

Light-face games and their strategies

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1: a light-face coanalytic game

Here is a Π_1^1 game. The players write, respectively and bitwise, α and ε in \mathcal{N} ; then

Rule: II wins if $\alpha \notin \text{WORD}$ or if ε codes a subset R of $\omega \times \omega$ such that $M_\varepsilon =_{\text{df}} (\omega, R)$ forms an ill-founded ω -model of KPL with $|\alpha| \cong$ some ordinal of M .

THEOREM *No winning strategy for this game can lie in any set-generic extension of L .*

For one direction we use a classical argument of Solovay (1967):

1.0 **PROPOSITION** *There is no winning strategy for the first player in our game.*

Proof: let σ be such. By the boundedness theorem, the ordinals of the form $|\sigma \star [\varepsilon]|$ are bounded by some countable ordinal, θ say; let α code θ and by Gandy find M with $\text{sto}(M) = \theta^+$, the first admissible ordinal strictly greater than θ . \dashv (1.0)

For the other direction we shall use a diagonal argument.

Some remarks on ω models

Let M be a model of some reasonable but possibly weak set theory, for example, Kripke–Platek with the axiom of infinity. Some of the “ordinals” of M will be well-founded and therefore isomorphic to von Neumann ordinals. These “ordinals” will be called *standard*. We write $\text{sto}(M)$ for the supremum of the von Neumann ordinals isomorphic to “ordinals” of M .

We suppose that M can define the rank of its members, and we write $\text{stp}(M)$ for the *standard part* of M , the transitive set isomorphic to the set of members of M whose rank, computed in M , is standard.

An ω -model means one with standard integers; equivalently, an M with $\text{sto}(M) > \omega$. In the coding of ω -models, we require each $k \in \omega$ to be represented by $2k$ in the model. We shall use the following notation: if x is in the transitive set isomorphic to the standard part of M we shall write $\lfloor x \rfloor$ for the integer that represents x in M . Conversely, if k is an integer, we write $\lceil k \rceil$ to indicate the object that it represents in M , or in the collapsed well-founded part of M : this second definition is more a reminder to the reader than a mathematical definition. Thus $2k = \lfloor k \rfloor$, and $\lceil 2k \rceil = k$.

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Here is an easy instance of the diagonal argument to be applied.

1.1 PROPOSITION ε cannot be in the standard part of the model it codes, provided the set of reals represented in that model is downwards closed under “recursive in”.

Proof: let $X = \{k \mid \varepsilon \text{ says } \ulcorner 2k \urcorner \text{ is not in } \ulcorner k \urcorner\}$. If X were in the model, represented by ℓ say, we would have a classical paradox by considering whether ℓ is in X or not:

$$\begin{aligned} \ell \notin X &\iff \varepsilon \text{ says } \ulcorner 2\ell \urcorner \text{ is not in } \ulcorner \ell \urcorner \\ &\iff \ell \in X. \end{aligned}$$

So X cannot be in the model, but it is recursive in ε , so ε cannot be, either. \neg (1.1)

1.2 PROPOSITION There is no winning strategy for the second player in $L[G]$, where G is an L -generic for some notion of forcing which is a set in L .

Proof: We suppose otherwise, and derive a contradiction. Note that by Shoenfield, once a strategy τ has come into being it remains a winning strategy in each further expansion of the universe. Thus we may simplify the picture by using the universal properties of the collapsing algebras to find a regular uncountable cardinal θ of L and G a generic for $\text{Coll}(\omega, \theta)$ such that there is a winning strategy $\tau \in L_\theta[H]$ for the second player.

We write η for θ^+ , the next admissible ordinal after θ .

We work in the model $L_\eta[G]$. Since the Lévy partial ordering $\text{coll}(\omega, \theta)$, which we shall denote by \mathbb{P} , is a member of L_η , $L_\eta[G]$ is admissible. Note that there is in $L_\eta[G]$ an α coding θ . We play that α against τ , obtaining $\varepsilon = [\alpha] \star \tau$. Write M for the model coded by ε . Note that $\text{sto}(M)$ will be exactly η , by M^{lle} Ville’s Lemma that $\text{stp}(M)$ is admissible.

Thus M has standard part including (but not necessarily equalling) L_η , and so \mathbb{P} is represented in M , by $\ulcorner \mathbb{P} \urcorner$, and we may therefore contemplate forcing over M with these conditions.

We take Shoenfield’s approach to forcing in which to each member x of the ground model is associated a constant, \underline{x} , of the forcing language, to be used as a name for some object in the generic extension. The inclusion of the ground model, here M , in the extension is achieved by defining for each member m of M a forcing-name \hat{m} , (“ m -hat”), also in M ; for each $(M, \ulcorner \mathbb{P} \urcorner)$ -generic H , $\text{val}_H(\hat{m})$ “equals” m , where val_H is the evaluation of forcing names defined by the generic H .

We shall form a subset X of ω , which, we shall see, both is and cannot be a member of $L_\eta[G]$.

First, given $k \in \omega$ we form the sentence φ_k of the forcing language (for $\ulcorner \mathbb{P} \urcorner$) inside M which says that the hat of the object $2k$ (representing k in the coding ε) is a member of

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the object in the forcing extension named in M by the object represented in M by k (in the coding ε). Thus φ_k is the sentence which says

$$“\neg(\widehat{\ulcorner 2k \urcorner} \in \ulcorner k \urcorner)”$$

The map $k \mapsto \varphi_k$ is $\Delta_1^1(\varepsilon)$ and therefore is in $L_\eta[G]$.

We ask whether there is some p in G such that in M the corresponding object $\ulcorner p \urcorner$ forces φ_k : if so, we place k in X ; otherwise we exclude it. Thus

$$X =_{\text{df}} \{k \in \omega \mid \exists p: \in G \ M \models \ulcorner p \urcorner \Vdash^{\ulcorner \mathbb{P} \urcorner} \varphi_k\}$$

The map $\pi : \mathbb{P} \longrightarrow \omega$ given by $\pi(p) = \ulcorner p \urcorner$ is in $L_\eta[G]$. Note further that we run the definition of forcing in M and do not attempt to restrict it to the standard part of M . Therefore X is a Δ_1 subset of ω , in the parameters G , π , ε and the integer $\ulcorner \mathbb{P} \urcorner$, and is therefore in $L_\eta[G]$. Hence there is a $t \in L_\eta$, such that $X = \text{val}_G(t)$. Let the integer ℓ represent t in the coding of M by ε .

We ask if ℓ is in X : and we shall reach a contradiction, for

$$\begin{aligned} \ell \text{ is not in } X &\iff \exists p: \in G \ p \Vdash^{\mathbb{P}} \neg(\widehat{\ell} \in \underline{t}) \\ &\iff \exists p: \in G \ M \models \ulcorner p \urcorner \Vdash^{\ulcorner \mathbb{P} \urcorner} \neg(\widehat{\ulcorner 2\ell \urcorner} \in \ulcorner \ell \urcorner) \\ &\iff \exists p: \in G \ M \models \ulcorner p \urcorner \Vdash^{\ulcorner \mathbb{P} \urcorner} \varphi_\ell \\ &\iff \ell \text{ is in } X \text{ after all.} \end{aligned}$$

The transition from forcing with \mathbb{P} in L_η to forcing with its representative in M relies on the fact that forcing a simple sentence such as φ_k is local to a bounded transitive subset of its standard part. ¬ (1.2)

1.3 PROBLEM Does the existence of a winning strategy for this game imply the existence of 0^\sharp ? or even that ω_1^L is countable ?

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