Answers to Final Exam 2017/18


January 5, 2018

1 Question 1

Prove via a counterexample that:

$$\neg \Box_a p \not\Rightarrow B_a \neg \Box_a p$$

Counterexample:



is a plausibility model such that:

$$w \models \neg \Box_a p$$

(since $w \leq_a w$, but $w \not\models p$). However, $w \not\models B_a \neg \Box_a p$, since $best_a w(a) = \{s\}$, and

$$s \not\models \neg \Box_a p$$

(because in fact $s \models \Box_a p$), hence $w \not\models B_a \neg \Box_a p$ and so

$$\neg \Box_a p \not\Rightarrow B_a \neg \Box_a p$$

2 Question 2

- 1. M: $(\neg m, \neg h, s) \longrightarrow (m, h, \neg s) \longrightarrow (m, \neg h, s) \longrightarrow (\neg m, h, \neg s)$
- 2. After $\uparrow m$, we get:

$$(\neg m, \neg h, s) \longrightarrow (m, h, \neg s) \longrightarrow (m, \neg h, s)$$

3. After $\uparrow \neg s$, we get:

$$(\neg m, \neg h, s) \longrightarrow (\neg m, h, \neg s) \longrightarrow (m, h, \neg s)$$

So the car believes h, that there is a human ahead.

4. If we perform the upgrades in the reverse order, we get the following: First apply $\uparrow \neg s$ to M - the model remains unchanged.

$$(\neg m, \neg h, s) \longrightarrow (m, h, \neg s) \longrightarrow (m, h, \neg s)$$


Secondly apply $\uparrow m$ to obtain the same model as part (2):


$$(\neg m, \neg h, s) \longrightarrow (\neg m, h, \neg s) \longrightarrow (m, h, \neg s) \longrightarrow (m, \neg h, s)$$

In this situation the car believes $\neg h$ and s, that there is no human and that it is safe to drive.

3 Question 3

1. (a) **M**:






1,0






(b) A answers $\neg B_a(n_a > n_b) \land \neg B_a(n_a < n_b)$. This is true in all worlds in the model **M** except in world (1,0). So after $\uparrow (\neg B_a(n_a > n_b) \land \neg B_a(n_a < n_b))$, we obtain:




(c) $B \text{ says } \neg B_a(n_a > n_b) \land \neg B_a(n_a < n_b)$. This is true in all worlds in the model \mathbf{M}' , EXCEPT for (0,1),(1,0),(1,2). So after $\uparrow (\neg B_a(n_a > n_b) \land \neg B_a(n_a < n_b))$, we obtain:



(d) A says $B_a(n_a > n_b)$. This is true in worlds (0,1), (2,1), (1,0), (1,2), (3,2), and false in all other worlds in \mathbf{M}'' . Updating with $\uparrow B_a(n_a > n_b)$,

we get model \mathbf{M}''' :



 $\mathbf{M}^{\prime\prime}$:

(e) The first (true) answer excludes (1,0), and the second (true) answer excludes (0,1),(1,0),(1,2). The third answer being true implies that the actual world is among: (0,1),(2,1),(1,0),(1,2),(3,2). So, the actual world belongs to:


$$\{(0,1),(2,1),(1,0),(1,2),(3,2)\}-\{(0,1),(1,0),(1,2)\}$$

So the real world is either (2,1) or (3,2).

2. (a) The event model Σ is:


$$B_a(n_a > n_b) \vee B_a(n_a < n_b) \longrightarrow \neg B_a(n_a > n_b) \wedge \neg B_a(n_a < n_b)$$

and the updated model $\mathbf{M}_1 = \mathbf{M} \otimes \boldsymbol{\Sigma}$ is:




i.e. exactly the same as in part (2b).

(b) The event model Σ_1 is:



and the updated model $\mathbf{M}_2 = \mathbf{M}_1 \otimes \mathbf{\Sigma}_1$ is:



(c) Assuming the real world is the same as in the previous scenario, i.e. either (2,1) or (3,2), Alexandru, being sincere, will now answer "I believe my number is smaller":

$$B_a(n_a < n_b)$$

since this is true in both (2,1) or (3,2). This belief is FALSE, since in both (2,1) and (3,2), Alexandru's number is in fact bigger than Bob's.