CS631 - Advanced Programming in the UNIX Environment

Advanced I/O / Encryption in a Nutshell

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Recall from our lecture on signals that certain system calls can block forever:

- read(2) from a particular file, if data isn't present (pipes, terminals, network devices)
- write(2) to the same kind of file
- open(2) of a particular file until a specific condition occurs
- read(2) and write(2) of files that have mandatory locking enabled
- certain ioctls(2)
- some IPC functions (such as sendto(2) or recv(2))

See eintr.c from that lecture.

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Nonblocking I/O lets us issue an I/O operation and not have it block forever. If the operation cannot be completed, return is made immediately with an error noting that the operating would have blocked (EWOULDBLOCK or EAGAIN).

Ways to specify nonblocking mode:

pass 0_NONBLOCK to open(2):

```
open(path, O_RDRW|O_NONBLOCK);
```

set 0_NONBLOCK via fcnt1(2):

```
flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags|O_NONBLOCK);
```

```
$ cc -Wall nonblock.c -o block
$ cc -DNONBLOCK -Wall nonblock.c -o nonblock
$ ./nonblock >/dev/null
wrote 100000 bytes
[...]
$ ./block | ( sleep 3; cat >/dev/null )
[...]
$ ./nonblock | ( sleep 3; cat >/dev/null )
[...]
$ ( ./nonblock | cat >/dev/null ) 2>&1 | more
[...]
$ nc -1 8080 >/dev/null &
$ ./nonblock | nc hostname 8080
[...]
```

Resource Locking

Ways we have learned so far to ensure only one process has exclusive access to a resource:

- open file using O_CREAT | O_EXCL, then immediately unlink(2) it
- create a "lockfile" if file exists, somebody else is using the resource
- use of a semaphore

What are some problems with each of these?

Advisory Locking

```
#include <fcntl.h>
int flock(int fd,int operation);

Returns: 0 if OK, -1 otherwise
```

- applies or removes an advisory lock on the file associated with the file descriptor fd
- operation can be LOCK_NB and any one of:
 - LOCK_SH
 - LOCK_EX
 - LOCK_UN
- locks entire file

Advisory Locking

```
$ cc -Wall flock.c
1$ ./a.out
Shared lock established - sleeping for 10 seconds.
[...]
Giving up all locks.
2$ ./a.out
Shared lock established - sleeping for 10 seconds.
Now trying to get an exclusive lock.
Unable to get an exclusive lock.
[...]
Exclusive lock established.
1$ ./a.out
[blocks until the other process terminates]
```

Advisory "Record" Locking

Record locking is done using fcnt1(2), using one of F_GETLK, F_SETLK or F_SETLKW and passing a

Lock types are:

- F_RDLCK Non-exclusive (read) lock; fails if write lock exists.
- F_WRLCK Exclusive (write) lock; fails if any lock exists.
- F_UNLCK Releases our lock on specified range.

Advisory "Record" locking

value can be:

- F_ULOCK unlock locked sections
- F_LOCK lock a section for exclusive use
- F_TLOCK test and lock a section for exclusive use
- F_TEST test a section for locks by other processes

	Request for				
	read lock	write lock			
no locks	OK	OK			
one or more read locks	OK	denied			
one write lock	denied	denied			

Region currently has


Advisory "Record" locking

Locks are:

- released if a process terminates
- released if a filedescriptor is closed (!)
- not inherited across fork(2)
- inherited across exec(2)
- released upon exec(2) if close-on-exec is set

Advisory "Record" locking

Locks are associated with a *file and process pair*, not with a *filedescriptor*!



Mandatory locking

- not implemented on all UNIX flavors
 - chmod g+s,g-x file
- possible to be circumvented:

```
$ mandatory-lock /tmp/file &
```

- \$ echo foo > /tmp/file2
- \$ rm /tmp/file
- \$ mv /tmp/file2 /tmp/file

Asynchronous I/O

- System V derived async I/O
 - limited to STREAMS
 - enabled via ioct1(2)
 - uses SIGPOLL
- BSD derived async I/O
 - limited to terminals and networks
 - enabled via fcntl(2) (O_ASYNC, F_SETOWN)
 - uses SIGIO and SIGURG

Mentioned here for completeness's sake only. See aio(7) for an example of POSIX AIO.

```
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>

void *mmap(void *addr, size_t len, int prot, int flags, int fd, off_t offset);

Returns: pointer to mapped region if OK
```


Protection specified for a region:

- PROT_READ region can be read
- PROT_WRITE region can be written
- PROT_EXEC region can be executed
- PROT_NONE region can not be accessed

flag needs to be one of

- MAP SHARED
- MAP_PRIVATE
- MAP_COPY

which may be OR'd with other flags (see mmap(2) for details).



Operation	Linux 2.4.22 (Intel x86)			Solaris 9 (SPARC)		
	User	System	Clock	User	System	Clock
read/write	0.04	1.02	39.76	0.18	9.70	41.66
mmap/memcpy	0.64	1.31	24.26	1.68	7.94	28.53

Exercise: write a program that benchmarks this performance and run it on the systems you have access to.

http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/bin/cp/utils.c?rev=HEAD

Hooray!

5 Minute Break

Cryptography


Cryptography can provide "security" in the areas of:

- Authenticity
 - Is the party I'm talking to actually who I think it is?
- Accuracy or Integrity
 - Is the message I received in fact what was sent?
- Secrecy or Confidentiality
 - Did/could anybody else see (parts of) the message?

Secrecy: Make sure that the data can only be read by those intended.

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- Alice and Bob agree on a way to transform data
- transformed data is sent over insecure channel
- Alice and Bob are able to get data out of the transformation




Different approaches:

- public key cryptography
- secret key cryptography


Different approaches:

- public key cryptography (example: RSA, your ssh keys)
 - Alice has a private and a public key
 - data encrypted with her private key can only be decrypted by her public key and vice versa
 - public key can be shared with Bob



Different approaches:

- secret key cryptography (example: AES)
 - Alice and Bob share a secret key
 - for authentication purposes, Alice may prove to Bob that he knows the secret key
 - any data encrypted with this key can also be decrypted using the same key




Cipher Modes

Encryption entails transformation of input data ("plain" or "clear" text) into encrypted output data ("ciphertext"). Input data is generally transformed in one of two ways:


Stream Cipher: each bit on plaintext is combined with a pseudo-random cipher digit stream (or keystream)

Block Cipher: fixed-length blocks of plaintext are transformed into same-sized blocks of ciphertext; may require padding

Electronic Codebook Mode




Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption




Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode decryption


Electronic Codebook Mode



Cipher Block Chaining



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

Random String generation

Random numbers can be generated using /dev/random, /dev/urandom, rand(3), random(3), BN_rand(3) etc.

Map numbers to printable characters (for use as a salt, for example):

Practical AES

- a symmetric block cipher
- variable key length
- consists of a key setup phase and the actual encryption or decryption
- keying material use of ivec, which needs to be shared
- useful code examples in EVP_EncryptInit(3)

HW#4

https://www.cs.stevens.edu/~jschauma/631/f16-hw4.html

aed - perform aes256cbc encryption/decryption

aed reads data from stdin and either encrypts or decrypts it using AES 256bit CBC mode with a SHA1 digest with keying material derived from the passphrase using the EVP_BytesToKey(3) function, generating a suitable salt via RAND_bytes(3).

aed reads the password from which to derive the key material from the AED PASS environment variable.

Output is written to stdout.

When encrypting, the output is prefixed by the string "Salted__", followed by the 8 byte salt.

HW#4

https://www.cs.stevens.edu/~jschauma/631/f16-hw4.html

To encrypt the contents of the file file and storing the encrypted output in file.enc:

To decrypt the contents of that file again:

Since aed operates on stdin and stdout, the above two commands could also be chained:

References

- crypto(3)
- EVP_EncryptInit(3)
- EVP_BytesToKey(3)
- http://tldp.org/LDP/LG/issue87/vinayak.html
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cipher_Block_Chaining
- http://www.moserware.com/2009/09/stick-figure-guide-to-advanced.html