

# Intro to NIST and Incident Response



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## The Digital Forensics Process

1. Search Authority: warrant, subpoena, or even consent.
2. Chain of Custody: essential to maintain integrity
3. Imaging/Hashing Function: Forensic image duplicating original(Read only)
4. Validated Tools: Document tool testing + validations
5. Repeatability(Quality Analysis): Collection of practices + procedures throughout the whole forensic process helping guarantee accuracy of findings
6. Analysis: Timeline, breaking encryption, connect the dots....
7. Reporting: Know your audience! Executive summary, list items examined, methods + tools used, conclusion, relevant exhibits
8. Possible Expert Presentation: Present to judge or jury

*Our Incident Response Plan  
goes something like this...*




# The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

- Establishes general guidelines for compliance
- Helps secures organization's infrastructure
- NIST Special Publication 800 - All Computer Security Info
  - Ex. IR Cycle is actually:
    - NIST SP 800-61

JOBS



# The Incident Response Lifecycle



# Volatile vs Non-Volatile

## Non-Volatile Memory:


Ex. HDD, SSD, CD, DVD, etc.

## Volatile Data:


Ex. RAM, pagefiles(win), swap(linux), caches, processes, etc.

**Random Access Memory ( RAM )**: not sequential, providing CPU the necessary speed to load your program

# Order of Volatility



# WIRESHARK





# WIRESHARK

time	Source	Destination	Protocol	des_port	Info
17:00:33.238957	10.7.15.101	89.238.68.194	SMTP		25 C: MAIL FROM:<fdrake@acm.org>
17:00:33.238243	89.238.68.194	10.7.15.101	SMTP		49168 S: 250-vm194.documentfoundat
17:00:33.067699	89.238.68.194	10.7.15.101	TCP		49168 25 → 49168 [ACK] Seq=62 Ack=
17:00:33.067597	10.7.15.101	89.238.68.194	SMTP		25 C: EHLO acm.org
17:00:33.067061	89.238.68.194	10.7.15.101	SMTP		49168 S: 220 vm194.documentfoundat
17:00:32.897062	10.7.15.101	199.89.1.120	TCP		25 49163 → 25 [ACK] Seq=77 Ack=
17:00:32.896786	199.89.1.120	10.7.15.101	TCP		49163 25 → 49163 [FIN, PSH, ACK] S
17:00:32.889785	10.7.15.101	10.7.15.1	DNS		53 Standard query 0x41e8 A mx2
17:00:32.885398	10.7.15.101	89.238.68.194	TCP		25 49168 → 25 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=
17:00:32.885126	10.7.15.1	10.7.15.101	DNS		50685 Standard query response 0xd0
17:00:32.884962	89.238.68.194	10.7.15.101	TCP		49168 25 → 49168 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0
17:00:32.857588	10.7.15.101	10.7.15.1	DNS		53 Standard query 0x40bc A smtp
17:00:32.856824	10.7.15.1	10.7.15.101	DNS		59663 Standard query response 0xa8
17:00:32.847639	10.7.15.101	131.252.210.177	TCP		25 49167 → 25 [ACK] Seq=89 Ack=
17:00:32.847306	131.252.210.177	10.7.15.101	TCP		49167 25 → 49167 [FIN, PSH, ACK] S
17:00:32.830536	10.7.15.101	10.7.15.1	DNS		53 Standard query 0x22bc A mx2
17:00:32.828259	10.7.15.101	104.17.79.191	TCP		25 49169 → 25 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=
17:00:32.827860	10.7.15.1	10.7.15.101	DNS		54288 Standard query response 0x62
17:00:32.825756	10.7.15.1	10.7.15.101	DNS		53237 Standard query response 0xfa

## What is it?

# MyDoom

- Worm from 2004
- 1 in 12 emails at its peak
- Estimated \$38 billion in damages
- Still exists today (different versions)
- **DDoS:**
  - a. [www.sco.com](http://www.sco.com) on Feb 1st, 2004
  - b. [www.microsoft.com](http://www.microsoft.com) on Feb 3rd, 2004

## Two methods of spreading:

1. KaZaA
2. Email Spamming



## Possible Filenames (KaZaA):

- winamp5.exe
- activation\_crack.pif
- office\_crack.bat



# MyDoom Email Spamming

## Characteristics:

- Sender address is spoofed
  - Disguised as an error message
  - Contains an attachment with randomly chosen name
  - Creates a backdoor

From: random@address.johndoe.com  
To: samples@t-secure.com  
Subject: Hello  
Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2004 14:07:48 -0800

The message contains Unicode characters and has been sent as a binary attachment.



doc.pif

## Ignores:

- **Mail domains such as:** gov, mil, berkeley, google
  - **Recipients such as:** bugs, help, info, postmaster, webmaster, admin, support

A screenshot of a Windows Notepad window titled "Message - Notepad". The window contains a large amount of encoded text, likely Base64 or a similar encoding scheme, which is mostly illegible. The text includes various symbols, numbers, and what appears to be a mix of English and other characters. The window has the standard Windows title bar and control buttons.

## Demo

# WIRESHARK

time	Source	Destination	Protocol	des_port	Info
17:00:33.238957	10.7.15.101	89.238.68.194	SMTP		25 C: MAIL FROM:<fdrake@acm.org>
17:00:33.238243	89.238.68.194	10.7.15.101	SMTP		49168 S: 250-vm194.documentfoundat
17:00:33.067699	89.238.68.194	10.7.15.101	TCP		49168 25 → 49168 [ACK] Seq=62 Ack=
17:00:33.067597	10.7.15.101	89.238.68.194	SMTP		25 C: EHLO acm.org
17:00:33.067061	89.238.68.194	10.7.15.101	SMTP		49168 S: 220 vm194.documentfoundat
17:00:32.897062	10.7.15.101	199.89.1.120	TCP		25 49163 → 25 [ACK] Seq=77 Ack=
17:00:32.896786	199.89.1.120	10.7.15.101	TCP		49163 25 → 49163 [FIN, PSH, ACK] S
17:00:32.889785	10.7.15.101	10.7.15.1	DNS		53 Standard query 0x41e8 A mx2
17:00:32.885398	10.7.15.101	89.238.68.194	TCP		25 49168 → 25 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=
17:00:32.885126	10.7.15.1	10.7.15.101	DNS		50685 Standard query response 0xd0
17:00:32.884962	89.238.68.194	10.7.15.101	TCP		49168 25 → 49168 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0
17:00:32.857588	10.7.15.101	10.7.15.1	DNS		53 Standard query 0x40bc A smtp
17:00:32.856824	10.7.15.1	10.7.15.101	DNS		59663 Standard query response 0xa8
17:00:32.847639	10.7.15.101	131.252.210.177	TCP		25 49167 → 25 [ACK] Seq=89 Ack=
17:00:32.847306	131.252.210.177	10.7.15.101	TCP		49167 25 → 49167 [FIN, PSH, ACK] S
17:00:32.830536	10.7.15.101	10.7.15.1	DNS		53 Standard query 0x22bc A mx2
17:00:32.828259	10.7.15.101	104.17.79.191	TCP		25 49169 → 25 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=
17:00:32.827860	10.7.15.1	10.7.15.101	DNS		54288 Standard query response 0x62
17:00:32.825756	10.7.15.1	10.7.15.101	DNS		53237 Standard query response 0xfa

time	Source	Destination	Protocol	src_port	des_port	Info
17:00:36.157647	10.7.15.101	88.99.190.237	SMTP/...	49170	25	from: "Post Office" <postmaster@documentfo...
17:00:48.507920	10.7.15.101	209.85.144.27	SMTP/...	49186	25	from: "Returned mail" <postmaster@translat...
17:01:04.270405	10.7.15.101	209.85.144.27	SMTP/...	49210	25	from: "Returned mail" <postmaster@translat...
17:01:04.694630	10.7.15.101	64.147.108.50	SMTP/...	49209	25	from: "Mail Delivery Subsystem" <noreply@p...
17:01:10.504836	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.103	SMTP/...	49211	25	from: brian.kelk@cl.cam.ac.uk, subject: Ma...
17:01:22.307739	10.7.15.101	173.228.157.40	SMTP/...	49219	25	from: "Mail Delivery Subsystem" <noreply@p...
17:01:23.210796	10.7.15.101	108.177.104.27	SMTP/...	49220	25	from: "Returned mail" <postmaster@translat...
17:01:23.320369	10.7.15.101	116.203.90.47	SMTP/...	49221	25	from: "Post Office" <postmaster@apache.org...
17:01:26.697898	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.102	SMTP/...	49224	25	from: brian.kelk@cl.cam.ac.uk, subject: Ma...
17:01:39.929847	10.7.15.101	64.233.177.27	SMTP/...	49230	25	from: "Returned mail" <postmaster@translat...
17:01:43.044508	10.7.15.101	34.199.147.133	SMTP/...	49234	25	from: "Post Office" <postmaster@apache.org...
17:01:45.849321	10.7.15.101	173.228.157.42	SMTP/...	49240	25	from: "Mail Delivery Subsystem" <noreply@p...
17:01:55.601723	10.7.15.101	64.233.177.26	SMTP/...	49246	25	from: "Returned mail" <postmaster@translat...
17:01:58.693910	10.7.15.101	207.244.88.150	SMTP/...	49247	25	from: "Post Office" <postmaster@apache.org...
17:02:10.500302	10.7.15.101	64.147.108.55	SMTP/...	49248	25	from: "Mail Delivery Subsystem" <noreply@p...
17:02:17.956165	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.103	SMTP/...	49250	25	from: brian.kelk@cl.cam.ac.uk, subject: Ma...
17:02:28.237144	10.7.15.101	173.228.157.41	SMTP/...	49255	25	from: "Mail Delivery Subsystem" <noreply@p...
17:02:45.513709	10.7.15.101	173.228.157.39	SMTP/...	49257	25	from: "Mail Delivery Subsystem" <noreply@p...
17:03:01.885655	10.7.15.101	64.147.108.51	SMTP/...	49259	25	from: "Mail Delivery Subsystem" <noreply@p...
17:03:17.510275	10.7.15.101	64.147.108.52	SMTP/...	49261	25	from: "Mail Delivery Subsystem" <noreply@p...
17:03:34.255986	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.103	SMTP/...	49262	25	from: "Automatic Email Delivery Software"...
17:03:50.463434	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.102	SMTP/...	49267	25	from: "Automatic Email Delivery Software"...
17:04:28.483141	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.103	SMTP/...	49271	25	from: "Automatic Email Delivery Software"...

smtp and ip contains "MAIL FROM:"							Expire
time	Source	Destination	Protocol	src_port	des_port	Info	
17:01...	10.7.15.101	192.254.190.1...	SMTP	49217	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<noreply@onlineconnections.com.au>	
17:01...	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.102	SMTP	49224	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<brian.kelk@cl.cam.ac.uk>	
17:01...	10.7.15.101	209.249.171.1...	SMTP	49225	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<postmaster@theriver.com>	
17:01...	10.7.15.101	209.249.171.1...	SMTP	49228	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<postmaster@theriver.com>	
17:01...	10.7.15.101	192.254.190.1...	SMTP	49227	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<noreply@onlineconnections.com.au>	
17:01...	10.7.15.101	64.233.177.27	SMTP	49230	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<postmaster@translate.org.za>	
17:01...	10.7.15.101	34.199.147.133	SMTP	49234	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<postmaster@apache.org>	
17:01...	10.7.15.101	173.228.157.42	SMTP	49240	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<noreply@pobox.com>	
17:01...	10.7.15.101	216.97.88.9	SMTP	49235	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<MAILER-DAEMON@unicode.org>	
17:01...	10.7.15.101	64.233.177.26	SMTP	49246	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<postmaster@translate.org.za>	
17:01...	10.7.15.101	216.97.88.9	SMTP	49245	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<MAILER-DAEMON@unicode.org>	
17:01...	10.7.15.101	207.244.88.150	SMTP	49247	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<postmaster@apache.org>	
17:02...	10.7.15.101	64.147.108.55	SMTP	49248	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<noreply@pobox.com>	
17:02...	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.103	SMTP	49250	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<brian.kelk@cl.cam.ac.uk>	
17:02...	10.7.15.101	173.228.157.41	SMTP	49255	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<noreply@pobox.com>	
17:02...	10.7.15.101	173.228.157.39	SMTP	49257	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<noreply@pobox.com>	
17:03...	10.7.15.101	64.147.108.51	SMTP	49259	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<noreply@pobox.com>	
17:03...	10.7.15.101	64.147.108.52	SMTP	49261	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<noreply@pobox.com>	
17:03...	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.103	SMTP	49262	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<postmaster@protonmail.ch>	
17:03...	10.7.15.101	173.228.157.53	SMTP	49266	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<noreply@pobox.com>	
17:03...	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.102	SMTP	49267	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<postmaster@protonmail.ch>	
17:04...	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.103	SMTP	49271	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<postmaster@protonmail.ch>	
17:04...	10.7.15.101	207.244.88.150	SMTP	49274	25 C:	MAIL FROM:<MAILER-DAEMON@openoffice.org>	

smtp and ip contains "Subject:"						
time	Source	Destination	Protocol	src_port	des_port	Info
17:00...	10.7.15.101	88.99.190.237	SMTP	49170	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:00...	10.7.15.101	209.85.144.27	SMTP	49186	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:01...	10.7.15.101	209.85.144.27	SMTP	49210	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:01...	10.7.15.101	64.147.108.50	SMTP	49209	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:01...	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.103	SMTP	49211	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:01...	10.7.15.101	173.228.157.40	SMTP	49219	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:01...	10.7.15.101	108.177.104.27	SMTP	49220	25 C:	DATA fragment, 43 bytes
17:01...	10.7.15.101	116.203.90.47	SMTP	49221	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:01...	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.102	SMTP	49224	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:01...	10.7.15.101	64.233.177.27	SMTP	49230	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:01...	10.7.15.101	34.199.147.133	SMTP	49234	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:01...	10.7.15.101	173.228.157.42	SMTP	49240	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:01...	10.7.15.101	64.233.177.26	SMTP	49246	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:01...	10.7.15.101	207.244.88.150	SMTP	49247	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:02...	10.7.15.101	64.147.108.55	SMTP	49248	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:02...	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.103	SMTP	49250	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:02...	10.7.15.101	173.228.157.41	SMTP	49255	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:02...	10.7.15.101	173.228.157.39	SMTP	49257	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:03...	10.7.15.101	64.147.108.51	SMTP	49259	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:03...	10.7.15.101	64.147.108.52	SMTP	49261	25 C:	DATA fragment, 52 bytes
17:03...	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.103	SMTP	49262	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:03...	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.102	SMTP	49267	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
17:04...	10.7.15.101	185.70.40.103	SMTP	49271	25 C:	DATA fragment, 1460 bytes

DATA

354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>

From: brian.kelk@cl.cam.ac.uk

To: btitze@protonmail.ch

Subject: Mail System Error - Returned Mail

Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 17:01:03 +0000

MIME-Version: 1.0

Content-Type: multipart/mixed;

boundary="=====NextPart\_000\_0011\_F649D84F.D914FDA4"

X-Priority: 3

X-MSMail-Priority: Normal

X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2600.0000

X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

=====NextPart\_000\_0011\_F649D84F.D914FDA4

Content-Type: text/plain;

charset=us-ascii

Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

The original message was included as attachment

=====NextPart\_000\_0011\_F649D84F.D914FDA4

Content-Type: application/octet-stream;

name="hfqgbha.zip"

Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

Content-Disposition: attachment;

filename="hfqgbha.zip"

tcp.port eq 1042						
time	Source	Destination	Protocol	src_port	des_port	Info
16...	10.7.15.101	15.16.238.13	TCP	49158	1042 49158 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
16...	10.7.15.101	15.16.238.13	TCP	49158	1042 [TCP Retransmission] 49158 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
16...	10.7.15.101	15.16.238.13	TCP	49158	1042 [TCP Retransmission] 49158 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
16...	10.7.15.101	192.168.0.63	TCP	49159	1042 49159 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
16...	10.7.15.101	192.168.0.63	TCP	49159	1042 [TCP Retransmission] 49159 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
16...	10.7.15.101	192.168.0.63	TCP	49159	1042 [TCP Retransmission] 49159 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
16...	10.7.15.101	63.240.218.176	TCP	49160	1042 49160 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
16...	10.7.15.101	63.240.218.176	TCP	49160	1042 [TCP Retransmission] 49160 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
16...	10.7.15.101	63.240.218.176	TCP	49160	1042 [TCP Retransmission] 49160 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
16...	10.7.15.101	15.40.86.187	TCP	49161	1042 49161 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
16...	10.7.15.101	15.40.86.187	TCP	49161	1042 [TCP Retransmission] 49161 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
16...	15.16.238.13	10.7.15.101	TCP	1042 49158	1042 → 49158 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0	
17...	10.7.15.101	10.128.61.61	TCP	49162	1042 49162 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
17...	10.7.15.101	10.128.61.61	TCP	49162	1042 [TCP Retransmission] 49162 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
17...	10.7.15.101	10.128.61.61	TCP	49162	1042 [TCP Retransmission] 49162 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
17...	192.168.0.63	10.7.15.101	TCP	1042 49159	1042 → 49159 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0	
17...	10.7.15.101	157.130.29.226	TCP	49164	1042 49164 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
17...	10.7.15.101	157.130.29.226	TCP	49164	1042 [TCP Retransmission] 49164 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
17...	10.7.15.101	157.130.29.226	TCP	49164	1042 [TCP Retransmission] 49164 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
17...	63.240.218....	10.7.15.101	TCP	1042 49160	1042 → 49160 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0	
17...	15.40.86.187	10.7.15.101	TCP	1042 49161	1042 → 49161 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0	
17...	10.7.15.101	15.44.62.154	TCP	49213	1042 49213 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	
17...	10.7.15.101	15.44.62.154	TCP	49213	1042 [TCP Retransmission] 49213 → 1042 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=	

I'm not gonna kill you



I'm gonna hurt you  
Really...Really...Bad



# Memory Forensics

**What is it:** Forensics analysis of a computer's memory dump

Different Memory compression algorithms for different operating systems

**Why windows 7?** Basic intro to learning memory forensics

**Why is it useful?** Provides experts with information when analyzing criminal activity such as hackers or insider threats.

**Tools used:** Volatility, FTK Imager, FireEye Redline, DumpIt


# Memory Dumps

- Memory Dumps consists of the recorded state of the working memory of a computer during a specific time in which it was crashed or abnormally infected
- Analyzing these dumps can determine how the host became infected through which process and potentially opened port

Offset(V)	Name	PID	PPID	Thds	Hnds	Sess	Wow64 Start	Exit
0x8419d020	System	4	0	85	423	-----	0 2019-09-26 22:26:08 UTC+0000	
0x84036020	smss.exe	244	4	2	29	-----	0 2019-09-26 22:26:08 UTC+0000	
0x84cad3f0	csrss.exe	336	324	9	480	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:09 UTC+0000	
0x84ff6030	csrss.exe	388	380	11	312	1	0 2019-09-26 22:26:09 UTC+0000	
0x84ff5310	wininit.exe	396	324	3	75	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:09 UTC+0000	
0x850230f8	winlogon.exe	432	380	5	115	1	0 2019-09-26 22:26:09 UTC+0000	
0x8559e348	services.exe	488	396	9	222	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:09 UTC+0000	
0x8559e168	lsass.exe	504	396	7	568	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:09 UTC+0000	
0x855a15a8	lsm.exe	512	396	11	197	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:09 UTC+0000	
0x855d3030	svchost.exe	620	488	10	357	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:09 UTC+0000	
0x855e8030	vmacthlp.exe	680	488	3	53	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:09 UTC+0000	
0x855ef3f8	svchost.exe	724	488	8	292	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:10 UTC+0000	
0x8560b410	svchost.exe	808	488	16	416	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:10 UTC+0000	
0x85625580	svchost.exe	868	488	15	380	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:10 UTC+0000	
0x85631988	svchost.exe	916	488	40	1029	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:10 UTC+0000	
0x85642030	audiodg.exe	980	808	6	132	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:10 UTC+0000	
0x85663d40	svchost.exe	1064	488	10	473	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:10 UTC+0000	
0x85687948	svchost.exe	1188	488	21	607	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:11 UTC+0000	
0x856abb68	spoolsv.exe	1312	488	12	297	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:12 UTC+0000	
0x856be030	svchost.exe	1340	488	13	220	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:12 UTC+0000	
0x85701310	svchost.exe	1436	488	14	232	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:12 UTC+0000	
0x8573f798	VGAuthService.	1504	488	3	86	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:12 UTC+0000	
0x8576a658	vmtoolsd.exe	1576	488	8	290	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:12 UTC+0000	
0x8580aa38	WmiPrvSE.exe	1968	620	10	199	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:14 UTC+0000	
0x85823a58	dllhost.exe	260	488	13	185	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:14 UTC+0000	
0x8588c030	msdtc.exe	1424	488	12	143	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:18 UTC+0000	
0x85d4e3c0	taskhost.exe	2840	488	8	191	1	0 2019-09-26 22:26:18 UTC+0000	
0x85d8f2d0	sppsvc.exe	2216	488	4	147	0	0 2019-09-26 22:26:19 UTC+0000	


Volatality pslist -f Win7MyDoom.raw

# Memory Dumps Process Tree



- To view the process listing in a tree form, use the **pstree** command. This enumerates the processes using the same technique as pslist.

# Infected Process ID



- Process ID 1672 running two child processes: 460 & 708
- Picture below shows the infected Process ID and command line with the location

```
root@derpling: ~/Documents
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
*****
Wtcwcxeptwfllv pid: 460
Command line : "C:\Users\Albert\AppData\Local\Wtcwcxeptwfllvn.exe" "-rC:\Users\Albert\Desktop\Malware\Vcffipzmnipbxzdl.exe"
Service Pack 1
Base Size LoadCount LoadTime Path
```

# Command History

```
root@derpling:~/Documents# volatility -f Win7MyDoom.raw --profile=Win7SP1x86 cmdscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
*****
CommandProcess: conhost.exe Pid: 2500
CommandHistory: 0x306508 Application: powershell.exe Flags: Allocated, Reset
CommandCount: 13 LastAdded: 12 LastDisplayed: 12
FirstCommand: 0 CommandCountMax: 50
ProcessHandle: 0x5c
Cmd #0 @ 0x305258: ls
Cmd #1 @ 0x2ff3e8: cd .\Desktop
Cmd #2 @ 0x305288: ls
Cmd #3 @ 0x2ff410: cd .\Malware
Cmd #4 @ 0x3052a8: ls
Cmd #5 @ 0x2ff438: .\gchrome.exe
Cmd #6 @ 0x30a7b0: .\Vcffipzmnipbxzdl.exe
Cmd #7 @ 0x2ff460: .\DROP_B~1.BAT
Cmd #8 @ 0x304430: cd ../..
Cmd #9 @ 0x3052b8: ls
Cmd #10 @ 0x2ff500: cd .\Desktop
Cmd #11 @ 0x3052c8: ls
Cmd #12 @ 0x2ff528: .\DumpIt.exe
Cmd #36 @ 0x2d00c4: 0?0?-??
Cmd #37 @ 0x3040c8: 0?-??????0
*****
```

# YARA - Yet Another Recursive Acronym

- Developed by Victor Alvarez
- **Purpose:** Identifies malware or families of malware by looking for designated patterns
- **Rules:** Find malware using binaries or strings
- **Usage:** malware research and detection
- Companies that use Yara - Kaspersky, Raytheon, McAfee, FireEye

# Simple Yara Rule Example

```
rule my_doom
{
meta:
    description = "Simple YARA rule to detect the mydoom malware."
strings:
    $a = "f-mydoom.exe"
condition:
    $a
}
```

```
root@kali:~/Desktop# volatility -f 'Win7 MyDoom.raw' --profile=Win7SP1x86_23418 yarascan --yara-file=mydoom_rule.yar
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Rule: my_doom
Owner: Process explorer.exe Pid 2572
0x001c0e0a 00 2d 6d 79 64 6f 6f 6d 2e 65 78 65 00 00 46 00 f-mydoom.exe..F.
0x001c0e1a 00 00 04 00 ef be 3a 4f 5c b4 3a 4f 5c b4 2a 00 .....:0\.:0\.*.
0x001c0e2a 00 00 8b aa 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x001c0e3a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 66 00 2d 00 6d 00 79 00 .....f.-m.y.
0x001c0e4a 64 00 6f 00 6f 00 6d 00 2e 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 d.o.o.m...e.x.e.
0x001c0e5a 00 00 1c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 6c 01 f3 01 0c 00 .....l.....
0x001c0e6a 00 0c 65 61 00 00 48 f1 39 03 40 2b f9 03 0a 00 ..ea.H.9.@+....
0x001c0e7a 00 0a 67 61 00 00 a8 fa a0 06 50 3f 18 00 20 00 ..ga.....P?...
0x001c0e8a 6d 00 61 00 73 00 73 00 20 00 64 00 65 00 73 00 m.a.s...d.e.s.
0x001c0e9a 74 00 72 00 75 00 63 00 74 00 69 00 6f 00 6e 00 t.r.u.c.t.i.o.n.
0x001c0eaa 2e 00 68 00 74 00 6d 00 00 00 1c 00 00 00 37 00 ..h.t.m.....7.
0x001c0eba 33 00 31 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 f3 01 85 eb 3.1.....
0x001c0eca 56 00 69 61 00 08 b0 34 2a 03 80 37 2a 03 87 e9 V.ia...4*..7*...
0x001c0eda 5e 0e 47 61 00 08 f8 2b 19 00 00 08 1c 00 0c 00 ^.Ga...+.....
0x001c0eaa 00 00 c0 d0 e0 f0 38 35 76 2d 19 00 00 8e 3a 00 .....85v..... .
0x001c0efa 3a 00 7b 00 35 00 33 00 39 00 39 00 45 00 36 00 ::{.5.3.9.9.E.6.

Rule: my_doom
Owner: Process explorer.exe Pid 2572
0x069db106 6d 2d 6d 79 64 6f 6f 6d 2e 65 78 65 00 00 46 00 f-mydoom.exe..F.
0x069db116 00 00 04 00 ef be 3a 4f 5c b4 3a 4f 5c b4 2a 00 .....:0\.:0\.*.
0x069db126 00 00 8b aa 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x069db136 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 66 00 2d 00 6d 00 79 00 .....f.-m.y.
0x069db146 64 00 6f 00 6f 00 6d 00 2e 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 d.o.o.m...e.x.e.
0x069db156 00 00 1c 00 00 00 36 b2 00 80 22 4d 27 2b c9 cc .....6... "M'+..
0x069db166 00 8c 62 00 32 00 26 0a 00 09 29 4e 42 b3 20 00 ..b.2.&...)NB...
0x069db176 44 52 4f 50 5f 42 7e 31 2e 42 41 54 00 00 46 00 DROP.B-1.BAT..F.
0x069db186 08 00 04 00 ef be 3a 4f 5c b4 3a 4f 5c b4 2a 00 .....:0\.:0\.*.
0x069db196 00 00 82 a9 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x069db1a6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 00 52 00 4f 00 50 00 .....D.R.O.P.
0x069db1b6 5f 00 42 00 7e 00 31 00 2e 00 42 00 41 00 54 00 _B.~.1...B.A.T.
0x069db1c6 00 00 1c 00 00 00 d1 f5 4d 15 34 4d 27 2b 2d f6 .....M.4M'+-
0x069db1d6 00 88 66 00 69 00 6c 00 65 00 3a 00 2f 00 2f 00 ..file://. .
0x069db1e6 2f 00 43 00 3a 00 2f 00 55 00 73 00 65 00 72 00 /C.../.U.s.e.r.
0x069db1f6 73 00 2f 00 41 00 6c 00 62 00 65 00 72 00 74 00 s./A.l.b.e.r.t.
```

# Yara Rule Example

WannaCry rule:

```
rule WannaCry_Ransomware {
meta:
    description = "Detects WannaCry Ransomware"
    author = "Florian Roth (with the help of binar.ly)"
    reference = "https://goo.gl/HG2j5T"
    date = "2017-05-12"
    hash1 = "ed01ebfb9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa"
strings:
    $x1 = "icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q" fullword ascii
    $x2 = "taskdl.exe" fullword ascii
    $x3 = "tasksche.exe" fullword ascii
    $x4 = "Global\\MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA" fullword ascii
    $x5 = "WNcry@2017" fullword ascii
    $x6 = "www.iuquerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwegwea.com" ascii
    $x7 = "mssecsvc.exe" fullword ascii
    $x8 = "C:\\%s\\queriuwjhrf" fullword ascii
    $x9 = "icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q" fullword ascii

    $s1 = "C:\\%s\\%s" fullword ascii
    $s2 = "<-- Windows 10 -->" fullword ascii
    $s3 = "cmd.exe /c \"%s\"" fullword ascii
    $s4 = "msg/m_portuguese.wnry" fullword ascii
    $s5 = "\\\\"192.168.56.20\\IPC$" fullword wide
    $s6 = "\\\\"172.16.99.5\\IPC$" fullword wide

    $op1 = { 10 ac 72 0d 3d ff ff 1f ac 77 06 b8 01 00 00 00 }
    $op2 = { 44 24 64 8a c6 44 24 65 0e c6 44 24 66 80 c6 44 }
    $op3 = { 18 df 6c 24 14 dc 64 24 2c dc 6c 24 5c dc 15 88 }
    $op4 = { 09 ff 76 30 50 ff 56 2c 59 59 47 3b 7e 0c 7c }
    $op5 = { c1 ea 1d c1 ee 1e 83 e2 01 83 e6 01 8d 14 56 }
    $op6 = { 8d 48 ff f7 d1 8d 44 10 ff 23 f1 23 c1 }

condition:
    uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 10000KB and ( 1 of ($x*) and 1 of ($s*) or 3 of ($op*) )
}
```