



Security Assessment Report

 aave
sGHO Vault

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Prepared for:
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Code developed by:



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Project Summary

Project Scope

Project Name	Repository (link)	Latest Commit	Platform
sGHO Vault	https://github.com/aave-dao/gho-origin	PR#5 (initial) 0993a90 (fix)	Solidity

Project Overview

This document describes the manual code review findings of **sGHO ERC4626 Vault**. The following contract list is included in our scope:

src/contracts/sgho/sGHO.sol

The work was undertaken from **September 3, 2025**, to **September 8, 2025**. During this time, Certora's security researchers performed a manual audit of all the Solidity contracts and discovered several bugs in the codebase, which are summarized in the subsequent section.

Protocol Overview


The sGHO contract is a typical ERC4626 implementation with a few modifications. Users deposit assets and get shares based on the current yield index. Over time, the yield index will grow based on the target rate set by the yield manager which allows users to receive more assets than deposited. The vault works on a first-come-first-served basis as the contract might not have enough GHO balance to support all withdrawals with their interest included.

Findings Summary

The table below summarizes the findings of the review, including type and severity details.

Severity	Discovered	Confirmed	Fixed
Critical	-	-	-
High	-	-	-
Medium	-	-	-
Low	1	1	-
Informational	1	1	1
Total	2	2	1

Severity Matrix



Detailed Findings

ID	Title	Severity	Status
L-01	Users can DoS vault actions by triggering <code>maxAction()</code> requires	Low	Acknowledged
I-01	Lack of pausability mechanism limits admin emergency action	Informational	Fixed

Low Severity Issues

L-01. Users can DoS vault actions by triggering `maxAction()` requires

Severity: Low	Impact: Medium	Likelihood: Low
Files: sGHO.sol	Status: Acknowledged	

Description

The `sGHO.sol` implements ERC4626, which has `deposit()/mint()` and `withdraw()/redeem()` actions. These actions are bound by `maxDeposit()/maxMint()`, `maxWithdraw()/maxRedeem()` checks, respectively.

These checks perform the following validation:

- For deposit/mint, it checks that the deposit will not put the vault above `$.supplyCap`
- For withdraw/redeem, it checks that the vault has enough underlying token balance to fulfill the withdrawal

The only requirements for someone to deposit or withdraw are, respectively, that they must have enough GHO to deposit, or sGHO to withdraw. So any user can DoS vault actions by triggering the `maxAction()` check. For example:

- Innocent user wants to deposit 1,000 GHO into the vault
- Attacker front-runs their deposit, making a deposit such that `$.supplyCap - currentAssets < 1000`
- The innocent user's transaction will revert with a `ERC4626ExceededMaxDeposit()` error
- Attacker back-runs this transaction, withdrawing the GHO back

Recommendation

There is no way of completely eliminating this vector, but the following mitigations limit the impact or feasibility of this attack:

- Include deposit or withdrawal fees: this will make it expensive for an attacker to perform this attack
- Prevent deposits and withdrawals in the same block: this will introduce an additional constraint for the attacker, as they must hold the funds for more than a block in order to perform it

Informational Issues

I-01. Lack of pausability mechanism limits admin emergency action

Description

The `sGHO.sol` contract relies on active admin action, such as setting target rate, supply cap, adding the funds equivalent to the accrued yield, and if necessary, rescuing tokens mistakenly sent to the contract.

However, the contract does not implement a pausability mechanism. As a result, the admin cannot temporarily halt user interactions in emergency situations, which may limit their ability to respond to unexpected risks.

Recommendation

Consider implementing pausability on external user actions – `deposit()`, `mint()`, `withdraw()`, and `redeem()`.

Fix Review

Fixed in [0993a90](#).

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