

Exploring boundaries of privacy in e2e verifiable e-voting systems.

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Contents

| | | |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| 1 | Abstract | 3 |
| 2 | Introduction | 4 |
| 3 | E-voting system | 6 |
| 3.1 | Preliminaries | 6 |
| 3.2 | Syntax and Correctness | 7 |
| 3.3 | Election process | 9 |
| 3.4 | E2E Verifiability | 10 |
| 4 | Privacy with respect to entities | 11 |
| 4.1 | Privacy with respect to VSD | 12 |
| 4.2 | Privacy with respect to EA | 13 |
| 4.3 | Privacy with respect to trusted VC | 14 |
| 4.4 | Privacy with respect to trusted T | 14 |
| 5 | Privacy | 15 |
| 5.1 | EA and T are honest: $G_{t-priv,EA,T}^{A,Sim}(1^\lambda)$ | 16 |
| 5.2 | VSD and T are honest: $G_{t-priv,VSD,T}^{A,Sim}(1^\lambda)$ | 21 |
| 6 | Comparison with existing definitions | 25 |
| 6.1 | Helios. Ballot privacy. | 25 |
| 6.2 | Demos privacy | 26 |

| | | |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| 7 | Strict privacy notion | 35 |
| 7.1 | EA and T are honest: $G_{strict,EA,T}^{A,Sim}(1^\lambda)$ | 36 |
| 7.2 | VSD and T are honest: $G_{strict,VSD}^{A,Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m)$ | 40 |
| 8 | Strict privacy vs E2E Verifiability | 44 |
| 8.1 | Proof: part 1 | 44 |
| 8.2 | Proof: part 2 | 49 |
| 9 | Blind signature e-voting scheme | 53 |
| 9.1 | Presentation of the blind signature e-voting scheme | 53 |
| 9.2 | Setup and parameters | 54 |
| 9.3 | Syntax | 54 |
| 9.4 | Building blocks | 55 |
| 9.4.1 | Blind signature | 55 |
| 9.4.2 | Homomorphic Integer Commitment and Homomorphic Cryptosystem | 57 |
| 9.4.3 | Proving signature knowledge | 57 |
| 9.4.4 | Proving that a ciphertext encrypts 0 or 1 | 58 |
| 9.5 | System Design | 60 |
| 9.6 | E2E Verifiability | 62 |

1 Abstract

In an electronic voting (e-voting) execution, the voters engage in an interaction with the system by providing sensitive data such as their vote preference, authentication passwords, or personal data used for election auditing. All collected data should be processed in a way that election integrity and voter privacy are preserved at the best possible level. In scenarios that e-voting runs at a national level data processing scales at the order of millions, whereas any security breach may lead to a massive and disastrous effect. Consequently, formal analysis and provable security of e-voting systems has been in the centre of related literature [1], [2], [3], [4].

We present the generalized model of e-voting system and analyse voter privacy with respect to different cases of collusion among entities of this model. The specification of trusted entities splits the Voter Privacy into different scenarios. All meaningful cases of collusion fall into two scenarios: (1) EA and T are honest and (2) VSD and T are honest. It is possible to construct e-voting scheme, that is private with respect to only trusted VSD, however most known schemes require trusted T as well.

The approach that we used for voter privacy in this thesis is the following: an honest voter is allowed to have only one perfectly hidden interaction from adversarial eyes and at the end he provides the adversary with (1) the real view of the result of this interaction and (2) a simulated one via an efficient algorithm *Sim* called the simulator. The adversary \mathcal{A} is allowed to observe a network trace of all interactions and play on behalf of corrupted entities and voters. This perfectly private interaction can be either an act of actually entering voter's preference into VSD or while a voter receives his credentials. If \mathcal{A} has no advantage in distinguishing real and simulated view over a coin flip, the system is considered private.

Voter privacy suggests that voters are capable of casting their votes secretly and freely without letting adversarial parties to learn any information about their preferences. On the other hand, integrity is traditionally captured by the end-to-end (E2E) verifiability [5] notion states that the voter can obtain a receipt at the end of the ballot casting procedure that is used for verifying that his vote was (1) cast as intended, (2) recorded as cast, and (3) tallied as recorded [6]. Furthermore, anyone should be able to verify that the election procedure is executed properly. It has been observed that voter privacy and E2E verifiability requirements inherently contradict each other at some point. Therefore, there should exist the maximum

level of privacy that is possible to achieve in any E2E verifiable e-voting system.

In this work, we perform a thorough and formal study on "locating" the critical contradiction point in the voter privacy-E2E verifiability tradeoff. As part of our analysis, in chapter 7 we introduce a strong privacy definition where voters are corrupted but an adversary is still unable to break privacy, denoted as strict privacy. We formally define strict voter privacy via a Voter Privacy game that is played between an adversary \mathcal{A} and a challenger \mathcal{C} . According to the game rules, an adversary is allowed to define the election parameters, corrupt a number of entities, and act on behalf of all voters. As for we apply the E2E verifiability definition given by Kiayias et al., according to which even when all election administrators are corrupted, they can not manipulate the results without a high detection probability.

Under this framework, we prove that strict privacy even in its weakest level contradicts end-to-end verifiability. However, any meaningful relaxation of the strict privacy definition, leads to a notion of privacy that is feasible by some E2E verifiable e-voting system.

Also, we design a new e-voting system based on blind signature scheme, that captures idea of anonymous voting, where everyone votes on behalf of an eligible group of voters. We argue that any system that keeps anonymous ballots is not E2E verifiable in the standard model.

2 Introduction

Electronic voting (e-voting) is a term used to describe the act of voting using electronic systems. Generally, we use term e-voting describe two different types of possible electronic voting scenarios: 1) 'Remote e-voting' voting over the Internet via personal gadgets (laptops, smartphones, etc.) at any place outside the polling station and 2) 'Polling place e-voting' – voting inside a polling station or similar premises controlled by electoral staff.

Electronic voting has been in the centre of researchers attention for over the last twenty years. Up to now, many e-voting schemes with quite strong security guarantee have been proposed. Perhaps the most well known and studied system is Helios designed by Ben Adida [4]. Helios is an open-source purely cryptographic

voting protocol which does not rely on paper. Other examples of purely electronic systems are Demos-2 [7] and Civitas [8]. Another sub class of e-voting systems is so called hybrid systems where paper ballots are used for computing tally or ensuring the integrity of election. Demos [6], ThreeBallot [9], Prêt-à-Voter [10] and Scantegrity [11] are examples of hybrid systems.

Nowadays, some countries allow their citizens who are living or staying abroad to vote remotely. However, only a few countries allow external voters to cast their votes electronically. For the last sixty years e-voting (including remote e-voting) has been conducted at least once only in the following countries Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Italy, the Netherlands (Rijnland Internet Election System), Norway, Peru, Romania, Switzerland, the UK, Venezuela, and the Philippines.

Benefits of using electronic voting systems are significant:

- (1) Voting is easier and more convenient;
- (2) E-voting system can be completely auditable. Therefore elections are completely transparent;
- (3) Results are announced faster;
- (4) Increased engagement and turnout;
- (5) Increased accessibility;
- (6) Voting is provably secure.

However, all of the potential benefits are moot if we can not trust the election result. Some argue that electronic voting is not secure because of issues with the technology, vast possibilities of fraud, and protection of voters privacy. To eliminate the security risks a number of security requirements for e-voting systems were developed: ensuring one vote per voter, voters eligibility, maintaining voter anonymity, accuracy of tallying and prevention of fraud.

Among the security properties that have been identified for e-voting, there are two highly desirable properties that consider to be crucial and has been investigated extensively: E2E Verifiability and Voter Privacy.

E2E Verifiability means that it is possible to verify the correctness of the election tally based on feedback from the participants and by examining the public election transcript. Informally the E2E verifiable property means that any voter can detect that the election outcome has been manipulated. Formally, E2E verifiability is defined as the ability of voter to verify that: 1) his vote was properly cast, 2) recorded as cast and 3) tallied into the election result as recorded.

Voter Privacy can be described as follows: e-voting system should not reveal how a particular voter voted. Voter privacy can be divided into three levels of different strength (in increasing order):

- (1) Ballot privacy: A set of ballots would not reveal voters' choices to anyone [12].
- (2) Receipt-freeness: A honest voter cannot prove to an adversary that he voted in a certain way [13].
- (3) Coercion resistance: A corrupted voter cannot prove to an adversary that he voted in a certain way [14].

It has been observed that voter privacy and E2E verifiability requirements inherently contradict each other at some point. In this work, we perform a thorough and formal study on privacy in E2E verifiable e-voting systems to analyse those restrictions and define the privacy limits. We suggest a stronger privacy definition, that does not impose restrictions on an adversarial behaviour. Also we define a notion of strict privacy and prove in simulation based settings that it contradicts E2E Verifiability. At the final chapter of this work, we present a blind signature scheme, that captures the idea voting anonymously, and prove that the whole class of such systems is not E2E Verifiable.

3 E-voting system

3.1 Preliminaries

Through this paper, we denote λ as the security parameter. We use $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ to denote a negligible function in λ , i.e., it always holds that $\text{negl}(\lambda) < \frac{1}{\lambda^c}$ for any $0 < c \in \mathbb{Z}$ for sufficient large λ .

Let Π be an e-voting system and $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ be the set of m candidates. Voters $\mathcal{V} = \{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$ use Π to vote for some allowed subset of candidates selections from the collection of allowed selections \mathcal{U} (which may include a 'blank' option too).

In this modelling, the election system involves five types of entities, the voters V_1, \dots, V_n , possibly equipped with the voting supporting device (VSD) and the auditing supporting device (ASD), the election authority (EA), the vote collector (VC), the trustee (T), and the bulletin board (BB) whose only role is to provide storage for the election transcript for the purpose of verification.


- (1) BB is completely passive and is only writeable by the VC, T and EA and readable by anyone.
- (2) Voters submit their votes by engaging in the ballot casting protocol to the VC and they are not allowed to interact with each other.
- (3) VC only role is to collect votes and write them to BB
- (4) T is responsible for computing the tally and announcing the election result.
- (5) EA - prepares all the election setup information and distributes the voters' ballots.

In many election systems, the EA and T are implemented by more than a single authority. However, since we consider the system to be malicious as a whole, this is completely immaterial. Hence, for simplicity in the syntax above we assume that both EA and T are single entities.

3.2 Syntax and Correctness

An e-voting system Π is a quintuple of algorithms and protocols (**Setup**, **Cast**, **Tally**, **Result**, **Verify**), that takes voters' preferences as an input and aims to return a tally, the protocols specified as follows:

- (1) The interactive protocol **Setup** is executed by the EA and T . During the setup phase EA generates Π 's public parameters Pub (which include P, V, U) and the voters' secrets s_1, \dots, s_n . The part of the interactive protocol during which EA distributes secrets among voters is defined as **Registration**. At the same time, T generates pre-election BB data and posts it on BB.



- (2) The interactive protocol **Cast** is executed between three parties, the voter V_l , the BB and the VC. During this interaction, the voter uses VSD, his secret s_l and an option U_l to generate the ballot b_l and sends this ballot to VC. Upon successful termination, VC posts ballot b_l to BB and the voter V_l receives a receipt α_l .
- (3) The algorithm **Result** is executed by T and outputs the result τ for the election or returns \perp in case such result is undefined.
- (4) The algorithm **Verify** on input α, τ outputs a value in $\{0, 1\}$, where α is a voter receipt (that corresponds to the voter's output from the **Cast** protocol).

In some e-voting systems **Registration** part is omitted and voters are expected to receive their credentials via secure channel such as post mail, pulling place etc.

Correctness of a system We say that a system Π has (perfect) correctness, if for any honest execution of any subset of not abstained voters that results in a public transcript τ , where the voters V_1, \dots, V_n cast votes for options U_1, \dots, U_n , it holds that $Result(\tau) = f(U_1, \dots, U_n)$, where $f(U_1, \dots, U_n)$ is the m -vector whose i -th location is equal to the number of times a candidate $P_i \in \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ was chosen in the candidate selections U_1, \dots, U_n .

3.3 Election process

Any electronic voting procedure can be spited into tree general stages: Pre-election, Election and Post-election. For some specific e-voting schemes, the first or the last stage can be omitted.

- (1) Pre-election: EA generates public pre-election data and posts it on the BB. Also EA creates and distributes envelopes with private voters' information among all eligible voters. Meanwhile T obtains secret data that would be used for producing the result and posts its own pre-election data to the BB.
- (2) Election: this stage typically spited into two parts:
 - (a) Registration: A voter and EA engaged in an interaction during which the voter proofs to the EA his identity and obtains credentials for vote casting. In some e-voting systems the registration part is omitted, and voters receive their credentials in envelopes via some secure channel.

- (b) *Vote casting*: An voter starts an interaction with VSD using his credentials as proof of his eligibility to cast a vote for preferred candidates. Upon successful termination, VC receives a ballot from VSD and posts it on the BB.
- (3) *Post-election*: After election is closed, the election result is computed and announced by T . If verification is supported, anyone may check the validity of the election procedure.

3.4 E2E Verifiability

Tree aspects of verifiability are usually distinguished:

- (1) *Individual verifiability*: a voter can check that his ballot is counted correctly [29].
- (2) *Universal verifiability*: anyone can check that the election outcome is obtained from the ballots published on the BB [33].
- (3) *End-to-end verifiability*: a voter can check that his vote was cast-as-intended and recorded-as-cast, also anyone can check that the ballots were tallied-as-recorded [32], [30].

E2E verifiability is a very strong level of security that allows voters to detect that a malicious e-voting system tries to misrepresent the election outcome.

In this work we use the E2E-verifiability definition by Kiayias et al. [6], [7], that is given in Figure 2. According to the definition an adversary \mathcal{A} can control all VSD's, EA, VC and some fraction of voters, however it still can not manipulate the results without a high detection probability. The entities involved are BB, VSD and EA that can be spited on EA, that involved on pre-election stage only, and T that computes the results. The algorithm **Cast** is run interactively between tree parties the BB, the voter V_l and T that uses VSD with the following inputs: public parameters Pub , voter's secret s_l and voter's choice \mathcal{U}_l . Upon successful termination, V_l obtains a receipt α_l . The algorithm **Verify**(τ, α_l) outputs a bit, based on voter's receipt α_l and the public transcript τ . The algorithm **Result**(τ) given the public transcript τ outputs the result for the election or \perp if result is undefined.

We prefer the definition by Kiayias et al over the one given by K'usters et al [31], because it is given in game-based settings. Moreover this definition of E2E

Verifiability does not require any additional assumptions, except for the existence of the BB, therefore it is achievable in the standard model. Furthermore, there is an ideal functionality that captures the essential aspects of the E2E Verifiability.

E2E Verifiability Game $G_{E2E-Ver}^{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}, d, \theta}(1^\lambda, m, n)$:

- (1) \mathcal{A} chooses a list of candidates $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$, a set of voters $\mathcal{V} = \{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$ and the set of allowed candidate selections \mathcal{U} . It provides \mathcal{C} with the sets $\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V}, \mathcal{U}$ along with information Pub and voter credentials $\{s_{l \in [n]}\}$. Throughout the game, \mathcal{C} plays the role of the BB.
- (2) The adversary \mathcal{A} and the challenger \mathcal{C} engages in an interaction where \mathcal{A} schedules the **Cast** protocols of all voters. For each voter V_l \mathcal{A} can either completely control the voter or allow \mathcal{C} to operate on their behalf, in which case \mathcal{A} provides a candidate selection \mathcal{U}_l to \mathcal{C} . Then, \mathcal{C} engages with the adversary \mathcal{A} in the **Cast** protocol so that \mathcal{A} plays the role of EA. Provided the protocol terminates successfully, \mathcal{C} obtains the receipt α_l on behalf of V_l .
Let $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}$ be the set of honest voters (i.e., those controlled by \mathcal{C}) that terminated successfully.
- (3) Finally, \mathcal{A} posts the election transcript τ to the BB.

The game returns a bit which is 1 if and only if the following conditions hold true:

- (i) $|\tilde{\mathcal{V}}| \geq \theta$, (i.e., at least θ honest voters terminated).
- (ii). $\forall l \in [n]$: if $V_l \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}$, then **Verify**(τ, α_l)=1 (i.e., the voters in $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}$ verify their ballot successfully).

and either one of the following two conditions:

- (iii-a). If $\perp \neq \mathcal{U}_l \rangle_{V_l \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \tilde{\mathcal{V}}} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\tau, \{\alpha_l\}_{V_l \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}})$,
then $d_1(\mathbf{Result}(\tau), f(\langle U_1, \dots, U_n \rangle)) \geq d$.

- (iii-b). $\perp \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\tau, \{\alpha_l\}_{V_l \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}})$.

FIGURE 2: E2E-verifiability by Kiayias et al.

4 Privacy with respect to entities

Unfortunately unconditional full privacy (that is privacy that relies neither on trusted third parties or on computational assumptions or certain fraction of trusted

voters), can not be achieved in electronic voting [15]. Therefore honest voters should rely on certain assumptions or trusted entities in order to protect their privacy. In this chapter, we refer to voter privacy as ability of a voter to keep his vote secret, that is e-voting system should not reveal how a particular voter voted. The purpose of analysing privacy with respect to trusted entities is to identify minimal combination of trusted entities for which voter privacy can possibly be achieved. Here we consider only entities that participate in pre-election or election stage, namely EA, VSD, VC and T , and exclude ASD, since it is involved in post-election checks only. Later in this work we provide formal game-based definition of privacy for all meaningful cases of collusion.

4.1 Privacy with respect to VSD

Suppose only VSD is trusted and all other entities (T , EA, VC) are controlled by an adversary. As always public database BB is completely passive and simply stores all information received from VC, EA and T . We will show that it is possible to achieve voter privacy with respect to trusted VSD only, by providing an example of the e-voting scheme that is private in case when only VSD can be trusted. Consider the following e-voting system Π :

- (1) EA generates a large random number R and commitments bases g, h . Also EA picks a random id x_i for every candidate $cand_i$. $R, g, h, \{cand_i, x_i\}$ - Π 's public information.
- (2) each voter submits via VSD a perfectly hiding commitment $g^{x_i} h^{r_i}$, where r_i is a random number less than R picked by VSD.
- (3) after the last voter cast his vote, VSD submits a commitment $g^{x_{abs}} h^{r_{vsd}}$, where x_{abs} corresponds to the abstain option and $r_{vsd} = R - \sum_{l=0}^{l=n} r_l$, n - number of voters.
- (4) T computes the product of all hiding commitments and opens the result.

In order to break individual voters' privacy and learn their choices, an adversary has to break perfectly hiding commitments, which is impossible since those commitments are information secure.

Even though the example scheme is kind of extreme case, it formally implies voter privacy as long as VSD can be trusted to keep individual randomness r_i in

secret. Moreover, due to active part of VSD during vote-casting procedure, this scheme can handle any voter turnout and produce meaningful tally at the end of the election.

4.2 Privacy with respect to EA

In case when only EA is trusted and all other entities (T , VSD, VC) are corrupted it is impossible to preserve voter's privacy. We will prove this statement by describing an attack against individual voter privacy, that is always successful.

Suppose there is some e-voting system Π which doesn't allow any adversary to learn anything about individual voters' intents in case when only EA is trusted. A strategy is to calculate tally after every vote submission and compare it with the previous tally to learn the voter's intent. Due to a correctness, Π should be able to produce meaningful election tally for any turnout, including just one voter. Since an adversary \mathcal{A} controls a trustee T , he should be able to compute results after very first cast procedure is done. This means that either \mathcal{A} may learn voters' choices one by one or Π fails to produce results for any subset of abstained voters and therefore is not correct.

Some may argue, that the e-voting scheme for trusted VSD only can be adopted to preserve voter privacy in case when only EA is trusted. However, EA is not active participant of the vote-casting phase and does not know in advance how many voters would actually participate in e-voting and who prefers to abstain. EA can only distribute information among voters and post some pre-election data on BB **before** the vote-casting procedure begins.

The problem is that if we trust EA only, we should make sure that T is not able to break individual privacy by decryption or interpreting in some way every cast ballot as vote for a certain option. It can be achieved only if T is able to compute election results as whole without knowing the individual vote distribution. The only way to capture this requirement is to use homomorphic tally, that can be decrypted only if all voters provide their input. Due to a correctness property, meaningful tally should be produced for any case of voter turnout. Theoretically, this issue can be addressed by posting additional data on BB or granting all eligible voters the ability to vote for the 'no-one' choice on behalf of all others voters, since they have no prior knowledge of those who abstains. Therefore if some voters would abstain, those who participated would cast vote on their behalf so

the information for producing an election result would not be lost. However, now every turnout results in meaningful election result, including a single voter participation, so malicious T can compute tally after every cast vote and trivially brake everyones privacy.

Since it is impossible to achieve voter privacy when only EA is trusted, consider the cases when EA and one more other entity can be trusted:

1) Privacy with respect to trusted EA and VC

VC solo role is to collect votes and forward them to BB. This entity can tamper with a ballot only **after** it has been generated. It is impossible to have voter privacy in systems where only ea and VC can be trusted, because an adversary can perform exactly the same attack as for 'EA only case'.

2) Privacy with respect to trusted EA and T

It is possible to construct a system that archives voter privacy when EA and T are trusted. For example, Demos is provably private with respect to trusted EA and T . In the article where Demos is presented [6], authors refers to EA and T as to the single entity EA, however in our classification EA participates only in pre-election process and is not active during vote-casting of tallying phases.

3) Privacy with respect to trusted EA and VSD

In such case e-voting system Π can be private, since it's enough to have a trusted VSD for preserving voters' privacy.

4.3 Privacy with respect to trusted VC

VC does not interact with a voter directly and can tamper with a ballot only **after** it has been generated. Moreover, voters are not expected to do any complex math themselves. All necessary computations are done inside VSD during the vote-casting phase or pre-computed by EA in advance. If all entities but VC are corrupted, it is impossible to archive privacy for voters, because the moment a voter casts his vote, he give away his choice.

The same reasoning applies for the case when only VC and T are trusted.

4.4 Privacy with respect to trusted T

Due to the assumption that voters are not able to collaborate for protecting their privacy and all complex math operation performed by VSD or EA, it's impossible to have privacy with respect to trusted T only. A voter provides VSD with an input

which is either in a plain text or calculated by EA line and therefore immediately gives away his choice.

5 Privacy

Voter privacy implies that a voter is capable of casting his own vote secretly and freely without letting others' parties, namely an adversary, to learn some information about his preferences or interfere in it.

In general, the goal of the adversary who attacks voter privacy is to learn some information about the candidate selections of the honest voters. We define an attack against voters privacy as successful, if there is an election result*, for which an adversary is capable of distinguishing how the honest voters voted while it can observe the whole e-voting network, except for untrappable channels, and corrupt some part of honest voters and some entities and also has access to honest voters' receipts.

*Obviously, it doesn't include trivial election results, where all voters voted for the same option.

During the election process an voter uses his credentials to cast his option by running the **Cast** protocol on a VSD. Since voters are not allowed to have or share a secret that would have helped them to preserve their privacy in case of a corrupted e-voting system, their privacy relies on the trusted entities of the system. There are two widely known classes of e-voting systems: code-based system and encryption-based systems. The former relies on crypto that run by the trusted administrator in advance, the latter places its safety on crypto performed inside VSD during the **Cast** protocol execution. From a voter point of view it means that his privacy is protected by trusted administrator and pre-calculated credentials, that would not reveal any sensitive information even if the choice is sent in a plane text, or by trusted VSD and crypto performed inside it.

The approach that we used in this thesis is the following: an honest voter is allowed to have **only one** perfectly hidden from an adversarial eyes interaction and at the end he provides the adversary with the real and simulated view of the result of this interaction. \mathcal{A} is allowed to observe a network trace of all interactions and play on behalf of corrupted entities and voters. This one perfectly private interac-




FIGURE 3: $G^{\mathcal{A}, Sim}_{t-priv, EA, T}(1^\lambda, n, m)$

tion can be either an act of actually entering voter's preference into VSD or while a voter receives his credentials. If \mathcal{A} has no advantage in distinguishing real and simulated view over a coin flip, the system is considered private.

We formally define the voter privacy via a Voter Privacy game, denoted as $G^{\mathcal{A}, Sim}_{t-priv, \langle \text{honest entities} \rangle}(1^\lambda)$, that is played between an adversary \mathcal{A} and a challenger \mathcal{C} , that takes as input the security parameter λ and returns 1 or 0 depending on whether the adversary wins. Also, \mathcal{A} is allowed to corrupt some entities. The choice of the corrupted parties splits the Voter Privacy game into two different scenarios: (1) entities (EA, T) are honest and (2) VSD is honest.

5.1 EA and T are honest: $G^{\mathcal{A}, Sim}_{t-priv, EA, T}(1^\lambda)$

The \mathcal{C} 's strategy in the $G^{\mathcal{A}, Sim}_{strict, EA, T}(1^\lambda, n, m)$ game captures the ability of an honest voter to lie about his vote in code-based e-voting schemes. Suppose, an adversary \mathcal{A} makes a voter V to vote for an option $U_{\mathcal{A}}$. However, V disobeys and votes for his intent U_V . If V can fake his credentials and convince \mathcal{A} that he voted for $U_{\mathcal{A}}$, V 's privacy is preserved. This approach is similar to *Demos Privacy*, however instead of faking voter's internal view of the **Cast** protocol, we fake credentials,

that would produce a fake internal view of the **Cast** protocol.

We can compare Demos privacy and the *Voter Privacy* defined here as follows. Under *Demos Privacy* framework a voter V provides \mathcal{A} with a fake internal view of the **Cast** protocol and the actual receipt as a proof of obidience, but keeps the original credentials in secret. If \mathcal{A} accesses the voter's original credentials, it would immediately detect lie. Under our *Voter Privacy* definition, a voter V gives \mathcal{A} a fake view, actual receipt and a fake credentials. If \mathcal{A} can not distinguish real and fake credentials, it has no way to find out whether V lies or not.

In the game $G_{t-priv,EA,T}^{\mathcal{A},Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m)$, an adversary \mathcal{A} interacts with the challenger \mathcal{C} on behalf of all corrupted voters, VC and VSD. \mathcal{C} plays the role of honest voters, EA and T . BB is completely passive and represents a publicly viewed database.

1) \mathcal{A} picks and sends two options U_i^0, U_i^1 to the challenger \mathcal{C} . The first option U_i^0 is its intent, the other – the option that the challenger would use in order to produce an indistinguishable from the intent's ballot and receipt view*. 2) After sending options, \mathcal{A} schedules the **Registration** protocol with \mathcal{C} on behalf of some voter V_i . 3) \mathcal{C} creates a fake credentials \tilde{s}_i and generates real credentials s_i for the voter V_i . 4) \mathcal{C} responds \mathcal{A} with a pair of credentials s_i^0, s_i^1 , where one of the credentials are real and the other were generated using the simulator *Sim* in a such way, that if \mathcal{A} guesses right and uses the real credentials to cast a vote for U_i^0 , the produced ballot and internal view of the **Cast** protocol would be real, otherwise generated ballot would correspond to the option U_i^1 and the returned view would be fake. 5) If \mathcal{A} choses to post the ballot b_i to BB, 6) \mathcal{C} posts exactly the same ballot** to BB. 7) When \mathcal{A} stops the election, \mathcal{C} posts the tally τ ***.

Remarks:

*If \mathcal{C} succeeds, \mathcal{A} wouldn't be able to say whether it voted for option U_i^0 or U_i^1 and BB would contain both ballots (one for the option U_i^0 , the other for the option U_i^1) so the tally wouldn't reveal any information. Example: if \mathcal{A} picks real credential then it casts a vote for the option U_i^0 on behalf of a voter V_i , at the same time exactly the same ballot posted by \mathcal{C} would correspond to the fake credentials and the option U_i^1 . In this case \mathcal{A} indeed voted for U_i^0 as it intended. Else if \mathcal{A} picks the fake credentials and votes for the option U_i^0 , its ballot corresponds to the real credentials and the option U_i^1 . At the same time, exactly the same ballot

posted by \mathcal{C} corresponds to the fake credentials and the option U_i^0 . In the last case \mathcal{A} actually voted for U_i^1 while thinking it casts vote for U_i^0 . If this privacy holds, \mathcal{A} has no idea what option voter V_i voted for.

** \mathcal{C} should post to the BB a ballot for the remaining candidate and since \mathcal{C} does not control VSD, it can only post identical ballot, but **Tally** it as if was generated with the fake credentials. If \mathcal{A} voted for U_i^0 , \mathcal{C} should vote for the U_i^1 and vice versa. Otherwise \mathcal{A} would guess the coin a by simply checking the result of an election. We allow \mathcal{A} to pick any two options U_i^0, U_i^1 and play as many rounds as it likes. Since lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ not necessarily sums to the same result as lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, where $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ is a list of honest voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot and used credentials s_i^0 and $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ similar but instead credentials s_i^1 were used, the adversary would trivially break privacy. To prevent it, we add challenger's ballots to the BB and compute the combined tally, namely $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1})$. However, if lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}, \langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}, \langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums to the same result $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$, we remove challenger's ballots and compute the actual tally.

*** The tally τ is posted only if for every correctly formed adversarial ballot, there is a corresponding challenger's ballot posted on the BB. \mathcal{A} may not post some ballots, however if it does, then challenger's ballot must be posted as well. Otherwise, \mathcal{A} wins the *Voter Privacy* game by simply checking the announced result. All \mathcal{A} 's ballots are tallied based on real credentials, all \mathcal{C} 's ones – based on fake credentials. Denote the list of honest voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot and uses credentials s_i^0 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ and the similar list but for credentials s_i^1 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1$. \mathcal{C} removes all challenger's ballots and computes tally for the adversarial ballots only if and only if lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}, \langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}, \langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums to the same result $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$. In this case, the result would be $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1})$ if challenger's coin $a = 0$ or $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$ otherwise.

$G_{t-priv,EA,T}^{\mathcal{A},Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m)$ defined as follows:

- (1) \mathcal{A} on input $1^\lambda, n, m$ defines a set of voters $\mathcal{V} = \{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$, choses a list of candidates $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ and the set of allowed candidates' selections \mathcal{U} . It provides \mathcal{C} with $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}$.

- (2) \mathcal{C} flips a coin $a \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ to define an order according to which real and simulated credentials would be returned to \mathcal{A} , and starts the election on behalf of EA.
- (3) The adversary \mathcal{A} picks two option $U_i^0, U_i^1 \in \mathcal{U}$, where U_i^0 is its intent and U_i^1 is an option that \mathcal{C} would use in order to fool \mathcal{A} . After that, \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{C} engage in an interaction where \mathcal{A} schedules the **Registration** protocols, during which all voters receive their credentials and forward them to \mathcal{A} . For each voter $V_i \in \mathcal{V}$, the adversary chooses whether V_i is corrupted:
- If V_i is corrupted, then \mathcal{C} provides \mathcal{A} with the real credentials s_i , and then they engage in a **Cast** protocol where \mathcal{A} vote on behalf of V_i and \mathcal{C} plays the role of EA.
 - If V_i is not corrupted, then \mathcal{C} generates real credentials s_i and fake credentials \tilde{s}_i using *Sim*. \mathcal{C} responds \mathcal{A} with a pair of simulated and real credentials (s_0, s_1) in order defined by the coin a :
$$\begin{cases} \text{if } a = 0, & (s_i^0, s_i^1) = (\tilde{s}_i, s_i) \\ \text{else} & (s_i^0, s_i^1) = (s_i, \tilde{s}_i) \end{cases}$$
 - An honest voter V_i forward both credentials s_i^0, s_i^1 to \mathcal{A}
 - Using one of the credentials \mathcal{A} schedules the **Cast** protocol execution to vote for an option U_i^0 and sends the produced ballot to BB in the entry that corresponds to the voter V_i . As a result of the **Cast** protocol execution, \mathcal{A} would obtain: receipt r_i , ballot b_i and the view of the internal state of the voter V_i $view_i$. During the **Tally** protocol execution this ballot would be treated as if it was generated with real credentials s_i . So, if \mathcal{A} indeed picked the real credentials, b_i would correspond to the option U_i^0 and $view_i$ would be real. Otherwise, b_i would be a ballot for the option U_i^1 and $view_i$ would be fake.
 - If \mathcal{A} posts a ballot on BB, \mathcal{C} posts exactly the same ballot. During the **Tally** protocol execution this ballot would be treated as if it was generated with fake credentials, which means that whatever option in reality \mathcal{A} voted for, \mathcal{C} picked the other option.
- (4) Denote the list of honest voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot and uses credentials s_i^0 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ and the similar list but for credentials s_i^1 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1$. If lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums to the same result $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$, \mathcal{C} removes all challenger's ballots and executes the **Tally** protocol on the cleared

BB. Otherwise, \mathcal{C} executes the **Tally** protocol on the BB that contains both adversarial and challenger's ballots.

- (5) Finally, \mathcal{A} using all information collected above (including the contents of the BB) outputs a bit a^*
- (6) Denote the set of corrupted voters as \mathcal{V}_{corr} and the set of honest voters as $\hat{\mathcal{V}} = \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{V}_{corr}$. The game returns a bit which is 1 if and only if the following hold true:
 - (a) $a = a^*$
 - (b) $|\mathcal{V}_{corr}| \leq t$ (i.e., the number of corrupted voters is bounded by t).

Remark:

Sim works in such a way that fake credentials satisfy both of the following rules:

- (1) The real credentials and U_i^0 option should give ballot and receipt, which are identical indistinguishable from ballot and receipt produced for the fake credentials and U_i^1 option.
- (2) The fake credentials and U_i^0 option should give ballot and receipt, which are identical to ballot and receipt produced for the real credentials and U_i^1 option.

To understand the logic behind the *Voter Privacy* defined above, consider the following toy examples:

Example 1

There are just 3 voters and 3 possible options op_1, op_2, op_3 . Challenger's coin $a = 0$, so the fake credentials are always would be the first credentials in the credentials pair. Suppose \mathcal{A} schedules three vote casting protocols for a voters V_1, V_2, V_3 :

- 1) $\boxed{V_1}$: \mathcal{A} chooses $U_1^0 = op_3, U_1^1 = op_1$ and picks the second credentials for generating the ballot b_1 for op_3 . Since \mathcal{A} picked the fake credentials, the ballot b_1 in the **Tally** protocol would result in a vote for op_1 . Meanwhile, \mathcal{C} posts identical to the ballot b_1 ballot \tilde{b}_1 that corresponds to an option op_3 .
- 2) $\boxed{V_2}$: \mathcal{A} chooses $U_2^0 = op_1, U_2^1 = op_2$ and picks the first credentials for generating the ballot b_2 for op_1 . Since \mathcal{A} picked the real credentials, the ballot b_2 in the **Tally** process would correctly result in a vote for op_1 . Meanwhile, \mathcal{C} posts

identical to the ballot b_2 ballot \tilde{b}_2 that corresponds to an option op_2 .

3) $\boxed{V_3}$: \mathcal{A} chooses $U_3^0 = op_3, U_3^1 = op_1$ and picks the first credentials for generating the ballot b_3 for op_3 . Since \mathcal{A} picked the fake credentials, the ballot b_2 in the **Tally** process would result in a vote for op_1 . Meanwhile, \mathcal{C} posts identical to the ballot b_3 ballot \tilde{b}_3 that corresponds to an option op_3 .

At the end of this mini election, \mathcal{A} would get the following result $op_1 = 3, op_2 = 1, op_3 = 2$. Even though \mathcal{A} 's intention was to vote for options op_3, op_1, op_3 , his real choices are op_1, op_1, op_1 . If privacy holds, \mathcal{A} is unable to understand whether he voted for U_i^0 and the challenger for an option U_i^1 or vice versa.

Example 2

\mathcal{C} 's coin $a = 0$, \mathcal{A} sent the challenger options U_i^0, U_i^1 and picked the credentials s_i^0 for voters V_0, V_3, V_5 and the credentials s_i^1 for the remaining voters V_1, V_2, V_4 to vote for an option U_i^0 for all $i \in [0, 5]$. Since the coin $a = 0$, the left credentials s_i^0 are fake. That means, adversarial ballots are actually for options $U_0^1, U_1^0, U_2^0, U_3^1, U_4^0, U_5^1$ instead of $U_0^0, U_1^0, U_2^0, U_3^0, U_4^0, U_5^0$ as it wanted. On the other hand, challenger's ballots are for options $U_0^0, U_1^1, U_2^1, U_3^0, U_4^1, U_5^0$. Suppose that the sum of all challenger's ballots $\tau_c = f(U_0^0) + f(U_1^1) + f(U_2^1) + f(U_3^0) + f(U_4^1) + f(U_5^0)$ and adversarial ones $\tau_a = f(U_0^1) + f(U_1^0) + f(U_2^0) + f(U_3^1) + f(U_4^0) + f(U_5^1)$. If τ_c and τ_a both give the same result, we can remove all challenger's ballots and return the **Result** over τ_a as an election result. In this case \mathcal{C} would not leak the coin a . Equivalence of τ_c and τ_a means that $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$.

Privacy: EA and T are honest:

The e-voting system Π achieves voter privacy in case of honest T and EA for at most t corrupted voters if there is a PPT simulator Sim such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} :

$$|\Pr[G_{t-priv, EA, T}^{\mathcal{A}, Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

5.2 VSD and T are honest: $G_{t-priv, VSD, T}^{\mathcal{A}, Sim}(1^\lambda)$

Even though, it is possible to achieve voter privacy for trusted VSD **only** (by making the T unable to decrypt individual votes), the case is rather extreme. The def-




FIGURE 4: $G_{t-priv, VSD}^{A, Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m)$

initiation of voter privacy below is given for trusted VSD and T . However, we identify changes that would transform the given definition into **only** VSD is trusted case.

In the game $G_{t-priv, VSD, T}^{A, Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m)$, an adversary \mathcal{A} operates on behalf of the all corrupted voters and all corrupted entities, such as: EA and VC . \mathcal{C} plays on behalf of VSD , T and all honest voters. \mathbb{BB} is completely passive and represents a publicly accessible database.

1) \mathcal{A} picks and sends options U_i^0, U_i^1 to the challenger \mathcal{C} . 2) After that \mathcal{A} schedules the **Cast** protocol with \mathcal{C} on behalf of all voters and decides whether a voter V_i is corrupted or not. 3) \mathcal{C} generates a real ballot, receipt and view and uses Sim to create the fake ones. 4) At the end \mathcal{C} responds with a pair of ballots, receipts and view $b_i^0, r_i^0, view_i^0, b_i^1, r_i^1, view_i^1$, where the order of real and fake output is determined according to a coin a . 5) If \mathcal{A} posts a ballot on the \mathbb{BB} , \mathcal{C} posts the other ballot*. 6) When \mathcal{A} stops the election, \mathcal{C} posts the tally τ **.

* \mathcal{C} should post to the \mathbb{BB} the remaining ballot, otherwise \mathcal{A} would guess the coin a by simply checking the result of an election. We allow \mathcal{A} to pick any two options U_i^0, U_i^1 and play as many rounds as it likes. Since lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$ and

$\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ not necessarily sums to the same result as lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, where $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ is a list of honest voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot and used credentials s_i^0 and $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ similar but instead credentials s_i^1 were used, the adversary would trivially break privacy. To prevent it, we add challenger's ballots to the BB and compute the combined tally, namely $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1})$. However, if lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums to the same result $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$, we remove challenger's ballots and compute the actual tally.

*** The tally τ is posted only if for every correctly formed adversarial ballot, there is a corresponding challenger's ballot posted on the BB. \mathcal{A} may not post some ballots, however if it does, then challenger's ballot must be posted as well. Otherwise, \mathcal{A} wins the *Voter Privacy* game by simply checking the announced result. All \mathcal{A} 's ballots are tallied based on real credentials, all \mathcal{C} 's ones – based on fake credentials. Denote the list of honest voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot and uses credentials s_i^0 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ and the similar list but for credentials s_i^1 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1$. \mathcal{C} removes all challenger's ballots and computes tally for the adversarial ballots only if and only if lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums to the same result $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$. In this case, the result would be $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1})$ if challenger's coin $a = 0$ or $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$ otherwise.

The game $G_{t\text{-}priv, \text{VSD}, T}^{\mathcal{A}, Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m)$ is defined as follows:

- (1) \mathcal{A} on input $1^\lambda, n, m$ defines a set of voters $\mathcal{V} = \{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$, choses a list of candidates $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ and the set of allowed candidates' selections \mathcal{U} . \mathcal{A} starts an election using $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}$ as input parameters.
- (2) \mathcal{C} flips a coin $a \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ to define an order according to which real and simulated ballots and receipts would be returned to \mathcal{A} .
- (3) \mathcal{A} sends to \mathcal{C} options $U_i^0, U_i^1 \in \mathcal{U}$, where U_i^0 is an option for the real ballot and receipt and U_i^1 is an option for the fake ones. After that, \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{C} engage in an interaction where \mathcal{A} schedules the **Cast** protocols of all voters which may run concurrently. For each voter $V_i \in \mathcal{V}$, the adversary chooses whether $V_i \in \mathcal{V}$ is corrupted:

– If V_i is corrupted, then \mathcal{C} provides \mathcal{A} with the real ballot and receipt (b_i, r_i) .

- If V_i is not corrupted, \mathcal{C} provides \mathcal{A} with a pair of simulated and real ballot, receipt and view $(b_i^0, r_i^0, view_i^0)(b_i^1, r_i^1, view_i^1)$ s.t.:

$$\begin{cases} \text{if } a = 0, & (b_i^0, r_i^0, view_i^0) = (\tilde{b}_i, \tilde{r}_i, fake_view_i) \text{ and } (b_i^1, r_i^1, view_i^1) = (b_i, r_i, view_i) \\ \text{else} & (b_i^0, r_i^0, view_i^0) = (b_i, r_i, view_i) \text{ and } (b_i^1, r_i^1, view_i^1) = (\tilde{b}_i, \tilde{r}_i, fake_view_i) \end{cases}$$
where the pair (b_i, r_i) is the ballot and receipt for an adversarial option U_i^0 and $(\tilde{b}_i, \tilde{r}_i)$ is the ballot and receipt for U_i^1 option generated via the simulator Sim .
- If \mathcal{A} posts a ballot on BB, \mathcal{C} posts the remaining ballot.

- (4) Denote the list of honest voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot and uses credentials s_i^0 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ and the similar list but for credentials s_i^1 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1$. If lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums to the same result $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$, \mathcal{C} removes all challenger's ballots and executes the **Tally** protocol on the cleared BB. Otherwise, \mathcal{C} executes the **Tally** protocol on the BB that contains ballots for options U_i^0 and U_i^1 .
- (5) Finally, \mathcal{A} using all information collected above (including the contents of the BB) outputs a bit a^*
- (6) Denote the set of corrupted voters as \mathcal{V}_{corr} and the set of honest voters as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}} = \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{V}_{corr}$. The game returns a bit which is 1 if and only if the following hold true:
 - (a) $a = a^*$
 - (b) $|\mathcal{V}_{corr}| \leq t$ (i.e., the number of corrupted voters is bounded by t).

***Remark:**

\mathcal{A} can control T and perform **Tally** procedure. However, in such a case, it should be impossible for T to learn the underline vote for any individual ballot or compute the result for BB that does not contain all ballots b_i^0, b_i^1 . The only exception is the case when lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums up to the same tally as lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, for this situation \mathcal{A} may perform **Tally** operation without challenger's ballots.

The e-voting system Π achieves voter privacy in case of honest VSD and T , for at most t corrupted voters, if there is a PPT simulator Sim such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} :

$$|\Pr[G_{t-priv, VSD, T}^{A, Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

6 Comparison with existing definitions

6.1 Helious. Ballot privacy.

Ballot privacy attempts to capture the idea that during its execution a secure protocol does not reveal information about the votes cast, beyond what the result of the election leaks. In some works, ballot privacy defined even stronger: "a voter's vote is not revealed to anyone". However, in most cases ballot privacy targets specifically vote-casting procedure end

Informally, ballot privacy is satisfied if an adversary in control of arbitrarily many voters cannot distinguish between real ballots and fake ballots, where ballots are replaced by ballots for some fixed vote ϵ chosen by adversary. The adversary \mathcal{A} has read access to public BB and may observe communication channels between the honest parties and BB. Note, that \mathcal{A} is not allowed to corrupt any entities.

Definition: Ballot privacy for Helious:

The challenger \mathcal{C} starts by flipping a coin a , which defines in what world the game between \mathcal{C} and an adversary \mathcal{A} would take place. If $a = 0$, the world is real, otherwise – fake. Also \mathcal{C} maintains two bulletin boards BB, BB' initialized via the setup algorithm, where BB' always contains ballots for the real votes. The adversary \mathcal{A} is always given access BB and can issue two types of queries: **vote** and **ballot**. In the real world a **vote** query causes a ballot for the given vote to be placed on the both BB: hidden BB' and public BB. In the fake one, the same query causes a ballot for the given vote to be placed on the BB' and a ballot for ϵ to be placed on BB. A **ballot** query always causes the submitted ballot to be processed on both boards. At some point, the adversary \mathcal{A} asks to see the result. The challenger computes tally based on BB'. The adversarial goal is to determine whether the world is real or fake.

The Ballot privacy for Helious contradicts verifiability notion by nature. Intuitively, verifiability means that it's possible to check that a vote was cast as intended, recorded as cast, tallied as recorded and, if the tally is encrypted, final

result was encrypted as required. The definition states that an adversary can not distinguish real and fake world, assuming that he observes communications channels and has access to the public BB only. In general case BB and BB' contains different sets of votes, though tallying is always done using BB'. The result of an election corresponds to evaluating an arbitrary function ρ that takes a list of votes as input and returns the election result on the underlying votes. Suppose, that there is a proof π that the result was tallied as recorded. π guarantees that tallying procedure was performed on the given BB and non vote has been modified or excluded. If there is such proof, an adversary against ballot privacy could easily check that produced result, even if decrypted correctly, was computed for some other BB and therefore guess the challenger's coin a with an overwhelming probability.

To defend against this attack, \mathcal{C} should be able to fake proof π . Suppose there is a simulator that can fake the proof π without using a global setup. That would mean that secure schemes would not satisfy tally uniqueness, since simulator allows any result to be accepted as the valid one. So, the same BB would have multiple valid election results, which contradicts verifiability.

Another case - using global setup or trapdoors.

6.2 Demos privacy

Demos voter privacy definition resembles witness indistinguishability of interactive proof system. An adversary's challenge is to distinguish between two pre-defined by the adversary \mathcal{A} lists of candidate selection that sums up to the same tally.

The game between an adversary \mathcal{A} and a challenger \mathcal{C} are defined as follows: The adversary defines election parameters: voters, candidates and selects two lists of candidates' selections $\mathcal{L} = \langle U_l^0, U_l^1 \rangle$ that sums up to the same tally. The challenger flips a coin b and starts an election. During the game, \mathcal{A} schedules all **Cast** protocols selecting corrupted voters adaptively (\mathcal{A} allowed to corrupt t voters at most). For all honest voters, \mathcal{A} provides \mathcal{C} with two candidates selections U_l^0, U_l^1 . \mathcal{C} selects U_l^b as voting option, runs the **Cast** protocol and returns to the adversary (i) the receipt r_l obtained from the protocol, and (ii) if $b = 0$ current view obtained from the protocol or if $b = 1$, a simulated view produced by a simulator \mathcal{S} .

According to the game, for a voter V_l , if $b = 0$ \mathcal{A} receives back a receipt r_l the first candidates' selection U_l^0 and the current real view of the internal state of the voter obtained from the **Cast** protocol. Otherwise, for $b = 1$, \mathcal{A} gets back a receipt r_l the second candidates' selection U_l^1 and the simulated view generated by a simulator \mathcal{S} . The e-voting scheme Π with at most t corrupted voters achieves voter privacy if there exist a simulator \mathcal{S} such that \mathcal{A} has a negligible advantage over a random coin flipping in guessing b .

Demos privacy definition

$G_{DEMOS,t-priv}^{*\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}}(1^\lambda, n, m)$ defined as follows:

During the game \mathcal{C} plays the role of honest voters, T and EA. \mathcal{A} operates on behalf of corrupted voters and VSD.

- (1) \mathcal{A} on input $1^\lambda, n, m$ defines a set of voters $\mathcal{V} = \{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$, choses a list of candidates $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ and the set of allowed candidates' selections \mathcal{U} . It provides \mathcal{C} with $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}$.
- (2) \mathcal{C} flips a coin $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and perform the **Setup** protocol on input $1^\lambda, \mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}$ to obtain $msk, s_1, \dots, s_n, Pub$; it provides \mathcal{A} with Pub .
- (3) The adversary \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{C} engage in an interaction where \mathcal{A} schedules the **Cast** protocols of all voters which may run concurrently. For each voter $V_i \in \mathcal{V}$ the adversary chooses whether V_i is corrupted:
 - If V_i is corrupted, then \mathcal{C} provides s_i to \mathcal{A} , and then they engage in a **Cast** protocol where \mathcal{A} plays the role of V_i and \mathcal{C} plays the role of EA and BB.
 - If V_i is not corrupted, \mathcal{A} provides two candidates selections $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0, \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle$ to the challenger \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} operates on V_i 's behalf, using \mathcal{U}_i^b as the V_i 's input. The adversary \mathcal{A} is allowed to observe the network trace of the **Cast** protocol where \mathcal{C} plays the role of V_i , EA and BB. When the **Cast** protocol terminates, the challenger \mathcal{C} provides to \mathcal{A} : (i) the receipt α_l that voter V_l obtains from the protocol, and (ii) if $b = 0$, the current view of internal state of the voter V_l , $view_l$ that the challenger obtains from the **Cast** protocol execution; or a simulated view of the internal state of V_l produced by $\mathcal{S}(view_l)$.

- (4) \mathcal{C} performs the **Tally** protocol playing the role of EA, T and BB. \mathcal{A} is allowed to observe the network trace of that protocol.
- (5) Finally, \mathcal{A} using all information collected above (including the contents of the BB) outputs a bit b^*

Denote the set of corrupted voters as \mathcal{V}_{corr} and the set of honest voters as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}} = \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{V}_{corr}$. The game returns a bit which is 1 if and only if the following hold true:

- (1) $b = b^*$
- (2) $|\mathcal{V}_{corr}| \leq t$ (i.e., the number of corrupted voters is bounded by t).
- (3) $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_l^0 \rangle_{V_l \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_l^0 \rangle_{V_l \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}})$ (i.e., the election result w.r.t. the set of voters $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}$ does not leak b).

To prove that Demos privacy implies a weaker level of privacy than we defined, we constructed an modified version of our privacy definition. The difference between the modified and original versions is that it is mandatory for \mathcal{A} use two lists that sums up to the same tally for the posted ballots in the modified one.

Modified original privacy definition

The only difference between the original privacy definition and the modified version is that \mathcal{A} picks its choices U_i^0, U_i^1 from the two lists that sums up to the same tally: $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}})$, where $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}$ is a list of honest voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot, the adversary would trivially break privacy.

$G_{mod_ORIG, t-priv, EA, T}^{\mathcal{A}, Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m)$ defined as follows:

- (1) \mathcal{A} on input $1^\lambda, n, m$ defines a set of voters $\mathcal{V} = \{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$, choses a list of candidates $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ and the set of allowed candidates' selections \mathcal{U} . It provides \mathcal{C} with $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}$.
- (2) \mathcal{C} flips a coin $a \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ to define an order according to which real and simulated credentials would be returned to \mathcal{A} , and starts the election on behalf of EA.

- (3) The adversary \mathcal{A} picks two option $U_i^0, U_i^1 \in \mathcal{U}$, where U_i^0 is its intent and U_i^1 is an option that \mathcal{C} would use in order to fool \mathcal{A} . After that, \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{C} engage in an interaction where \mathcal{A} schedules the **Registration** protocols, during which all voters receive their credentials and forward them to \mathcal{A} . For each voter $V_i \in \mathcal{V}$, the adversary chooses whether V_i is corrupted:
- If V_i is corrupted, then \mathcal{C} provides \mathcal{A} with the real credentials s_i , and then they engage in a **Cast** protocol where \mathcal{A} vote on behalf of V_i and \mathcal{C} plays the role of EA.
 - If V_i is not corrupted, then \mathcal{C} generates real credentials s_i and fake credentials \tilde{s}_i using *Sim*. \mathcal{C} responds \mathcal{A} with a pair of simulated and real credentials (s_0, s_1) in order defined by the coin a :
$$\begin{cases} \text{if } a = 0, & (s_i^0, s_i^1) = (\tilde{s}_i, s_i) \\ \text{else} & (s_i^0, s_i^1) = (s_i, \tilde{s}_i) \end{cases}$$
 - An honest voter V_i forward both credentials s_i^0, s_i^1 to \mathcal{A}
 - Using one of the credentials \mathcal{A} schedules the **Cast** protocol execution to vote for an option U_i^0 and sends the produced ballot to BB in the entry that corresponds to the voter V_i . As a result of the **Cast** protocol execution, \mathcal{A} would obtain: receipt r_i , ballot b_i and the view of the internal state of the voter V_i $view_i$. During the **Tally** protocol execution this ballot would be treated as if it was generated with real credentials s_i . So, if \mathcal{A} indeed picked the real credentials, b_i would correspond to the option U_i^0 and $view_i$ would be real. Otherwise, b_i would be a ballot for the option U_i^1 and $view_i$ would be fake.
 - \mathcal{A} choses whether to post the produced ballot b_i to the BB or not.
- (4) \mathcal{C} executes the **Tally** protocol on the BB.
- (5) Finally, \mathcal{A} using all information collected above (including the contents of the BB) outputs a bit a^*
- (6) Denote the set of corrupted voters as \mathcal{V}_{corr} and the set of honest voters as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}} = \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{V}_{corr}$. The game returns a bit which is 1 if and only if the following hold true:
- (a) $a = a^*$
 - (b) $|\mathcal{V}_{corr}| \leq t$ (i.e., the number of corrupted voters is bounded by t).

- (c) $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$ (i.e., the election result does not leak a), where $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ is the list of honest voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot and uses credentials s_i^0 and $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1$ is the similar list but for credentials s_i^1 .

The game $G_{mod_ORIG, t-priv, VSD, T}^{\mathcal{A}, Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m)$ is defined as follows:

- (1) \mathcal{A} on input $1^\lambda, n, m$ defines a set of voters $\mathcal{V} = \{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$, choses a list of candidates $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ and the set of allowed candidates' selections \mathcal{U} . \mathcal{A} starts an election using $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}$ as input parameters.
- (2) \mathcal{C} flips a coin $a \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ to define an order according to which real and simulated ballots and receipts would be returned to \mathcal{A} .
- (3) \mathcal{A} sends to \mathcal{C} options $U_i^0, U_i^1 \in \mathcal{U}$, where U_i^0 is an option for the real ballot and receipt and U_i^1 is an option for the fake ones. After that, \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{C} engage in an interaction where \mathcal{A} schedules the **Cast** protocols of all voters which may run concurrently. For each voter $V_i \in \mathcal{V}$, the adversary chooses whether $V_i \in \mathcal{V}$ is corrupted:
 - If V_i is corrupted, then \mathcal{C} provides \mathcal{A} with the real ballot and receipt (b_i, r_i) .
 - If V_i is not corrupted, \mathcal{C} provides \mathcal{A} with a pair of simulated and real ballot, receipt and view $(b_i^0, r_i^0, view_i^0)(b_i^1, r_i^1, view_i^1)$ s.t.:

$$\begin{cases} \text{if } a = 0, & (b_i^0, r_i^0, view_i^0) = (\tilde{b}_i, \tilde{r}_i, fake_view_i) \text{ and } (b_i^1, r_i^1, view_i^1) = (b_i, r_i, view_i) \\ \text{else } & (b_i^0, r_i^0, view_i^0) = (b_i, r_i, view_i) \text{ and } (b_i^1, r_i^1, view_i^1) = (\tilde{b}_i, \tilde{r}_i, fake_view_i) \end{cases}$$
 where the pair (b_i, r_i) is the ballot and receipt for an adversarial option U_i^0 and $(\tilde{b}_i, \tilde{r}_i)$ is the ballot and receipt for U_i^1 option generated via the simulator *Sim*.
 - If \mathcal{A} posts a ballot on BB, \mathcal{C} posts the remaining ballot.
- (4) \mathcal{C} executes the **Tally** protocol on the BB.
- (5) Finally, \mathcal{A} using all information collected above (including the contents of the BB) outputs a bit a^*
- (6) Denote the set of corrupted voters as \mathcal{V}_{corr} and the set of honest voters as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}} = \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{V}_{corr}$. The game returns a bit which is 1 if and only if the following hold true:

- (a) $a = a^*$
- (b) $|\mathcal{V}_{corr}| \leq t$ (i.e., the number of corrupted voters is bounded by t).
- (c) $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$

Suppose there exists an adversary \mathcal{B} that wins the Demos privacy game with the probability more than one half. We will show that it's possible to construct an adversary \mathcal{A} that exploits \mathcal{B} and breaks the modified original privacy.

$\mathcal{B} - \mathcal{A} - \mathcal{C}$ (challenger against Modified original privacy) interaction:

- (1) \mathcal{B} on input $1^\lambda, n, m$ defines a set of voters $\mathcal{V} = \{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$, choses a list of candidates $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ and the set of allowed candidates' selections \mathcal{U} . It provides \mathcal{A} with $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}$.
- (2) \mathcal{A} forwards to \mathcal{C} lists $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}$ defined by \mathcal{B}
- (3) \mathcal{C} starts the election on behalf of EA. Also, \mathcal{C} flips a coin $a \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ to define an order according to which real and simulated credentials would be returned to \mathcal{A} .
- (4) The adversary \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{C} engage in an interaction where \mathcal{A} schedules the **Registration** protocols, during which all voters receive their credentials and forward them to \mathcal{A} . At the same time, \mathcal{A} simulates the challenger for demos privacy game for \mathcal{B} and schedules the **Cast** protocol with \mathcal{B} . For each voter $V_i \in \mathcal{V}$ the adversary \mathcal{B} chooses whether V_i is corrupted and \mathcal{A} forwards this decision to \mathcal{C} :

– If V_i is corrupted, then \mathcal{C} provides s_i to \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{A} forwards s_i to \mathcal{B} and then they engage in a **Cast** protocol where \mathcal{B} plays the role of V_i and \mathcal{C} plays the role of EA and BB, while \mathcal{A} simply transfers information from \mathcal{B} to \mathcal{C} .

– If V_i is not corrupted, \mathcal{B} provides two candidates selections $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0, \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle$ to \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A} forwards this pair to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} generates real credentials s_i and fake credentials \tilde{s}_i using *Sim*. \mathcal{A} receives a pair of simulated and real credentials (s_0, s_1) in order defined by the coin a :

$$(s_0, s_1) \text{ in order defined by the coin } a: \begin{cases} \text{if } a = 0, & (s_i^0, s_i^1) = (\tilde{s}_i, s_i) \\ \text{else} & (s_i^0, s_i^1) = (s_i, \tilde{s}_i) \end{cases}$$

\mathcal{A} always uses the first credentials s_i^0 to schedule the **Cast** protocol execution and vote for an option U_i^0 . Since \mathcal{A} controls VSD, it produces

ballot b_i and posts it to the BB in the entry that corresponds to the voter V_i . As a result of the **Cast** protocol execution, \mathcal{A} would obtain: receipt r_i , ballot b_i and the view of the internal state of the voter V_i $view_i$. During the **Tally** protocol execution this ballot would be treated as if it was generated with real credentials s_i . So, if \mathcal{A} indeed picked the real credentials, b_i would correspond to the option U_i^0 and $view_i$ would be real. Otherwise, b_i would be a ballot for the option U_i^1 and $view_i$ would be fake. The adversary \mathcal{B} is allowed to observe the network trace of the **Cast** protocol where \mathcal{A} plays the role of V_i and VSD and \mathcal{C} plays on behalf of EA. When the **Cast** protocol terminates, \mathcal{A} provides to \mathcal{B} : (i) the receipt r_i that voter V_i obtains from the protocol, and (ii) $view_i$

- (5) \mathcal{C} performs the **Tally** protocol playing the role of EA, T and BB. Since *Demos Privacy* implies that $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}})$ and \mathcal{A} always posts all ballots and always uses the first credentials s_i^0 , then $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$, where $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1$ is empty. \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B} are allowed to observe the network trace of that protocol.
- (6) Finally, \mathcal{B} using all information collected above (including the contents of the BB) outputs a bit b^*
- (7) \mathcal{A} returns $1 - b^*$

If the challenger's \mathcal{C} coin $a = 0$, then the first credentials s_i^0 are always fake. Since \mathcal{A} always uses s_i^0 to schedule the **Cast** protocol execution with \mathcal{C} and vote for an option U_i^0 , as a result of the execution \mathcal{A} would obtain: receipt r_i , ballot b_i that is actually a vote for U_i^1 and the fake view of the internal state of the voter V_i . This case corresponds to the coin $b = 1$ in the Demos privacy game.

Else if \mathcal{C} 's coin $a = 1$, s_i^0 are always real credentials. As a result of the **Cast** protocol execution \mathcal{A} would obtain: receipt r_i , ballot b_i that is indeed a vote for U_i^0 and the real view of the internal state of the voter V_i . This case corresponds to the coin $b = 0$ in the Demos privacy game.

By assumption \mathcal{B} has an advantage over a coin flipping in winning the demos privacy game. This means that \mathcal{B} is capable of guessing coin b with probability more than one half. \mathcal{A} returns $1 - b^*$, where b^* is the \mathcal{B} 's guess. The above states that \mathcal{A} is capable of winning the modified privacy game against the challenger \mathcal{C}

with probability more than random coin flipping, which means \mathcal{A} breaks modified privacy definition.

So, if there is an adversary that breaks *Demos Privacy*, there is an adversary that exploits it in order to break *Modified Voter Privacy* for the case of trusted EA and T .

We will show, that *Demos Privacy* is also weaker than *Modified Voter Privacy* for the case of trusted VSD and T . Suppose there exists an adversary \mathcal{B} that wins the *Demos Privacy* game with the probability more than one half. We will show that it's possible to construct an adversary \mathcal{A} that exploits \mathcal{B} and breaks the *Modified Voter Privacy*.

$\mathcal{B} - \mathcal{A} - \mathcal{C}$ (challenger against Modified original privacy) interaction:

- (1) \mathcal{B} on input $1^\lambda, n, m$ defines a set of voters $\mathcal{V} = \{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$, choses a list of candidates $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ and the set of allowed candidates' selections \mathcal{U} . It provides \mathcal{A} with $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}$.
- (2) \mathcal{A} starts the election on behalf of EA.
- (3) \mathcal{C} flips a coin $a \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ to define an order according to which real and simulated credentials would be returned to \mathcal{A} .
- (4) The adversary \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{C} engage in an interaction where \mathcal{A} schedules the **Cast** protocols. At the same time, \mathcal{A} simulates the challenger for demos privacy game for \mathcal{B} and schedules the **Cast** protocol with \mathcal{B} . For each voter $V_i \in \mathcal{V}$ the adversary \mathcal{B} chooses whether V_i is corrupted and \mathcal{A} forwards this decision to \mathcal{C} :

– If V_i is corrupted, then \mathcal{A} provides s_i to \mathcal{B} and then they engage in a **Cast** protocol where \mathcal{B} plays the role of V_i and \mathcal{C} plays the role of VSD, while \mathcal{A} simply transfers information from \mathcal{B} to \mathcal{C} .

– If V_i is not corrupted, \mathcal{B} provides two candidates selections $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0, \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle$ to \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A} forwards this pair to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} returns $(r_i^0, b_i^0, view_i^0, r_i^1, b_i^1, view_i^1)$ in order defined by the coin a :

$$\begin{cases} \text{if } a = 0, & (r_i^0, b_i^0, view_i^0, r_i^1, b_i^1, view_i^1) = (\tilde{r}_i, \tilde{b}_i, fake_view_i, r_i, b_i, view_i) \\ \text{else} & (r_i^0, b_i^0, view_i^0, r_i^1, b_i^1, view_i^1) = (r_i, b_i, view_i, (\tilde{r}_i, \tilde{b}_i, fake_view_i)) \end{cases}$$

\mathcal{A} always sends the first receipt and view $r_i^0, view_i^0$ to \mathcal{B} . If \mathcal{A} indeed picked the real pair, r_i^0, b_i^0 would correspond to the option U_i^0 and $view_i^0$ would be real. Otherwise, r_i^0, b_i^0 would be the ballot and receipt for the option U_i^1 and $view_i^0$ would be fake. The adversary \mathcal{B} is allowed to observe the network trace of the **Cast** protocol where \mathcal{C} plays the role of V_i and VSD and \mathcal{A} plays on behalf of EA and BB.

- (a) \mathcal{C} performs the **Tally** protocol playing the role of T . Since *Demos Privacy* implies that $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}})$ and \mathcal{A} always posts the first ballot, then $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$, where $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1$ is empty. \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B} are allowed to observe the network trace of that protocol.
- (b) Finally, \mathcal{B} using all information collected above (including the contents of the BB) outputs a bit b^*
- (c) \mathcal{A} returns $1 - b^*$

If the challenger's \mathcal{C} coin $a = 0$, then the first values $r_i^0, b_i^0, view_i^0$ are always fake. Since \mathcal{A} always uses $r_i^0, b_i^0, view_i^0$, \mathcal{B} would obtain: receipt r_i , ballot b_i that is actually a vote for U_i^1 and the fake view of the internal state of the voter V_i . This case corresponds to the coin $b = 1$ in the *Demos Privacy* game.

Else if \mathcal{C} 's coin $a = 1$, values $r_i^0, b_i^0, view_i^0$ are always real. As a result of the **Cast** protocol execution \mathcal{B} would obtain: receipt r_i , ballot b_i that is indeed a vote for U_i^0 and the real view of the internal state of the voter V_i . This case corresponds to the coin $b = 0$ in the *Demos Privacy* game.

By assumption \mathcal{B} has an advantage over a coin flipping in winning the demos privacy game. This means that \mathcal{B} is capable of guessing coin b with probability more than one half. \mathcal{A} returns $1 - b^*$, where b^* is the \mathcal{B} 's guess. The above states that \mathcal{A} is capable of winning the modified privacy game against the challenger \mathcal{C} with probability more than random coin flipping, which means \mathcal{A} breaks *Modified Voter Privacy* definition.

We proved that if there exist a successful adversary againsts *Demos Privacy*, then there also exist an adversary who breaks the *Modified Voter Privacy*. Therefore, *Demos Privacy* implies weaker level of privacy than *Modified Voter Privacy* for both cases of collision. On the other hand, *Modified Voter Privacy* is the particular case of *Voter Privacy*. This means that if *Demos Privacy* is broken than

Voter Privacy is also would be broken. The *Voter Privacy* game implies at least the *Demos Privacy*.

7 Strict privacy notion

In this section we introduce a strong privacy definition where **all** voters are corrupted but an adversary is still unable to break privacy, denoted as strict privacy. We formally define strict voter privacy via a *Strict Voter Privacy* game, denoted as $G_{strict, \langle honest\ entities \rangle}^{A, Sim}(1^\lambda)$, that is played between an adversary A and a challenger C .

According to the game rules, an adversary is allowed to define the election parameters, corrupt some entities, and act on behalf of all voters. C plays role of honest parties and returns to the adversary simulated and real view of a voter in order defined by a pre-flipped coin a (If $a = 0$, C returns $(simulated_view, real_view)$ and $(real_view, simulated_view)$ otherwise). During the interaction with C , A would try to guess the coin a . The *Strict Voter Privacy* game takes as input the security parameter λ , the number of candidates m and the number of voters n , where n, m are polynomial in λ , and returns 1 or 0 depending on whether the adversary wins or not.

The only difference between Strict privacy and Privacy is the number of corrupted voters. In Strict privacy games **all** voters are corrupted and A vote on their behalf. On the contrary, in the Privacy games at most t voters are corrupted and all others are honest. The crucial moment is that honest voters are able to verify that their vote was cast as intended, but an adversary can not since he does not know the intent and does not control all entities. Therefore, voters may lie about vote while an adversary have no ways to learn the truth and not to win the game $G_{t-priv, \langle honest\ entities \rangle}^{A, Sim}(1^\lambda)$.

The specification of trusted entities splits the Voter Privacy into different scenarios. All meaningful cases of collusion fall into two scenarios: (1) EA and T are honest and (2) VSD and T are honest. It is possible to construct e-voting scheme, that is private with respect to only trusted VSD, however most known schemes require trusted T as well.

We will show that the notion of strict privacy is the weakest level of privacy

that contradicts end-to-end verifiability. To prove the contradiction we used the E2E verifiability definition given by Kiayias et al [1] and considered a strict voter privacy case where all voters are corrupted but an adversary is still unable to break privacy. Under this framework, we prove that it is not possible to achieve E2E verifiability in any strictly private system. Moreover, any meaningful relaxation of the strict privacy definition, leads to a notion of privacy that is feasible by some E2E verifiable e-voting system.

7.1 EA and T are honest: $G_{strict,EA,T}^{A,Sim}(1^\lambda)$


Strict Voter Privacy implies that even if all voters are corrupted, an adversary \mathcal{A} is still unable to break the individual privacy and learn the actual votes. The *Strict Voter Privacy* game is similar to the *Voter Privacy* game, but instead of scheduling the **Registration** protocol for a voter V , \mathcal{A} starts the protocol itself.

In the game $G_{strict,EA,T}^{A,Sim}(1^\lambda)$, an adversary \mathcal{A} interacts with the challenger \mathcal{C} on behalf of **all** voters, VC and VSD. \mathcal{C} plays the role of EA and T . BB is completely passive and represents a publicly viewed database.

1) \mathcal{A} picks and sends two options U_i^0, U_i^1 to the challenger \mathcal{C} . The first option U_i^0 is its intent, the other – the option that the challenger would use in order to produce an indistinguishable from the intent's ballot and receipt view*. 2) After sending options, \mathcal{A} runs the **Registration** protocol with \mathcal{C} on behalf of some voter V_i . 3) \mathcal{C} creates a fake credentials \tilde{s}_i and generates real credentials s_i for the voter V_i . 4) \mathcal{C} responds \mathcal{A} with a pair of credentials s_i^0, s_i^1 , where one of the credentials are real and the other were generated using the simulator Sim in a such way, that if \mathcal{A} guesses right and uses the real credentials to cast a vote for U_i^0 , the produced ballot and internal view of the **Cast** protocol would be real, otherwise generated ballot would correspond to the option U_i^1 and the returned view would be fake. 5) If \mathcal{A} choses to post the ballot b_i to BB, 6) \mathcal{C} posts exactly the same ballot** to BB. 7) When \mathcal{A} stops the election, \mathcal{C} posts the tally τ ***.

Remarks:

*If \mathcal{C} succeeds, \mathcal{A} wouldn't be able to say whether it voted for option U_i^0 or U_i^1 and BB would contain both ballots (one for the option U_i^0 , the other for the option U_i^1) so the tally wouldn't reveal any information. Example: if \mathcal{A} picks real credential then it casts a vote for the option U_i^0 on behalf of a voter V_i , at the same time exactly the same ballot posted by \mathcal{C} would correspond to the fake credentials and

FIGURE 5: $G_{strict,EA,T}^{\mathcal{A},Sim}(1^\lambda)$

the option U_i^1 . In this case \mathcal{A} indeed voted for U_{i_1} as it intended. Else if \mathcal{A} picks the fake credentials and votes for the option U_i^0 , its ballot corresponds to the real credentials and the option U_i^1 . At the same time, exactly the same ballot posted by \mathcal{C} corresponds to the fake credentials and the option U_i^0 . So \mathcal{A} voted for U_i^0 . If this privacy holds, \mathcal{A} has no idea what option voter V_i voted for.

** \mathcal{C} should post to the BB a ballot for the remaining candidate. If \mathcal{A} voted for U_i^0 , \mathcal{C} should vote for the U_i^1 and vice versa. Otherwise \mathcal{A} would guess the coin a by simply checking the result of an election. We allow \mathcal{A} to pick any two options U_i^0, U_i^1 and play as many rounds as it likes. Since lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ not necessarily sums to the same result as lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, where $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ is a list of voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot and used credentials s_i^0 and $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ similar but instead credentials s_i^1 were used, the adversary would trivially break privacy. To prevent it, we add challenger's ballots to the BB and compute the combined tally, namely $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1})$. However, if lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}, \langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}, \langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums to the same result $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$, we remove challenger's ballots and compute the actual tally.

*** The tally τ is posted only if for every correctly formed adversarial ballot, there is a corresponding challenger's ballot posted on the BB. \mathcal{A} may not post some ballots, however if it does, then challenger's ballot must be posted as well. Otherwise, \mathcal{A} wins the *Voter Privacy* game by simply checking the announced result. All \mathcal{A} 's ballots are tallied based on real credentials, all \mathcal{C} 's ones – based on fake credentials. Denote the list of voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot and uses credentials s_i^0 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ and the similar list but for credentials s_i^1 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1$. \mathcal{C} removes all challenger's ballots and computes tally for the adversarial ballots only if and only if lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums to the same result $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$. In this case, the result would be $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1})$ if challenger's coin $a = 0$ or $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$ otherwise.

$G_{strict,EA,T}^{\mathcal{A},Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m)$ defined as follows:

- (1) \mathcal{A} on input $1^\lambda, n, m$ defines a set of voters $\mathcal{V} = \{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$, choses a list of candidates $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ and the set of allowed candidates' selections \mathcal{U} . It provides \mathcal{C} with $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}$.
- (2) \mathcal{C} flips a coin $a \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ to define an order according to which real and simulated credentials would be returned to \mathcal{A} , and starts the election on behalf of EA.
- (3) The adversary \mathcal{A} picks two option $U_i^0, U_i^1 \in \mathcal{U}$, where U_i^0 is its intent and U_i^1 is an option that \mathcal{C} would use in order to fool \mathcal{A} . After that, \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{C} engage in an interaction where \mathcal{A} runs the **Registration** protocols on behalf of all voters. For each voter $V_i \in \mathcal{V}$:
 - \mathcal{C} generates real credentials s_i and fake credentials \tilde{s}_i using *Sim*. \mathcal{C} responds \mathcal{A} with a pair of simulated and real credentials (s_0, s_1) in order defined by the coin a :

$$\begin{cases} \text{if } a = 0, & (s_i^0, s_i^1) = (\tilde{s}_i, s_i) \\ \text{else} & (s_i^0, s_i^1) = (s_i, \tilde{s}_i) \end{cases}$$
 - Using one of the credentials \mathcal{A} schedules the **Cast** protocol execution to vote for an option U_i^0 and sends the produced ballot to BB. As a result of the **Cast** protocol execution, \mathcal{A} would obtain: receipt r_i , ballot b_i and the view of the internal state of the voter V_i – $view_i$.

During the **Tally** protocol execution this ballot would be treated as if it was generated with real credentials s_i . So, if \mathcal{A} indeed picked the real credentials, b_i would correspond to the option U_i^0 and $view_i$ would be real. Otherwise, b_i would be a ballot for the option U_i^1 and $view_i$ would be fake.

– If \mathcal{A} posts a ballot on BB, \mathcal{C} posts exactly the same ballot. During the **Tally** protocol execution this ballot would be treated as if it was generated with fake credentials, which means that whatever option in reality \mathcal{A} voted for, \mathcal{C} picked the other option.

- (4) Denote the list of voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot and uses credentials s_i^0 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ and the similar list but for credentials s_i^1 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1$. If lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums to the same result $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$, \mathcal{C} removes all challenger's ballots and executes the **Tally** protocol on the cleared BB. Otherwise, \mathcal{C} executes the **Tally** protocol on the BB that contains adversarial and challenger's ballots.
- (5) Finally, \mathcal{A} using all information collected above (including the contents of the BB) outputs a bit a^*
- (6) The game returns a bit which is 1 if $a = a^*$ and 0 otherwise.

Remark:

Sim works in such a way that fake credentials satisfy both of the following rules:

- (1) The real credentials and U_i^0 option should give ballot and receipt, which are identical indistinguishable from ballot and receipt produced for the fake credentials and U_i^1 option.
- (2) The fake credentials and U_i^0 option should give ballot and receipt, which are identical to ballot and receipt produced for the real credentials and U_i^1 option.

Strict privacy: EA and T are honest:

The e-voting system Π achieves strict voter privacy in case of trusted EA and T , if there is a PPT simulator *Sim* such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} :

$$|\Pr[G_{strict,EA,T}^{\mathcal{A},Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

7.2 VSD and T are honest: $G_{strict,VSD}^{\mathcal{A},Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m)$




FIGURE 6: $G_{strict,VSD}^{\mathcal{A},Sim}(1^\lambda)$

In *Strict Voter Privacy* game we do not consider the case where privacy of voters relies on trusted VSD **only** since the case is rather extreme and rare. The definition of strict voter privacy below is given for trusted VSD and T . However, we identify changes that would transform the given definition into **only** VSD is trusted case.

In the game $G_{strict,VSD,T}^{\mathcal{A},Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m)$ there is no honest voters, instead an adversary \mathcal{A} operates on behalf of the all voters, EA and VC. \mathcal{C} plays on behalf of VSD and T . BB is completely passive and represents a publicly accessible database.

1) \mathcal{A} picks and sends options U_i^0, U_i^1 to the challenger \mathcal{C} . 2) After that \mathcal{A} runs the **Cast** protocol with \mathcal{C} . 3) \mathcal{C} generates a real ballot, receipt and view for an option U_i^0 and uses Sim and option U_i^1 to create the fake ones. 4) At the end \mathcal{C} responds with a pair of ballots, receipts and view $b_i^0, r_i^0, view_i^0, b_i^1, r_i^1, view_i^1$, where the order of real and fake output is determined according a coin a . 5) If \mathcal{A} posts a ballots on the BB, \mathcal{C} posts the other ballot*. 6) When \mathcal{A} stops the election, \mathcal{C} posts the tally τ **

* \mathcal{C} should post to the BB the remaining ballot, otherwise \mathcal{A} would guess the coin a by simply checking the result of an election. We allow \mathcal{A} to pick any two options U_i^0, U_i^1 and play as many rounds as it likes. Since lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ not necessarily sums to the same result as lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, where $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ is a list of honest voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot and used credentials s_i^0 and $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ similar but instead credentials s_i^1 were used, the adversary would trivially break privacy. To prevent it, we add challenger's ballots to the BB and compute the combined tally, namely $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1})$. However, if lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums to the same result $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$, we remove challenger's ballots and compute the actual tally.

*** The tally τ is posted only if for every correctly formed adversarial ballot, there is a corresponding challenger's ballot posted on the BB. \mathcal{A} may not post some ballots, however if it does, then challenger's ballot must be posted as well. Otherwise, \mathcal{A} wins the *Voter Privacy* game by simply checking the announced result. All \mathcal{A} 's ballots are tallied based on real credentials, all \mathcal{C} 's ones – based on fake credentials. Denote the list of voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot and uses credentials s_i^0 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ and the similar list but for credentials s_i^1 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1$. \mathcal{C} removes all challenger's ballots and computes tally for the adversarial ballots only if and only if lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums to the same result $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$. In this case, the result would be $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1})$ if challenger's coin $a = 0$ or $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$ otherwise.

The game $G_{strict, VSD}^{\mathcal{A}, Sim}(1^\lambda)$ is defined as follows:

- (1) \mathcal{A} on input $1^\lambda, n, m$ defines a set of voters $\mathcal{V} = \{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$, choses a list of candidates $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ and the set of allowed candidates' selections \mathcal{U} . \mathcal{A} starts an election using $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}$ as input parameters.
- (2) \mathcal{C} flips a coin $a \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ to define an order according to which real and simulated ballots and receipts would be returned to \mathcal{A} .
- (3) \mathcal{A} sends to \mathcal{C} options $U_i^0, U_i^1 \in \mathcal{U}$, where U_i^0 is an option for the real ballot and receipt and U_i^1 is an option for the fake ones. After that, \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{C} engage in an interaction where \mathcal{A} runs the **Cast** protocols of all voters which may run concurrently. For each voter $V_i \in \mathcal{V}$:

– \mathcal{C} provides \mathcal{A} with a pair of simulated and real ballot, receipt and view $(b_i^0, r_i^0, view_i^0)(b_i^1, r_i^1, view_i^1)$ s.t.:

$$\begin{cases} \text{if } a = 0, & (b_i^0, r_i^0, view_i^0) = (\tilde{b}_i, \tilde{r}_i, fake_view_i) \text{ and } (b_i^1, r_i^1, view_i^1) = (b_i, r_i, view_i) \\ \text{else} & (b_i^0, r_i^0, view_i^0) = (b_i, r_i, view_i) \text{ and } (b_i^1, r_i^1, view_i^1) = (\tilde{b}_i, \tilde{r}_i, fake_view_i) \end{cases}$$

where the pair (b_i, r_i) is the ballot and receipt for an adversarial option U_i^0 and $(\tilde{b}_i, \tilde{r}_i)$ is the ballot and receipt for U_i^1 option generated via the simulator Sim .

– If \mathcal{A} posts a ballot on BB, \mathcal{C} posts the remaining ballot.

- (4) Denote the list of voter for which \mathcal{A} choses to post produced ballot and uses credentials s_i^0 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0$ and the similar list but for credentials s_i^1 as $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1$. If lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums to the same result $f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) = f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}) + f(\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0})$, \mathcal{C} removes all challenger's ballots and executes the **Tally** protocol on the cleared BB. Otherwise, \mathcal{C} executes the **Tally** protocol on the BB that contains ballots for both options U_i^0 and U_i^1 .

- (5) Finally, \mathcal{A} using all information collected above (including the contents of the BB) outputs a bit a^*

- (6) The game returns a bit which is 1 if $a = a^*$ and 0 otherwise

***Remark:**

\mathcal{A} can control T and perform **Tally** procedure. However, in such a case, it should be impossible for T to learn the underline vote for any individual ballot or compute the result for BB that does not contain all ballots b_i^0, b_i^1 . The only exception is the case when lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ sums up to the same tally as lists $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^1}$ and $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle_{V_i \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}^0}$, for this situation \mathcal{A} may perform **Tally** operation without challenger's ballots.

Strict privacy: VSD is honest:

The e-voting system Π achieves strict voter privacy in case when VSD is trusted, if there is a PPT simulator Sim such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} :

$$|\Pr[G_{strict, VSD}^{\mathcal{A}, Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Because *Demos Privacy* implies the weaker security than *Voter Privacy*, the same holds for strict privacy notion. We introduce *Strict Version of Demos Privacy*, where \mathcal{A} does not corrupt any entity, but operates on behalf of all voters.

Strict version of Demos Privacy

$G_{DEMOS,strict}^{*\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}}(1^\lambda, n, m)$ defined as follows:

- (1) \mathcal{A} on input $1^\lambda, n, m$ defines a set of voters $\mathcal{V} = \{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$, choses a list of candidates $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$ and the set of allowed candidates' selections \mathcal{U} . It provides \mathcal{C} with $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}$.
- (2) \mathcal{C} flips a coin $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and perform the **Setup** protocol on input $1^\lambda, \mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{U}$ to obtain $msk, s_1, \dots, s_n, Pub$; it provides \mathcal{A} with Pub .
- (3) The adversary \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{C} engage in an interaction where \mathcal{A} runs the **Cast** protocols on behalf of all voters:
 - \mathcal{A} provides two candidates selections $\langle \mathcal{U}_i^0, \mathcal{U}_i^1 \rangle$ to the challenger \mathcal{C} and plays on behalf V_i . \mathcal{C} uses \mathcal{U}_i^b as the V_i 's input. When the **Cast** protocol terminates, the challenger \mathcal{C} provides to \mathcal{A} : (i) the receipt α_i and (ii) if $b = 0$, the real view of internal state of the voter V_i , $view_i$ obtained from the **Cast** protocol execution; or a simulated view of the internal state of V_i produced by $\mathcal{S}(view_i)$.
- (4) \mathcal{C} performs the **Tally** protocol playing the role of EA, T and BB. \mathcal{A} is allowed to observe the network trace of that protocol.
- (5) Finally, \mathcal{A} using all information collected above (including the contents of the BB) outputs a bit b^*
- (6) The game returns a bit which is 1 if $b = b^*$ and 0 otherwise

Strict Demos Privacy :

The e-voting system Π achieves strict demos voter privacy, if there is a PPT simulator Sim such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} :

$$|\Pr[G_{DEMOS,strict}^{*\mathcal{A},Sim}(1^\lambda, n, m) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

8 Strict privacy vs E2E Verifiability

Any system Π that satisfies the definition of strict privacy, is "receipt free" but not E2E Verifiable.

The Real and Ideal executions in this case are shown on the figure 6.

Security requires existence of some simulator program \mathcal{S} such that the real and ideal executions are indistinguishable for any environment \mathcal{Z} . Unfortunately, as we are about to show, no such simulator exists.

Proposition:

For any system Π that satisfies the definition of strict privacy, there is an adversary \mathcal{A} such that for any simulator \mathcal{S} , there is an environment \mathcal{Z} that distinguishes ideal and real executions $\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z},\mathcal{S}}^{\mathcal{F},\mathcal{G}_{BB}} \not\approx \text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z},\mathcal{A}}^{\Pi,\mathcal{G}_{BB}}$

8.1 Proof: part 1

Suppose we have a system Π , which is strictly private in case "EA is corrupted, but VSD is honest".

Consider the following attack against E2E Verifiability:

\mathcal{A} :

- corrupts EA and VSDs but doesn't corrupt ASDs.
- corrupts t voters ($t \leq n$), where n is the total number of voters.
- creates fake voters $\{V'_0, V'_1, \dots, V'_n\}$ and using its power substitutes some part γ of honest voters with fake ones for the U_a option.
- fake voters vote for adversarial options according to a vote-casting procedure.
- substituted honest voters receive receipts generated for fake voters.

let \mathcal{Z} be the environment that works as follows:




FIGURE 7: Real and Ideal Execution




FIGURE 8: \mathcal{A}

\mathcal{Z} :


- defines an election setup information:
 $election_params = (\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V}, \mathcal{U}, params)$, where \mathcal{C} - list of candidates, \mathcal{V} - list of voters, \mathcal{U} - list of allowed candidates' selections, $params$ - other required information.
- instructs each voter V_i to vote for the blank $'no\ one'$ option.
- stops the vote-casting phase.
- asks \mathcal{G}_{BB} for the election result τ
- asks every voter V_i to verify his choice and return the result of verification - $response_i$, where $response_i$ equal to $(sid, verify_response, \tau')$ in case of successful verification and \perp otherwise.
- If the number of successful verification responses equal to the number of voters and in all responses provided by a voter tally τ' is equal to the \mathcal{G}_{BB} 's tally τ return 1. Otherwise return 0. 46

Since Π is strictly private, probability, that an adversary \mathcal{D} engaging in the **Cast** protocol would distinguish real and simulated view and win the attack against the strict privacy $\Pr[G_{strict, VSD, T}^{\mathcal{D}, Sim}(1^\lambda) = 1] = \frac{1}{2} + \alpha$ where α is negligible. In case of corrupted EA, \mathcal{C} returns a real pair of ballot and receipt and a real view and also a simulated via *Sim* pair and fake view. This means that in a strictly private system an adversary has a negligible chance to distinguish the ballot and receipt for his option and for some U_a option.

During the Real Execution a voter can either accept or reject the cast ballot. Rejection is possible only if he detects that the returned receipt, ballot and view are faked. The probability that a voter distinguish the receipt and ballot for his option from for the ‘no-one’ option and rejects is $\Pr[V_i \text{ rejects}] \leq \alpha$, where α is negligible.

By nature of the attack, fake receipt is the perfectly valid receipt for the U_a option and the cast ballot would always be successfully verified. Therefore in the Real Execution \mathcal{Z} would get a successful verification response from all n voters and output 1 with the probability $\Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{A}}^{\Pi, \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 1] = \Pr[\text{all } V_i \text{ accept}] = \prod_{i=0}^n (1 - \Pr[V_i \text{ rejects}]) \geq (1 - \alpha)^n = 1 - n\alpha = 1 - \beta$, where $\beta = n\alpha$ is negligible. Thus, $\Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{A}}^{\Pi, \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 0] = 1 - \Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{A}}^{\Pi, \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 1] \leq \beta$, where β is negligible.

Suppose for the sake of contradiction that $\Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{A}}^{\Pi, \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 0] \geq \beta$, where β is non-negligible. This means that at least one voter rejects the receipt. We will show that this contradicts the definition of strict privacy. Consider an attacker \mathcal{B} against strict privacy which exploits the environment \mathcal{Z} .



\mathcal{B} interacts with the challenger in the strict privacy attack \mathcal{C} as follows:

- \mathcal{Z} defines an election parameters *election_params*, assign every voter to vote for the blank option $\{V_i, 'no\ one'\}$ and send this information to the \mathcal{B} .
- \mathcal{B} forwards received *election_params* to the EA.
- \mathcal{B} corrupts the EA.
- EA starts the election.
- \mathcal{B} interacts with the challenger \mathcal{C} provides $(V_i, 'no\ one', U_{\mathcal{Z}_i})$ as the input.
- \mathcal{C} sends back to the \mathcal{B} real and simulated view $(b_0, r_0), (b_1, r_1)$ in the order defined by the challenger's coin a .
- \mathcal{B} votes on behalf of all voters
- \mathcal{Z} stops the vote-casting phase.
- \mathcal{B} computes the election's tally and proof of the tally's correctness.
- \mathcal{Z} asks \mathcal{G}_{BB} for the election result τ
- \mathcal{Z} requests every voter to verify his ballot correctness.
- \mathcal{B} will run the verification on behalf of all voters using ballots and receipts from $\{b_0, r_0\}$.
- \mathcal{Z} outputs 1 or 0 depending on the voters' verdict.
- \mathcal{B} outputs whatever the \mathcal{Z} outputs.

The challenger \mathcal{C} outputs simulated ballot and receipt as (b_0, r_0) , when the coin $a = 0$ and as (b_1, r_1) otherwise.

In case when $a = 0$, \mathcal{B} 's behaviour is identical to the \mathcal{A} 's strategy and \mathcal{B} wins if \mathcal{Z} outputs 0, which happens if at least one voter rejects the simulated receipt. By assumption $\Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{A}}^{\Pi, \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 0] \geq \beta$, where β is non-negligible. Therefore if (b_0, r_0) is the set of simulated ballot and receipt, \mathcal{B} wins with the probability $\Pr[\mathcal{B} \rightarrow 0 | a = 0] = \Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{A}}^{\Pi, \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 0] \geq \beta$, where β is non-negligible.

On the other hand, when $a = 1$, \mathcal{B} plays honestly and the probability of \mathcal{Z} outputting 1 is equal to probability that all voters successfully verify their votes in the honest execution, which is happens with overwhelming probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

The probability of \mathcal{B} winning the attack against the strict privacy is

$$\Pr[G_{strict}^{\mathcal{B}}(1^\lambda) = 1] = \Pr[\mathcal{B} \rightarrow 0 | a = 0] \Pr[a = 0] + \Pr[\mathcal{B} \rightarrow 1 | a = 1] \Pr[a = 1] \\ = \Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{A}}^{\Pi, \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 0] \Pr[a = 0] + \Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}, honest}^{\Pi, \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 1] \Pr[a = 1] \geq \\ \frac{1}{2}\beta + \frac{1}{2} - \text{negl}(\lambda), \text{ where } \beta \text{ is not negligible. This implies that } \mathcal{B} \text{ wins the attack} \\ \text{against strict privacy with the probability more than } \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda), \text{ which contra-} \\ \text{dicts the assumption that the } \Pi \text{ is strictly private.}$$

In the Ideal Execution any simulator S can either:

- 1) post in \mathcal{G}_{BB} the tally τ' generated by \mathcal{A} or any other tally $\tau' \neq \tau$
or
- 2) ignore the \mathcal{A} 's tally and post the actual tally τ .

In the first case, the ideal functionality for E2E verifiability \mathcal{F} would always detect the tally deviation caused by \mathcal{A} if such exists. And since \mathcal{A} doesn't corrupt ASDs, for all honest voters the ideal functionality \mathcal{F} would block verification responses. This implies that in the Ideal Execution $\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}, S}^{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{G}_{BB}}$ \mathcal{Z} would get no response from honest voters. The total number of successful verifications would be equal to the number of corrupted voters, which is less (if not voters are corrupted) than the total number of voters – \mathcal{Z} outputs 0.

In the second case, there exists a class of simulators which ignore \mathcal{A}' actions and post the actual tally. For those simulators consider an modified environment $\tilde{\mathcal{Z}}$ that works as follows:

$\tilde{\mathcal{Z}}$:
 Outputs a bit according to the following rules:

$$\begin{cases} \text{if } \mathcal{Z} \text{ outputs 1 and the number of non-blank votes greater or equal } \gamma - \text{output 1} \\ \text{else output 0} \end{cases}$$

$\tilde{\mathcal{Z}}$ would still output 1 in case of the real execution since the number of non-blank votes would be at least γ due to successful attack \mathcal{A} . However $\tilde{\mathcal{Z}}$ would not find at least γ non-blank votes and output 0 in the ideal execution.

Thus, there is the attacker \mathcal{A} such that for any simulator S there is the environment $\tilde{\mathcal{Z}}$ or \mathcal{Z} which can always distinguish real and ideal executions.

One can notice, that exactly the same attack is applicable against any *Strictly Demos Private* system Π as well.

8.2 Proof: part 2

Suppose we have a system Π' , which is strictly private in case “EA is honest, but VSD is corrupted”.

Consider the following attack against E2E Verifiability:

\mathcal{A}' :

- corrupts EA and VSDs but doesn't corrupt ASDs.
- chooses an option $U_a \in \mathcal{U}$
- corrupts t voters ($t \leq n$), where n is the total number of voters.
- provides every honest voter V_i with fake credentials s'_i s.t. the ballot and receipt produced using $(s'_i, 'no\ one')$ are identical to the ballot and receipt produced using real credentials for an option U_a : $b, r \leftarrow (s'_i, 'no\ one')$ AND $b, r \leftarrow (s_i, U_a)$
- creates fake voters $\{V'_0, V'_1, \dots, V'_n\}$ and provides them with real credentials s_i
- using its power substitutes some part γ of honest voters' cast protocols with the fake voters' protocols for the U_a option.

let \mathcal{Z}' be the environment that works as follows:

\mathcal{Z}' :


- defines an election setup information:
 $election_params = (\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V}, \mathcal{U}, params)$, where \mathcal{C} - list of candidates, \mathcal{V} - list of voters, \mathcal{U} - list of allowed candidates' selections, $params$ - other required information.
- instructs each voter V_i to vote for the blank option ('no one').
- stops the vote-casting phase.
- asks \mathcal{G}_{BB} for the election result τ
- asks every voter V_i to verify his choice and return the result of verification - $response_i$, where $response_i$ equal to $(sid, verify_responce, \tau')$ in case of successful verification and \perp otherwise.
- If the number of successful verification responses equal to the number of voters and in all responses provided by a voter tally τ' is equal to the \mathcal{G}_{BB} 's tally τ return 1. Otherwise return 0.

Since Π' is strictly private, probability, that an adversary engaging in the **Registration** protocol would distinguish real and simulated view and win the attack against the strict privacy $|\Pr[G_{strict,EA}^{A,Sim}(1^\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = \alpha$ where α is negligible. In case "EA is honest, but VSD is corrupted", simulated view is credentials \tilde{s}_i generated via the simulator Sim .

In the Real Execution a voter V_i starts the Cast protocol using fake credentials s'_i and an option 'no one'. However, \mathcal{A}' substitutes his ballot and receipt with the ballot and receipt generated for a fake voter with real credentials and U_a op-

tion. By nature of the attack, the returned receipt generated for real credentials and the U_a option is identical to the receipt produced for a fake credentials and ‘no one’ option. Therefore in the Real Execution \mathcal{Z}' would output 1 if non of the voters would detect that he was given a receipt for fake credentials. The probability of this event is $\Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}', \mathcal{A}'}^{\Pi', \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 1] = \Pr[\text{all } V_i \text{ accept}] = \prod_{i=0}^n (1 - \Pr[V_i \text{ rejects}])$. Suppose, the probability of rejection by V_i is $\Pr[V_i \text{ rejects}] = \zeta$. Thus, $\Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}', \mathcal{A}'}^{\Pi', \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 1] = (1 - \zeta)^n = 1 - n\zeta = 1 - \zeta'$.

Suppose that ζ' is not negligible. This means that $\Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}', \mathcal{A}'}^{\Pi', \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 0] = 1 - \Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}', \mathcal{A}'}^{\Pi', \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 1] = \zeta'$, where ζ' is not negligible. This means that at least one voter rejects the receipt with a non-negligible probability. We will show that this contradicts the definition of strict privacy. Consider an attacker \mathcal{B}' against strict privacy which exploits the environment \mathcal{Z}' .



\mathcal{B}' interacts with the challenger in the strict privacy attack \mathcal{C} as follows:

- \mathcal{Z} defines an election parameters $election_params$, assign each voter the blank option $\{V_i, 'no\ one'\}$ and send this information to the \mathcal{B} .
- \mathcal{B}' forwards received $election_params$ to the \mathcal{C} .
- \mathcal{B}' corrupts the VSD.
- \mathcal{C} starts the election.
- \mathcal{B}' sends to \mathcal{C} $(V_i, 'no\ one', U_a)$.
- \mathcal{C} sends back s_0, s_1 .
- \mathcal{B}' provides voters with credentials s_0 and uses $(s_0, 'no\ one')$ to produce the ballot and receipt and posts the result on BB.
- \mathcal{Z}' stops the vote-casting phase.
- \mathcal{C} executes the *Tally* protocol.
- \mathcal{Z}' asks \mathcal{G}_{BB} for the election result τ
- \mathcal{Z}' requests every voter to verify his ballot correctness.
- \mathcal{B}' will run the verification on behalf of all voters.
- \mathcal{Z}' outputs 1 or 0 depending on the voters' verdict.
- \mathcal{B}' outputs whatever the \mathcal{Z}' outputs.

In case when the simulated credentials are chosen ($a = 0$), \mathcal{B}' provides a voter with fake credentials and generated ballot and receipt for the blank option using the fake credentials, which means that real credentials correspond to the U_a option. \mathcal{B}' 's behaviour is identical to the \mathcal{A}' 's strategy. \mathcal{B}' wins if outputs 0, which happens if \mathcal{Z}' outputs 0. $\Pr[\mathcal{B}' \rightarrow 0 | a = 0] = \Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}', \mathcal{A}'}^{\Pi', \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 0] = \zeta'$

Else if $a = 1$, \mathcal{B}' provides a voter with real credentials and uses the real credentials to vote for the blank option, which is honest behaviour. $\Pr[\mathcal{B}' \rightarrow 1 | a = 1] = \Pr[\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}', honest}^{\Pi', \mathcal{G}_{BB}} = 1] = 1$

Thus, the probability of \mathcal{B}' winning the attack against the strict privacy is $\Pr[G_{strict, EA}^{B, Sim}(1^\lambda) = 1] = \frac{1}{2}(\Pr[\mathcal{B}' \rightarrow 0 | a = 0] + \Pr[\mathcal{B}' \rightarrow 1 | a = 1]) = \frac{1}{2}(\zeta' + 1) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\zeta'$, where ζ' is not negligible. This implies that \mathcal{B}' wins the attack against strict privacy with the probability more than $\frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$, which contradicts the assumption that the Π is strictly private.

In the Ideal Execution any simulator S can either:

- 1) post in \mathcal{G}_{BB} the tally τ' generated by \mathcal{A}' or any other tally $\tau' \neq \tau$
- or

2) ignore the \mathcal{A}' 's tally and post the actual tally τ .

In the first case, the ideal functionality for E2E verifiability \mathcal{F} would always detect the tally deviation caused by \mathcal{A}' if such exists. And since \mathcal{A}' doesn't corrupt ASDs, for all honest voters the ideal functionality \mathcal{F} would block verification responses. This implies that in the Ideal Execution $\text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{Z}', \mathcal{S}}^{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{G}_{BB}} \mathcal{Z}'$ would get no response from honest voters. The total number of successful verifications would be equal to the number of corrupted voters, which is less (if not voters are corrupted) than the total number of voters – \mathcal{Z}' outputs 0.

In the second case, there exists a class of simulators which ignore \mathcal{A}' actions and post the actual tally. For those simulators consider an modified environment $\tilde{\mathcal{Z}}'$ that works as follows:

$\tilde{\mathcal{Z}}'$:
 Outputs a bit according to the following rules:
 $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{if } \mathcal{Z} \text{ outputs 1 and the number of non-blank votes greater or equal } \gamma - \text{output 1} \\ \text{else output 0} \end{array} \right.$

$\tilde{\mathcal{Z}}'$ would still output 1 in case of the real execution since the number of non-blank votes would be at least γ due to successful attack \mathcal{A} . However $\tilde{\mathcal{Z}}'$ would not find at least γ non-blank votes and output 0 in the ideal execution.

Thus, there is the attacker \mathcal{A}' such that for any simulator \mathcal{S} there is the environment $\tilde{\mathcal{Z}}'$ or \mathcal{Z}' which can always distinguish real and ideal executions.

9 Blind signature e-voting scheme

9.1 Presentation of the blind signature e-voting scheme

Our system is a two-server web-based system. The first server - *Signing server* is used for **Registration** process and the second one - VC for vote-casting. In an election, the *Signing server* mainly plays the roles of the EA but may aid the other parties. Trustee T is a separate entity that has a secure channel to communicate with EA, security of communication is supported by HTTPS. All the other parties are realized by Javascripts running at the client side. The system uses additive ElGamal encryption, so the tally is done homomorphically. Currently the blind signature scheme supports approval type of voting s.t. x -out-of- m type of option

selection, where x is between 0 and m .

9.2 Setup and parameters

Throughout the paper, we assume that we have a group of n voters $\mathcal{V} = \{V_1, \dots, V_n\}$ that can choose as many candidates as they like among the set of m candidates $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$, n and m are both thought as polynomial functions of security parameter λ . Also, during the vote casting procedure no 'write-in's votes are allowed, the number of candidates m is fixed. A voter may cast any vote including a blank or an invalid votes.

We denote by M a strict upper bound on the number of votes any candidate can receive. In case when each voter has only one vote, M is a strict upper bound on the number of voters n .

We assume that the message space is \mathbb{Z}_n for a suitable $n > M^m$, the l_R -bit randomizer size is \mathbb{Z} . For NIZK proofs we use a cryptographic hash-function that outputs an l_e -bit number e . In case of SHA-256 $l_e = 256$. A security parameter l_s is such that for any value a , its sum with a random $|a| + l_s$ -bit number $a + r_a$ and this random number r_a are indistinguishable. Article [16] suggests to use $l_s = 80$, since this value is large enough to ignore the off chance that $|a + r| > |a| + l_s$.

9.3 Syntax

An e-voting system Π is a quintuple of algorithms and protocols $\langle \mathbf{Setup}, \mathbf{Register}, \mathbf{Cast}, \mathbf{Tally}, \mathbf{Result}, \mathbf{Verify} \rangle$ specified as follows:

- (1) **Setup**: The algorithm $\mathbf{Setup}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V}, \mathcal{U})$ is executed by the EA and T . During the setup phase EA generates Π 's public parameters $PubEA$ (which include $P, V, U, pkey, snPkey, params$), where $params$ are public election data, $pkey$ is the public key for encrypting votes and $snPkey$ is the public key that is used during the registration process for obtaining a blind signature. EA posts $PubEA$ on BB. Also, EA the voters' secrets s_1, \dots, s_n , that includes a unique salt seed $seed_i$ for AES encryption, a voter's login $login_i$ and password $password_i$ that are used for signing in. EA distributes secrets among all voters. At the same time, T obtains secret keys $skey$ and $snSkey$ for decrypting ballots and signing respectively

and generates pre-election BB data $PubT$ and posts it on BB. We define $Pub = \langle PubEA, PubT \rangle$

- (2) **Register:** The algorithm **Register**($login_i, password_i, id_i$) is executed by each voter. A voter V_i randomly chooses a l_b -bit string x_i as his alias and a blinding factor z_i . He uses x_i, z_i and $snPkey$ to construct the value $p_i = Hash(x_i)Enc(z_i; snPkey)$. The voter sends value p_i to the EA along with his $login_i, password_i$ and proofs of identity id_i .
- (3) **Cast:** The interactive protocol **Cast**($vote_i, x_i$) is executed between three parties, the voter V_i , the BB and the VC. During this interaction, the voter uses VSD to cast an encrypted ballot $b_i = \langle C, \alpha_i, \pi_i, hash_i \rangle$, where $C = Enc(vote_i; r)$, $hash_i$ - HASH of entire ballot, α_i and π_i are non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of eligibility and vote correctness respectively. Upon successful termination, VC posts ballot b_i to BB. The voter V_i receives nothing.
- (4) **Tally:** The interactive protocol **Tally**(Pub) can be executed by anyone due to a homomorphic property of the encryption scheme. The output is an encrypted sum of all valid ballots τ or \perp in case all entries are invalid.
- (5) **Result:** The algorithm **Result**($\tau, sKey$) performs the decryption and outputs the result R_τ of the election and proofs of correct decryption π_τ or returns \perp in case such result is undefined.
- (6) **Verify:** The algorithm **Verify**(b_i) outputs 1 if ballot b_i is valid and 0 otherwise.

9.4 Building blocks

9.4.1 Blind signature

In cryptography digital signature allows one to 'sign' message in such a way that everyone can verify the validity of authentic signatures, but no one can forge (to produce a *new* signature) signatures of new messages. A variation on basic digital signatures, known as blind digital signatures, include the additional requirement that a signer can 'sign' a message without knowing what the document contains. The concept of blind signing was introduced by David Chaum in [17].

The global idea is to form a specially constructed message that hides a secret, obtain a signature for this message and then construct a valid signature for the secret. Suppose Alice wants Bob to sign a value x with his private key $skey = (d, N)$ without learning x . To do so, Alice picks random blinding factor z such that $\gcd(z, N) = 1$ and calculates $p = xz^e \bmod N$. She sends value p to Bob. Bob signs $p^d \bmod N$ and sends it back to Alice. Alice calculates $p^d \bmod Nz^{-1} = x^d \bmod N$ which is a signature for value x . Bob is not able to determine the secret x on his own due to multiplication on unknown blinding factor. Blind signature can not be broken even with a help of a quantum computer.

Public input: $pkey = (e, N)$

Private input: $skey = (d, N)$

Argument to sign:

$p = xz^e \bmod N$

Constructing signature:

$p^d \bmod Nz^{-1} = x^d z z^{-1} \bmod N = x^d \bmod N$

Security:

Security of the blind signature scheme relies on an information assumption and does not rely on a computational one, so it achieves information-theoretic security considered to be cryptanalytically unbreakable. That means that blind signature cannot be broken even if an adversary has unlimited computing power because the adversary simply does not have enough information to break the encryption.

Also, Chaum's blind signature satisfies the blindness property [17] and the non-forgeability [18], [19] of additional signatures, the former means that a signer can not link the blinded message he signs and the original one except with negligible probability, and latter means that after getting l signatures, it is infeasible to compute the $l + 1$ signature.

Informally, unlinkability or blindness can be proven as follows. For any message m there is a unique set of values r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n that produces a set of blinded messages m'_1, m'_2, \dots, m'_n , with $mi_i \equiv mr_i^e$. No set of values r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n is any more probable than any other, hence the signer gets no information whether m corresponds to m'_1 or m'_2 or whether it was one of the values signed at all.

Blind signature schemes can be implemented using a common public key sign-

ing schemes. One of the simplest blind signature schemes is based on RSA signing.

9.4.2 Homomorphic Integer Commitment and Homomorphic Cryptosystem

There are only a few homomorphic integer commitment schemes [20], [21], [22] and they are quite similar in structure. For the blind signature scheme we offer the following variant. We choose a modulus n as a product of two safe primes and random generators g_1, \dots, g_k, h of QR_n . In order to commit to integers m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k using randomness r , we compute $c = \text{com}(m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k; r) = g_1^{m_1} g_2^{m_2} \dots g_k^{m_k} h^r$. The commitment is statistically hiding if the randomness choice is $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{l_r}$.

Root extracting property: When proving soundness and knowledge in our protocols we need a root extraction property, which basically says that if a ciphertext raised to a nontrivial exponent encrypts 1, then the ciphertext itself encrypts 1 [23]. For the homomorphic encryption generalisation of this property can be formalized as follows [16]:

Root extracting property:

If there is a ciphertext C and $e \neq 0$ so $|e| < l_e$ and $C^e = E(M; R)$, then it must be possible to find μ, ρ so $M = e\mu, R = e\rho$ and $C = E(\mu; \rho)$.

ElGamal encryption scheme is an asymmetric key encryption algorithm for public-key cryptography with an implementation of Diffie-Hellman key distribution system that was introduced by Taher Elgamal in 1985 [24]. The security of the scheme relies on the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm over finite fields. ElGamal encryption is semantically secure, has the root extraction property and admit threshold decryption [23].

9.4.3 Proving signature knowledge

Non interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proof of signature knowledge a method by which one party (the prover) can successfully convince another party (the verifier) that the prover knows something without conveying any information apart from that fact.

Suppose we have a signature σ for a hash value over message x $HASH(x)$. Now we want to convince a verifier that we know the signature without revealing value σ . We choose a random variable A and encrypt it using the public key $pkey = (e, N)$. Then we compute a product S of the encrypted value and our signature raised in power of a challenge c . In the non-interactive proofs the challenge c typically equal to the result of a hash function over the concatenation of all publicly known variables and arguments that is used for proving the statement. The NIZK argument is the challenge c and the product S .

Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Argument for proving signature knowledge:

$skey: (d, N)$

$pkey: (e, N)$

We prove the signature knowledge by producing:

$NIZK[(x, \sigma) : \sigma = x^d \bmod N]$

Argument:

$\sigma = HASH(x)^d \bmod N$

Choose random $A \in_R Z_N$

$R = A^e \bmod N$

$c = HASH(x || R)$

$S = A\sigma^c \bmod N$

The argument is: (c, S)

Verify:

$\hat{R} = \frac{S^e}{HASH(x)^c} \bmod N$

$\hat{c} = HASH(x || \hat{R})$

Verify $\hat{c} = c$

Indeed if $\hat{c} = HASH(x || \frac{S^e}{HASH(x)^c} \bmod N) = HASH(x || A^e \bmod N) = HASH(x || R) = c$ then proofs of signature knowledge are valid.

9.4.4 Proving that a ciphertext encrypts 0 or 1

Each voter V_i can vote for as many candidates from the set of all candidates as he likes. The voter specifies his choice by setting $a_j = 1$ if he wishes to vote for can-

didate j and $a_j = 0$ if he does not. The plaintext vote is $VOTE_i = \sum_{j=0}^{m-1} a_j M^j$. The voter encrypts this to get a ciphertext $C = E(\sum_{j=0}^{m-1} a_j M^j; R)$. He now needs to prove that indeed the plaintext is on the right form so $a_j = 0 \vee 1$ for all $j \in [0, m-1]$.

We commit to values a_0, \dots, a_{m-1} . In order to prove that all hidden $a_j \in \{0, 1\}$ we use the fact that $x^2 \geq x$ for any integer and equality holds only for $x = 0$ or $x = 1$. This means that if we want to prove that all a_j 's belong to $\{0, 1\}$ we need to convince verifier that $\Delta = \sum_{j=0}^{m-1} (a_j^2 - a_j) = 0$.

Using hide our variables a_j and Δ using the standard techniques $\boxed{a_j} = ea_j + r_{a_j}$ and $\boxed{\Delta} = e\Delta + r_\Delta$. In the verification, we construct the same value $\boxed{\Delta} = \sum_{j=0}^{m-1} (\boxed{a_j}^2 - e\boxed{a_j})$. The left side of this equation is a degree 1 polynomial in e while the right side is a degree 2 polynomial in e . With overwhelming probability over e this implies that the value we committed to $\Delta = 0$, which is exactly what we needed to prove.

The rest of the NIZK argument are a proof of knowledge of the plaintext V and a proof that this plaintext has been properly constructed with values a_j 's that we committed to.

Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Argument for Correctness of the encrypted vote:

We prove correctness of the vote by producing:

$NIZK[(v, \rho, a_0, \dots, a_{m-1}) : C = Encr(v; \rho) \text{ and } v = \sum_{j=0}^{m-1} a_j M^j \text{ and } \sum_{j=0}^{m-1} (a_j^2 - a_j) = 0]$

Argument:

Choose $r_{a_0}, \dots, r_{a_{m-1}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{1+l_s+l_e}$ and let $\Delta = \sum_{j=0}^{m-1} (2a_j - 1)r_{a_j}$

Choose $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{l_r}$ and set $c = com(a_0, \dots, a_{m-1}, \delta; r)$

Choose $r_r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{l_r+l_s+l_e}$ and set $c_r = com(r_{a_0}, \dots, r_{a_{m-1}}, \sum_{j=0}^{m-1} r_{a_j}^2; r_r)$

$R_v = \sum_{j=0}^{m-1} a_j M^j$, choose $R_R \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{l_R+l_e+l_s}$ and set $C_R = Encr(R_v; R_R)$

Compute a challenge $e \leftarrow hash(C, C_R, c, c_r)$

Set $\boxed{R} = eR + R_R$. Set $\boxed{a_j} = ea_j + r_{a_j}$ and $\boxed{r} = er + r_r$

The argument is: $C_R, c, c_r, \boxed{R}, \boxed{a_0}, \dots, \boxed{a_{m-1}}, \boxed{r}$

Verification:

Compute e as above.

Define $\boxed{V} = \sum_{j=0}^{m-1} \boxed{a_j} M^j$ and

$\boxed{\Delta} = \sum_{j=0}^{m-1} (\boxed{a_j}^2 - e\boxed{a_j})$.

Verify $C^e C_R = Encr(\boxed{V}; \boxed{R})$ and $c^e c_r = com(\boxed{a_0}, \dots, \boxed{a_{m-1}}, \boxed{\Delta}; \boxed{r})$

9.5 System Design

Here is the description of a blind signature e-voting system for r-out-of-m elections, where $0 \leq r \leq m$.

The Blind signature scheme:

Setup ($1^\lambda, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V}, \mathcal{U}$).

Let $(GenBL, EncrB, SignBL)$ be the PPT algorithms that constitute the RSA blind signature scheme, PRG_{str} - a function for pseudo random string generation, PRG_{prime} - a function for pseudo-random prime number generation and $(Gen, Encr, Decr)$ - PPT algorithms for the ELGamal encryption scheme. The EA runs $GenBL(Param, 1^\lambda)$ to generate the blind signature scheme keys (bsk, bpk)

and $Gen(Param, 1^\lambda)$ to generate ELGamal keys (sk, pk) . Public keys bpk, pk and functions $EncrB, Encr, PRG_{str}, PRG_{prime}$ are posted on the BB. Then, for every voter V_l , where $l \in [n]$, EA runs $PRG_{str}(1^\lambda)$ function to generate random string $seed_l$.

Registration

Let $(GenAES, EncrAES, DecrAES)$ be the publicly known PPT algorithms that implements AES encryption scheme and $Hash$ - hash algorithm.

Every voter V_l completes the following procedure:

- uses the published on the BB function $PRG_{str}(1^\lambda)$ to generate his alias x_l and $PRG_{prime}(bpk)$ to generate a blinding factor z_l .
- calculates value $p_l = Hash(x_l)EncrB(z_l)$.
- chooses his secret password $password_l$ and runs $GenAES(password_l, s_l)$ to generate his key for symmetric encryption key_l , where $s_l = PRG_{str}(seed_l)$.
- encrypts x_l and z_l by running $EncrAES(key_l, x_l)$ and $EncrAES(key_l, z_l)$ respectively to get encrypted values \hat{x}_l, \hat{z}_l
- sends $p_l, \hat{x}_l, \hat{z}_l$ to the EA

EA:

Upon receiving $p_l, \hat{x}_l, \hat{z}_l$ from a voter, EA posts all information to the BB.

When registration is closed, EA runs $SignBL(bsk, p_l)$ for every entry in the BB and post the result in the corresponding line as p_l^{sign} .

Cast:

Let $e_l = (e_{1l}, e_{2l}, \dots, e_{ml})$ be the characteristic vector corresponding to the voter's selection, where $e_{j_l} = 1$ if the option opt_j is selected by the voter V_l .

Every voter V_l completes the following procedure:

- gets all information from the BB - $\{p_l, \hat{x}_l, \hat{z}_l\}$.
- finds his entry and decrypts x_l and z_l by running $DecrAES(key_l, \hat{x}_l)$ and $DecrAES(key_l, \hat{z}_l)$ respectively, where $key_l = GenAES(password_l, s_l)$ and $s_l = PRG_{str}(seed_l)$
- computes σ_l - signature for x_l by calculating $p_l^{signed} z_l^{-1}$
- computes Π_l – NIZK proof of signature knowledge .
- chooses his vote-option e_{j_l} and writes the corresponding characteristic vector e_l
- for $j \in [m]$ compute $c_{j_l} = Encr(pk, e_{j_l})$
- computes NIZK proofs π_{j_l} that each c_{j_l} is an encryption of 1 or 0.
- sends $b_l = (x_l, \sigma_l, \Pi_l, c_l, \pi_l)$ to the EA.

- keeps x_l as receipt.
- If EA accept b_l , protocol terminates successfully.
- *Optional: every voter can export the randomness to check that the ballot was cast as intended.

Upon receiving $(x_l, \sigma_l, \Pi_l, c_l, \pi_l)$ from a voter, EA checks NIZK proofs and, if it's valid, accepts the ballot and posts all information to the BB.

Tally:

After election is closed, EA computes \mathcal{C} – the sum of all c_l and runs $Decr(sk, \mathcal{C})$ to decrypt Tally τ . EA posts the τ along with the proof of tally correctness *Proof*.

Result:

result is straightforward.

Verify:

The algorithm returns 1 only if the following checks are true:

- exported randomness is correct or voter choose not to check.
- there is ballot with x_l
- all Π_l, π_l are valid
- number of ballots less or equal to the number of registered voters
- *Proof* is correct
- sum of all scores at τ are less than or equal to ballot numbers

9.6 E2E Verifiability

In the E2E verifiability proof, only BB is assumed to be honest. The rest components of the election server are controlled by the adversary and its is allowed to change the content on the BB arbitrarily before the **Result** protocol starts. However, we can assume that validity of all NIZK proofs on the BB can be checked by anyone as well as the result of the **Tally** protocol execution, since *Tally* is computed homomorphically and this computation doesn't require any secret information. To prove that the blind signature scheme is E2E verifiable, we first construct a vote extractor \mathcal{E} :

\mathcal{E} has input τ and the set of receipts $\{x_l\}_{V_l \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}}$ where $\tilde{\mathcal{V}}$ is the set of the honest

voters that voted successfully. If $Result(\tau) = \perp$ (i.e., the transcript is not meaningful), then \mathcal{E} outputs \perp . Otherwise, \mathcal{E} (arbitrarily) arranges the voters in $\mathcal{V} \setminus \tilde{\mathcal{V}}$ and the tags not included in $\{x_l\}_{V_l \in \tilde{\mathcal{V}}}$ as $\langle V_l^\mathcal{E} \rangle_{l \in [n - |\tilde{\mathcal{V}}|]}$ and $\langle tag_l^\mathcal{E} \rangle_{l \in [n - |\tilde{\mathcal{V}}|]}$ respectively. Next, for every $l \in [n - |\tilde{\mathcal{V}}|]$:

- (1) \mathcal{E} finds at the BB entry with $x_l = tag_l^\mathcal{E}$ and brute-force the corresponding ELGamal cipher to open the selected candidate $\mathcal{P}_l^\mathcal{E}$. If $\mathcal{P}_l^\mathcal{E}$ is the valid candidate's selection, then \mathcal{E} sets $\mathcal{U}_l^\mathcal{E} = \{\mathcal{P}_l^\mathcal{E}\}$. Otherwise it inputs \perp .

Finally \mathcal{E} outputs $\langle \mathcal{U}_l^\mathcal{E} \rangle_{V_l \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \tilde{\mathcal{V}}}$ Finally \mathcal{E} outputs $\langle \mathcal{U}_l^\mathcal{E} \rangle_{V_l \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \tilde{\mathcal{V}}}$

According to the definition of E2E verifiability, an adversary \mathcal{A} wins the game $G_{\text{e2e-ver}}^{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}, d, \theta}(1^\lambda, n, m, t)$ and breaks E2E verifiability if it allows at least θ honest voters to cast their votes successfully and achieves tally deviation d .

All NIZK proofs are perfectly sound and the **Tally** protocol is completely transparent and can be repeated and checked by anyone.

Modification attack - we need a hash of the whole ballot and ballot id as receipt to prevent malicious EA from cheating. \mathcal{A} may attempt to decrypt a single vote, learn x , create a signature and compute a perfectly valid vote for another candidate.

However EA can use abstain voters to create additional ballots and cause deviation. It can use $y_{reg} - y_{voted} - 1$ additional votes. Abstain voter can not prove anything since he doesn't know whether he is the only one who abstains or not. However, if every registered voter is assigned a specific entry in BB he can detect that someone (EA) voted on his behalf. On the other hand, assigning every voter ballot id makes this system linkable. Tradeoff: either EA should be able to link an individual voter with his ballot or EA can vote on behalf of abstain voters and no-one would detect it as long as number of additional ballots strictly less than the number of abstain voters.

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