

EchoPulse Formal KEM Definition

1. Key Generation (KeyGen)

The key generation algorithm, denoted as $\text{KeyGen}(\lambda)$, takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a public key PK and a secret key SK.

1. **Input:** Security parameter λ (implicitly determines the lengths of symbol sequences and other parameters).
2. **Output:** Public key $\text{PK} \in \Sigma^{l'}$ and secret key $\text{SK} \in \Sigma^l$, where Σ is the symbol set, and l, l' are positive integers determined by λ .

The key generation process proceeds as follows:

1. Initialize the state transition graph $G(V, E)$ with $|V| = 1024$ states and transitions defined by $\delta: V \times \Sigma \rightarrow V$, starting from a fixed initial state $v_0 \in V$. The construction of G is deterministic based on a master secret or a public seed (depending on the instantiation).
1. Generate the secret key $\text{SK} = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_l)$ as a sequence of l symbols chosen randomly from Σ or derived deterministically from a master secret.
1. Compute the private state $v_{\text{priv}} = \delta(\dots \delta(v_0, \sigma_1), \sigma_2) \dots, \sigma_l)$.
1. Generate the public key $\text{PK} = (\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \dots, \sigma'_{l'})$ either independently as a sequence of l' symbols or derived deterministically from SK through a one-way transformation.
1. Compute the public state $v_{\text{pub}} = \delta(\dots \delta(v_0, \sigma'_1), \sigma'_2) \dots, \sigma'_{l'})$.
1. Output the public key PK and the secret key SK.

2. Encapsulation (Encaps)

The encapsulation algorithm, denoted as $\text{Encaps}(\text{PK})$, takes as input the public key PK and outputs a ciphertext C and a shared secret key K.

3. **Input:** Public key $\text{PK} \in \Sigma^{l'}$.
4. **Output:** Ciphertext $C \in \Sigma^m$ and shared secret key $K \in \{0, 1\}^n$, where m is the length of the random symbol sequence and n is the output length of the hash function H.

The encapsulation process proceeds as follows:

2. Generate a random symbol sequence $r = (p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m)$ of length m , where each p_i is chosen uniformly at random from Σ . Set the ciphertext $C = r$.
2. Compute the public state reached by applying PK from the initial state: $v_{\text{pub}} = \delta(v_0, \text{PK})$, where $\delta(v_0, (\sigma'_1, \dots, \sigma'_{l'})) = \delta(\dots \delta(\delta(v_0, \sigma'_1), \sigma'_2) \dots, \sigma'_{l'})$.
2. Compute the encapsulated state v_{enc} by applying the random symbol sequence r from the public state v_{pub} : $v_{\text{enc}} = \delta(v_{\text{pub}}, r)$, where $\delta(v_{\text{pub}}, (p_1, \dots, p_m)) = \delta(\dots \delta(\delta(v_{\text{pub}}, p_1), p_2) \dots, p_m)$.
2. Compute the shared secret key K by applying a cryptographic hash function H to the concatenation of the encoded encapsulated state v_{enc} and the random symbol sequence r : $K = H(\text{encode}(v_{\text{enc}}) || r)$.
2. Output the ciphertext C and the shared secret key K.

3. Decapsulation (Decaps)

The decapsulation algorithm, denoted as $\text{Decaps}(C, \text{SK})$, takes as input a ciphertext C and the secret key SK, and outputs a shared secret key K'.

5. **Input:** Ciphertext $C \in \Sigma^m$ and secret key $\text{SK} \in \Sigma^l$.
6. **Output:** Shared secret key $K' \in \{0, 1\}^n$.

The decapsulation process proceeds as follows:

3. Let the received ciphertext be $C = r = (p_1, p_2, \dots, p_m)$.
3. Compute the private state reached by applying SK from the initial state: $v_{\text{priv}} = \delta(v_0, \text{SK})$, where $\delta(v_0, (\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_l)) = \delta(\dots \delta(\delta(v_0, \sigma_1), \sigma_2) \dots, \sigma_l)$.
3. Compute the decapsulated state v_{dec} by applying the received symbol sequence r from the private state v_{priv} : $v_{\text{dec}} = \delta(v_{\text{priv}}, r)$, where $\delta(v_{\text{priv}}, (p_1, \dots, p_m)) = \delta(\dots \delta(\delta(v_{\text{priv}}, p_1), p_2) \dots, p_m)$.
3. Compute the derived shared secret key K' by applying the same cryptographic hash function H to the concatenation of the encoded decapsulated state v_{dec} and the received symbol sequence r : $K' = H(\text{encode}(v_{\text{dec}}) || r)$.
3. Output the derived shared secret key K'.

4. Correctness

The EchoPulse KEM is correct if, for all public/secret key pairs (PK, SK) generated by $\text{KeyGen}(\lambda)$, and for all ciphertexts C and shared secrets K generated by $\text{Encaps}(\text{PK})$, the decapsulation of C using SK results in the same shared secret K':

$$\text{Decaps}(C, \text{SK}) = K$$

This correctness relies on the deterministic nature of the state transitions and the synchronized state of the graph $G(V, E)$ between the sender and the receiver for the given session. Specifically, if the graph and the initial state v_0 are consistent, and no errors occur during the application of the symbol sequences, then v_{enc} computed during encapsulation should be equal to v_{dec} computed during decapsulation.

5. Security Model

The security of the EchoPulse KEM aims to achieve indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) or a related post-quantum security notion. The security relies on the following core components:

7. **(a) Hash Function H:** The cryptographic hash function H must provide strong collision resistance and preimage resistance.
8. **(b) Mutation Randomness:** The deterministic but evolving nature of the state transition graph $G(V, E)$ through the mutation function μ , driven by a shared salt and session index, introduces temporal randomness that hinders long-term analysis.
9. **(c) Path Entropy:** The length of the private and public key symbol sequences (l and l') and the branching factor of the graph must provide sufficient entropy to resist brute-force attacks on the secret