

Supply chain uncertainty and diversification

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Supply chain disruption risk and firms' sentiments




Figure 1: Average sentiment




Figure 2: Average risk

- Hassan et al. (2023): Text-based measures on earning calls dedicated to the event of interest: *"Supply chain risk"*
 - Sentiment: perceived impact on the **mean** of the firm's economic outlook
 - Risk: perceived impact on the **variance** of the firm's economic outlook

Research question and results

- ▶ How does supply chain uncertainty affect firms' sourcing decision?
 - Would firms be sourcing from foreign countries to diversify against this risk? Or will they be re-shoring instead?
 - Would firms import from cheaper or less risky/riskier countries?

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 - Counterfactual analysis: changes in uncertainty and impact on firms sourcing, both on the *extensive* and *intensive* margin

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 - Multi-country sourcing model with supply chain idiosyncratic and aggregate *uncertainty*
 - Counterfactual analysis: changes in uncertainty and impact on firms sourcing, both on the *extensive* and *intensive* margin
- ▶ Preview of the results:
 - Theoretically, ambiguous effect of risks
 - ▷ Firm-level uncertainty affects sourcing capability: option-value effect
 - ▷ Aggregate risk affects market demand: hedging effect
 - Increase in uncertainty increases foreign sourcing via both margins: Option value effect dominates hedging effect
 - Mean-preserving uncertainty was not the only mechanism at play during the post-Covid-19 trade disruption events

Related Literature

- ▶ Sourcing models
 - ▶ Antràs and Helpman (2004), Antràs and Helpman (2006), Antràs, Fort, and Tintelnot (2017), Bernard and Moxnes (2018)
 - Study supply chain disruption risk in multi-country sourcing model
- ▶ Uncertainty in trade
 - ▶ Theory: Grossman, Helpman, and L'Huillier (2023), Grossman, Helpman, and Sabal (2023), Gervais (2021, 2018)
 - Multi-country model allows for sourcing interdependencies and to separate effect of cost and uncertainty, aggregate and idiosyncratic.
 - Structural estimation with micro data and counterfactual analysis
 - ▶ Tariff policy uncertainty: Handley et al. (2020), Handley and Limão (2017), Charoenwong et al. (2023)
 - General framework for policy, supply-chain risk, and trade shocks
 - ▶ Trade disruption shocks Carreras-Valle (2021), Castro-Vincenzi (2022), Lafrogne-Joussier et al. (2022)
 - Analyze uncertainty and firm's sourcing choice using structural model
 - ▶ Empirical literature on propagation through trade networks: Caselli et al. (2020), Boehm et al. (2019), Carvalho et al. (2021), LaBelle et al. (2021), D'Aguanno et al. (2021)
 - Study of firms' joint sourcing and diversification decision

Model: Set-up and timeline

- ▶ Multi-country sourcing model inspired from [Antràs, Fort, and Tintelnot \(2017\)](#)
 - I countries. Origin: i , Destination: j .
 - Final-good producers in j , with productivity φ , produce a single variety – with monopolistic competition – using a unit measure of intermediate inputs
 - Sourcing from set of countries $\mathcal{I}_j(\varphi)$
 - Trade from intermediate good firms in countries $i \in I$, perfect competition, productivity follows Fréchet distribution with shape θ : $\mathbb{P}(a_i(\nu, \varphi) \geq a) = e^{-T_i a^\theta}$

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 - Supply chain risk from i to j for firm φ : [aggregate](#) and [idiosyncratic](#) shock

$$p_{ij}(\nu, \varphi) \equiv \tau_{ij} \bar{\gamma}_{ij} \tilde{\gamma}_{ij}(\varphi) w_i$$


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$$p_{ij}(\nu, \varphi) \equiv \tau_{ij} \bar{\gamma}_{ij} \tilde{\gamma}_{ij}(\varphi) w_i$$

- Household consumes final goods as a CES bundle with elasticity σ

▶ Three-stages firms decisions



Model: Firm Behavior Conditional on Sourcing Strategy, $\mathcal{I}_j(\varphi)$

- Share of intermediate input purchases for realized shocks:

$$\mathcal{X}_{ij}(\varphi, \gamma) = \frac{T_i(\tau_{ij} \bar{\gamma}_{ij} \tilde{\gamma}_{ij}(\varphi) w_i)^{-\theta}}{\Theta_j(\varphi, \bar{\gamma}_{ij} \tilde{\gamma}_{ij}(\varphi))} \text{ if } i \in \mathcal{I}_j$$

$\Rightarrow T_i(\tau_{ij} \bar{\gamma}_{ij} \tilde{\gamma}_{ij}(\varphi) w_i)^{-\theta}$: *sourcing potential* of country i from the point of view of firm φ in country j

$\Rightarrow \Theta_j(\varphi, \bar{\gamma}_{ij} \tilde{\gamma}_{ij}(\varphi)) \equiv \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}_j(\varphi)} T_k(\tau_{kj} \bar{\gamma}_{kj} \tilde{\gamma}_{kj}(\varphi) w_k)^{-\theta}$: *sourcing capability* of firm φ in country j

\Rightarrow *Ex-post* Eaton and Kortum, within the firm

Model: Choice of Set of Countries to Import from, $\mathcal{I}_j(\varphi)$

- Choice of \mathcal{I} using ex-ante profits, with $\mathcal{I}_j(\varphi) = \{i : \mathbb{1}_{ij} = 1\}$:

$$\max_{\mathbb{1}_{ij} \in \{0,1\}_{i=1}^I} \mathbb{E}(\pi_j(\varphi, \gamma)) = \mathbb{E} \left(\underbrace{\varphi^{\sigma-1}}_{\text{prod}} \underbrace{\left(\eta \sum_{i=1}^I \mathbb{1}_{ij} T_i (\tau_{ij} \bar{\gamma}_{ij} \tilde{\gamma}_{ij}(\varphi) w_i)^{-\theta} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\theta}}}_{\substack{\text{sourcing capability} \\ \Theta_j(\varphi, \gamma(\varphi))}} \underbrace{B_j(\bar{\gamma})}_{\substack{\text{market} \\ \text{demand}}} \right) - w_j \sum_{i=1}^I \mathbb{1}_{ij} f_{ij}$$

- With market demand in j defined as

$$B_j(\bar{\gamma}) \equiv \frac{1}{\sigma} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} E_j P_j(\bar{\gamma})^{\sigma-1}$$


⇒ Effect through price index Price index

Decomposition: What determines profits?


- The firms maximizes expected profit for their sourcing decision

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathbb{E}[\pi(\varphi, \gamma)] = & \varphi^{\sigma-1} \left(\underbrace{\Theta_H(\varphi, \mathbb{E}[\gamma])^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\theta}}}_{\text{Sourcing capability for expected shock}} \right. \\
 & + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[\Theta_H(\varphi, \gamma)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\theta}} - \Theta_H(\varphi, \mathbb{E}[\gamma])^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\theta}}]}_{\text{Risk effect on capability}} \Big) \times \underbrace{\mathbb{E}(B_H(\bar{\gamma}))}_{\text{Expected market demand}} \\
 & + \varphi^{\sigma-1} \underbrace{\text{Cov}(\Theta_H(\varphi, \gamma)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\theta}}, B_H(\bar{\gamma}))}_{\text{Covariance btw sourcing capability \& market demand}} - \underbrace{w_j \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}(\varphi)} f_{ij}}_{\text{Fixed cost of sourcing}}
 \end{aligned}$$

Profit Decomposition – 3 Countries Example



Profit and Firm sourcing



- ▶ Proprietary administrative data from the Central Bank of Chile:
 - **Customs** country-to-firm level data: import unit values, quantities, origin countries, and product categories
 - **Tax Form 29:** sales and materials purchases
 - **Unemployment Funds:** employer-employee level data.
 - Quarterly panel from 2012 to 2023.
- ▶ Publicly available data (yearly):
 - (i) CEPII gravity data set (population weighted distance, and common language): 2003-2021.
 - (ii) World Bank WGI (control of corruption): 2003-2021.

Structural Estimation: Step 1, Average Sourcing Potential

We want to estimate the parameters and risk $\bar{\gamma}_{ij}, \tilde{\gamma}_{ij}^n, f_{ij}^n$.

- ▶ Take θ and σ from [Antràs et al. \(2017\)](#), so $\theta = 1.789$ and $\sigma = 3.85$,
 $\Rightarrow (\sigma - 1)/\theta = 1.593 > 1$
- ▶ Use model-derived relationship:

$$\log \chi_{ij,t}^n = \underbrace{\log T_i - \theta (\log \tau_{ij} + \log w_i)}_{\log \bar{\xi}_i} - \underbrace{\theta (\log \bar{\gamma}_{ij,t} + \log \tilde{\gamma}_{ij,t}^n)}_{\log \epsilon_{it}^n} - \log \Theta_{j,t}^n(\gamma)$$

if $i \in \mathcal{I}_j$, and re-write it in terms of a country FE and a firm-level error term

- ▶ Take log differences and set domestic sourcing potential to 1 so that:

$$\log \chi_{ij,t}^n - \log \chi_{jj,t}^n = \log \bar{\xi}_i + \log \epsilon_{i,t}^n$$

- ▶ Run OLS using data on firms' total imports from each country, wage bill, and total input usage to measure shares, to obtain $\bar{\xi}_i$

Results

Structural Estimation: Step 2, Estimating Shocks

- ▶ Let us define $\hat{\xi}_{i,t} = T_i (\tau_{ij} \bar{\gamma}_{ij,t} w_i)^{-\theta}$ and $\hat{\epsilon}_{i,t}^n = (\tilde{\gamma}_{ij,t}^n)^{-\theta}$, take first-differences over log sourcing share differences to identify shocks:

$$\Delta_{t,t-4} (\log \mathcal{X}_{ij,t}^n - \log \mathcal{X}_{jj,t}^n) = \Delta_{t,t-4} (\log \hat{\xi}_{i,t} + \log \hat{\epsilon}_{i,t}^n)$$

- ▶ Recover shocks as:
 - $\Delta_{t,t-4} \log \hat{\xi}_{i,t} = -\theta \log \bar{\gamma}_{i,t} / \bar{\gamma}_{i,t-4}$
 - $\Delta_{t,t-4} \log \hat{\epsilon}_{i,t}^n = -\theta \log \tilde{\gamma}_{i,t}^n / \tilde{\gamma}_{i,t-4}^n$
- ▶ To recover $\bar{\gamma}_{ij,t}$ and $\tilde{\gamma}_{ij,t}^n$, and $\bar{\sigma}^2$ and $\tilde{\sigma}^2$, we assume
 - Trend process follows random walk
 - Initial values are equal to 1, i.e., no shock,
 - Data follows a log-normal distribution.

Results, Chile-China/US

Structural Estimation: Step 3, Fixed Costs Estimation

- ▶ Use average 2012q1-2019q4 data.
- ▶ Firm-country fixed-costs depend on gravity related variables and control of corruption
 - $f_{ij}^n \sim \text{log-normal}(\log \beta_c^f + \beta_d^f \log \text{distance}_{ij} + \log \beta_l^f \text{language}_{ij} + \beta_C^f \text{control of corruption}_i, \beta_{disp,f}^n)$
 - We assume $f_{jj}^n = 0$.
- ▶ SMM to estimate

$$\delta = [E, \bar{f}_{\text{CHN}}, \bar{f}_{\text{USA}}, \bar{f}_{\text{ROW}}, \beta_{c,f}^n, \beta_{d,f}^n, \beta_{l,f}^n, \beta_{C,f}^n, \beta_{\text{disp},f}^n]$$

- ▶ Draw shocks:
 - Draw aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks γ from previous distrib.
 - Draw firm productivity φ from a Pareto distribution.
 - Draw firm-level fixed costs from Normal distribution.

- ▶ Moment selection: m_k data, $\hat{m}_k(\delta)$ simulated
 1. Share of importers for all firms.
 2. Share of importers with firm sales below the median.
 3. Share of firms that import from each country.
 - ▶ $(I - 1) \times 1$ vector of moments.
 4. Share of firms whose input purchases from Chile are less than the median input purchases from Chile in the data.
- ▶ High dimensionality combinatorial problem:
 - ⇒ Use Jia's algorithm.
- ▶ Minimize $\hat{\delta} = \arg \min_{\delta} \hat{y}(\delta)^{\top} \mathbf{W} \hat{y}(\delta)$
 - ▶ We use $\hat{y}(\delta) = (\mathbf{m}/\hat{\mathbf{m}}(\delta) - 1)$ and assume $\mathbb{E}(\hat{y}(\delta_0)) = 0$ for the true parameter δ_0 .

Model Fit


Jia's

Counterfactual exercise

- ▶ Estimate model using average values from 2012-2019
- ▶ Re-estimate model using average standard deviation for aggregate shocks in period 2020-2023
- ▶ Evaluate effects on shares of importing firms by country (extensive margin) and decompose effects on shares of intermediate purchases by country
- ▶ Evaluate correlation btw change in agg. uncertainty and these effects
- ▶ Evaluate effect on HHI

Change in aggregate uncertainty


Figure 3: Change in the mean and standard deviation of aggregate shock




(a) Change in $\mathbb{E}(\bar{\gamma}_{ij})$

Change in aggregate uncertainty

Figure 3: Change in the mean and standard deviation of aggregate shock



(a) Change in $E(\tilde{\gamma}_{ij})$



(b) Change in $\sigma(\tilde{\gamma}_{ij})$

Variation in aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty




Figure 5: Change in std dev of aggregate shock





Figure 6: Change in std dev of idiosyncratic shock


Change in proportion of importing firms

Figure 7: Share of importing firms by country



Change in mean and variance

Figure 8: Extensive v/s intensive margin (% change)



Decomposition of average shares into margins

- ▶ Extensive margin:

$$\lambda_{ij} = \int_{\varphi} \mathbb{1}\{i \in \mathcal{I}_j(\varphi)\} dG(\varphi)$$

- ▶ Decomposition:


$$\bar{\chi}_{ij} \equiv \mathbb{E}_{\gamma} \left[\int_{\varphi} \chi_{ij}(\varphi, \gamma) dG_j(\varphi) \right] = \underbrace{\lambda_{ij}}_{\text{extensive margin}} \times \underbrace{\frac{\bar{\chi}_{ij}}{\lambda_{ij}}}_{\text{intensive margin}}$$

- ▶ We hence plot, for each country i , the decomposition:

$$\Delta\% \bar{\chi}_{ij} \approx \Delta\% \lambda_{ij} + \Delta\% \frac{\bar{\chi}_{ij}}{\lambda_{ij}}$$

Change in margins

Figure 9: Extensive v/s intensive margin (% change)



► Conclusion:

- a. Theoretically, main effect from decrease in overall cost through increased competition. However, uncertainty affects firms' sourcing decisions non trivially.
- b. Counterfactual:
 - Increase in uncertainty increases foreign sourcing via both the extensive margin and the intensive margin.
- c. Even though aggregate uncertainty has two opposing forces, the option value effect dominates over the hedging effect.

► Next steps:

- Introduce aggregate shocks correlation (Covid-19)
- Any feedback for the future of the project is very welcome

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- The price index is:

$$P_j(\bar{\gamma}) = \left(\int_{\tilde{\varphi}} \int_{\tilde{\gamma}(\varphi)} p_j(\varphi, \gamma)^{1-\sigma} d\tilde{\Psi}_j^\varphi(\tilde{\gamma}) dG_j(\varphi) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

with:

$$p_j(\varphi, \gamma) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{1}{\varphi} \underbrace{\left(\eta \Theta_j(\varphi, \gamma) \right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}}_{mc_j(\varphi)}$$

$$\text{and } \eta = \left[\Gamma \left(\frac{\theta+1-\rho}{\theta} \right) \right]^{\frac{\theta}{1-\rho}}$$

Back

Proposition 1

1. Higher productivity firms will increase their expected profits by sourcing more from more or “better” countries:

$$\mathbb{E} \left(\Theta_j(\mathcal{I}_j(\varphi_H, \gamma(\varphi_H)))^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\theta}} B_j(\bar{\gamma}) \right) > \mathbb{E} \left(\Theta_j(\mathcal{I}_j(\varphi_L, \gamma(\varphi_L)))^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\theta}} B_j(\bar{\gamma}) \right)$$

2. If $\sigma - 1 > \theta$, import countries are **complements** in the sourcing decisions
 - ▶ More productive firms source from more countries
 - ▶ Pecking order: Same ordering of countries if fixed costs are the same across firms

Back

Closing the model: gravity and HHI

- ▶ Outside sector, freely tradable and big enough to pin down wages
- ▶ Using free entry condition and Fubini's theorem:

$$N_j = \frac{\alpha L_j}{\sigma \left(\int_{\tilde{\varphi}_j}^{\infty} \int_{\tilde{\gamma}(\varphi)} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_j(\varphi)} f_{ij} d\Psi_{ij}^{\varphi}(\tilde{\gamma}) dG_i(\varphi) + f_{ej} \right)}$$

- ▶ Gravity:

$$M_{ij}(\bar{\gamma}) = \frac{E_j}{P_j(\bar{\gamma})^{1-\sigma} / N_j} \frac{Q_i}{\sum_k \frac{E_k}{P_k(\bar{\gamma})^{1-\sigma} / N_k} (\tau_{ik} \bar{\gamma}_{ik})^{-\theta} \Lambda_{ik}(\bar{\gamma})} (\tau_{ij} \bar{\gamma}_{ij})^{-\theta} \Lambda_{ij}(\bar{\gamma})$$

with $Q_i = \sum_k M_{ik}$ total production of intermediate inputs in i

- ▶ Model-implied HHI:

$$HHI_j = \sum_{i=1}^I \left(\frac{T_i (\tau_{ij} \bar{\gamma}_{ij} w_i)^{-\theta} \Lambda_{ij}(\bar{\gamma})}{\sum_{k=1}^I T_k (\tau_{kj} \bar{\gamma}_{kj} w_k)^{-\theta} \Lambda_{kj}(\bar{\gamma})} \right)^2$$

Parameterization


Variable	Definition	Value
$SD(\gamma)$	Standard deviation of shock	0.25
ρ	Substitutability across intermediate varieties	2.00
I	Number of countries	3.00
$T_D(\tau_D w_D)^{-\theta}$	Domestic sourcing potential	1.00
$T_{F1}(\tau_{F1} w_{F1})^{-\theta}$	Sourcing potential Foreign 1	0.10
$T_{F2}(\tau_{F2} w_{F2})^{-\theta}$	Sourcing potential Foreign 2	0.03
N	Number of domestic firms	150
f_D	Fixed cost of sourcing Domestic	0.00
f_{F1}	Fixed cost of sourcing Foreign 1	0.22
f_{F2}	Fixed cost of sourcing Foreign 2	0.12
<i>Calibration for high complementarity $(\sigma - 1)/\theta = 1.58$ following Antràs et al. (2017)</i>		
σ	Elasticity of final demand	3.85
θ	Productivity Fréchet distribution shape	1.79
<i>Calibration for medium complementarity $(\sigma - 1)/\theta = 1.00$</i>		
σ	Elasticity of final demand	3.1
θ	Productivity Fréchet distribution shape	2.1
<i>Calibration for low complementarity $(\sigma - 1)/\theta = 0.482$</i>		
σ	Elasticity of final demand	2.30
θ	Productivity Fréchet distribution shape	2.70

Back

Table 1: Targeted Moments

Moments	Data	Model
Share of importers	0.226	0.1959
Share imp. w/sales below median	0.082	0.0848
Median input purchases	124.430	112.56

Figure 10: Model fit: share of importers by country



Jia's Algorithm

- ▶ Proposition: $\forall i$, define mapping $V_{ij}(\varphi, \mathcal{I})$ to be one whenever including country i in sourcing strategy \mathcal{I} raises firm-level expected profits $\mathbb{E}(\pi_j(\varphi, \mathcal{I}))$, and a value of zero o/w. Then, when $(\sigma - 1)/\theta \geq 1$, $V_{ij}(\varphi, \mathcal{I}') \geq V_{ij}(\varphi, \mathcal{I})$ for $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathcal{I}'$


- ▶ Algorithm:
 1. Let $V_i^n(\mathcal{I}) = 1$ if mg. ben. of adding country i is positive and 0 o/w

 2. When starting from set $\underline{\mathcal{I}}$ (no countries), iteratively add each country to the set (lower bound set)
 - ▶ Optimal sourcing strategy: minimum # of countries s.t. $V_i^n(\mathcal{I}) = 1$

 3. Then, starting from set $\bar{\mathcal{I}}$, remove 1-by-1 and find optimal sourcing str. (upper bound set)


 4. If sets do not overlap, only consider profits of upper bound set

Figure 11: Sourcing potential and extensive margin



Estimated Aggregate Supply Chain Disruption Shocks

Figure 12: Aggregate supply chain disruption shock $\bar{\gamma}_{ij,t}$



[Back](#)

Results: Fixed cost estimation

Table 2: Estimated Parameters Without Uncertainty

E	fc_{CHN}	fc_{USA}	fc_{ROW}	β_c^f	β_d^f	β_l^f	β_C^f	β_{disp}^f
222.42	19.258	7.635	2.624	1.272	0.255	1.093	-0.368	0.691

Figure 13: Estimated Sourcing Potential and Median Fixed Cost

