

# From AUTOSAR Adaptive to a Safe Level 4 ADAS Platform

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
# Contents



- ✓ ADAS ECU - TTIntegration Platform Approach and Validation Support
- ✓ Experience from Level 3 series projects
- ✓ TTIntegration and AUTOSAR Adaptive
- ✓ The fail-operational Level 4 challenge
- ✓ Putting it all together


# ADAS Domain ECU Architecture – Scalable and Flexible Architecture

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# Ad Hoc Software Architecture


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- ▼ Different APIs, no SWC portability
- ▼ Inhomogeneous basic services, tool and integration landscape
- ▼ „Manual“ interface adaptation between SWCs

# Integrated Software Architecture – Integration and Validation Support


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- ✓ Uniform basic services on all Hosts
- ✓ SWCs can be moved between Hosts
- ✓ Integrated Tooling and SWC integration process


# PC-based SW-in-the-Loop Simulation (SIL)

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# Debugging & Tracing – Validation Support using Open Standards


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# Software Integration of Complex Real-Time Systems

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1. Integration of platform without configuring execution frames
2. Applications are integrated and tested individually by SWC suppliers without any timing restrictions
3. All applications are integrated by the SW-integrator on the platform; conflicts start immediately as it is not clear who is causing problems and why




4. Conflicts are reported back to function SW suppliers, applications have to be modified to meet the system's timing restrictions




# Modular Platform - Reduced Integration and Validation Efforts

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
Integration process  
massively accelerated




Iterations are  
avoided



1. Platform configuration  
and application  
scheduling



2. Single SWC test within  
configured schedule




3. SWCs are instantly running  
together ("composability")

# Insights from Serial Development

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
Providing a clean platform architecture requires only very little HW-Overhead (Switch)



Middleware features are intensively used (flexible SW allocation, PC co-simulation, debug features)




A clearly defined integration process is very helpful for the work split between suppliers, dependencies and release organization




## Next Generation – Diverse Application Interfaces with AUTOSAR Adaptive

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


# Next Generation – Diverse Application Interfaces with AUTOSAR Adaptive




## Next Generation – Diverse Application Interfaces with AUTOSAR Adaptive

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
# Automated Driving - System Classification by VDA

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# Level 4 - Safety Requirements


- Level 4 automated driving requires ASIL D
- No high performance compute chips available for ASIL D
- High speed Level 4 automated driving required fault tolerance ASIL D




# The Fail-Operational Requirement

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Level 4: “System can handle all situations automatically in the specific application case” [VDA] → Even in the case of component failures!



- ✓ Autonomous lane change to the side and stopping



- ✓ Or Stop the car (avoiding obstacles)



# Why is it Difficult?

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
Airplanes are fly-by-wire and fail-operational ...

... but they use triple or quad redundant diverse electronics  
And they have very strict software development requirements



TTTech provides the fly-by-wire network for Embraer E-Jet E2 Family



## 777 Triple-Triple Architecture [Yeh, 96]



- Boeing 777 Flight Computer
- 3 x 3 Architecture
- Hardware diversity
- „Perfect“ Software – No ASIL decomposition like mechanisms

# ISO 26262 Approach

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
ASIL: Automotive Safety Integrity Level

# Design Corners For Random Hardware Faults

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1oo2


one out of two



- ✓ Components need to be fail-silent or self-checking (i.e., deliver correct result or no result at all)

2oo3

two out of three




- ✓ Components can fail arbitrarily
- ✓ The voter becomes the critical element and a single point of failure
- ✓ Components can be ASIL B (high performance) but the voter becomes ASIL D (embedded safety)


## Solution Sketch Systematic Faults – Fail-operational ASIL-D and Diversity




diverse software  
single hardware



single software  
diverse hardware




diverse software  
diverse hardware



- ✓ In most cases diversity is more costly and more effort compared to a single version with a higher ASIL level
- ✓ Unfortunately many COTS SW/HW components are not available as ASIL D
- ✓ But many COTS components are available from multiple suppliers (Operating Systems, SoCs etc.)
  - No need to raise to fail-operational ASIL D due to diversity opportunity
- ✓ The “right” compromise is clearly application specific


## The New Problem for fail-operational Architectures : Example insufficient ASIL D Decomposition



Bugs in QM components  
are detected but message  
is still unusable

System is only "QM" concerning  
availability of the software

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# The Fail-Operational Challenge




- ✓ Find the optimal architectural compromise for cost, safety and performance by selecting
  - ✓ the best suited hardware fault-tolerance mechanisms,
  - ✓ the most appropriate ASIL decomposition
  - ✓ considering diversity where necessary or beneficial
  - ✓ based on the best suited set of sensor and SoCs
  - ✓ considering scalability

# Fail-operational Redundancy Integration: Fail-operational as a Simple Add-in (1)

## Sensors

High Integrity Main  
Node enables (fail-  
silent) ASIL D  
commands



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
Add-in Fallback Node  
as a flexible low cost  
architecture  
extension for fail-op  
systems



# Random/Systematic HW Fault Solution: Partition Independence (1)

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
Sensors



# Random HW Fault Solution: Partition Independence (1)




Sensors



System architecture allows use of "high FIT" performance SoCs


# Systematic Software Faults – Example Application Architecture Solution



# Platform Architecture for Level 4 Automated Driving (1)

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
- Flexible combination of SoCs according to the necessary performance and ASIL level
- Flexibility to support different redundancy, and diversity schemes



# Platform Architecture for Level 4 Automated Driving (2)

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
- Flexible combination of different operating systems according to needed features and ASIL level
- Possibility for diverse operating systems use



# Next Generation Platform Architecture (3)

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- Flexible combination of SWCs with different ASIL levels
- Coexistence of fail-silent and fail-op SWCs without interference
- Diverse application interfaces (POSIX, AUTOSAR (Classic, Adaptive))
- Diverse and replicated SWCs will be supported
- Middleware will fulfill fail-op ASIL D



## TTIntegration for fail-operational Level 4 Autonomous Driving



- ✓ We do not know what the OEM's Level 4 application will look like - But the next generation TTIntegration will support it by providing a flexible fail-operational ASIL D execution environment

✓ Thank you for your attention

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