

Title of your thesis

Bachelor-Arbeit

zur Erlangung des Grades

Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.)

im Studiengang Mathematik

am Department Mathematik der
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

vorgelegt am **18.Mai 2020**

von **Your name**

Prüfer: Prof. A
Prüfer: Dr. B
Betreuer: M.Sc. C

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Chapter 1

About

Actually, you never know if
you're sleeping or not, it's kind
of an illusion.

(Benno B.)

1.1 Purpose of this document

This document is a bundle of various finds and techniques that I came across with during the process of *writing mathematics*. It both serves as an introduction to the programming language \LaTeX as well as an user guide for the class `fau-math-thesis`. Concerning the first aspect, one has to note that there are in fact a number of very good tutorials and courses available online and in print [`latex`]. The reader is strongly encouraged to use the given sources, however the introduction presented here may suffice for the target audience and is a fortiori to be understood as a memory aid for frequent \LaTeX users, which was a strong motivation for me to write this document. Concerning my perception of the target audience, I will note the following: Primarily it consists of FAU students that are in the process of writing any thesis involving mathematics, secondarily of anybody else with the same problem. The topics mentioned so far cover the task of making the computer do what you want, thus in order to help you write a good thesis I will also present some guidelines that improve your wants. Finally it should be noted that the style of writing and respectively teaching is rather casual and informal, which is a purposely implemented feature, especially the use of the personal pronoun—which is highly uncommon when writing a thesis—is a product of this directive.

1.2 What is the class `fau-math-thesis`?

If you are a beginner and didn't look into the \LaTeX basics yet you may skip this section. To answer the question of the title plain and simple, `fau-math-thesis` is a \LaTeX class. While there is a humongous amount of cleverly written class files available, especially for the purpose of writing a thesis in mathematics, one should note an important difference concerning the philosophy of `fau-math-thesis`.

Simplicity over flexibility! This template is designed for a specific purpose and is to be customized only within the boundaries of this task.

Many packages and class files [**refLatex**] tend to offer very flexible solutions that are applicable to a vast variety of problems, the main goal of this project is to offer a rather intuitive \LaTeX template that on the one hand allows beginners to get started with writing mathematics and on the other hand helps students write their thesis. Hence, the mentioned *specific purpose* is best described by

- learning \LaTeX ,
- writing a Bachelors or Master thesis that involves mathematics.

One has to take into account that **fau-math-thesis** was not written from scratch but rather is a melting pot of different techniques I employed in various documents. Historically it bases off of my Bachelor thesis, which was a rebase of another one and so on. In fact, it was this frustrating process of sending code around via email to students and colleagues that showed the need for an unified framework. So it is indeed an aspiration to substitute the template that is currently provided by the mathematics department of FAU, [1]. Especially for beginners this is hard to use and does not offer enough functionality, thus it is not entirely wrong to claim that **fau-math-thesis** is a cleaned and pumped up version that is easy to handle and specifically provides the lacking functionality mentioned before. Furthermore it is important to note the didactic structure of the code, as it is also to be—and was in fact—used as \LaTeX tutorial.

1.3 Structure of this document

As mentioned before we will cover three main topics that are briefly summarized below,

- ?? gives a very quick introduction to \LaTeX which showcases the basic concepts of this programming language that will allow the reader to write his own thesis,
- [Chapter 2](#) is somewhat of a documentation for the class **fau-math-thesis**,
- ?? gives an introduction to the world of *writing mathematics*.

Chapter 2

Writing a math thesis with fau-math-thesis

This chapter is dedicated to the functionality of the template concerning its actual and inherent purpose: mathematics. We use material from [1] to showcase the possibilities.

2.1 Some basics

Choosing a language While the whole process of writing a thesis can be exhausting, I would recommend the latter option. It is great practice and will most certainly help you later on. Take me for an example, as you probably have already guessed, I’m not a native English speaker, thus some sentences are a bit clumsy. Nevertheless writing my thesis helped me improve my language skills to the point that I’m now able to write documents that most people worldwide understand.

2.2 Formal requirements

Your thesis must fulfil certain formal requirements laid down by the [examinations office of the faculty of sciences](#)¹. However to the best of my knowledge there are only very few—compared with other universities—which are listed below.

- A title page: the layout is prescribed on the website of the examinations office, we employed the original source code and hence fulfil this requirement (see [Section 2.4](#)).
- The usage of a permitted language. You will find a passage in examination regulations which basically states, that your thesis has to be written in German, except

¹<https://www.fau.eu/education/advice-and-services/examination-offices/examinations-office-faculty-of-sciences>

the examiner allows you to write it in English. It is also possible to use a different language, but this has to be discussed with your examiner *and* the examinations office.

- A declaration: this is a short statement where you ensure that the work is original up to the references you explicitly mentioned². See [Section 2.5](#) for more information.

More informations about the regularities for writing a thesis can be found on the official website of the FAU (see [\[9\]](#)).

2.3 How to structure your thesis

On a very course level there are three parts you should divide your thesis into.

1. The front matter: the first few pages of your document should contain
 - a title page,
 - a table of contents.

Additionally you can include

- a list of figures,
- a quick guide to the nomenclature,
- an abstract,
- an acknowledgement
- a preface.

Note, that you can add the preface as a chapter, which will not be numbered. Never go below the chapter hierarchy in the front matter, i.e. do not use sections.

2. The main matter: the actual content of your thesis goes here.
3. The back matter: you will use this part of your thesis for
 - the bibliography,
 - any kind of appendices,
 - the declaration.

Additionally if you want to employ an index, it will be displayed here.

```
\frontmatter
\mainmatter
\backmatter
```

²You should keep in mind that this is serious stuff, it is necessary to reference *all* your sources properly for the thesis not to be interpreted as plagiarism.

These commands structure the document as mentioned above. You may ask yourself why it is necessary to use these commands at all, it should be enough for me know where which part starts, right? In fact, there are some small difference between the three that do not only affect your choice of content, but also the appearance of the pages. The command `\frontmatter` sets Roman numerals for pagination, that start at *i*. As hinted above chapter numbering is also turned off. The command `\mainmatter` will restart the numbering at 1 with Arabic numerals. A common but *very* severe mistake would be to put page 1 on an actual even sided page (see [Sections 2.6](#) and [2.10](#)). The provided commands prevent such behaviour. The command `\backmatter` does pretty much the same as `\frontmatter` but *keeps* the page numbering.

EXAMPLE 2.1.

The typical usage of the commands above is displayed below.

```
\begin{document}
%-----
\frontmatter
% here you will put stuff like the titlepage and the
% table of contents
% ...
%-----
\mainmatter
% put all your main contents here
% ...
%-----
\backmatter
% stuff like bibliography and appendices
% ...
\end{document}
```

2.4 The front matter

The titlepage Note that the title page always uses German for the prescribed text. However, it is not really clear whether you need to translate the title, this can be a tricky question ³, discuss this with your examiner!

³My Bachelor thesis was written in English and it turned out that translating the title would be rather weird, since it mostly consists of terms that don't have an appropriate German analogue.

2.5 The back matter

Declaration As mentioned in [Section 2.2](#) you need to include a declaration where you ensure the originality of your work. This text is pre-formulated and can be found on the website, see [\[9\]](#).

```
\begin{declaration}...\end{declaration}
\declarationGer
```

The `declaration` environment allows you to create the above mentioned declaration. If the option `twoside` is active it will always be placed on a odd sided page, furthermore it clears a page, is *not* included as a chapter and uses an empty page style, i.e. no footers or headers are displayed. As the text is pre-formulated already you can just use the command `\declarationGer` that will place this text inside the environment.

MEMO 2.2: Language of formal text

Everything in your document that has a formal character, i.e. is a stated requirement of [Section 2.2](#) should be written in German. This also applies to the declaration. It is good practice not to use anything fancy like boxes and colours for these types of pages, except of course it is required.

We will now showcase the effect of the command `\declarationGer`.

Erklärung

Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbstständig verfasst und keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt habe, dass alle Stellen der Arbeit, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß aus anderen Quellen übernommen wurden, als solche kenntlich gemacht sind und dass die Arbeit in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form noch keiner Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt wurde.

Erlangen, den 18.Mai 2020

.....

Your name

Bibliography Brace yourself, this part is as important as difficult if you haven't created a bibliography before. The basic task is simple: whenever we use concepts and ideas that aren't our own we need to cite the source we got it from. Furthermore it is often simpler to redirect the reader to certain literature instead of copying it all to your thesis. You have probably already observed this concept as it was also employed for this document, but let us start with an example from the world of mathematics.

EXAMPLE 2.3: Citing.

The concepts introduced by Kantorovich [6] original published in 1942 are the most important steps towards the optimal transport theory as we know it today. The reader is referred to [2, 3] for an extensive study of the results connected to these concepts. We will proceed to consider numerical methods in optimal methods as presented in [3, Ch. 6].

THEOREM 2.4: Benamou-Brenier-Guittet [7].

A pretty neat convergence result...

Proof. We refer to the original source for a complete formal proof. It should however be noted that one can find some very intuitive arguments in [3, Ch. 6] that will help to understand the proof better. \square

In [Example 2.3](#) we explored the most common style of citing references in the mathematical world. This is often referred to as in-text citation via AMS plain. This means that we incorporate the reference directly in the text, but instead of placing the full reference text, we simply display a number that corresponds to the respective source. The number-reference mapping will be displayed in the bibliography. So how do we do this in \LaTeX ? By the help of the package [biblatex](#)⁴. The first step is to create a file that stores the information of our references. In our case this will be the file `bibliography/thesis-bibliography.bib`.

EXAMPLE 2.5: The .bib file.

```
@article{Kantorovich06,
  title={On the Translocation of Masses},
  author={Kantorovich, Leonid V.},
  journal={Journal of Mathematical Sciences},
  year={2006},
  volume={133},
  pages={1381-1382}
}
@book{Evans15,
  Author = {Lawrence Craig Evans},
```

⁴<https://ctan.org/pkg/biblatex>

```

    title = {Measure Theory and Fine Properties of
              Functions, Revised Edition (Textbooks in
              Mathematics)},
    description = {Measure Theory and Fine
                  Properties of Functions, Revised Edition (
                  Textbooks in Mathematics) (Book, 2015)},
    publisher = {Chapman and Hall/CRC},
    year = {2015},
    month = {4},
    isbn = {9781482242386},
    url = {https://www.xarg.org/ref/a/1482242389/}
}
@online{FAUreg,
    title = {Examination regulations of FAU},
    url = {https://www.fau.de/fau/rechtsgrundlagen/
          pruefungsordnungen/naturwissenschaftliche-
          fakultaet},
    urldate = {2020-05-02}
}

```

You can or better you should open this file right now and get familiar with it. You will find an excerpt in [Example 2.5](#).

```

@article{...}
@book{...}
@online{...}
@misc{...}

```

These are the most important commands to create a new entry in your `.bib` file. They work pretty similar, but are only to be used for each specific type of entry. So you will use `@article{...}` for papers and articles `@book{...}` for books, `@online{...}` for websites and `@misc{...}` for anything else you can't really classify. If you feel the need to use different types, you will find some additional ones in the package documentation of `biblatex`. So what do we write inside the brackets? The first argument is the label of the entry, this is only used for `LATEX`code and will not be displayed in your document. You should, however, use a consistent naming scheme here, since you will need this label in your code. For books and papers you could use `<author><last two digits of publishing year>`. The other arguments are all put in via `<arg>={<text>}` and are separated by comma. Collecting these data is a tedious but many websites export in BibTeX format and there are tools⁵ that output the data in wanted format. Furthermore instead of working directly in `.bib` via a editor, you can employ software like `jabref`⁶. In

⁵<https://www.doi2bib.org/> for example

⁶<https://www.jabref.org/>

order to obtain a good looking bibliography you should be as consistent with given data as possible, i.e. entries of the same type should have the same information.

`\cite{<label>}`

This command allows you to create a reference to an entry in the bibliography, see [Listing 2.6](#)

LISTING 2.6: Usage the cite command

```
Basic usage: \cite{Evans15}.\
Using multiple entries: \cite{Evans15, Kantorovich06}.\
Adding information about pages or chapters: \cite[P.
87]{Evans15}.
```

Basic usage: [1].

Using multiple entries: [1, 6].

Adding information about pages or chapters: [1, P. 87].

...

Appendix As any dedicated reader can clearly see, the Ideal of practical reason is a representation of, as far as I know, the things in themselves; as I have shown elsewhere, the phenomena should only be used as a canon for our understanding. The paralogisms of practical reason are what first give rise to the architectonic of practical reason. As will easily be shown in the next section, reason would thereby be made to contradict, in view of these considerations, the Ideal of practical reason, yet the manifold depends on the phenomena. Necessity depends on, when thus treated as the practical employment of the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions, time. Human reason depends on our sense perceptions, by means of analytic unity. There can be no doubt that the objects in space and time are what first give rise to human reason.

Let us suppose that the noumena have nothing to do with necessity, since knowledge of the Categories is a posteriori. Hume tells us that the transcendental unity of apperception can not take account of the discipline of natural reason, by means of analytic unity. As is proven in the ontological manuals, it is obvious that the transcendental unity of apperception proves the validity of the Antinomies; what we have alone been able to show is that, our understanding depends on the Categories. It remains a mystery why the Ideal stands in need of reason. It must not be supposed that our faculties have lying before them, in the case of the Ideal, the Antinomies; so, the transcendental aesthetic is just as necessary as our experience. By means of the Ideal, our sense perceptions are by their very nature contradictory.

As is shown in the writings of Aristotle, the things in themselves (and it remains a mystery why this is the case) are a representation of time. Our concepts have lying before them the paralogisms of natural reason, but our a posteriori concepts have lying before

Explain how to abbreviate names in entries.

Explain the compiling process!

them the practical employment of our experience. Because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, the paralogisms would thereby be made to contradict, indeed, space; for these reasons, the Transcendental Deduction has lying before it our sense perceptions. (Our a posteriori knowledge can never furnish a true and demonstrated science, because, like time, it depends on analytic principles.) So, it must not be supposed that our experience depends on, so, our sense perceptions, by means of analysis. Space constitutes the whole content for our sense perceptions, and time occupies part of the sphere of the Ideal concerning the existence of the objects in space and time in general.

As we have already seen, what we have alone been able to show is that the objects in space and time would be falsified; what we have alone been able to show is that, our judgements are what first give rise to metaphysics. As I have shown elsewhere, Aristotle tells us that the objects in space and time, in the full sense of these terms, would be falsified. Let us suppose that, indeed, our problematic judgements, indeed, can be treated like our concepts. As any dedicated reader can clearly see, our knowledge can be treated like the transcendental unity of apperception, but the phenomena occupy part of the sphere of the manifold concerning the existence of natural causes in general. Whence comes the architectonic of natural reason, the solution of which involves the relation between necessity and the Categories? Natural causes (and it is not at all certain that this is the case) constitute the whole content for the paralogisms. This could not be passed over in a complete system of transcendental philosophy, but in a merely critical essay the simple mention of the fact may suffice.

Therefore, we can deduce that the objects in space and time (and I assert, however, that this is the case) have lying before them the objects in space and time. Because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, it must not be supposed that, then, formal logic (and what we have alone been able to show is that this is true) is a representation of the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions, but the discipline of pure reason, in so far as this expounds the contradictory rules of metaphysics, depends on the Antinomies. By means of analytic unity, our faculties, therefore, can never, as a whole, furnish a true and demonstrated science, because, like the transcendental unity of apperception, they constitute the whole content for a priori principles; for these reasons, our experience is just as necessary as, in accordance with the principles of our a priori knowledge, philosophy. The objects in space and time abstract from all content of knowledge. Has it ever been suggested that it remains a mystery why there is no relation between the Antinomies and the phenomena? It must not be supposed that the Antinomies (and it is not at all certain that this is the case) are the clue to the discovery of philosophy, because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions. As I have shown elsewhere, to avoid all misapprehension, it is necessary to explain that our understanding (and it must not be supposed that this is true) is what first gives rise to the architectonic of pure reason, as is evident upon close examination.

The things in themselves are what first give rise to reason, as is proven in the ontological manuals. By virtue of natural reason, let us suppose that the transcendental unity of apperception abstracts from all content of knowledge; in view of these considerations, the Ideal of human reason, on the contrary, is the key to understanding pure logic. Let us suppose that, irrespective of all empirical conditions, our understanding

stands in need of our disjunctive judgements. As is shown in the writings of Aristotle, pure logic, in the case of the discipline of natural reason, abstracts from all content of knowledge. Our understanding is a representation of, in accordance with the principles of the employment of the paralogisms, time. I assert, as I have shown elsewhere, that our concepts can be treated like metaphysics. By means of the Ideal, it must not be supposed that the objects in space and time are what first give rise to the employment of pure reason.

As is evident upon close examination, to avoid all misapprehension, it is necessary to explain that, on the contrary, the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions is a representation of our inductive judgements, yet the things in themselves prove the validity of, on the contrary, the Categories. It remains a mystery why, indeed, the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions exists in philosophy, but the employment of the Antinomies, in respect of the intelligible character, can never furnish a true and demonstrated science, because, like the architectonic of pure reason, it is just as necessary as problematic principles. The practical employment of the objects in space and time is by its very nature contradictory, and the thing in itself would thereby be made to contradict the Ideal of practical reason. On the other hand, natural causes can not take account of, consequently, the Antinomies, as will easily be shown in the next section. Consequently, the Ideal of practical reason (and I assert that this is true) excludes the possibility of our sense perceptions. Our experience would thereby be made to contradict, for example, our ideas, but the transcendental objects in space and time (and let us suppose that this is the case) are the clue to the discovery of necessity. But the proof of this is a task from which we can here be absolved.

Index As any dedicated reader can clearly see, the Ideal of practical reason is a representation of, as far as I know, the things in themselves; as I have shown elsewhere, the phenomena should only be used as a canon for our understanding. The paralogisms of practical reason are what first give rise to the architectonic of practical reason. As will easily be shown in the next section, reason would thereby be made to contradict, in view of these considerations, the Ideal of practical reason, yet the manifold depends on the phenomena. Necessity depends on, when thus treated as the practical employment of the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions, time. Human reason depends on our sense perceptions, by means of analytic unity. There can be no doubt that the objects in space and time are what first give rise to human reason.

Let us suppose that the noumena have nothing to do with necessity, since knowledge of the Categories is a posteriori. Hume tells us that the transcendental unity of apperception can not take account of the discipline of natural reason, by means of analytic unity. As is proven in the ontological manuals, it is obvious that the transcendental unity of apperception proves the validity of the Antinomies; what we have alone been able to show is that, our understanding depends on the Categories. It remains a mystery why the Ideal stands in need of reason. It must not be supposed that our faculties have lying before them, in the case of the Ideal, the Antinomies; so, the transcendental aesthetic is

just as necessary as our experience. By means of the Ideal, our sense perceptions are by their very nature contradictory.

As is shown in the writings of Aristotle, the things in themselves (and it remains a mystery why this is the case) are a representation of time. Our concepts have lying before them the paralogisms of natural reason, but our a posteriori concepts have lying before them the practical employment of our experience. Because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, the paralogisms would thereby be made to contradict, indeed, space; for these reasons, the Transcendental Deduction has lying before it our sense perceptions. (Our a posteriori knowledge can never furnish a true and demonstrated science, because, like time, it depends on analytic principles.) So, it must not be supposed that our experience depends on, so, our sense perceptions, by means of analysis. Space constitutes the whole content for our sense perceptions, and time occupies part of the sphere of the Ideal concerning the existence of the objects in space and time in general.

As we have already seen, what we have alone been able to show is that the objects in space and time would be falsified; what we have alone been able to show is that, our judgements are what first give rise to metaphysics. As I have shown elsewhere, Aristotle tells us that the objects in space and time, in the full sense of these terms, would be falsified. Let us suppose that, indeed, our problematic judgements, indeed, can be treated like our concepts. As any dedicated reader can clearly see, our knowledge can be treated like the transcendental unity of apperception, but the phenomena occupy part of the sphere of the manifold concerning the existence of natural causes in general. Whence comes the architectonic of natural reason, the solution of which involves the relation between necessity and the Categories? Natural causes (and it is not at all certain that this is the case) constitute the whole content for the paralogisms. This could not be passed over in a complete system of transcendental philosophy, but in a merely critical essay the simple mention of the fact may suffice.

Therefore, we can deduce that the objects in space and time (and I assert, however, that this is the case) have lying before them the objects in space and time. Because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, it must not be supposed that, then, formal logic (and what we have alone been able to show is that this is true) is a representation of the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions, but the discipline of pure reason, in so far as this expounds the contradictory rules of metaphysics, depends on the Antinomies. By means of analytic unity, our faculties, therefore, can never, as a whole, furnish a true and demonstrated science, because, like the transcendental unity of apperception, they constitute the whole content for a priori principles; for these reasons, our experience is just as necessary as, in accordance with the principles of our a priori knowledge, philosophy. The objects in space and time abstract from all content of knowledge. Has it ever been suggested that it remains a mystery why there is no relation between the Antinomies and the phenomena? It must not be supposed that the Antinomies (and it is not at all certain that this is the case) are the clue to the discovery of philosophy, because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions. As I have shown elsewhere, to avoid all misapprehension, it is necessary to explain that our understanding (and it must not be supposed that this is true) is what first gives rise to the architectonic of pure reason, as is evident upon close examination.

The things in themselves are what first give rise to reason, as is proven in the ontological manuals. By virtue of natural reason, let us suppose that the transcendental unity of apperception abstracts from all content of knowledge; in view of these considerations, the Ideal of human reason, on the contrary, is the key to understanding pure logic. Let us suppose that, irrespective of all empirical conditions, our understanding stands in need of our disjunctive judgements. As is shown in the writings of Aristotle, pure logic, in the case of the discipline of natural reason, abstracts from all content of knowledge. Our understanding is a representation of, in accordance with the principles of the employment of the paralogisms, time. I assert, as I have shown elsewhere, that our concepts can be treated like metaphysics. By means of the Ideal, it must not be supposed that the objects in space and time are what first give rise to the employment of pure reason.

As is evident upon close examination, to avoid all misapprehension, it is necessary to explain that, on the contrary, the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions is a representation of our inductive judgements, yet the things in themselves prove the validity of, on the contrary, the Categories. It remains a mystery why, indeed, the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions exists in philosophy, but the employment of the Antinomies, in respect of the intelligible character, can never furnish a true and demonstrated science, because, like the architectonic of pure reason, it is just as necessary as problematic principles. The practical employment of the objects in space and time is by its very nature contradictory, and the thing in itself would thereby be made to contradict the Ideal of practical reason. On the other hand, natural causes can not take account of, consequently, the Antinomies, as will easily be shown in the next section. Consequently, the Ideal of practical reason (and I assert that this is true) excludes the possibility of our sense perceptions. Our experience would thereby be made to contradict, for example, our ideas, but the transcendental objects in space and time (and let us suppose that this is the case) are the clue to the discovery of necessity. But the proof of this is a task from which we can here be absolved.

2.6 Page layout

In order to write anything on a sheet of paper, you will need a basic understanding of typography. While there exists a strong theory behind this whole topic, we will not dive too deep and only give minimal introduction. One should however keep in mind that going freestyle on your page design greatly endangers the overall quality of your document. So if you're not an expert on typography, it is probably best practice to just use the possibilities provided by **KOMA-script** (especially the **typearea** package), or any package where you can be sure that the author has a solid typographical background. Further information on this topic may be found in [4, 5].

Page vs. paper In order to display our thoughts and ideas we first need some kind of canvas, which we refer to as *paper*. If you're writing a thesis the size of this should

almost always be of a A4 or A5 format. Once you’ve chosen the paper size you need to specify the area where you want to put stuff, which is refereed to as *page*.

MEMO 2.7: Page vs. paper

The paper does not necessarily coincide with the page.

For simplicity—as hinted above—we will assume that the page is contained in the paper. At first it might seem odd, as to why we differentiate between paper and page, but there is a simple practical example that explains why it is not a good idea to think of the paper as a page, using the above terminology. Suppose you print out your document and want to assemble the sheets of paper in some kind of fixed bundle; this usually happens via *binding*. You can think of this as gluing small stripes of the paper together, thus greatly decreasing the visibility of anything printed specifically on this area. It is therefore useful not to think of the page as the whole paper.

Arrangement of a page There are four main instances placed on the page, namely:

- the body of text: most of the things you write will be put in here, it should be the dominant instance of the page,
- the header: a field above the body, which will display information about the current chapter, section, etc.,
- the footer: a field below the body, which usually displays the pagination,
- two margins: two fields placed to the right and left of the body, of which one actually displays marginal notes and the other is placed to preserve the symmetry,

see [Fig. 2.1](#). Having identified the main instances of our page, we now need to define their positions and dimensions. In order to do this in a way that is consistent with the basic rules of typography, we employ the package `typearea`, which is the natural choice for any document that bases off of `KOMA-script`. In most cases the presets of this package will suffice for your purpose, if you want to really get behind this topic we refer to the manual [8]. Again it is important to note that you can pass any options of our base class `scrbook` to the class `fau-math-thesis`. We proceed to present the most important options.

```
\documentclass{..., onside, ...}
\documentclass{..., twoside, ...}
\documentclass{..., twoside=semi, ...}
```

If you want the odd numbered pages to look like the even numbered pages you use the option `onside`. This is usually done for documents that are only to be viewed in PDF format. You might argue that in a PDF viewer pages are arranged vertically and thus an odd page should be same as an even one. Another case where you should use this option, is when you want your document to be printed onesided, i.e. only the front




Figure 2.1: The basic ingredients of our page, this graphic was created by the `layouts` package.




Figure 2.2: Page arrangement for a twosided document, this graphic was created with the `layouts` package

side of the paper is used for printing and the backside is left blank. Using this option will set the note margin to the right hand side and a *equally spaced* blank margin to the left. If you want to print out your document in a double paged format, i.e. both sides of the paper are used for printing it is necessary to use the option `twoside`. Just imagine an opened book lying in front of you. The left page is referred to as even and the right side as odd. The line where the paper of these two pages meet is called *spine*. There are some basic rules we note here:

- the odd and the even page are arranged axial symmetric with respect to the spine,
- the respective outer margin is used for notes, the inner one is blank,
- the width of the two inner margins *combined* defines the width of *each* of the outer margins, which means that for one page alone its inner margin is half the size of the outer margin (see [Fig. 2.2](#)).

If you want equally spaced margins for but keep the twosided behaviour, use the option `twoside=semi`. Keep in mind that only one of this options above can be used as they are mutually exclusive.

```
\documentclass{..., BCOR=<w>mm, ...}
```

This option is important if you want to print out your document. If you're not that familiar with the this process, you should read [Section 2.10](#) first. But lets assume you

know that is important to specify an area on the paper that is not used for the page (see above Page vs. Paper). The option `BCOR` stands for *B*inding *COR*rection and specifies the width `<w>` of the strip that will disappear in the binding. Together with the option `oneside` this strip is always placed on the left hand side, with `twoside` it is placed next to the receptive inner margin.

```
\documentclass{..., PDF, ...} \documentclass{..., setPDF, ...}
```

The first option basically tells the class that it is to be viewed as a PDF document. There are no direct effects on the page layout, we will discuss this option further below. The second one will preset the values mentioned above to the recommended setting for documents that are only to be viewed electronically. Note that this options also has other effects discussed below.

```
\documentclass{..., print, ...} \documentclass{..., setprint, ...}
```

The analogous options for documents that you want to print out, again the second one will actually affect the page layout.

MEMO 2.8: Printing presets

The value `BCOR=15mm` is set by this option, but you should actually set this value manually. Either you do binding yourself and find the best value, or you contact the shop you want to print it at and ask them.

Headers Usually the header instance is used to display information about the current chapter or the name of the thesis/book so that the reader is constantly reminded what he is reading at the current moment. Naturally there are many possibilities to style this area above the body and if you want to spend some time on that there will be more than enough material available online.

MEMO 2.9: KOMA and fancyhdr or titlesec

The well known packages `fancyhdr` and `titlesec` are the common choice when dealing with header styling. However, we are using a `KOMA-script` based class and should thus try to solve all our problems without `fancyhdr`. In fact there are some minor conflicts when using a combination of the above, which will probably not affect you, but still, try to keep it KOMA!

2.7 Theorems and Referencing

In this section the term *theorem* does not only refer to a theorem in a mathematical sense, but in fact to definitions, lemmata, examples, remarks, etc., i.e. the environments you usually need to write a math thesis and want to follow some consistent numbering scheme. The package used for theorem numbering and styling is `tcolorbox`, which offers

a modern and versatile way to create nice boxes around your theorems, while providing the full functionality of the more traditional `amsthm` package. The necessary commands for theorems are defined in the file `styles/fau-appearance.sty`, so you do not have to worry about that (unless you want to). Hence, we will not fully explain how to define these commands, but we will showcase how to use them. The following code snippet

```
\begin{theorem}{Euler 1763}{fermat}
Here could be your result.
\end{theorem}
```

will result in the output

THEOREM 2.10: Euler 1763.

Here could be your result.

The number of the theorem is assigned automatically. The second argument defines the theorem addition as displayed above and the third argument defines the name of the label that is used to reference [Theorem 2.10](#). While \LaTeX provides the basic commands for cross-referencing, the use of `tcolorbox` suggests to employ `cleveref` package that enhances some of the basic features and is indeed very clever. The above reference was defined by the command

```
\cref{thm:fermat}
```

where the prefix `thm:` was defined in the `tcolorbox` settings. The following environment prefix combinations are provided by `styles/fau-appearance.sty`:

- theorem - `thm`,
- definition - `def`,
- lemma - `lem`,
- corollary - `cor`,
- remark - `rem`.

The actual appearance of the theorem can be specified by the packet option `thmboxing` for `fau-appearance.sty`, for example

```
\usepackage[thmboxing=thmstyle_plain]{styles/fau-appearance}.
```

is used to create the document you are reading right now. It is currently not supported to simply add custom box styles. If you don't want to use the solutions provided by `fau-appearance.sty` use the `thmcust` option

```
\usepackage[thmcust]{styles/fau-appearance}
```

showcase
some of
the boxes
we pro-
vide

which will not define any theorem environments.

The `cleveref` links are preset such that link labels are capitalized and carry the link in them. The link colours are set via the `hyperref` package and follow the defined colour scheme. This can be customized globally by

```
\hypersetup{
    urlcolor=blue,
    citecolor=red,
    linkcolor=green}
```

but also locally for each link.

2.8 Lists and Enumerations

Another key feature you may want to use inside your thesis are lists and enumerations. In \LaTeX you can simply use the `itemize` environment like this

LISTING 2.11: Itemize

```
\begin{itemize}
\item The first item,
\item[$\circ$] a second item with a different bullet
      type.
\end{itemize}
```

- The first item,
- a second item with a different bullet type.

For enumerations we use the `enumitem` package, that provides vast options for customization. Take a look at the following definition taken from [1],

DEFINITION 2.12.

A mapping $\mu : 2^X \rightarrow [0, \infty]$ is called a **measure** on the nonempty set X provided

- (i) $\mu(\emptyset) = 0$ and
- (ii) if

$$A \subset \bigcup_{k \in \mathbb{N}} A_k,$$

then

$$\mu(A) \leq \sum_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \mu(A_k).$$

We can reference single items of an enumeration, for example concerning [Definition 2.12](#) we can add the information that [Item 2.12\(ii\)](#) is called subadditivity. The code that produces this enumeration looks like this:

LISTING 2.13: Enumerate

```
\begin{enumerate}[roman, ref=\thetcbcounter (\roman*)]
\item ... % first item
\item\label{en:subadd} ... % second item
\end{enumerate}
```

The option `roman` is a preset from `fau-appearance.sty` but you can use any valid style provided by `enumitem` itself or define one yourself. The argument `ref=\thetcbcounter (\roman*)` specifies how the label for the reference of this item should be displayed, where `\thetcbcounter` refers to the number of the theorem an enumeration was defined in, thus `\cref{en:subadd}` results in [Item 2.12\(ii\)](#) instead of [Item \(ii\)](#). An enumeration outside of a theorem has to use a different argument for referencing.

LISTING 2.14: Enumerate

```
\begin{enumerate}[label=(K\theenumi), ref=MyEnum (K
\theenumi)]
\item ... % first item
\item\label{en:second} ... % second item
\end{enumerate}
```

(K1) ...

(K2) ...

Here the reference look like this, [Item MyEnum \(K2\)](#).

2.9 B

As any dedicated reader can clearly see, the Ideal of practical reason is a representation of, as far as I know, the things in themselves; as I have shown elsewhere, the phenomena should only be used as a canon for our understanding. The paralogisms of practical reason are what first give rise to the architectonic of practical reason. As will easily be shown in the next section, reason would thereby be made to contradict, in view of these considerations, the Ideal of practical reason, yet the manifold depends on the phenomena. Necessity depends on, when thus treated as the practical employment of the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions, time. Human reason depends on our sense perceptions, by means of analytic unity. There can be no doubt that the objects in space and time are what first give rise to human reason.

Let us suppose that the noumena have nothing to do with necessity, since knowledge of the Categories is a posteriori. Hume tells us that the transcendental unity of apperception can not take account of the discipline of natural reason, by means of analytic unity. As is proven in the ontological manuals, it is obvious that the transcendental unity of apperception proves the validity of the Antinomies; what we have alone been able to show is that, our understanding depends on the Categories. It remains a mystery why the Ideal stands in need of reason. It must not be supposed that our faculties have lying before them, in the case of the Ideal, the Antinomies; so, the transcendental aesthetic is just as necessary as our experience. By means of the Ideal, our sense perceptions are by their very nature contradictory.

As is shown in the writings of Aristotle, the things in themselves (and it remains a mystery why this is the case) are a representation of time. Our concepts have lying before them the paralogsms of natural reason, but our a posteriori concepts have lying before them the practical employment of our experience. Because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, the paralogsms would thereby be made to contradict, indeed, space; for these reasons, the Transcendental Deduction has lying before it our sense perceptions. (Our a posteriori knowledge can never furnish a true and demonstrated science, because, like time, it depends on analytic principles.) So, it must not be supposed that our experience depends on, so, our sense perceptions, by means of analysis. Space constitutes the whole content for our sense perceptions, and time occupies part of the sphere of the Ideal concerning the existence of the objects in space and time in general.

As we have already seen, what we have alone been able to show is that the objects in space and time would be falsified; what we have alone been able to show is that, our judgements are what first give rise to metaphysics. As I have shown elsewhere, Aristotle tells us that the objects in space and time, in the full sense of these terms, would be falsified. Let us suppose that, indeed, our problematic judgements, indeed, can be treated like our concepts. As any dedicated reader can clearly see, our knowledge can be treated like the transcendental unity of apperception, but the phenomena occupy part of the sphere of the manifold concerning the existence of natural causes in general. Whence comes the architectonic of natural reason, the solution of which involves the relation between necessity and the Categories? Natural causes (and it is not at all certain that this is the case) constitute the whole content for the paralogsms. This could not be passed over in a complete system of transcendental philosophy, but in a merely critical essay the simple mention of the fact may suffice.

Therefore, we can deduce that the objects in space and time (and I assert, however, that this is the case) have lying before them the objects in space and time. Because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions, it must not be supposed that, then, formal logic (and what we have alone been able to show is that this is true) is a representation of the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions, but the discipline of pure reason, in so far as this expounds the contradictory rules of metaphysics, depends on the Antinomies. By means of analytic unity, our faculties, therefore, can never, as a whole, furnish a true and demonstrated science, because, like the transcendental unity of apperception, they constitute the whole content for a priori principles; for these reasons, our experience is just as necessary as, in accordance with the principles of our

a priori knowledge, philosophy. The objects in space and time abstract from all content of knowledge. Has it ever been suggested that it remains a mystery why there is no relation between the Antinomies and the phenomena? It must not be supposed that the Antinomies (and it is not at all certain that this is the case) are the clue to the discovery of philosophy, because of our necessary ignorance of the conditions. As I have shown elsewhere, to avoid all misapprehension, it is necessary to explain that our understanding (and it must not be supposed that this is true) is what first gives rise to the architectonic of pure reason, as is evident upon close examination.


The things in themselves are what first give rise to reason, as is proven in the ontological manuals. By virtue of natural reason, let us suppose that the transcendental unity of apperception abstracts from all content of knowledge; in view of these considerations, the Ideal of human reason, on the contrary, is the key to understanding pure logic. Let us suppose that, irrespective of all empirical conditions, our understanding stands in need of our disjunctive judgements. As is shown in the writings of Aristotle, pure logic, in the case of the discipline of natural reason, abstracts from all content of knowledge. Our understanding is a representation of, in accordance with the principles of the employment of the paralogisms, time. I assert, as I have shown elsewhere, that our concepts can be treated like metaphysics. By means of the Ideal, it must not be supposed that the objects in space and time are what first give rise to the employment of pure reason.

As is evident upon close examination, to avoid all misapprehension, it is necessary to explain that, on the contrary, the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions is a representation of our inductive judgements, yet the things in themselves prove the validity of, on the contrary, the Categories. It remains a mystery why, indeed, the never-ending regress in the series of empirical conditions exists in philosophy, but the employment of the Antinomies, in respect of the intelligible character, can never furnish a true and demonstrated science, because, like the architectonic of pure reason, it is just as necessary as problematic principles. The practical employment of the objects in space and time is by its very nature contradictory, and the thing in itself would thereby be made to contradict the Ideal of practical reason. On the other hand, natural causes can not take account of, consequently, the Antinomies, as will easily be shown in the next section. Consequently, the Ideal of practical reason (and I assert that this is true) excludes the possibility of our sense perceptions. Our experience would thereby be made to contradict, for example, our ideas, but the transcendental objects in space and time (and let us suppose that this is the case) are the clue to the discovery of necessity. But the proof of this is a task from which we can here be absolved.

Actual page layout values.

<code>\paperheight = 845.04694pt</code>	<code>\paperwidth = 597.50793pt</code>
<code>\hoffset = 0.0pt</code>	<code>\voffset = 0.0pt</code>
<code>\evensidemargin = 17.3562pt</code>	<code>\oddsidemargin = 17.3562pt</code>
<code>\topmargin = -25.16531pt</code>	<code>\headheight = 17.0pt</code>
<code>\headsep = 20.40001pt</code>	<code>\textheight = 595.80026pt</code>
<code>\textwidth = 418.25555pt</code>	<code>\footskip = 47.6pt</code>
<code>\marginparsep = 12.8401pt</code>	<code>\marginparpush = 6.11995pt</code>
<code>\columnsep = 10.0pt</code>	<code>\columnseprule = 0.0pt</code>
<code>1em = 10.95003pt</code>	<code>1ex = 4.71457pt</code>

The circle is at 1 inch from the top and left of the page. Dashed lines represent (`\hoffset + 1 inch`) and (`\voffset + 1 inch`) from the top and left of the page.



2.10 Printing

As much as I didn't want to believe it when writing my Bachelor's thesis, the process of printing is not just some ... it is actual work and a crucial step towards your final goal which will affect the overall quality!

Books

- [1] L. C. Evans. *Measure Theory and Fine Properties of Functions, Revised Edition (Textbooks in Mathematics)*. Chapman and Hall/CRC, Apr. 2015. URL: <https://www.xarg.org/ref/a/1482242389/>.
- [2] V. Cédric. *Topics in Optimal Transportation*. American Mathematical Society.
- [3] F. Santambrogio. *Optimal Transport for Applied Mathematicians*. Springer International Publishing, 2015. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-319-20828-2](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20828-2). URL: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20828-2>.
- [4] J. Tschichold. *Ausgewählte Aufsätze über Fragen der Gestalt des Buches und der Typographie*. Birkhäuser Basel, 1975. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-0348-7799-2](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-7799-2). URL: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-7799-2>.
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- [6] L. V. Kantorovich. “On the Translocation of Masses.” In: *Journal of Mathematical Sciences* 133 (2006), pp. 1381–1382.
- [7] J.-D. Benamou, Y. Brenier, and K. Guittet. “The Monge-Kantorovitch mass transfer and its computational fluid mechanics formulation.” In: *International Journal for Numerical Methods in Fluids* 40.1-2 (2002), pp. 21–30. DOI: [10.1002/fld.264](https://doi.org/10.1002/fld.264). URL: <https://doi.org/10.1002/fld.264>.
- [8] M. Kohm. “koma-script.” In: (2020). URL: <https://www.ctan.org/pkg/koma-script>.

Online

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