adjoint*  $T^*$  is defined by:

$$\langle Tf, g \rangle = \langle f, T^*g \rangle$$

► An operator is *self-adjoint* if  $T = T^*$

- Let  $J(g)$  be a functional and let  $h$  be arbitrary in  $L^2$ . The *Gateaux derivative* of  $J$  in the direction  $h$  is defined as:

$$\delta J(g; h) = \lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 0} \frac{J(g + \alpha h) - J(g)}{\alpha}$$

- Let  $H : L^2 \mapsto \mathbb{R}^n$ .
- If  $J$  has a continuous Fréchet differential, a necessary condition for  $J$  to have an extremum at  $g$  under the constraint  $H(g) = 0$  is:

$$\exists \lambda \in L^2 \Rightarrow \begin{cases} \delta \mathcal{L}(g; h) &= 0 \\ \mathcal{L}(g) &= J(g) + \langle \lambda, H(g) \rangle \end{cases}$$