Commit 03e9fbf
committed
fix: Use Opus in the CBR mode
VBR is susceptible to a transcription attack, where words can be
deducted from bandwidth fluctuations, even despite the audio being
encrypted. Toxcore does add padding, but it's just 0-7 bytes, to pad to
a 8 byte boundary, which might not be enough. CBR is safe from this
attack, it is the industry recommendation to use CBR: "Applications
conveying highly sensitive unstructured information SHOULD NOT use
codecs in VBR mode."[1], and is what other secure messengers use too,
e.g. Signal.
Here are some papers on this topic:
- A. M. White, A. R. Matthews, K. Z. Snow and F. Monrose, "Phonotactic
Reconstruction of Encrypted VoIP Conversations: Hookt on Fon-iks,"
2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, USA, 2011,
pp. 3-18, doi: 10.1109/SP.2011.34.
- L. A. Khan, M. S. Baig, and Amr M. Youssef. Speaker recognition
from encrypted VoIP communications. Digit. Investig. 7, 1–2 (October,
2010), 65–73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2009.10.001
- C. V. Wright, L. Ballard, S. E. Coull, F. Monrose and G. M. Masson,
"Spot Me if You Can: Uncovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted VoIP
Conversations," 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008),
Oakland, CA, USA, 2008, pp. 35-49, doi: 10.1109/SP.2008.21.
Thanks to an IRC user who asked to remain anonymous for sending the
diff.
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6562#section-31 parent 671b1f9 commit 03e9fbf
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