

# The Winners and Losers of Climate Policies: A Sufficient Statistics Approach

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## Abstract

To combat global warming, climate policies like carbon taxes, renewable subsidies, and carbon tariffs must be implemented to phase out fossil fuel consumption and lower emissions. Who are the winners and losers of such policies? Through a simple Integrated Assessment Model with heterogeneous countries and international trade in goods and energy, we study both the costs of implementing these policies unilaterally, and the local costs and global gains of international policy cooperation. To do so, we express and decompose welfare changes under different policy regimes to the first order as a function of sufficient statistics that depend on observables and identifiable elasticities like nations' energy mix, energy rents, trade shares, energy supply and demand elasticities, and damage parameters. We show that climate change has non-trivial reallocation effects through international trade in goods and energy. Pursuing unilateral policies generates strong leakage effects, primarily through energy trade. Global climate policy cooperation mitigates leakage, but not all countries have an incentive to participate. Regional climate clubs operate differently: an EU-wide club reduces global emissions but creates internal winners and losers, while an ASEAN climate club achieves smaller global gains but delivers welfare increases for member nations.

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# 1 Introduction

Climate policies must be implemented to phase out fossil fuel consumption and keep the world temperature under 2°C to avoid dramatic consequences of global warming (IPCC et al., 2022). To that aim, several policies have been proposed. First, carbon pricing has been the preferred instrument of economists: it follows from the Pigouvian benchmark, where the externality – and the social cost of carbon emissions – can be internalized by taxation. Second, several countries have been promoting subsidies for renewable energy sources as an alternative to carbon taxation, with, for example, the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States. These climate policies may engender ‘carbon leakage’ by reallocating economic activity to other trade partners unaffected by the policy, motivating the need for carbon tariffs. To address these concerns, countries have also been advocating for international cooperation through climate agreements.

Who are the winners and losers of these different climate policies? This paper addresses this question by quantifying the heterogeneous welfare impacts of different climate policies across nations and decomposing the transmission channels through which they operate: productivity changes from climate damages, and general equilibrium effects in energy and goods markets. We develop a framework that allows us to quantify these different margins using sufficient statistics, in the sense of Chetty (2009): a set of observable data moments and elasticities estimated using quasi-experimental variation. In our framework, observables like the energy mix (the share of oil, gas, coal, and renewables in energy use), the energy rent share of GDP, and trade shares, provide crucial information on whether a country ‘wins’ or ‘loses’ as a result of implementing different climate policies.

To that purpose, we use a climate-economy framework – or Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) – augmented with heterogeneous countries, energy markets, and international trade, closely following Bourany (2025). Individual countries differ in their vulnerability to climate change, their energy mix in oil, gas, coal, and non-carbon energy, their costs of producing fossil fuels, as well as trade costs in international goods trade. We approximate the model using a first-order, log-linear decomposition of welfare changes around the current – i.e., status-quo – equilibrium. This allows us to linearly break down the various channels through which climate change and climate policies affect different nations.

These climate policies have unequal impacts across countries, determining their willingness to implement such policies. First, regions are differentially affected by climate change due to differences in local temperature, exposure to global warming, or trade linkages with vulnerable countries. Second, if carbon taxation reduces fossil-fuel consumption, it also has substantial impacts on energy markets: it affects disproportionately the countries that consume a large share of fossil fuels – oil, gas, and coal – or that export those energy resources. Third, countries are heterogeneously exposed to international trade in both goods and energy, and thus to ‘carbon leakage’, which reinforces or dampens the gains and losses from the climate policies, especially when implemented unilaterally.

Quantifying the winners and losers from climate policies with our framework – and understanding the underlying mechanisms – requires several key elasticities, in addition to readily

available moments in international trade, energy, and national accounts data. First, we require estimates of the marginal damages of temperature shocks in different countries on a structural primitive of our model: TFP in traded goods. To identify the parameters of our structural damage function, we implement an estimation strategy inspired by Rudik et al. (2022) that leverages variations in import penetration within bilateral trading partners and changes in local temperature, and controls for energy market effects. Second, we require energy supply elasticities in oil-, gas-, and coal-producing sectors. We use time-series variation in local fossil rents and international prices and a simple empirical Bayes shrinkage procedure to recover spatially heterogeneous energy supply elasticities.

Armed with these elasticities and data moments, we use our sufficient statistics formula to study several different policy experiments for a sample of 193 countries. First, we analyse the effects of increasing greenhouse gas emissions and, hence, global temperature. This has heterogeneous impacts across locations due to differences in temperatures. Local temperature changes have large spillovers: by changing TFP, they affect production and the endogenous choice of energy inputs. As a result, declines in productivity are the main driver of reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Moreover, climate change reallocates production unequally across trade partners. Therefore, spillovers through international trade represent an important transmission mechanism of global warming damages across countries, as even cold but open regions can be significantly affected through trade channels.

Second, we study the impacts of four different climate policies. (i) First, we consider the case where each country unilaterally increases the carbon tax, and the revenue of the carbon tax is rebated to households. As a result, countries are heterogeneously affected through their energy consumption and exports, but the climate impact, in terms of emission reductions, is limited by the size of each country. Moreover, unilateral carbon taxation leads to carbon leakage effects: local taxation reduces domestic fossil fuel demand and thus also lowers the global equilibrium price for oil and gas, leading to increases in carbon emissions of the countries unaffected by the carbon tax. Additionally, by increasing the marginal cost of goods exports, it also reallocates activity through international trade to regions that do not implement carbon taxation. Combining and decomposing all these effects, we can measure the extent of the ‘free-riding incentives’ that deter individual governments’ climate action.

Then, (ii) we consider renewable energy subsidies as an alternative to carbon taxation. Such subsidies lower the relative price of renewables – compared to fossil fuels – and are financed by lump-sum taxes. As a result, they have different general equilibrium implications on energy markets, as well as different welfare effects across countries, compared to carbon taxation. Moreover, (iii) to prevent the carbon leakage consequences of unilateral carbon pricing, carbon tariffs have been suggested as potential solutions, e.g., with the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism in the European Union. In a third policy, we study the implementation of such carbon tariffs, under which a group of countries – a climate coalition – jointly administer a carbon tax as well as tariffs

that scale with the carbon intensity of imports.<sup>1</sup> Carbon tariffs divert trade flows away from high-emissions countries and reduce carbon emissions, which we can quantify for a small increase in the carbon price for imports. We analyse this policy for two sets of countries: the European Union (EU), which is already implementing carbon pricing and carbon tariffs, and ASEAN, which gathers southeast Asian countries, all of whom are affected by climate change. We find that while an EU-wide climate club more effectively combats climate change, it creates winners and losers within member nations. In contrast, a climate club of ASEAN members has a smaller global effect, but unambiguously improves the welfare of its member states.

Finally, (iv) we study the distribution of welfare gains and losses from implementing internationally coordinated policies. When all the countries implement carbon taxation together, greenhouse gas emissions are lowered significantly, improving climate and global temperature. In addition, the demand and, hence, the price of fossil fuels change depending on the strength of the substitution between oil, gas, and coal. Such changes in oil and gas prices also have strong redistributive effects, depleting the energy rents of fossil-fuel exporters. Finally, global climate policy reallocates economic activity and trade patterns, and all these effects attenuate the direct costs of carbon taxation.

Although our first-order sufficient statistics approach precludes a consideration of nonlinearities in the climate system, or how agents react to aggregate risk generated by uncertainty in the path of future warming, it provides a powerful tool to easily assess many different policies. More importantly, it allows us to decompose the channels through which these policies create winners and losers, thereby highlighting the role energy and goods trade play in shaping the efficacy of different policy instruments in different regions. To assess the relevance of nonlinearities in the global climate system for our results, we estimate the social cost of carbon at two points of approximation: at baseline (\$203/tCO<sub>2</sub>) and under 3°C of warming (\$302/tCO<sub>2</sub>), suggesting that our results are best interpreted as relative to the status quo than as valid under some future, warmer climate.

### *Related literature*

This work relates to a lengthy literature on the macroeconomics of climate change, specifically the literature that uses large-scale IAMs to evaluate the cost of climate change and the effects of different policies (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996; Barrage and Nordhaus, 2024; Cruz and Rossi-Hansberg, 2024). Our main contribution is to show that, in the macroeconomic IAM of Bourany (2025), the effects of many climate policy regimes can be decomposed to the first order to direct effects, effects that operate through the energy market (including changes to energy rents), and leakage effects in international goods markets, and that these effects can be estimated by a set of sufficient statistics readily computable with off-the-shelf macroeconomic data and estimable elasticities. Thus, our work is similar to Lashkaripour (2021), who uses a sufficient statistics

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<sup>1</sup>This experiment resembles the idea of a ‘climate club’ in which countries form a coalition, set a carbon tax on their own emissions, and apply trade penalties against non-participating countries, cf. Nordhaus (2015); Farrokhi and Lashkaripour (2024); Bourany (2025). Note that in our case, carbon tariffs scale with carbon intensity of the good traded, implying additional reallocation across import sources.

approach to estimate the cost of a global trade war, [Baqae and Farhi \(2024\)](#), who examine how changes to trade barriers reallocate economic activity in general equilibrium, and [Kleinman et al. \(2024\)](#) who derive sufficient statistics for how productivity shocks differentially affect trading partners in constant-elasticity trade models. In essence, we extend this approach to a broad set of climate policy instruments in an environment that also features detailed energy markets. Additionally, our framework also allows us to derive a local cost of carbon, which accounts for heterogeneity in both damages and the marginal utility of income, as in [Cruz and Rossi-Hansberg \(Forthcoming\)](#).

The structure of energy markets in our model distinguishes us from recent work. Like [Kotlikoff et al. \(2024\)](#), we model detailed fossil fuel production and energy rents, but our quantification covers 193 countries, instead of 18 regions. Unlike [Krusell and Smith \(2022\)](#), we allow for cross-border trade in energy, and unlike [Cruz and Rossi-Hansberg \(2024\)](#), we allow for energy rents to accumulate heterogeneously across space. However, we abstract from both market power and dynamic considerations in international energy trade ([Bornstein et al., 2023](#); [Abuin, 2024](#)), and instead focus on a framework that yields tractable sufficient statistics to study the role energy markets play in shaping the efficacy of climate policy. Our focus on the consequences of climate policies through energy choice enables a finer analysis of various substitution mechanisms between coal, natural gas, and renewable energy, as in [Abuin \(2024\)](#) and [Harstad and Holtsmark \(2025\)](#).

What we do not do is study optimal climate policy at a global level, as in [Golosov et al. \(2014\)](#), or unilaterally optimal policy in an open economy setting, like in [Kortum and Weisbach \(2021\)](#). Unlike [Bourany \(2025\)](#), who studies the optimal design of international climate agreements with carbon taxation and tariffs, or [Farrokhi and Lashkaripour \(2024\)](#), who study the optimal trade policy, either unilaterally or in the context of climate clubs, we exploit the tractability of our sufficient statistics formula to evaluate a large set of climate policies and decompose their effects that operate through different markets. However, our framework is static, which prevents us from studying dynamic policy environments, as in [Bourany \(2024\)](#), who analyses climate policy and redistribution concerns, [Hsiao \(2022\)](#), who studies climate coordination with commitment, or [Kotlikoff et al. \(2021\)](#), who study the benefits of carbon taxation across generations. Moreover, our static environment limits us from considering the role climate policies may play in generating dynamic forms of adaptation, like spurring the accumulation of adaptation capital (e.g., sea walls, as in [Fried, 2022](#); [Hong et al., 2023](#); [Hsiao, 2025](#)), changing the speed of fossil extraction (for example, whether policy faces a ‘green paradox,’ [Lemoine, 2017](#); [Norman and Schlenker, 2024](#)) or renewable uptake ([Arkolakis and Walsh, 2023](#)), or directing innovation towards the production of green energy ([Acemoglu et al., 2012, 2016](#)). We hope future research will improve our understanding of dynamic leakage effects in the energy sector induced by carbon policy.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out our full macroeconomic IAM. Section 3 derives our first-order decomposition of climate policies in our model and details the policy experiments we have in mind. We describe our data, estimation, and quantification in Section 4. Section 5 details our results for multiple policy counterfactuals, and Section 6 concludes.

## 2 A global integrated assessment model

This model follows the structure of Bourany (2025). We build a simple integrated assessment model (IAM) incorporating multiple dimensions of heterogeneity, a climate externality, international energy markets, and a realistic trade structure that reproduces the leakage effects of climate policies.

We study a static economy with  $I$  countries indexed by  $i \in \mathbb{I}$ , each with population  $\mathcal{P}_i$ . All the economic variables are expressed per capita.<sup>2</sup> Each country is composed of five representative agents: (i) a household that consumes the final goods, (ii) a final-good firm producing goods using labour and energy, (iii) a fossil energy firm extracting oil and gas, (iv) a producer of coal energy, and (v) a producer of renewable/non-carbon energy. Moreover, each country has a government that sets taxes, subsidy, and tariffs.

### 2.1 Household problem

The representative household in country  $i$  imports from all countries  $j \in \mathbb{I}$ , consumes the aggregate quantity  $c_i$ , and inelastically supplies a unit of labour to each country's representative goods firm. Production follows an Armington structure in which each nation produces its own unique variety of traded consumption goods (Anderson, 1979; Arkolakis et al., 2012), over which households have constant elasticity of substitution preferences over different national varieties. Households maximize their utility  $\mathcal{U}_i$ , solving,

$$\mathcal{U}_i = \max_{\{c_{ij}\}} u(\{c_{ij}\}_j) = u(c_i) , \quad c_i = \left( \sum_{j \in \mathbb{I}} a_{ij}^{\frac{1}{\theta}} c_{ij}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} , \quad (1)$$

where  $a_{ij}$  are the preference shifters for country  $i$  on the good purchased from country  $j$ .<sup>3</sup> We consider standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility  $u(c) = c^{1-\eta}/(1-\eta)$ .<sup>4</sup>

Households earn labour income, energy rents, and transfers, and their budget constraints are given by,

$$\sum_{j \in \mathbb{I}} c_{ij} (1+t_{ij}^b) \tau_{ij} p_j = w_i + \pi_i^e + t_i^{ls} , \quad (2)$$

where  $w_i$  is the wage rate,  $\pi_i^e$  the profit earned from the ownership of the energy firms, and  $t_i^{ls}$  the lump-sum transfer received from the government. Households in  $i$  import quantities  $c_{ij}$  from country  $j$ , purchased at price  $p_j$ , and subject to iceberg cost  $\tau_{ij}$  and to trade tariffs  $1+t_{ij}^b$ .

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<sup>2</sup>For example,  $y_i$  or  $e_i^f$  are final output and fossil energy use, respectively, and  $\mathcal{P}_i y_i$  and  $\mathcal{P}_i e_i^f$  represent the total quantities produced/consumed in the country.

<sup>3</sup>We assume that preferences  $\{a_{ij}\}$  and iceberg trade costs  $\{\tau_{ij}\}$  are policy-invariant, in particular, they are not sensitive to price changes and tariffs.

<sup>4</sup>We do not include direct effects of climate change on utility, which could proxy for changes to local amenities, or the mortality effects of climate change. It is easy to augment the framework to include direct utility damages by assuming the climate externality affects consumption through a factor  $\mathcal{D}_i^u(\mathcal{E})$  which summarizes climate damages, given world emissions  $\mathcal{E}$ . As labour is internationally immobile, utility damages have no general equilibrium effect, and so we omit them from this analysis. Including utility damages would simply amplify gains and losses stemming from changes in local temperature.

The optimal consumption choice of the household yields the following quantities and trade shares given by:

$$c_{ij} = a_{ij} c_i \left( \frac{(1+t_{ij}^b) \tau_{ij} p_j}{\mathbb{P}_i} \right)^{-\theta}, \quad (3)$$

$$s_{ij} \equiv \frac{c_{ij} p_{ij}}{c_i \mathbb{P}_i} = a_{ij} \frac{((1+t_{ij}^b) \tau_{ij} p_j)^{1-\theta}}{\sum_k a_{ik} ((1+t_{ik}) \tau_{ik} p_k)^{1-\theta}},$$

where  $p_{ij} = (1+t_{ij}^b) \tau_{ij} p_j$  is the effective price for a variety from country  $j$  sold in country  $i$ , and  $\mathbb{P}_i$  is the price index of country  $i$ :

$$\mathbb{P}_i = \left( \sum_{k \in \mathbb{I}} a_{ik} ((1+t_{ik}^b) \tau_{ik} p_k)^{1-\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}.$$

As a result, we summarize the budget constraint as  $c_i \mathbb{P}_i = \sum_{j \in \mathbb{I}} c_{ij} (1+t_{ij}^b) \tau_{ij} p_j$ , and the per-capita welfare of country  $i$  is then summarized by the indirect utility as the utility of income discounted by the price level and climate damages, namely:

$$\mathcal{U}_i = u(c_i) = \frac{1}{1-\eta} \left( \frac{w_i + \pi_i^e + t_i^{ls}}{\mathbb{P}_i} \right)^{1-\eta}. \quad (4)$$

## 2.2 Final good firm problem

The representative final good producer in country  $i$  is producing the domestic variety at price  $p_i$ . The firm's profit maximization is:

$$\max_{\ell_i, e_i^f, e_i^c, e_i^r} p_i \mathcal{D}_i^y(\mathcal{E}) z_i F(\ell_i, e_i^f, e_i^c, e_i^r) - w_i \ell_i - q^f (1+\xi^f t_i^\varepsilon) e_i^f - q_i^c (1+\xi^c t_i^\varepsilon) e_i^c - q_i^r (1-s_i^\varepsilon) e_i^r \quad (5)$$

where the production function  $\bar{y}_i = F(\ell_i, e_i^f, e_i^c, e_i^r)$  has constant returns to scale and is concave in all inputs. It uses labour,  $\ell_i$ , at wage  $w_i$ , fossil energy,  $e_i^f$ , purchased at price,  $q^f$ , coal,  $e_i^c$ , at price,  $q_i^c$ , and renewable energy,  $e_i^r$ , at price,  $q_i^r$ . Energy from oil-gas,  $e_i^f$ , and coal,  $e_i^c$ , differ from renewable in the sense that they emit greenhouse gases, with respective carbon concentration  $\xi^f$  and  $\xi^c$ , as we will see in Section 2.4. As a result, there is a motive for taxing oil, gas, and coal energy with the carbon tax  $t_i^\varepsilon$ . Similarly, as an alternative, we consider renewable energy subsidy, which reduces the price of renewables by a factor  $s^\varepsilon$ .

The productivity of the domestic good firm,  $y_i = \mathcal{D}_i^y(\mathcal{E}) z_i \bar{y}_i$ , can be decomposed in two terms. First, the TFP,  $z_i$ , represents productivity as well as institutional/efficiency differences between countries. This technology wedge accounts for income inequality across countries. These differences in TFP translate into differences in consumption that create redistribution motives for tax policy. The second difference in productivity comes from the climate externality. This is summarized by the net-of-damage function  $\mathcal{D}_i^y(\mathcal{E})$ , given world emissions  $\mathcal{E}$ , which is also a reduced-form representation of the climate system from temperatures. It decreases in  $\mathcal{E}$  and is country-specific due to differences in costs of climate change, as detailed in Section 4.

The input decisions of the firm solve the standard optimality conditions. For example, in the case of oil and gas (hereon, oil-gas)  $e_i^f$ , the first-order condition is

$$p_i \mathcal{D}_i^y(\mathcal{E}) z_i F_{ef}(\ell_i, e_i^f, e_i^c, e_i^r) = q^f (1 + \xi^f t_i^\varepsilon), \quad (6)$$

and similarly for other inputs  $\ell_i, e_i^c, e_i^r$ . Crucially, the private decisions by firms do not internalize the climate externalities of their own fossil-fuel energy use and only respond to price, carbon tax  $t_i^\varepsilon$ , and subsidy  $s_i^\varepsilon$ .

We consider a nested CES production function for output  $y_i$ . The firm combines labour  $\ell_i$  with a composite of energy  $e_i$ , with elasticity  $\sigma^y$ .<sup>5</sup> Second, energy  $e_i$  aggregates the different energy sources: oil-gas  $e_i^f$ , coal  $e_i^c$ , and renewable/non-carbon  $e_i^r$ , with elasticity  $\sigma^e$ .

$$y_i = \mathcal{D}^y(\mathcal{E}) z_i \left( \varepsilon^{\frac{1}{\sigma^y}} (e_i)^{\frac{\sigma^y-1}{\sigma^y}} + (1-\varepsilon)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^y}} (\ell_i)^{\frac{\sigma^y-1}{\sigma^y}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma^y}{\sigma^y-1}},$$

$$e_i = \left( (\omega^f)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^e}} (e_i^f)^{\frac{\sigma^e-1}{\sigma^e}} + (\omega^c)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^e}} (e_i^c)^{\frac{\sigma^e-1}{\sigma^e}} + (\omega^r)^{\frac{1}{\sigma^e}} (e_i^r)^{\frac{\sigma^e-1}{\sigma^e}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma^e}{\sigma^e-1}}.$$

This allows us to distinguish between the substitution across energy sources and between energy and other inputs like labour, due to climate policies.

## 2.3 Energy markets

Energy is generated from three sources: oil-gas, coal, and renewable (i.e., non-carbon) energy. Each of these energy sources are supplied by three representative energy firms in each country. Oil-gas is traded internationally, and countries can be exporters or importers. Coal and renewable sources are both traded locally, an empirically relevant assumption given the substantial trade costs in coal shipping or electricity transfers. The profits of all the energy firms  $\pi_i^e = \pi_i^f + \pi_i^c + \pi_i^r$  are redistributed lump-sum to the household.

### 2.3.1 Fluid fossil production

In each country  $i$ , a competitive energy producer extracts fluid fossil fuels – oil-gas,  $e_i^x$  – and sells them on the international market at price  $q^f$ . The energy is extracted at a convex cost  $\mathcal{C}_i^f(e_i^x)$ , where these costs are paid in the price of country  $i$ 's good. The energy firm's profit maximization problem is given by:

$$\pi_i^f = \max_{e_i^x} q^f e_i^x - \mathcal{C}_i^f(e_i^x) p_i, \quad (7)$$

where  $\pi_i^f$  is the fossil energy rent per capita in country  $i$ . The optimal extraction decision follows from the optimality condition

$$q^f = \mathcal{C}_i^f'(e_i^x) p_i. \quad (8)$$

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<sup>5</sup>labour is inelastically supplied  $\ell_i = \bar{\ell}_i$  in each country and normalized to 1 – since the country size  $p_i$  is already taken into account. As a result, all the variables can be seen as input per capita.

A positive energy rent exists even with competitive firms taking the fossil price as given, as energy production is effectively decreasing returns to scale. For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider that energy firms have market power in the setting of global energy prices as in Bornstein et al. (2023), even though this framework could easily allow for such an extension. We account for misallocation across energy sectors (in the sense of Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) arising due to existing policy distortions that take the form of fossil taxes or subsidies as embedded in extraction productivity in  $\mathcal{C}_i^f(\cdot)$ , while we capture endogenous misallocation from market power (which can attenuate output elasticities) in our estimates of energy supply elasticities.

We use an isoelastic extraction function  $\mathcal{C}_i^f$  displays decreasing returns

$$\mathcal{C}_i^f(e_i^x)p_i = \frac{\bar{\nu}_i^f}{1 + \nu_i^f} (e_i^x)^{1+\nu_i^f} p_i ,$$

with inverse renewable supply elasticity is  $\nu_i^f = \frac{\mathcal{C}_i^{f''}(e^x)}{\mathcal{C}_i'(e^x)e^x}$ . In this formulation, we think of market power as affecting the supply elasticity by affecting the intensity of reserves in the production of fossil energy. We can write the profit function as

$$\pi_i^f = \frac{\nu_i^f (\bar{\nu}_i^f)^{-1/\nu_i^f}}{1 + \nu_i^f} (q^f)^{1+\frac{1}{\nu_i^f}} .$$

As we will see below, the profit  $\pi_i^f$  and its share in income  $\eta_i^{\pi f} = \frac{\pi_i^f}{y_i p_i + \pi_i^e}$  are key to determine the exposure of a country to carbon taxation. Indeed, reducing carbon emissions by phasing out fossil fuels reduces energy demand and its price  $q^f$  and hence affects energy profit  $\pi_i^f$  and the welfare of large oil-gas exporters.

### 2.3.2 International fossil energy markets

We assume that fluid fossil (oil-gas) is a homogeneous good traded frictionlessly in international markets.<sup>6</sup> The market clears such that

$$E^f = \sum_{i \in \mathbb{I}} \mathcal{P}_i e_i^f = \sum_{i \in \mathbb{I}} \mathcal{P}_i e_i^x . \quad (9)$$

As we allow for international trade, the production of fluid fossil in country  $i$ ,  $\mathcal{P}_i e_i^x$ , need not equal its consumption,  $\mathcal{P}_i e_i^f$ ; country  $i$ 's net exports of oil-gas are  $\mathcal{P}_i(e_i^x - e_i^f) \leq 0$ . Each country's exposure to the international fossil market depends on its status as a net exporter or importer of fluid fossil.

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<sup>6</sup>We refrain from considering a general Armington structure in which each country produces unique, imperfectly substitutable energy varieties. We make the simplifying assumption that fossil fuels produced are not distinguishable across countries and traded without cost in international markets. That is, crude oil or natural gas from Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, or Russia are perfect substitutes and their movement across borders is costless. In reality, fossil energy has less than an infinite elasticity of substitution due to quality grade differences like sulfur content, and there are trade costs in shipping oil, despite the considerable scale economies in transport on large crude carriers. Farrokh (2020) estimates this elasticity as above 19, which suggests oil is almost perfectly substituted across source countries.

### 2.3.3 Coal production

In addition to oil-gas production, coal, a solid fossil, is produced by a representative firm in each country, and sold to each country's final goods firm. We differentiate coal from fluid fossil fuels like oil-gas for two reasons. First, coal production typically generates smaller energy rents as share of GDP for producer countries. Second, most coal is consumed locally: trade costs for coal are considerably higher than they are for oil-gas, which can flow via pipelines and are considerably more energy dense than coal. Hence, we make this empirically grounded assumption that coal is not traded.

We again assume production of coal,  $e_i^c$ , is decreasing returns to scale (owing to convex extraction costs) and uses country  $i$  final good input. These convex extraction costs capture the fact that an expansion of the coal industry requires mining deeper or expanding production to less productive mines.

Coal producers' profit maximization problem is

$$\pi_i^c = \max_{e_i^c} q_i^c e_i^c - \mathcal{C}_i^c(e_i^c) p_i ,$$

with the cost function  $\mathcal{C}_i^c$ , with inverse supply elasticity  $\nu_i^c = \frac{\mathcal{C}_i''(e_i^c)}{\mathcal{C}_i'(e_i^c)e_i^c}$ . As before, the coal supply decision is determined by

$$q_i^c = \mathcal{C}_i'(e_i^c) p_i . \quad (10)$$

We consider the same isoelastic cost function as for the oil-gas production, with constant inverse elasticity  $\nu_i^c$ .

### 2.3.4 Renewable and non-carbon energy production

The final energy source we consider is renewable and non-carbon energy. This includes sources such as solar, wind, or nuclear power. A representative firm produces renewable or non-carbon energy, and this supply,  $e_i^r$ , is not traded internationally. This assumption is verified by the fact that electricity is rarely traded across countries, and when it is, it is explained by intermittency (e.g., ‘reciprocal load smoothing,’ [Antweiler, 2016](#)) rather than structural imbalances. The convex costs of renewable ‘extraction’ are similarly paid in country  $i$ ’s good at price  $p_i$ .

Aggregate renewable energy supply may be upward sloping for several reasons. First, there may be quality degradation, as the sunniest or windiest spots are used first, and so expanding the size of the renewable energy sector requires placing wind or solar generation capacity on lower-quality sites. Second, there may be fixed factors of production, that induces increasing marginal cost. For example, critical materials such as silicon, cobalt, lithium, and rare earth elements such as neodymium are needed in the production of renewable energy.

The representative renewable firm solves:

$$\pi_i^r = \max_{e_i^r} q_i^r e_i^r - \mathcal{C}_i^r(e_i^r) p_i,$$

so that the inverse renewable supply elasticity is  $\nu_i^r = \frac{\mathcal{C}_i''(e_i^r)}{\mathcal{C}_i'(e_i^r)e_i^r}$ . As a result, the supply decision of the renewable producer is determined by

$$q_i^r = \mathcal{C}_i'(e_i^r)p_i . \quad (11)$$

Again, we consider the an isoelastic cost function for renewable extraction with constant inverse elasticity  $\nu_i^r$ . When  $\nu_i^r = 0$ , we have constant return to scale,  $\mathcal{C}_i'$  is a constant and zero profits  $\pi_i^r = 0$ . This, once again, would return a perfectly elastic supply curve, which is a slightly stronger assumption in the context of renewable energy.

## 2.4 The climate system

Carbon emissions released from the burning of fossil fuels create an externality as they feed back into the atmosphere, increase temperatures and damage productivity. Despite the model being static, we incorporate a simple climate system as in standard Integrated Assessment Models.

We model the climate damage affecting country  $i$ 's productivity with the structural damage function  $\mathcal{D}_i^y(\mathcal{E})$ , a reduced-form representation of how rising temperatures (and other correlated weather changes) affect a nation's productivity  $z_i$ . The structural damage function maps emissions  $\mathcal{E}$  to atmospheric carbon concentration  $\mathcal{S}$ , which fosters a rise in global temperature, and, in turn, local temperatures  $T_i$ , which affect output.

The energy choices yield yearly emissions from fossil fuels, which sum up to,

$$\mathcal{E} = \sum_{i \in \mathbb{I}} p_i (\xi^f e_i^f + \xi^c e_i^c) ,$$

where  $\xi^f$  and  $\xi^c$  represent the carbon concentration of oil-gas and coal, respectively. These emissions increase the carbon concentration in the atmosphere. We use the scalar  $\mathbb{T}$  to convert a static – one year – model to a long-term / dynamic representation of climate.

$$\mathcal{S} = \mathcal{S}_0 + \mathbb{T}\mathcal{E}$$

with  $\mathcal{S}_0$  the initial carbon concentration before all the policy decisions are made at the beginning of the 21st century. We assume a linear relationship between the cumulative  $CO_2$  emissions  $\mathcal{S}$  and the global temperature anomaly  $\mathcal{T}$  compared to pre-industrial levels.

$$\mathcal{T} = \chi \mathcal{S} = \chi (\mathcal{S}_0 + \mathbb{T}\mathcal{E}) ,$$

where  $\chi$  is the climate sensitivity parameter, i.e. how much warming a tonne of  $CO_2$  causes, and where  $\mathcal{E}$  and  $\mathcal{S}$  are measured in carbon units. This specification is rationalized by the climate-sciences literature. For example, Dietz et al. (2021) shows an approximately linear relationship between  $\mathcal{S}$  and  $\mathcal{T}$ , as shown in Figure 1. It displays the relationship between temperature anomalies and cumulative  $CO_2$  emissions over time.




Figure 1: Cumulative anthropogenic emissions since 1750, (fossil fuel and industrial, GtCO<sub>2</sub>) and temperature anomalies relative to the pre-industrial era (1861-1890, in degrees °C), since 1900. Source: [Ritchie et al. \(2023\)](#).

Moreover, we consider a linear relationship between global and local temperatures, namely,

$$T_i = \Delta_i \mathcal{T} = \Delta_i \chi \mathcal{S},$$

where  $\Delta_i$  is a linear pattern scaling parameter that depends on geographical factors such as albedo or latitude.

Finally we consider a period damage function  $\hat{\mathcal{D}}(T_{it} - T_i^*)$  where  $T_i^*$  is the optimal temperature for country  $i$ . The function  $\hat{\mathcal{D}}(\hat{T})$  is a reduced-form representation of the economic damage to productivity, with curvature  $\delta$ ;

$$\mathcal{D}_i^y(T_i - T_i^*) = e^{-\gamma^y(T_i - T_i^*)^{1+\delta}}. \quad (12)$$

In our baseline quantification, we assume damages are quadratic, i.e.  $\delta = 1$ , as in the Integrated Assessment Models of Nordhaus' DICE-RICE, [Krusell and Smith \(2022\)](#), [Kotlikoff et al. \(2021\)](#) and [Burke et al. \(2015\)](#). Such damage creates winners and losers: the countries warmer than the target temperature  $T^*$  are more affected by global warming. In contrast, regions with negative  $T_i - T_i^*$  benefit from a warmer climate. We discuss this quantification in Section 4.

To conclude, the reduced-form static damage functions  $\mathcal{D}_i^y(\mathcal{E})$  and  $\mathcal{D}_i^u(\mathcal{E})$ , for productivity and utility, respectively, we summarize the future costs of climate change in present-discounted value,

$$\mathcal{D}_i^y(\mathcal{E}) = \mathcal{D}_i^y(T_i - T_i^*) = \mathcal{D}_i^y(\Delta_i \chi(\mathcal{S}_0 + \mathbb{T}\mathcal{E}) - T_i^*).$$

The damage function  $\mathcal{D}_i^y(\mathcal{E})$  changes endogenously with climate policy choices, as they affect  $\mathcal{E}$ .

## 2.5 Equilibrium

To close the model, we need to determine the final good prices for each country  $p_i$ . To do so, we consider market clearing for each good  $i$ , which happens for the total quantity of goods, and not on a per capita basis, so we must adjust by total population,  $\mathcal{P}_i$ ,

$$\mathcal{P}_i \underbrace{y_i}_{=\mathcal{D}_i^y(\mathcal{E})z_i F(\cdot)} = \sum_{k \in \mathbb{I}} \mathcal{P}_k \tau_{ki} c_{ki} + \mathcal{P}_i (x_i^f + x_i^c + x_i^r) \quad (13)$$

where  $x_i^f$ ,  $x_i^c$  and  $x_i^r$  are the good inputs used in country  $i$  to produce fossil and renewable energy, respectively. To summarize, the competitive equilibrium of this economy is defined as follows:

**Definition. Competitive equilibrium (C.E.):**

For a set of policies  $\{t_i^\varepsilon, t_{ij}^b, t_{ij}^{ls}\}_i$  across countries, a C.E. is a set of decisions  $\{c_{ij}, e_i^f, e_i^c, e_i^r, e_i^x\}_{ij}$ , and prices  $q^f, \{p_i, w_i, q_i^c, q_i^r\}_i$  such that:

- (i) Households choose consumption  $\{c_{ij}\}_{ij}$  maximizing utility equation (1) s.t. the budget constraint equation (2), which yield trade shares equation (3)
- (ii) Final good firms choose inputs  $\{\ell_i, e_i^f, e_i^r\}_i$  to maximize profits, resulting in equation (6)
- (iii) Fossil energy firms maximize profits equation (7) and extract/produce  $\{e_i^x\}_i$  given by equation (8)
- (iv) Renewable and coal energy firms maximize profits, so that supplies  $\{e_i^c, e_i^r\}$  are given respectively by equation (10) and equation (11)
- (v) Energy markets clear for fossils as in equation (9) and for coal and renewable in equation (10) and equation (11)
- (vi) Good markets clear for each country as in equation (13), and trade is balanced by Walras' Law.

## 3 Welfare decomposition and climate policy experiments

Different countries have unequal exposure to both climate change and different climate policies. This international heterogeneity depends on how local temperature shocks impact countries' production, countries' exposure to international energy markets, and countries' position in the international goods trade network. In this section, we log-linearize the model to the first order to describe analytically the different transmission channels of several climate policy experiments.

### 3.1 Summary of the different experiments

In these experiments, we compute the marginal change in welfare  $d\mathcal{U}_i$  for different policies, e.g., changes in energy taxes  $dt$ . Our preferred welfare measure is the consumption-equivalent change in welfare measured as,

$$\Delta_t \mathcal{U}_i = \frac{d\mathcal{U}_i}{dt} \frac{1}{u'(c_i) c_i}$$

for policy change  $dt$ . Note that this welfare metric – in percentage terms – measures the *total derivative*  $d\mathcal{U}_i/dt$  and summarizes all the general equilibrium effects of the policy. While country  $i$ 's welfare is simply the indirect utility  $\mathcal{U}_i$ , we compute the world welfare for several experiments,

$$\mathcal{W} = \sum_{i \in \mathbb{I}} \mathcal{P}_i \omega_i \mathcal{U}_i \quad , \quad (14)$$

with Pareto weights  $\omega_i$  and population  $\mathcal{P}_i$ . Similarly, the welfare change – measured in consumption-equivalent units is:

$$\Delta_t \mathcal{W} = \frac{d\mathcal{W}/dt}{\sum_i \mathcal{P}_i \omega_i u'(c_i) c_i} = \sum_i \mathcal{P}_i \widehat{\omega}_i \Delta_t \mathcal{U}_i \quad (15)$$

with the consumption equivalent weights  $\widehat{\omega}_i$ ,

$$\mathcal{P}_i \widehat{\omega}_i = \frac{\mathcal{P}_i \omega_i u'(c_i) c_i}{\sum_j \mathcal{P}_j \omega_j u'(c_j) c_j} .$$

### **Change in carbon emissions and global warming**

In a first experiment, we want to understand the impact of climate change on different countries. For that, we write the response of agents welfare  $d\mathcal{U}_i$  and decisions  $dx_i$  a first-order log-linear change in global emissions,  $d\log \mathcal{E} = \frac{d\mathcal{E}}{\mathcal{E}}$ , which will impact global temperature  $\mathcal{T}$ , by an amount  $d\log \mathcal{T}$  and hence local temperature  $T_i$ . This changes productivity through damage as well as utility. However, the goal of this exercise is to quantify and decompose the welfare gains between (i) the direct effect in terms of TFP and the indirect effects due to (ii) the endogenous choice of inputs, in particular energy sources, and (iii) the reallocation of production through international trade. The total impact of climate is measured in consumption-equivalent percentage change,

$$\Delta_{\mathcal{E}} \mathcal{U}_i = \frac{1}{u'(c_i) c_i} \frac{d\mathcal{U}_i}{d\mathcal{E}} .$$

As we know from the climate economics literature, summarizing all these effects takes the form of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) – accounting for global welfare – and the Local Social Cost of Carbon (LCC) for the local welfare of country  $i$ . These represent the monetary cost of extra emissions. The Local Cost of Carbon is,

$$LCC_i = -\frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_i}{\partial \mathcal{E}} / \frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_i}{\partial c_i} = -\frac{d\mathcal{U}_i}{d\mathcal{E}} \frac{1}{u'(c_i)} \quad (16)$$

where  $d\mathcal{U}_i$  is the change in  $i$ 's welfare due to an 1% increase in emissions, and  $u'(c_i)$  is the marginal utility of consumption.

Interestingly, at the first-order and small change in  $d\mathcal{E}$ , the Local Cost of Carbon is related to the consumption equivalent welfare change:

$$LCC_i = -\frac{d\mathcal{U}_i}{d\mathcal{E}} \frac{1}{u'(c_i)} = -c_i \Delta_{\mathcal{E}} \mathcal{U}_i$$

where  $LCC_i$  is measured in monetary units and  $\Delta_{\mathcal{E}} \mathcal{U}_i$  in percentage change.

Similarly, the global welfare changes for additional carbon emission relate to the Social Cost of Carbon for the welfare objective  $\mathcal{W}$ , which gives:

$$\begin{aligned}
SCC &= -\frac{\frac{\partial \mathcal{W}}{\partial \mathcal{E}}}{\frac{\partial \mathcal{W}}{\partial c}} = \sum_i p_i \omega_i u'(c_i) LCC_i \\
&= -\sum_i p_i \omega_i u'(c_i) c_i \Delta_{\mathcal{E}} \mathcal{U}_i \\
&= -\left( \sum_i p_i \omega_i u'(c_i) c_i \right) \Delta_{\mathcal{E}} \mathcal{W}
\end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

As a result, the Social Cost of Carbon is proportional to the consumption equivalent welfare change, where the conversion factor is the household consumption weights by the social welfare weights  $\omega_i u'(c_i)$ . Details on this calculation in more general Integrated Assessment Models can be found in Bourany (2024).

### ***Unilateral carbon taxation***

We now analyse how welfare changes when each country implements a unilateral carbon tax  $t_i^\varepsilon$  on its own emissions. Such a tax increases the cost of oil-gas by  $\xi^f d \log t_i^\varepsilon \approx \xi^f dt_i^\varepsilon$  and the cost of coal by  $\xi^c dt_i^\varepsilon$ . The consumption-equivalent welfare measure for country  $i$  of implementing unilaterally a marginal increase in the carbon tax  $t_i^\varepsilon$  when other countries are passive  $t_j^\varepsilon = 0, \forall j \neq i$ ,

$$\Delta_{t_i^\varepsilon} \mathcal{U}_i = \frac{1}{u'(c_i) c_i} \frac{d\mathcal{U}_i}{dt_i^\varepsilon}.$$

Part of these welfare effects can be decomposed between (i) the direct effect on climate – which is limited given the unilateral implementation of the policy – and (ii) the general equilibrium effect through energy prices, oil-gas rents, and good prices. In particular, the leakage effects play a significant role that we can quantify. Naturally, such leakage effects generate welfare gains for country  $i$  when country  $j$  implements these carbon policies,  $\Delta_{t_j^\varepsilon} \mathcal{U}_i$ . As a result, the leakage spillovers for all countries can be summarized by the Jacobian matrix:

$$\partial_t \mathcal{U} = \left\{ \Delta_{t_j^\varepsilon} \mathcal{U}_i \right\}_{ij}$$

with welfare change  $\Delta_{t_j^\varepsilon} \mathcal{U}_i$  for country  $i$  (row) from country  $j$  (column) unilateral carbon policy  $t^\varepsilon$ .

### ***Unilateral renewable subsidies***

Carbon taxation creates an additional cost for fossil fuels and is particularly detrimental to coal energy. Moreover, due to the leakage effect in terms of energy prices and international trade in goods, unilateral carbon taxation induces negative welfare losses, which give rise to policy inaction. We consider an alternative policy where each government unilaterally implements a subsidy on renewable energy  $d \log s_i^\varepsilon \approx ds_i^\varepsilon$ , which reduces the cost of renewable inputs  $e_i^r$  for final good firms. This type of industrial policy is financed through lump-sum taxation – maintaining symmetry with

our carbon taxation experiments. The welfare changes can be written as,

$$\Delta_{s_i^\varepsilon} \mathcal{U}_i$$

and similarly for the cross-country spillover Jacobian  $\partial_s \mathcal{U} = \left\{ \Delta_{s_j^\varepsilon} \mathcal{U}_i \right\}_{ij}$ .

### ***Unilateral carbon tariffs***

To dampen the leakage effects through international trade in goods, carbon tariffs have been suggested. We consider the unilateral policy where each country  $i$  imposes tariffs that scale with the carbon intensity of the country  $j$  it imports from:

$$d \log t_{ij}^b \approx dt_{ij}^b = \xi_j^\varepsilon dt_i^{b,\varepsilon} \quad \xi_j^\varepsilon = \frac{\epsilon_i}{y_i p_i}$$

where  $\xi_i^\varepsilon$  is the carbon intensity of country  $i$  with total emissions  $\epsilon_i$ , and  $dt_i^{b,\varepsilon}$  is the marginal increase in carbon price. Unilateral carbon tariffs change the relative prices of goods and has stronger terms-of-trade effects for carbon-intensive countries. The welfare change is denoted  $\Delta_{t_i^b} \mathcal{U}_i$ .

### ***Unilateral carbon taxation with carbon tariffs***

Our fourth policy experiment is the combination of two unilateral policies : (i) a carbon tax  $dt_i^\varepsilon$  on fossil fuel consumption combined with (ii) a carbon tariff  $dt_i^{b,\varepsilon}$  on the carbon content of the imports, both of them the same size. Such a policy gives rise to a welfare change for country  $i$ ,

$$\Delta_{t_i^{b,\varepsilon}} \mathcal{U}_i$$

where the spillovers from  $j$ 's policy on country  $i$  write in matrix form  $\partial_{t^{b,\varepsilon}} \mathcal{U} = \left\{ \Delta_{t_j^{b,\varepsilon}} \mathcal{U}_i \right\}_{ij}$ .

### ***Coordinated carbon policy***

We now turn to coordinated climate policy. Unilateral policies are limited in their impact on climate due to the small size of countries relative to the world economy, which creates free-riding incentives. We consider the implementation of a marginal increase of the carbon tax in a large set  $J$  of countries – roughly, a climate agreement. We consider both an agreement with all the countries  $J = \mathbb{I}$ , and agreements within the EU and ASEAN member states, in which nonmembers face a carbon tariff. The optimal design of climate agreements with carbon taxation and tariffs is studied and solved for in [Bourany \(2025\)](#).

The welfare of country  $i$  depends on whether it belongs to the agreements  $i \in J$  or not,

$$\Delta_{t^\varepsilon|J} \mathcal{U}_i,$$

for each agreement coalition  $J$ . In our experiments, we measure changes in welfare to the first-order given increase in the carbon tax. This implies that the cumulative impact of coordination scales

linearly with the number of additional countries such that:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta_{t^\varepsilon|J} \mathcal{U}_i &= \frac{1}{u'(c_i) c_i} \frac{d\mathcal{U}_i}{dt^\varepsilon} \Big|_J \\ &= \frac{1}{u'(c_i) c_i} \sum_{j \in J} \alpha_{ij} \frac{d\mathcal{U}_i}{dt_j^\varepsilon} \underbrace{\frac{dt_j^\varepsilon}{dt^\varepsilon}}_{=1} = \sum_{j \in J} \alpha_{ij} \Delta_{t_j^\varepsilon} \mathcal{U}_i,\end{aligned}$$

where  $\alpha_{ij}$  are parameters to be determined as a function of the observables, like trade and energy market shares, energy elasticities, and damage parameters, as we will see below. Coordination gains may be nonlinear in terms of welfare – both in the number of countries  $J$  and the size of the carbon tax  $t^\varepsilon$  – as discussed in [Bourany \(2025\)](#).

We now derive the model's welfare decomposition for general experiments. In the next section, we turn to the result for specific policy experiments.

### 3.2 Observables and sufficient statistics

We now derive the impact of changes in prices and quantities on welfare through the budget constraint. First, we define several objects that are relevant for the decomposition:

- Trade share:  $s_{ij} = \frac{c_{ij} p_{ij}}{c_i \mathbb{P}_i}$
- Energy share in production:  $s_i^e = \frac{e_i q_i^e}{y_i p_i}$
- Fossil share in energy mix  $s_i^f = \frac{e_i^f q_i^f}{e_i q_i^e}$  and similarly  $s_i^c = \frac{e_i^c q_i^c}{e_i q_i^e}$  and  $s_i^r = \frac{e_i^r q_i^r}{e_i q_i^e}$
- Fossil energy share:  $\eta_i^{\pi f} = \frac{\pi_i^f}{y_i p_i + \pi_i^e}$  and similarly for  $\eta_i^{\pi c}$ , and  $\eta_i^{\pi r}$ .
- Production share/rent share in GDP:  $\eta_i^y = \frac{y_i p_i}{y_i p_i + \pi_i^e} = 1 - \eta_i^{\pi f} - \eta_i^{\pi c} - \eta_i^{\pi r}$
- Consumption expenditure:  $x_i = c_i \mathbb{P}_i$
- Consumption share in GDP:  $\eta_i^c = \frac{x_i}{y_i p_i + \pi_i^e}$
- Consumption as a ratio of output:  $s_i^{c/y} = \frac{c_i \mathbb{P}_i}{y_i p_i} = \frac{x_i}{y_i p_i + \pi_i^f} \frac{y_i p_i + \pi_i^f}{y_i p_i} = \frac{\eta_i^c}{1 - \eta_i^{\pi f}} = \frac{\eta_i^c}{\eta_i^y}$ ,
- Energy share as a ratio of consumption:  $\frac{e_i q_i^e}{x_i} = \frac{e_i q_i^e}{y_i p_i} \frac{y_i p_i}{y_i p_i + \pi_i^e} \frac{y_i p_i + \pi_i^f}{x_i} = s_i^e \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c}$
- Profit share as a ratio of consumption:  $\frac{\pi_i^f}{x_i} = \frac{\pi_i^f}{y_i p_i + \pi_i^e} \frac{y_i p_i + \pi_i^f}{x_i} = \frac{\eta_i^{\pi f}}{\eta_i^c}$  and similarly for  $\pi_i^c$  and  $\pi_i^r$ .
- The share of GDP of energy imports and exports, with  $v_i = p_i y_i + q^f(e_i^x - e_i^f)$  and  $v^y = \frac{p_i y_i}{v_i}$ ,  $v^{e^x} = \frac{q^f e_i^x}{v_i}$ ,  $v^{e^f} = \frac{q^f e_i^f}{v_i}$  and  $v^{ne} = \frac{q^f (e_i^x - e_i^f)}{v_k}$ .

All these variables are measured in the current equilibrium, before implementing climate policies. Moreover, all these variables are observable in international trade and national accounts data.

### 3.3 Welfare, budget constraint and expenditure

We now compute the welfare of individual country  $i$ ,  $\mathcal{U}_i$ , in consumption equivalent terms, accounting for the changes in consumption and climate damages,

$$\frac{d\mathcal{U}_i}{u'(c_i) c_i} = \frac{dx_i}{x_i} - \frac{d\mathbb{P}_i}{\mathbb{P}_i},$$

with  $x_i = c_i \mathbb{P}_i$  the consumption expenditure  $c_i$ . To save on notation, we denote  $d \log x_i = \frac{dx_i}{x_i} -$  with a slight abuse of notation.<sup>7</sup> As a result, we expand the budget constraint from equation (2). The carbon tax and subsidies are rebated/taxed lump-sum to the households, and hence, climate policies do not have direct income effects and only act through reallocation and equilibrium effects through price changes.

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_t \mathcal{U}_i dt &= \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} \left( \underbrace{d \log \mathcal{D}_i^y}_{\text{climate damage}} + \underbrace{d \log p_i}_{\text{exports terms of trade}} \right) - \underbrace{d \log \mathbb{P}_i}_{\text{import terms of trade}} - \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} s_i^e \left( \underbrace{s_i^f d \log q^f + s_i^c d \log q_i^c + s_i^r d \log q_i^r}_{\text{energy price effects (demand)}} \right) \\ &\quad + \underbrace{\frac{\eta_i^{\pi f}}{\eta_i^c} d \log \pi_i^f + \frac{\eta_i^{\pi c}}{\eta_i^c} d \log \pi_i^c + \frac{\eta_i^{\pi r}}{\eta_i^c} d \log \pi_i^r}_{\text{energy rent effect (supply)}} \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

We see that the welfare gains and losses can be decomposed in five terms: (i) the direct impacts of climate damages production  $\mathcal{D}_i^y$ , (ii-iii) two terms of trade effects for  $p_i$  the sales of good  $i$ , and  $\mathbb{P}_i$  the price index of the goods purchased by the household from countries  $j$ , and (iv-v) the effects of the energy prices changes – for oil-gas,  $q^f$ , coal,  $q_i^c$ , and renewable  $q_i^r$  – through the purchasing cost for production and through the revenue through energy rents. Note that we replace incomes from output  $y_i$  at the first-order using the standard Solow decomposition:

$$d \log y_i = d \log \mathcal{D}_i^y + \frac{M P e_i e_i}{y_i} d \log e_i = d \log \mathcal{D}_i^y + s_i^e [s_i^f d \log e_i^f + s_i^c d \log e_i^c + s_i^r d \log e_i^r]$$

where we use the labour supply being inelastic in this Armington trade structure  $\ell_i = \bar{\ell}_i$ . While each of these terms depends on how equilibrium prices change in a counterfactual, we do not need to simulate the model to recover how log prices change to the first order. Instead, each one of these terms can be computed using observable moments in the data and estimated or calibrated elasticities.

### 3.4 Climate system and damages

We log-linearize our simple climate system for small changes in emissions  $\mathcal{E}$  and energy consumption in oil-gas  $E^f$  and in coal  $E^c$ . Given the linearity of the climate system  $T_i = \Delta_i \mathcal{T} = \Delta_i \chi \mathcal{S}$ , we naturally obtain that the percentage increase in temperature reflects the percentage change in carbon concentration,

$$d \log T_i = d \log \mathcal{S} .$$

The change in carbon concentration depends on the time horizon  $\mathbb{T}$  where  $\mathcal{S} = \mathcal{S}_0 + \mathbb{T} \mathcal{E}$ , and  $s^{\mathcal{E}/\mathcal{S}} = \mathbb{T} \mathcal{E} / \mathcal{S}$  which converges to 1, the longer the horizon we consider,<sup>8</sup>

$$d \log \mathcal{S} = s^{\mathcal{E}/\mathcal{S}} d \log \mathcal{E} \xrightarrow{\mathbb{T} \rightarrow \infty} d \log \mathcal{E} .$$

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<sup>7</sup>This is not the case, for example, when  $x_i < 0$  or changes sign.

<sup>8</sup>If  $\mathcal{E}$  represents annual emissions  $\sim 35 \text{ GtCO}_2/\text{year}$ , given the calibration on 2015 temperature, a horizon  $\mathbb{T}$  corresponding to  $\sim 85$  years until 2100 would imply  $\mathbb{T} \mathcal{E} / \mathcal{S} \sim 0.7$ .

Now, using the damage function with slope  $\gamma$  and curvature  $\delta$  as in equation (12), we obtain the linearization:

$$\begin{aligned} d \log \mathcal{D}_i^y &= -\gamma^y(1+\delta)(T_i - T_i^*)^\delta T_i d \log T_i \\ d \log \mathcal{D}_i^y &= -\bar{\gamma}_i^y d \log \mathcal{E} . \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

with  $\bar{\gamma}_i^y = (1+\delta)(T_i - T_i^*)^\delta T_i$ . Therefore, the larger the curvature  $\delta$ , the more significant the heterogeneity in damages  $(T_i - T_i^*)^\delta$ , despite log-linearizing the model around the current equilibrium. Finally, total emissions reacts to changes in aggregate fossil fuels (oil-gas) and coal consumption,

$$d \log \mathcal{E} = s^{f/E} d \log E^f + s^{c/E} d \log E^c \quad s^{f/E} = \frac{\xi^f E^f}{\mathcal{E}} \quad s^{c/E} = \frac{\xi^c E^c}{\mathcal{E}}$$

To understand the determination of the equilibrium quantities of oil-gas  $E^f$  and  $E^c$  we now turn to energy markets.

### 3.5 Energy markets – Profits, prices, and supply

Using the energy firm problems, we log-linearize the profit change as a function of energy and input prices. For fossil energy (oil and gas), this yields,

$$d \log \pi_i^f = \left(1 + \frac{1}{\nu_i^f}\right) d \log q^f - \frac{1}{\nu_i^f} d \log p_i \quad (20)$$

with  $\nu_i^f$  the fossil energy inverse supply elasticity. We obtain similar formulas for  $\pi_i^c$  and  $\pi_i^r$  as functions of  $\nu_i^c$ ,  $\nu_i^r$  and  $q_i^c$  and  $q_i^r$  respectively.

Given that coal and renewables are assumed to be only traded locally (i.e.,  $\bar{e}_i^c = e_i^c$ ), we can write the supply curves for coal and renewable energy,

$$d \log q^c = \nu_i^c d \log e_i^c + d \log p_i \quad (21)$$

and similarly for  $q^r$  with inverse elasticity  $\nu_i^r$ . As a result, the price of coal and renewable energy rises both with the input cost  $p_i$  and with the quantity demanded  $e_i^c$ .

In contrast, oil-gas are traded internationally, where the price  $q^f$  clears the world market. Denoting  $E^f$  the total oil-gas quantity, changes to the aggregate supply curve are,

$$d \log E^f = \sum_i \lambda_i^x d \log e_i^x = \sum_i \lambda_i^f d \log e_i^f , \quad (22)$$

with  $\lambda_i^f = \rho_i e_i^f / E^f$  the demand share from country  $i$  and  $\lambda_i^x = \rho_i e_i^x / E^f$  the supply share (or market share) of country  $i$  as an exporter,

$$d \log q^f = \bar{\nu}^f d \log E^f + \sum_i \lambda_i^x \frac{\bar{\nu}}{\nu_i} d \log p_i . \quad (23)$$

with the aggregate inverse supply elasticity  $\bar{\nu}^f = \left(\sum_i \lambda_i^x \nu_i^{-1}\right)^{-1}$ .

### 3.6 Energy markets – Taxation and demand

The production function equation (7) allows for different, finite elasticities of substitution between both labour and energy (with elasticity  $\sigma^y$ ) and between the different energy sources (with elasticity  $\sigma^e$ ). In our formulation, we can write the individual country demand curve – for example, for oil and gas – as,

$$d \log e_i^f = \underbrace{-\left(\frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f + (1-s_i^f)\sigma^e\right)}_{\text{substitution away from oil-gas}} \left[ d \log q^f + \xi^f dt_i^\varepsilon \right] \\ + \underbrace{\left(\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}\right)}_{\text{substitution away from coal and renewable toward oil-gas}} \left( s_i^c [d \log q_i^c + \xi^c dt_i^\varepsilon] + s_i^r [d \log q_i^r - ds_i^\varepsilon] \right) \\ + \underbrace{\frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} (d \log \mathcal{D}_i + d \log p_i)}_{\text{energy demand changes due to climate damage or price changes}} .$$

We see that a price surge  $d \log q^f$  not only decreases fossil demand  $e^f$  through substitution across energies  $\sigma^e$  but also away from energy  $\sigma^y$  scaling with the fossil share  $s_i^f$ . In comparison, a cost increase for coal also raises the demand for oil-gas  $e^f$  through substitution  $\sigma^e$ , but similarly pushes firms away from the energy bundle with elasticity  $\sigma^y$  – the difference of the two elasticities yielding the net effect. Moreover, an increase in productivity  $\mathcal{D}_i^y$  or price  $p_i$  both increase input demand, as shown in the last two terms.

Finally, replacing input demand, we also summarize the impact on output of changes in prices and policies,

$$d \log y_i = (1+\alpha^y) d \log \mathcal{D}_i^y + \alpha^y d \log p_i - \alpha^y s_i^f [d \log q^f + \xi^f dt_i^\varepsilon] \\ - \alpha^y s_i^c [d \log q_i^c + \xi^c dt_i^\varepsilon] - \alpha^y s_i^r [d \log q_i^r - ds_i^\varepsilon],$$

with the factor  $\alpha^y = \frac{s_i^e \sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}$ . We learn two lessons: first, climate damage  $d \log \mathcal{D}_i^y$  reduces output more than one for one due to input reallocation away from energy. This multiplier effect  $(1+\alpha^y)$  is even stronger when damage reduces when the energy supply curves are flat, i.e.  $\nu^c = \nu^r = 0$ . However, this effect is dampened when those curves are less elastic  $\nu^c \rightarrow \infty$ : declines in TFP lower the energy price, which facilitates the purchase of additional inputs and improves production, providing some form of adaptation to climate change.

Second, we learn about the sensitivity of output to carbon taxation and other climate policies. The direct exposure of production  $y_i$  to the carbon tax  $t_i^\varepsilon$  is summarized by the factor  $\alpha^y (\xi^f s_i^f + \xi^c s_i^c) = \frac{s_i^e \sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} (\xi^f s_i^f + \xi^c s_i^c)$ , which represent the substitution effect of oil-gas and coal.

To decompose the effect further, we replace the input demand equation (24), with the supply curve equation (21) to find the equilibrium demand for coal and renewables – where the prices  $q_i^c$  and  $q_i^r$  are solved for. Due to the complex reallocations between the three inputs  $e_i^f, e_i^c, e_i^r$ , we keep the general formula for the appendix. The general intuition is that climate policies like carbon

taxes  $t_i^\varepsilon$  and renewable subsidies reduce demand for oil and coal. However, this effect is damped by the decline along the supply curve, which reduces the effectiveness of the policy.<sup>9</sup> As a result, the more elastic the supply for coal and renewable, the stronger the quantity – and emissions – response to carbon taxation and climate policies.

### *Oil-gas energy price*

We now combine the individual countries' fossil energy demand, as in equation (24), with the country  $i$  share in global demand  $\lambda_i^f = \frac{P_i e_i^f}{E^f}$  as in equation (22), and the supply curve equation (23). We obtain, in general equilibrium, the total demand for oil,

$$\begin{aligned}
d \log E^f &= \sum_i \lambda_i^f d \log e_i^f \\
&= \frac{1}{1 + \bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}_{\mathbb{I}}^{\sigma, f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \underbrace{\left[ -\xi^f \left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f + (1-s_i^f) \sigma^e \right) + \xi^c s_i^c \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) \right]}_{\text{carbon taxation (oil-gas + coal) effect}} J_i dt^\varepsilon \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{1 + \bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}_{\mathbb{I}}^{\sigma, f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f s_i^r \underbrace{\left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right)}_{\text{renewable subsidy effect}} J_i ds_i^\varepsilon + \frac{1}{1 + \bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}_{\mathbb{I}}^{\sigma, f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \underbrace{\frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \log \mathcal{D}_i^y}_{\text{climate damage effect}} \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{1 + \bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}_{\mathbb{I}}^{\sigma, f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \underbrace{\left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \log p_i + \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) (s_i^c d \log q_i^c + s_i^r d \log q_i^r) \right)}_{\substack{\text{terms-of-trade} \\ \text{effect}}} \underbrace{\text{substitution from coal and renewable}}
\end{aligned} \tag{24}$$

with  $\bar{\lambda}_{\mathbb{I}}^{\sigma, f} = \sum_{i \in \mathbb{I}} \lambda_i^f \left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f + (1-s_i^f) \right) \xi^f$  the aggregate demand elasticity for oil, and the aggregate inverse supply elasticity  $\bar{\nu}^f = \left( \sum_i \lambda_i^x \nu_i^{-1} \right)^{-1}$ .

This decomposition first reveals that the carbon tax affects oil-gas demand through two channels: the direct substitution away from oil-gas and the indirect substitution away from coal into oil-gas. Comparing the relative strength, the first effect dominates if:

$$\bar{\lambda}_{\mathcal{J}}^{\sigma, f} := \sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}} \lambda_i^f \left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f + (1-s_i^f) \sigma^e \right) \xi^f > \sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}} \lambda_i^f \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) s_i^c \xi^c =: \bar{\lambda}_{\mathcal{J}}^{\sigma, c}$$

where  $\mathcal{J}$  is the set of countries imposing the carbon tax.<sup>10</sup> If the largest oil-gas consumers are reducing their demand for oil faster than they substitute away from coal, the net effect on oil-

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<sup>9</sup>The formula in the appendix for coal and renewable demand have the following general form. Take an arbitrary energy demand curve  $d \log e = -\sigma[d \log q + dt] + \tilde{\sigma} d \log b$ , and the supply curve  $d \log q = \nu d \log e + \tilde{\sigma} d \log c$ , where  $b$  and  $c$  are demand and supply shifters respectively, we obtain the general demand:

$$d \log e = -\frac{\sigma}{1 + \nu \sigma} dt + \frac{\tilde{\sigma}}{1 + \nu \sigma} d \log b - \frac{\sigma}{1 + \nu \sigma} d \log b$$

<sup>10</sup>Reorganizing the terms, we can write it as follows – verified in most empirically relevant cases where large oil consumers  $\lambda_i^f$  also have high oil energy share  $s_i^f$ :

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}} \lambda_i^f \left[ \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} (s_i^f \xi^f + s_i^c \xi^c) + \sigma^e ((1-s_i^f) \xi^f - s_i^c \xi^c) \right] > 0.$$

gas demand declines. Second, we also observe that climate policies, like carbon taxation,  $t^\varepsilon$ , and renewable subsidy,  $s^\varepsilon$ , are stronger when coordinated: oil-gas demand decline more for larger sets of countries implementing the policy J. However, it also generates a *energy price leakage effect*. When country  $i$  does not impose carbon policies, the price of oil declines for larger sets of climate agreement participants J – which is beneficial for country  $i$ 's production and welfare. We quantify this leakage effect below.

To study the direct effect of carbon taxation and the gain for coordination with climate agreement J, we simplify the model further to obtain an analytical formula for the fossil price. In the following, we assume that the energy mix is concentrated on oil and gas  $s_i^f = 1, s_i^c = s_i^r = 0$ . This implies:

$$d \log E^f = -\frac{1}{1+\bar{\gamma}+\mathbb{C}\text{ov}_i(\tilde{\lambda}_i^f, \bar{\gamma}_i) + \bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \tilde{\lambda}_i^f J_i dt_i^\varepsilon + \sum_i \hat{\lambda}_i^f d \log p_i$$

with energy market shares  $\lambda_i^f = \frac{P_i e_i^f}{E^f}$ , and weighted by elasticity  $\tilde{\lambda}_i^f = \lambda_i^f \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}$ . The average elasticity becomes  $\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f} = \sum_i \lambda_i^f \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}$ , the price impact  $\hat{\lambda}_i^f = \tilde{\lambda}_i^f / (1 + \sum_i \tilde{\lambda}_i^f \gamma_i + \bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f})$ , and the covariance is the empirical analog,  $\mathbb{C}\text{ov}_i(x_i, y_i) = \sum_i x_i y_i - \sum_i x_i \sum_i y_i$ .

The higher the carbon tax  $dt_i^\varepsilon$  – at the intensive margin – or the size of a climate policy agreement J – at the extensive margin – the lower the fossil-fuel demand. However, the strength of carbon taxation is muted for three reasons: (i) the more inelastic the supply – with higher curvature  $\nu_i^f$  and  $\bar{\nu}^f$  – the larger the price decline along the supply curve, which then in turn reinforce fossil demand and emissions. This contrasts with the analysis of the oil market in [Asker et al. \(2024\)](#): we claim that the more inelastic the oil supply – due to curvature of costs, concentration, or market power – is detrimental to the effectiveness of coordinated carbon taxation. Moreover, (ii) the energy curve  $q^f$  is affected by climate change: higher emissions damage the climate  $\bar{\gamma} = \sum_i \bar{\gamma}_i$ , which in turn reduces productivity, energy demand and hence emissions. Thus, with damages, the price impact of taxation is lower as it improves both the climate and energy demand in consequence. Additionally, (iii) this vicious effect is strengthened with the distribution of demand  $\tilde{\lambda}_i^f$  and climate damage  $\bar{\gamma}_i$ . The covariance term  $\mathbb{C}\text{ov}_i(\tilde{\lambda}_i^f, \bar{\gamma}_i)$  is positive if large energy consumers – with larger market shares  $\lambda_i^f$  and high elasticity  $\sigma$  – are also the most affected by climate change – with higher costs  $\bar{\gamma}_i$ . The demand effect of taxation is thus muted in those circumstances.

### 3.7 International trade in goods

Recall the Armington trade block of the model where the good demand is constant elasticity of substitution  $\theta$ , purchased at a price  $p_i$  and subject to tariffs  $t_{ki}^b$  for goods from country  $i$ . Using the market clearing in equation (13) – reformulated such as countries  $i$  sales equal countries  $k$  expenditures, coming from incomes in good sales as well as net-exports of fossil energy – the price

index, and the trade shares as in equation (3), we obtain the log-linearization of trade patterns:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_i p_i y_i &= \sum_{k \in \mathbb{I}} \mathcal{P}_k s_{ki} \frac{1}{1+t_{ki}} [p_k y_k + q^f (e_k^x - e_k^f)], \\ \mathbb{P}_i &= \left( \sum_j a_{ij} (\tau_{ij} (1+t_{ij}^b) p_j)^{1-\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}, \quad s_{ij} = \left( \frac{(1+t_{ij}^b) \tau_{ij} p_j}{\mathbb{P}_i} \right)^{1-\theta}, \\ d \log s_{ij} &= (\theta - 1) \left( \sum_k s_{ik} \left( d \log p_k + dt_{ik}^b \right) - \left( d \log p_j + dt_{ij}^b \right) \right). \end{aligned}$$

The linearization of the market clearing is more complex as it also integrates the income effects of the changes in imports and exports of energy  $e_i^f - e_i^x$  and energy prices  $q^f$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \underbrace{(d \log p_i + d \log y_i)}_{\text{sales from } i} &= \sum_k t_{ik} \left[ \underbrace{\left( \frac{p_k y_k}{v_k} \right) (d \log p_k + d \log y_k)}_{\text{production income of } k} \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \underbrace{\frac{q^f e_k^x}{v_k} d \log e_k^x - \frac{q^f e_k^f}{v_k} d \log e_k^f + \frac{q^f (e_k^x - e_k^f)}{v_k} d \log q^f}_{\text{oil-gas income of } k} \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \underbrace{\theta \sum_h (s_{kh} dt_{kh}^b - (1+s_{ki}) dt_{ki}^b) + (\theta-1) \sum_h (s_{kh} d \log p_h - d \log p_i)}_{\text{change in trade share in goods purchased by } k \text{ from } h \text{ relative to } i} \right] \end{aligned}$$

with  $\mathbf{S} = \{s_{ij}\}_{ij} = \frac{c_{ij} p_{ij}}{c_i \mathbb{P}_i}$  the trade share matrix,  $\mathbf{T} = \{t_{ij}\}_{ij} = \{\frac{\mathcal{P}_j v_j}{\mathcal{P}_i v_i} s_{ji}\}$  income flow matrix –

which represents the share of income  $v_i$  from  $i$  that is coming from country  $j$  – which is identical to the trade/income matrix in Kleinman, Liu and Redding (2024), and the Armington CES  $\theta$ . This implies that rewritten in matrix notation, we get the price changes as a function of climate damage, carbon tax  $t^\varepsilon$  and renewable subsidies  $s^\varepsilon$ , and finally, the trade tariffs policies  $t^b$  where the matrix  $\mathbf{J}$  represents which countries  $k$  impose tariffs on country  $i$ .

As for the reaction of oil-gas prices to climate policy, one general lesson from this decomposition relates to the gains from coordination: the larger the coalition of countries implementing carbon taxation and green subsidies, the stronger the reallocation effects. Climate damages lower the productivity  $\mathcal{D}_k^y$  and income, which lowers the demand from the most affected countries and redirects the trade patterns. More policy coordination improves global climate, which mitigates those trade disruptions, even for countries that free-ride without implementing carbon policies. However, this free-riding is a double-edged sword: countries  $i$  outside climate agreements benefit more from the leakage effect caused by the climate policy in countries  $k$ , but when those policies are costly for  $k$ 's income, that might lower the total demand for country  $i$ . All these channels are

represented here, and the complete formula can be found in the appendix in Appendix B.

$$\begin{aligned}
d \log p = & \underbrace{\mathbf{A} \left[ (\mathbf{T}v^y - \mathbf{I}) \delta^{y,z} - \mathbf{T}v^{ef} \beta^{e,d,f} \right]}_{\text{climate impact on output } \delta^{y,z} \text{ and energy demand } \beta^{e,d,f}} d \log \mathcal{D}^y \\
& + \underbrace{\mathbf{A} \left[ -(\mathbf{T}v^y - \mathbf{I}) \delta^{y,qf} + \mathbf{T} \left( v^{ex} \frac{1}{\nu^f} - v^{ef} \beta_{f,f}^{e,q} + v^{ne} \right) \right]}_{\text{oil-gas price impact on energy output } \delta^{y,qf} \text{ and net energy bill } e^x - e^f} d \log q^f \\
& + \underbrace{\mathbf{A} \left[ -\mathbf{T}v^{ef} \left( -\beta_{f,f}^{e,q} \xi^f + \beta_{f,c}^{e,t} \xi^c \right) - (\mathbf{T}v^y - \mathbf{I}) \delta^{y,t\varepsilon} \right]}_{\text{carbon tax impact on output } \delta^{y,t} \text{ and energy demand away from oil-gas } \beta_{f,f}^{e,q} \text{ and from coal } \beta_{f,c}^{e,q}} \mathbf{J} dt^\varepsilon \\
& + \underbrace{\mathbf{A} \left[ \mathbf{T}v^{ef} \beta_{f,r}^{e,t} + (\mathbf{T}v^y - \mathbf{I}) \delta^{y,se} \right]}_{\text{renewable subsidy impact on oil-gas demand } \beta_{f,r}^{e,t} \text{ and output } \delta^{y,se}} \mathbf{J} ds^\varepsilon \\
& + \underbrace{\theta \mathbf{A} \left( \mathbf{T}S \mathbf{J} dt^b - \mathbf{T}(\mathbf{1} + \mathbf{S}') (\mathbf{J} dt^b)' \right)}_{\text{trade reallocation due to tariffs}}
\end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

with  $\mathbf{J}$  a tariff direction matrix – whether country  $i$  imposes tariffs on country  $j$ , with tariff increasing in the carbon intensity of  $j$  in the case of carbon tariffs. Moreover, the general equilibrium (and leakage) effects are summarized in a complicated matrix  $\mathbf{A}$  that summarizes the fact that the price  $p_i$  also affects energy demand, oil-gas extraction, energy trade balance, and output. Further description can be found in the Appendix B.

In sum, we use the welfare decomposition of Equation equation (18), which decomposes the effects of climate policies into the following four channels: (i) the climate damages or *direct productivity* impacts, (ii) the importer and exporter terms-of-trade effects or *trade* effects, (iii) the impact on energy prices or *energy cost* effect, and (iv) the effect on profit from the energy sector or the *energy rent* effect. We decompose the welfare impacts through these four different channels, given the other general equilibrium effects of the model: the climate damage as in equation (19), the individual countries' demand for energy as in equation (24), the global price for oil-gas in equation (23) which depends on aggregate quantity of energy consumed in equation (24), the profit of energy firms as in equation (20), and finally the general equilibrium of the good markets driving the terms of trade effects and prices as in equation (25). Before turning to the result of our model, we explain how we estimate the key parameters, such as climate damages and energy supply elasticities.

## 4 Estimation and quantification

Our main data sources are the World Development Indicators (WDIs), energy data compiled by Our World in Data from the Energy Institute (OWID, [Energy Institute, 2024](#)), and the International Trade and Production Database estimation sample (ITPD-E, [Borchert et al., 2021](#))

for international trade flows at the sector level, which allows us to remove energy trade from the flow of all other goods internationally. Additional data sources are described in the text. Our estimation covers years 2000-2016 for the trade data, and 1985-2019 for the energy data.

#### 4.1 Estimating the structural damage function

We estimate the structural damage function  $\mathcal{D}_i^y$  using temperature shocks and data on trade flows. Typical damage function estimation recovers damage parameters from regressions of GDP/capita on temperature shocks (see, e.g., [Burke et al., 2015](#)). In this context, a regression of log GDP per capita on temperature would fail to identify the parameters of the damage function, as GDP contains effects of temperature elsewhere (via their propagation through trade network), as well as general equilibrium effects on energy prices, rents and wages. Subsequently, in our context, an off-the-shelf damage function estimated on GDP recovers parameters that are subject to the Lucas critique. Our estimates of the structural adaptation function are robust to this critique because they net out endogenous adaptation and climate change effects that operate through goods and energy markets.

To estimate  $T^*$  and  $\gamma$ , we use the model's gravity regression to estimate the parameters of the damage function, similar to [Rudik et al. \(2022\)](#). To do so, we leverage trade flow data from ITPD-E sample combined with local temperature data. For temperature data, we use Berkeley Earth near-surface temperature data ([Rohde et al. \(2013\)](#), available in  $1^\circ \times 1^\circ$  cells), which we aggregate to the country level, population-weighting using population from the Global Human Settlement Layer in 2015 ([Pesaresi et al., 2024](#)).

The ITPD-E trade data measures trade flows  $X_{ij}$  at the industry level between most country pairs in 2000 through 2016. We use the ITPD-E data as it allows us to drop bilateral trade flows in the energy sector. Through the lens of the model, trade flows from exporter  $j$  to importer  $i$  are,

$$X_{ij} = p_{ij} c_{ij} = \left( \frac{(1+t_{ij}^b) \tau_{ij} p_j}{\mathbb{P}_i} \right)^{1-\theta} \frac{c_i}{\mathbb{P}_i} a_{ij}, \quad (26)$$

where,

$$p_i = (\mathcal{D}_i^y(T_i) z_i)^{-1} \left( \epsilon(q_i^e)^{1-\sigma^y} + (1-\epsilon)(w_i)^{1-\sigma^y} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^y}}$$

where  $q_i^e$  is a CES price index for energy prices. We use equation 26 as a basis for estimating  $\mathcal{D}_i^y$ . Dividing domestic trade, and treating each year  $t$  in the data as an equilibrium of the model, equation 26 becomes,

$$\frac{X_{ijt}}{X_{itt}} = (p_{jt} / p_{it})^{1-\theta} \varsigma_{ij} \varsigma_t \tilde{a}_{ijt} \tilde{\tau}_{ijt}$$

where  $\varsigma_{ij}$  are all time-invariant bilateral preference or cost shifters, and  $\tilde{a}_{ijt} \tilde{\tau}_{ijt}$  represents any time-varying components of bilateral preferences or trade costs. Taking logs and setting  $\delta = 1$  generates the estimating equation,

$$\log \mathbb{E}[X_{ij}/X_{ii}] = \beta_0(T_{jt} - T_{it}) + \beta_1(T_{jt}^2 - T_{it}^2) + \varsigma_{ij} + \varsigma_t + \Gamma' W_{it} + \Omega' W_{jt}. \quad (27)$$




Figure 2: Marginal damages on productivity from a 1 degree change in local temperature versus country baseline temperature, using estimates of equation 27 available in Appendix Table A1, Column (4). 95% CIs computed using standard errors two-way clustered by importer and exporter. Also pictured: the histogram of countries across the baseline temperature distribution, weighted and unweighted by population. The coldest countries in the data are Greenland and Mongolia.

In this specification,  $\varsigma_{ij}$  is a country-pair fixed effect, while  $\varsigma_t$  is a time fixed effect.  $W_{it}$  and  $W_{jt}$  are importer- and exporter-year controls. These controls are a second order polynomial in log GDP/capita, the share of GDP that is attributed from oil rents, and renewable energy consumption as a per cent of total final energy consumption, and are all taken from the WDIs. These controls proxy for the component of factory gate prices  $p_j$  driven by energy prices  $q_i^e$  or wages  $w_i$ . With these controls, the coefficients on temperature  $\beta_0$  and  $\beta_1$  identify parameters of the damage function (when  $\delta = 1$ ), namely,

$$-\frac{1}{2} \frac{\beta_0}{\beta_1} = T^*, \quad \frac{-2\beta_1}{\theta - 1} = \gamma.$$

We estimate equation (27) with a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator with high dimensional fixed effects to maintain zeros in the trade matrix (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Correia et al., 2020). We limit the estimation sample to countries for which domestic trade  $X_{ii}$  is not missing in the ITPD-E data and for which  $W_{it}$  and  $W_{jt}$  is not missing in the WDIs, as well as entities that are present in the ITPD but not other common trade datasets, like CEPII (Conte et al., 2022). This retains 169 countries, primarily dropping territories, dependencies, small island states, historical entities, or special jurisdictions, as well as North Korea.

Identification of  $\beta_0$  and  $\beta_1$  comes from within-trading-partner pair variation, tracing out how temperature shocks to bilateral terms-of-trade affect the import penetration ratio, net of year effects common to all pairs and importer- and exporter-year controls (which control for the time-varying component of factor prices). In short, the identification assumption is that time-varying shocks to preferences  $\tilde{a}_{ijt}$  and shocks to bilateral cost shifters  $\tilde{\tau}_{ijt}$  are such that  $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{a}_{ijt}\tilde{\tau}_{ijt} | T_{it}, T_{it}^2, T_{jt}, T_{jt}^2, \varsigma_{ij}, \varsigma_t, W_{it}, W_{jt}] = 1$ ; i.e., conditional on the fixed effects and our con-

trols, temperature shocks (and their square) are uncorrelated with the error term.

Appendix Table A1 reports the results of our estimation. All specifications two-way cluster standard errors at the importer and exporter year to account for serial correlation of temperature within countries. Column (4) reports the results of our preferred specification, which uses differences in temperature ( $T_{jt} - T_{it}$ ) and its square as a regressor, providing more efficient estimators of  $\beta_0$  and  $\beta_1$ . We estimate  $\hat{T}^* = 14.02$  and  $\hat{\gamma} = 0.012$ . Column (3) reports the results by separately estimating coefficients on  $T_{it}$ ,  $T_{jt}$ , and their squares. Reassuringly, separate estimates have the correct sign and magnitude and are statistically indistinguishable from each other, though estimates on importer temperature are noisier.<sup>11</sup>

Figure 2 represents the damage function by using the estimates of  $\beta_0$  and  $\beta_1$  from Appendix Table A1, Column (4) to compute the marginal damages at each point along the baseline temperature distribution, i.e., the derivative of  $\mathcal{D}_i^y$ . Russia, which starts from a baseline cold temperature, experiences gains from local warming, while India, a baseline hot country, experiences large losses. This representation of the damage function is common in the literature, and our damage function resembles those estimated using GDP (Burke et al., 2015; Cruz and Rossi-Hansberg, 2024), despite our identification strategy that leverages panel variation in non-energy import penetration and temperature differences.

Finally, to calibrate  $T_i^*$ , we also use an intermediary assumption that nests us between the following cases: (i) that  $T^*$  represents a global peak temperature for goods production TFP (as in Burke et al., 2015; Kotlikoff et al., 2021; Krusell and Smith, 2022), (ii) or that global warming affects all the locations symmetrically, where deviation from the local baseline temperature  $T_i^* = T_{it_0}$  damage productivity, as in the representative agent economy of Barrage and Nordhaus (2024). A variant of (ii) is the assumption of full local adaptation to a changing climate, in which local weather shocks (i.e., temperature deviations from a moving average of local temperature) are the only source of damages, an assumption maintained in Kahn et al. (2019). Bilal and Käñzig (2024) suggest, in contrast, that climate damages on GDP come in large part from shocks to global (rather than local) temperature, as they are associated with extreme events.<sup>12</sup> Our intermediate step and assumes partial local adaptation by assuming,

$$T_i^* = \alpha^T T^* + (1-\alpha^T) T_{it_0}$$

where  $\alpha^T = 0.5$  and  $T^* = 14.02$ , as estimated. We hold  $\gamma$  fixed across countries, implying that all local adaptation affects the peak but not the shape of the damage function.

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<sup>11</sup>To estimate  $T^*$  and  $\gamma$  with separate coefficients on importer and exporter temperatures, we form precision-weighted averages of the estimands, and recover estimates of  $T^*$  and  $\gamma$  that are statistically indistinguishable to those estimated in Column (4). Columns (1) and (2) use an OLS estimator. With the OLS estimator, the effects of importer temperature on import penetration are substantially noisier. With separate coefficients, we find a peak of around 16 and a flatter damage function  $\gamma \approx 0.001$ . The effects of temperature differences are indistinguishable from zero in, Column (2).

<sup>12</sup>Goulet Coulombe and Klieber (2025) suggest these estimates are driven by a spurious correlation due to the timing of the eruption of Mount Agung and postwar European growth, and later, ENSO events and the rise of China. Neal et al. (2025) find that including global temperature tends to amplify the cost of climate change in several econometric models. We omit global temperature given the limited time-series and these potential concerns.

## 4.2 Estimating energy supply elasticities

Our goal is to recover the supply elasticities of fossil (oil and gas) and coal production for each country. Our estimation strategy begins with the model-implied relationship that,

$$d \log \pi_i^f = \left(1 + 1/\nu_i^f\right) d \log q^f - \left(1/\nu_i^f\right) d \log p_i$$

As the world price of fossil is taken as exogenous to producers, a regression of oil rents on international oil-gas prices would recover the oil-gas supply elasticity, provided changes to international oil-gas prices are uncorrelated with changes in traded goods prices. For oil rents, we use data on the GDP share of oil and gas rents from the WDIs,  $\eta_i^f$ . For each country, we construct the effective price of fossil by taking an average of international oil and natural gas prices (from OWID), weighted by the share of oil and gas in the total fossil rents share of GDP. Treating each year as an equilibrium of the model, we leverage the time series to estimate the fossil supply elasticity by estimating,

$$\Delta \log \eta_{it}^f = \rho_i \Delta \log q_{it}^f + \Omega \Delta \log GDP_{it} + \varsigma_i + u_{it}. \quad (28)$$

We estimate equation (28) by OLS country-by-country, where here  $\Delta$  indicates first-differencing and  $\varsigma_i$  indicates a country fixed effect, which controls for country-specific time trends intended to capture potentially confounding secular trends in oil rents and international prices within each country. First-differencing implicitly nets out country fixed effects, which absorb all time-invariant shifters of  $p_i$ . Controlling for changes to GDP controls for year-over-year changes to  $p_i$ , as well as controlling for the denominator of  $\eta_{it}^f$ , so variation on the left-hand side reflects variation in  $\pi_i^f$ .

Estimating equation (28) results in very noisy estimates of  $\rho_i$  for some countries. Some estimates of  $\rho_i$ , while positive, fall below 1 (implying a negative oil-gas supply elasticity), while other estimates are even negative, inconsistent with the model and incompatible with the quantification. To ameliorate this, we estimate a pooled estimate of  $\rho$  across countries and use an empirical Bayes shrinkage estimator to shrink noisy and wrong-signed estimates towards the pooled mean. We impose a truncated normal prior on  $\rho_i$  with the truncation beginning at 1. This is tractable, as a normal likelihood (for the coefficient estimates,  $\rho_i$ ) is conjugate with a truncated normal prior, which allows for easy recovery of the posterior mean.<sup>13</sup> Imposing coefficient sign restrictions in estimation while jointly shrinking away noise is similar to the approach in estimating millions of retail product demand elasticities in Rosenthal-Kay et al. (2024). Histograms of the OLS and empirical Bayes estimates are available in Appendix Figure A2.

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<sup>13</sup>To be precise, we implement a quasi-empirical Bayes routine by estimating  $\mathbb{E}[\rho_i | \hat{\rho}_i]$  under the hierarchical model,

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\rho}_i | \rho_i &\sim N(\rho_i, \sigma_{\rho_i}^2) \\ \rho_i &\sim N_{1,\infty}(\rho, \sigma_\rho), \end{aligned}$$

where we treat the pooled regression estimate and its standard error as parameters of a truncated normal prior where the truncation begins at 1,  $N_{1,\infty}$ . As a truncated normal prior preserves conjugacy with a normal likelihood (both are of the exponential family), the posterior is then also truncated normal, with location and scale parameters  $\tilde{\rho}_i = \omega_i \hat{\rho}_i + (1 - \omega_i) \hat{\rho}$  and  $\tilde{\sigma}_{\rho_i} = \hat{\sigma}_{\rho_i} \sqrt{1 - \omega_i}$  where the shrinkage factor takes the precision-weighted form,  $\omega_i = \frac{\hat{\sigma}_{\rho_i}^{-2}}{\hat{\sigma}_{\rho_i}^{-2} + \hat{\sigma}_\rho^{-2}}$ ,




Figure 3: Empirical Bayes estimates of oil-gas and coal energy supply elasticities. Left: Hydrocarbon fossil (oil-gas) elasticities. Saudi Arabia, China, Russia, and the United States are labeled on the plot. Oil-gas energy is inelastically supplied in Saudi Arabia, potentially due to their market power through OPEC. Right: Coal energy supply elasticities.

To recover coal supply elasticities, we repeat the analysis using the coal rent share of GDP as a regressand and the international price of coal (from OWID) as a regressor and apply the same empirical Bayes shrinkage routine. While in our model, coal is traded only locally, in reality, there does appear to be an international price of coal: differences in coal prices across countries are small, and movements in coal prices across countries are strongly correlated (Appendix Figure A1). This is because in actuality, coal is traded to some extent, and as a commodity, there is significant and sophisticated arbitrage in global markets. With this in mind, we treat the global price of coal as exogenous for estimation.

Figure 3 plots the results of our estimation. Coal supply is substantially more elastic than fossil supply. There is large spatial heterogeneity in supply elasticity estimates: for example, fossil supply is nearly inelastic in OPEC nations like Saudi Arabia as well as Russia and China. Our estimates of energy supply elasticities do not uncover the true resource intensity of extraction technology that, in theory, could be uncovered by a production function estimation routine that accounts for market power. Instead, we view our estimates as ‘reduced form’ supply elasticities that combine both technology and market power. Market power can attenuate the effective supply elasticity as producers endogenously adjust quantities to move up along their perceived energy

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and the posterior averages rely on the inverse Mills ratio,

$$\mathbb{E} [\rho_i | \hat{\rho}_i] = \tilde{\rho}_i + \tilde{\sigma}_{\rho_i} \frac{\phi\left(\frac{1-\tilde{\rho}_i}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\rho_i}}\right)}{1 - \Phi\left(\frac{1-\tilde{\rho}_i}{\tilde{\sigma}_{\rho_i}}\right)},$$

where  $\phi()$  and  $\Phi()$  are the pdf and cdf of standard normal distribution.

demand curve, consistent with low supply elasticities for OPEC nations. In contrast, we find fairly elastically supplied oil-gas in the US

However, coal supply elasticities follow an opposite pattern, in which coal is fairly inelastically supplied in the US and India and more elastically supplied in Russia and China. On average, coal is far more elastically supplied than fossil, generating a flatter supply curve and low coal rents in equilibrium. This is consistent with EPA estimates of the shape of the US coal supply curve ([U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2023](#)), and the fact that even the largest coal producers do not have coal rents above 1% of GDP.

For countries with no fossil or coal rents in the data, we assign supply elasticities equal to the global pooled estimate (such countries are absent in the figure).

### 4.3 Externally calibrated parameters

For shares of energy rents in GDP and the other observable shares – as listed in Section 3.2 – and required by our sufficient statistics formula, we use 2000-2016 averages as the baseline, relying on data from the WDIs, OWID, and ITPD. For trade shares, we use data from the ITPD-S dataset for 2019, which fills in missing entries in the trade matrix with temporal smoothing and other extrapolation techniques to compute trade shares. For domestic trade, some entries in small nations with poor data, like Cuba, have implausibly low domestic trade shares. We replace reported domestic trade shares of 5% or less with these predicted domestic trade shares from a logistic regression of trade shares on log GDP/capita, population size, absolute latitude, temperature, and log bilateral flows with the United States (which has good reporting quality). We then renormalize the data so that trade shares sum to one, allowing us to construct  $\mathbf{S}$ . In practice, the trade data is not balanced, so we renormalize the columns of the  $\mathbf{T}$  to mechanically enforce balanced trade in the data.<sup>14</sup>

For the household, we calibrate the CRRA/IES parameter to be  $\eta = 1.5$ , taken from [Barrage and Nordhaus \(2024\)](#).<sup>15</sup> and set the elasticity of substitution  $\theta = 5$ , consistent with a trade elasticity of 4, which accords with the estimates of [Simonovska and Waugh \(2014\)](#).

For the production function for goods, we use the average energy cost share  $\frac{q_i^e e_i}{p_i y_i}$  to 10%, as documented by OECD reports and used in [Kotlikoff et al. \(2024\)](#) and [Krusell and Smith \(2022\)](#). For the elasticity between energy and other inputs, we set  $\sigma^y = 0.6$  for all countries, which is in the range of estimates in [Papageorgiou et al. \(2017\)](#), among others.<sup>16</sup> This implies that labour and energy are complementary in production: an increase in the price of energy has a strong impact on output as it is less productive to substitute away toward other inputs – here, labour. This aligns with other empirical and structural evidence on the impact of energy shocks, e.g., [Hassler et al. \(2019\)](#). For energy sources, we calibrate the individual countries' energy mix for oil-gas, coal, and

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<sup>14</sup>This ensures that the sum of the shares of income spent on traded goods sums to income. Visualizations of these trade matrices for 25 large economies are available in Appendix Figure A3.

<sup>15</sup>This is slightly lower than the standard value  $\eta = 2$ , for the reason that higher curvature would imply more unequal weights,  $\omega_i$ , across different countries.

<sup>16</sup>It also aligns with the estimation in [Bourany \(2022\)](#).

non-carbon (nuclear, hydroelectricity, solar, wind, etc.) to match the energy mix documented in Energy Institute (2024). This allows us to successfully identify countries that are more reliant on specific energy sources: for example, China and India are highly coal-dependent, while Russia, the Middle East, and the United States/Canada are the biggest consumers of oil and gas. Finally, for the elasticity between energy inputs, we use the value  $\sigma_e = 2$ , following the rest of the literature, i.e. Papageorgiou et al. (2017), Kotlikoff et al. (2024), and Cruz and Rossi-Hansberg (2024), among others. As we are unable to estimate renewable energy supply elasticities at the country level, we take  $1/\nu^r = 2.7$ , based on the estimate in Johnson (2014). A summary of these parameters is available in Appendix Table A2.

In addition, we calibrate the climate model described in Section 2.4 to match important features of the relationship between carbon emissions, temperatures, and climate damages. We consider linear models for the relationships between carbon emissions  $\mathcal{E}$ , carbon concentration  $\mathcal{S}$ , and global and local temperature  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $T_i$ , and this implies that we do not require to parametrize the climate sensitivity  $\chi$ , or the pattern scaling  $\Delta_i$ .<sup>17</sup> However, since the economic model is static, we consider the horizon  $\mathbb{T}$  to be 2100 for performing policy experiments. In this context, we analyse the long-term policy impact of climate and trade policies through different channels.

Finally, when we consider welfare, as in equation (14), we consider the weighted sum of individual utilities, with Utilitarian weights  $\omega_i = 1$ . This implies that the aggregation of the consumption-equivalent welfare change in equation (15) can be aggregated with weights  $\mathcal{P}_i \hat{\omega}_i \propto \mathcal{P}_i \omega_i u'(c_i) c_i = \mathcal{P}_i c_i^{1-\eta}$  for  $\eta$  the inverse of the IES, which control “inequality aversion” in this type of models, as discussed in Anthoff et al. (2009). This, therefore, puts additional weight on the welfare costs of emerging and low-income countries with low consumption and we report his welfare measure in our policy experiments. Alternatively, we also consider Negishi weights  $\omega_i \propto 1/u'(c_i)$ . These would undermine these redistributive considerations by putting more weight on advanced economies, yielding  $\hat{\omega}_i = c_i \propto y_i$ .

## 5 Results

In this section, we report the results of our main experiments, using our sufficient statistics formulas, data moments, and estimated damage functions and energy supply elasticities. Our results for various carbon taxation experiments are available in Appendix Table A3.

### 5.1 The welfare effects of global warming

We use our sufficient statistics formula to compute the welfare effects of global warming from an emissions impulse that generates 3°C of warming by 2100. The results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 4. In the left panel, we display the spatial distribution of welfare changes around the world. The losers of climate change are predominately concentrated in the global

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<sup>17</sup>Indeed, the log-linearization of this linear climate system yields  $d \log T_i = d \log \mathcal{S} \propto d \log \mathcal{E}$  and there is no requirement for climate sensitivity or pattern scaling. If world emissions increase by 12%, so does carbon concentration  $\mathcal{S}$ , implying a 12% increase in the world temperature – 3° by 2100, from 19° to 22 – and local temperatures  $T_i$ .




Figure 4: The welfare effects of a  $3^{\circ}\text{C}$  rise in global temperature. Left: map of global welfare changes, in % terms. Red countries lose, while blue countries win. Right: decomposition of welfare changes for several major economies.

south: Africa, Latin America, and South East Asia – all hot countries at baseline – lose, while cooler countries like Canada and Russia win, and the effects of global warming are small in the United States and China. This aligns with the literature on the heterogeneous effects of climate change (Cruz and Rossi-Hansberg, 2024; Krusell and Smith, 2022).

The right panel of Figure 4 decomposes these welfare changes into those driven by the direct effects of climate change, those driven by changes in terms-of-trade, changes in energy rents, and exposure to changes in the price of energy. Global warming, by making the world poorer, reduces global demand for energy, which lowers the equilibrium price  $q^f$  and provides relief to oil and gas importing countries. However, it also deteriorates the energy rents of fossil exporters such as Saudi Arabia. While this baseline hot country loses due to the direct effect on productivity, this loss is partially offset by improved terms-of-trade, as Saudi Arabia is well-connected in the trade matrix to countries that gain, like Japan and Russia.

Using our framework, we can compute the Social Cost of Carbon in the Business-as-Usual scenario. The global welfare cost of reaching  $3^{\circ}$  by 2100 – with utilitarian Pareto weights  $\omega_i = 1$ , giving the same importance to each person in every country – is a loss of 17% in consumption-equivalent welfare, as displayed in Figure 4. We use our formula in equation (17) to obtain a Social Cost of Carbon of  $SCC = \$203$  per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>. This number is quite high given that our model is static and log-linearized. An Integrated Assessment Model with dynamics and non-linearity as Cruz and Rossi-Hansberg (2024); Krusell and Smith (2022); Bourany (2024) or uncertainty as Weitzman (2009); Barnett, Brock and Hansen (2020) – among many others – would amplify those costs, increasing the Social Cost of Carbon.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup>One exercise we performed in our framework is to change the climate cost as computed in equation (19). Country-level climate damages scale with the temperature gap  $T_i - T^*$ , and we could replace the *present* temperature  $T_i$  with *future* temperature  $T_i^* + 3^{\circ}$ , to change the point of approximation of our linearization. This implies that the currently cold countries would be warmer by 2100 and lose more from global warming. The Social Cost of Carbon becomes  $\$302/tCO_2$ , which shows how the model would amplify the cost of global warming. Using Negishi weights




Figure 5: The welfare effects of a \$50/ton carbon tax imposed unilaterally by China. Left: map of global welfare changes, in % terms. Red countries lose, while blue countries win. Right: decomposition of welfare changes for several major economies.

## 5.2 Unilateral carbon taxation

We now consider the welfare effects of unilateral carbon taxation. As a case study, we begin with a unilateral carbon tax imposed by China of \$50 USD/tonne. While this is potentially an unrealistic scenario, this illustrates model mechanisms and the value of including a rich energy sector in a macroeconomic model of climate change. Despite China being a large polluter, this moderate carbon tax has virtually no effect on global emissions, which actually *rise*, though by less than 0.07%. Yet, the policy nonetheless creates winners and losers, visible in the left panel of Figure 5. The winners of the policy include Gulf and North African nations, as well as Russia, and interestingly, China.


The reason for the gains in these nations is visible in the right panel. At baseline, China is heavily reliant on coal, reflected in their large share of coal in their energy mix (one of the data moments key to our sufficient statistics exercise) and the fact that they are a fossil importer. By imposing a carbon tax, China substitutes away from coal towards oil-gas fossil sources, as coal is dirtier than oil-gas ( $\xi_c/\xi_f \approx 1.44$ ), putting upwards pressure on the price of these energy commodities. As a result, the global price of oil-gas rises by approximately 5%, and energy rents rise for fossil exporters, making the Gulf countries among the biggest winners. Utilitarian welfare falls by 0.2% (0.2% Negishi-weighted). China is one of the few countries for which local carbon taxation causes global welfare losses; see Appendix Figure A5.

While the surge in the global oil-gas price improves the rents of fossil exporters, it also inflates the energy costs for the rest of the world, in particular energy importers. This causes a decline in production and welfare, as for example, European nations ‘lose’ from the Chinese carbon tax. As a result, this also incentivizes those other countries to substitute away from oil and gas towards coal,

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at baseline, the SCC falls to \$3.31, reflecting the fact that the cost of climate change is predominately borne by low-income countries with a high marginal utility of consumption.

**Each nation's own percent change in welfare**  
from a unilateral \$50/ton global carbon tax



**Each nation's own percent change in welfare**  
from a unilateral 42.6% renewable energy subsidy




Figure 6: Left: each country’s individual welfare change from pursuing unilateral carbon taxation. Right: each country’s individual welfare change from pursuing a unilateral renewable subsidy.

explaining the slight increase in global emissions. In China, the overall welfare effect of changing energy prices is positive: the direct effect of taxation drops out in the first-order decomposition as tax revenues are rebated to the household; only the general equilibrium of prices net of carbon taxes affects welfare. Coal prices fall as demand shifts to fossil, and as China has a large share of coal in their energy mix, they benefit. Moreover, China experiences a slight improvement in its terms of trade, as the volume of its exports decline due to higher energy costs.

In Appendix Figure A4, we display the results of a \$50 unilateral carbon tax imposed in the United States. This policy fosters a 0.8% decline in global emissions. This reduction in atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> has positive welfare effects on nations in the global south and damages the ‘winners’ of climate change. Interestingly, though Saudi Arabia’s energy rents appreciate, though more modestly than was the case with China, their terms of trade deteriorate as their trading partners suffer productivity losses. Welfare effects in the US are small but positive: energy prices rise, more than totally offsetting the gains associated with reducing climate damages, but are balanced by improved terms of trade with Canada and European nations.

### 5.3 Unilateral renewable energy subsidies

In contrast to carbon taxation, we consider renewable energy subsidies. We compare the effect of subsidizing renewable energy with carbon taxation by plotting each country’s welfare change from unilateral policy for a \$50 carbon tax and a 42.6% renewable energy subsidy. We choose this renewable energy subsidy so that the policy-induced relative price change between the oil-gas and coal bundle and renewables stays the same on average. The main reason why subsidizing renewable energy differs from taxing carbon is that it does not directly cause a reallocation from carbon-intensive coal to oil-gas within the dirty energy bundle, as the tax does not directly alter the oil-gas and coal price ratio. This affects both the aggregate change in emissions, as well as dirty energy exporters’ energy rents, depending on their relative dirty energy supply elasticities.

In Figure 6, we plot both each country’s consumption equivalent welfare change from pur-




Figure 7: Left: changes in welfare from an EU climate club. Right: Decomposition of welfare changes within the EU (top) and for major trade partners and losers of climate change (bottom).

suing a \$50 carbon tax (left panel) and a 42.6% renewable energy subsidy (right).<sup>19</sup> There are large differences across the world in the effects of these two policies. On average, renewable energy subsidies are considerably less effective at raising welfare and cause more harm. For example, a renewable subsidy in France is much worse than a carbon tax, as it disproportionately induces France to move up its renewable energy supply curve. As France has a high share of renewable energy at baseline (over 40%), this effect on energy costs is considerable, as more resources are wasted on renewable ‘extraction.’ Simply put, the marginal nuclear power plant or solar farm has a high price in France. Likewise, in China, a renewable subsidy generates a large movement up its domestic renewable supply curve, rather than the small movement up the global oil-gas supply curve induced by carbon taxation.

#### 5.4 Coordinated carbon policy

We now consider coordinated climate policy, in which blocs of nations jointly implement carbon taxes and tariffs that take the form of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAMs). CBAMs levy a tariff on the carbon content of imports to each nation in the bloc, but do not place tariffs on bloc members – a ‘climate club’ as suggested by [Nordhaus \(2015\)](#) and studied in other work ([Clausing and Wolfram, 2023; Ernst et al., 2023; Farrokh and Lashkaripour, 2024; Bourany, 2025](#)). The carbon intensity of any nation’s exports is observable by knowing the energy mix in production and the carbon intensity of those energy sources, and is readily observable simply by knowing the carbon emissions of any country. Exporting countries only respond to CBAM through the general equilibrium impact on energy prices as well as through terms-of-trade adjustments in the international goods market.

<sup>19</sup>In Appendix Figure A5, left panel, we plot for each country the global welfare gain – of a Utilitarian planner – associated with unilateral carbon policy. While Russia loses from imposing a carbon tax on themselves, the world still benefits, suggesting a considerable gap between governmental and global incentives to internalize the carbon externality. Likewise, in the right panel, we can see similar effects for the renewable energy subsidy.

First, we examine the effects of a European Union-wide climate club with a carbon tax and CBAM-tariff of \$50. Figure 7 displays the results of this exercise. The EU is a loser from its own climate club, with only the South of Europe – Spain, Portugal, and Italy – benefiting. Aggregate emissions decline by 3%, cooling global temperatures and harming the EU nations that benefit from climate change (e.g. Germany, Scandinavian countries), alongside other cool nations like Canada and Russia. However, the global welfare effect of such a policy is positive, with global utilitarian-weighted welfare rising by around 5% (1% with Negishi weights). This underscores the importance of coordinating climate policy: unilateral carbon policy without tariffs has virtually no global impact when pursued by EU member states due to formidable leakage effects (see Appendix Figure A5), which a climate club can overcome.

In the top right panel of Figure 7, we plot the welfare decomposition for EU member states. Energy cost effects are heterogeneous across the EU, e.g. rising in France and falling in Poland and Germany. Ireland is particularly hurt through international trade, as their major trading partner, Great Britain, faces productivity declines. Countries in the global south benefit from the reduction in global temperature (bottom panel), and most economies benefit from a reduction in energy costs, as demand pressures from Europe in the international fossil hydrocarbon market lessen. This generates positive welfare effects in countries that are mostly unaffected by climate change directly, like the United States and China. Major oil-gas exporters like Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Russia lose energy rents as a result, though only Russia is a net loser due to the direct, negative productivity effect brought about by lower carbon emissions.

In contrast, we consider a climate club composed of ASEAN members with the same policies as the EU climate club. These southeastern Asian countries are losers from climate change at baseline, so internalizing the carbon externality benefits them due to a reduction in carbon emissions alone. Figure 8 plots the results of this exercise. The ASEAN climate club reduces global emissions by 0.5% and raises global welfare by around 0.8% (0.2%, Negishi-weighted). By reducing global emissions, this climate club benefits the losers of climate change and harms the winners.

ASEAN members broadly benefit from the policy, due to the reduction in world temperature. However, gains are heterogeneous not only because of exposure to climate change, but also because of trade in goods and energy, as seen in the top left panel. Energy exporters like Brunei and Indonesia have smaller gains as they lose energy rents. Goods trade within the club reallocates, with Laos, Indonesia, and Myanmar enjoying improved terms-of-trade at the expense of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Elsewhere, oil-gas exporters lose energy rents as the global fluid fossil fuels price falls by 0.6%.

## 5.5 Global carbon policy

Finally, we examine the case when all nations impose a \$50 carbon tax in Figure 9. When all nations participate in carbon taxation, carbon border adjustment mechanisms are not needed due to the targeting principle; the carbon externality is internalized at its source. When we impose this policy, the global price of hydrocarbons rises by 1.0%. Indeed, this results from the mechanism explained in equation (24), where carbon taxation has a strong impact on coal consumption, and




Figure 8: Left: changes in welfare from an ASEAN climate club. Right: Decomposition of welfare changes within ASEAN member states (top) and for major economies and losers of climate change (bottom).

countries substitute towards oil and gas. In net, carbon emissions decline by 4%, which is one order of magnitude larger than for unilateral policies or carbon taxation implemented in small climate clubs. Such global climate policy results in around 6% increase in utilitarian-weighted global welfare. Were we to evaluate welfare using Negishi weights, the global change in welfare is 1%, as rich, cool countries receive a higher weight. Consequently, a large part of the measured welfare gain from implementing global carbon taxation, when evaluating welfare changes from a utilitarian perspective, stems from reducing international inequality.

We plot the results of this exercise in Figure 9. They are the reverse of the effects of climate change: nations in the global south benefit from global carbon taxation while baseline cold nations lose. These losses are offset in Europe, as European nations like Great Britain and Germany have improved terms of trade, while gains are attenuated in Saudi Arabia for the same reason. Saudi and Nigerian energy rents grow as the world substitutes from coal to oil-gas, thanks to the upward pressure on the international price of hydrocarbon fossil.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper, we use a first-order decomposition of the effects of climate policy derived from a macroeconomic IAM to study who wins and loses under various climate policy regimes. Our IAM features trade in both goods and energy markets, and our decomposition is computable with a modest set of sufficient statistics available using freely available trade and national accounts data and estimable elasticities.

We estimate heterogeneous damages on productivity from rises in local temperature using bilateral trade data, and estimate a large set of heterogeneous energy supply elasticities for both hydrocarbon fossil and coal producers. We find that this heterogeneity is important not only in capturing differences in productivity damages across space from climate change, but also in the




Figure 9: The welfare effects of a \$50 carbon tax imposed in every country around the world. Left: map of global welfare changes, in % terms. Red countries lose, while blue countries win. Right: decomposition of welfare changes for several major economies.

response of nations' energy sectors to climate policy.

We use our estimates to consider a large set of climate policies. First, in agreement with the literature, we find spatially heterogeneous winners and losers from climate change, with baseline hot regions suffering from a hotter planet, and cold nations gaining. These welfare changes are amplified by changes in international goods and energy markets: dirty energy exporters lose energy rents, and the pattern of trade adjusts, improving or deteriorating different nations' terms-of-trade.

We find that pursuing unilateral policy is often ineffective in combating climate change, despite often creating positive welfare gains for the nations that pursue such policies. For example, carbon taxation in China does little to affect global emissions. Instead, it redirects their energy mix towards oil and gas imports, improving the extraction rents of energy exporters and indirectly generating an improved terms-of-trade for China in international goods markets. As nations' energy mixes differ, carbon taxes and renewable energy subsidies generate different welfare responses. Broadly, we find that subsidizing renewables is substantially less effective than taxing carbon.

Coordinated climate policy through climate clubs, in which member nations impose a domestic carbon tax and levy carbon tariffs on imports from non-member nations, better addresses the climate externality. Climate policy in the EU broadly harms EU members but delivers sizeable global gains. A climate club of ASEAN members both improves global welfare and the welfare of club members modestly. However, this policy has unequal effects on member nations, as it redirects trade, causing some nations to benefit more than others.

In short, our results suggest that implementing climate policy is difficult unilaterally, as leakage effects can be an order of magnitude larger than the gains from cooling global temperature. Appendix Table A3 summarizes our carbon-taxation-based policy experiments. It makes clear that energy market effects tend to be significantly larger than effects in international goods markets, suggesting the central source of leakage for climate policy occurs through energy trade. International agreements are necessary to combat climate change, but can generate unequal effects

among member nations through these leakage channels. While our sufficient statistics and welfare formulas allow us to quickly compute and decompose the effects of many possible climate clubs, they do not take into account the non-linear effects induced by imposing large carbon taxes and tariffs. [Bourany \(2025\)](#) moves beyond sufficient statistics and solves for the *optimal* design of these types of climate agreements.

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## Appendix

### A Additional tables and figures

	OLS		Poisson	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Exporter Temperature (C)	0.086** (0.032)		0.722*** (0.199)	
Exporter Temperature <sup>2</sup>	-0.002 (0.001)		-0.027*** (0.007)	
Importer Temperature (C)	0.058 (0.168)		-0.607 (0.747)	
Importer Temperature <sup>2</sup>	-0.002 (0.007)		0.020 (0.019)	
Exporter-Importer Temperature (C) difference		0.015 (0.083)		0.652** (0.287)
Exporter-Importer Temperature <sup>2</sup> difference		0.000 (0.003)		-0.023** (0.010)
$T^*$	13.871 (3.8021)	-31.560 (581.2571)	13.425 (1.5101)	14.016 (2.4188)
$\gamma$	0.001 (0.0008)	-0.000 (0.0016)	0.010 (0.0025)	0.012 (0.0049)
Importer-Exporter pair FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Origin GDP/cap control	✓	✓	✓	✓
Origin energy controls	0.865	0.865		
R <sup>2</sup>			0.854	0.854
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	366,384	366,384	463,614	463,614

Table A1: Estimates of equation 27. \*\*\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors are two-way clustered at the importer and exporter level in parentheses. Dependent variable: importer penetration ratio  $X_{ij}/X_{ii}$ . Columns (1)-(2) use an OLS estimator with the log of the import penetration ratio on the left-hand side, while (3)-(4) use a Poisson estimator, which retains zeros in the trade matrix. Specifications differ by whether importer and exporter temperature are allowed to have different coefficients, or if the model-implied coefficient restriction is imposed. Computation of  $T^*$  and  $\gamma$  assumes  $\theta = 5$ , as in our quantification.

Parameter	Value	Description	Source
<i>Household preferences</i>			
$\eta$	1.5	Coefficient of relative risk aversion	Barrage and Nordhaus (2024)
$\theta - 1$	4	Trade elasticity	Simonovska and Waugh (2014)
<i>Goods production</i>			
$T^*$	14.02	Global peak temperature	Estimated
$\gamma$	0.012	Shape parameter of $D_i^y$	–
$\sigma^y$	0.3	Elasticity of substitution between energy and labour	Papageorgiou et al. (2017)
$\omega^f$	–	Share of oil-gas in production	Calibrated to match energy mix
$\omega^c$	–	Coal share	–
$\omega^r$	–	Renewables share	–
$\sigma_e$	2	Elasticity of substitution between energy sources	Papageorgiou et al. (2017); Kotlikoff et al. (2024)
<i>Energy production</i>			
$1/\nu_i^f$	–	Supply elasticity of oil-gas	Estimated for each country
$1/\nu_i^c$	–	Supply elasticity of coal	–
$1/\nu^r$	2.7	Supply elasticity of renewable energy	Johnson (2014)

Table A2: Summary of estimated and externally calibrated parameters

		% change welfare	% change climate damages	% change energy effects	% change trade effects
<i>Business-as-usual</i>					
World		-16.55	-18.98	2.28	0.15
Biggest winners: Sweden, Lithuania, Latvia, Austria, Switzerland		7.51	4.49	4.46	-1.45
Biggest losers: Djibouti, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Sudan		-36.93	-39.10	2.15	0.02
<i>Global carbon tax, \$50 USD/tonne</i>					
$\Delta\epsilon: -3.82\%, \Delta q^f: 0.96\%$					
World		5.84	6.04	-0.10	-0.10
Biggest winners: Djibouti, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Somalia		12.59	12.65	0.00	-0.06
Biggest losers: Norway, Sweden, Kazakhstan, Canada, Russia		-2.08	-1.27	-0.56	-0.25
<i>China carbon tax, \$50 USD/tonne</i>					
$\Delta\epsilon: 0.07\%, \Delta q^f: 5.01\%$					
World		-0.23	-0.11	-0.14	0.02
Biggest winners: Timor-Leste, Kuwait, Turkmenistan, Equatorial Guinea, Iraq		2.43	-0.07	2.80	-0.30
Biggest losers: Burkina Faso, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Haiti, Benin		-0.65	-0.20	-0.51	0.06
<i>USA carbon tax, \$50 USD/tonne</i>					
$\Delta\epsilon: -0.77\%, \Delta q^f: 0.08\%$					
World		1.12	1.22	-0.08	-0.02
Biggest winners: Djibouti, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Somalia		2.56	2.55	-0.01	0.02
Biggest losers: Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Norway, Russia		-0.61	-0.12	-0.13	-0.36
<i>European Union climate club</i>					
$\Delta\epsilon: -2.92\%, \Delta q^f: -4.60\%$					
World		4.71	4.62	0.19	-0.10
Biggest winners: Djibouti, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Somalia		9.81	9.67	0.44	-0.31
Biggest losers: Sweden, Kazakhstan, Austria, Finland, Latvia		-1.21	-1.03	-0.12	-0.06
<i>ASEAN climate club</i>					
$\Delta\epsilon: -0.50\%, \Delta q^f: -0.56\%$					
World		0.80	0.80	0.01	-0.01
Biggest winners: Maldives, Djibouti, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali		1.76	1.66	0.05	0.05
Biggest losers: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Russia, Norway, Azerbaijan		-0.26	-0.08	-0.14	-0.04

Table A3: Welfare effects of carbon taxation-based climate policies in a variety of policy scenarios.  $\epsilon$  refers to aggregate emissions;  $q^f$  is the international price of fluid fossil fuels. Climate clubs include carbon taxation and carbon tariffs. ‘Energy effects’ combine energy cost and energy rent effects, while ‘trade effects’ combine terms-of-trade channels, following Equation (18). ‘Biggest winners’ and ‘Biggest losers’ rows report simple averages of welfare changes across countries, while ‘World’ is the utilitarian change in welfare.




Figure A1: Coal prices in several countries. Source: Our World in Data.

### Empirical Bayes shrinkage estimates




Figure A2: Histograms of the distribution of OLS country-specific energy supply elasticities and the empirical Bayes estimates. Left: oil-gas (hydrocarbon fossil) energy supply elasticities,  $1/\nu_i^f$ . Right: coal energy supply elasticities  $1/\nu_i^c$ . See main text for details.




Figure A3: Trade patterns for the 25 largest countries. Left: Trade shares matrix,  $S$ . Right: Income shares matrix  $T$ . See main text for details.




Figure A4: The welfare effects of a \$50 carbon tax imposed unilaterally by the United States. Left: map of global welfare changes, in % terms. Red countries lose, while blue countries win. Right: decomposition of welfare changes for several major economies.




Figure A5: Left: Map of the global utilitarian welfare change associated with each country's unilateral \$50 carbon tax. Right: the same, for a 42.6% renewable energy subsidy.

## B Welfare decomposition

In this Appendix, we derive the sufficient statistics by log-linearizing the model.

### B.1 Model summary

First let us summarize the model, as presented above

$$\begin{aligned}
c_i \mathbb{P}_i &= x_i = w_i \ell_i + \pi_i^x + t_i^{ls} = p_i z_i \mathcal{D}_i(T_i) F(e_i, \ell_i) - q_i^e e_i + \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_i} (q^e e_i^x - p_i \mathcal{C}^f(\mathcal{P}_i e_i^x, \mathcal{R}_i)) + t_i^{ls} \\
\mathcal{P}_i p_i y_i &= \sum_{k \in \mathbb{I}} \mathcal{P}_k s_{ki} \frac{v_k}{1 + t_{ki}} \\
v_i &= p_i y_i + q^f (e_i^x - e_i^f) + t_i^{ls} \\
\pi_i^f &= \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_i} \frac{\nu_i^f \bar{\nu}^{-1/\nu_i^f}}{1 + \nu_i^f} \mathcal{R}_i(q^f)^{1 + \frac{1}{\nu_i^f}} p_i^{-1/\nu_i^f} \\
\pi_i^c &= \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_i} \frac{\nu_i^c \bar{\nu}^{-1/\nu_i^c}}{1 + \nu_i^c} (q_i^c)^{1 + \frac{1}{\nu_i^c}} p_i^{-1/\nu_i^c} \\
\pi_i^r &= \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_i} \frac{\nu_i^r \bar{\nu}^{-1/\nu_i^r}}{1 + \nu_i^r} (q_i^r)^{1 + \frac{1}{\nu_i^r}} p_i^{-1/\nu_i^r} \\
\sum_k \mathcal{P}_i e_i^f &= \sum_k e_i^x = (q^f)^{1/\nu} \sum_k \mathcal{R}_i \bar{\nu}_i^{-1/\nu} p_i^{-1/\nu} \\
F_i(\varepsilon(e^f, e^c, e^r), \ell) &= [(1 - \epsilon)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_y}} (\bar{k}^\alpha \ell^{1-\alpha})^{\frac{\sigma_y-1}{\sigma_y}} + \epsilon^{\frac{1}{\sigma_y}} (z_i^e \varepsilon_i(e^f, e^c, e^r))^{\frac{\sigma_y-1}{\sigma_y}}]^{\frac{\sigma_y}{\sigma_y-1}} \\
\varepsilon(e^f, e^c, e^r) &= [(\omega_i^f)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_e}} (e^f)^{\frac{\sigma_e-1}{\sigma_e}} + (\omega_i^c)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_e}} (e^c)^{\frac{\sigma_e-1}{\sigma_e}} + (\omega_i^r)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_e}} (e^r)^{\frac{\sigma_e-1}{\sigma_e}}]^{\frac{\sigma_e}{\sigma_e-1}}
\end{aligned}$$

### B.2 Change in welfare – experiments

We compute the change in the welfare of each country for different experiments. The model is linearized around an equilibrium where climate change is not realized yet  $\mathcal{T} = 0$ , and where the policies are identical to the "status quo":  $t^\varepsilon = \bar{t}^\varepsilon = 0$  and  $t_{ij}^b = \bar{t}_{ij}^b$ . As a result, this corresponds to the competitive equilibrium.

We consider first-order deviations where we increase either (i) the impact of climate change and (ii) climate policy instruments by a small amount. To save on notation, we denote  $d \ln x_i = \frac{dx_i}{x_i}$  – with a slight abuse of notation<sup>20</sup>

#### *Effects of climate change*

We consider a first-order change in global warming, which will impact global temperature  $\mathcal{T}$ , by an amount  $d \ln \mathcal{T}$  and hence local temperature  $T_i$  and local productivity  $d \ln z_i = \frac{dz_i}{z_i}$ .

#### *Unilateral climate policies – Carbon tax and Renewable subsidy*

In addition, we consider a first-order change in local climate policies: carbon tax  $t_i^\varepsilon$  and renewable subsidies  $s_i^\varepsilon$ . As a result, the policy change we consider is  $d \ln t_i^\varepsilon = \frac{dt_i^\varepsilon}{1+t_i^\varepsilon} = dt_i^\varepsilon$  where we consider a

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<sup>20</sup>This is the case, for example, when  $x_i < 0$  or change sign.

multiplicative carbon tax on fossil fuel  $q_i^f(1+t_i^\varepsilon)$ . Similarly, for small renewable subsidy:  $d \ln s_i^\varepsilon = ds_i^\varepsilon$ .

We consider the case where those policies are implemented unilaterally, i.e., for country  $i$  but not for country  $j \neq i$ , and compare the cost of such implementation in the presence of trade leakage.

### *Coordinated climate policies*

Then, we consider the case of coordinated climate policies, where a large set of countries implement the policy jointly. We consider a set  $\mathcal{J}$  of  $J$  countries that are linked by a coordination mechanism, e.g. a climate agreement. In matrix notation, these changes in carbon tax are noted:

$$\mathbf{J}dt^\varepsilon = \{\mathbb{1}_{\{i \in \mathcal{J}\}} d \ln t_i^\varepsilon\}_i$$

with  $\mathbf{J} = \mathbf{J}_i = \mathbb{1}_{\{i \in \mathcal{J}\}}$  the column vector that is one if  $i \in \mathcal{J}$  and zero otherwise.

### *Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism / Carbon tariffs*

We also consider a first-order change in tariffs  $t_{ij}^b$ , imposed by country  $i$  on the goods from country  $j$ . As a result, the policy change we consider is  $d \ln t_{ij}^b = \frac{dt_{ij}^b}{1+t_{ij}^b} = dt_{ij}^b$  for multiplicative tariffs. The tariff scales with carbon intensity of the country one imports from:  $t_{ij}^b = \xi_j^\varepsilon t_i^\varepsilon$  with the carbon intensity of country  $j$ ,  $\xi_j^\varepsilon = \frac{\varepsilon_j}{y_j p_j}$  with  $\varepsilon_j$  the per capita carbon emissions.

We consider three cases: First, this policy is implemented unilaterally for country  $i$  but not for country  $j \neq i$ . Second, the policy is implemented in coordination with the carbon tax at the same carbon price  $t^\varepsilon$ , again unilaterally. Third, this carbon tax + carbon tariff policy is coordinated among countries within a club  $\mathcal{J}$ , e.g. European Union or OECD countries against non-member countries,  $\bar{\mathbf{J}} \equiv \mathbf{J}_{ij} = \mathbb{1}_{\{i \in \mathcal{J}, j \notin \mathcal{J}\}}$ .

### *Welfare change*

We now compute the welfare of individual country  $i$ , defined as the indirect utility, accounting for change in consumption and climate damages:  $\mathcal{U}_i = u(\{c_{ij}\}_j, T_i) = u(c_i \mathcal{D}_i^u(T_i))$ . This changes can be written as:

$$d\mathcal{U}_i = du(c_i \mathcal{D}_i^u) = u'(c_i \mathcal{D}_i^u)(c_i \mathcal{D}_i^u) \left( \frac{dc_i}{c_i} + \frac{d\mathcal{D}_i^u}{\mathcal{D}_i^u} \right) = u'(\tilde{c}_i) \tilde{c}_i \left( \frac{dx_i}{x_i} - \frac{d\P_i}{\P_i} + \frac{d\mathcal{D}_i^u}{\mathcal{D}_i^u} \right)$$

with  $x_i = c_i \mathbb{P}_i$  the consumption expenditure and  $\tilde{c}_i = c_i \mathcal{D}_i^u$ . As a result, in the main text, we display the result in consumption equivalent:

$$\frac{d\mathcal{U}_i}{u'(\tilde{c}_i) \tilde{c}_i} = \left( \frac{dx_i}{x_i} - \frac{d\P_i}{\P_i} + \frac{d\mathcal{D}_i^u}{\mathcal{D}_i^u} \right)$$

### B.3 Climate externality

To see the effects of a change in emissions and carbon policies on climate, we unpack the damage  $d\mathcal{D}_i$ . In this section, we consider the following simplified climate system:

$$T_i = \Delta_i \mathcal{T} = \Delta_i \chi \mathcal{S}$$

$$\mathcal{S} = \mathcal{S}_0 + \mathbb{T}\mathcal{E} = \mathcal{S}_0 + \xi^f E^f + \xi^c E^c$$

where

$$\mathcal{E} = \sum_i \mathcal{P}_i (\xi^f e_i^f + \xi^c e_i^c)$$

is a representation of yearly emissions  $\mathcal{E}$  due to oil-gas and coal. We scale those yearly emissions by a factor  $\mathbb{T}$  to represent a specific horizon – say 50 or 100 years. Moreover, the parameters  $\xi^f$  and  $\xi^c$  represent the carbon contents for different fossil fuels per unit of energy supplied.

We use a damage function, conventionally used in Integrated Assessment models, with curvature  $\delta$  and slope  $\gamma$ :

$$\mathcal{D}_i^y(T_i) = e^{-\frac{\gamma^y}{1+\delta}(T_i - T_i^\star)^{1+\delta}}$$

and similarly for  $\mathcal{D}_i^u(T_i)$ . The linear approximation of this climate system implies:

$$\frac{d\mathcal{D}_i^y}{\mathcal{D}_i^y} = -\gamma^y (T_i - T_i^\star)^\delta dT_i = -\gamma (T_i - T_i^\star)^\delta T_i \frac{dT_i}{T_i}$$

we notice that despite the approximation being linear – and hence abstracting from the curvature  $\delta$  of damages – we still have that a higher curvature imply more heterogeneous damages between warm and cold regions based on  $(T_i - T_i^\star)^\delta$ .

Regarding the change in temperature caused by emissions, we get:

$$dT_i = \Delta_i \chi d\mathcal{S} = \Delta_i \chi (\xi^f dE^f + \xi^c dE^c)$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{dT_i}{T_i} = \frac{\Delta_i \chi d\mathcal{E}}{\Delta_i \chi (\mathcal{S}_0 + \mathbb{T}\mathcal{E})} = s^{E/S} \left( s^{f/E} \frac{dE^f}{E^f} + s^{c/E} \frac{dE^c}{E^c} \right)$$

$$\text{with } s^{E/S} = \frac{\mathbb{T}\mathcal{E}}{\mathcal{S}_0 + \mathbb{T}\mathcal{E}} \quad s^{f/E} = \frac{\xi^f E^f}{\mathcal{E}} \quad s^{c/E} = \frac{\xi^c E^c}{\mathcal{E}}$$

As a result, to summarize, the change in damage depends on the total energy used in fossil (oil-gas) and coal.

$$d\ln \mathcal{D}_i^y = -\bar{\gamma}_i^y (s^{f/E} d\ln E^f + s^{c/E} d\ln E^c) \quad \bar{\gamma}_i^y = \gamma (T_i - T_i^\star) T_i s^{E/S}$$

and similarly for  $d\ln \mathcal{D}_i^u$  where  $\bar{\gamma}_i^y$  and  $\bar{\gamma}_i^u$  summarize in simple parameters – as sufficient statistics – the heterogeneous impacts of climate change on output and utility.

### B.4 Production

We now derive the impact of changes in prices and quantities on welfare through the budget constraint. First, we define several objects – like shares – that are relevant for the decomposition:

- Energy share in production:  $s_i^e = \frac{e_i q_i^e}{y_i p_i}$
- Fossil share in energy mix  $s_i^f = \frac{e_i^f q_i^f}{e_i q_i^e}$  and similarly  $s_i^c = \frac{e_i^c q_i^c}{e_i q_i^e}$  and  $s_i^r = \frac{e_i^r q_i^r}{e_i q_i^e}$
- Production share/rent share in GDP:  $\eta_i^y = \frac{y_i p_i}{y_i p_i + \pi_i^f} = 1 - \eta_i^\pi$
- Consumption share in GDP:  $\eta_i^c = \frac{x_i}{y_i p_i + \pi_i^f}$
- Consumption as a ratio of output:  $s_i^{c/y} = \frac{c_i \mathbb{P}_i}{y_i p_i} = \frac{x_i}{y_i p_i + \pi_i^f} \frac{y_i p_i + \pi_i^f}{y_i p_i} = \frac{\eta_i^c}{1 - \eta_i^\pi} = \frac{\eta_i^c}{\eta_i^y}$ ,
- Energy share as a ratio of consumption:  $\frac{e_i q_i^e}{x_i} = \frac{e_i q_i^e}{y_i p_i} \frac{y_i p_i + \pi_i^f}{y_i p_i + \pi_i^f} \frac{y_i p_i + \pi_i^f}{x_i} = s_i^e \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c}$
- Profit share as a ratio of consumption:  $\frac{\pi_i^f}{x_i} = \frac{\pi_i^f}{y_i p_i + \pi_i^f} \frac{y_i p_i + \pi_i^f}{x_i} = \frac{\eta_i^\pi}{\eta_i^c}$
- The share of GDP of energy imports and exports, with  $v_i = p_i y_i + q^f(e_i^x - e_i^f)$  and  $v^y = \frac{p_i y_i}{v_i}$ ,  $v^{ex} = \frac{q^f e_i^x}{v_i}$ ,  $v^{ef} = \frac{q^f e_i^f}{v_i}$  and  $v^{ne} = \frac{q^f (e_i^x - e_i^f)}{v_k}$ .

Returning to our decomposition, we start from the budget constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} c_i \mathbb{P}_i &= x_i = p_i z_i \mathcal{D}_i(T_i) F(e_i, \ell_i) - q_i^e e_i + \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_i} \sum_{\ell} \left( q^{\ell} \bar{e}_i^{\ell} - p_i \mathcal{C}^{\ell}(e_i^{\ell}) \right) + t_i^{ls} \\ &= p_i z_i \mathcal{D}_i(T_i) F(e_i, \ell_i) - (q^f (1 + t_i^{\varepsilon}) e_i^f + q_i^c (1 + t_i^{\varepsilon}) e_i^c + q_i^r (1 - s_i^{\varepsilon}) e_i^r) + \\ &\quad \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_i} \sum_{\ell} \left( q^{\ell} \bar{e}_i^{\ell} - p_i \mathcal{C}^{\ell}(e_i^{\ell}) \right) + \tilde{t}_i^{ls} + q^f t_i^{\varepsilon} e_i^f + q_i^c t_i^{\varepsilon} e_i^c - q_i^r s_i^{\varepsilon} e_i^r \end{aligned}$$

Since the revenues of the carbon tax and the renewable subsidy are redistributed/taxed lump-sum to the Household, we do not see any direct redistributive effect of carbon taxation, e.g. as the terms  $q^f t_i^{\varepsilon} e_i^f$  cancel out.

Taking the first-order expansion of the budget constraint, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dc_i}{c_i} &= \frac{dx_i}{x_i} - \frac{d\mathbb{P}_i}{\mathbb{P}_i} = \frac{p_i y_i}{x_i} \left( \frac{dp_i}{p_i} + \frac{dy_i}{y_i} \right) - \frac{e_i q_i^e}{x_i} \left( \frac{e_i^f q^f}{e_i^f} \left( \frac{de^f}{e^f} + \frac{dq^f}{q^f} \right) + \frac{e_i^c q^c}{e_i^c} \left( \frac{de^c}{e^c} + \frac{dq^c}{q^c} \right) + \frac{e_i^r q^r}{e_i^r} \left( \frac{de^r}{e^r} + \frac{dq^r}{q^r} \right) \right) \\ &\quad + \frac{\pi^f}{x_i} \frac{d\pi_i^f}{\pi^f} + \frac{\tilde{t}_i^{ls}}{x_i} \left( \frac{d\tilde{t}_i^{ls}}{\tilde{t}_i^{ls}} \right) - \frac{d\mathbb{P}_i}{\mathbb{P}_i} \\ \frac{dc_i}{c_i} &= \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} \left( \frac{dp_i}{p_i} + \frac{dy_i}{y_i} \right) - s_i^e \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} \left( s_i^f \left( \frac{de^f}{e^f} + \frac{dq^f}{q^f} \right) + s_i^c \left( \frac{de^c}{e^c} + \frac{dq^c}{q^c} \right) + s_i^r \left( \frac{de^r}{e^r} + \frac{dq^r}{q^r} \right) \right) \\ &\quad + \frac{\eta_i^{\pi f}}{\eta_i^c} \frac{d\pi_i^f}{\pi^f} + \frac{\eta_i^{\pi c}}{\eta_i^c} \frac{d\pi_i^c}{\pi^c} + \frac{\eta_i^{\pi r}}{\eta_i^c} \frac{d\pi_i^r}{\pi^r} + \frac{\tilde{t}_i^{ls}}{x_i} \left( \frac{d\tilde{t}_i^{ls}}{\tilde{t}_i^{ls}} \right) - \frac{d\mathbb{P}_i}{\mathbb{P}_i} \end{aligned}$$

First, using output changes, approximating the production function:

$$\frac{dy_i}{y_i} = \frac{d\mathcal{D}_i^y}{\mathcal{D}_i^y} + \frac{M P e_i e_i}{y_i} \frac{de_i}{e_i} = \frac{d\mathcal{D}_i^y}{\mathcal{D}_i^y} + s_i^e \left[ s_i^f \frac{de_i^f}{e_i^f} + s_i^c \frac{de_i^c}{e_i^c} + s_i^r \frac{de_i^r}{e_i^r} \right]$$

we see that Hulten's theorem implies a first-order impact of a change in energy price that scales with the share of energy in production  $s_i^e$ , which is typically around 5–10% and the share of fossils in the energy mix  $s_i^f, s_i^c$ , which sum to above 85%.

## B.5 Energy markets – Profits, and prices for Coal and Renewable

Using the fossil-energy firm problem, we get the profit change as a function of the price:

$$\frac{d\pi_i^f}{\pi_i^f} = \left( (1 + \frac{1}{\nu_i^f}) \frac{dq^f}{q^f} - \frac{1}{\nu_i^f} \frac{dp_i}{p_i} \right)$$

The energy rent is affected by changes in the aggregate fossil energy price  $dq^f$ . Since the cost also depends on imported inputs, the prices of goods  $\mathbb{P}_i$  also matter for profit and welfare.

Similarly, for coal and renewable, we obtain the same formulation for profit:

$$\frac{d\pi_i^c}{\pi_i^c} = (1 + \frac{1}{\nu_i^c}) \frac{dq_i^c}{q_i^c} - \frac{1}{\nu_i^c} \frac{dp_i}{p_i}$$

and similarly for  $d\ln \pi_i^r$  as a function of  $d\ln q_i^r$ .

Now, we use the production function for coal and renewable, which implies the simple supply curve  $q_i^c = \mathcal{C}_i^{c'}(\bar{e}_i^c)p_i = (e_i^c)^{\nu_i^c} p_i$  and  $q_i^r = v_i^r \mathbb{P}_i$ , we get

$$\frac{dq^r}{q^r} = \nu_i^r \frac{de_i^r}{e_i^r} + \frac{dp_i}{p_i} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{dq^c}{q^c} = \nu_i^c \frac{de_i^c}{e_i^c} + \frac{dp_i}{p_i}$$

the price of both coal and renewable energy are directly exposed to changes in the price of the domestic good used in production.

As a result, the profits from coal and renewable can also be rewritten in function of quantities:

$$\frac{d\pi_i^c}{\pi_i^c} = (1 + \frac{1}{\nu_i^c}) \left[ \nu_i^r \frac{de_i^r}{e_i^r} + \frac{dp_i}{p_i} \right] - \frac{1}{\nu_i^c} \frac{dp_i}{p_i} = (1 + \nu_i^c) \frac{de_i^r}{e_i^r} + \frac{dp_i}{p_i}$$

## B.6 Returning to the budget/expenditure

Accounting for these different effects dramatically simplifies the change in consumption:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dc_i}{c_i} &= \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} \left( \frac{dp_i}{p_i} + \frac{dy_i}{y_i} \right) - s_i^e \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} \left( s_i^f \left( \frac{de^f}{e^f} + \frac{dq^f}{q^f} \right) + s_i^c \left( \frac{de^c}{e^c} + \frac{dq^c}{q^c} \right) + s_i^r \left( \frac{de^r}{e^r} + \frac{dq^r}{q^r} \right) \right) \\ &\quad + \sum_{\ell} \frac{\eta_i^{\pi\ell}}{\eta_i^c} \left( (1 + \frac{1}{\nu_i^{\ell}}) \frac{dq^{\ell}}{q^{\ell}} - \frac{1}{\nu_i^{\ell}} \frac{dp_i}{p_i} \right) + \frac{d\tilde{t}_i^{ls}}{x_i} - \frac{d\mathbb{P}_i}{\mathbb{P}_i} \\ &= \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} \left( \frac{dp_i}{p_i} + \frac{d\mathcal{D}_i}{\mathcal{D}_i} \right) - \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} s_i^e \left[ s_i^f \frac{dq^f}{q^f} + s_i^c \frac{dq^c}{q^c} + s_i^r \frac{dq^r}{q^r} \right] + \sum_{\ell} \frac{\eta_i^{\pi\ell}}{\eta_i^c} \left( (1 + \frac{1}{\nu_i^{\ell}}) \frac{dq^{\ell}}{q^{\ell}} - \frac{1}{\nu_i^{\ell}} \frac{dp_i}{p_i} \right) + \frac{d\tilde{t}_i^{ls}}{x_i} - \frac{d\mathbb{P}_i}{\mathbb{P}_i} \\ \frac{dc_i}{c_i} &= \left[ \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} - \sum_{\ell} \frac{1}{\nu_i^{\ell}} \frac{\eta_i^{\pi\ell}}{\eta_i^c} \right] \frac{dp_i}{p_i} + \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} \frac{d\mathcal{D}_i^y}{\mathcal{D}_i^y} + \sum_{\ell} \left[ \frac{\eta_i^{\pi\ell}}{\eta_i^c} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\nu_i^{\ell}} \right) - \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} s_i^e s_i^{\ell} \right] \frac{dq^{\ell}}{q^{\ell}} - \frac{d\mathbb{P}_i}{\mathbb{P}_i} + \frac{d\tilde{t}_i^{ls}}{x_i} \end{aligned}$$

## B.7 Energy markets

We now turn to energy where the demand and equilibrium effect on prices will be of first-order importance for our welfare decomposition.

## Energy demand

To examine the demand side of the market, we compute the elasticities of demand for each energy source, which are determined jointly by the firm First-Order Conditions. Thanks to our nested CES formulation, we can compute the elasticity  $\varepsilon_{q^k}^\ell = \frac{\partial e_i^\ell}{\partial q^k} \frac{q^k}{e_i^\ell}$  as :

$$\begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{q^f}^f & \varepsilon_{q^c}^f & \varepsilon_{q^r}^f \\ \varepsilon_{q^f}^c & \varepsilon_{q^c}^c & \varepsilon_{q^r}^c \\ \varepsilon_{q^f}^r & \varepsilon_{q^c}^r & \varepsilon_{q^r}^r \end{bmatrix} = (\tilde{H}^e)^{-1} = -\frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} \begin{bmatrix} s^f & s^c & s^r \\ s^f & s^c & s^r \\ s^f & s^c & s^r \end{bmatrix} + \sigma^e \begin{bmatrix} -(1-s^f) & s^c & s^r \\ s^f & -(1-s^c) & s^r \\ s^f & s^c & -(1-s^r) \end{bmatrix}$$

where the first part correspond to the change in aggregate price of energy  $q^e$ , since  $\frac{\partial q^e}{\partial q^k} \frac{q^k}{q^e} = s_i^k$ , which reduces demands for overall energy, according to elasticity  $\frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}$  where  $s_i^e$  is the cost share of energy and  $\sigma^y$  the elasticity between energy and other inputs. Second, the later part summarizes the substitution effect across energy sources, negative along the diagonal and positive out of diagonal, due to positive cross-elasticity in the CES framework.

Moreover, the energy demand also depends on aggregate TFP (and hence climate damage), and the price level at which the final good is sold. As a result, the productivity elasticities and the final good price elasticity write:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_z^f \\ \varepsilon_z^c \\ \varepsilon_z^r \end{bmatrix} = \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_p^f \\ \varepsilon_p^c \\ \varepsilon_p^r \end{bmatrix} = \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

which again is standard in the Nested CES framework.

As a result, we can express the energy demand as a function of the other endogenous variables:

$$\begin{aligned} d \ln e_i^f &= -\left(\frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f + (1-s_i^f) \sigma^e\right) [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^\varepsilon] + \left(\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}\right) s_i^c [d \ln q_i^c + \xi^c J_i d \ln t^\varepsilon] + \left(\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}\right) s_i^r [d \ln q_i^r - J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon] \\ &\quad + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln p_i \\ d \ln e_i^c &= \left(\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}\right) s_i^f [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^\varepsilon] - \left(\frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^c + (1-s_i^c) \sigma^e\right) [d \ln q_i^c + \xi^c J_i d \ln t^\varepsilon] + \left(\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}\right) s_i^r [d \ln q_i^r - J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon] \\ &\quad + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln p_i \\ d \ln e_i^r &= \left(\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}\right) s_i^f [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^\varepsilon] + \left(\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}\right) s_i^c [d \ln q_i^c + \xi^c J_i d \ln t^\varepsilon] - \left(\frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^r + (1-s_i^r) \sigma^e\right) [d \ln q_i^r - J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon] \\ &\quad + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln p_i \end{aligned}$$

Those endogenous energy demands can be reintegrated into the production function to obtain

the change in output as a function of good prices, energy prices, and productivity:

$$\begin{aligned}
d \ln y_i &= d \ln \mathcal{D}_i + s_i^e [s_i^f d \ln e_i^f + s_i^r d \ln e_i^c + s_i^r d \ln e_i^r] \\
&= (1 + \frac{s_i^e \sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) d \ln \mathcal{D}_i + \frac{s_i^e \sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \ln p_i - s_i^e \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f [\xi^f d \ln q^f + d \ln t_i^\varepsilon] \\
&\quad - s_i^e \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^r [d \ln q_i^c + \xi^c d \ln t_i^\varepsilon] - s_i^e \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^r [d \ln q_i^r - J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon] \\
d \ln y_i &= \alpha_i^{y,z} d \ln z_i + \alpha_i^{y,p} d \ln p_i - \alpha_i^{y,qf} [d \ln q^f + d \ln t_i^\varepsilon] - \alpha_i^{y,qc} [d \ln q_i^c + d \ln t_i^\varepsilon] - \alpha_i^{y,qr} [d \ln q_i^r - d \ln s_i^\varepsilon] \\
\alpha_i^{y,z} &= 1 + \frac{s_i^e \sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \quad \alpha_i^{y,p} = \frac{s_i^e \sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \\
\alpha_i^{y,qf} &= s_i^e \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f \quad \alpha_i^{y,qc} = s_i^e \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^c \quad \alpha_i^{y,qr} = s_i^e \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^r \\
d \ln y_i &= \alpha_i^{y,z} d \ln z_i + \alpha_i^{y,p} d \ln p_i - \alpha_i^{y,qf} d \ln q^f \\
&\quad - (\xi^f \alpha_i^{y,qf} + \xi^c \alpha_i^{y,qc}) d \ln t_i^\varepsilon + \alpha_i^{y,qr} d \ln s_i^\varepsilon - \alpha_i^{y,qc} d \ln q_i^c - \alpha_i^{y,qr} d \ln q_i^r
\end{aligned}$$

where this last equation uses the supply curve of coal and renewable. We can see the exposure of country  $i$ 's output of carbon tax:  $\xi^f \alpha_i^{y,qf} + \xi^c \alpha_i^{y,qc} = s_i^e \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} (\xi^f s_i^f + \xi^c s_i^c)$ , through the price and substitution effect of oil, gas and coal.

### **Coal and renewable energy markets**

We write the demand curves in matrix forms:

$$\begin{aligned}
dq_i^{c,r} &= \begin{bmatrix} d \ln q_i^c \\ d \ln q_i^r \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \nu_i^c & 0 \\ 0 & \nu_i^r \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} d \ln e_i^c \\ d \ln e_i^r \end{bmatrix} + d \ln p_i \\
de_i^{c,r} &= \begin{bmatrix} d \ln e_i^c \\ d \ln e_i^r \end{bmatrix} = A dq_i^{c,r} + J_i A \begin{bmatrix} \xi^c d \ln t_i \\ -d \ln s_i \end{bmatrix} + (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t_i^\varepsilon] + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \ln p_i
\end{aligned}$$

with

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} -(\frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^c + (1-s_i^c) \sigma^e) & (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^r \\ (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^c & -(\frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^r + (1-s_i^r) \sigma^e) \end{bmatrix}$$

We can summarize and solve the system, where the vector  $b$  compiles the other terms (productivity and oil price effects):

$$\begin{aligned}
dq_i^{c,r} &= \boldsymbol{\nu} de_i^{c,r} + d \ln p_i \\
de_i^{c,r} &= A dq_i^{c,r} + A d \ln t_i^{c,r} + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \ln p_i + b_i \\
de_i^{c,r} &= [\mathbb{I} - A \boldsymbol{\nu}]^{-1} A d \ln t_i^{c,r} + [\mathbb{I} - A \boldsymbol{\nu}]^{-1} [A + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \mathbb{1}] d \ln p_i + [\mathbb{I} - A \boldsymbol{\nu}]^{-1} b_i
\end{aligned}$$

Solving in matrix form yields the price and quantity expression for coal and renewables.

$$dq_i^{c,r} = [\mathbb{I} - A \boldsymbol{\nu}]^{-1} \boldsymbol{\nu} A d \ln t_i^{c,r} + [\mathbb{I} - A \boldsymbol{\nu}]^{-1} \boldsymbol{\nu} b_i + [\mathbb{I} - A \boldsymbol{\nu}]^{-1} [\frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \boldsymbol{\nu} + 1] \mathbb{1} d \ln p_i$$

with  $b_i = (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^e] + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i$ .

We can write the energy and price as follows:

$$dq_i^c = -\beta_{c,c}^{q,t} \xi^c d \ln t_i^e - \beta_{c,r}^{q,t} d \ln s_i^e + \beta^{q,b,c} \left[ (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^e] + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i \right] + \beta^{q,p,c} d \ln p_i$$

$$dq_i^r = +\beta_{r,c}^{q,t} \xi^c d \ln t_i^e + \beta_{r,r}^{q,t} d \ln s_i^e + \beta^{q,b,r} \left[ (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^e] + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i \right] + \beta^{q,p,r} d \ln p_i$$

Where  $\beta^q$  are complicated parameters function of  $A$  and  $\nu$ . For  $\nu_i^r = \nu_i^c = 0$ , we can simplify to have  $\beta_{\ell,\ell'}^{q,t} = \beta^{q,b,\ell} = 0$  and  $\beta^{q,p,\ell} = 1$ , where we simply obtain  $d \ln q_i^c = d \ln q_i^r = d \ln p_i$ . For quantities, we get the demand curve as a function of the policies:

$$de_i^c = -\beta_{c,c}^{e,t} \xi^c d \ln t_i^e - \beta_{c,r}^{e,t} d \ln s_i^e + \beta^{e,p,c} d \ln p_i + \beta^{e,b,c} \left[ (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^e] + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i \right]$$

$$de_i^r = \beta_{r,c}^{e,t} \xi^c d \ln t_i^e + \beta_{r,r}^{e,t} d \ln s_i^e + \beta^{e,p,r} d \ln p_i + \beta^{e,b,r} \left[ (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^e] + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i \right]$$

where,  $\beta^e$  are again complicated parameters function of  $A$  and  $\nu$ . Again, with  $\nu_i^r = \nu_i^c = 0$ , we obtain  $\beta_{\ell,\ell'}^{e,t} = A_{\ell,\ell'}$  and  $\beta^{e,p,\ell} = \sum_{\ell'} A_{\ell,\ell'} + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e}, \forall \ell$  and  $\beta^{e,b,\ell} = 1, \forall \ell$

As a result, the energy demand for fossil can also be rewritten:

$$d \ln e_i^f = -\left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f + (1-s_i^f) \sigma^e \right) [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^e] + \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) s_i^c [d \ln q_i^c + \xi^c J_i d \ln t^e] + \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) s_i^r [d \ln q_i^r - J_i d \ln s_i^e] + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln p_i$$

$$dq_i^c = -\beta_{c,c}^{q,t} \xi^c d \ln t_i^e - \beta_{c,r}^{q,t} d \ln s_i^e + \beta^{q,b,c} \left[ (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^e] + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i \right] + \beta^{q,p,c} d \ln p_i$$

$$dq_i^r = \beta_{r,c}^{q,t} \xi^c d \ln t_i^e + \beta_{r,r}^{q,t} d \ln s_i^e + \beta^{q,b,r} \left[ (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^e] + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i \right] + \beta^{q,p,r} d \ln p_i$$

$$d \ln e_i^f = \left\{ -\left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f + (1-s_i^f) \sigma^e \right) + \left[ s_i^c \beta^{q,b,c} + s_i^r \beta^{q,b,r} \right] \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right)^2 s_i^f \right\} [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^e] + \left\{ s_i^c - s_i^c \beta_{c,c}^{q,t} + s_i^r \beta_{r,c}^{q,t} \right\} \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) \xi^c J_i d \ln t_i^e + \left\{ -s_i^r - s_i^c \beta_{c,r}^{q,t} + s_i^r \beta_{r,r}^{q,t} \right\} \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) J_i d \ln s_i^e + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} \left\{ 1 + \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) [s_i^c \beta^{q,b,c} + s_i^r \beta^{q,b,r}] \right\} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i + \left\{ \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} + \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) [s_i^c \beta^{q,p,c} + s_i^r \beta^{q,p,r}] \right\} d \ln p_i$$

$$d \ln e_i^f = -\beta_{f,f,i}^{e,q} [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^e] + \beta_{f,c,i}^{e,t} \xi^c J_i d \ln t_i^e - \beta_{f,r,i}^{e,t} J_i d \ln s_i^e + \beta_i^{e,d,f} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i + \beta_i^{e,d,f} d \ln p_i$$

This equation shows the layers of general equilibrium effects happening in the three energy markets. An increase in the price of fossil (oil-gas) decreases directly the oil-gas quantity consumed. However, it also creates substitution effects, as it now also increases both the demand and hence the price of coal and renewable – with magnitude  $\beta^{q,b,c}$  and  $\beta^{q,b,r}$  which then triggers a substitution effect away from those sources, and towards fossil, which then mitigates the drop in oil-gas demand. Similar effects arise for the carbon tax on coal  $\xi^c t_i^e$  which increases demand for oil-gas, or subsidy for renewables  $s_i^e$  that decreases it, accounting for all reallocation channels.

If we assume  $\nu_i^c = \nu_i^r = 0$ , the coal and renewable supply curves are perfectly elastic, and

then, we obtain a simplified formula as a function of primitives:

$$\begin{aligned}
d \ln e_i^f = & - \underbrace{\left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f + (1-s_i^f) \sigma^e \right)}_{=\beta_{f,f}^{e,q}} [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^e] + \underbrace{s_i^c \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right)}_{=\beta_{f,c}^{e,t}} \xi^c J_i d \ln t_i^e - \underbrace{s_i^r \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right)}_{=\beta_{f,r}^{e,t}} J_i d \ln s_i^e \\
& + \underbrace{\frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln D_i}_{=\beta^{e,d,f}} + \underbrace{\left[ \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} + \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) (s_i^c + s_i^r) \right]}_{=\beta^{e,d,f}} d \ln p_i
\end{aligned}$$

Going back to the general case, we can rewrite output – substituting the price of coal and renewable – as a function of policies:

$$\begin{aligned}
d \ln y_i = & \alpha^{y,z} d \ln z_i + \alpha^{y,p} d \ln p_i - \alpha^{y,qf} d \ln q^f \\
& - (\xi^f \alpha^{y,qf} + \xi^c \alpha^{y,qc}) d \ln t_i^e + \alpha^{y,qr} d \ln s_i^e - \alpha^{y,qc} d \ln q_i^c - \alpha^{y,qr} d \ln q_i^r \\
dq_i^c = & - \beta_{c,c}^{q,t} \xi^c d \ln t_i^e - \beta_{c,r}^{q,t} d \ln s_i^e + \beta^{q,b,c} \left[ - \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) s_i^f [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^e] + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln D_i \right] + \beta^{q,p,c} d \ln p_i \\
dq_i^r = & \beta_{r,c}^{q,t} \xi^c d \ln t_i^e + \beta_{r,r}^{q,t} d \ln s_i^e + \beta^{q,b,r} \left[ \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) s_i^f [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^e] + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln D_i \right] + \beta^{q,p,r} d \ln p_i \\
\Rightarrow d \ln y_i = & \left[ \alpha^{y,z} - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} (\alpha^{y,qc} \beta^{q,b,c} + \alpha^{y,qr} \beta^{q,b,r}) \right] d \ln D_i + \left[ \alpha^{y,p} - (\alpha^{y,qc} \beta^{q,p,c} + \alpha^{y,qr} \beta^{q,p,r}) \right] d \ln p_i \\
& + \left[ - \alpha^{y,qf} + (\alpha^{y,qc} \beta^{q,b,c} + \alpha^{y,qr} \beta^{q,b,r}) \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) s_i^f \right] d \ln q^f \\
& + \left[ - (\xi^f \alpha^{y,qf} + \xi^c \alpha^{y,qc}) + (\alpha^{y,qc} \beta_{c,c}^{q,t} - \alpha^{y,qr} \beta_{r,c}^{q,t}) \xi^c + (\alpha^{y,qc} \beta^{q,b,c} + \alpha^{y,qr} \beta^{q,b,r}) \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) s_i^f \xi^f \right] d \ln t_i^e \\
& + \left[ \alpha^{y,qr} + (\alpha^{y,qc} \beta_{c,r}^{q,t} - \alpha^{y,qr} \beta_{r,r}^{q,t}) \right] d \ln s_i^e
\end{aligned}$$

this combines all the demand and supply substitution patterns arising in the three energy markets. To give an idea for the mechanism, take the parameter for the carbon tax  $t^e$ , it shows different effects: (i) the direct impact of carbon taxation on the consumption of oil-gas and coal ( $\xi^f \alpha^{y,qf} + \xi^c \alpha^{y,qc}$ ), (ii) the indirect impact of the decline in coal demand due to this tax  $\xi^c t^e$  on respectively the price of coal  $q_i^c$  and the price of renewable  $q_i^r$ , hence change the input choices:  $(\alpha^{y,qc} \beta_{c,c}^{q,t} - \alpha^{y,qr} \beta_{r,c}^{q,t}) \xi^c$ , and (iii) the indirect impact of the decline in oil-gas demand due to the tax  $\xi^d t^e$  on the price of coal  $q_i^c$  and the price of renewable  $q_i^r$  respectively, i.e.  $(\alpha^{y,qc} \beta^{q,b,c} + \alpha^{y,qr} \beta^{q,b,r}) \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) s_i^f \xi^f$ , the price of energies  $c$  and  $r$  affecting output with magnitude  $\alpha^{y,qc}$  and  $\alpha^{y,qr}$  respectively.

To save on notation, we compile these effects under the new parameters  $\delta$

$$d \ln y_i = \delta^{y,z} d \ln D_i + \delta^{y,p} d \ln p_i - \delta^{y,qf} d \ln q^f - \delta^{y,te} d \ln t_i^e + \delta^{y,se} d \ln s_i^e$$

### Fossil energy market – demand

The energy demand in fossil is the sum of individual countries demand, where we denote the share of country  $i$  in global production  $\lambda_i^f = \frac{\mathcal{P}_i e_i^f}{E^f}$

$$\begin{aligned} dE^f &= \sum_i \mathcal{P}_i d e_i^f \\ d \ln E^f &= \sum_i \lambda_i^f d \ln e_i^f \\ &= - \sum_i \lambda_i^f \left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f + (1-s_i^f) \sigma^e \right) [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t_i^\varepsilon] + \sum_i \lambda_i^f \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) s_i^c [d \ln q_i^c + \xi^c J_i d \ln t_i^\varepsilon] \\ &\quad + \sum_i \lambda_i^f \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) s_i^r [d \ln q_i^r - J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon] + \sum_i \lambda_i^f \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i + \sum_i \lambda_i^f \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d \ln p_i \end{aligned}$$

We see that carbon taxation decreases demand for oil and gas by direct substitution but can also increase it if the substitution away from coal is strong enough. The first effect dominates the second – up to the first order – if:

$$\bar{\lambda}_{\mathcal{J}}^{\sigma,f} := \sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}} \lambda_i^f \left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f + (1-s_i^f) \sigma^e \right) \xi^f > \sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}} \lambda_i^f \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) s_i^c \xi^c =: \bar{\lambda}_{\mathcal{J}}^{\sigma,c}$$

which depend, among others, on the covariance  $\text{Cov}_i(\lambda_i^f, 1-s_i^f)$  and  $\text{Cov}_i(\lambda_i^f, s_i^c)$ , since the substitution effect is stronger than the income effect  $\sigma^e > \sigma^y/(1-s_i^e)$ , in most empirically-relevant cases.

However, that simple condition only summarizes the direct effects. When we consider the indirect effects, accounting for the changes in prices for coal and renewable  $d \ln q^c$  and  $d \ln q^r$ .

$$\begin{aligned} d \ln E^f &= \sum_i \lambda_i^f d \ln e_i^f \\ &= - \sum_i \lambda_i^f \beta_{f,f,i}^{e,q} [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t_i^\varepsilon] + \sum_i \lambda_i^f \beta_{f,c,i}^{e,t} \xi^c J_i d \ln t_i^\varepsilon \\ &\quad + \sum_i \lambda_i^f \beta_{f,r,i}^{e,t} J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon + \sum_i \lambda_i^f \beta_i^{e,d,f} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i + \sum_i \lambda_i^f \beta_i^{e,d,f} d \ln p_i \end{aligned}$$

The condition becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{\lambda}_{\mathcal{J}}^{\sigma,f} &:= \sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}} \lambda_i^f \left\{ \left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f + (1-s_i^f) \sigma^e \right) + \left[ s_i^c \beta_i^{q,b,c} + s_i^r \beta_i^{q,b,r} \right] \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right)^2 s_i^f \right\} \xi^f \\ &> \sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}} \lambda_i^f \left\{ s_i^c - s_i^c \beta_{c,c}^{q,t} + s_i^r \beta_{r,c}^{q,t} \right\} \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) \xi^c =: \bar{\lambda}_{\mathcal{J}}^{\sigma,c} \end{aligned}$$

We obtain that, if  $\bar{\lambda}_{\mathcal{J}}^{\sigma,f} > \bar{\lambda}_{\mathcal{J}}^{\sigma,c}$ , the direct effect of a carbon tax  $\xi^f t_i^\varepsilon$  on oil-gas outweighs the reallocation from coal to oil-gas due to the larger increase  $\xi^c t_i^\varepsilon$ .

### Fossil energy market – supply

Now, the energy supply curve can also be recast as the sum of individual extraction  $E^f = \sum_i \rho_i e_i^f = \sum_i \rho_i e_i^x$ , and, with the share of fossil production  $\lambda_i^x = \rho_i e_i^x / E^f$ , it hence derives as follow:

$$\begin{aligned} e_i^x &= (q^f)^{1/\nu_i} \mathcal{R}_i \bar{\nu}_i^{-1/\nu_i} p_i^{-1/\nu_i} \\ d \ln E^f &= \sum_i \lambda_i^x d \ln e_i^x = \sum_i \lambda_i^x \frac{1}{\nu_i} [d \ln q^f - d \ln p_i] \\ \Rightarrow \quad d \ln q^f &= \bar{\nu} d \ln E^f + \sum_i \lambda_i^x \frac{\bar{\nu}}{\nu_i} d \ln p_i \end{aligned}$$

with the aggregate supply elasticity  $\bar{\nu} = (\sum_i \lambda_i^x \nu_i^{-1})^{-1}$ , that we already encountered in the second best optimal Ramsey policy.

Now, replacing the energy demand quantity  $d \ln E^f$  into the energy supply/price curve, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} d \ln q^f &= \bar{\nu} d \ln E^f + \sum_i \lambda_i^x \frac{\bar{\nu}}{\nu_i} d \ln p_i \\ &= -\bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f} d \ln q^f + \bar{\nu} \sum_i \lambda_i^{\sigma,f} \xi^f J_i d \ln t^\varepsilon + \bar{\nu} \sum_i \lambda_i^f (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^c [d \ln q_i^c + \xi^c J_i d \ln t^\varepsilon] \\ &\quad + \bar{\nu} \sum_i \lambda_i^f (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^r [d \ln q_i^r - d \ln s_i^\varepsilon] + \bar{\nu} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} [d \ln D_i + d \ln p_i] + \sum_i \lambda_i^x \frac{\bar{\nu}}{\nu_i} d \ln p_i \\ d \ln q^f &= -\bar{\nu} \underbrace{\sum_i \lambda_i^f \beta_{f,f,i}^{e,q} [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^\varepsilon]}_{=\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} + \bar{\nu} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \beta_{f,c,i}^{e,t} \xi^c J_i d \ln t^\varepsilon \\ &\quad + \bar{\nu} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \beta_{f,r,i}^{e,t} J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon + \bar{\nu} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \beta_i^{e,d,f} d \ln D_i + \bar{\nu} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \beta_i^{e,d,f} d \ln p_i + \sum_i \lambda_i^x \frac{\bar{\nu}}{\nu_i} d \ln p_i \\ d \ln q^f &= \frac{\bar{\nu}}{1+\bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f J_i [-\xi^f \beta_{f,f,i}^{e,q} + \xi^c \beta_{f,c,i}^{e,t}] d \ln t^\varepsilon + \frac{\bar{\nu}}{1+\bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \beta_{f,r,i}^{e,t} J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon \\ &\quad + \frac{\bar{\nu}}{1+\bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \beta_i^{e,d,f} d \ln D_i + \frac{\bar{\nu}}{1+\bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i [\lambda_i^f \beta_i^{e,p,f} + \lambda_i^x \frac{\bar{\nu}}{\nu_i}] d \ln p_i \end{aligned}$$

where  $\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f} = \bar{\lambda}_{\mathbb{I}}^{\sigma,f}$ , for  $\mathbb{I}$  the whole world. As before, we see that carbon taxation decreases the oil-gas energy price if  $\bar{\lambda}_{\mathcal{J}}^{\sigma,f} > \bar{\lambda}_{\mathcal{J}}^{\sigma,c}$ . Moreover, we see that a change in the good price  $d \ln p_i$  of all the countries change the aggregate price of oil and gas because it both increases the price of renewable and coal, increases demand for oil-gas by substitutions – the terms  $\bar{\nu} \lambda_i^{\sigma,c}$  and  $\bar{\nu} \lambda_i^{\sigma,r}$  – and it also increases the price of the input – through the term  $\lambda_i^x \frac{\bar{\nu}}{\nu_i}$ .

If we assume that again  $\nu^c = \nu^r = 0$ , this implies:

$$\begin{aligned} d \ln q^f &= \frac{\bar{\nu}}{1+\bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f J_i \left[ -\xi^f \left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f + (1-s_i^f) \sigma^e \right) + \xi^c s_i^c \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) \right] d \ln t^\varepsilon + \frac{\bar{\nu}}{1+\bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f s_i^r \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon \\ &\quad + \frac{\bar{\nu}}{1+\bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln D_i + \frac{\bar{\nu}}{1+\bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \left[ \lambda_i^f \left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} + \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) (s_i^c + s_i^r) \right) + \lambda_i^x \frac{\bar{\nu}}{\nu_i} \right] d \ln p_i \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, we can write total energy demand as:

$$\begin{aligned} d \ln E^f &= \frac{1}{1+\bar{\nu}\lambda^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f J_i \left[ -\xi^f \left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} s_i^f + (1-s_i^f) \sigma^e \right) + \xi^c s_i^c \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) \right] d \ln t^\varepsilon + \frac{1}{1+\bar{\nu}\lambda^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f s_i^r \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{1+\bar{\nu}\lambda^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln D_i + \frac{1}{1+\bar{\nu}\lambda^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \left[ \lambda_i^f \left( \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} + \left( \sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} \right) (s_i^c + s_i^r) \right) \right] d \ln p_i \end{aligned}$$

## B.8 Trade à la Armington

To investigate how the price indices  $\mathbb{P}_i$  and the good price  $p_i$  are determined, we should now consider the market for goods.

$$\mathcal{P}_i p_i y_i = \sum_{k \in \mathbb{I}} \mathcal{P}_k s_{ki} \frac{v_k}{1+t_{ki}}$$

Using the CES framework, we obtain that:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}_i &= \left( \sum_j a_{ij} (\tau_{ij}(1+t_{ij}^b)p_j)^{1-\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} \\ \frac{d\mathbb{P}_i}{\mathbb{P}_i} &= \sum_j s_{ij} \left( \frac{dp_j}{p_j} + \frac{dt_{ij}^b}{1+t_{ij}^b} \right) \\ s_{ij} &= \frac{c_{ij}(1+t_{ij})\tau_{ij}p_j}{\sum_k c_{ik}(1+t_{ik})\tau_{ik}p_k} = a_{ij} \frac{\left( (1+t_{ij})\tau_{ij}p_j \right)^{1-\theta}}{\sum_k \left( (1+t_{ik})\tau_{ik}p_k \right)^{1-\theta}} = \left( \frac{(1+t_{ij})\tau_{ij}p_j}{\mathbb{P}_i} \right)^{1-\theta} \\ \frac{ds_{ij}}{s_{ij}} &= (\theta-1) \left( \frac{d\mathbb{P}_i}{\mathbb{P}_i} - \left( \frac{dp_j}{p_j} + \frac{dt_{ij}^b}{1+t_{ij}^b} \right) \right) \\ \frac{ds_{ij}}{s_{ij}} &= (\theta-1) \left( \sum_k s_{ik} \left( \frac{dp_k}{p_k} + \frac{dt_{ik}^b}{1+t_{ik}^b} \right) - \left( \frac{dp_j}{p_j} + \frac{dt_{ij}^b}{1+t_{ij}^b} \right) \right) \end{aligned}$$

Using those formulas, the market clearing linearizes as follows:

$$\frac{d[\frac{s_{ij}v_i}{1+t_{ij}^b}]}{\frac{s_{ij}v_i}{1+t_{ij}^b}} = \left[ d \ln v_i + \theta \sum_k (s_{ik} d \ln t_{ik} - (1+s_{ij}) d \ln t_{ij}) + (\theta-1) \sum_{k \neq j} (s_{ik} d \ln p_k - d \ln p_j) \right]$$

$$\text{with } v_i = p_i y_i + q^f (e_i^x - e_i^f)$$

This implies:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_i \tilde{v}_i \left( \frac{dp_i}{dp_i} + \frac{dy_i}{y_i} \right) &= \sum_k \mathcal{P}_k \frac{s_{ki}v_k}{1+t_{ki}} d \ln \left[ \frac{s_{ki}v_k}{1+t_{ki}} \right] \\ \left( \frac{dp_i}{dp_i} + \frac{dy_i}{y_i} \right) &= \sum_k \frac{\mathcal{P}_k v_k}{\mathcal{P}_i v_i} s_{ki} \left[ d \ln v_k + \theta \sum_h (s_{kh} d \ln t_{kh} - (1+s_{ki}) d \ln t_{ki}) + (\theta-1) \sum_h (s_{kh} d \ln p_h - d \ln p_i) \right] \\ \left( \frac{dp_i}{dp_i} + \frac{dy_i}{y_i} \right) &= \sum_k t_{ik} \left[ \left( \frac{p_k y_k}{v_k} \right) (d \ln p_k + d \ln y_k) + \frac{q^f e_k^x}{v_k} d \ln e_k^x - \frac{q^f e_k^f}{v_k} d \ln e_k^f + \frac{q^f (e_k^x - e_k^f)}{v_k} d \ln q^f \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \theta \sum_h (s_{kh} d \ln t_{kh} - (1+s_{ki}) d \ln t_{ki}) + (\theta-1) \sum_h (s_{kh} d \ln p_h - d \ln p_i) \right] \end{aligned}$$

with  $\mathbf{t}_{ik} = \frac{\mathcal{P}_k v_k}{\mathcal{P}_i v_i} s_{ki}$ , which is analogous to the same matrix in Kleinman et al. (2024). Using the fact that  $\sum_k \mathbf{t}_{ik} = 1$  we factorize the  $p_i$ . This implies, rewritten in matrix notation:

$$(\theta d \ln p_i + d \ln y_i) = \sum_k \mathbf{t}_{ik} \left[ \left( \frac{p_k y_k}{v_k} \right) (d \ln p_k + d \ln y_k) + \frac{q^f e_k^x}{v_k} d \ln e_k^x - \frac{q^f e_k^f}{v_k} d \ln e_k^f + \frac{q^f (e_k^x - e_k^f)}{v_k} d \ln q^f \right] \\ + \theta \sum_k \mathbf{t}_{ik} \sum_h (s_{kh} d \ln t_{kh} - (1+s_{ki}) d \ln t_{ki}) + (\theta-1) \sum_k \mathbf{t}_{ik} \sum_h s_{kh} d \ln p_h$$

$$\theta d \ln p + d \ln y = \mathbf{T} v^y [d \ln p + d \ln y] + \mathbf{T} v^{e^x} d \ln e^x - \mathbf{T} v^{e^f} d \ln e^f + \mathbf{T} v^{ne} d \ln q^f + (\theta-1) \mathbf{TS} d \ln p \\ + \theta (\mathbf{T} (\mathbf{S} \odot \mathbf{J} \odot dt^b) \mathbf{1} - \text{diag}[\mathbf{T} (\mathbf{1} + \mathbf{S}') \odot (\mathbf{J} \odot dt^b)'])$$

$$[\theta \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{T} \odot v^y - (\theta-1) (\mathbf{TS})] d \ln p = (\mathbf{T} \odot v^y - \mathbf{I}) d \ln y + \mathbf{T} v^{e^x} d \ln e_k^x - \mathbf{T} v^{e^f} d \ln e_k^f + \mathbf{T} v^{ne} d \ln q^f \\ + \theta (\mathbf{T} (\mathbf{S} \odot \mathbf{J} \odot dt^b) \mathbf{1} - \text{diag}[\mathbf{T} (\mathbf{1} + \mathbf{S}') \odot (\mathbf{J} \odot dt^b)'])$$

$$\text{with } v^y = \frac{p_i y_i}{v_i}, v^{e^x} = \frac{q^f e_i^x}{v_i}, v^{e^f} = \frac{q^f e_i^f}{v_i} \text{ and } v^{ne} = \frac{q^f (e_i^x - e_i^f)}{v_i}.$$

Recall fossil demand and supply and production of goods  $y_i$ ,

$$d \ln e_i^f = -\gamma_{f,f,i}^{e,q} [d \ln q^f + \xi^f J_i d \ln t^\varepsilon] + \gamma_{f,c,i}^{e,t} \xi^c J_i d \ln t_i^\varepsilon + \gamma_{f,r,i}^{e,t} J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon + \gamma_i^{e,d,f} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i + \gamma_i^{e,d,f} d \ln p_i \\ d \ln e_i^x = \frac{1}{\nu_i} [d \ln q^f - d \ln p_i] \\ d \ln y_i = \alpha^{y,z} d \ln z_i + \alpha^{y,p} d \ln p_i - \alpha^{y,qf} d \ln q^f - (\xi^f \alpha^{y,qf} + \xi^c \alpha^{y,qc}) d \ln t_i^\varepsilon - (\alpha^{y,qc} + \alpha^{y,qr}) d \ln p_i$$

We can replace that in the general equilibrium for prices:

$$[\theta \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{T} \odot v^y - (\theta-1) (\mathbf{TS})] d \ln p = (\mathbf{T} v^y - \mathbf{I}) d \ln y + \mathbf{T} v^{e^x} \frac{1}{\nu f} [d \ln q^f - d \ln p] \\ - \mathbf{T} v^{e^f} [-\beta_{f,f}^{e,q} d \ln q^f + (-\beta_{f,f}^{e,q} \xi^f + \beta_{f,c}^{e,t} \xi^c) J d \ln t^\varepsilon - \beta_{f,r}^{e,t} J d \ln s^\varepsilon + \beta^{e,d,f} d \ln \mathcal{D}^y + \dots] \\ + \mathbf{T} v^{ne} d \ln q^f$$

Rewriting and rearranging:

$$[\theta \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{T} \odot v^y - (\theta-1) (\mathbf{TS}) + \mathbf{T} \odot (v^{e^f} \odot \beta^{e,d,f} + v^{e^x} \odot \frac{1}{\nu f})] d \ln p = (\mathbf{T} \odot v^y - \mathbf{I}) d \ln y \\ + \mathbf{T} \odot [v^{e^x} \frac{1}{\nu f} - v^{e^f} \beta_{f,f}^{e,q} + v^{ne}] d \ln q^f - \mathbf{T} v^{e^f} \beta^{e,d,f} d \ln \mathcal{D}^y \\ - \mathbf{T} \odot v^{e^x} [(-\beta_{f,f}^{e,q} \xi^f + \beta_{f,c}^{e,t} \xi^c) J d \ln t^\varepsilon + \beta_{f,r}^{e,t} J d \ln s^\varepsilon] \\ + \theta (\mathbf{T} (\mathbf{S} \odot \mathbf{J} \odot dt^b) \mathbf{1} - \text{diag}[\mathbf{T} (\mathbf{1} + \mathbf{S}') \odot (\mathbf{J} \odot dt^b)'])$$

Replacing output  $y$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \left[ \theta \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{T} \odot v^y - (\theta - 1)(\mathbf{TS}) + \mathbf{T} \odot (v^{ef} \odot \beta^{e,d,f} + v^{ex} \odot \frac{1}{\nu^f}) \right] d \ln p = \\
& \quad (\mathbf{T} \odot v^y - \mathbf{I}) \left[ \delta^{y,z} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i^y + \delta^{y,p} d \ln p_i - \delta^{y,qf} d \ln q^f - \delta^{y,t\varepsilon} d \ln t_i^\varepsilon + \delta^{y,s\varepsilon} d \ln s_i^\varepsilon \right] \\
& \quad + \mathbf{T} \odot [v^{ex} \frac{1}{\nu^f} - v^{ef} \beta_{f,f}^{e,q} + v^{ne}] d \ln q^f - \mathbf{T} v^{ef} \beta^{e,d,f} d \ln \mathcal{D}^y \\
& \quad - \mathbf{T} \odot v^{ef} [(-\beta_{f,f}^{e,q} \xi^f + \beta_{f,c}^{e,t} \xi^c) J dt^\varepsilon + \beta_{f,r}^{e,t} J ds^\varepsilon] \\
& \quad + \theta (\mathbf{T}(\mathbf{S} \odot \mathbf{J} \odot dt^b) \mathbf{1} - \text{diag}[\mathbf{T}(\mathbf{1} + \mathbf{S}') \odot (\mathbf{J} \odot dt^b)'])
\end{aligned}$$

As a result, the general equilibrium effects on the goods markets yield the following change in prices:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \left[ (\theta + \delta^{y,p}) \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{T} \odot v^y (1 + \delta^{y,p}) - (\theta - 1)(\mathbf{TS}) + \mathbf{T} \odot (v^{ef} \odot \beta^{e,d,f} + v^{ex} \odot \frac{1}{\nu^f}) \right] d \ln p = \left[ (\mathbf{T} \odot v^y - \mathbf{I}) \delta^{y,z} - \mathbf{T} v^{ef} \beta^{e,d,f} \right] d \ln \mathcal{D}_i^y \\
& \quad + \left[ -(\mathbf{T} \odot v^y - \mathbf{I}) \delta^{y,qf} + \mathbf{T} \odot (v^{ex} \frac{1}{\nu^f} - v^{ef} \beta_{f,f}^{e,q} + v^{ne}) \right] d \ln q^f \\
& \quad + \left[ -\mathbf{T} \odot v^{ef} ((-\beta_{f,f}^{e,q} \xi^f + \beta_{f,c}^{e,t} \xi^c)) - (\mathbf{T} \odot v^y - \mathbf{I}) \delta^{y,t\varepsilon} \right] J dt^\varepsilon \\
& \quad + \left[ \mathbf{T} \odot v^{ef} \beta_{f,r}^{e,t} + (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{T} \odot v^y) \delta^{y,s\varepsilon} \right] J ds^\varepsilon \\
& \quad + \theta (\mathbf{T}(\mathbf{S} \odot \mathbf{J} \odot dt^b) \mathbf{1} - \text{diag}[\mathbf{T}(\mathbf{1} + \mathbf{S}') \odot (\mathbf{J} \odot dt^b)'])
\end{aligned} \tag{29}$$

Again, this compile all the different channels of transmissions that arise in our model. For example, taking the parameter for the carbon tax  $t^\varepsilon$  we see that it changes the price in multiple ways: (i) first, it lowers the oil-gas expenditure for country  $k$ , by a factor  $\beta_{f,f}^{e,q} \xi^f$ , (ii) however, it increases the oil-gas bill as a substitution away from coal  $\beta_{f,c}^{e,t} \xi^c$ . In addition, (iii) taxing carbon reduces output by a factor  $\delta^{y,t\varepsilon}$ , which then reduces the revenues in net by a factor  $(\mathbf{T} \odot v^y - \mathbf{I})$ .

## B.9 Back to welfare and climate damage

From the budget/consumption expenditure, we saw that welfare is written as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{d\mathcal{M}_i}{u'(c_i)c_i} &= (d \ln c_i + d \ln \mathcal{D}_i^u) \\
\frac{d\mathcal{M}_i}{u'(c_i)c_i} &= \left[ \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} - \sum_\ell \frac{1}{\nu_i^\ell} \frac{\eta_i^{\pi\ell}}{\eta_i^c} \right] \frac{dp_i}{p_i} + \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} d \ln \mathcal{D}_i^y + \sum_\ell \left[ \frac{\eta_i^{\pi\ell}}{\eta_i^c} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\nu_i^\ell} \right) - \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} s_i^e s_i^\ell \right] \frac{dq^\ell}{q^\ell} - \frac{d\Pi_i}{\Pi_i} + \frac{d\tilde{l}_i^s}{x_i} + d \ln \mathcal{D}_i^u
\end{aligned}$$

with the damage

$$d \ln \mathcal{D}_i^y = -\bar{\gamma}_i^y (s^{f/E} d \ln E^f + s^{c/E} d \ln E^c)$$

and similarly with  $\bar{\gamma}_i^u$  for  $\mathcal{D}_i^u$

The oil-gas energy price is central for summarizing all the general equilibrium forces for fossil-fuel demand. As a result, since the aggregate supply curve for oil and gas is upward sloping, a higher price implies a higher demand, and hence higher quantity consumed and greenhouse gas

emitted.

$$\begin{aligned} d \ln q^f &= \frac{\bar{\nu}}{1+\bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f J_i [-\xi^f \gamma_{f,f,i}^{e,q} + \xi^c \gamma_{f,c,i}^{e,t}] d \ln t^\varepsilon + \frac{\bar{\nu}}{1+\bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \gamma_{f,r,i}^{e,t} J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon \\ &\quad + \frac{\bar{\nu}}{1+\bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f \gamma_i^{e,d,f} d \ln D_i + \frac{\bar{\nu}}{1+\bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i [\lambda_i^f \gamma_i^{e,p,f} + \lambda_i^x \frac{\bar{\nu}}{\nu_i}] d \ln p_i \\ d \ln E^f &= \frac{1}{\bar{\nu}} [d \ln q^f - \sum_i \lambda_i^x \frac{\bar{\nu}}{\nu_i} d \ln p_i] \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, for total coal consumption, we can aggregate, with weights  $\lambda_i^c = \frac{P_i e_i^c}{E_i^c}$

$$\begin{aligned} d \ln E^c &= \sum_i \lambda_i^c d \ln e_i^c = \sum_i \lambda_i^c [-\beta_{c,c,i}^{e,t} \xi^c + \beta_i^{e,b,c} (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f \xi^f] J_i d \ln t^\varepsilon - \sum_i \lambda_i^c \beta_{c,r,i}^{e,t} J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon + \sum_i \beta_i^{e,p,c} d \ln p_i \\ &\quad + \sum_i \lambda_i^c \beta_i^{e,b,c} \left[ (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f d \ln q^f + \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} d \ln D_i \right] \end{aligned}$$

As a result, we can write damage depending on a complicated combination of supply and demand effects:

$$\begin{aligned} d \ln D_i^y &= -\bar{\gamma}_i^y (s^{f/E} d \ln E^f + s^{c/E} d \ln E^c) \\ &= -\bar{\gamma}_i^y \left\{ \frac{s^{f/E}}{1+\bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \lambda_i^f [-\xi^f \gamma_{f,f,i}^{e,q} + \xi^c \gamma_{f,c,i}^{e,t}] J_i + s^{c/E} \sum_i \lambda_i^c [-\beta_{c,c,i}^{e,t} \xi^c + \beta_i^{e,b,c} (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f \xi^f] J_i \right\} d \ln t^\varepsilon \\ &\quad - \bar{\gamma}_i^y \sum_i \left\{ \frac{s^{f/E}}{1+\bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \lambda_i^f \gamma_{f,r,i}^{e,t} + s^{c/E} \lambda_i^c \beta_{c,r,i}^{e,t} \right\} J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon \\ &\quad - \bar{\gamma}_i^y \sum_i \left\{ \frac{s^{f/E}}{1+\bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \lambda_i^f \gamma_i^{e,d,f} + s^{c/E} \lambda_i^c \beta_i^{e,b,c} \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} \right\} d \ln D_i^y + s^{c/E} \sum_i \lambda_i^c \beta_i^{e,b,c} (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f d \ln q^f \\ &\quad - \bar{\gamma}_i^y \sum_i \left\{ \frac{s^{f/E}}{1+\bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} [\lambda_i^f \gamma_i^{e,p,f} - \bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f} \lambda_i^x \frac{\bar{\nu}}{\nu_i}] + s^{c/E} \lambda_i^c \beta_i^{e,p,c} \right\} d \ln p_i \end{aligned}$$

with  $\tilde{\lambda}_i^f = \lambda_i^f + \lambda_i^c \beta_i^{e,b,c} (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f \bar{\nu} \frac{s^{c/E}}{s^{f/E}}$ , we can rewrite without the price of oil-gas  $q^f$

$$\begin{aligned} d \ln D_i^y &= -\bar{\gamma}_i^y (s^{f/E} d \ln E^f + s^{c/E} d \ln E^c) \\ \left[ 1 + \bar{\gamma}_i^y \sum_i \left\{ \frac{s^{f/E}}{1+\bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \tilde{\lambda}_i^f \gamma_i^{e,d,f} + s^{c/E} \lambda_i^c \beta_i^{e,b,c} \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s^e} \right\} \right] d \ln D_i^y &= \\ &- \bar{\gamma}_i^y \left\{ \frac{s^{f/E}}{1+\bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \sum_i \tilde{\lambda}_i^f [-\xi^f \gamma_{f,f,i}^{e,q} + \xi^c \gamma_{f,c,i}^{e,t}] J_i + s^{c/E} \sum_i \lambda_i^c [-\beta_{c,c,i}^{e,t} \xi^c + \beta_i^{e,b,c} (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}) s_i^f \xi^f] J_i \right\} d \ln t^\varepsilon \\ &- \bar{\gamma}_i^y \sum_i \left\{ \frac{s^{f/E}}{1+\bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} \tilde{\lambda}_i^f \gamma_{f,r,i}^{e,t} + s^{c/E} \lambda_i^c \beta_{c,r,i}^{e,t} \right\} J_i d \ln s_i^\varepsilon \\ &- \bar{\gamma}_i^y \sum_i \left\{ \frac{s^{f/E}}{1+\bar{\nu}\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f}} [\lambda_i^f \gamma_i^{e,p,f} - \bar{\nu} \bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f} \lambda_i^x \frac{\bar{\nu}}{\nu_i}] + s^{c/E} \left( \lambda_i^c \beta_i^{e,p,c} + \left( \sum_k \beta_k^{e,b,c} (\sigma^e - \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_k^e}) s_k^f \right) \lambda_i^x \frac{\bar{\nu}}{\nu_i} \right) \right\} d \ln p_i \end{aligned}$$

Damages change with the aggregate consumption of oil, gas, and coal, which each depends on various general equilibrium effects. The carbon tax and renewable subsidies create substitution

effects away from fossil and towards renewable. Moreover, the price level  $p_i$  increases the terms of trade for countries that consume oil-gas, and reduces production for exporters, which then affects the equilibrium prices of oil. All these effects are accounted for in this formula, which then enter in the welfare calibration above.

## B.10 Further simplification

To simplify the welfare formula even further, in the following we consider that energy is only composed of oil-gas. In practice, oil and gas compose the largest share of energy, with oil representing close to 35% of energy use and natural gas close to 20% at the world level.

We consider that  $s_i^f = 1$  and  $s_i^r = s_i^c = 0$  in all the formulas above.

This assumption simplify our setting dramatically. The previous welfare decomposition reduces to :

$$\frac{dU_i}{u'(c_i)c_i} = \frac{dc_i}{c_i} = \left[ \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} - \frac{\eta_i^\pi}{\eta_i^c} \frac{1}{\nu_i} \right] \frac{dp_i}{p_i} + \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} \frac{dD_i}{D_i} - \frac{\eta_i^y}{\eta_i^c} s_i^e \frac{dq^f}{q^f} + \frac{\eta_i^\pi}{\eta_i^c} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\nu} \right) \frac{dq^f}{q^f} - \frac{dP_i}{P_i} + \frac{dt_i^{ls}}{x_i}$$

where the damage rewrite:

$$d\ln D_i = -\bar{\gamma}_i d\ln E^f$$

with the average damage is defined as  $\bar{\gamma} = \sum_i \bar{\gamma}_i$ . And the oil-gas demand curve write:

$$\begin{aligned} d\ln E^f &= \sum_i \lambda_i^f d\ln e_i^f \\ &= - \sum_i \lambda_i^f \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} [d\ln q^f + J_i d\ln t^e] + \sum_i \lambda_i^f \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d\ln D_i + \sum_i \lambda_i^f \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e} d\ln p_i \\ &= - \sum_i \tilde{\lambda}_i^f [d\ln q^f + J_i d\ln t^e] + \sum_i \tilde{\lambda}_i^f d\ln D_i + \sum_i \tilde{\lambda}_i^f d\ln p_i \end{aligned}$$

where, to simplify notations, we denote  $\tilde{\lambda}_i^f = \lambda_i^f \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}$ , and it's average  $\bar{\lambda}^{\sigma,f} = \sum_i \tilde{\lambda}_i^f \frac{\sigma^y}{1-s_i^e}$ . As a result, the demand now rewrites:

$$d\ln E^f = \frac{1}{1+\bar{\gamma} + \text{Cov}_i(\tilde{\lambda}_i^f, \bar{\gamma}_i)} \left[ - \sum_i \tilde{\lambda}_i^f [d\ln q^f + J_i d\ln t^e] + \sum_i \tilde{\lambda}_i^f d\ln p_i \right]$$

We can see that the energy demand curve is affected by climate change: more emission imply larger damage, which in turn reduce energy demand and hence emissions. Moreover, the covariance term indicates that if the large energy producers (with a larger share of the market, and high elasticity  $\sigma$ ) are also the most affected by climate change, this effect is stronger and the demand curve is even steeper / more inelastic.