

POL00011 “Politics for Rocket Scientists” revision notes

Todd Davies

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1 The Ends and Means of Political Life (Political Philosophy and Normative Political Theory)

1.1 Aristotle; The Politics

- We should scientifically analyze how states are composed
- Every state is a community, and has some communal idea of a good to be achieved
- Kings vs statesmen:
 - King** If a government is personal/monarchical
 - Statesman** If the citizens rule and are ruled in turn according to legislature
- What is a state?
 - The earliest forms of society were in villages which formed into self-regulating communities
 - Made up of many parts: citizens, non-citizens, office holders
 - There are ideally commonalities between citizens (language, trade, blood, proximity, consent, etc)
 - Humans live in groups to pursue the good life
 - Humans need to be 'perfected' by society and gain virtue; concern for the common good
- Citizens are defined as those who have the power to take up deliberative or judicial administration
- What are the actions of a state?
 - If a tyrant does something, is it the tyrant doing it or the state?
 - How big can states get before they are multiple nations (Aristotle thinks they should be small)
 - If a Government changes, should its obligations be kept?
- What forms of Government are there?

- Man is a 'political animal'; men are brought together by their common interests to attain a measure of well-being
- Men are brought together by their common interest to attain well-being
- Good vs bad (degenerate) forms of government:
 - * One ruler: King vs Tyrant
 - * Few rulers: Aristocracy vs Oligarchy
 - * All citizens rule: Constitutional government vs Democracy
- From the worst kinds, tyranny is the worst, then oligarchy, then democracy which is most tolerable
- Democracy is essentially being ruled by the poor, while oligarchy is being rule by the rich
- Degenerate forms of government lack a concern for the common good (democracy is degenerate because it doesn't seek the greater good)

1.2 Francis Fukuyama; The Origins of Political Order: From Pre-human Times to the French Revolution

- State development occurs through its structure and political institutions
- "If you want a country where the government doesn't get in your way, go to Somalia"
- Three important institutions of the state:
 - Legitimate monopoly of force Max Weber
 - * Concentrate power, enforce rules and treat every citizen equally
 - Rule of law
 - * Decide on a set of norms
 - * The law binds everybody, including the executive branch
 - * Power is transparently handled
 - Accountability
 - * The government acts in the interest of the people
 - * Free and fair elections
 - * Moral accountability
- Origins of the state
 - China created the first real states because of competitive pressure (wars)
 - They had taxes, meritocratic office assignment, bureaucracies (all to help compete)
- Origins of the rule of law
 - Came from religion
 - Even rulers were subject to religious law
- Africa has always had a lack of state power and weak governments. Stronger institutions would help Africa a lot.
- China has no checks and balances, so it has many potential time bombs in its government.

1.3 John Rawls; The Original Position and Justification & Two Principles of Justice

- We can only get a rational answer to a problem when we know:
 - The beliefs and interests of all parties
 - Their relations
 - The alternative choices
 - The decision procedures of all parties
- That's pretty hard, so how do we decide what the best interpretation of a situation is?
- We can find widely accepted premises and build on them to produce rules that justice can be based on
- **Veil of ignorance:** These rules and laws should be made without ulterior motives, with the creator imagining that they don't know their position in society when they are making the rules
- Jeremy Bentham thought up utilitarianism which is the greatest good to the greatest number, and Rawls' theory of justice was an answer to that.
- Two principles for justice:

- Each person should have equal rights to basic liberty (such that their liberty doesn't encroach on other people's liberty). These are:
 - * Political liberty (the right to vote and run for office), freedom of speech and assembly
 - * Liberty of conscience and freedom of thought
 - * Freedom of the person and the right to hold property
 - * Freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure of property
- Social and economic inequalities are arranged so that they operate to everybody's advantage, and offices of the state are available to all
 - * Wealth does not need to be equally distributed, but the distribution should work for everybody.
 - * This principle is less important than the former principle
 - * You must not be able to give up your rights from principle 1 for material gain in principle 2
- The only reason for eroding somebody's freedom (first principle) is if their freedom is itself eroding somebody else's rights.
- There is a "reflective equilibrium" between the two principles of justice which means that they are mutually balanced

1.4 Lecture:

- Normative questions are about how things should be, and what principles should guide our behaviour
- Conceptual questions are about defining how we think about things (e.g. what is a state)
- Empirical political science tries to examine things in practice
- Living in groups (e.g. societies) lets us pass on skills. Language in particular is important
- Political organizations came from the advent of agriculture, which made humans stay in one place and thus need to organize to avoid being targets for attack
- Thomas Hobbes
 - Social contract theory:
 - * On which political institutions would a citizen agree to if they had to write a contract about the society in which they were going to live?
 - Hobbes was shaped by the English Civil War, and described the **state of nature** as when life is "solitary, spoor, nasty, brutish and short".
 - People might accept a limitation of their freedoms to avoid this
 - He said a Leviathan is the solution (i.e. a powerful ruler that would enforce the law and avoid the state of nature)
- John Locke
 - Was critical of Hobbes, and thought that the state of nature would be fairly peaceful
 - Everybody should have a right to life, liberty and property
 - The separation of powers in the state is the path to this, which gave rise to democratic elections

2 The Origins and Articulation of Political Preferences

2.1 Where Do Political Preferences Come From?

2.1.1 Allan Meltzer and Richard Scott; A Rational Theory of the Size of Government.

- The size of the government should be measured by how much income it redistributes
- The 'decisive voter' is the median/middle voter
- When the 'decisive voter' has an income lower than the mean income, then there is an incentive for a redistribution of wealth from the rich people to the poor people
- Higher taxes and redistribution of wealth reduce the incentive to work, and lower earned income. This puts an upper-limit on the size of government since government won't raise taxes high enough to lower productivity in that manner.
- The authors create a model where individuals decide to work or subsist on welfare payments, where this decision is affected by the tax rate

- Voters are assumed to be rational, and anticipate the outcome of the political voting process on themselves when voting
- Voters have an incentive to tax the future rich as opposed to the current rich, so it makes sense for them to vote for a government which will borrow money to be paid back in the future.
- This lets income be redistributed intertemporally, which is ethical if we assume economic growth means that future generations are richer than current ones
- The more taxes you pay, the less incentive you have to engage in labour which means your leisure time goes up and your productivity drops
- Poor and economically unproductive people might not want 100% tax rates since (all) people have less incentive to work and overall productivity drops, so the state is less able to support them

2.1.2 Henry Farrell; Redistribution and National Identity

- Intuitively, states with a strong national identity have strong preferences for redistribution because citizens feel alike
- But this paper says something different
- States with strong national identity have high income inequality and low desire among the working class for redistribution
 - 1. The more similar you are to members of a group, the more likely you are to identify with them
 - 2. The more high status a group is, the more likely you are to identify with them
 - The second option means that working class voters are less likely to identify with their own group
 - When working class voters identify as working class, they want to push for redistribution
 - When they identify more with their nation than their class, they want less redistribution
 - Lower classes are often ethnically diverse, and because of that, they don't strongly identify with each other (first option)
 - Recursion: lack of redistribution means increased inequality, which means less working class identification under (2).
- Equilibria emerge:
 - Lower classes identify with themselves and vote for redistribution, which increases the status of lower classes and cements the equilibrium.
 - Lower classes identify with their nation, and vote for lower redistribution, which reinforces their lower class status and the equilibrium.
- More nationalism = less redistribution

2.1.3 Lecture

- There are two approaches to income redistribution:
 - A strategic pursuit of material self-interest: citizens prefer policies that benefit them personally and materially (Meltzer/Scott reading)
 - Citizens are concerned with social attachments and vote in the interests of their perceived group (Farrell reading)
- There are three faces of power (according to Steven Lukes):
 - Decision making power: direct negotiations between formal bodies of government
 - Agenda-setting power: who decides what the decision makers get to decide on?
 - Ideological power: what issues are relevant and which solutions are there to the issues? How are issues framed, and what is the broader discourse. The ability to influence what people want.

2.2 How Do We Communicate and Aggregate Preferences

2.2.1 James Madison; Federalist 10 –The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

- The public concern mustn't be overridden by private interest
- The rights of minorities must not be overridden by interests of majorities

- A 'faction' is a group of citizens that are united by a common idea/goal/passion
- Factions can have negative effects, and can be removed by:
 - Taking away people's freedoms (cure is worse than the disease)
 - Ensuring all citizens have the same opinions (impossible)
- So... factions are here to stay
- The largest cleavage in society (as of Madison's time) was between those with and without property
- Under the law, somebody cannot be a judge of himself, but voters judge themselves. Because of this, the largest group of voters might always put their own interests first and win.
- Following from this, sometimes immediate interests will win over longer term ones which might lead to bad decisions, so the majority must be protected from their own bad decisions.
- A republic is where:
 - A small number of citizens is elected by the rest
 - This small number should be patriotic and wise
 - The aim is to get a more consistent government than direct democracy
 - Larger governments are good because they are harder to turn into a cabal, but smaller ones are good because they are more easily coordinated
 - Few citizens per representative is good because the representative can represent their interests well, but many citizens per representative increases competition and should mean that representatives are higher quality.
- A republic is better than a simple majority because there are many diverse views so it is harder for a single dominant faction to emerge. This protects minorities.

2.2.2 Hale, John, Margetts, and Yasseri; How Digital Design Shapes Political Participation: A Natural Experiment with Social Information

- Politics is increasingly happening online
- How does this change politics?
 - Creates a non-normal distribution (fat tailed) of political activity
- People take cues from what is popular
 - E.g. if a petition is popular, it is likely to get more signatures
 - This means that you get preferential attachment to popular petitions, and they grow continually
- The difference between offline and online petitions/politics is that it is easier to find out how popular things are online (likes/signatures/visibility, etc).
- Social media helps aggregate social norms, which can act as a nudge to encourage participation
- Low transaction costs of online media increase participation
- Empirical analysis:
 - UK Government started showing trending petitions on its petitions site
 - Hypothesis:
 - * The number of signatures overall would go up
 - * The number of signatures was constant, but the trending petitions received more of the signatures
- Second hypothesis was true
- People with a lower interest in politics are more willing to sign online-petitions than do other political things, but they have few set opinions and are (more) easily influenced by things like social media.
- Since the number of petition signatures doesn't increase much and there is a limited space on the trending page (or in the national consciousness), there is a zero-sum race for attention among petitions

2.2.3 Pierskalla, and Hollenbach; Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa

- Do mobile phones increase violent collective action (in Africa?)
- Outcome: they do increase the probability of violent conflict
- Free riding in insurgent groups is a big problem:
 - High costs for engaging in violence

- Benefits of toppling a government are distributed across the population
- Leaders must ensure that insurgent members actually contribute
- Mass media and violence:
 - Mass media makes violent challenges to the state less likely
 - Soft power of the media makes it easier for governments to dissuade insurgent action
 - But, 'hate radio' has been used in Rwanda to incite violence and facilitate collective action
- Individual communication technologies (e.g. mobile phones) can undermine government propaganda and overcome collective action and coordination problems
- This means that communication becomes easier and participation in rebel groups increases.
- Mobile phones are also helpful when fighting
- Africa is a good target for analysis because it has violent conflict, lots of variation in the conflict, lots of difference in phone coverage and phones are often the first long-distance communication technology there.
- Even though phones do increase violence, their overall effect is still positive since they bring many benefits

2.2.4 Lecture

- All members of the UN have committed to the basic human rights
- To change a constitution, a supermajority is required (e.g. 66%)
- Simple majorities are good enough for most decisions
- Dilemmas of democracies:
 - Majority rule but minority protection
 - Whether to have a direct or representative democracy
- US Federation or Confederation:
 - Confederation has more rights for the individual units. States are fully independent and have little obligation to join in with decisions. Decisions require 100% consensus.
 - Federations make joint decisions for most decisions, with the transfer of authority going from the states to the federal level.
- Direct democracy is pure, indirect/representative democracy is a republic
- The Federalist papers were trying to convince the public that the federal system was better than the Confederate one
- Functions of political parties:
 - Goal formation
 - Preference articulation and aggregation
 - Mobilization for contesting elections (set the agenda, contest issues)
 - Socialization (socialize new people into the political system)
 - Form the political elite and recruit people into parties
- Types of parties (from Katz)
 - Elite, caucus or cadre party
 - * Small organization
 - * Early democracies
 - * Lightweight, only really came together in parliament
 - * Individuals had lots of political resources (elite)
 - Mass party
 - * Drive for mass suffrage
 - * They were mostly outside of parliament (because they didn't have the vote)
 - Catch all party
 - * Came out of the mass parties
 - * But wanted to appeal to more people
 - * Mass parties were too small and niche to get majorities
 - Cartel party
 - * Younger than other types
 - * Evolution/deterioration of more traditional parties
 - * Try to maintain power and distribute political offices among their leaders

- * Push for more state support because they don't have many members
- Business firm party
 - * Challenges the catch all parties
- Anti-Cartel parties
 - * Like UKIP/Greens
 - * Challenge the convenient cartel of the cartel parties
- What is the point of elections?
 - They allow for articulation of political preferences
 - They allow for voter representation (so voters can be heard peacefully)
 - They allow for the legitimate allocation of power
 - They allow for competition between government and opposition
 - They control government through parliament
 - They support policy innovation through competition
- **Majoritarian system** First past the post
- **Proportional representation system** Each electoral district is represented by several individuals proportional to their vote share
- Duverge's 1st law: majoritarian systems tends towards dualism (two parties)
- Duverge's 2nd law: proportional representation systems tends towards multiple parties

3 How Are Decisions Made Given Divergent Preferences (Political Institutions)

3.1 Who Makes the Rules for Whom? Legislatures and Political Trade offs

3.1.1 Michael Munger. with Kevin Munger; Choosing in Groups: An Intuitive Presentation

Thin preference an unspecified ordering from best to worst between the possible alternatives

Thick preferences Incorporate assumptions about beliefs (e.g I prefer ice cream as long as it is warm) as well

Given thin preferences, the set of possible choices, the decision rule (how to go from individual to group preferences) and a group, we can predict the group choice

- Sometimes there are situations where no group preference will make everybody or even a majority happy
- In these cases, the decision rule is important because it lets the group still make a decision since they all signed up for the rule
- E.g. in the case of a tie, the oldest person's choice wins

Procedures (e.g. the decision rule) are as important as preferences.

Whoever has power over the decision rule and also knows preferences can then decide the outcome of the vote

Strategic voting is anticipating each other's preferences and using a knowledge of the rules to try to gain the outcome you want.

People can use strategic voting on you, so it's not a perfect science

The Paradox of Condorcet:

- Three or more choices
- Three or more voters
- Disagreement between the voters (persuasion or compromise is impossible)
- Then there may be no way for an ethical outcome to be achieved
- Even when individual preferences are strictly ordered, we can get a cycle when we put them together.

Cycling majority When a group's preferences are cycling, e.g. if one majority wants X to Y, another wants Y to Z and another wants Z to X

Condorcet Winner When one choice X is preferred over any other alternative Y by at least half of the voters

Good decision rules will choose the Condorcet Winner if one exists

If no Condorcet winner exists:

- Then the rule will choose the winner
- If there is no Condorcet winner in practice, the outcome can be imposed by:
 - Political power

- Agenda control
- Random choice
- If people vote honestly, then whoever controls the agenda will win
- If they vote dishonestly (and try to predict the outcome) then the result is based on lies and deception
- Neither of the above is democratic
- Sometimes, disagreement over the decision rule can cause a cycling majority for it. This happened in the French Revolution where there were many changes in a very short period of time.
- If this occurs, then sometimes a single dictator looks good (Napoleon and Putin)

3.1.2 Michael Laver; Legislatures and Parliaments in Comparative Context.

- Legislature and parliament do not mean the same thing:
Legislature Legislatures pass laws (legislation). They are part of the separation of the legislature (making laws), executive (business of government) and judiciary (interpreting laws).
 In a parliamentary system, the parliament legislates but also:
 - The executive is derived from the legislature, and is also responsible for it
 - The government stays in office as long as it has the confidence of the legislature
 - The parliament can make or break governments
- Votes of confidence
 - There two types of vote on government:
 - * Confidence/no confidence
 - If the government loses, then it is deemed to have been dismissed
 - Parliament has a big stick to use against the Government
 - Governments can tie an issue to a vote of confidence (i.e. you might not like this stance, but if you vote against it, you need a new government)
 - John Major did this to force through the Maastricht Treaty (first vote failed, second succeeded because back-bench Tories didn't want to lose their seats in a general election).

Investiture vote Voting in a new government

- Governments can lose individual votes as long as it is not a vote of no confidence
- Parliamentary elections are more about electing governments (and party leaders) than choosing specific representatives
- Parliament can be dissolved at the request of the government, but can rarely dissolve itself
- The government can strategically time elections
 - They can surf a favorable economic wave which the Government couldn't plan on
 - They could manipulate the economy to create good conditions for an election
- Governments can set the agenda for debates in parliament because the government has the votes to do so (because it has a majority)
- The government can then mysteriously create delays when drafting legislation it doesn't like
- A large majority gives governments almost complete control over the speed of legislation
- Parties confer the following benefits on legislators:
 - Electoral boost
 - Offices
 - Research facilities
 - Speaking rights in debates
- Parties are very important to politicians and have their own internal politics
 - Party leaders incentivise individual politicians to vote along party lines by offering rewards like access to executive power
 - Party leaders rely on the loyalty of party members to maintain their control of government
- Politicians in a party vote with the party in almost all matters, or risk being thrown out of the party
- Party politics can make or break political leaders just like parliamentary politics (Margaret Thatcher lost her majority through party politics)
- There are two types of coalitions:
Government coalitions The set of politicians who are actually members of government, and who may

belong to one or more political parties. Usually the cabinet + junior ministers.

Parliamentary support coalition The set of parliamentarians who are expected to vote for the government when there is a vote of no confidence

- Countries with parliamentary systems are not governed by parliament, but are governed by the executive. The executive must have the confidence of parliament, implicitly by it not passing a vote of no confidence.

3.1.3 Lecture

- Preferences are ranked alternatives
- Preferences come from different places (e.g. your wealth or income)
- If you know where preferences come from, then you can use that information to your benefit (e.g. by guessing somebody's else's preferences based on their situation)
- Information changes people's preferences; having control over information distribution can let you control people's preferences
- When you judge somebody's preferences you're also judging the source of their preferences implicitly
- Preferences are transitive which means we can (sometimes) get the cycling problem (see 'Choosing in Groups' above), and there can never a happy majority.
- What is modern democracy?
- Robert Dahl said: "the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals"
- The separation of powers aims to achieve a stable and responsive government, and was proposed by Montesquieu.
- Again, that's the legislature creating laws, the executive implementing and enforcing laws, and the judiciary adjudicating disputes.
- Each of these branches contests the others
- There are two models for making the executive accountable to the public:
 - Representative delegation: Parliament consists of representatives from all aspects of society, lots of parties in Parliament and lots of compromise in Parliament too (German/proportional representation model)
 - Accountability model: There is a threat of dismissal of the executive through elections. A small number of parties is present in Parliament so the public can decide who to throw out in the next election (UK/majoritarian model).
- Most democracies are on a continuum between these
- Types of legislature:
 - Parliamentary system:
 - * Parliament is directly elected
 - * Parliament then elects the executive
 - * The government needs the 'confidence' of the parliament
 - * The focus of elections is on the executive performance, since the executive is elected by parliament (if it was good, they want the same composition of parliament again)
 - * Flexible electoral calendar
 - Presidential system:
 - * The legislature and the executive are directly elected
 - * The focus of the legislature is about controlling the spending of money by the executive and holding it to account
 - * Fixed electoral calendar
- Regime types:
 - Democratic (democratic) regimes:
 - * Democracy's minimalist definition: competition for power
 - * More extensive definitions:
 - Political rights
 - Guaranteed individual liberties
 - Minority protections

- Authoritarian (autocratic) regimes:
 - * Not fully democratic
 - * There are many ways that authoritarian regimes can be examined, e.g. counting veto players, looking at factions within the regime, etc
- Hybrid regimes:
 - * Characteristics of democracies and authoritarian regimes
 - * Regular elections for at least some levels of government
 - Even if elections are rigged and the outcome is controlled
 - * Why bother with elections if they are rigged?
 - Can help overcome the dictators dilemma

Dictators dilemma balance between authoritarian governments' use of information communication technology for economic development with their need to control the democratizing influences of this technology

- Electoral confirmation of the regime
- More credibility
- Make social groups who might challenge the regime more visible
- Show of power
- * How to rig elections:
 - Rig the district sizes
 - Repress the opposition
 - Guarantee seats for incumbents
 - Use state resources to increase votes for incumbent party
- Regime types and COVID:
 - Authoritarian governments can act quickly and have long time horizons, but struggle to provide accurate information because of a lack of trust (people are wary of reporting the truth dictator's dilemma) and are less stable than democracies.
 - Democratic countries are looking towards the next election, but at the same time, political parties are looking to protect their image and have a long time horizon

3.2 The Government, the State, and Power: Executive Political Institutions and the Regulation of Market Competition

3.2.1 Otto Hintze; Military Organization and the Organization of the State.

- Organizing the state and the military is a continually interacting process
- Originally, state organization was military organization because states were organized around protection
- When agriculture came along, people specialized into warriors and farmers, and the warriors became a special part of the whole
- Different societies optimize for different ends of the spectrum; military society and industrial society.
- International conflict is good for forcing states into a domestic compromise; the enemy abroad is more important than the one at home
- States eventually matured into organizations that would try to educate their population in civilian and military matters
- Economic growth is good for states since it also lets them expand their military

3.2.2 James Madison or Alexander Hamilton; Federalist 51: The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments

- Different branches of Government should be separated.
- The different branches should be somewhat adversarial so that they keep each other in check
- How does this work? Individual ambition
 - Ambition must be played against ambition, and the constitution created in a way such that competition inside government works to everybody's advantage
- This is a design-level failsafe of Government because the people who work in Government aren't perfect

- Each branch of government needs to have different capabilities, different mechanisms of action and different methods of election
- The different branches of government guard different parts of society against other parts of society
- E.g. to protect minorities against majorities
- To protect minorities, you can prevent majorities from ever forming (good luck) or you can set up a body that is independent of the majority to protect the minority.
- If majorities ever do suppress minorities, then anarchy will reign
- All parties and factions should support this idea in the recognition that one day, they might be the weaker faction.

3.2.3 James Wilson; The Bureaucracy Problem

- Everybody thinks that bureaucracy in the US has become a problem
- Right wing thinks it is a social revolution (e.g. welfare), the left wing thinks it is a conservative reaction (e.g. police state), and the center thinks that it isn't working.
- Increasing federal power is about increasing the discretion of appointed officials rather than increasing bureaucracy.
- Liberals try to increase federal power while conservatives want to diminish it
- Local agencies are often buy-able by business interest, so conservatives like local power but liberals do not.
- Administrative power is self-perpetuating and usually serves its own ends.
- There are several problems with bureaucracy:
 - Getting it to serve on agreed national goals, and do so in an accountable and controlled manner
 - Getting all issues and cases treated equally
 - Making it efficient
 - Making it responsive, and stretching the rules when compassion is required
 - Fiscal integrity
- Groups who try and aim for fiscal integrity within the bureaucracy usually win
- Large hierarchical organizations are inherently limited
- Even though they might not be able to solve all problems, they need to try
- But things that are not possible shouldn't be attempted (e.g. trying to have a policy stance on every happening in all foreign countries)
- The supply of competent executives is not increasing as quickly as the supply of problems
- The qualities required of those people cannot be taught quickly (sound judgment, sensitivity to political reality, ability to motivate others)
- The reality of hiring good people is often ignored within Government
- So... The bureaucracy problem can be mitigated but not solved
- The most important thing to do, is to prioritize and direct the limited capacity of the bureaucracy to what you want to accomplish
- Clear goals let you make good value judgments when issues arise

3.2.4 Lecture

- **The State** is a political unit that successfully claims the monopoly of the use of legitimate physical force over a given territory
- The essential functions of the state are:
 - Provide external and internal security (failed states fail this test)
 - Ensure basic economic welfare and opportunity for citizens
 - Ensure opportunities for participation for citizens
- These ideas have changed over time (e.g. maintaining peace became more important when taxation became feasible, as to avoid destroying economic progress).
- When one state innovates, the others need to catch up
- What is the difference between the state and the government?
 - The state is the executive, judicial and legislative branch, as well as the bureaucracy

- The head and state and the head of government can be the same (e.g. US) or different (e.g. UK)
- There are two ideas for how states can avoid deterioration:
 - Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Grow individuals to pursue the general well being of the state/common good above their own self interest
 - James Madison: Take self-interest as a given and design political institutions with that in mind (see above)
- The Bureaucracy:
 - Max Weber thought the bureaucracy was the epitome & best achievement of modernity
 - A system administered by trained professionals based on well defined and organized competencies, underpinned by abstracted rules, laws and regulations
 - Regular decision making, organized into a hierarchical structure
 - Merit based advancement
 - Regular salary ensures political neutrality
- Wilson (see above) thought that we want certain characteristics from a bureaucracy
- Principle-Agent theory:
 - The principle conditionally grants authority to another actor (the agent) to act on their behalf
 - Interests can diverge between the principle and agent
 - The principle can control the agent by:
 - * Selecting the right agent
 - * Recontracting when the relationship breaks down (time limiting helps)
 - * Give the agent more rules so it is hard to shirk
 - * Monitor and report on the agent
 - * Have checks and balances
- Competition
 - Perfect competition is when there are infinite buyers and sellers, who have perfect information and there are no transaction costs
 - This does not exist naturally
 - Market power is the ability to influence other buyers and sellers
 - * Can be used to extract rents or exert political power
 - Adam Smith "People of the same trade seldom meet, and if they do then it ends in conspiracy to raise prices"
 - Competition law is designed to encourage competition by:
 - * Deterring anti-competitive conduct
 - * Maintaining the incentives we want from a competitive market (lower prices, higher quality, increased efficiency, increased innovation)
 - * Maximising consumer welfare
 - * Ensuring economic and political freedom
 - Competition law authorizes the government to prevent the accumulation of market power. Because of this, it is inherently political.

3.3 Courts and Judges

3.3.1 Martin Shapiro; The Prototype Of Courts

- The ideal "prototype court" includes:
 - An independent judge who
 - Applies pre-existing legal norms to facilitate
 - Adversarial proceedings so that
 - A decision may be reached assigning one party the legal right and the other the legal wrong
- Like perfect competition, no societies have such perfect courts
- Courts are a way to settle disputes between two parties by having an adjudicating party.
- Note that when the adjudicator decides, it turns into a two-against-one situation, so lots of court behaviour tries to stop this from being bad.

- If all parties agree to the adjudication beforehand, the loser has previously agreed to the situation at the end. Having physical presence at court helps indicate consent (which is why physical presence is useful).
- The continuum of mediation:
 - Go between** somebody unconnected to either party who enables communication
 - Mediator** operates with both parties consent, and tries to invent novel solutions in the interest of both parties
 - Arbitrator** Comes up with solutions but they might not have appeal from both parties. Can be compelled arbitration (e.g. in an employment contract). Has the legal authority to impose the solution on the parties without their consent. Good arbiters aim to find satisfactory solutions for both parties.
 - Judge** Imposes their rule on both parties, since both parties live under the law and implicitly consent to it.
- Judges cannot be chosen by the parties, they are supplied by the state
- Judges can make dichotomous (yes/no) rulings and deny their own discretion, or they can try to use their discretion to mediate in some situations (but this can be seen as taking sides).
- Courts are the least consensual along the continuum of mediation, but consent of both parties is still important.
- Often, parties will negotiate under the assumption that if they cannot agree, then they will be able to settle it in court.
- Some courts assume facts are unequivocally true when ruling, others have different systems to make judgments when the facts are uncertain
- Courts rarely follow up on their decisions, but rely on other branches of government to do so (e.g. take somebody back to court if they disobey)
- When parties know each other well, litigation is rarely required (e.g. long running business transactions or rural settings)
- Mediation can work well with litigation; litigation is expensive so mitigation can be used 90% of the time and litigation can be used for the remaining 10% of hard cases.
- Social control is a core role of courts, but too much social control means that consent will drop
- Courts represent the state, and if the parties are in disagreement with the state then they won't go to court. If the case is a crime, then one of the parties is automatically the state, and the judge is by default no-longer impartial.
- There should be a separation between the courts and the rest of government, so that the government is not seen as an active party in litigation. This hopefully increases the chance that courts will be impartial. Measures must be taken to ensure that judges are impartial.
- If you don't believe in independent judges, then they start to look more like administrators.
- New regimes can try to show that they are better than old regimes by providing better services and courts are a part of that.
- Laws should be shaped by the parties themselves, otherwise the regime is just imposing its rules. This is why the legislature is democratically elected.
- Courts engage in supplementary lawmaking where they fill in the details of law based on the specific case
- They are not neutral parties in this case, and their political attitudes can influence the outcome
- Lawmaking while judging is necessary because the law cannot account for all eventualities, thus past judgments become 'case law'.
- In the US, courts do lots of things because they took on lots of additional tasks over time (this is easier than creating new governmental agencies to do the tasks).
- Sometimes the courts and other government agencies have overlapping jobs; this provides redundancy and helps with oversight.
- Political systems have four ways to control the judiciary:
 - Secede power to the judiciary
 - Systematically withdraw the ability of the judiciary to decide on political matters
 - Intervene to pull particular cases out of the courts
 - Create systems of judicial recruitment, training, etc which will make judges independent except when one of the parties is the state

Trial de novo Doing the whole trial again in an appeal

- Good if you want to convict somebody cheaply based on a small or underqualified court, and you can do the whole ruling again later if appealed

Errors of fact are when the court got what happened wrong

Errors of law are when the court got the ruling wrong based on the given facts

- Norms like presumptions of truth and per se rules are the way that courts can manipulate factual issues to achieve policy goals. E.g. presumption of truth makes it harder to secure convictions.
- Appeals are a good way to give face to the loser; they have a mental and societal cover, even if the appeal is only threatened.
- "Courts always exist in tension between their basic source of legitimacy as consensual triadic resolves of convict and their position as government agencies imposing law on the citizenry"

3.3.2 Georg Vanberg; Constitutional Courts in Comparative Perspective: A Theoretical Assessment

- Courts are increasing in power across the world
- Alexander Hamilton said that courts are weak institutions in Federalist 78 since they rely on other actors to execute decisions for them
- Legislature and executive can just ignore the courts when they don't like decisions
- Courts are growing in power because:
 - Incentives for legislature and executive to respect the judiciary
 - Costs for the legislature and executive if they attack judicial authority
 - Judges engage in strategic behaviour to increase and maintain their authority
- Constitutions are created under uncertainty about the future; and have limits on political power to restrain temporary passions and protect minorities
- Policy makers want an independent judiciary if it helps them achieve goals more efficiently
- Politicians can't harm the judiciary on a per-decision basis because the tools they have act across the whole judiciary. As long as the judiciary is of benefit overall, then they shouldn't harm it.
 - Studies show that judges are aware of this, and bear in mind government and public opinion on rulings
- Supporting the judiciary is all or nothing
- Judiciaries are useful because:
 - They can get rid of bad legislation that seemed good at the time
 - This limits the damage of bad policy which takes pressure of policy makers
 - If it is (politically) hard for legislators to remove policies, then they can rely on the courts to remove them
 - Legislators can make vague legislation, then let the courts fill in the details
 - The judiciary helps enforce the boundaries between the legislature and the executive
 - Courts can help overcome governmental gridlock and force areas of government to work together
 - The judiciary protects opposition parties in the legislature, but this is tolerated by the incumbent party because that could be them after the next election
 - * A powerful judiciary thus requires a competitive political system, since otherwise a powerful incumbent party could attack judicial authority with little repercussions.
 - * Parties need to have a long enough time horizon to be interested in their own future with an independent judiciary to protect them
- Strong courts are created by strongly competitive democracies
- More explanations for judicial independence and authority:
 - Public support for independent courts because:
 - * Citizens and government have a principle agent relationship
 - * Judiciary helps enforce that
 - * Judiciary helps citizens know when to revoke their support for the government; if the government is overstepping constitutional bounds
 - * If a decision has been made by the court, and the executive fails to follow it, that is a clear signal to voters that the government is failing to play by the rules
 - * Thus judges derive power from being able to coordinate collective action against a rogue executive

- Courts typically avoid disastrous confrontation when they are young in order to build public support and soft power over time.

3.3.3 Lecture notes

- Courts are useful for:
 - Fact finding (essential because it tells the court what principles to apply)
 - Dispute resolution (that is acceptable and understandable for all parties)
 - Law making
 - Social control (that reflects power relations in society, and as an instrument of central government control over rural areas)
 - Providing safeguards against abuse of political power
- **Exogenous** External cause
- **Endogenous** Internal cause
- The exogenous explanation for independent courts is that they have popular support
- The endogenous reason is self-interest of the legislature and executive, who want to protect themselves from future governments if they are voted out
- Civil law systems:
 - Try to specify the law in a lot of detail
 - Anticipate all cases and account for them
 - Civil law is associated with greater predictability
 - Example: Germany
- Common law systems:
 - Recognize social norms
 - Judiciary has more interpretational power
 - Judiciary does more law making
 - More leeway for actors
 - Example: UK & ex-colonies
- The rule of law defines how the Government is allowed to interfere with civilian life, and what behaviour is acceptable between citizens
- The rule of law is:
 - Positively correlated with income per capital
 - Negatively correlated with mortality
 - Positively correlated with education
- How to measure the rule of law?
 - Economic freedom index, which is the extent by which property is protected and individuals engage in voluntary transactions
 - Judicial independence: if court decisions influence other actors and are enforced
- Do courts actually help ordinary people?
 - Courts can be used as a tool by powerful people
 - There is a thin definition of the law: procedural aspects (e.g. the rule of law where the state operates according to its law)
 - Thick definition of the law: individual rights including social welfare (outcomes) are upheld by the law
- The World Justice Project advocates for 'effective access to justice', which is somewhere between thick and thin conceptions:
 - Governments, officials and private entities should be accountable to the law
 - Laws are clear, public, stable and fair
 - The process of enforcing laws is accessible, fair and efficient
 - Access to justice is provided in a timely manner by competent, independent and ethical adjudicators.

4 Conflict And Cooperation Beyond The Nation State

4.1 War and Peace in the Digital Age

4.1.1 Kenneth Waltz; The Anarchic Structure of World Politics

- Tries to look at the international/world political system as a whole, and understand how units are positioned (rather than understanding how they interact)
- View the positioning of actors as an arrangement of the system, and study the system
- Three outcomes from this view:
 - Structure endures even while individual actors change
 - Structural definitions let you swap out parts and still expect the same behaviour
 - Theories from other fields that use structures can be applied
- How is the international system structured?
 - Example of 'structured': domestic politics is hierarchically ordered; units take cues from each other and most have specific authorities.
 - * Domestic states are ordered according to principles
 - * Domestic states formally specify the functions of offices
 - * Domestic states distribute capabilities of the offices
 - * The more a state's functions are specified, the more developed it is
- While domestic political systems are hierarchical and centralized, international ones are anarchic and decentralized
- International Organizations help bring order to the international political scene, but can start to look like states themselves, or are unable to act without the support of their constituent states
- The anarchic nature of international political systems means that authority is based on capability
- Microeconomic theory can be used as an analogy for international politics:
 - Countries/IOs/states (firms) are rational and self interested
 - Structures emerge from the interactions between actors
 - No actors wish to be constrained
 - Emergent systems are not intended, but are spontaneous and individualist
- States are the basic unit of the international political system
 - They vary greatly but have functional similarities
 - There are other actors like IOs too
 - States are declining in importance relative to other actors
 - Each state is sovereign unto itself
- Distribution of capabilities
 - In a domestic hierarchical system, the units are functionally differentiated
 - In the anarchic international one, units are undifferentiated, and related by their differing capabilities
 - Power can be estimated by comparing capacities
- Violence
 - All states must be prepared to use some force to avoid living at the mercy of other states
 - At the domestic level, governments have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, so private citizens can rely on the government to protect them against illegitimate uses
 - At the international level, there is no such monopoly and the only way to stop violence against you is self-help
- Independence
 - Different actors can depend on each other for different things, mainly because of specialization which is useful for everybody (division of labour is efficient)
 - The differences between states can actually bind them together because of this
 - Some things are not divided, e.g. military dependence is rare among major nations.
 - This is because:
 - * Self help systems encourage self-protection
 - * States providing the military protection would get different things to the states who pay for military

protection

- Who will gain more?

- * States don't like being dependent on others

- The more it specializes, the more it is dependent on others

- Collective action problems:
 - Some courses of action require states to work together
 - Collective action problems are rarely solved when everybody is self-interested and rational
 - Only structural change can fix this really
- Anarchy
 - Anarchy is a high risk system and states can only rely on themselves
 - Organizational costs of anarchy are low
 - International organizations want to get things done, but also want to maintain themselves
- A world government is impossible because:
 - The central authority would be unable to mobilize resources to create and maintain the unity of the system
 - A civil war would be likely
 - States can't entrust power to the central state unless it can protect them
 - The more power that comes into the center, the more incentive there is to control it
 - The more power there is on the fringes (individual member states), the greater the power must be in the center to balance them
- Therefore states are free to ignore each other without a central government
- If they cannot, they can aim for the minimum agreement between them, rather than full alignment under a world government
- States have an incentive to avoid violence which is often unproductive

4.1.2 Daniel Drezner; Technological Change and International Relations

- Technological change affects international relations, but also the other way around (world politics affects the pace of technological change)
- Technological change also implies economic redistribution and societal disruption
- Recent trends:
 - Globalization reduces cross-border transaction costs
 - Innovation is good for economies, but also creates societal churn and threats
 - Interconnection leads to vulnerabilities
- Rationalist accounts of technological change
 - Technological change is important for economic growth; 60% productivity growth in developed economies and 90% in developing ones.
 - Joseph Schumpeter made five categories of innovation
 - * Invention
 - * Innovation in production processes
 - * Finding new markets
 - * Discovering new supply
 - * Developing new modes of economic organization
 - Lots of those are about taking advantage of new technology
 - Competition between states can spur on technology development
 - Thus, one dominant state (unipolarity) suppresses innovation, while multipolarity has the right security/insecurity mix to spur it along
 - Inclusive political settings with strong property rights also help technological change
 - Strong states without competition usually fail to maintain their rate of innovation over time
 - Those who are currently powerful will try to oppose innovation. This is one reason why powerful states start to innovate more slowly
 - Technological laggards have an advantage when catching up to leaders since they can avoid path dependencies and leapfrog certain steps

- Countries that have strong external threats will innovate more easily
- Prestige (or desire for prestige) will also favour policy making for innovation
- Classifying inventions
 - Two axes:
 - * Fixed costs: high or low?
 - * Public or private sector?
 - High fixed costs, public sector dominance: prestige tech (e.g. nukes)
 - High fixed costs, private sector dominance: strategic tech (e.g. 5G)
 - Low fixed costs, public sector dominance: public tech (e.g. roads)
 - Low fixed costs, private sector dominance: general purpose tech (e.g. internet, drones)
- Public policy makes a huge difference in how quickly technologies will diffuse
- Technology and international relations
 - Power between states
 - * Prestige tech diffuses slowly, but can still have huge effects
 - * Often they let states have an outside impact (e.g. nukes make you really good at offense, but don't help with anything else)
 - * When a state gains prestige tech, then it gains a new place in the power hierarchy (e.g. NK with nukes)
 - Power between states and non-state actors
 - * General purpose technology (e.g. the internet) can make non-state actors more powerful
 - * But it goes both ways, and states can also use public technology against non-state or state actors (e.g. surveillance, hacks)
 - Interests
 - * Different state actors view the international system as either a zero or non-zero sum game
 - * Nuclear weapons provide evidence for positive-sum; the US could have used its nukes on the Soviet Union before it developed them, and but it didn't
 - * Instead, we got a strong international non-proliferation regime
 - * In contrast, the Internet has spawned no similar regime of regulation even though it is public tech
 - This is because states prioritize their own interests over the interests of a whole
 - Norms
 - * Technology is supposed to speed up the convergence of global norms
 - * Gay marriage and stopping violence against women were to quickly spreading global norms
 - * By definition, new technology lacks well defined norms, so it's hard to predict how it will be used
 - E.g. when it was first used, the US military saw the atomic bomb as just another bomb
 - * Norms for the internet and cybersecurity are still evolving.
- Conclusions:
 - General purpose technology has a greater leveling effect than prestige technology
 - Technology's effects on national security are often counter intuitive. The internet has not made states more secure, but nuclear weapons can be seen to have done so.

4.1.3 Vally Koubi; Climate Change and Conflict

- At the end of the cold war, the idea of national security spread to include environmental and demographic issues
- Before it was just territorial, military and political integrity
- Climate change and conflict are related:
 - Climate change affects the likelihood of conflict via physical or mental factors
 - * Discomfort is increased with extremes of weather
 - * Hot weather increases propensity for violence
 - * This can be inter/intrastate conflict
 - * Neoclassical economists say that the market will ensure abundance of food through the price mechanism and ensure the efficient use of resources...
 - Climate indirectly leads to conflict by reducing economic output, increasing food prices and migration

- * Economic output dropping will:
 - Increase crime rates since individuals are less able to make money legally
 - Increase rebellions since an incentive to rebel is inversely correlated to socioeconomic status
 - Reduce tax revenues so governments are less able to respond
 - Disproportionally affect those worst off the most (lower income countries are more susceptible to climate related changes)
- * Migration will
 - Cause people to move to new areas
 - Make those new areas more burdened, and move the resource crunch from place to place
 - Mess up ethnopolitical balances
- Conclusion is that climate change is a threat multiplier.

4.1.4 Lecture

- Politics beyond the nation state is different from within it because:
 - It happens under anarchy; no global entity is able to take the role of government
 - Legitimate force is not solely under the control of the government (because of there being no world government)
 - Each state is concerned with its own security because other states could attack it
 - Political conflicts can escalate to the use of force
- Anarchy is equality, whereas having a state means hierarchy
- The international system is anarchic because all states are equal (treaty of Westphalia said this, and certain for great powers in practice)
- Game theory concepts:
 - Strategy is an action which a player can choose (or rather, their action for each conceivable move they could make)
 - The outcome is the result of all players' choice of strategies
 - Payoff is the benefit gained by a given player in a given interaction
 - Equilibrium is the outcome if no player can depart from their strategy without increasing their payoff
 - The best strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma is tit-for-tat.
- International Organizations help organize a multi-round game on the international stage
- Criticisms of Kenneth Waltz include:
 - There is an exaggerated difference between domestic and international politics
 - No state completely controls its domestic sphere
 - Hobbes' talks about the state of nature which is similar to the international system's anarchy in theory, but in practice they are very different
 - If international politics is pure self-help, then why do IOs and military alliances exist?
 - Globalization and interdependence all help build cooperation.
- Rationality and war (Fearon IO)
 - War is always irrational and inefficient
 - If the outcome of the war was already known, then the two sides should have come to an agreement, but this is impossible because wars are always uncertain
 - Nevertheless, each side has a strong incentive to communicate to the other side how committed and strong they are to prevent attacks
 - Changing vulnerabilities can trigger war; if you think your country will be less powerful in 5 years than now, then you might have an incentive to fight the war now and get it over with.
 - Domestic constraints might force leaders into a war (e.g. it is politically impossible to lose some territory)
- Trends in armed conflicts
 - Fewer/no wars between the great powers
 - Rare inter state (state vs state) wars
 - International (non neighboring) wars have increased
 - Intrastate (within state) wars have increased
 - Wars were less deadly after the millennium, but are back to the same deadliness as during the cold war

now

- The Perpetual Peace
 - Kant said that citizen voters in a republic would be the ultimate decision makers
 - They would see that war is unproductive and so would not vote for it
 - Additional economic interdependence would reduce the chance
 - As would more IOs
 - Empirically, there has never been a war between economically interdependent countries
- Democratic peace
 - There has always been peaceful interstate relations between democracies
 - There have been conflicts between democracies and non-democracies
 - And also between non-democracies and each other
 - Why is this?
 - * Democracies have many veto-points which could make them less likely to fight.
 - * They might also share more norms
 - * And they probably have many dispute resolution practices

4.2 Conflict and Cooperation in the World Economy

4.2.1 Peter Gourevitch; International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896.

- Why do some countries adopt protectionist policies and not others?
- Look at:
 - Domestic societal interests
 - Political system explanations
 - International political and economic factors
 - Economic ideology
- Most convincing explanations are domestic societal interests.
- Tariffs are set because of:
 - Economic preferences of different groups in society
 - The ability of economic actors to realize policy goals (groups differ in their ability to access power)
 - The country's position in the international political and economic system
 - * Military security, economic independence, etc
 - Economic ideology (intellectual ideas might outlive the conditions that created them)
- Different factions within different countries have different resources, and thus differing abilities to affect politics. Even if political systems are constituted differently, sometimes a certain policy is pretty much inevitable.
- The winning group in society usually has urgent needs, strategic positions in the economy, and strategic or superior positions in the political system.

4.2.2 Tim Büthe; Competition Law & Policy as an Emerging IPE Issue


- Why competition law is inherently political:
 - Competition law and policy entails the use of political power to constrain or redistribute economic/market power
 - Market power can be used to extract economic rent, but also to exert political power. Economic power can always be translated into political power.
 - The implementation of competition law and policy does not involve just applying rules, but the situation needs to be interpreted (with many possible interpretations).
- **Ordo-liberalis**] a philosophical school of thought, motivated in part by the experience with cartels and trusts in "Weimar and Nazi Germany, that rejects government intervention when it seeks to direct economic activity but sees the state as having a necessary 'ordering' function in the economy to safeguard individuals against any concentration of political and economic power that would threaten their freedom and equality of opportunity.

- Net importing countries might oversupply competition enforcement
 - The beneficiaries of the enforcement would be domestic companies
 - But the costs would be borne overseas
- Reverse goes for net exporting countries
- Competition policy can be a genuine complement to institutionalized free trade.
 - International integration of markets provides more opportunity for anti-competitive behaviour
 - There is lots of benefits to collusion on the international market (especially if companies had less competition before internationalization)
 - Competition law is thus needed to prevent this
- International industries tend towards global oligopoly, which means that competition policy is critically important as a genuine complement to free trade in order to safeguard against losing the gains from trade liberalization to monopolistic production and pricing and the accompanying deadweight loss.

4.2.3 Lecture

- Cyber conflicts
 - Cyber conflicts can be very destructive (e.g. turn off a national grid)
 - What counts as a cyber conflict? Does a mis-information campaign or electoral interference count?
 - There are still traditional security policies that work like:
 - * Airgaps
 - * Pooling of resources among democratic states to respond robustly
 - * Deterrence: threat of a counter strike
- The environment, politics and conflict
 - Degradation of the environment can cause resource scarcity
 - Environmental events can cause chain reactions
 - But they can also cause cooperation
 - Examples of conflict:
 - * Water is taken from the the Jordan river at various points, and by the time it gets to Palestine, there isn't much left. Palestinians can't force getting more water since it is taken upstream.
 - * Bangladesh had a drought and refugees came to India, and the two countries ended up having a war.
 - Political consequences of global warming
 - * Mass migration of coastal area populations
 - * Increases and decreases in animal habitats (increased zoonotic disease, less genetic variation)
 - * Uneven distribution of climate change
 - Is the environment a public good?
 - * Public good: non excludable, non-rival in consumption
 - Problems: collective action problem, free riding problem
 - * The commons is a resource over which no single decision making unit holds power
 - Problems: Overconsumption
 - Example of regulation
 - * OILPOL mandated that ships fully clean out their oil tanks in harbors rather than out at sea. The incentives weren't right and it was hard to track/enforce so it wasn't complied with.
 - * MARPOL required extra ballast tanks which were easy to monitor and enforce.
 - * Therefore; agreement design is very important
- Conflict and cooperation in the world economy
 - IPE: International Political Economy
 - Core issues:
 - * Conflict and cooperation in the world economy
 - * Explaining conflict escalation and resolution
 - * Explaining openness
 - Low tariffs and free trade is often good in the long run but not in the short run
 - * Who governs the world economy and why?

- * Distributions of the costs and benefits
- * Consequences of the rise of new economies (China, India, Brazil)
- Ricardian Model
 - * Basic model
 - Two countries and two goods
 - No unemployment
 - Trade is voluntary
 - No transport costs
 - Countries have different productivity
 - * Trade is beneficial to both countries under this model
 - * In the example below, Italy can produce grapes at a comparative advantage to Germany, and Germany can produce wheat at a comparative advantage to Italy.



- * They both require 70 tonnes of wheat, and if they trade freely (intersection on the graph), then they will end up with more grapes overall (220t as opposed to 150t).
- * See example at the end of the section.
- * Even if one country has an advantage in both cases, we can look at the relative cost of producing a good (here, in Germany, one tonne of wheat costs one tonne of grapes but in Italy, one tonne of wheat costs 2 tonnes of grapes).
- * Trade is still beneficial to both countries even when one country is more efficient in both goods, as long as the countries differ in their relative efficiency (so each has a comparative advantage)

- This is true for all countries, since there are no cloned countries
- So, why isn't there free trade all the time?
- Realist explanations
 - * "Security externalities" say that though trade is beneficial to both parties, the gains from trade can let countries free up resources to do other things. Some of these other things could be building up a military.
 - So, countries might just want to trade with alliance partners as to avoid strengthening potential enemies.
 - * Hegemonic Stability Theory
 - Maintaining a free trade environment might be thought of a public good (given that domestic politics has an incentive to limit free trade)
 - Having an international system of free trade requires a hegemonic country that is able to enforce it
 - Economic theory says that free trade should act as an equalizing force between countries
 - This means that by enforcing free trade, the hegemon would actually undermine itself
 - * Interdependence theory
 - A is dependent on B if the condition of A is determined or affected by B
 - Interdependence is mutual dependence (doesn't have to be symmetrical)
 - International interdependence is when countries are interdependent
 - Interdependence increase the costs of war and decreases the likelihood of violence
 - But... some groups are willing to sacrifice economic prosperity for other (e.g. nationalistic) goals
- Statist explanations
 - * National autonomy and self sufficiency can be important for countries
 - * Tariffs are a source of government revenue
 - You only indirectly take from the pockets of citizens so it's not strongly opposed, and it's easy to implement
 - * Some countries will try to protect young industries from international competition to let them grow
 - These industries get used to the tariff protection and lobby hard against removal
 - Worked for Asian tigers, but they weren't democracies
 - * Maximising value added in the country
 - Lots of value added at the higher design levels, little at the raw material production levels
 - Governments have an incentive to keep higher levels in the country
- Economic interest explanations
 - * The Heckscher Ohlin model tries to explain why countries choose protectionism despite there being mutual advantages for free trade:
 - Countries have multiple resources (e.g. labour and land)
 - But differ in abundance of resources (e.g. UK has lots of labour relative to land because it is densely populated, US is the opposite). This is based on the ratio of resources.
 - Thus, the resources are relatively more expensive between countries
 - Produced goods require different amounts of resources to produce
 - These resources are rival between the goods produced, i.e. if you use labour to produce good A then you can't use it for good B.
 - Thus there is an opportunity cost; if you choose to use a resource to produce good A, then you can't use it to produce good B
 - If politically powerful factions control a scarce resource (e.g. land in the UK, labour in the US), then you can expect protectionist policies (since it would be relatively expensive and vulnerable to relatively cheaper imports). Same in reverse
 - * The specific factors model
 - The same as above, but realises that as a country specializes in a given resource (e.g. China specializing in providing labour), then that resource becomes less and less abundant.
 - Thus there is a 'concave production possibility frontier'

- More specialization brings diminishing returns
- * Multinational production
 - Many industries have production lines that span countries
 - One key reason why we haven't seen a reversion to protectionism has been that business have lobbied for free trade because of this, rather than a powerful hegemon
- * Other incentives
 - New trade theory: each country should try to achieve an economy of scale in something, as long as they do not overlap
 - New new trade theory: firm level differences in productivity mean that different firms within a country want different outcomes for that country (e.g. low productivity firm wants protectionism, high productivity firm wants open trade)
 - Other concerns between countries e.g. banning imports of GMOs
 - Tax benefits (doing high value business in low tax environments)
- * Domestic explanations
 - Median voter is important, and often a consumer who wants trade
 - But, elections are usually not decided on trade policy and the electorate can be fairly easily manipulated
 - Power dynamics within countries can affect trade policy (e.g. if rural districts are overweighted in elections (often are) then they can benefit).
 - Partisan differences (both the left and right can be protectionist)
 - Differences between groups in their organizational capacity. E.g. farmers have historically been well organized politically. (think Gourevitch)
 - Bhagwati's law of constant protection: "Whenever you lower barriers somewhere, the most intensely protectionist interests will find another way to raise the barriers somewhere else"
- * Ideological expectations
 - Different people have different commitments to the ideology of free trade
 - When the free trade system has failed, people often turn to more nationalistic ideas
- Post WW2 international (free) trade regime
 - * After WW2 ended, leaders wanted to avoid a big economic crash, so instituted two agreements.
 - * GATT was a temporary agreement to instantiate free trade
 - * ITO was the organization which would take time to implement, but the US withdrew in 1950 and it collapsed, so now we just have the GATT
- GATT:
 - * Most favoured nation principle
 - All exports from any other country should be treated the same as exports from your most favoured nation (closest ally)
 - Exception for regional trade agreements
 - * National treatment; foreign goods are to be treated the same as domestic goods
 - * Rules against:
 - Dumping (selling in one country more cheaply than another)
 - Predatory pricing (below cost selling)
 - Subsidies (financing domestic companies to increase international market share)
 - * Turn quotas and other restrictions into tariffs, which are now the main instrument of trade policy. This is 'tariffication'.
 - * Multilateral trade negotiations are designed to gradually lower tariffs
 - Idea is that both sides pick a tariff to lower
 - Tariffs are lowered for everybody by the most favoured nation principle
 - Tariffs are gradually removed
 - * Dispute resolution:
 - Dispute panel and an appellate body
 - Whoever lost had to agree to the outcome so this rarely happened
 - The WTO has a new dispute settlement mechanism that is binding, but the Trump adminis-

- tration has vetoed it by not nominating a new judge
- * There are still trade barriers that are not covered
 - Voluntary export restrictions (one country avoids exporting to another country to avoid a protectionist backlash from it)
 - Anti-dumping measures are abused (it takes a long time to investigate dumping, and you can put barriers up until it is complete)
 - Governments found ways to subsidize industries through regulation
 - Administrative procedures can be a barrier to trade (e.g. forcing trade to go through lots of silly hoops)
- * Success?
 - Trade has gone up
 - But maybe just because transport costs dropped loads
 - But tariffs did go down too

4.3 Governing Global Markets

4.3.1 Tim Bütte and Walter Mattli; The Rise of Private Regulation in the World Economy

- Standards between companies/countries mean accurate and comparable financial reports
- This shapes research funding, executive compensation and many other important things
- The US banking standard changed to the UK one in 2008 which was a big shift
 - From a litigation based system to a principles based one
- Other countries followed suit, now 120 countries use it (2010)
- International integration of financial markets and more multinational companies created that shift
 - Divergence has costs too, often higher than (one time costs of) switching systems
- Governments privatize regulation because they lack the necessary technical expertise, resources or the flexibility to deal with urgent cases
- National standards have been declining as international standards have been increasing
- Why?
 - The WTO obliges the use of international standard unless they are inappropriate or ineffective
 - Standards define best practices and help reduce legal liability
 - Standardized trade reduces transaction costs. Bringing standards to unstandardized trade would reduce transaction costs equivalent to removing several percent worth of tariffs
 - This benefits firms (lower overheads) and consumers (more access to products)
- Standard setting organizations like the ISO and IEC are private organizations
- Understanding who holds power in these organizations is important
- International standards say that science is the same everywhere, but this is naïve. There is often no right or wrong answer for standards, but many details that are important for countries.
- Countries have huge interests in setting good standards
- International standards organizations rely on national level standards organizations, but these differ in their capacities
- Countries with strong, single and unified national standard setting bodies often have lots of success when influencing international standards (US), countries with many competing national bodies have less success (EU).

4.3.2 Tim Bartley; Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Field

- Private regulation has emerged to address some environmental and labour issues
- The following was important for that to occur:
 - Social movement campaigns that targeted companies
 - Neo-liberal institutional context for business
- Standards have gone from a top down national model to a bottom up market mechanism model
- Private regulation organizations:

- Forest Stewardship Council, Sustainable Forestry Initiative and CSA-International
- Fair labor association ,social accountability international, worldwide responsible apparel production
- These organizations were not planned, but sprung up from coalitions and nonprofits
- Both industries ended up at the same solution.
- Potential problems with regulation:
 - Greenwashing (changing an image without changing practices)
 - Private regulation conflicts with openness and accountability
 - Private regulators have little power to enforce anything in contrast to public regulators
- General findings of a common cause for the two industries:
 - Social movements and neoliberal (low regulation) context
 - NGOs were repeatedly defeated in international trade negotiations, so they tried a different approach (of private regulation)
 - Free trade limited direct state action (e.g. Austria was accused of violating the GATT by preventing imports of unsustainable timber)
 - Social movement pressure:
 - * Public attention peaked in the ~early 90's, and pressure made the unsustainable companies form buyers groups, which created a demand for sustainable timber and good labor conditions
 - States supported private regulation
 - * Free trade rules limited direct government action
 - * States then funded private regulators themselves
 - * But poorer countries that were exporting were opposed to regulations (Global North-South conflict).

4.3.3 Tim Bütke and Walter Mattli; Implications for Global Governance

- Regulation is increasingly privatized, and the representation of national interests is increasingly done via private domestic regulators
- Some systems have one domestic regulator, while others have many. Many domestic regulators (EU) are worse for influencing international regulation than one domestic regulator (US).
- Implications for public policy:
 - Institutional reform to improve the fit between domestic and international regulators
 - * Firms pay a real cost for misalignment here
 - * You can either:
 - Change the existing international organization which is really hard, because it's unlikely that a majority will agree with you
 - Create a new competing international organization with decision making procedures that are better for you (hard too because you have to compete with the incumbent on a global scale)
 - Change domestic institutions to make them more complimentary with the existing international regime (this is the only realistic option).
- Private sector regulation can promote industry interests over public interests
- The EU has a large private sector regulator which is able to have oversight of and give public control over private regulation
- A similar model needs to be rolled out internationally; consumer participation in standard setting has been dropping, and consumer representatives are often ignored in favour of industry interests. An EU-style body is often required to ensure public interests are maintained.

4.3.4 James Vincent; Can Standards and Regulations Keep Up with Health Technology?

- Technology is changing fast and making health technology change fast too, but the regulatory structure struggles to keep up
- Regulation is used to guide the design of new medical equipment
- Novel technologies usually don't fit into the standards because they are novel
- Regulatory challenges:
 - Open source designs might be used very few times, so there is a high regulatory burden

- Designers might want to iterate rapidly on new tech, or test in real-life cases
- The context that people use devices in varies lots (especially for home use, e.g. T1 diabetes)
 - * Having more configuration of the same product can help with this, but the development burden is increased
 - * One solution is post-market analysis e.g. diaries
- Open source or private solutions might be low quality (e.g. mobile phone apps with bad programming).
 - * One solution is to have guidelines that developers must stick to
- Opportunities:
 - Ideas can be shared with new technologies like open source
 - Users can understand the constraints of a solution if they have a good knowledge of how it works and can contact the developers

4.3.5 Lecture

- Product standards are important for design, sizing, performance, interoperability, etc
- Mass production is inconceivable without standards
- Public interest is furthered by standards in consumer protection, workplace safety and environmental externalities
- Cross national differences in standards create barriers to trade (equal to 2-10% tariffs)
- International harmonization of standards through regulatory cooperation, delegation of standard setting to transnational bodies is efficient.
- Private bodies exist: ISO (International Standards Organization) and IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission)
 - These are non-governmental
 - One member body per country
 - Really big, 50k+ experts involved
 - Standards development is controlled by a central secretariat
 - The central secretariat and coordination between the ISO and IEC guarantees that there is one definitive standard for a given product
 - Bottom up agenda, with adoption of standards by a super-majority
 - These are powerful bodies, and as such, whoever gets to write the actual standards has a lot of power
 - * Countries have distributional conflicts based on business interests
- These are the different types of standards organizations:
 - Institutional setting for the rule making:
 - * Public
 - Unitary (non-market based): Rule making in a focal international organization
 - Plural (market based selection): Competing standards developed by national/regional bodies
 - * Private
 - Unitary: Transnational focal institution
 - Plural: Competing standards from individual firms (e.g. Microsoft or consortia)
- Institutional complementarity theory
 - International standardization has adjustment costs and thus distributional conflicts
 - Institutional complementarity (see Buthe/Mattli above) is the functional fit between the domestic institutions and the international level.
 - * This affects the ability of domestic players to influence international standards
- Key elements of the ISO and IEC process:
 - They are the focal points of international standard setting
 - There is a multi-stage rule making procedure which tries to settle the fundamentals early on, and then increases the specificity of the drafts as time goes on
 - The preferences of everybody are tried to be understood and integrated to get a consensus
 - Countries with a greater institutional capacity can better influence the stages
 - * They need expertise, material resources, information about the international standardization politics, and the ability to know what is in their interest on a domestic level (domestic preference

- aggregation)
- * Hierarchical systems are good at this (US good, UK bad)

4.4 The Politics of Economic Development

4.4.1 Tim Büthe, Solomon Major, and André de Mello e Souza; The Politics of Private Foreign Aid: Humanitarian Principles, Economic Development Objectives, and Organizational Interests in the Allocation of Private Aid by NGOs.

- Lots of foreign aid is raised from non-governmental sources, but up until recently (this paper) we didn't know how it was distributed.
- Private donations make up 60% of aid, and private money makes more and more decisions of what gets funded in poor countries
- There is lots of literature on public aid, but little on private aid
- A common identity shapes NGO interactions around a "principled issue network" which shapes members around their values rather than material concerns
- There are two types of altruism here for NGOs which explain private aid:
 - Humanitarian discourse** Find underdeveloped or neglected populations and provide them with services
 - People should get aid based on objective need
 - Oriented around an ethical obligation to relieve suffering
 - Tries to be impartial, neutral and independent
 - Prioritizes by need and distress, ignores race, gender etc
 - Wide acceptance
 - Development discourse** Focus on root causes of poverty and aim for sustainable improvements in the long term
 - People should get aid based on whether it can contribute to sustained development
 - Concerned with outcomes rather than intentions
 - Aims for persistent increases in socioeconomic, political or physical well being
 - The better suited the recipient's environment is to development aid, the more that objective need plays a role in determining aid allocation
- A third explanation for private aid is:
 - Fundraising discourse** NGOs allocate funds to opportunities that can increase fundraising capacity based on what is currently in the media
 - Cynics are skeptical of NGOs good intentions
 - NGOs can fail organizationally or systemically, e.g. if they want to grow bigger or self perpetuate, they might act in their own interests.
 - NGOs can be seen to operate in a competitive market for aid funding and aid delivery.
 - NGOs sometimes need to be present for world events so that they can show their presence to donors
- Public donors use discretion to allocate aid that serves their own interests
- NGOs act more like a group and are mutually respecting and supporting, which supports their group discourses
- Conclusion / empirical findings:
 - Humanitarian discourse is strongly supported
 - Development discourse is weakly supported
 - No support for fundraising discourse
 - Low salaries and unpleasant conditions mean that the NGO industry is self-selecting for those who want to do good work.

4.4.2 Lecture

- Economic growth is the following:
 - $GDP = C + I + G$
 - * Consumer spending
 - * Investment

- * Government spending

- Economic growth is varied by the institutional context in which it occurs

Institutions Stable, valued and recurring patterns of order like schools

- Three institutions are important for economic growth:
 - Property rights
 - Rule of law
 - Independent courts

resource curse When natural resource wealth allows the state to access wealth without having to tax citizens, which means citizens lose a level over which it can control government (willingness to pay tax), so the government doesn't develop properly and performs poorly

- Types of foreign aid:
 - Military aid
 - Humanitarian/emergency/development aid
 - Teaching assistance/state building/administrative training
- Distinctions of aid:
 - Direct vs indirect (e.g. country to country or via the world bank/EU/etc)
 - Different mechanisms of delivery (goods, cash, etc)
 - Grants vs loans
 - Official government aid or private aid
 - OECD says official aid is:
 - * Administered to promote economic development and welfare of the recipient as the main objective, with at least 25% grants
- Countries give aid because:
 - Physical security for the donor (avoid spillover conflicts)
 - Increase the donor's political influence (e.g. reward 'good' UN voting histories)
 - Donor's economic self-interest (developing markets abroad)
 - Try to maintain global peace, disease eradication etc (protect the global commons)
 - Increase the donor's reputation
 - Out of a sense of duty or altruism
- Why not to give aid:
 - There is a moral hazard because the recipient could chose to not develop because it is guaranteed aid
 - Aid dependency trap (economy never develops because aid is given, local markets cannot compete with aid and die)
 - Donor's economic self interest (might be a hidden subsidy for domestic firms)
 - Donor's reputation (might be artificially raised)
 - It might not be a good use of money compared to other things
- The OECD decided in 1970 to donate 0.7% of GDP for foreign aid.
 - Few countries make this (about 5)
 - US gives about 0.16%; congress never supported 0.7%, only the executive
- Drivers of aid:
 - Alliance partners (same reasons as why countries trade with alliance partners)
 - Geopolitical strategic importance (Somalia got loads of aid until the cold war ended, then it stopped and the country collapsed)
 - UN voting record
 - UN Security Council seat (brings lots more aid when a country receives it)
 - Trade (export opportunities for the donor)
 - Good governance in the recipient country (so the money isn't wasted)
 - Recipient need (but this is inconsistent)
- Private aid
 - Private sources are agenda setters
 - Sources include:
 - * Business charitable giving (financial, managerial, volunteer time, etc)

- * Individuals donations
- * Foundations
 - Old ones: Rockefeller, Ford, etc
 - New ones: Gates
 - Fast growing sector
 - Lots of agenda setting power
- * Private sources aggregate funds from many countries and spend them together
- * The allocation decision is not influenced by governments

5 Political Science and Public Policy

5.1 Jake Bowers and Paul Testa; Better Government, Better Science: The Promise of and Challenges Facing the Evidence-Informed Policy Movement

- Evidence can be used for evaluation (what worked) or insight (why did it work)
- What does evidence mean, and what is evidence based policy?
 - Evidence can be peer reviewed studies or future studies that assess the success of policy interventions
 - Policies should be judged that shares the authority of science, i.e. it should be impersonal, transparent and unbiased
 - Policy can be "evidence informed" as opposed to "evidence based" when social scientists advise rather than set policy
- Organizations can use experiments and randomized trials to determine whether a policy worked. Randomized trials are especially good because they can be easily compared.
- An example is having defaults:
 - E.g. default organ donation
 - They are low-touch and don't require lots of intervention
 - They lower the transaction costs for most people
 - Defaults are implicitly endorsed by experts, which is good for people who lack expertise
- Problems:
 - Sometimes evidence based policies are seen as paternal
 - They can be seen as the government intervening in the lives of citizens
 - The policymaker might be more of a salesperson than an objective evaluator
 - There is nothing to say that academics will actually create good policies; perhaps their analysis is still wrong or they lack the right tools
 - Results from studies might not generalize into the proposed use case
 - * Having multiple teams around the world working on parallel identical studies can help
 - If trials only show what works, then we might not tell us anything about new phenomena
 - * E.g. in Tennessee, a trial showed that small classes in schools produce better outcomes, but in California the policy was implemented by using more new teachers which led to worse outcomes
 - * It is important to try to understand the 'why' behind studies
 - Scholars might try to oversell results
 - Scholars might not publish null results, but these are still useful for finding out what doesn't work

5.2 Helen Milner and Sondre Ulvund Solstad; Technology Diffusion and the International System

- States rely on technology being invented abroad, and technology development affects economic development
 - States mostly import technologies rather than creating their own
 - Adoption of technology is costly and disruptive
 - Thus most new technologies are resisted by interest groups & governments
 - Government policies are critical to slowing down or speeding up technology development
- Cardwell's law: No nation has been very creative for more than an historically short period. Fortunately, as each leader has flagged there has always been, up to now, a nation or nations to take up the torch."

- During 'long waves', technology diffused quickly through the international system and at other times it was slow
- Internal state politics:
 - Governments want support from consumers and firms and want to perpetuate the state
 - Firms want the government to not support new technology, but provide national defense
 - Consumers want national defense, but also new technology under the assumption that it will increase their welfare
- This paper argues that:
 - The external pressures of states to innovate changes over time
 - * When threats from abroad are greater than threats to the government from domestic forces with vested interests in existing technology, then governments will encourage technology adoption
 - * If there is lots of competition in the international system, there is more pressure to adopt new technologies
 - Systemic pressures are related to the distribution of capabilities in the international system
 - * The benefits of a technological leader are great, and allow states to coerce other states
 - * There is an inverse correlation between violent international competition and system concentration (more equally sized states means more competition)
 - * Neighborhood threats are positively related to technology adoption
 - * Civil war is negatively related to technology adoption
 - * Further away inventions take longer to adopt
 - * Less concentration leads competitive pressures and more tech innovation
 - Systemic shifts can be linked to global technology waves
- Example: Swiss government establishing railroads
 - Railroads hadn't been passed in the Swedish parliament for 25 years
 - Then once the Crimean war broke out they were passed in weeks
 - At some points after this, Sweden spent 15% of expenditure on railroads
 - Their setup was inefficient, with a main line inland, and branches to settlements on the sea intended to make Sweden more defensive.

5.3 Lecture

- Science gives us another way of knowing things; in particular we can say "it never happened but we know that it is true"
- It lets us cope with and systematically reduce uncertainty in life
- Unlike physical sciences, social science has the following difficulties:
 - Few observations but many variables
 - Little chance for genuine experimentation
 - Findings seem intuitive after you find them
 - * Common sense is a grab bag of logically inconsistent beliefs that can work in specific contexts, but don't work well when generalized because they lose all the context from the specific situation.
 - High complexity (linked to the first one)