Wealth distribution over the business cycle A mean-field game approach

Thomas Bourany^{1,2}

¹Sciences Po and UPMC-Sorbonne University

²Under the supervision of Yves Achdou at Paris-Diderot University

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Introduction

- ➤ Recent development in macroeconomics : the incorporation of agent heterogeneity in standard models :
 - The Aiyagari-Bewley-Huggett model, enriching the Brock-Mirman (1972) Stochastic Growth model
 - The HANK models enriching DSGE models, Woodford (2003), Gali (2008)
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 - Many others...
- ▶ Why is this important?
 - Matching micro-data using macro models, e.g. the wealth and income distribution
 - Studying welfare implication of shocks and policies
 - Micro matters for macro: we reached the limits of representative agents model.

- ▶ What are the limits of conventional HA theories?
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- ► High entry cost (tools from functional analysis and stochastic calculus), but obtain new results easily.

Introduction and motivation

This presentation : outline

- ► A Nash equilibrium of a differential game, when the number of (symmetric and small) players become very large
 - Analogy with "mean field" theory from particle physics
- ► It will consist of a system of two Partial Differential Equation (PDE) given by two building blocks :

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 - The evolution of the distribution of agents, when the agents control
 are given
 - ▶ One can characterize the agent distribution
 - Yield the second PDE: the Fokker-Planck (Kolmogorov-Forward) equation (FP)

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 - Yield the second PDE: the Fokker-Planck (Kolmogorov-Forward) equation (FP)
- ▶ I will do a brief lecture on these two points
 - Stochastic control and the HJB
 - · Mean-Field theory and the FP.

► The aim of the agent is to maximize its objective function :

$$v(t_0, X_{t_0}) = \sup_{\{\alpha_t\}_{t_0}^T} \mathbb{E}_{t_0} \left(\int_{t_0}^T L(t, X_t, \alpha_t) dt + g(X_T) \right)$$

where v is the value function of the agent (at time t_0), L and G resp. the running gain and terminal gain.

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where v is the value function of the agent (at time t_0), L and G resp. the running gain and terminal gain.

 $ightharpoonup \alpha_t$ the (adapted) control variable and X_t is the state variable, (unique) solution of SDE:

$$\begin{cases} dX_t = b(t, X_t, \alpha_t)dt + \sigma(t, X_t, \alpha_t)dB_t \\ X_{t_0} = x_0 \qquad (t_0, x_0) \in [0, T] \times \mathbb{R}^d \end{cases}$$

where b is the drift, σ the variance and B_t a Brownian motion More on this

Stochastic control and Mean-Field Games : an informal presentation

The stochastic control problem – the HJB equation

$$v(t_0, X_{t_0}) = \sup_{\{\alpha_t\}_{t_0}^T} \mathbb{E}_{t_0} \big(\int_{t_0}^{t_1} L(t, X_t, \alpha_t) dt + v(t_1, X_{t_1}) \big)$$

Here, Bellman dynamic programming principle holds :

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- ▶ Use the Itô formula here to compute the value fct at time t + h:

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► This is the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB) PDE!

▶ The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman :

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▶ Sometimes, mathematicians write it with "Hamiltonian"

$$H(t, x, p, M) = \sup_{a} \left\{ L(t, x, a) + p \cdot b + \frac{1}{2} Tr(\sigma \sigma^{T} M) \right\} = 0$$

and the HJB rewrites :

$$\partial_t v(t,x) + H(t,x,\nabla_x v, D_{xx}^2 v) = 0$$

The optimal control can be given in feedback form by the First-Order Conditions (FOC).

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- The optimal control can be given in feedback form by the First-Order Conditions (FOC).
- ▶ Plenty of different applications

The stochastic control problem – Applications

- Methods to find solutions :
 - Verification methods (guess and verify)
 - What if the fct v is not smooth? (not $C^{1,2}$)
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 - One of the first applications: Merton portfolio selection problem
 - Optimal liquidation problems
 - Transaction costs and liquidity risk models
 - Applications in incomplete markets: super-replication of options (uncertain volatility models)

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- Many applications in economics!
 - Firm investment problems
 - Optimal investment/consumption strategies
 - Stochastic growth model and ... RBC model!

Stochastic control – Applications – RBC model

$$v(t_0, k_0, z_0) = \sup_{\{c_t\}_{t \ge 0}} \mathbb{E}_{t_0} \left(\int_{t_0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} u(c_t) dt \right)$$
$$dk_t = \left(z_t F(k_t) - \delta k_t - c_t \right) dt$$
$$dz_t = \mu(z) dt + \sigma(z) dB_t$$

Applying the same methods, we can obtain the HJB:

$$\rho v(k, z) = \max_{c} u(c) + \partial_k v(k, z) \left[zF(k) - \delta k - c \right]$$
$$+ \mu(z) \partial_z v(k, z) + \frac{\sigma(z)^2}{2} \partial_{zz}^2 v(k, z)$$

- ► The Fokker-Planck equation is known for a long time by physicists :
 - Used to compute the (probability) distribution of particles e.g. fluid/gas – in a domain
 - Each particle is subject to shocks (e.g. diffusion).
 - In plasma physics, it corresponds to the Boltzmann equation.
- ► Knowing the initial distribution, one can compute the evolution of the distribution over time. It is forward in time.

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 - In plasma physics, it corresponds to the Boltzmann equation.
- ► Knowing the initial distribution, one can compute the evolution of the distribution over time. It is forward in time.
- ► After, I draw a direct link with stochastic calculus, through the use of the Feynman Kac formula
 - Feynman Kac is backward in time.
 - Also used a lot in option pricing, e.g. Black-Scholes model

Suppose we consider N interacting particles X_t^i , i = 1, ..., N subject to shocks (again a SDE):

$$\begin{cases} dX_t^i = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N b(t, X_t^i, X_t^j) dt + \sigma dB_t^i \\ X_{t_0}^i = Y^i \end{cases}$$

with Y^i i.i.d. and B_t^i i.i.d. (independence is key!).

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- ▶ What happen when $N \to \infty$?
 - 'Simply' use the law of large number!

 $\frac{1}{N}\sum_{j=1}^{N}\varphi(Z^{j})\to \int \varphi(z)m_{Z}(dz)$ where m_{Z} is the probability measure of the r.v. Z:

$$\begin{cases} dX_t^i = \int_{\mathbb{R}^d} b(t, X_t^i, y) m(dy) dt + \sigma dB_t^i \\ X_{t_0} = Y \end{cases}$$

► From the evolution of these particles, one can obtain the Fokker-Planck:

$$\begin{cases} \partial_t m(t,x) - div \left(b m(t,x) \right) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} D_{xx}^2 \left(m(t,x) \right) = 0 \\ m(0,x) = m_0(x) \end{cases}$$

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• More formally, derive the Itô's formula for test function $\varphi \in \mathcal{C}_c^{\infty}$ on X_t , take the expectation and derive the 'adjoint' operators on m.

More on adjoint operators

The evolution of the distribution – the Fokker-Planck equation

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- $(b\nabla \cdot)^* \equiv -div(b\cdot)$ and $(\sigma\sigma^T\Delta \cdot)^* \equiv D^2(\sigma\sigma^T \cdot)$

▶ If w(t,x) is a $C^{1,2}$ function and has bounded derivative, $\nabla_x v \in L^{\infty}$, and is solution of :

$$\begin{cases} \partial_t w(t,x) + b \cdot \nabla_x w(t,x) + \frac{1}{2} Tr \left(\sigma \sigma^T D_{xx}^2 w(t,x) \right) = 0 \\ w(T,x) = g(x) \end{cases}$$

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► Then, the Feynman Kac formula gives us the form of the solution :

$$w(t,x) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0}\Big(g(X_T^{t_0,x})\Big)$$

where X_T is the solution of the SDE:

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► The above PDE is called Feynman-Kac equation or "Kolmogorov Backward equation" A general Feynman Kac thm

► The Feynman-Kac/Kolmogorov Backward equation is

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► When one return the time, one may find the following "Kolmogorov Forward equation"

$$\begin{cases} -\partial_t p(t,x) - \operatorname{div}(b \, p(t,x)) + \frac{1}{2} D_{xx}^2 (\sigma \sigma^T p(t,x)) = 0 \\ p(0,x) = p_0(x) \end{cases}$$

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- More formally, this equation is the "adjoint" equation of the KBE

 More on adjoint operators
- $(b\nabla \cdot)^* \equiv -div(b\cdot)$ and $(\sigma\sigma^T\Delta \cdot)^* \equiv D^2(\sigma\sigma^T \cdot)$

- ► Mean field games take advantage of these two PDEs, it is a mixture of various elements :
 - Game theory : Nash equilibria when the number of players $N \to \infty$
 - Stochastic control: the HJB equation
 - Mean field theory: the FP equation

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- Game theory : Nash equilibria when the number of players $N \to \infty$
- Stochastic control: the HJB equation
- Mean field theory: the FP equation
- Usual assumptions :
 - The agent control the drift of the diffusion, but not the variance
 - The agents are small enough, so that we do not consider inter-individual interactions
 - Without this, no Fokker-Planck equation!

► The optimal control problem :

$$\sup_{\{\alpha_t\}_t^T} \mathbb{E}_t \left(\int_t^T L(X_s, m_s, \alpha_s) ds + g(X_T, m_T) \right)$$

Controlling the SDE : $dX_t = \alpha_t dt + \sqrt{2\nu} dB_t$

- Writing the Hamiltonian : $H(x, m, \nabla v) = \sup_{a} \left(L(x, m, a) + a \cdot \nabla_{x} v(t, x) \right)$
- If *v* is regular, the control is given by the feedback :

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► This yields the system of PDEs

(i)
$$-\partial_t v - \nu \Delta v + H(t, x, \nabla_x v) = 0$$
 in $\mathbb{R}^d \times [0, T]$

(ii)
$$\partial_t m - \nu \Delta m - div(D_p H(t, x, \nabla_x v) m) = 0$$
 in $\mathbb{R}^d \times [0, T]$

(iii)
$$m(0, \cdot) = m_0(\cdot)$$
 $v(x, T) = G(x, m_T)$

▶ The "economists-friendly" formulation would be :

(i)
$$-\partial_t v(t,x) - \nu Tr(D_{xx}^2 v(t,x)) + (L(t,x,a^*) + a^* \cdot \nabla_x v(t,x)) = 0$$

(ii)
$$\partial_t m(t,x) - \nu Tr(D_{xx}^2 m(x,t)) - \sum_i \partial_{x_i} (a^* m) = 0$$

(iii)
$$m(0,\cdot) = m_0(\cdot)$$
 $v(x,T) = G(x,m_T)$

where a^* is the optimal control for problem at (t, x)

• Remember : $div(f(x)) = \sum_{i}^{d} \partial_{x_{i}} f(x)$ and $\Delta f(x) = Tr(D_{xx}^{2} f(x)) = \sum_{i}^{d} \partial_{x_{i}x_{i}}^{2} f(x)$

Wrapping-up

- ➤ "Solving het. agents models = Solving PDEs" (cf. B. Moll)
 - A Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman: backward in time
 How the agent value/decisions change when distribution is given
 - A Fokker-Planck (Kolmogorov-Forward): forward in time How the distribution changes, when agents control is given

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 - A Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman: backward in time
 How the agent value/decisions change when distribution is given
 - A Fokker-Planck (Kolmogorov-Forward): forward in time How the distribution changes, when agents control is given
- ▶ Let's see a concrete example : the Aiyagari-Bewley model :
 - Reference:?

- ➤ This model has become the workhorse model to study income and wealth distribution in Macroeconomics
- ▶ Households are heterogeneous (ex-post) in their wealth *a* and income *y*, and solve an analogous stochastic control problem.

- ► This model has become the workhorse model to study income and wealth distribution in Macroeconomics
- ► Households are heterogeneous (ex-post) in their wealth *a* and income *y*, and solve an analogous stochastic control problem.
- ▶ Income z_t is the only stochastic process (for now!): Poisson processes with two states $z_t \in \{z_1, z_2\}$ with intensities λ_1, λ_2 (the higher the intensity, the higher the proba to jump).
- ► Can be generalized to any process (diffusion, Poisson, Levy)
- ► We can analyze both the stationary case and the transition case (evolving in time).

☐ The Aiyagari-Bewley model : ?

MFG – the Aiyagari-Bewley model

▶ One of the specificities is the credit constraint (state constraints) :

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 - Mathematically, it is not possible to find a PDE and a boundary condition on ∂Ω even in the sense of distribution.
- ► This will result on both (i) a Dirac mass on the boundary and (ii) an explosion near the boundary.

► The stochastic control problem is the following :

$$\max_{c_t} \mathbb{E}_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} u(c_t) dt$$
 subject to :
$$da_t = (z_t w + r \, a_t - c_t) dt$$
 (Budget constraint) and
$$a_t \ge \underline{a}$$
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
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
- ▶ z_t Jump processes with two states $\{z_1, z_2\}$ (intensities λ_1, λ_2)
 - c consumption, ρ time pref., $u(\cdot)$ utility (u' > 0, u'' < 0).
 - $a \ge -y_1/r_t$ natural borrowing limit.
 - r_t interest rate, w_t wage : adjust in general equilibrium.
- ► z_t idiosync. productivity can be generalized to diffusions : $dz_t = b(z_t)dt + \sigma(z_t)dB_t$.

Aiyagari-Bewley model: the Household

$$\max_{c_t} \mathbb{E}_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} u(c_t) dt \qquad da_t = (z_t w + r a_t - c_t) dt$$

► The agent controls the drift: here $s_j(a) = z_j w + r a - c_j(a)$ Optimal saving policy function, given by the FOC in the HJB: $c_j(a) = (u')^{-1}(\partial_a v_j(a))$





Aiyagari-Bewley model: the Firm

- ▶ Beside the household, capital is used by a representative firm :
 - Use capital *K* to produce $F(K, L) = A K^{\alpha} z_{av}^{1-\alpha}$
 - Rent it at the interest r,
 - Hire households and pay the wage w.
- ► Capital demand is thus:

$$K(r) := \left(\frac{\alpha A}{r+\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} z_{av}$$

- δ depreciation of capital and A productivity level
- z_{av} is the average productivity of households : $z_{av} = \frac{z_1 \lambda_2 + z_2 \lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$

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- δ depreciation of capital and A productivity level
- z_{av} is the average productivity of households : $z_{av} = \frac{z_1 \lambda_2 + z_2 \lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2}$
- ▶ If one have the capital stock *K*, you could easily compute the interest rate and the wage paid by the firm :

$$w = (1 - \alpha) A K^{\alpha} z_{av}^{-\alpha}$$
$$r = \alpha A K^{\alpha - 1} z_{av}^{1 - \alpha} - \delta$$

Aiyagari-Bewley model: a MFG formulation

- Doing the same computation as above, one obtain the system of PDEs
- ► The stationary case :

$$\rho v_j(a) = \max_c u(c) + \partial_a v_j(a)(z_j w + ra - c) + \lambda_j (v_{-j}(a) - v_j(a))$$
[HJB]
$$0 = \frac{d}{da} [s_j(a) g_j(a)] + \lambda_j g_j(a) - \lambda_{-j} g_{-j}(a)$$
[FP]

$$S(r) := \int_{a}^{\infty} a g_1(a) da + \int_{a}^{\infty} a g_2(a) da = K(r)$$
 [Market clearing]

- ► For the stationary case, these equations are simply ODE...
- ▶ When one add transition dynamics, we obtain PDEs

Aiyagari-Bewley model: a MFG formulation

▶ When studying the dynamics of the system, we obtain :

$$\begin{split} \rho \, v_j(a,t) &= \partial_t v_j(a,t) + \max_c u(c) + \partial_a v_j(a,t) \, s_j(a,t) + \lambda_j (v_{-j}(a,t) - v_j(a,t)) \\ 0 &= \partial_t g^j(a,t) + \frac{d}{da} [s_j(a) \, g_j(a,t)] + \lambda_j g_j(a,t) - \lambda_{-j} g_{-j}(a,t) \\ S(r,t) &:= \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} a \, g_1(a,t) da + \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} a \, g_2(a,t) da = K(r,t) \\ s_j(a,t) &= z_j w_t + r_t \, a - c_j(a,t) & c_j(a,t) = (u')^{-1} (\partial_a v_j(a,t)) \end{split}$$

[Mark

Aiyagari-Bewley model: a MFG formulation

▶ When studying the dynamics of the system, we obtain :

$$\rho v_{j}(a,t) = \partial_{t}v_{j}(a,t) + \max_{c} u(c) + \partial_{a}v_{j}(a,t) s_{j}(a,t) + \lambda_{j}(v_{-j}(a,t) - v_{j}(a,t))$$

$$0 = \partial_{t}g^{j}(a,t) + \frac{d}{da}[s_{j}(a)g_{j}(a,t)] + \lambda_{j}g_{j}(a,t) - \lambda_{-j}g_{-j}(a,t)$$

$$S(r,t) := \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} a \, g_1(a,t) da + \int_{\underline{a}}^{\infty} a \, g_2(a,t) da = K(r,t)$$


$$s_i(a,t) = z_i w_t + r_t a - c_i(a,t) \qquad c_i(a,t) = (u')^{-1} (\partial_a v_i(a,t))$$

[Mark

► Note:

- We obtained as many PDEs as income states (z_1, z_2)
- Idiosyncratic state *j* is a variable of value function. We could have written : v(a, j, t)
- Will matter if z is a diffusion : adding a dimension is not free ...

- ► Two income states : Blue, poor agent, Red, rich agent
 - Dirac point mass at the borrowing constraint!



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 - FOC yields $u'(c_j(\underline{a})) = \partial_a v_j(\underline{a})$
 - Saving given by $s_j(a) = z_j w + r a c_j(a) \ge 0$
- v_j is determined by both (i) the HJB in the interior and (ii) the boundary condition (*).
 - The junction may not be C^2 , \rightarrow viscosity solutions.
 - Cf. any book on stochastic control or B. Moll slides on the topic

- ? provide plenty of different theoretical results :
 - 1. Analysis of household decisions:
 - ► Full characterization of consumption and saving behavior :
 - Decision of the Poor, the Rich, close or far from the constraint
 - ▶ Time needed to hit the credit constraint
 - ▶ MPC and MPS (given by the Feynman-Kac formula!)

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 - If IES ≥ 1 then substitution effect dominates income effect of interest rate →, Capital supply S(r) increasing in r ⇒ Uniqueness
 - 4. Extension to 'soft'-borrowing constraint
 - ▶ Interest rate r higher is a < 0.
 - Theoretical characterization
 - ▶ Match empirical evidence : spike around zero net worth.
- ▶ A general computational algorithm.

Aiyagari-Bewley model: theoretical results

► An Euler equation :

$$(\rho - r)u'(c_j(a)) = u''(c_j(a))c'_j(a)s_j + \lambda_j(u'(c_{-j}(a)) - u'(c_j(a)))$$

- Assumption 1 : Absolution risk aversion R(c) = -u''(c)/u'(c) is finite when wealth a approaches the constraint \underline{a} .
- (Behavior of the poor) if $r < \rho$ and assumption 1 holds, then :
 - (Prop 1) $s_1(\underline{a}) = 0$ and $s_1(a) < 0$, they all decumulate assets except constrained individuals, who consume everything (poverty trap!).
 - (Cor. 1) Poor individuals hit the borrowing constraint in finite time, at a speed proportional to $\nu = (\rho r)IES(c_1)c_1 + \lambda_1(c_2 c_1)$

The algorithm: an overview

- Aim: find the equilibria: i.e. the functions v^j and g^j (j = 1, 2) and the interest rate r.
- ► General structure :
 - 1. Guess interest rate r^{ℓ} , compute capital demand $K(r^{\ell})$ & wages w(K)
 - 2. Solve the HJB using finite differences (semi-implicit method): obtain $s_j^{\ell}(a)$ and then v_j^{ℓ} , by a system of sort : $\rho \mathbf{v} = \mathbf{u}(\mathbf{v}) + \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{v}; r)\mathbf{v}$
 - 3. Using \mathbf{A}^T , solve the FP equation (finite diff. system : $\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{v}; r)^T \mathbf{g} = 0$), and obtain g_j
 - 4. Compute the capital supply $S(\mathbf{g}, r) = \int_{a}^{\infty} a g_1(a) da + \int_{a}^{\infty} a g_2(a) da$
 - 5. If S(r) > K(r), decrease $r^{\ell+1}$ (update using bisection method), and conversely, and come back to step 2.
 - 6. Stop if $S(r) \approx K(r)$

The algorithm : advantages relative to discrete time :

- 1. Borrowing constraint only appears in the boundary conditions
 - FOCs $u'(c(a)) = \partial_a v^j(a)$ and HJB eq. always holds with equality
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
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 - Matrix is sparse (tridiagonal)
 - Continuous space : one step left or one step right
- 4. HJB and FP are coupled
 - The matrix to solve FP is the transpose of the one of HJB.
 - Why? Operator in FP is simply the 'adjoint' of the operator in HJB: 'Two birds one stone'
- Specificity of MFG! Thomas Bourany Heterogeneous agents models - a MFG approach

The algorithm: Finite difference scheme

Finite difference scheme : discretize the state-space a_i for i = 1,...I.

$$\partial_a v_j(a_i) \approx \frac{v_{i+1,j} - v_{i,j}}{\Delta a} \equiv v'_{i,j,F}$$

 $\partial_a v_j(a_i) \approx \frac{v_{i-1,j} - v_{i,j}}{\Delta a} \equiv v'_{i,j,B}$



- ▶ Vector form :
- ▶ Linear system to solve **A** is sparse.

$$\rho \mathbf{v} = \mathbf{u}(\mathbf{v}) + \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{v}; r)\mathbf{v}$$
$$0 = \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{v}; r)^{T}\mathbf{g}$$
$$S(\mathbf{g}, r) = K(r)$$

The algorithm: theoretical results

- ► This numerical solution converges to the unique (viscosity) solution of the HJB, under some conditions:
 - 1. Monotonicity (invertible and inverse positive)
 - 2. Consistent (approx error is majored by powers of step sizes)
 - 3. Stability (iteration in *k* is bounded)
- ▶ Is the matrix monotonous?
 - In the scheme for solving the HJB, one can distinguish if the drift is positive or negative:
 - that is the upwind scheme
 - When s(a) > 0 use $v'_{i,j,F}$, and s(a) < 0, use $v'_{i,j,B}$
 - This insures the convergence of the algorithm

The algorithm: transition dynamics

- ► The algo for transitions is a generalization :
 - Discretization : $v_{i,j}^n$ and $g_{i,j}^n$ stacked into v^n and g^n
 - Somehow, it is more specific to Mean Field Games:

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 - Somehow, it is more specific to Mean Field Games:
- Take advantage of the backward-forward structure of the MFG
 - Make a guess r_t^{ℓ} (t = 1, ..., N) on the *path* interest rates.
 - Solve the HJB (implicit scheme), given terminal condition;

$$\rho v^{n+1} = u^n + \mathbf{A}(v^{n+1}; r^n) v^{n+1} + \frac{v^{n+1} - v^n}{\Delta t}$$
$$v^N = v_{\infty} \qquad \text{(terminal condition = steady state)}$$

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• Solve the FP forward, given the initial condition

$$\frac{g^{n+1} - g^n}{\Delta t} = \mathbf{A}(v^n; r^n)^T g^{n+1}$$
$$g^1 = g_0 \qquad \text{(initial condition)}$$

• Update the interest rates path

The algorithm: wrapping up

- ► This algorithm to compute the dynamics of the system will be used a lot when adding aggregate shocks.
 - HJB start from the end (what agent anticipate) and runs backward until the computation of the initial value function
 - FP start from the beginning (what wealth agents hold) and runs forward to compute the evolution of distributions.
 - If there are discrepancies between capital demand and capital supply, loop to correct the path of interest rate.

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 - If there are discrepancies between capital demand and capital supply, loop to correct the path of interest rate.
- ▶ Performance of the algorithm : (≈ 1000 grid points in space, 400 in time) :
 - Stationary equilibrium: 0.25-0.4 sec
 - Transition dynamics : around 50 secs
 - MIT shocks or perfect foresight.
 - ▶ 10^{-6} error on the path of interest rate.
 - What about anticipated shocks?

- ► That is where things start to complicate!
 - MFG literature, aggregate shocks referred as 'common noise'
- ► We still have the same household problem Don't remember?
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 - Need your opinion on this!
 - ► According to me : need to endogenize it;)

- ▶ Why will it matter? (for household?)
- Affect firm's production, capital demand and ... interest rate and wages!

$$w_t = (1 - \alpha) A_t K^{\alpha} z_{av}^{-\alpha}$$

$$r_t = \alpha A_t K^{\alpha - 1} z_{av}^{1 - \alpha} - \delta$$


► Household will anticipate (through *v*) the rise or fall of wages, and change their saving behavior accordingly (*s* and thus *g*)


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- ► This way, build a 'tree' of different path of productivity, and from each node growing different branches
 - Taking $\Delta T \rightarrow 0$, you can approximate any process.
- ▶ On each branch (between each shock), compute the evolution of the MFG system (HJB and FP) and equilibrium $v(a,j,t,\tilde{A})$ and $g(a,j,t,\tilde{A})$.

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- ▶ On each branch (between each shock), compute the evolution of the MFG system (HJB and FP) and equilibrium $v(a,j,t,\tilde{A})$ and $g(a,j,t,\tilde{A})$.
- ▶ Need to link the different branches together in the appropriate way

- Two examples of trees, with M = 4 (qualitative example) and M = 6 (quantitative ¹).
- ▶ left : 16 different paths, right : 64 paths.





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- ▶ How what one compute the evolution of the MFG accounting for future and past shocks? $(m \in \{1, \dots, M\})$
- ► Use the boundary conditions of the PDEs!
 - t_m^- : time before revelation of the shock $(A_{t_m^-} = A_m)$ t_m^+ : time when shocks hits $(A_{t_m^+} = A_{m+1} \text{ take 2 (or } K) \text{ values)}$

$$v(a,j,t_m^-,A_m) = \sum_{k|A_{m+1}=A_k} \mathbb{P}(A_{m+1}|A_m) v(a,j,t_m^+,A_{m+1})$$
$$g(a,j,t_m^-,A_m) = g(a,j,t_m^+,A_{m+1})$$

- ▶ How what one compute the evolution of the MFG accounting for future and past shocks? $(m \in \{1, \dots, M\})$
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- ► Agents are forward looking, form expectations over the different set of future branches
- ► Continuity of $g(\cdot)$ in time t

- ► Remarks:
 - 1. At the final time T_M , the MFG is at its stationary eq. with its own productivity A_M .
 - 2. Need to compute the system of PDEs on all the branches
- After all this, loop on the path of interest rate to adjust demand and supply of capital.
 - Why?


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 - ▶ Nice, since the FP runs forward, no?
- ▶ In practice, this loop on prices may take a long time.


Results – aggregate variables

▶ For each branch, one can compute capital stock and interest rates



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
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Results – v solution to HJB


- ► The value function evolves across time, with productivity
- ► Movie?

Results – v solution to HJB

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Results – jump in v




Results – g solution to FP


- ► The wealth distribution evolves across time, with productivity
- ► Movie?

Results -g solution to FP


► The wealth distribution evolves across time, with productivity




▶ The wealth distribution evolves across time, in the best case scenario (i.e. productivity increases!)




► The wealth distribution evolve across time, in the *worst* case scenario (i.e. productivity decreases!)




► The wealth distribution evolve across time, in the *best* case scenario (i.e. productivity increases!) [poor]




► The wealth distribution evolve across time, in the *worst* case scenario (i.e. productivity decreases!) [poor]




► The wealth distribution evolve across time, in the *worst* case scenario (i.e. productivity decreases!) [from behind]



► The wealth distribution evolve across time, in the *best* case scenario (i.e. productivity increases!) [rich]




► The wealth distribution evolve across time, in the *worst* case scenario (i.e. productivity decreases!) [rich]



Results – mathematical objective


- ► The main idea, mathematically, is to be able to compute v(a, j, t, A) and g(a, j, t, A) for any value of A.
- ▶ Solving infinite-dimensional equation, i.e. the master-equation.
- Here, discretization procedure inspired by Carmona, Delarue and Lacker
- (btw : only 'weak equilibrium', question of adaptability of the solution)
- ► However, can still have a good approximation :

Results – objective – g(a, 1, t, A)




Results – objective – g(a, 2, t, A)







- ▶ Need to compare the heterogeneous agent model with the Brock-Mirman (72) model
 - i.e. stochastic growth model, or RBC when adding endogenous labor supply
- ▶ I made use of the deterministic neoclassical growth model
- ► I build an approximation scheme for the Brownian motion, as before
- ► Solve the RBC (B/M) model on each branch of the tree
- ► Compare the graph quantitatively (with 6 shocks)


➤ On the left the Krusell/Smith model, on the right the Brock/Mirman (look at the scale!)





▶ What about interest rate? left K/S, right B/M, (look at the scale!)





- Precautionary savings reduce the fluctuation caused by productivity shocks
 - Capital: Best case scenario: decrease from 3 to 1.6 the aggregate level of capital
 - Interest rate: Worst case scenario: decrease from 22% to 10 % the interest rate.
- ► Smooth the business cycle!
- Well-known fact in such type of models!
- Precautionary saving with aggregate shocks: important quantitatively

Computational challenge

TABLE – Summary – computational cost

Number of shock	Number of	Computing time		Number of computations	
('waves')	branches	(sec.)	(min.)	H.J.B.	F.P.
2	4	70	1.6	285	210
3	8	240	4	578	403
4	16	510	8.5	1158	783
5	32	1196	19	2320	1545
6	64	2252	37	3071	2063

This without counting the cost of storage of large 4 - D arrays (may reach several Gb when $M \ge 7$)

Several limitation and future research

- 1. Computing time may be quite long, for $M \ge 7$
 - Solution : parallelize the algo, code it in C++ (internship : task 1)
 - Code it in Julia/Fortran (faster?), use cloud computing (planned)
- 2. What about endogenous labor supply?
 - With controls on c, s and ℓ : more heterogeneity
 - Solution: loop over wages to clear labor markets (algo ready, internship: task 2)
- 3. Idiosyncratic shocks follow 2 states process (boring?) What about income as diffusion?
 - Solution: Done in stationary equilibrium, need to study common noise (internship: task 3)
- 4. What if idiosyncratic shock is correlated to aggregate state
 - Solution : λ_j (or b/σ if diffusion) change with A_t (internship : task 4)

Several limitation and future research

- 5. Is it better than Reiter and Winberry's algorithm to study aggregate uncertainty?
 - Avoid linearization, can use large shocks
 - Comparison with discrete time methods (planned)
- 6. And Krusell/Smith? Does it feature approximate aggregation?
 - Comparison with their algo (planned)
- 7. Extension to fat-tailed wealth distribution:
 - Wealth in illiquid asset/wealth hand-to-mouth behavior (Kaplan/Violante)
 - Need to add one dimension (internship: task 5 maybe)
- 8. What about the data? Does it fit the business cycle time series? the micro data?
- 9. Extension with a demand side? HANK?
- 10. Fiscal/Monetary policy?
- 11. Any suggestion?

Conclusion

- ► MFG : high entry cost (need to study PDEs) but numerical algorithm more or less straightforward.
- Relevant framework to study evolution of wealth distributions along aggregate fluctuations
- Powerful tool with great adaptability / generalization of other models
- ► Thank you for your attention!

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Brownian motion

- ► This is the "continuous-time" stochastic process which is the closest to a random-walk.
- ▶ We define as a *Brownian motion* the continuous process W_t valued in \mathbb{R} such that :
 - 1. The function $t \mapsto W_t(\omega)$ is continuous on \mathbb{R}_+
 - 2. For all $0 \le s < t$, the increment $W_t W_s$ is independent of $\sigma(W_u, u \le s)$
 - 3. For all $t \ge s \ge 0$, $W_t W_s$ follows the normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$


Go back

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 - The brownian motion is "standard" if $W_0 = 0$ and $\sigma = 1$.
 - Here, the Brownian motion is a martingale
 - It is used to model any "small" shock in a continuous-time finance/macro models.
- By Donsker theorem, one can show that a "normal"-random-walk converges in law toward a BM, when time increment goes to zero.

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Itô's formula

For any X_t Itô process :

$$dX_t = b_t dt + \sigma_t dB_t$$

and any $C^{1,2}$ scalar function f(t,x) of two real variables t and x, one has :

$$df(t,X_t) = \left(\frac{\partial f}{\partial t} + b_t \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} + \frac{\sigma_t^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial x^2}\right) dt + \sigma_t \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} dB_t$$

For vector-valued processes $\mathbf{X}_t = (X_t^1, X_t^2, \dots, X_t^n)$

$$d\mathbf{X}_t = \boldsymbol{b}_t dt + \sigma_t d\mathbf{B}_t$$

The Itô formula rewrites :

$$df(t, \mathbf{X}_{t}) = \frac{\partial f}{\partial t}(t, X_{t}) dt + \sum_{i=1}^{d} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_{i}}(t, X_{t}) dX_{t}^{i} + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i,j=1}^{d} \frac{\partial^{2} f}{\partial x_{i} \partial x_{j}}(t, X_{t}) d < X^{i}, X^{j} >_{t}$$

$$= \partial_{t} f dt + \nabla_{x} f \cdot d\mathbf{X}_{t} + \frac{1}{2} Tr \left(\sigma_{t} \sigma_{t}^{T} D_{xx}^{2} f \right) dt,$$

$$= \left\{ \partial_{t} f + \nabla_{x} f \cdot \mathbf{b}_{t} + \frac{1}{2} Tr \left(\sigma_{t} \sigma_{t}^{T} D_{xx}^{2} f \right) \right\} dt + \nabla_{x} f \cdot \sigma_{t} d\mathbf{B}_{t}$$

Feyman Kac - a general formula

► Consider the function

$$v(t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0} \left[\int_{t_0}^T e^{-\int_{t_0}^s r(u, X_u) du} f(s, X_s) ds + e^{-\int_{t_0}^T r(u, X_u) du} g(X_T) \right] \qquad \forall (t, x) \in [0, T] \times 1$$

Supposing that X follows the SDE:

$$\begin{cases} dX_t = b(t, X_t)dt + \sigma(t, X_t)dB_t \\ X_{t_0} = x_0 \qquad (t_0, x_0) \in [0, T] \times \mathbb{R}^d \end{cases}$$

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The Feynman-Kac formula tells us that v is solution to the PDE:

$$\begin{cases} r(t,x) v(t,x) - \partial_t v(t,x) - \nabla_x v(t,x) \cdot b - \frac{1}{2} Tr \left(\sigma \sigma^T D_{xx}^2 v(t,x) \right) = f(t,x) \\ v(T,.) = g \end{cases}$$

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Supposing that *X* follows the SDE :

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- Moreover, if w(t, x) is $C^{1,2}$ and has bounded derivative, then w(t, x) = v(t, x), i.e. admits the representation above.
 - Intuitions: a function v of X subject to a diffusion can be represented by the expected future value g, adding running gain f and discounting r
- ▶ Used a lot in finance to compute option prices (Black-Scholes)
 - One can compute w using Monte-Carlo methods for instance

Operators - a primer

- If Operators are the infinite-dimensional version of matrices, Adjoint operator are the "equivalent" of transpose matrices.
- Most of the time an operator is a function applied on function :
 - Example : $\nabla : \mathcal{C}^1 \to \mathcal{C}^0, f \mapsto \nabla f$
- ► The basic idea of linear algebra extend to functional spaces :

$$\langle Mv_1, v_2 \rangle = \langle v_1, M^T v_2 \rangle$$

The only difference is that inner product is "replaced" by duality brackets. For conventional functional spaces, it is "defined" as follow:

$$\langle f, g \rangle = \int_{\mathbb{R}^d} f(x) g(x) dx$$

The nice thing is that you get more flexibility : f or g can be much less regular : it can be probability measure $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{R}^d)$ or "distributions" $\mathcal{D}'(\mathbb{R}^d)$ for instance.

Operators - a primer

- ▶ This flexibility has a cost : one of the two functions should be regular enough to compensate for the irregularity of the other.
 - For instance, $f = \varphi \in \mathcal{C}_c$ and $g = m \in \mathcal{P}$:

$$\langle L\varphi, m \rangle = \int_{\mathbb{R}^d} L[\varphi](x) \, m(dx)$$

Let's transpose an operator! For our first example, $f \in \mathcal{C}^1$ and $g \in \mathcal{C}_c$ (compact support). Then, we already knew the result, actually (by integration by part):

$$\begin{split} \langle \nabla f, g \rangle &= \int_{\mathbb{R}^d} \nabla f(x) g(x) dx = \sum_i^d \int_{\mathbb{R}} \partial_{x^i} f(x^i) g(x^i) dx^i \\ &= \sum_i \left[f g \right]_{-\infty}^{\infty} - \sum_i^d \int_{\mathbb{R}} f(x^i) \partial_{x^i} g(x^i) dx^i \\ &= - \int_{\mathbb{R}^d} f(x) \nabla g(x) dx \\ &= - \langle f, \nabla g \rangle \end{split}$$

► This can be generalized, even if $f \notin C^1$. (Important, e.g. if the measure/ distribution of agents has (Dirac) mass points (at the credit constraint in our case).

Operators - a primer

- ► Following this technique, one can find the adjoints of common operators.
- ▶ Here are a few of them, with $\varphi \in \mathcal{C}_c^{\infty}$ and $m \in \mathcal{D}'$:
 - The gradient is given above : $\langle \nabla \varphi, m \rangle = -\langle f, \nabla g \rangle$
 - "Scaled" gradient : $\langle b\nabla\varphi, m\rangle = -\langle \varphi, div(b\,m)\rangle$
 - The Laplacian Δ is self-adjoint (\approx symmetrical) : $\langle \Delta \varphi, m \rangle = \langle \varphi, \Delta m \rangle$
 - "Scaled Laplacian: $\langle \sigma \sigma^T \Delta \varphi, m \rangle = \langle \varphi, D_{xx}^2 (\sigma \sigma^T m) \rangle$
- ► Remember : $div[f] = \sum_{i}^{d} \partial_{x_{i}} f$ and $\Delta f = Tr(D_{xx}^{2} f)$
- These formulas should be useful for most cases found in economics.
 - Still not convinced?
- When we discretize the operators numerically (in the finite difference scheme), this will yield matrices that we can transpose without problem... Go back