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Perspectives of Time and Change

Rethinking Embedded Environmental Activism in China

PETER HO AND RICHARD LOUIS EDMONDS

Abstract China's burgeoning civil society has often been characterized as state-led or corporatist. However, these concepts fail to capture the current dynamics of Chinese social activism, as they cannot account for two of its critical features. First, the fact that the nature of Chinese state–society relations is not a matter of the former dictating the latter, but rather a kind of "negotiated symbiosis." Second, the semiauthoritarian context necessitates that China's social activists develop a diffuse, and informal rather than formal, network of relations. This informal web of relations has yielded undeniable political as well as societal legitimacy. It is against this background that we put forward the concept of "embedded social activism." Since its initial emergence, environmental activism has resourcefully adapted to, rather than opposed, the political conditions of its era. The hallmark, and in fact, the success of China's reforms lie in their strategy of incremental change. Therefore, we might view embedded environmentalism as a transient phase which is itself changing through time, a transitional feature of a burgeoning civil society in a semiauthoritarian context.

Keywords social activism, civil society development, environmentalism, environmental NGOs, politics

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The sociological and political science literatures hold that social movements emerge and evolve as a function of several critical conditions: the level of cleavages and conflicts in society; the movement's norms and values ("cultural frames") that bind together its participants; its organization and capacity to mobilize resources; and the movement's specific political opportunities.[1] In other words, a social movement's emergence, dynamics, and its development trajectory is a measure of these parameters. Furthermore, social movements are

generally seen as capable of effecting structural political and social changes—be they for wider civil rights or a better environment. To study the dynamics and potential of social movements in China, this special issue zoomed in on one of the country's earliest and most active sectors of civil society since the beginning of the Chinese reforms in 1979: the environmental realm.

Environmental activism in China critically diverges from the popular image of social movements as "masses of people taking to the streets and erecting barricades" in opposition to an established order. Chinese environmentalism differs from what the world has witnessed in some of the ex-socialist countries in East and Central Europe where green movements acted as a catalyst for a wider democratization in society. It also differs from what could be seen in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan where social movements transformed into "color revolutions" that toppled autocratic regimes. In fact, since its emergence in the early 1990s, Chinese environmentalism has been mostly fragmentary, highly localized, and nonconfrontational. To explain these features some scholars have portrayed, and at times criticized, China as a country under a totalitarian regime where any attempt at autonomous association is either suppressed or incorporated into the structures of the "Leninist party-state."[2] Others have talked about a "state-led civil society" or "state corporatism" whereby social activists and their organizations are co-opted into the state agenda.[3]

However, as we will see, the concepts of a state-led civil society or state corporatism fail to capture the current dynamics of Chinese social activism, as they cannot account for two of its critical features. For one thing, in China today the state is unable to impose its dictates on society. Current state–society relations can be likened to an ongoing negotiation or a "negotiated symbiosis," albeit not necessarily a negotiation between equals. Moreover, as a result of this semiauthoritarian setting, Chinese social activists have to rely on an informal and diffuse, rather than formal, network of relations. Due to this informal web of relations, the divides between the party-state and society can be successfully bridged, yielding undeniable political leverage, as well as societal legitimacy.

Chinese environmentalism is different from what is popularly regarded as "green social movement." However, at the same time, it is evident that the parameters that could propel a broadly supported social movement are present in contemporary Chinese society. In this light, we tried to gauge the effect of the limited political space for the development and dynamics of a social movement in China. We also examined whether the possibility for, or

the actual occurrence of, a social movement is sine qua non for political change and the development of civil society. Lastly, we explored the prospects for the emergence of a social movement in China, and how it would relate to transnational environmentalism.

Implications of a limited political space

In order to answer the question about the consequence of China's semiauthoritarian context for the development and dynamics of a social movement, it is necessary to revert to the conceptualization of a social and environmental movement. Some insisted that a shared collective identity and a sense of mission are critical preconditions to label social groups as a "movement."[4] Discussions have also focused on the constituent elements of social and environmental movements—loosely organized grass-roots cells or also well-institutionalized, specialized organizations.[5] However, considering the specific features of Chinese environmentalism, it might be useful to remind ourselves of what Doyle and McEachern rightly remarked about social movements: "There is no unifying teleological purpose that drives them. There is no single causal reality that made them. Interpretations of their origins and significance of environmental movements are as contested as the movements themselves."[6]

The people actively involved in environmental activism in China include individuals, groups, loose networks, and organizations with varying degrees of institutionalization and formalization, such as NGOs, green salons, student associations, and also the "government-organized NGOs." However, equating Chinese green activism with, for example, the May Fourth Movement that followed the Versailles negotiations in 1919[7] or with the students' movement that swept over Tian'anmen Square and the rest of China in 1989 is a comparison that falls short because of its fragmentary, highly localized, and nonconfrontational nature.[8] For this reason, we have chosen to dub Chinese green activism "embedded environmentalism." It is the resultant of a limited, semiauthoritarian political space for civil society.

Since the revitalization of Polanyi's notion of "embeddedness" formulated by Granovetter, the concept has been applied in various disciplines of the social sciences.[9] In economic sociology it has come to denote the idea that economic action is more than merely a function of prices and markets; it also critically depends on the wider sociopolitical, cultural, and historical context.[10] In political science it has been used to explain economic success in relation to the relative autonomy of the state from the claims of interest

groups in society.[11] Vice versa, in organizational studies "embeddedness" is employed as a measure of autonomy of civic organizations from the state. However, in the proliferating, and at times contradictory, writings about embeddedness, we can distil two critical features that are relevant to the Chinese experience: contextualization and networks.[12]

First, embeddedness refers to the contextualization of human action. In a different wording, although China's semiauthoritarian environment is still heavily influenced by the Party and state, which set out seemingly invisible limits that paradoxically seem to be known by all, social action is not a matter of state versus society, or state dictating society. Different from a fully authoritarian context,[13] social action between state and society crucially is an interaction and ongoing negotiation. In this sense, embedded environmentalism in China is a situation of a negotiated symbiosis with the Party and state. Second, interaction and negotiation are effected through social networks and ties. This, of course, holds true for any society. However, the crux of the matter is to what extent personal, informal, and "weak" ties are instrumental in relation to the level of formality of society. It is generally posited that in less formal environments, the evolvement of "thick" personalized relations is critical to secure sufficient trust for effective human interaction.[14] In the Chinese case, where the central state leaves little maneuvering space for formal associations independent of the state, it is vital for NGOs and individual activists to rely on informal, personal ties to achieve their ends. Moreover, the nature of these ties—or *guanxi* as it is termed in Chinese—is rooted in the kind of interpersonal Confucian-style connections that have long existed in China. For these reasons, we argue that environmental activism in China is not an activity that can operate fully autonomously from the Party and state—as some foreign observers and scholars silently hope. However, this by no means implies that environmental activism in China is "state-led" or suppressed. What sets Chinese embedded activism aside is that it has evolved within a semiauthoritarian environment which limits activism while at the same time enabling it. This specific setting has caused green activists to be enmeshed in a diffuse web of informal relations, unwritten rules, and shared missions with the party-state. It is this informal network that can effectively bridge the divides between the party-state and society, as well as between China and the outside world. Yet, perhaps as important, Chinese green activists engage in collective action in the name of, and thus, not necessarily out of a concern for, environmental conservation and protection. This brings us to the next question, namely whether the occurrence of

a social movement is a precondition for political change and the development of civil society in China.

The contradiction of embeddedness: restricted while liberated

Classical studies by de Tocqueville and Tilly offer the view that social movements are critically linked to revolution and regime change.[15] They are seen as vehicles for a societal transition towards more democratic, transparent, and accountable governance structures. In the former socialist economies of Bulgaria and Hungary, environmentalism was propelled by a demand for political change, rather than by environmental protection per se. However, as overt political opposition was a sheer impossibility within the repressive, authoritarian environment at the time, citizens looked for alternative, and less politically sensitive, channels to expand civil and political rights. They found it in part in environmentalism. In fact, green activism proved to be a very effective means of mobilizing people in protest against the communist administrations, with the ultimate result of regime change. Environmentalism was thus inextricably linked to wider issues of human rights and democracy.[16] When one of China's first environmental NGOs—Friends of Nature—was established in the early 1990s, some foreign observers and the international media hoped for a Hungarian or Bulgarian scenario unfolding in China as well. Yet, after a decade such scenarios seem far away.

The Chinese authorities have shown on several occasions that any nationwide movement in opposition of the central state will not be tolerated. Even more so, the gradually expanding political and civil freedoms that led to the emergence of voluntary, green groups in the 1990s have been increasingly rescinded in the aftermath of the color revolutions. The end of 2005 has seen a sudden stepping up of control over civil organizations, particularly environmental NGOs. By demanding renewed registration, creating new "nongovernmental" institutions,[17] and controlling activists' channels for communication such as the internet and the media,[18] the Chinese state sought to keep the environmentalist spirit in the bottle.[19] Moreover, in order to expose potential links with "foreign hostile and destabilizing forces" NGOs were asked to open up their financial accounts for government inspection. This action culminated in a vicious attack on Global Village of Beijing, a renowned green NGO, which was heavily criticized for having received funding from the Heinrich Boell Stiftung, the development foundation of the German Green Party.[20] The

fact that the Heinrich Boell Stiftung is one of the foreign foundations that openly support more controversial projects related to human rights, press freedom, and the environment rendered Global Village of Beijing quite vulnerable at the time.

In China's semiauthoritarian context today, it is no surprise that the Chinese green movement lacks what characterized environmentalism in Europe and North America: the capacity and opportunity to mobilize a nationwide, popular movement against national policies. By contrast, Chinese environmentalism is fragmentary, small-scaled, and organized around local rather than national political issues. Chinese environmentalism consciously steers away from possible confrontations with the national government through "depoliticized politics" and "self-imposed censorship." The organizational spectrum of Chinese activism features a substantial number of NGOs that fail to apply for formal registration.[21] On the other hand, the organizations that do succeed in registering often have strong ties with the government, or result directly from the privatization and disbanding of former state institutions. Some critics question whether a docile and depoliticized green activism will be able to achieve any "real" sociopolitical and environmental changes. In fact, the lack of autonomy and the fear to openly confront the national authorities have caused some observers to wonder whether one can talk about a Chinese green movement at all.[22]

However, is an embedded Chinese environmentalism an entirely negative matter? Not necessarily, as embeddedness might be seen as a specific social response to the current legal-political conditions, while allowing for organizational survival over the long run. Furthermore, it is a grave misconception to portray Chinese environmentalism as strictly confined within state-defined and controlled spaces. Embeddedness has earned Chinese environmental activism a certain legitimacy in the central government's eyes, a firm place within society, as well as links with international NGOs. Chinese environmentalism has amply demonstrated an ability to engage in successful and effective pressure politics.

An excellent illustration of the political leverage of embedded activism is the case study of the Nujiang antidam campaign described by Guobin Yang and Craig Calhoun in this issue. This movement grew out of an informal salon, subsequently developed into a loose network of activists, academics, journalists, and sympathetic officials, and eventually became an institutionalized "green partnership" of eight environmental NGOs, with transnational connections as well. Although the struggle over the dam is still ongoing at

the time of writing, this environmental partnership succeeded in attracting high political attention and the temporary halting of the dam construction. One of the main reasons for the movement's success lies in its clever use of the political opportunities provided by the state. Rather than pushing against political limits or demanding for greater freedoms and rights, the movement chose to work within the political spaces opened up by what Ho and Vermeer termed the "greening of the state."[23] As Yang and Calhoun also note, the movement carefully avoided framing the campaign in political terms, and instead, explicitly used legal terms. In this sense, the proclamation of the new "Environmental Impact Assessment Law" shortly before the environmental movement gained full momentum proved crucial. By referring to this law, the movement succeeded in exerting such strong political pressure on the central government that Premier Wen Jiabao in person called for a renewed environmental impact assessment of the dam.

What we can learn from this case is that embeddedness is most certainly not a matter of subjecting oneself to the authoritarian restrictions of the state, or being silenced for voicing dissent, as some in the international media might want us to believe. Rather, embedded environmentalism is a resourceful and negotiated strategy employed by activists to gain maximum political and social influence, at least in name, by professing to uphold the principles of the Chinese Communist Party and state. This is the contradictory essence of the embeddedness of Chinese activism: limiting while enabling.

The lapse of time

Some observers have voiced the opinion that Chinese environmentalism can only be considered a "full-fledged movement" if it can—as can its counterparts in the West—engage in mass mobilization and radical strategies.[24] In this view, the current dynamics of Chinese green activism is a result of state-imposed restrictions rather than choice. The founder and director of Global Village of Beijing, Liao Xiaoyi, once said, "Chinese environmentalism cannot always rely on nonconfrontational tactics to achieve its aims."[25] With this remark she touched on the final two questions of this special issue—the future prospects for the emergence of a social movement in China, and its potential relations with a transnational or global environmentalism.

In this volume, we believe that the answer to the former question is of significantly less relevance than the observation that Chinese environmentalism has found a fairly effective response to a semiauthoritarian context,

which enables it to play an increasingly critical role in the greening of industries, the government, and consumer lifestyles. Part of the criticism of Chinese activism as docile and a mere supporter of the state also derives from the fact that these sociopolitical analyses are a snapshot in time rather than a series of pictures. In some transitional countries, environmentalism started out as a broadly supported movement that managed to mobilize huge masses of people, and subsided in later years, only to return as professionalized, formal organizations. For instance, Jancar-Webster wrote that environmentalism in East and Central Europe has changed "from being a mobilising agent for populist protest against the *totalitia* of the Communist regime ... and in its place have emerged pragmatic, goal-oriented professional organisations."[26] Her characterization appeals to the wider assumption that the environmentalist development trajectory generally starts from a popular, radical movement, and over time changes into an institutionalized, "social movement organization" oriented to incremental environmental reforms by lobbying and tripartite negotiations (i.e. between NGOs, government, and business).[27]

In China we seem to witness a reverse development. Rather than starting out as a broad protest movement, the semiauthoritarian context forces activists to abandon any radical, confrontational, and mass mobilization tactics to achieve political objectives. Conversely, different from a fully authoritarian context, there are ample avenues left to gain political leverage through an embedded form of activism. More important, what all the contributions in this special issue of *China Information* demonstrate without exception is that embeddedness buys time for civic organizations to consolidate and institutionalize. Although many NGOs fail to register as an official "social organization," their nonregistered status does not prevent them from building up expertise in specific areas as their activities develop. We see this happening for widely divergent organizations ranging from well-established NGOs that focus on something as technical as combating agricultural pesticide use, to groups of student volunteers that gather together for bird-watching or tree-planting. Moreover, the type of organization also differs with its specialization, and as such, different NGOs need to gain different managerial and political experience in running their organizations.

The element of time is critical for a balanced assessment of the opportunities and constraints of Chinese green activism. Apart from being a "full-fledged movement," Chinese embedded environmentalism in fact shows virtually all organized forms of green activism seen elsewhere in the world: grass-roots networks of volunteers, lobby and pressure groups, and NGOs. Moreover, despite the highly localized nature of today's embedded

environmentalism, some campaigns have clear consequences for national politics. For example, as Yang and Calhoun show, in the beginning the Nujiang antidam campaign was primarily an issue between local activists and the Yunnan provincial government. However, as the movement grew into a partnership with the involvement of Beijing-based NGOs, it soon took on national dimensions. The intervention by the central Party leadership to temporarily stop the construction is proof of this.

The hallmark and, in fact, the success of China's reforms lie in their strategy of incremental change. In this light, we might view embedded environmentalism as a transient phase which is itself changing through time, a transitional feature of a burgeoning civil society in a semiauthoritarian context.[28] Since its initial emergence in the early 1990s, environmental activism has undeniably gained in political leverage and international linkages because it resourcefully adapted to rather than opposed the political conditions of its era. Antidam protests were unthinkable at the time when the National People's Congress voted on the construction of the Three Gorges (Sanxia) Dam in April 1992. At the time of writing, antidam protests are a political reality in China. In industrialized nations, the occurrence of social movements is also seen as an indicator of the degree of trust that the state has in its political, social, and economic institutions. In other words, the question is whether institutions are sufficiently robust and mature to deal with the force of social movements without risking the disintegration of the state. The question we might ask ourselves is not so much whether China will open up the space for embedded environmentalism to employ confrontational, radical, and mass mobilization tactics, but rather *when* and under *what* conditions. In determining these conditions, allowing for the lapse of time is vital.

Notes

[1] See, for instance, Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), 10–25.

[2] Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko, "The 'State of the State,'" in *The Paradox of China's Post Mao Reforms*, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1999), 348.

[3] Michael Frolic, "State-led Civil Society," in *Civil Society in China*, ed. Timothy Brook and Michael Frolic (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 15–38; Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, "Corporatism in China: A Developmental State in an East Asian Context," in *China after Socialism: In the Footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia*, ed. Barrett L. McCormick and Jonathan Unger (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 95–129.

[4] See Mario Diani, "The Concept of a Social Movement," *Sociological Review* 40, no. 1 (1992): 1–15.

[5] For an overview of the various definitional discussions of environmental and social movements, see also Christopher A. Rootes, "Environmental Movements and Green Parties in Western and Eastern Europe," in *The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology*, ed. Michael Redclift and Graham Woodgate (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997), 325–6. An interesting analogy is the likening of a social movement to a "palimpsest"—a piece of papyrus used in ancient times to write and rewrite, as a result of which several layers of text were created. A social movement is thus seen as consisting of five layers: the individual; the network; the group; the organization; and the movement itself. See Timothy Doyle and Doug McEachern, *Environment and Politics* (London: Routledge, 1998), 62.

[6] Doyle and McEachern, *Environment and Politics*.

[7] After the defeat of Germany, the Allied powers decided to pass on the German concessions in Shandong Province to Japan. The Chinese frustrations about this were great, and on 4 May 1919 around 5,000 students of Peking University demonstrated against the Versailles Treaty, which eventually culminated in a nationwide movement and boycott against Japan and Japanese goods.

[8] The same also counts for more recent (religious) movements, such as the Falun Gong, which managed to attract thousands of followers in opposition to the Chinese government. For more information on the chain of events that led to the emergence of the Falun Gong in China, see "Wang Zhaoguo on Fight against Falungong," World News Connection, 23 July 1999, from World Reporter (TM) cited in Human Rights Watch, "Dangerous Mediation: China's Campaign against Falungong," 2002, <http://hrw.org/reports/2002/china/China0102-02.htm#P331_49488>, accessed 1 February 2002; and Hubert Seiwert, "China's Repression of Folk Religions: The Battle against Falun Gong in Historical Context," *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* (New Zurich newspaper), 13 July 2001, <http://www.nzz.ch/english/background/2001/07/13_china. html>, accessed 14 July 2001. Note that Chinese religious mass movements date back to at least 200 B.C.

[9] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1944).

[10] For a discussion on embeddedness in relation to economic action, see Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," *American Journal of Sociology* 91, no. 3 (1984): 481–510; and Martinelli Alberto and Neil J. Smelser, eds, *Economy and Society: Overview in Economic Sociology* (London: Sage Publications, 1990).

[11] See Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy. States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Peter Evans, "Government Action, Social Capital and Development: Reviewing the Evidence on Synergy," *World Development* 24, no. 6 (1995): 1119–32; and Bruno Trezzini, "Embedded State Autonomy and Legitimacy: Piecing Together the Malaysian Development Puzzle," *Economy and Society* 30, no. 3 (2001): 324–53.

[12] See, for instance, Robert P. Weller, *Alternate Civilities: Democracy and Culture in China and Taiwan* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 66–70. This idea has been specifically employed for environmental agencies by David P. Angel and Michael T. Rock, "Engaging Economic Development Agencies in Environmental Protection: The Case for Embedded Autonomy," *Local Environment* 8, no. 1 (2003): 45–59.

[13] This is not to say that the role of agency in a fully authoritarian society is reduced to zero. However, in relative terms, human action is more grounded in a semiauthoritarian than in a full-fledged authoritarian setting.

[14] Granovetter showed that "weak," informal and personal ties can be of great significance in human action. See Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 6 (1973): 1360–80; Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). For a work on trust in a postsocialist context, see William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies," *Journal of Politics* 59, no. 2 (1997): 418–51.

[15] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1954).

[16] Barbara Jancar-Webster, "Environmental Movement and Social Change in the Transition Countries," *Environmental Politics* 7, no. 1 (1998): 69–90. Some authors argue that the same may be said about the Falun Gong sect, which is not driven by a desire for free religious praxis alone, but has clear political aims as well. See James Tong, "An Organizational Analysis of the *Falun Gong*: Structure, Communications, Financing," *The China Quarterly*, no. 171 (2002): 636–60.

[17] Such a newly created institution included the All-China Federation of Environmental Protection. Shortly after the color revolutions took place, environmental NGOs and voluntary organizations were subjected to an increase in state control.

[18] Josephine Ma, "Green Groups Fall under Microscope in Beijing," *South China Morning Post*, 18 August 2005, 12. According to Lin, the Chinese government has recently also stepped up control over international NGOs, fearing that they might destabilize Chinese society. See Lin Yuguo, "China Worries that Foreign NGOs Are Importing a 'Color Revolution,'" Sun/Central News Agency, 2005, <http://www.chinalaborwatch.org> , accessed 6 August 2005.

[19] The concept of "building a harmonious society" was launched by the Chinese leadership in the face of challenges posed to the government by the "independent thinking of the general public, their newly developed penchant for independent choices and thus the widening gap of ideas among different social strata." According to President Hu Jintao, a harmonious society should "feature democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity, and vitality." Foreign observers have interpreted the new concept as a way to pre-empt the occurrence of social movements in China. See also Xinhua News Agency, "Building Harmonious Society Crucial for China's Progress," *People's Daily* online, 27 June 2005, <http://www.english.people. com.cn/200506/27/ eng20050627_ 192495.htm>, accessed 27 June 2005.

[20] See also Michael Busgen, "The Campaign against the Nujiang Dam" (MA thesis, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 2005), 58.

[21] Peter Ho, "Greening without Conflict? Environmentalism, Green NGOs and Civil Society in China," *Development and Change* 32, no. 5 (2001): 893–921.

[22] Lu Yiyi, *Environmental Civil Society and Governance in China* (London: Chatham House, 2005); Wu Fengshi, "New Partners or Old Brothers? GONGOs in Transnational Environmental Advocacy in China," *China Environment Series*, issue 5 (2002): 47, 53.

[23] See Peter Ho and Eduard B. Vermeer, eds, *China's Limits to Growth: Greening State and Society* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2006). See also Peter Ho, ed., *Greening Industries in Newly Industrializing Countries: Asian-style Leapfrogging?* (London: Kegan Paul, 2007).

[24] Exactly this issue, namely the use of radicalist strategies and the large-scale mobilization of people for environmental politics, was heatedly debated during a meeting among mainland Chinese, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese NGOs. See Chiu Yu-tzu, "Same

War, Different Battles," *Taipei Times*, 21 April 2001, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/news>, accessed 15 November 2001.

[25] This remark immediately sparked a heated discussion among Liao Xiaoyi, Liu Guozheng, deputy Director General of the DG for Environmental Information of the State Environmental Protection Agency, and Wang Canfa, the director of the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims. The discussion was part of a delegation visit in the framework of the SENGO Project (Strengthening Environmental NGOs in China), which took place from 6 to 16 November 2003. The SENGO Project was funded by the Dutch ministries of foreign affairs and economic affairs.

[26] Jancar-Webster, "Environmental Movement and Social Change."

[27] See, for instance, David A. Sonnenfeld, "Social Movements and Ecological Modernization: The Transformation of Pulp and Paper Manufacturing," *Development and Change* 33, no. 1 (2002): 1–27.

[28] For a discussion of the early developments of civil society in China, see Gordon White, *Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China* (London: Macmillan Press, 1993).

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