$ECO 2020\ Microeconomic\ Theory\ I\ (PhD)$ Individual Decision Making, Market Equilibrium, Market Failure, and Other Topics.

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- GitHub: https://github.com/TianyuDu/Spikey_UofT_Notes
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1 Chapter 1. Preference and Choice

1.1 Preference Relations

Definition 1.1.

(i) The **strict preference** relation, \succ , is defined by

$$x \succ y \iff x \succsim y \land \neg(y \succsim x) \tag{1.1}$$

(ii) The **indifference** relation, \sim , is defined by

$$x \sim y \iff x \succsim y \land y \succsim x \tag{1.2}$$

Definition 1.2 (1.B.1). The preference relation \succeq is **rational** if it possesses the following two properties

(i) Completeness

$$\forall x, y \in X, \ x \succsim y \lor y \succsim x \tag{1.3}$$

(ii) Transitivity

$$\forall x, y, z \in X, \ x \succsim y \land y \succsim z \implies x \succsim z \tag{1.4}$$

Proposition 1.1 (1.B.1). If \succeq is rational, then

- (i) \succ is both **reflexive** $(\neg x \succ x)$ and **transitive** $(x \succ y \land y \succ z \implies x \succ z)$;
- (ii) \sim is both **reflexive** and **transitive**;
- (iii) $x \succ y \succsim z \implies x \succ z$.

Example 1.1. Typical scenarios when transitivity of preference is violated:

- (i) Just perceptible differences;
- (ii) Framing problem;
- (iii) Observed preference might from the result of the interaction of several more primitive rational preferences (Condorcet paradox);
- (iv) Change of tastes.

Definition 1.3 (1.B.2). A function $u: X \to \mathbb{R}$ is a utility function representing preference relation \succeq if

$$\forall x, y \in X, \ x \succsim y \iff u(x) \ge u(y) \tag{1.5}$$

Proposition 1.2 (1.B.2). If a preference relation \succeq can be represented by a utility function, then \succeq is rational.

1.2 Choice Rules

Definition 1.4. A choice structure, $(\mathcal{B}, C(\cdot))$, is a tuple consists of

- (i) The collection of **budget sets** \mathcal{B} , which is a set of nonempty subsets of X.
- (ii) The **choice rule**, $C(B) \subset B$, is a *correspondence* for every $B \subset \mathcal{B}$ denotes the individual's choice from among the alternatives in B. If C(B) is not a singleton, it can be interpreted as the *acceptable alternatives* in B, which the individual would actually chosen if the decision-making process is run repeatedly.

Definition 1.5 (1.C.1). The choice structure $(\mathcal{B}, C(\cdot))$ satisfies the **weak axiom of revealed preference** if

$$\left(\underbrace{\exists B \in \mathscr{B} \ s.t. \ x, y \in B \land x \in C(B)}_{x \succsim y \text{ revealed.}}\right) \implies \left(\forall B' \in \mathscr{B} \ s.t. \ x, y \in B', \ y \in C(B') \implies x \in C(B')\right)$$
(1.6)

Definition 1.6. Given a choice structure $(\mathcal{B}, C(\cdot))$, the **revealed preference relation** \succeq^* is defined as

$$x \succsim^* y \iff \exists B \in \mathscr{B} \ s.t. \ x, y \in B \land x \in C(B) \tag{1.7}$$

Remark 1.1 (Interpretation on the definition of WARP). If x is revealed at least as good as y, then y cannot be revealed preferred to x.

1.3 The Relationship between Preference Relations and Choice Rules

Definition 1.7. Given rational preference relation \succeq on X, the **preference-maximizing choice rule** is defined as

$$C^*(B, \succeq) := \{ x \in B : x \succeq y \ \forall y \in B \} \ \forall B \in \mathscr{B}$$
 (1.8)

We say the rational preference relation **generates** the choice structure $(\mathcal{B}, C^*(\cdot, \succeq))$.

Assumption 1.1. Assume $C^*(B, \succeq) \neq \emptyset$ for all $B \in \mathscr{B}$.

Proposition 1.3 (1.D.1 (Rational \to WARP)). Suppose that \succeq is a <u>rational</u> preference relation. Then the choice structure generated by \succeq , $(\mathscr{B}, C^*(\cdot, \succeq))$, satisfies the weak axiom.

Definition 1.8 (1.D.1). Given choice structure $(\mathcal{B}, C(\cdot))$, we say that the <u>rational preference relation</u> \succeq **rationalizes** $C(\cdot)$ relative to \mathcal{B} if

$$C(B) = C^*(B, \succeq) \ \forall B \in \mathscr{B} \tag{1.9}$$

That is, \succeq generates the choice structure $(\mathcal{B}, C(\cdot))$.

Remark 1.2. In general, for a given choice structure $(\mathcal{B}, C(\cdot))$, there may be more than one rational preference relation \succeq rationalizing it.

Proposition 1.4 (1.D.2 (WARP \rightarrow Rational)). If $(\mathcal{B}, C(\cdot))$ is a choice structure such that

- (i) The weak axiom is satisfied:
- (ii) \mathcal{B} includes all subsets of X up to three elements.

Then there is a rational preference relation \succeq that rationalizes $C(\cdot)$ relative to \mathscr{B} .

2 Chapter 2. Consumer Choice

2.1 Commodities

Definition 2.1. Assume the number of **commodities** is finite and equal to L. In general, a **commodity vector** or **commodity bundle** is an element in a **commodity space**, typically \mathbb{R}^L .