THOMAS BOURANY

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Research and Teaching Fields

Primary: Macroeconomics, Environmental Economics, International Trade

Secondary: Monetary Economics, Public Finance, Computational Econonomics, Macro-Finance

Education

University of Chicago, Ph.D. Economics 2019–2025

University of Chicago, M.A. ECONOMICS 2018–2019

MAPSS

UPMC – Sorbonne Université, M.Sc. Mathematics 2016–2018

Applied Mathematics for Modeling, with honors

Sciences Po, École Polytechnique & Ensae, M.A. ECONOMICS 2014–2016

Economics and Public Policies (EPP)

Sciences Po. & UPMC–Sorbonne Université, Dual Bachelor 2011–2014

Sciences and Social Sciences, with honors

o B.A. Social Sciences, "Diplôme du Collège universitaire" – Sciences Po Paris

o B.Sc. Mathematics – UPMC-Sorbonne Paris

• Exchange program – Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, Chennai, India

References

Professor Mikhaïl Golosov (Chair) Professor Esteban Rossi-Hansberg

University of Chicago University of Chicago

Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics

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University of Chicago University of Chicago

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The Optimal Design of Climate Agreements, Inequality, Trade and Incentives for Carbon Policy

Abstract: Fighting climate change requires ambitious global policies, which are undermined by free-riding incentives. The heterogeneity in both the impacts of climate change and the costs of carbon taxation exacerbate non-cooperation which make the implementation of multilateral climate agreements difficult. This paper studies how to design an optimal climate club – in the spirit of Nordhaus (2015) – to maximize global welfare, incorporating strategic behavior when countries can exit climate agreements. In a Integrated Assessment Model with heterogeneous countries and international trade, I study the choice of countries in the agreement, the optimal level of carbon tax that members set on fossil fuels, and the tariffs they impose on non-members to incentivizes participation. This reveals a tradeoff between an intensive margin – a club with few countries and large individual emission reductions – and an extensive margin – accommodating more countries at the cost of lowering the carbon tax. I find that the optimal climate club consists of all countries except Russia, a \$100 tax per ton of CO₂ within the club, and a 50% tariff on goods from non-members. In contrast, the globally optimal carbon tax is \$150, when free-riding is absent. In several extensions, I study additional policy instruments, such as transfers or fossil-fuel specific tariffs.

Working Papers

Inequality, Climate Change, and the Optimal Climate Policy

Abstract: What is the optimal policy to fight climate change? Taxation of carbon and fossil fuels has strong redistributive effects across countries: (i) curbing energy demand is costly for developing economies, which are the most affected by climate change in the first place, (ii) taxation has strong general equilibrium effects through energy markets and trade reallocation. Through the lens of an Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) with heterogeneous countries, I show that optimal carbon policy depends crucially on the availability of redistribution instruments. After characterizing the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC), I derive formulas for second-best fossil fuel taxes in the presence of inequalities in climate damages and incomes, redistributive and distortionary effects on energy markets. I show that a uniform carbon should be reduced twofold in the presence of inequality. If country-specific carbon taxes are available, the distribution of carbon prices is proportionally related to the level of income: poor and hot countries should pay lower energy taxes than rich and cold countries. These qualitative results are general and I propose a dynamic quantitative model to provide recommendation for the optimal path of carbon tax.

Supply chain disruptions and diversification

(with Ignacia Cuevas and Gustavo González)

Abstract: Supply chain disruptions have become increasingly frequent, generating substantial uncertainty for companies that rely on sourcing inputs for production. We investigate how firms facing supply chain uncertainty adapt their sourcing strategies, by diversifying foreign suppliers, re-shoring, or selecting suppliers based on cost and risk considerations. To answer these questions, we develop a multi-country sourcing model inspired by Antràs, Fort, and Tintelnot (2017), in which firms choose where to import from, accounting for international supply-chain disruptions. Our findings reveal that mean-preserving uncertainty introduces a positive option value associated with diversifying the set of suppliers. However, country-specific aggregate risk also features hedging motives, yielding ambiguous predictions on firms' sourcing decisions. Leveraging firm-level data from Chile, we use this structural model to estimate supply chain risk over time for major trade partners as well as fixed costs of sourcing. We assess the impact of the recent surge in trade risk following the Covid-19 pandemic, and we perform counterfactual exercises to evaluate how this affected firms' sourcing strategies. Our results indicate that the observed change in sourcing patterns correspond more to changes in expected costs rather than solely to increases in risk.

A Perturbational Approach for Approximating Heterogeneous-Agent Models

(with Mikhaïl Golosov, Anmol Bhandari, and David Evans)

Abstract: We develop a perturbational technique to approximate equilibria of a wide class of discrete-time dy-namic stochastic general equilibrium heterogeneous-agent models with complex state spaces, including multi-dimensional distributions of endogenous variables. We show that approximating policy functions and stochastic process that governs the distributional state to any order is equivalent to solving small systems of linear equations that characterize values of certain directional derivatives. We analytically derive the coefficients of these linear systems and show that they satisfy simple recursive relations making their numerical implementation quick and efficient. Compared to existing state-of-the-art techniques, our method is faster in constructing first-order approximations and extends to higher orders, capturing the effects of risk that are ignored by many current methods. We illustrate how to apply our method to a broad set of questions such as impacts of first- and second-moment shocks, welfare effect of macroeconomic risk and stabilization policies, endogenous household portfolio formation, and transition dynamics in heterogeneous agent general equilibrium settings.

Non-Keynesian stabilizers and wage-price spirals

(with Xavier Ragot and François Le Grand)

Abstract: When both prices and wages are subject to nominal frictions, a negative supply shock or a positive demand shock can trigger a wage-price spiral, as both nominal wages and prices adjust slowly. To analyze optimal policy in this environment, we consider a heterogeneous-agent model, with both wage and price stickiness. We derive joint optimal fiscal-monetary Ramsey policy, using a rich set of fiscal tools, for both supply and demand shocks. Studying various economies, we first find that time-varying labor tax is important to ensure price stability for demand shocks. Second, time-varying wage subsidy (to decrease the labor cost of firm) is the useful instrument for negative demand shocks. We call these policies a non-Keynesian stabilization policy because it does not operate directly through aggregate demand management. Finally, we show that the allocation is significantly different in the HA economy compared to the RA economy when public debt is a relevant tool.

Work in Progress

When is aggregation enough? Aggregation and Projection with the Master Equation

Abstract: I study how the Master Equation – developed in the Mean Field Games literature – can be used for economic models with heterogeneous agents and aggregate risk. Using projection, I bypass part of the assumption of bounded-rationality as in Krusell, Smith (1998): households still consider few moments of the distribution when making expectations but their dynamics are now fully non-linear and consistent with equilibrium outcomes. I obtain a global characterization of the value, agent policy, and aggregate dynamics in a standard HA models, that can be adapted to richer models with portfolio choice when perturbation methods is limited.

Energy shocks and aggregate fluctuations, 3rd-year paper

Abstract: How important is energy for economic fluctuations? I analyze the contribution of energy shocks – oil shocks for example – for business cycles fluctuations using a RBC model that features a high degree of complementarity and non-linearity in production. I show that the expansion of energy supply was significant for output growth in the post-WWII period, and its decline explains part of the slowdown since the second oil shock. I estimate that energy shocks explain between 20 and 30% of output volatility.

Credit Cycles, Asset prices, and Heterogeneous Firms

Master thesis (MAPSS) and 2nd-year paper, 2020, University of Chicago

Pre-Doc

Wealth distribution over the business cycle, A mean-field game with common noise,

Master thesis (M2), 2018, M. Sc. Mathematics at UPMC-Sorbonne. Supervisor: Yves Achdou

Fiscal policy in monetary union

Master thesis (M2), 2016, M.A. Economics / EPP. Supervisor: Jean Baptiste Michau

Fiscal Policy and Tax compliance over the business cycle

Master thesis (M1), 2015, M.A. Economics / EPP. Supervisor: Francesco Pappadà

Teaching Experience

University of Chicago, Department of Economics, PhD Mathematical Methods in Economics, PhD Applied Macroeconomics: Heterogeneity & Macro, PhD Monetary Economics, PhD	TA for Prof. J. Vavra, R. Kekre TA for Prof. F. Alvarez Winter 2021 Fall 2021
Chicago Booth School of Business Global Strategy and Economics, <i>EMBA</i> International Financial Policy, <i>MBA</i> Money and Banking, <i>MBA</i>	TA for Prof. G. Lorenzoni <i>Spr. 2022, 2023, 2024</i> TA for Prof. R. Kekre <i>Spr. 2020, 2021, 2022</i> TA for Prof. K. Huber <i>Winter 2021</i>
University of Chicago, The College Economic Policy Analysis, undergrad	TA for Prof. K. Kuevibulvanich Spring 2019
Sciences Po, Doctoral School, Economics Dep Graduate Macroeconomics & finance, PhD Fiscal and monetary policy, PhD	TA for Prof. X. Ragot Fall 2016, 2017 TA for Prof. J. Barthelemy Fall 2016
Sciences Po, School of Public Affairs, Master Macroeconomics, MPP Macroeconomics for public policy, MPP Public Economics, MPP Quantitative Analysis, MPP Awards, Scholarships, and Grants	TA for Prof. T. Chaney Fall 2016, Spr. 2018 TA for Prof. X. Ragot, P. Andrade Spr. 2016 TA for Prof. Mark Stabile Fall 2015 TA for Prof. M. Foucault Fall 2015
Stevanovich Fellowship Award	2024
3-Minutes Thesis Competition, Finalist	2024
University of Chicago MAPSS Merit Scholarship	2018
Sciences Po, Prize for the Best Master Thesis in Eco	onomics 2016
École Polytechnique, Prize for the Research Interns.	
Research Experience	
Research Assistant, University of Chicago Prof. Mikhail Golosov	2019-2021
Research Assistant (ponctual), University of Chicag Prof. Greg Kaplan, Prof. Robert Lucas, Prof. Kilia	
Research Intern, Université Paris Diderot $Prof\ Y.\ Achdou$	2018
Research Intern, Banque de France, International M. Prof F. Pappadà and Y. Zylberberg	Macro Division & Forecasting 2015

Academic Experience

Conferences

2024: NBER SI Macro-Public Finance, Boston, EEA-ESEM, European Economic

Association, Rotterdam, Society of Economic Dynamics, Barcelona,

Dynamic Quantitative Trade – JIE special conference, UWisconsin, Madison

Yiran Fan Conference, UChicago, 49th Conf., Eastern Economic Association, Boston 2023: Economic & Environmental Consequences of Climate Change, IMSI UChicago,

HEC Economics PhD Conference, HEC, Paris Area

2018: Macroeconomic Implications of Micro Heterogeneity, OFCE, Paris

Note: only presentations of solo/junior projects

Presentations

2023-2024: Young Scholars Webinar on Climate Economics, E-axes Forum

EPIC Lunch, MFR Summer session for Young scholar (poster), Climate Frontiers: Energy and Climate (poster), UChicago

2020-2024: PhD workshops (Macro, Trade, Environment, Finance), *UChicago*

2017, 2023: PhD workshops, Sciences Po

2019: Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund

2018: Workshop on MFG, Université Paris Diderot **2015:** DGEI Internal Conference, Banque de France

Refereeing Activity \triangleright Journal of Political Economy, \triangleright Journal of European Economic Association (\times 2)

▷ Theoretical Economics, ▷ Journal of Political Economy, Macroeconomics,

▷ Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money,

▷ IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (Maths)

Seminar organization:

Student or	ganizer of Capital Theory, UChicago	2023 – 2025
Student or	ganizer of Advanced Macro Reading Group, UChicago	2022-2024
Organizer	of 2nd-3rd year students Macro workshop, UChicago	2019–2020
Others st	udent activities:	
	udent activities: Student Liaison (GSL) – Student representative, UChicago	2023–2025

Additional Information

Citizenship

France

Programming Skills Julia, Matlab, Dynare, Stata, Python, R

Languages

French (Native), English (Fluent), Spanish (Intermediate)

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