



**BRNO UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY**

VYSOKÉ UČENÍ TECHNICKÉ V BRNĚ

**FACULTY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY**

FAKULTA INFORMAČNÍCH TECHNOLOGIÍ

**DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER GRAPHICS AND MULTIMEDIA**

ÚSTAV POČÍTAČOVÉ GRAFIKY A MULTIMÉDIÍ

**PORTING TANG TO OPENWRT**

PORTOVANIE TANG NA OPENWRT

**BACHELOR'S THESIS**

BAKALÁŘSKÁ PRÁCE

**AUTHOR**

AUTOR PRÁCE

**TIBOR DUDLÁK**

**SUPERVISOR**

VEDOUCÍ PRÁCE

**Ing. ONDREJ LICHTNER**

**BRNO 2018**

## Abstract

This thesis describes the encryption and its application to secure the computer's hard drive. It describes the structure of the encrypted disk's partition according to the LUKS specification on Linux operating systems. The thesis focus on describing possibilities of automating the disk decryption process using an external server that enters the process as a third party. It describes the principles of Key Escrow and Tang server. Steps required to compile and configure the Tang server are described too. Also described is Tang server's client – Clevis. The main objective of this work was to port and document the process of porting the Tang server and its dependencies to OpenWrt system, described in this thesis too, which is designed for embedded devices such as WiFi routers. The thesis also includes a documented process of contributing changes and newly created OpenWrt packages to corresponding Open Source projects.

## Abstrakt

Hlavným cieľom tejto práce je sprístupnenie serveru Tang na vstavané zariadenia typu WiFi smerovač s plne modulárnym operačným systémom OpenWrt. Tým dosiahneme anonymnú správu šifrovacích kľúčov pre domáce siete a siete malých firiem. Preto táto práca popisuje problematiku šifrovania a jeho využitie na zabezpečenie pevného disku počítača. Oboznámuje čitateľa so štruktúrou šifrovaného diskového oddielu podľa LUKS špecifikácie na operačných systémoch typu Linux. Práca rozoberá možnosti automatizácie odomykania šifrovaných diskov použitím externého servera, ktorý vstupuje do procesu ako tretia strana. Sú v nej popísané princípy serverov Key Escrow a Tang. Dosiahnutie hlavného cieľa je možné vďaka procesu portovania a cross-kompilácie na platforme Linux. Práca obsahuje zdokumentovaný postup prispievania zmien a novo vytvorených balíkov pre OpenWrt do príslušných Open Source projektov.

## Keywords

porting, Tang, server, Clevis, client, Escrow, OpenWrt, operating system, embedded device, encryption, LUKS, hard drive, disk partition, encryption key, automation, cross-compiling, package system

## Kľúčové slová

portovanie, Tang, server, Clevis, klient, Escrow, OpenWrt, operačný systém, vstavané zariadenie, šifrovanie, LUKS, pevný disk, diskový oddiel, šifrovací kľúč, automatizácia, cross-kompilácia, balíkový systém

## Reference

DUDLÁK, Tibor. *Porting Tang to OpenWRT*. Brno, 2018. Bachelor's thesis. Brno University of Technology, Faculty of Information Technology. Supervisor Ing. Ondrej Lichtner

# Porting Tang to OpenWRT

## Declaration

Hereby I declare that this term project was prepared as an original author's work under the supervision of Ing. Ondrej Lichtner. The supplementary information was provided by Jan Pazdziora, Ph. D. All the relevant information sources, which were used during preparation of this thesis, are properly cited and included in the list of references.

.....

Tibor Dudlák

April 26, 2018

## Acknowledgements

V této sekci je možno uvést poděkování vedoucímu práce a těm, kteří poskytli odbornou pomoc (externí zadavatel, konzultant, apod.).

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>How we use Encryption</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1	Encryption and security . . . . .	5
2.2	Hard drive encryption . . . . .	6
2.2.1	Bit Locker . . . . .	7
2.2.2	LibreCrypt . . . . .	7
2.2.3	LUKS . . . . .	8
2.3	Disk encryption with LUKS . . . . .	8
2.3.1	Creating LUKS volume . . . . .	9
2.3.2	LUKS drive structure . . . . .	9
2.3.3	Managing LUKS volume . . . . .	10
2.3.4	LUKS security . . . . .	14
<b>3</b>	<b>Tang</b>	<b>16</b>
3.1	Key Escrow . . . . .	16
3.2	Tang - binding daemon . . . . .	17
3.3	Binding with Tang . . . . .	18
3.4	Provisioning . . . . .	18
3.5	Recovery . . . . .	19
3.6	Security . . . . .	19
3.6.1	Man-in-the-Middle attack . . . . .	19
3.6.2	Compromise the client to gain access to cJWK . . . . .	20
3.6.3	Compromise the server to gain access to sJWK's private key . . . . .	20
3.7	Building Tang . . . . .	20
3.8	Server enablement . . . . .	20
3.9	Clevis client . . . . .	21
3.9.1	PIN: Tang . . . . .	21
3.9.2	PIN: HTTP . . . . .	21
3.9.3	PIN: SSS - Shamir Secret Sharing . . . . .	21
3.9.4	Binding LUKS volumes . . . . .	22
3.9.5	Dracut . . . . .	22
3.9.6	UDisks2 . . . . .	22
<b>4</b>	<b>Software portability</b>	<b>23</b>
4.1	OpenWrt system . . . . .	24
4.1.1	OpenWrt and LEDE . . . . .	24
4.1.2	Why use OpenWrt . . . . .	25

4.2	OpenWrt's toolchain . . . . .	25
4.2.1	Compiler . . . . .	25
4.2.2	Linker . . . . .	26
4.2.3	C standard library . . . . .	27
4.3	OpenWrt's buildroot . . . . .	27
4.3.1	Buildroot prerequisites . . . . .	28
4.4	Prepare the enviroment . . . . .	28
4.4.1	Buildroot's dependencies . . . . .	29
4.4.2	Getting buildroot . . . . .	29
4.5	Working with buildroot . . . . .	29
<b>5</b>	<b>Porting the dependencies</b>	<b>32</b>
5.1	Find the dependencies . . . . .	33
5.2	Update outdated packages . . . . .	33
5.2.1	Update jansson . . . . .	34
5.2.2	Update http-parser . . . . .	35
5.3	Makefiles for OpenWrt's packages . . . . .	35
5.4	Create new packages . . . . .	36
5.4.1	Create José . . . . .	37
<b>6</b>	<b>Porting Tang</b>	<b>38</b>
6.1	Install dependencies . . . . .	38
6.2	Socket activation with xinetd . . . . .	39
6.2.1	How . . . . .	39
6.3	Cross-compile Tang . . . . .	40
6.3.1	Concealing http-parser . . . . .	41
6.3.2	Mysterious José . . . . .	42
6.4	Configure Tang with xinetd . . . . .	43
6.4.1	systemd . . . . .	43
6.4.2	. . . . .	43
<b>7</b>	<b>Tang on OpenWrt</b>	<b>44</b>
7.1	Configuration . . . . .	44
7.1.1	OPKG Package manager . . . . .	44
7.2	Limitations . . . . .	44
7.3	Contribute your work . . . . .	44
7.3.1	subsection name . . . . .	44
7.3.2	Follow contribution guide . . . . .	44
<b>8</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>45</b>
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>A</b>	<b>Disk content</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>Pre-istallation enablement of hard drive encryption</b>	<b>49</b>
B.1	Fedora 25 - disc encryption option selecting . . . . .	49
B.2	Fedora 25 - determination key encryption key . . . . .	50

<b>C</b>	<b>LUKS In-Place Encryption</b>	<b>51</b>
C.1	Step 1 - unmounting . . . . .	51
C.2	Step 2 - resizing . . . . .	51
C.3	Step 3 - encrypting . . . . .	52
C.4	Step 4 - adding key . . . . .	52

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

*We spend our time searching for  
security, and hate it when we get it.*

---

John Steinbeck[15]

Nowadays, the whole world uses information technologies to communicate and to spread knowledge in form of bits to the other people. But there are pieces of personal information such as photos from family vacation, videos of our children as they grow, contracts, testaments which we would like to protect.

*Encryption*, as described in chapter 2 How we use Encryption, protects our data and privacy even when we do not realize that. It provides process of transforming our information in such way that only trusted person or device can decrypt data and retrieve it. An unauthorized party might be able to access secured data but will not be able to read the information from it without the proper key. The most important thing is keeping the encryption key a secret.

With an increasing number of encryption keys to store and protect, there might be necessary to consider using Key management server. This server should provide a secure and persistent service to its clients. One of the possible solutions for persistent Key management is to deploy *Key Escrow* server described in section 3.1. Another solution is server *Tang*, which principles are mentioned in chapter 3 Tang server. Tang is completely anonymous key recovery service. In contrast to Key Escrow server, Tang does not know any key. It only provides mathematical operation for its clients to recover them.

The goal of this bachelor thesis is to port the *Tang* server, and its dependencies listed in section 3.7 to the OpenWrt system. *OpenWrt*, characterized in chapter 4.1 OpenWrt system, is Linux based operating system for *embedded* devices such as Wireless routers.

To achieve this goal ... [[thesis tour correct refs]]

With accomplishing thesis goal, we will be able to automatize process of unlocking encrypted drives on our private home or small office network, therefore securing our data stored on personal computer's hard drive and/or NAS (Network-attached storage) server if it is stolen. There will be no need for any decryption or even Key Escrow server but the *OpenWrt* device running the *Tang* server itself only.

## Chapter 2

# How we use Encryption

We may not realize this, but we use encryption every day. The purpose of encryption is to keep us safe when we are browsing the internet or just storing our sensitive information on digital media. In general encryption is used to secure our data, whether transmitted around the internet or stored on our hard drives, from being compromised. Encryption protects us from many threats.

It protects us from identity theft. Our personal information stored all over governmental authorities should be secured with it. Encryption takes care for not revealing sensitive information about ourselves, to protect our financial details, passwords along with others, mainly when we bank online from being defraud.

It looks after our conversation privacy. To be more specific, our cell phone conversations from eavesdroppers and our online chatting with acquaintances or colleagues. It also allows attorneys to communicate privately with their clients and it aims to secure communication between investigation bureaus to exchange sensitive information about lawbreakers.

If we encrypt our laptop or desktop computer's hard drive encryption protects our data in case the computer or hard drive is stolen.

### 2.1 Encryption and security

Security is not binary; it is a sliding scale of risk management. People are used to mark things, for example good and bad, expensive, and cheap. But we know that people may differ on image/sense. For example, there is no such thing as line or sign which tells us, this part of town is secure, and this is not. The way we reason about security is that we study environment entering or observing it, and we begin to decide whether it is secure or not. Especially at enterprise sector. Encryption, on its own, might not be enough to make our data or infrastructure secure but is definitely a critical aspect of security.

Companies define their own security strategies which may include encryption or not at all. Security strategies rely on company's needs or will to take risks in conclusion of getting high gain from them.

According to 2016 Global Encryption Trends Study, independently conducted by the Ponemon Institute, the enterprise-wide encryption in 5 years increased from 15 to 38 percent. Also the ratio of companies with no encryption strategy at all decreased from 37 to 15 percent. More than 50 percent companies are using extensively deployed encryption technologies to encrypt mostly databases, infrastructure and laptop hard drives [17].



Passwords are the most common authentication method used for accessing computer systems, files, data, and networks. It is important to keep changing them in reasonable time and as a secret to others. Still, no matter the company's security strategy, we keep seeing them on monitors or desktops written on sticky notes, and this is absolutely not secure. In fact, users are the most vulnerable part of securing our systems. To aid their memory, users often include part of a phone number, family name, Social Security number, or even birth date in their passwords [18]. They choose cryptographically weak passwords, dictionary words, which are easy to remember but also easy to guess or to break with brute-force attacks in short period of time. According to Splash Data, a supplier of security applications, the most common user selected password in the year 2016 was „123456“. They claim that people continue to put themselves at risk for hacking and identity theft by using weak, easily guessable passwords. To create strong password you can follow any trustworthy guide<sup>1</sup> on the Internet. More secure way to create passwords would be to generate cryptographically stronger cipher and use it as password. The only disadvantage is that it is hard to remember [14].

## 2.2 Hard drive encryption

It all starts, as mentioned, with desire to keep our data to ourselves and as a secret to others. More often than not, these secrets are stored on our hard drives.

Hard drive encryption is a technology provided by software performing sophisticated mathematical functions or hardware that encrypts the data stored on a hard drive or a disk volume. This technology is used to prevent unauthorized access by unauthorized persons or service to an encrypted data storage without possession of the appropriate key or password. Encrypting the hard drive means providing another layer of security against hackers and other online threats.

To protect secret data we usually encrypt this data by using an „encryption key“ - see Figure 2.1 Hard drive encryption in a nutshell. Every encryption key should be unpre-




Figure 2.1: Hard drive encryption in a nutshell

dictable and unique set of bits able to „scramble“ data in a way that it would be impossible to recover data without it. To satisfy this need, encryption keys are generated by specialized algorithms such as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard<sup>2</sup>) for symmetric keys and

<sup>1</sup><https://www.wikihow.com/Create-a-Secure-Password>

<sup>2</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symmetric-key\\_algorithm#Implementations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symmetric-key_algorithm#Implementations)

RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman<sup>3</sup>) for asymmetric. Changing encryption key implies the whole data decryption with old key and encryption with new encryption every time the old one is compromised or change is required. Also this secret data might grow in size, and it is time and resource consuming to decrypt and encrypt the volume or even the whole hard drive. Because of that the encryption key is then wrapped by the key encryption key.

Key encryption key is mostly generated using the user provided password. This key encryption key is then used to encrypt encryption key which does the actual data encryption. Again the most unsecure thing in this would be the user provided password which we can easily replace with using only cryptographically stronger key. This principle has at least two advantages. Changing the key encryption key does not affect encrypted data, and key can be changed whenever user desire to, and redistributed to all users or services who are supposed to access this data.

Hard drive could be encrypted as whole or per partition. Full disk encryption is done in a way that all content on hard drive except MBR(Master Boot Record) is encrypted. Encrypting MBR would make impossible to start boot sequence of the operating system. Boot sequence would prompt user for key encryption key in order to load operating system from encrypted storage.

This could disrupt our daily basis and might be the reason why most of us do not use hard drive encryption, even when we know it will protect our data. There is a way to automate hard drive unlocking on early boot with a help from key management system. We can get the key encryption key from some remote system, the Escrow server mentioned in section 3.1 Escrow server, or recover it with Tang described in chapter 3 Tang server. Before that, let us have a look on most common hard drive encryption implementations.

### 2.2.1 Bit Locker

BitLocker is a closed source full disk data protection feature that integrates with the operating system Windows Vista and later. It is designed to protect data by providing encryption for entire volumes and addresses the threats of data theft or exposure from lost, stolen, or inappropriately decommissioned computers. By default it uses the AES encryption algorithm in cipher block chaining (CBC) or XTS mode with a 128-bit or 256-bit key. CBC is not used over the whole disk; it is applied to each individual sector.

BitLocker supports TPM (Trusted Platform Module). The TPM is a hardware component installed in many newer computers by the computer manufacturers. It works with BitLocker to help protect user data and to ensure that a computer has not been tampered with while the system was offline[12].

### 2.2.2 LibreCrypt

LibreCrypt is a LUKS (Linux Unified Key Setup-on-disk-format) compatible open source “on-the-fly” transparent disk encryption software written mostly in Pascal programming language. This project is based on original FreeOTFE project by Sarah Dean renamed in version 6.2 to LibreCrypt and supports both 32 and 64 bit Windows. LibreCrypt is easy to use even for unexperienced user through its GUI (Graphical User Interface) with support of many languages.

---

<sup>3</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key\\_cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography)

LibreCrypt support many ciphers including AES (up to 256 bit), Twofish<sup>4</sup> (up to 256 bit), Blowfish<sup>5</sup> (up to 448 bit), Serpent<sup>6</sup> (up to 256 bit)[?]. It can create “virtual disks” on your computer and anything written to these disks is automatically encrypted before being stored on your computer’s hard drive[19].

Unfortunately this project seems to be abandoned by its developer on github. The source code of LibreCrypt is available on GitHub you can visit the site or clone source code using git:

```
git clone https://github.com/t-d-k/LibreCrypt.git
```

### 2.2.3 LUKS

LUKS (Linux Unified Key Setup-on-disk-format) is a platform-independent disk encryption specification. LUKS was created by Clemens Fruhwirth in 2004 and was originally intended for Linux distributions only. It provides a standard on-disk-format for hard disk encryption, which facilitates compatibility among Linux distributions and provides secure management of multiple user passwords.

Referential implementation of LUKS is using a device-mapper crypt target (dm-crypt) subsystem for bulk data encryption. This subsystem is not particularly bound to LUKS and can be used for plain format encryption.

It is important for us to know this specification a little more due to working with Linux distribution and the implementation of the Tang server.

## 2.3 Disk encryption with LUKS

**[[merge and add motivation related to unlockers and tang]]**

With modern versions of cryptsetup (i.e., since 2006), encrypted block devices can be created in two main formats, plain dm-crypt format or the extended LUKS format.

Plain format is just that: It has no metadata on disk. When using any such encrypted device, all the necessary parameters must be passed to cryptsetup from the commandline (otherwise it uses the defaults, which will only succeed if the device was created using default settings). It derives (generate) the master key from the passphrase provided and then uses that to decrypt or encrypt the sectors of the device, with a direct 1:1 mapping between encrypted and decrypted sectors.

In contrast to previous Linux disk encryption solutions, LUKS stores all necessary setup information in the partition header, enabling the user to more easily transport or migrate their data. LUKS uses the dm-crypt subsystem. Device-mapper is a part of the Linux kernel that provides a generic way to create virtual layers of block devices, most commonly LVM (Logical Volume Manager) logical volumes. The device-mapper crypt target (dm-crypt) provides transparent encryption of block devices using the kernel crypto API (Application programming interface) supporting ciphers and digest algorithms via standard kernel modules.

In Fedora and Red Hat Enterprise Linux, userspace interaction with dm-crypt is managed by a tool called cryptsetup, which uses the device-mapper infrastructure to setup and operate on encrypted block devices.

---

<sup>4</sup><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twofish>

<sup>5</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowfish\\_\(cipher\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowfish_(cipher))

<sup>6</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serpent\\_\(cipher\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serpent_(cipher))

The advantages of LUKS over plain dm-crypt are the higher usability: automatic configuration of non-default crypto parameters, the ability to add, change, and remove multiple passphrases. Additionally, LUKS offers defenses against low-entropy passphrases like salting and iterated PBKDF2<sup>7</sup> (Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2) passphrase hashing. With LUKS, encryption keys are always generated by the kernel RNG (Random number generator); in contrast to plain dm-crypt where one can choose, e.g. a simple dictionary word and have an encryption key derived from that. One disadvantage of using LUKS over plain is that it is readily obvious there is encrypted data on disk; the other is that damage to the header or key slots usually results in permanent data loss. To mitigate this risk the Backup of the LUKS header would be best option [2].

### 2.3.1 Creating LUKS volume

Creating just a LUKS volume is quite easy all you need is tool called cryptsetup. You can install it on Fedora system using command:

```
# dnf install cryptsetup
```

Note, that this command has to be run by user with root privileges. After installation succeeds all we need to do is to choose partition to encrypt. For demonstration we will encrypt the `/dev/xvdc` partition using:

```
# cryptsetup -y -v luksFormat /dev/xvdc
WARNING!
=====
This will overwrite data on /dev/xvdc irrevocably.

Are you sure? (Type uppercase yes): YES
Enter LUKS passphrase:
Verify passphrase:
Command successful.
```

But having full disk encryption if the system is already installed might be quite tough. Hard drive partition must contain the LUKS header just before the encrypted data. Let's sum up the easier way first.

In case we have not installed our Linux operation system yet, we could simply select an option in time of installation. Then the installation wizard will most likely ask for pass phrase - the key encryption key. To demonstrate this, screen shots with Fedora 25 system installation can be found on appendix B Pre-installation enablement of hard drive encryption.

If we have already system installed with lots of data on partition, process will probably last longer and the procedure will be more complex. There is no way you can encrypt whole system disk with LUKS without unmounting partition to encrypt. For this purpose was developed *luksipc*, the LUKS In-Place Conversion Tool. Steps to encrypt disk using *luksipc* are on appendix C LUKS In-Place Encryption.

### 2.3.2 LUKS drive structure

Hard drive with a LUKS partition has notable structure see Figure 2.2 LUKS volume structure for demonstration. The LUKS format uses a metadata header, also marked as

---

<sup>7</sup><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PBKDF2>

*phdr*, and 8 key slot areas at the the beginning of the device. After header there is section with bulk data, which are encrypted with the encryption key. Header contains information




Figure 2.2: LUKS volume structure

about the used cipher, cipher mode, the key length, a uuid and a master key checksum. The passphrases stored in the key slots, which structure is shown on Figure 2.3 LUKS Key Slot, are used to decrypt a single key encryption key that is stored in the anti-forensic stripes.




Figure 2.3: LUKS Key Slot

Every key slot is associated with a key material section after the header. When a key slot is active, the key slot stores an encrypted copy of the master key in its key material section. This encrypted copy is locked by a user password or cipher. Supplying this user password unlocks the decryption for the key material, which stores the master key.

### 2.3.3 Managing LUKS volume

This is demonstration how it could look like on real at this point our „host“ Fedora 27 system. For this demonstration we will use tools available for Fedora 27 such as:

- parted-3.2-28.fc27.x86\_64
- cryptsetup-1.7.5-3.fc27.x86\_64

These tools are available through Fedora 27 upstream repositories and can be easily downloaded and installed via Fedora package management system the dnf. To list hard drives for our system we will use the parted tool:

```
# parted -l
Model: NVMe Device (nvme)
Disk /dev/nvme0n1: 256GB
```

```
Sector size (logical/physical): 512B/512B
Partition Table: msdos
Disk Flags:
```

Number	Start	End	Size	Type	File system	Flags
1	1049kB	1075MB	1074MB	primary	ext4	boot
2	1075MB	256GB	255GB	primary}		

The exhibit shows that on our „host“ system we have installed an NVMe (NVM Express) volume<sup>8</sup> using the msdos, therefore MBR partition table. The NVMe is a specification for accessing SSDs attached through the PCI Express bus. Our SSD drive has two partition as you can see the first is boot partition and second should be our LUKS partition. To find out if the second partition is LUKS volume we will use cryptsetup tool with option isLuks:

```
# cryptsetup isLuks /dev/nvme0n1p1 -v
Device /dev/nvme0n1p1 is not a valid LUKS device.
Command failed with code 22: Invalid argument
```

This command has no /std/out nor /std/err output unless the -v option is used. The actual result of the command is returned as exit code. The output show reflects that our boot partition is not a valid LUKS volume as expected. This is expected behavior, encrypting MBR partition would make impossible for system to boot.

```
# cryptsetup isLuks /dev/nvme0n1p2 -v
Command successful.
```

At this point we have successfully identified the LUKS volume. To dump the header information of this LUKS volume use cryptsetup option luksDump:

```
# cryptsetup luksDump /dev/nvme0n1p2
LUKS header information for /dev/nvme0n1p2

Version:          1
Cipher name:      aes
Cipher mode:      xts-plain64
Hash spec:        sha256
Payload offset:   4096
MK bits:          512
MK digest:        85 b3 b9 71 b6 b7 51 18 60 39
                  78 db ac e8 82 97 0c 7b a2 3e
MK salt:          0d 22 53 83 56 0d a0 70 25 c2 bf fe 75 40 71 a9
                  75 f1 ae a3 67 e5 b2 a5 14 85 39 1d c6 74 00 a8
MK iterations:    52625
UUID:             267c308e-5d64-4acf-abf2-f6e224e8febf

Key Slot 0: ENABLED
  Iterations:      415583
  Salt:            3e f9 7d 3b b6 08 60 9a eb dc 52 bb 8e 21 eb bf
                  b9 4d 80 a4 70 2d 4e 97 8e 47 c1 a3 04 45 74 d4
  Key material offset: 8
```

<sup>8</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NVM\\_Express](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NVM_Express)

```

    AF stripes:                4000
Key Slot 1: DISABLED
Key Slot 2: DISABLED
Key Slot 3: DISABLED
Key Slot 4: DISABLED
Key Slot 5: DISABLED
Key Slot 6: DISABLED
Key Slot 7: DISABLED

```

From the listing we can assume that `/dev/nvme0n1p2` has one key encryption key in key slot 0 and has other 7 slots (1-7) disabled. The advantage of LUKS is that if a team or group of up to eight people has to work with a common encrypted volume each team member may use his own password. New user keys may be added to the encrypted volume and old user keys may be removed. To add a new key we will use `cryptsetup` with option `luksAddKey` as shown:

```

# cryptsetup luksAddKey /dev/nvme0n1p2
Enter any existing passphrase:
Enter new passphrase for key slot:
Verify passphrase:

```

The `cryptsetup` will derive the key encryption key from this passphrase and bind it to first available key slot in LUKS header. The dump of header will now contain information similar to the exhibit below:

```

# cryptsetup luksDump /dev/nvme0n1p2
LUKS header information for /dev/nvme0n1p2

Version:                1
Cipher name:             aes
Cipher mode:             xts-plain64
Hash spec:              sha256
Payload offset:         4096
MK bits:                512
MK digest:              85 b3 b9 71 b6 b7 51 18 60 39
                        78 db ac e8 82 97 0c 7b a2 3e
MK salt:                0d 22 53 83 56 0d a0 70 25 c2 bf fe 75 40 71 a9
                        75 f1 ae a3 67 e5 b2 a5 14 85 39 1d c6 74 00 a8
MK iterations:          52625
UUID:                   267c308e-5d64-4acf-abf2-f6e224e8febf

Key Slot 0: ENABLED
  Iterations:            415583
  Salt:                 3e f9 7d 3b b6 08 60 9a eb dc 52 bb 8e 21 eb bf
                        b9 4d 80 a4 70 2d 4e 97 8e 47 c1 a3 04 45 74 d4
  Key material offset:   8
  AF stripes:           4000
Key Slot 1: ENABLED
  Iterations:            1247257
  Salt:                 44 48 92 df 29 8a df 81 f6 44 f8 66 c5 c2 32 49
                        23 76 8a 37 48 85 33 2a 29 10 d8 cc 8f 45 0a 46

```

```

    Key material offset:    1520
    AF stripes:            4000
Key Slot 2: DISABLED
Key Slot 3: DISABLED
Key Slot 4: DISABLED
Key Slot 5: DISABLED
Key Slot 6: DISABLED
Key Slot 7: DISABLED

```

At this point LUKS volume is accessible via two different passphrases. To remove any key from LUKS header we will use `cryptsetup` with option `luksKillSlot` as shown:

```

# cryptsetup luksKillSlot /dev/nvme0n1p2 0
Enter any remaining passphrase:

```

To successfully remove key from key slot 0 we have to enter any remaining passphrase. In our case we would enter the newly created passphrase which is bound to key slot 1. This will result into having LUKS header in state like shown:

```

# cryptsetup luksDump /dev/nvme0n1p2
LUKS header information for /dev/nvme0n1p2

Version:            1
Cipher name:        aes
Cipher mode:        xts-plain64
Hash spec:          sha256
Payload offset:     4096
MK bits:            512
MK digest:          85 b3 b9 71 b6 b7 51 18 60 39
                   78 db ac e8 82 97 0c 7b a2 3e
MK salt:            0d 22 53 83 56 0d a0 70 25 c2 bf fe 75 40 71 a9
                   75 f1 ae a3 67 e5 b2 a5 14 85 39 1d c6 74 00 a8
MK iterations:      52625
UUID:              267c308e-5d64-4acf-abf2-f6e224e8febf

Key Slot 0: DISABLED
Key Slot 1: ENABLED
    Iterations:      1247257
    Salt:            44 48 92 df 29 8a df 81 f6 44 f8 66 c5 c2 32 49
                   23 76 8a 37 48 85 33 2a 29 10 d8 cc 8f 45 0a 46
    Key material offset: 1520
    AF stripes:      4000
Key Slot 2: DISABLED
Key Slot 3: DISABLED
Key Slot 4: DISABLED
Key Slot 5: DISABLED
Key Slot 6: DISABLED
Key Slot 7: DISABLED

```

Password rotation is very important. To change LUKS key slot passphrase use the `cryptsetup`'s option `luksChangeKey`:



```
#cryptsetup luksChangeKey /dev/nvme0n1p2 -S 1
Enter passphrase to be changed:
Enter new passphrase:
Verify passphrase:
```

Note that passphrase to be changed and the slot number must be related to each other. We could see change in LUKS header after command succeeded:

```
# cryptsetup luksDump /dev/nvme0n1p2
LUKS header information for /dev/nvme0n1p2

Version:                1
Cipher name:            aes
Cipher mode:            xts-plain64
Hash spec:              sha256
Payload offset:         4096
MK bits:                512
MK digest:              85 b3 b9 71 b6 b7 51 18 60 39
                        78 db ac e8 82 97 0c 7b a2 3e
MK salt:                0d 22 53 83 56 0d a0 70 25 c2 bf fe 75 40 71 a9
                        75 f1 ae a3 67 e5 b2 a5 14 85 39 1d c6 74 00 a8
MK iterations:          52625
UUID:                   267c308e-5d64-4acf-abf2-f6e224e8febf

Key Slot 0: DISABLED
Key Slot 1: ENABLED
    Iterations:          1630572
    Salt:               cf 54 a9 77 ed 8b c5 75 ca 65 60 6b 31 cb 29 0f
                        4e 54 78 8c b1 9a db 3f 2f 6c aa 84 79 da 81 66
    Key material offset: 512
    AF stripes:         4000

Key Slot 2: DISABLED
Key Slot 3: DISABLED
Key Slot 4: DISABLED
Key Slot 5: DISABLED
Key Slot 6: DISABLED
Key Slot 7: DISABLED
```

For more usecases and examples how to use cryptsetup see the man page of the tool<sup>9</sup>. Examples shown demonstrate basic key management for LUKS volumes and should be sufficient for basic understanding of cryptsetup/LUKS behavior and usability on the system with encrypted drive. **[[nafuknut little bit]]**

### 2.3.4 LUKS security

In August 2012 Ubuntu Privacy Remix Team did a deep analysis of LUKS/cryptsetup in Ubuntu enviroment. Cryptsetup in version 1.4.1 used by Ubuntu 12.04 LTS has been chosen

---

<sup>9</sup><https://linux.die.net/man/8/cryptsetup>

for they analysis. They wrote the programs luksanalyzer and hashtest for the purpose of the analysis.

At the end they came into conclusion that cryptsetup with LUKS is a highly secure program for encrypting whole data media or partitions thereupon. The encryption algorithms and other security mechanism it implements comply with the current state of the art in cryptography. They found no back door or security-related mistake in the published source code. If we use this program in a secure environment we may assume with high certainty that no one can get access to the data stored in your volumes as long as they are closed, the passwords are really good and the attacker doesn't apply highly advanced methods below the layer of the operation system, such as BIOS rootkits, hardware keyloggers or video surveillance. A special strong point of Cryptsetup with LUKS is its high power of resistance against dictionary attacks. This resisting power is adapted to the increased speed of hardware when new encrypted volumes are created on new up to date hardware[16].

# Chapter 3

## Tang

[[re-factor entire chapter]]

Automated decryption of HDDs with Tang blablebli.

Before Tang, automated decryption was usually handled by a Key Escrow server.

### 3.1 Key Escrow

The Key Escrow server (also known as a “fair” cryptosystem) is providing escrow service for encryption keys. A client using Key Escrow usually generates a key, encrypts data with it and then stores the key encryption key on a remote server. Unfortunately, it is not always as simple as it sounds and there are couple of security concerns.

To transfer the encryption keys we want to store on an Escrow server, we have to encrypt the channel on which we send them. When transmitting keys over an insecure network without an encrypted link, anyone listening to the network traffic could immediately fetch the key. This should signal security risks, and, of course, we do not want any third party to access our secret data. Usually we encrypt a channel with TLS(Transport Layer Security) or GSSAPI (Generic Security Services Application Program Interface) as shown on a Figure 3.1 Escrow model. Unfortunately, this is not enough to have the communication secure.




Figure 3.1: Escrow model

We can not just start sending these keys to the escrow server if we do not know whether this server is the one it acts to be. This server has to have its identity verified, and the client has to authenticate to this server too. The increasing amount of keys implicates a need for

Certification Authority server (CA) or a Key Distribution Center (KDC) to manage all of them.

With all these keys, and at this point only, server can verify if the client is permitted to get their key, and the client is able to identify trusted server. This is a fully stateful process. To sum up, an authorized third party may gain access to keys stored on an Escrow server under certain circumstances only.

The complexity of this system increases the attack surface and for a such complex system it would be unimaginable not to have backups. Escrow server may store lots of keys from lots of different places, users and services.

With key escrow a third party gets copies of a cryptographic key. People might not be comfortable with any third party having this ability and that „technical“ problems vex the key escrow solution. Tang’s key recovery, on the other hand, lets us just „backup“ and restore cryptographic keys anonymously and without any third party possessing our key.

Key recovery is necessary. Key escrow is not. Let us not confuse these two.

## 3.2 Tang - binding daemon

Tang server is an open source project implemented in C programming language, and it binds data to network presence. What does binding data to network presence really mean? **[[do not ask]]** Essentially, it allows us to make some data to be available only when the system containing the data is on a particular, usually secure, network.

Tang server advertises asymmetric keys and a client is able to get the list of these signing keys 5.4.1 by HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) GET request. The next step is the provisioning step. With the list of these public keys the process of encrypting data may start. A client chooses one of the asymmetric keys to generate a unique encryption key. After this, the client encrypts data using the created key. Once the data is encrypted, the key is discarded. Some small metadata have to be produced as a part of this operation. The client should store these metadata to work with it when decrypting.

Finally, when the client wants to access the encrypted data, it must be able to recover encryption key. This step starts with loading the stored metadata and ends with simply performing a HTTP POST to Tang server. Server performs its mathematical operation and sends the result back to the client. Finally, the client has to calculate the key value, which is better than when server calculates it. So the Tang server never knew the value of the key and literally nothing about its clients.




Figure 3.2: Tang model

On Figure 3.2 you can see the Tang model. It is very similar to Escrow model 3.1 but there are some thing missing. In fact, there is no longer a need for TLS channel to secure communication between the client and the server, and that is the reason why Tang implements the McCallum-Relyea exchange 3.1 as described below.

### 3.3 Binding with Tang

A client performs an ECDH key exchange using the McCallum-Relyea algorithm 3.1 in order to generate the binding key. Then the client discards its own private key so that the Tang server is the only party that can reconstitute the binding key. To blind **[[blind?]]** the client's public key and the binding key, Tang uses a third, ephemeral key. Ephemeral key is generated for each execution of a key establishment process. Now only the client can unblind his public key and binding key.

Provisioning		Recovery	
used client's side	server's side	client's side	server's side
	$S \in_R [1, p-1]$	$E \in_R [1, p-1]$	
	$s = gS$	$x = c + gE$	
	$\leftarrow s$	$x \rightarrow$	
$C \in_R [1, p-1]$			$y = zS$
$e = gC$			$\leftarrow y$
$K = gSC = sC$		$K = y - sE$	
Discard: K, C			
Retain s, c			

Table 3.1: McCallum-Relyea exchange

### 3.4 Provisioning

The client selects one of the Tang server's exchange keys (we will call it sJWK; identified by the use of deriveKey in the sJWK's key\_ops attribute). The lowercase „s“ stands for server's key pair and JWK is used format of the message. The client generates a new (random) JWK (cJWK; c stands for client's key pair). The client performs its half of a standard ECDH exchange producing dJWK which it uses to encrypt the data. Afterwards, it discards dJWK and the private key from cJWK.

The client then stores cJWK for later use in the recovery step. Generally speaking, the client may also store other data, such as the URL of the Tang server or the trusted advertisement signing keys.

$$s = g * S \tag{3.1}$$

$$c = g * C \tag{3.2}$$

$$K = s * C \tag{3.3}$$

### 3.5 Recovery

To recover dJWK after discarding it, the client generates a third ephemeral key (eJWK). Using eJWK, the client performs elliptic curve group addition of eJWK and cJWK, producing xJWK. The client POSTs xJWK to the server.

The server then performs its half of the ECDH key exchange using xJWK and sJWK, producing yJWK. The server returns yJWK to the client.

The client then performs half of an ECDH key exchange between eJWK and sJWK, producing zJWK. Subtracting zJWK from yJWK produces dJWK again.

Mathematically (capital is private key; g stands for generate) client's operation:

$$e = g * E \quad (3.4)$$

$$x = c + e \quad (3.5)$$

$$y = x * S \quad (3.6)$$

$$z = s * E \quad (3.7)$$

$$K = y - z \quad (3.8)$$

### 3.6 Security

We can now compare Tang and Escrow. In contrast, Tang is stateless and doesn't require TLS or authentication. Tang also has limited knowledge. Unlike escrows, where the server has knowledge of every key ever used, Tang never sees a single client key. Tang never gains any identifying information from the client.

	Escrow	Tang
Stateless	No	Yes
SSL/TLS	Required	Optional
X.509	Required	Optional
Authentication	Required	Optional
Anonymous	No	Yes

Table 3.2: Comparing Escrow and Tang

Let's think about the security of Tang system. Is it really secure without an encrypted channel or even without authentication? So long as the client discards its private key, the client cannot recover dJWK without the Tang server. This is fundamentally the same assumption used by Diffie-Hellman (and ECDH).

#### 3.6.1 Man-in-the-Middle attack

In this case, the eavesdropper in this case sees the client send xJWK and receive yJWK. Since, these packets are blinded by eJWK, only the party that can unblind these values is the client itself (since only it has eJWK's private key). Thus, the MitM attack fails.

### 3.6.2 Compromise the client to gain access to cJWK

It is of utmost importance that the client protects cJWK from prying eyes. This may include device permissions, filesystem permissions, security frameworks (such as SELinux - Security-Enhanced Linux) or even the use of hardware encryption such as a TPM. How precisely this is accomplished depends on the client implementation.

### 3.6.3 Compromise the server to gain access to sJWK's private key

The Tang server must protect the private key for sJWK. In this implementation, access is controlled by file system permissions and the service's policy. An alternative implementation might use hardware cryptography (for example, an HSM) to protect the private key.

## 3.7 Building Tang

Tang is originally packaged for Fedora OS version 23 and later but we can build it from source of course. It relies on few other software libraries:

- http-parser 5.2.2
- systemd / xinetd 6.4.1
- jose 5.4.1
  - jansson 5.2.1
  - openssl ??
  - zlib ??

The steps to build it from source include download source from project's GitHub or clone it. Make sure you have all needed dependencies installed and then run:

```
\$ autoreconf -if
\$ ./configure --prefix=/usr
\$ make
# sudo make install
```

Optionally to run tests:

```
\$ make check
```

## 3.8 Server enablement

Enabling a Tang server is a two-step process. First, enable and start the service using systemd.

```
\$ sudo systemctl enable tangd-update.path --now
```

```
\$ sudo systemctl start tangd-update.path
```

```
\$ sudo systemctl enable tangd.socket --now
```

Second, generate a signing key and an exchange key.

```
# jose gen -t '{"alg":"ES256"}' -o /var/db/tang/sig.jwk

# jose gen -t '{"kty":"EC","crv":"P-256","key_ops":["deriveKey"]}' \
-o /var/db/tang/exc.jwk
```

Now we are up and running. Server is ready to send advertisement on demand. [\[\[Get clevis in here?\]\]](#)

## 3.9 Clevis client

Clevis provides a pluggable key management framework for automated decryption. It can handle even automated unlocking of LUKS volumes. To do so, we have to encrypt some data with simple command:

```
\$ clevis encrypt PIN CONFIG < PLAINTEXT > CIPHERTEXT.jwe
```

In clevis terminology, a *pin* is a plugin which implements automated decryption. We simply pass the name of supported pin here. Secondly *config* is a JSON object which will be passed directly to the *pin*. It contains all the necessary configuration to perform encryption and setup automated decryption.

### 3.9.1 PIN: Tang

Clevis has full support for Tang. Here is an example of how to use Clevis with Tang:

```
\$ echo hi | clevis encrypt tang '{"url": "http://tangserver"}' > hi.jwe
The advertisement is signed with the following keys:
kWwirxc5PhkFIH0yE28nc-EvjDY

Do you wish to trust the advertisement? [yN] y
```

In this example, we encrypt the message „hi“ using the Tang pin. The only parameter needed in this case is the URL of the Tang server. During the encryption process, the Tang pin requests the key advertisement from the server and asks you to trust the keys. This works similarly to SSH.

Alternatively, you can manually load the advertisement using the *adv* parameter. This parameter takes either a string referencing the file where the advertisement is stored, or the JSON contents of the advertisement itself. When the advertisement is specified manually like this, Clevis presumes that the advertisement is trusted.

### 3.9.2 PIN: HTTP

Clevis also ships a pin for performing escrow using HTTP. Please note that, at this time, this pin does not provide HTTPS support and is suitable only for use over local sockets. This provides integration with services like Custodia.

### 3.9.3 PIN: SSS - Shamir Secret Sharing

Clevis provides a way to mix pins together to provide sophisticated unlocking policies. This is accomplished by using an algorithm called Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS).



### 3.9.4 Binding LUKS volumes

Clevis can be used to bind a LUKS volume using a pin so that it can be automatically unlocked.

How this works is rather simple. We generate a new, cryptographically strong key. This key is added to LUKS as an additional passphrase. We then encrypt this key using Clevis, and store the output JWE inside the LUKS header using LUKSMeta.

Here is an example where we bind `/dev/vda2` using the Tang ping:

```
\$ sudo clevis bind-luks /dev/sda1 tang '{"url": "http://tang.local"}'
The advertisement is signed with the following keys:
    kWwirxc5PhkFIH0yE28nc-EvjDY

Do you wish to trust the advertisement? [yN] y
Enter existing LUKS password:
```

Upon successful completion of this binding process, the disk can be unlocked using one of the provided unlockers.

### 3.9.5 Dracut

The Dracut unlocker attempts to automatically unlock volumes during early boot. This permits automated root volume encryption. Just rebuild your initramfs after installing Clevis:

```
\$ sudo dracut -f
```

Upon reboot, you will be prompted to unlock the volume using a password. In the background, Clevis will attempt to unlock the volume automatically. If it succeeds, the password prompt will be cancelled and boot will continue.

### 3.9.6 UDisks2

Our UDisks2 unlocker runs in your desktop session. You should not need to manually enable it; just install the Clevis UDisks2 unlocker and restart your desktop session. The unlocker should be started automatically.

This unlocker works almost exactly the same as the Dracut unlocker. If you insert a removable storage device that has been bound with Clevis, we will attempt to unlock it automatically in parallel with a desktop password prompt. If automatic unlocking succeeds, the password prompt will be dismissed without user intervention.

## Chapter 4

# Software portability

Ideally, any software would be usable on any operating system, platform, and any processor architecture. Existence of term „porting“, derived from the Latin *portāre* which means „to carry“, proves that this ideal situation does not occurs that often, and acctual process of „carrying“ software to system with different environment is most probably required. Porting is process not documented and required if we want to run thing on another platform. Porting is also used to describe procces of converting computer games to became platform independent[20].

Software porting procces might be hard to distinguish with building software. The reason might be that in many cases building software on desired platform is enough, when software application does not work „out of the box“. This kind of behavior, an application that works immediately after or even without any special installation and without need for any configuration or modification, is ideal. It often happens when we copy application from one computer to another, not realizing that they have processors with same instructions set and same or very simmlar operating system therefore envoroment. But let us be realistic, it depends on many things, such as processor architecture to which was application written (compiled), quality of design, how application is meant to be deployed and of course application’s source code.

Number of significantly different central processor units (CPUs), and operating systems used on the desktop or server is much smaller than in the past. However on embeded devices there are still much more various architectures available ARM MIPS RISC CISC x86\_64. **[[TODO]]**

Nowadays, the goal should be to develop software which is portable between preferred computer platforms (Linux, UNIX, Apple, Microsoft). If software is considered as not portable, it could not have to mean immediately that it is not possible, just that time and resources spent porting already written software are almost comparable, or even significantly higher than writing software as a whole from scratch. Effort spent porting some software product to work on desired platform must be little, such as copying already installed files to usb flash drive and run it on another computer. This kind of approach might most probably fail, due to not present dependencies of third party libraries not present on destination computer. Despite dominance of the x86 architecture there is usually a need to recompile software running, not only on different operating systems, to make sure we have all the dependencies present.

To simplify portability, even on distinguished processors with distant instruction sets, modern compilers translate source code to a machine-independent intermediate code. But

still, in the embedded system market, where OpenWrt belongs to, porting remains a significant issue [9].

## 4.1 OpenWrt system

OpenWrt is perhaps the most widely known Linux distribution for embedded devices especially for wireless routers. It was originally developed in January 2004 for the Linksys WRT54G with buildroot from the uClibc project. Now it supports many more models of routers. OpenWrt is a registered trademark which is held by the Software in the Public Interest (SPI) in the name of the OpenWrt project.

Installing OpenWrt system means replacing your router's built-in firmware with the Linux system which provides a fully writable filesystem with package management. This means that we are not bound to applications provided by the vendor. Router (the embedded device) with this distribution can be used for anything that an embedded Linux system can be used for, from using its SSH Server for SSH Tunneling, to running lightweight server software (e.g. IRC server) on it. In fact it allows us to customize the device through the use of packages to suit any application.

### 4.1.1 OpenWrt and LEDE

The LEDE Project ("Linux Embedded Development Environment") is a Linux operating system emerged from the OpenWrt project. Its announcement was sent on 3th May 2016 by Jo-Philipp Wich to both the OpenWrt development list and the new LEDE development list<sup>1</sup>. It describes LEDE as „a reboot of the OpenWrt community“ and as „a spin-off of the OpenWrt project“ seeking to create an embedded-Linux development community „with a strong focus on transparency, collaboration and decentralisation“<sup>2</sup>.

The rationale given for the reboot was that OpenWrt suffered from longstanding issues that could not be fixed from within—namely, regarding internal processes and policies. For instance, the announcement said, the number of developers is at an all-time low, but there is no process for on-boarding new developers and, it seems, no process for granting commit access to new developers.

At the moment latest release of OpenWrt 15.05.1 (code-named „Chaos Calmer“) released in March 2016. LEDE developers continued to work separately on their upstream release and they delivered LEDE „Reboot“ with version 17.01.0 on February 22nd 2017.

The remerge proposal vote was passed by LEDE developers in June 2017<sup>3</sup>. After long and sometimes slowly moving discussions about the specifics of the re-merge, with multiple similar proposals but little subsequent action, formally announced on LEDE forum in January 2018<sup>4</sup>. OpenWrt and LEDE projects agreed upon their unification under the OpenWrt name. After merge OpenWrt upstream repository started to show signs of life.

Today (April 2018) the stable LEDE 17.01.4 „Reboot“ release of OpenWrt released in October 2017 using Linux kernel version 4.4.92 runs on many routers.

---

<sup>1</sup><https://lwn.net/Articles/686180/>

<sup>2</sup>[https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news\\_item&px=OpenWRT-Forked-As-LEDE](https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=OpenWRT-Forked-As-LEDE)

<sup>3</sup><http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/lede-adm/2017-June/000552.html>

<sup>4</sup><https://forum.lede-project.org/t/announcing-the-openwrt-lede-merge/10217>

### 4.1.2 Why use OpenWrt

Router is basically a full-blown computer that's always powered on, let us make some good use of it! OpenWrt turns our router in a fully capable GNU/Linux computer, not just a network „magic“ box.

OpenWrt system may be more stable than our hardware's default firmware from vendor. Not even that but probably more secure login with support of key-based SSH and less security holes since OpenWrt is regularly updated.

It is capable of running lightweight services like an IRC bouncer, a dyndns updater, print server, lighttpd even. Some routers has USB ports so samba/ftp file sharing over the network comes into mind with an external HDD connected to it.

OpenWrt has an Web UI interface too so users less experienced in Linux could easily set up their network. With OpenWrt we can tweak all the network settings such as QoS, Per-service bandwidth throttling, wireless isolation. It is not bound to some „consumer-friendly“ vendor-specific configuration of firewalling. We are able to set up firewall and port-forwarding as we wish. It provides load and bandwidth live graphs and we can monitor all outgoing/incoming connections.

The goal of this thesis would be to port a lightweight Tang daemon described in the chapter 3 Tang server to OpenWrt system. Tang server will help us unlock our encrypted volumes while on safe home or office network without need for extra PC running it but having it on our tiny OpenWrt „server“. With Tang we do not have to care about typing passphrases over and over to unlock LUKS drives in safe enviroment.

## 4.2 OpenWrt's toolchain

Embedded devices are not meant for building on them because they does not have enough memory nor computation resorces as ordinary personal computers do(see Table 4.1). Building on such device would be time consuming and may result to overheating, which could cause hardware to fail. For this particular reason package building is done with cross-compiler.

Cross-compilation is done by set of tools called toolchain and it consists of:

- compiler
- linker
- a C standard library

For porting to „target“ system (OpenWrt) this toolchain has to be generated on „host“ system. The toolchain can be achieved in many different ways. The easiest way is undoubtedly to find a .rpm (or .deb) package and have it installed on our „host“ system. If a binary package with desired toolchain is not available for our system or is not available at all, there might be need to compile a custom toolchain from scratch.<sup>5</sup>

In case of OpenWrt we have available a set of Makefiles and patches called buildroot which is capable of generating toolchain.

### 4.2.1 Compiler

**[[rewrite section compiler]]**

---

<sup>5</sup>tools like crosstool-ng (<https://github.com/crosstool-ng/crosstool-ng>) may help

In a nutshell compilers translate the high level programming language source code into lower level language such as machine understandable assembler instructions. To do so compiler is performing many operations starting with preprocessing.

Preprocessing supports macro substitution and conditional compilation. Typically the preprocessing phase occurs before syntactic or semantic analysis. However, some languages such as Scheme<sup>6</sup> support macro substitutions based on syntactic forms.

Lexical analysis, also known as lexing or tokenization, breaks the source code text into a sequence of small pieces called lexical tokens. Lexical analyzer does the scanning (cutting the input text into tokens and assign them a category) and the evaluating (converting tokens into a processed value). Common token categories may include:

- keywords (bound to programming language)
- identifiers (can not be keyword)
- separators
- operators
- literals
- comments

The set of token categories varies in different programming languages. The lexeme syntax is typically a regular language, so a finite state automaton constructed from a regular expression can be used to recognize it.

Syntax analysis typically builds a parse tree structure according to the rules of a formal grammar which define the language's syntax. The parse tree is often analyzed, augmented, and transformed by later phases in the compiler.

Semantic analysis checks parse tree and does type checking, object binding and definite assignment. Output of semantic analysis is the symbol table or it results into rejecting incorrect programs or issuing warnings.

Code optimization, such as dead code elimination, inline expansion, constant propagation, loop transformation and even automatic parallelization, is done after analysis and it is independent on the CPU architecture.

Code generation is CPU dependent and does the transformation of intermediate language into the target machine language. This involves resource and storage decisions, such as deciding which variables to fit into registers and memory and generating machine instructions along with their associated addressing modes.

Cross-compiler is programming tool capable of creating executable file that is supposed to run on a „target“ architecture, in a similar or completely different environment, while working on a different „host“ architecture. It can also create object files used by linker. Reason for using cross-compiling might be to separate the build environment from target environment as well. OpenWrt toolchain uses gcc compiler, and it is one of the most important parts of toolchain.

#### 4.2.2 Linker

[[refactor]]

---

<sup>6</sup><https://www.scheme.com/tspl4/>

With linker we are able to link compile's object files into single executable, library or object file. Linker can do static linking and dynamic linking.

Static linking is the result of the linker copying all library routines used in the program into the executable image. This may require more disk space and memory than dynamic linking, but is more portable, since it does not require the presence of the library on the system where it runs. Static linking also prevents „DLL Hell“, since each program includes exactly the versions of library routines that it requires, with no conflict with other programs. In addition, a program using just a few routines from a library does not require the entire library to be installed.

Dynamic linking is the process of postponing the resolving of some undefined symbols until a program is run. That means that the executable code still contains undefined symbols, plus a list of objects or libraries that will provide definitions for these. Loading the program will load these objects/libraries as well, and perform a final linking. Dynamic linking needs no linker.

This approach offers two advantages:

Often-used libraries (for example the standard system libraries) need to be stored in only one location, not duplicated in every single binary. If a bug in a library function is corrected by replacing the library, all programs using it dynamically will benefit from the correction after restarting them. Programs that included this function by static linking would have to be re-linked first. There are also disadvantages:

Known on the Windows platform as „DLL Hell“, an incompatible updated library will break executables that depended on the behavior of the previous version of the library if the newer version is not properly backward compatible. A program, together with the libraries it uses, might be certified (e.g. as to correctness, documentation requirements, or performance) as a package, but not if components can be replaced. (This also argues against automatic OS updates in critical systems; in both cases, the OS and libraries form part of a qualified environment.)

### 4.2.3 C standard library

Most common C standard libraries are: GNU Libc, uClibc musl-libc, or dietlibc. They provide macros, type definitions and functions for tasks such as input/output processing (<stdio.h>), memory management (<stdlib.h>), string handling (<string.h>), mathematical computations (<math.h>) and many more<sup>7</sup>. The OpenWrt's cross-compilation toolchain uses musl-libc.

## 4.3 OpenWrt's buildroot

OpenWrt's buildroot is a build system capable of generating toolchain, and also a root filesystem (also called sysroot), environment tightly bound to target. Build system can be configured for any device that is supported by OpenWrt.

The root filesystem in general is a mere copy of the file system of target's platform. In many cases just having the folders /usr and /lib would be sufficient, therefore we do not need to copy nor create the entire target file system on our host .

It is a good idea to store all these things, the toolchain and the root filesystem in a single place. With using OpenWrt's buildroot we will have this covered. Be tidy and pedantic, because cross-compiling can easily become a painful mess!

---

<sup>7</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C\\_standard\\_library#Header\\_files](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C_standard_library#Header_files)

### 4.3.1 Buildroot prerequisites

Let us demonstrate what are minimum requirements of space and size of RAM (Random Access Memory) for building packages for Openwrt using its buildroot. For generating an installable OpenWrt firmware image file with a size of e.g. 8MB, we will need at least:

- ca. 200 MB for OpenWrt build system
- ca. 300 MB for OpenWrt build system with OpenWrt Feeds
- ca. 2.1 GB for source packages downloaded during build from the Feeds
- ca. 3-4 GB to build (i.e. cross-compile) OpenWrt and generate the firmware file
- ca. 1-4 GB of RAM to build Openwrt.(build x86's img need 4GB RAM)

These are specifications of embedded device TL-WR842Nv3 a regular wireless router manufactured by TP-LINK which was used to test all packages related to Tang server porting effort:

Model	TL-WR842N(EU)
Version	v3
Architecture:	MIPS 24Kc
Manufacturer:	Qualcomm Atheros
Bootloader:	U-Boot
System-On-Chip:	Qualcomm Atheros QCA9531-BL3A
CPU Speed:	650 MHz
Flash chip:	Winbond 25Q128CS16
Flash size:	16 MiB
RAM chip:	Zentel A3R12E40CBF-8E
RAM size:	64 MiB
Wireless:	Qualcomm Atheros QCA9531
Antenae(s):	2 non-removable
Ethernet:	4 LAN, 1 WAN 10/100
USB:	1 x 2.0
Serial:	?

Table 4.1: TL-WR842Nv3 specifications

The actual sum of space required only for buildroot to work correctly which is about 6.4 GB compared to available storage space on wireless router should be demonstrative why is building for embedded devices done with cross-compiling. The another reasons, not to just compare internal storage which might be extended (as shown on appendix TODOappendix), are device's minimalistic RAM size and not that „powerfull“ CPU. **[[add more about CPU]]**

## 4.4 Prepare the enviroment

Before getting to know buildroot we have to have host enviroment ready for buildroot in a way that we will install buildroot's dependencies and then buildroot itself.

#### 4.4.1 Buildroot's dependencies

To be able to work with OpenWrt's buildroot we will need lots of buildroot dependencies first. Please note that following commands have to be run by user with root privileges to install buildroot dependencies on Fedora 27 system:

```
# dnf install binutils bzip2 gcc gcc-c++ \  
gawk gettext git-core flex ncurses-devel ncurses-compat-libs \  
zlib-devel zlib-static make patch perl-ExtUtils-MakeMaker \  
perl-Thread-Queue glibc glibc-devel glibc-static quilt sed \  
sdcc intltool sharutils bison wget unzip openssl-devel
```

Some feeds might be not available over git but only via other versioning tools like subversion (svn) or mercurial. If we want to obtain their source-code, we need to install svn and mercurial as well:

```
# dnf install subversion mercurial
```

#### 4.4.2 Getting buildroot

There are mirrors containing OpenWrt SDK (Software development kit) buildroots for every released version of OpenWrt system. It is good to consider using OpenWrt's SDK in order to build software application to only one specific release of target system. For example when we are using „stable“ release of OpenWrt 15.05.1 with codename „Chaos Calmer“ on TL-WR842N(EU) device, we should probably end up in in „Supplementary Files“ section of the OpenWrt archives<sup>8</sup> looking for SDK.

If we have host platform which aims to be on the bleeding edge of open-source technologies, such as OS Fedora, we will probably encounter issues with dependencies. These issues are appearing because an older version of the dependencies are required for this old SDK to work and might be not available for our host platform anymore. In this case we would have to install or even build older version of required packages to our host system.

When we start with porting an upstream project (such as Tang) for latest release of target's system on Fedora host system, an upstream bleeding edge buildroot should be the best solution. In our case we will work with latest OpenWrt release LEDE 17.01.4 on our target device, and download the OpenWrt bleeding edge (trunk version) buildroot with git. To download OpenWrt buildroot from upstream repository run command:

```
$ git clone https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt.git
```

### 4.5 Working with buildroot

Working with OpenWrt's buildroot requires some basic knowledge of the git version control system<sup>9</sup> and processes of upstream project development using GitHub.

To save our work progress and be able to contribute to the upstream repository we should have a own fork of it. A fork is a copy of a repository that we can manage. It lets us make changes to a project without affecting the original (upstream) repository. We can fetch updates from the upstream or submit changes to the original repository with pull

<sup>8</sup>[https://archive.openwrt.org/chaos\\_calmer/15.05.1/ar71xx/generic/](https://archive.openwrt.org/chaos_calmer/15.05.1/ar71xx/generic/)

<sup>9</sup><https://git-scm.com/docs/gittutorial>



requests. These pull request are generated from the „devel“ branch that we should have in our fork. Figure 4.1 GitHub’s workflow reflects this in a nutshell.



Figure 4.1: GitHub’s workflow

To fork OpenWrt’s buildroot we should have our GitHub account set up<sup>10</sup>, visit the OpenWrt’s project upstream repository<sup>11</sup>, and click on „Fork“ button in the top-right corner of the page. Before cloning our fork it is recommended to set up git environment<sup>12</sup> on host machine and upload the SSH keys<sup>13</sup> to our account to minimize pushing effort to our fork. All work related to this thesis has been done using GitHub account Tiboris<sup>14</sup> therefore output of following commands are bound to it.

```
$ git clone https://github.com/Tiboris/openwrt.git \
~/buildroot-openwrt
```

Please note that this command will clone the *openwrt* repository of the GitHub user *Tiboris* to the *~/buildroot-openwrt* directory on our host.

To catch up with changes made upstream we should consider to configure a remote that points to it. Configured remote allows us to sync changes made in the original repository with the fork and vice versa. Make sure you are in the buildroot directory and add remote called upstream:

```
$ cd ~/buildroot-openwrt
$ git remote add upstream \
https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt.git
```

To verify that remote is present run:

```
$ git remote -v
origin    git@github.com:Tiboris/openwrt.git (fetch)
origin    git@github.com:Tiboris/openwrt.git (push)
upstream  https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt.git (fetch)
upstream  https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt.git (push)
```

With the remote configured correctly we can now sync with upstream repository. To download latest upstream changes use the „fetch“ option and the „merge“ option to apply them to our fork’s branch.

```
$ git fetch upstream master
remote: Counting objects: 4376, done.
```

<sup>10</sup><https://github.com/join>

<sup>11</sup><https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt>

<sup>12</sup><https://git-scm.com/book/en/v2/Getting-Started-First-Time-Git-Setup>

<sup>13</sup><https://help.github.com/articles/adding-a-new-ssh-key-to-your-github-account/>

<sup>14</sup><https://github.com/Tiboris/>

```

remote: Compressing objects: 100% (2/2), done.
remote: Total 4376 (delta 1776), reused 1775 (delta 1775),
pack-reused 2599
Receiving objects: 100% (4376/4376), 1.27 MiB
| 743.00 KiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (2932/2932), completed
with 809 local objects.
From https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt
* branch                master      -> FETCH_HEAD
   36fb0697e2..d089a5d773  master      -> upstream/master
$ git merge upstream/master

```

After we have environment ready to be worked on (all needed dependencies installed and fork of our buildroot downloaded on host system) let us just follow these simple 4 rules to not break our environment in any way.

1. Do everything in buildroot as non-root user!
2. Issue all OpenWrt build system commands in the <buildroot> directory, e.g. ~/buildroot-openwrt/
3. Do not build in a directory that has spaces in its full path.
4. Change ownership of the directory where we downloaded the OpenWrt to other than root user

\$

describe buildroot topology and describe what every single thing is what for  
 make will trigger making all packages not like in sdk  
 difference working with sdk and buildroot that sdk build only packages and buildroot  
 can build only package but it is designed to build entire image  
 for specified architecture respectively device from list  
 do not know how to add there new device but may provide link  
 configured with make menuconfig shown here firstly select architecture and configuration  
 will be generated into .config :

in sdk .config is pre generated and make menuconfig (need to find out if possible)

on sdk make will trigger only building packages in directory package and it has to be done right way

it is also possible to do this with buildroot but is better to have upstream or own packages there in right directory

screen

make menuconfig is to select all packages which we want to build todo find out if it is necessary to build base packages for selected

\$ make

\$ feeds install -a

tm tmp is needed if package directory has been edited to regenerate metadata of what (todo find out)

it is better to know what we are installing with feeds install and to choose only required packages for one newly choosed package to build

## Chapter 5

# Porting the dependencies

Programs don't run in a vacuum but they interface with the outside world. The view of this outside world differs from environment to environment. Things like hostnames, system resources, and local conventions could be different.

When we start porting a code to a specific target platform, in our case OpenWrt, it is likely that we will face the first problem: satisfying missing dependencies. This problem is easy to solve in principle, but can easily mess things up to a level we wouldn't imagine.

If the code depends on some library that is NOT in the root filesystem, there's no way out but to find them somewhere, somehow. Dependencies can be satisfied in two ways: with static libraries or with shared libraries. If we are lucky, we could find a binary package providing what we need (i.e. the library files and the header files), but most often we will have to cross-compile the source code on our own. Either ways, we end up with one or more binary files and a bunch of header files. Where to put them? Well, that depends. There are a few different situations that can happen, but basically everything reduces to having dependencies in buildroot's root filesystem or in a different folder.

Having dependencies in a different folder could be an interesting solution to keep the libraries that we cross-compiled on our own separated from the other libraries (for example, the system libraries). We can do that if we want but if we do, we must remember to provide to compiler and linker programs with the paths where header files and binary files can be found. With static libraries, this information are only needed at compile and linking time, but if we are using shared libraries, this won't suffice. We must also specify where these libraries can be found at run time.

If we are satisfying the dependencies with shared libraries (.so files) having dependencies in root filesystem is probably the most common solution (and maybe, the best solution). Remember that when everything will be up and running, these libraries must be installed somewhere in the file system of the target platform. So there is a natural answer to the question above: install them in the target's root filesystem, for example in /usr/lib (the binary shared files) and /usr/include (the header files) or in any other path that allow the loader to find those libraries when the program executes. Do not forget to install them in the file system of the actual target machine, in the same places, in order to make everything work as expected. Please note that static libraries ('a' files) does not need to be installed in the target file system since their code is embedded in the executable file when we cross-compile a program. In case of OpenWrt we will use this approach.

## 5.1 Find the dependencies

To port Tang to OpenWrt system we have have all its dependencies available and installed in buildroot. First thing we should do is some digging and find out if dependencies for our software, we are about to port, are available for target's platform. All packages available for OpenWrt can be found in its github repositories. Let us remember Tang's dependencies first:

- http-parser 5.2.2
- systemd's socket activation 6.4.1
- José 5.4.1
  - jansson 5.2.1
  - openssl ??
  - zlib ??

After some digging we will find out that the OpenWrt system has already packages openssl, zlib, http-parser, and jansson. Packages openssl and zlib are in versions already sufficient for Tang to get things work.

Package http-parser was little bit tricky. At first try there is a chance that we will not find this package in OpenWrt's repository. The reason might be that we will try to find a exactly „http-parser“ string in OpenWrt's GitHub repository openwrt/openwrt only. First of all, we must not forget that feeds of many packages are living in repository packages nested under openwrt organization. Secondly after searching repository openwrt/packages for http-parser we will find out that it is named as libhttp-parser and in version 2.2.3. This, let us say naming convention, is really common in Linux and could be predictable as the http-parser is in fact only a library. One way or another compared to fedora packages it needs to be updated.

Jansson package was only available in version 2.7 which is too outdated for Tang's dependency José because it require at least jansson version 2.9. We shall not forget that there is a need for updating jansson package for OpenWrt platform as well so we will do updates first.

Packages José, Tang and systemd are not listed in OpenWrt's packages. Porting of the systemd would be huge effort but tang's requirements are minimal and we should be able to work with xinetd's socket activation. Finally, as José and Tang are not listed in packages they will require to add them into package feeds to port Tang itself.

## 5.2 Update outdated packages

Finding that some of dependencies are already available on our desired target platform will definitely make us satisfied. We would agree that starting with something already built for OpenWrt is the best thing to do when you are approaching unknown platform. In following subsections we will use all things we know from section 4.5 Working with buildroot. Let us start with missing update of José's dependency, package jansson.

### 5.2.1 Update jansson

Tang uses this parser for both parsing HTTP requests and HTTP responses. The parser can be found on its own GitHub [\[10\]](#).

### 5.2.2 Update http-parser

## 5.3 Makefiles for OpenWrt's packages

This is very important part of creating new packages therefore porting them to openwrt this file is similar to specfiles on fedora...

```
#include<stdio.h>
#include<iostream>
int main(void)
{
    printf("Chello World\n");
    // comment
    return 0;
}
```

Listing 5.1: Basic C code.

## 5.4 Create new packages

### 5.4.1 Create José

José [11] is a C-language implementation of the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption standards. Specifically, José aims towards implementing the following standards:

- RFC 7515 - JSON Web Signature (JWS) [5]
- RFC 7516 - JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [7]
- RFC 7517 - JSON Web Key (JWK) [4]
- RFC 7518 - JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [3]
- RFC 7519 - JSON Web Token (JWT) [6]
- RFC 7520 - Examples of ... JOSE [13]
- RFC 7638 - JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint [8]

JOSE (Javascript Object Signing and Encryption) is a framework intended to provide a method to securely transfer claims (such as authorization information) between parties.

Tang uses JWKs in communication between client and server. Both POST request and reply bodies are JWK objects.



## Chapter 6

# Porting Tang

### 6.1 Install dependencies

update feeds feeds install make menuconfig

## **6.2 Socket activation with xinetd**

there is no systemd for OpenWrt need to configure socket activation because tang is not programmed to use nor create its own sockets

### **6.2.1 How**

to have an example created simple application in C for xinetd

## 6.3 Cross-compile Tang

do not forget to add xinetd in Dependencies

### **6.3.1 Concealing http-parser**

without upstream patch not working tang

### **6.3.2 Mysterious José**

does makefiles support shell a,b thing???

## 6.4 Configure Tang with xinetd

We need xinetd's socket activation for Tang to work.

### 6.4.1 systemd

systemd is a suite of basic building blocks for a Linux system. It provides a system and service manager that runs as PID 1 and starts the rest of the system. systemd provides aggressive parallelization capabilities, uses socket and D-Bus activation for starting services, offers on-demand starting of daemons, keeps track of processes using Linux control groups, maintains mount and automount points, and implements an elaborate transactional dependency-based service control logic. **[[Why is systemd needed by tang]]**

/etc/services  
xinetd configuration

### 6.4.2

# Chapter 7

## Tang on OpenWrt

### 7.1 Configuration

#### 7.1.1 OPKG Package manager

The opkg utility (Open Package Management System) is a lightweight package manager used to download and install OpenWrt packages. The opkg is fork of an ipkg (Itsy Package Management System). These packages could be stored somewhere on device's filesystem or the package manager will download them from local package repositories or ones located on the Internet mirrors. Users already familiar with GNU/Linux package managers like apt/apt-get, pacman, yum, dnf, emerge etc. will definitely recognize the similarities. It also has similarities with NSLU2's Optware, also made for embedded devices. Fact that OPKG is also a full package manager for the root file system, instead of just a way to add software to a separate directory (e.g. /opt) includes the possibility to add kernel modules and drivers. OPKG is sometimes called Entware, but this is mainly to refer to the Entware repository for embedded devices.

Opkg attempts to resolve dependencies with packages in the repositories - if this fails, it will report an error, and abort the installation of that package.

Missing dependencies with third-party packages are probably available from the source of the package.

### 7.2 Limitations

### 7.3 Contribute your work

Everyone can profit from our work...

#### 7.3.1 subsection name

Make it look easy

Be tidy create nice files and patch files to be used.

#### 7.3.2 Follow contribution guide

[\[\[mailing lists\]\]](#)  
[\[\[github - how\]\]](#)

## Chapter 8

# Conclusion

The Tang 3 server is a very lightweight program. It provides secure and anonymous data binding using McCallum-Relyea exchange 3.1 algorithm.

As every server purpose is to serve its clients, it needs to have client application. In case of Tang we have Clevis. Clevis 3.9 is a client software with full support for Tang. It has minimal dependencies and it is possible to use with HTTP, Escrow 3.1, and it implements Shamir Secret Sharing. Clevis has GNOME integration so it is not only a command line tool. Clevis also supports removable devices unocking using UDisks2 or even early boot integration with dracut, which was this thesis inspiration and goal to achieve with only embedded device supported OpenWrt running Tang server.

To port Tang to OpenWrt system it was necessary to port all its dependencies first. The OpenWrt system has already package openssl, zlib, and jansson but only version 2.7 which was too old. So there was a need for updating jansson to resolve all dependencies for package José. José required porting and after focusing on upstream version porting on this package was straightforward. After struggling with older version, package http-parser known as libhttp-parser in OpenWrt feeds, is now updated to latest upstream version 2.8.0. The systemd would be huge effort but tang's requirements are minimal and we were able to work with xinetd's socket activation. With correct configuration of xinetd and removing dependency for systemd Tang server is running on OpenWrt with some platform specific changes mentioned in chapter 6 Porting Tang.



# Bibliography

- [1] Bauer, J.: *LUKS In-Place Conversion Tool*. [Online] Accessed 3 May 2017.  
Retrieved from: <http://www.johannes-bauer.com/linux/luksipc/>
- [2] Fruhwirth, C.: LUKS On-Disk Format Specification Version 1.1. *Changes*. vol. 1. 2005: pp. 22–01,. [Online] Accessed 22 April 2018.  
Retrieved from: [http://tomb.dyne.org/Luks\\_on\\_disk\\_format.pdf](http://tomb.dyne.org/Luks_on_disk_format.pdf)
- [3] Jones, M.: JSON Web Algorithms (JWA). Technical Report 7518. May 2015.  
Retrieved from: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7518.txt>
- [4] Jones, M.: JSON Web Key (JWK). Technical Report 7517. May 2015.  
Retrieved from: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7517.txt>
- [5] Jones, M.; Bradley, J.; Sakimura, N.: JSON Web Signature (JWS). Technical Report 7515. May 2015.  
Retrieved from: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7515.txt>
- [6] Jones, M.; Bradley, J.; Sakimura, N.: JSON Web Token (JWT). Technical Report 7519. May 2015.  
Retrieved from: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7519.txt>
- [7] Jones, M.; Hildebrand, J.: JSON Web Encryption (JWE). Technical Report 7516. May 2015.  
Retrieved from: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7516.txt>
- [8] Jones, M.; Sakimura, N.: JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint. Technical Report 7638. September 2015.  
Retrieved from: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7638.txt>
- [9] Lehey, G.: *Porting UNIX Software: From Download to Debug*. Sebastopol, CA, USA: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.. 1995. ISBN 1-56592-126-7.
- [10] McCallum, N.: *HTTP-parser*. [Online] Accessed 1 May 2017.  
Retrieved from: <https://github.com/nodejs/http-parser>
- [11] McCallum, N.: *jose*. [Online] Accessed 1 May 2017.  
Retrieved from: <https://github.com/latchset/jose>
- [12] Microsoft: *BitLocker*. [Online] Accessed 21 April 2018.  
Retrieved from: <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/bitlocker/bitlocker-overview>

- [13] Miller, M.: Examples of Protecting Content Using JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE). Technical Report 7520. May 2015.  
Retrieved from: <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7520.txt>
- [14] SplashData: *Worst Passwords of 2016*. [Online] Accessed 15 May 2017.  
Retrieved from:  
[https://www.teamsid.com/worst-passwords-2016/?nabe=4587092537769984:2,6610887771422720:1&utm\\_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.cz%2F](https://www.teamsid.com/worst-passwords-2016/?nabe=4587092537769984:2,6610887771422720:1&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.cz%2F)
- [15] Steinbeck John, e. b. S. S.; Benson., J. J.: *Of men and their making*. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press. 2002. ISBN 07-139-9622-6.
- [16] Team, U. P. R.: Security Analysis of Cryptsetup/LUKS. 2012. [Online] Accessed 22 April 2018.  
Retrieved from:  
[https://www.privacy-cd.org/analysis/cryptsetup\\_1.4.1-luks-analysis-en.pdf](https://www.privacy-cd.org/analysis/cryptsetup_1.4.1-luks-analysis-en.pdf)
- [17] Thales: *Global Encryption Trends Study*. [Online] Accessed 1 May 2017.  
Retrieved from:  
[http://images.go.thales-esecurity.com/Web/ThalesEsecurity/{5f704501-1e4f-41a8-91ee-490c2bb492ae}\\_Global\\_Encryption\\_Trends\\_Study\\_eng\\_ar.pdf](http://images.go.thales-esecurity.com/Web/ThalesEsecurity/{5f704501-1e4f-41a8-91ee-490c2bb492ae}_Global_Encryption_Trends_Study_eng_ar.pdf)
- [18] Wakefield, R. L.: Network Security and Password Policies. *The CPA Journal*. vol. 74, no. 7. 07 2004: pp. 6–6,8. copyright - Copyright New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants Jul 2004; Last updated - 2011-07-20;  
SubjectsTermNotLitGenreText - United States; US.  
Retrieved from:  
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/212314970?accountid=17115>
- [19] Wikipedia: *Free On The Fly Encryption*. [Online] Accessed 3 May 2017.  
Retrieved from: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FreeOTFE>
- [20] Wikipedia: *Porting*. [Online] Accessed 1 May 2017.  
Retrieved from: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Porting>

## Appendix A

### Disk content

## Appendix B

# Pre-installation enablement of hard drive encryption

### B.1 Fedora 25 - disc encryption option selecting




Figure B.1: Checking option

## B.2 Fedora 25 - determination key encryption key




Figure B.2: Determining key

## Appendix C

# LUKS In-Place Encryption

It takes 4 steps to perform an in place encryption with *luksipc* [1]:

1. Unmounting the filesystem
2. Resizing the filesystem to shrink about 10 megabytes (2048 kB is the current LUKS header size – but do not trust this value, it has changed in the past!)
3. Performing luksipc
4. Adding custom keys to the LUKS keyring

### C.1 Step 1 - unmounting

There should not be any problems unmounting partition, unless you want to encrypt / - the root partition, which in our case (to lock whole disk) will be necessary. To do so we need to restart our computer and boot any other or live distribution capable of completing these next steps.

```
# umount /dev/vda2
```

### C.2 Step 2 - resizing

There are plenty tools for re-sizing, essentially for partitioning as whole (fdisk, e2fsck, etc.). Demonstrating how this is done for ext 2, 3, 4 here:

```
# e2fsck /dev/vda2
```

```
# resize2fs /dev/vda2 -s -10M
```

Delete and recreate shrunked partition with fdisk:

```
# fdisk /dev/vda Welcome to fdisk (util-linux 2.23.2).
```

Changes will remain in memory only, until you decide to write them. Be careful before using the write command.

```
Command (m for help):
```

```
Check the partition number:
```

```
Command (m for help): p Disk /dev/vda: 407.6 GiB, 437629485056 bytes, 854745088 sectors
Units: sectors of 1 * 512 = 512 bytes Sector size (logical/physical): 512 bytes / 4096 bytes
I/O size (minimum/optimal): 4096 bytes / 4096 bytes Disklabel type: dos Disk identifier: 0x5c873cba
Partition 2 does not start on physical sector boundary.
```

```
Device Boot Start End Blocks Id System /dev/vda1 * 2048 1026047 512000 83
Linux /dev/vda2 1026048 1640447 307200 8e Linux LVM
```

### C.3 Step 3 - encrypting

After this, luksipc comes into play. It performs an in-place encryption of the data and prepends the partition with a LUKS header. First we have to download luksipc or install it with package manager.

```
$ wget https://github.com/johndoe31415/luksipc/archive/master.zip
$ unzip master.zip
$ cd luksipc-master/
$ make
```

Now run it with parameters like:

```
# ./luksipc -d /dev/vda2
```

luksipc will have created a key file `/root/initial_keyfile.bin` that you can use to gain access to the newly created LUKS device:

```
# cryptsetup luksOpen -key-file /root/initial_keyfile.bin /dev/vda2 fedoradrive
```

### C.4 Step 4 - adding key

DO NOT FORGET to add key to LUKS volume:

```
# cryptsetup luksAddKey -key-file /root/initial_keyfile.bin /dev/vda2
```