FIRST STEPS TO FULL LIFECYCLE SECURITY WITH OPEN SOURCE TOOLS

INTRODUCTION

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HIGH LEVEL WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES

- Scanning Containers and IaC in Development
- Testing in the CI/CD pipeline
- Security in Production

COURSE PRE-REQUISITES

- Ability to run a local Kubernetes cluster
 - KinD
 - minikube
 - microk8s
 - **...**
- Ability to download and run binaries in :-
 - Linux
 - MacOS
 - FreeBSD?!

COURSE LOGISTICS

- Ground rules
- Materials
 - Slides http://slides.pwndland.uk
 - commands http://commands.pwndland.uk
 - setup notes http://setup.pwndland.uk
- Questions? Just Ask!

SECURITY IN DEVELOPMENT

- Vulnerability Scanning
- IaC Mis-configuration Scanning

SECURITY SCANNING PROCESS

- Before using any third-party resources
- During Develpment
- Before Deployment

VULNERABILITY SCANNING

- Using a container image vulnerability scanning tool is a useful way of assessing base images and also built container images.
- We'll demonstrate this with Trivy

HOW DO CONTAINER VULNERABILITY SCANNERS WORK?

- Generally look at two types of information
 - OS packages (e.g.debian, alpine, RHEL)
 - Programming language packages (e.g. npm, rubygems)
- Assess whether there are known vulnerabilities in the installed versions

OPEN SOURCE CONTAINER VULNERABILITY SCANNERS

- Trivy
- Grype
- Clair
- Snyk CLI Only

INSTALLING TRIVY

- Several options on the install page
 - https://aquasecurity.github.io/trivy/v0.28.0/ge started/installation/
- Homebrew for MacOS
- APT repository for Debian/Ubuntu
- YUM repo for RHEL/CentOS
- Let's install Trivy!

USING TRIVY TO SCAN IMAGES

trivy i ubuntu:20.04

trivy i public.ecr.aws/docker/library/ubuntu:20.04

IGNORE UNFIXED

trivy i --ignore-unfixed ubuntu:20.04

trivy i --ignore-unfixed public.ecr.aws/docker/library/ubuntu:20

LOOKING FOR HIGH/CRITICAL OS ISSUES

trivy image --severity HIGH, CRITICAL --vuln-type os postgres:10

trivy image --severity HIGH, CRITICAL --vuln-type os public.ecr.a

LOOKING FOR HIGH/CRITICAL LIBRARY ISSUES

trivy image --severity HIGH, CRITICAL --vuln-type library node:10

trivy image --severity HIGH, CRITICAL --vuln-type library public

SCANNING GITHUB REPOSITORIES

trivy repo --vuln-type library https://github.com/raesene/sycamo

SCANNING THE FILESYSTEM

Pick a project on your machine or

git clone https://github.com/raesene/sycamore

Scan a whole directory

trivy fs ./sycamore/

Scan a file

trivy fs ./sycamore/yarn.lock

JSON OUTPUT

trivy i --format json raesene/spring4shelldemo:latest

USING JQ TO FIND A SPECIFIC ISSUE

trivy -q i --format json raesene/spring4shelldemo:latest | jq '

CONFIGURATION SCANNING

- A good practice during development or when using 3rd party projects
- Can flag up where good security practices aren't being followed
- Rulesets vary by tool, although some can be based on standards (e.g. Kubernetes PSS, CIS Benchmarks)

CONFIGURATION SCANNING - DOCKER

git clone https://github.com/AnaisUrlichs/trivy-demo.git
cd trivy-demo

trivy config bad iac/docker/

FIXING A DOCKER ISSUE

Uncomment the USER line in the Dockerfile

trivy config bad_iac/docker/

CONFIGURATION SCANNING - KUBERNETES

trivy config bad_iac/kubernetes/

FIXING A KUBERNETES ISSUE

 Pick an issue from the ones flagged up and see if you can fix it, then re-scan

trivy config bad_iac/kubernetes/

CONFIGURATION SCANNING - TERRAFORM

trivy config bad_iac/terraform/

TRIVY SBOM

trivy sbom ubuntu:20.04

*also available as Docker Desktop Extension

SECURITY SCANNING IN CI/CD

- Applying the same checks as are available in development, in CI/CD pipelines provides an additional layer of security.
- Using GitHub Actions and SARIF, we can automate security checks either periodically or as code is checked in

USING A GITHUB ACTION TO BUILD AND SCAN A DOCKER IMAGE

- Here's an example https://github.com/raesene/sycamore/blob/main/ publish.yml
 - It's a modified version of GitHub's basic Docke

PERMISSIONS TO BUILD+SCAN AN IMAGE

```
permissions:
    contents: read
    packages: write
    # This is used to complete the identity challenge
    # with sigstore/fulcio when running outside of PRs.
    id-token: write
    security-events: write # To upload sarif files
```

RUNNING TRIVY

```
- name: Run trivy
    uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
    with:
        image-ref: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}:
        format: sarif
        output: 'trivy-results.sarif'
```

UPLOADING RESULTS TO GITHUB SECURITY

```
- name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
    uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v1
    with:
       sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'
```

CONFIG SCANNING IN CI/CD WITH TRIVY

```
- name: Run Trivy in Config mode to generate SARIF
   uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
   with:
       scan-type: 'config'
       hide-progress: false
       format: 'sarif'
       output: 'trivy-results.sarif'
```

OPEN SOURCE SECURITY IN PRODUCTION

- Once our workloads are deployed to clusters we need on-going security
- Regular scans for compliance and assurance
- Runtime security to detect attacks


KUBERNETES OPERATOR

Automating human behaviour through controllers

https://www.cncf.io/wp-

content/uploads/2021/07/CNCF_Operator_WhitePaper

Kubernetes Cluster



INSTALLING STARBOARD OPERATOR

kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity,

CRDS

 Starboard creates a number of CRDs to hold scan data.

```
ciskubebenchreports.aquasecurity.github.io clustercompliancedetailreports.aquasecurity.github.io clustercompliancereports.aquasecurity.github.io clusterconfigauditreports.aquasecurity.github.io configauditreports.aquasecurity.github.io vulnerabilityreports.aquasecurity.github.io
```

CONFIRMING ALL IS WELL

 Checking the deployment of the operator tells us if the install was successful

kubectl get deployment -n starboard-system

CREATING A DEPLOYMENT

```
kubectl create ns app
kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AnaisUrlichs/
```

VULNERABILITYREPORT

Automatically scans the containers that are used inside of your cluster.

Deployment-scoped

kubectl get vulnerabilityreports -o wide -n app

Cluster-scoped

kubectl get clustervulnerabilityreports -o wide -n app

CONFIGURATION AUDITING

Kubernetes configurations are checked against builtin policies

Deployment-scoped

kubectl get configauditreports -o wide -n app

Cluster-scoped

kubectl get clusterconfigauditreports -o wide -n app

INFRASTRUCTURE SCANNING

- CIS benchmark for Kubernetes nodes provided by kube-bench.
- Penetration test results for a Kubernetes cluster provided by kube-hunter.

CISKUBEBENCHREPORT

Maps CIS Benchmarks against Kubernetes version

```
kubectl get nodes
kubectl get ciskubebenchreports -o wide
kubectl describe ciskubebenchreports/<insert report name>
```

OTHER TOOL TO PRODUCE CIS BENCHMARKS

https://github.com/chen-keinan/kube-beacon

CLUSTER COMPLIANCE REPORT

NSA report

ClusterCompliance and ClusterComplianceDetail Report

```
kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/
kubectl get clustercompliancereport -o wide

kubectl describe clustercompliancereport nsa
kubectl get clustercompliancedetailreport -o wide
```

NSA REPORTS PRODUCED BY OTHER TOOLS

```
kubescape scan framework nsa --submit
[info] ARMO security scanner starting
[warning] Kubernetes cluster nodes scanning is disabled. This is required to collect valuable data for certain controls. You can enable it using the --enabl
e-host-scan flag
[info] Downloading/Loading policy definitions
[success] Downloaded/Loaded policy
[info] Accessing Kubernetes objects
[success] Accessed to Kubernetes objects
[info] Scanning. cluster: do-fra1-demo-cluster
[success] Done scanning. cluster: do-fra1-demo-cluster
^^^^^^
Controls: 19 (Failed: 15, Excluded: 0, Skipped: 2)
 SEVERITY |
                          CONTROL NAME
                                                        FAILED RESOURCES | EXCLUDED RESOURCES | ALL RESOURCES | % RISK-SCORE
            Disable anonymous access to Kubelet service
                                                                                  0
                                                                                                               skipped*
                                                                                  0
            Enforce Kubelet client TLS authentication
                                                                                                    0
                                                                                                               skipped*
                                                                                  0
 Hiah
            Cluster-admin binding
                                                                                                   84
                                                                                                                  2%
            Privileged container
                                                                                                                 38%
 Hiah
 Medium
            Allow privilege escalation
                                                                                  0
                                                                                                    8
                                                                                                                 79%
 Medium
            Allowed hostPath
                                                                                  0
                                                                                                                 29%
                                                               57
 Medium
            Automatic mapping of service account
                                                                                                   57
                                                                                                                 100%
 Medium
            Cluster internal networking
                                                                                  0
                                                                                                                 100%
 Medium
            Container hostPort
                                                                                  0
                                                                                                    8
                                                                                                                 10%
 Medium
            Exec into container
                                                                                  0
                                                                                                   84
                                                                                                                  2%
                                                                                                                 48%
 Medium
            HostNetwork access
                                                                                                    8
                                                                                  0
                                                                                                                 100%
 Medium
            Ingress and Egress blocked
 Medium
            Insecure capabilities
                                                                                  0
                                                                                                    8
                                                                                                                 19%
 Medium
            Linux hardening
                                                                                  0
                                                                                                                 79%
                                                                                                    8
 Medium
            Non-root containers
                                                                                  0
                                                                                                                 100%
                                                                                                    8
                                                                                  0
            Immutable container filesystem
                                                                                                                 79%
 Low
 Low
            Resource policies
                                                                                  0
                                                                                                                 60%
                                                               64
                                                                                  0
                                                                                                   157
                                                                                                                 30.66%
                        RESOURCE SUMMARY
FRAMEWORK NSA
```

https://github.com/armosec/kubescape

CUSTOM POLICIES

- Trivy/Starboard: Write custom policies using Rego
- tfsec: Custom policies in JSON/YAML

trivy config --policy ./custom-policies --namespaces user ./man:

WHAT IS NEXT?

- Integrate Starboard metrics into your observability stack
- Try out Trivy's functionality in your own projects
- Let us know what use cases you would like to see

LINKS

Repository https://github.com/AnaisUrlichs/trivy-demo

Aqua GitHub https://github.com/aquasecurity Rory's Twitter https://twitter.com/raesene Anais' Twitter https://twitter.com/urlichsanais

THANK YOU!

- Rory's Twitter/GitHub: @raesene
- Anais' Twitter: @urlichsanais