

# System Security - Attack and Defense for Binaries



CS 4390/5390, Spring 2026


Instructor: MD Armanuzzaman (*Arman*)

# Agenda

- Background knowledge
  - Compiler, linker, loader
  - x86 and x86-64 architectures and ISA
  - Linux fundamentals
    - Linux file permissions
    - Set-UID programs
    - Memory map of a Linux process
    - System calls
    - Environment and Shell variables
    - ELF files
    - Reverse engineering tools

# Background Knowledge: Compiler, linker, and loader

# From a C program to a process



# A Shell in a Nutshell

```
int pid = fork();

if (pid == 0) {
    // I am the child process

    exec("ls");
}

else if (pid == -1) {
    // fork failed
}

else {
    // I am the parent; continue my business being a cool program

    // I could wait for the child to finish if I want
}
```

# Loading and Executing a Binary Program on Linux

Validation (permissions, memory requirements etc.)

Operating system starts by setting up a new process for the program to run in, including a virtual address space.

The operating system maps an interpreter into the process's virtual memory.

# Interpreter, e.g., `/lib/ld-linux.so` in Linux

The interpreter loads the binary into its virtual address space (the same space in which the interpreter is loaded).

It then parses the binary to find out (among other things) which dynamic libraries the binary uses.

The interpreter maps these into the virtual address space (using `mmap` or an equivalent function) and then performs any necessary last-minute relocations in the binary's code sections to fill in the correct addresses for references to the dynamic libraries.

1. Copying the command-line arguments on the stack
2. Initializing registers (e.g., the stack pointer)
3. Jumping to the program entry point (`_start`)

# Compiling a C program behind the scene (add\_32 add\_64)

add.c

```
#include "add.h"
#define BASE 50

int add(int a, int b)
{ return a + b + BASE;}
```

add.h

```
#ifndef ADD_H
#define ADD_H

int add(int, int);

#endif
```

```
gcc -Wall -save-temps -P -m32 -O2 add.c main.c -o add_32
```

```
gcc -Wall -save-temps -P -O2 add.c main.c -o add_64
```

main.c

```
/* This program has an integer overflow vulnerability. */
#include "add.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#define USAGE "Add two integers with 50. Usage: add a b\n"

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int a = 0;
    int b = 0;

    if (argc != 3)
    {
        printf(USAGE);
        return 0; }
    a = atoi(argv[1]);
    b = atoi(argv[2]);
    printf("%d + %d + 50 = %d\n", a, b, add(a, b));
}
```



# Background Knowledge: x86 architecture

# Data Types

There are 5 integer data types:

**Byte** – 8 bits.

**Word** – 16 bits.

**Dword, Doubleword** – 32 bits.

**Quadword** – 64 bits.

**Double quadword** – 128 bits.

# Endianness

- Little Endian (Intel, ARM)

Least significant byte has lowest address

Dword address: 0x0

Value: 0x78563412

- Big Endian

Least significant byte has highest address

Dword address: 0x0

Value: 0x12345678


Address 0	0x12
Address 1	0x34
Address 2	0x56
Address 3	0x78

# Base Registers

There are


- Eight 32-bit “general-purpose” registers,
- One 32-bit EFLAGS register,
- One 32-bit instruction pointer register (eip), and
- Other special-purpose registers.

# The General-Purpose Registers



- 8 general-purpose registers
- **esp** is the stack pointer
- **ebp** is the base pointer
- **esi** and **edi** are source and destination index registers for array and string operations

# The General-Purpose Registers



- The registers `eax`, `ebx`, `ecx`, and `edx` may be accessed as 32-bit, 16-bit, or 8-bit registers.
- The other four registers can be accessed as 32-bit or 16-bit.

# EFLAGS Register

The various bits of the 32-bit EFLAGS register are set (1) or reset/clear (0) according to the results of certain operations.

We will be interested in, at most, the bits

CF – carry flag

PF – parity flag

ZF – zero flag

SF – sign flag


# Instruction Pointer (EIP)

Finally, there is the **EIP** register, which is the instruction pointer (program counter).

Register **EIP** holds the address of the **next** instruction to be executed.



# Registers on x86 and amd64



# Instructions

Each instruction is of the form

label: mnemonic operand1, operand2, operand3

The label is optional.

The number of operands is 0, 1, 2, or 3, depending on the mnemonic.

Each operand is either

- An immediate value,
- A register, or
- A memory address.

# Source and Destination Operands

Each operand is either a source operand or a destination operand.

A source operand, in general, may be

- An immediate value,
- A register, or
- A memory address.

A destination operand, in general, may be

- A register, or
- A memory address.

# Instructions

**hlt** – 0 operands

halts the central processing unit (CPU) until the next external interrupt is fired

**inc** – 1 operand; inc <reg>, inc <mem>

**add** – 2 operands; add <reg>, <reg>

**imul** – 1, 2, or 3 operands; imul <reg32>, <reg32>, <con>

**In Intel syntax the first operand is the destination**

# Intel Syntax Assembly and Disassembly

Machine instructions generally fall into three categories: **data movement**, **arithmetic/logic**, and **control-flow**.

<reg32> Any 32-bit register (eax, ebx, ecx, edx, esi, edi, esp, or ebp)

<reg16> Any 16-bit register (ax, bx, cx, or dx)

<reg8> Any 8-bit register (ah, bh, ch, dh, al, bl, cl, or dl)

<reg> Any register

<mem> A memory address (e.g., [eax] or [eax + ebx\*4]); [] square brackets

<con32> Any 32-bit immediate

<con16> Any 16-bit immediate

<con8> Any 8-bit immediate

<con> Any 8-, 16-, or 32-bit immediate

# Addressing Memory

Move from **source** (operand 2) to **destination** (operand 1)

Square bracket `[]` represents memory location.

`mov [eax], ebx` Copy 4 bytes from register EBX into memory address specified in EAX.

`mov eax, [esi - 4]` Move 4 bytes at memory address ESI - 4 into EAX.

`mov [esi + eax * 1], cl` Move the contents of CL into the byte at address ESI+EAX\*1.

`mov edx, [esi + ebx*4]` Move the 4 bytes of data at address ESI+4\*EBX into EDX.

# Addressing Memory

The size directives BYTE PTR, WORD PTR, and DWORD PTR serve this purpose, indicating sizes of 1, 2, and 4 bytes respectively.

`mov [ebx], 2` isn't this ambiguous? We can have a default.

`mov BYTE PTR [ebx], 2` Move 2 into the single byte at the address stored in EBX.

`mov WORD PTR [ebx], 2` Move the 16-bit integer representation of 2 into the 2 bytes starting at the address in EBX.

`mov DWORD PTR [ebx], 2` Move the 32-bit integer representation of 2 into the 4 bytes starting at the address in EBX.

# Data Movement Instructions

**mov** — Move

Syntax

`mov <reg>, <reg>`

`mov <reg>, <mem>`

`mov <mem>, <reg>`

`mov <reg>, <con>`

`mov <mem>, <con>`

Examples

`mov eax, ebx` — copy the value in EBX into EAX

`mov byte ptr [var], 5` — store the value 5 into the byte at location var



# Data Movement Instructions

**push** — Push on stack; decrements ESP by 4, then places the operand at the location ESP points to.

Syntax

push <reg32>

push <mem>

push <con32>

Examples

**push eax** — push eax on the stack

**push [var]** — push the 4 bytes at address var onto the stack

# Data Movement Instructions

**pop** — Pop from stack

Syntax

`pop <reg32>`

`pop <mem>`

Examples

**pop edi** — pop the top element of the stack into EDI.

**push [var]** — pop the top element of the stack into memory at the four bytes starting at location EBX.

# LEA Instructions

**lea** — Load effective address; used for quick calculation

Syntax

`lea <reg32>, <mem>`

Examples

**Lea edi, [ebx+4\*esi]** — the quantity  $EBX+4*ESI$  is placed in EDI.

# Arithmetic and Logic Instructions

**add eax, 10** — EAX is set to  $EAX + 10$

**addb byte ptr [eax], 10** — add 10 to the single byte stored at memory address stored in EAX

**sub al, ah** — AL is set to  $AL - AH$

**sub eax, 216** — subtract 216 from the value stored in EAX

**dec eax** — subtract one from the contents of EAX

**imul eax, [ebx]** — multiply the contents of EAX by the 32-bit contents of the memory at location EBX. Store the result in EAX.

**shr ebx, cl** — Store in EBX the floor of result of dividing the value of EBX by  $2^n$  where n is the value in CL.

# Control Flow Instructions

## **jmp** — Jump

Transfers program control flow to the instruction at the memory location indicated by the operand.

### Syntax

`jmp <label> # direct jump`

`jmp <reg32> # indirect jump`

### Examples

`jmp begin` — Jump to the instruction labeled begin.

# Control Flow Instructions

## **jcondition** — Conditional jump

### Syntax

`je <label>` (jump when equal)

`jne <label>` (jump when not equal)

`jz <label>` (jump when last result was zero)

`jg <label>` (jump when greater than)

`jge <label>` (jump when greater than or equal to)

`jl <label>` (jump when less than)

`jle <label>` (jump when less than or equal to)

### Examples

```
cmp ebx, eax
```

```
jle done
```

# Control Flow Instructions

**cmp** — Compare

Syntax

```
cmp <reg>, <reg>
```

```
cmp <mem>, <reg>
```

```
cmp <reg>, <mem>
```

```
cmp <con>, <reg>
```

Examples

```
cmp byte ptr [ebx], 10
```

```
jeq loop
```

If the byte stored at the memory location in EBX is equal to the integer constant 10, jump to the location labeled loop.

# Control Flow Instructions

## call — Subroutine call

The call instruction first **pushes the current code location onto the hardware supported stack** in memory, and then performs an **unconditional jump to the code** location indicated by the label operand. *Unlike the simple jump instructions, the call instruction saves the location to return to when the subroutine completes.*

## Syntax

call <label>

call <reg32>

call <mem>



# Control Flow Instructions

**ret** — Subroutine return

The `ret` instruction implements a subroutine return mechanism. This instruction pops a code location off the hardware supported in-memory stack to the program counter.

Syntax

`ret`

# The Run-time Stack

The run-time stack supports procedure calls and the passing of parameters between procedures.

The stack is located in memory.

The stack grows towards **low memory**.

When we **push** a value, **esp** is decremented.

When we **pop** a value, **esp** is incremented.

# Stack Instructions

**enter** — Create a function frame

Equivalent to:

**push ebp**

**mov ebp, esp**

**sub esp, Imm**

# Stack Instructions

**leave** — Releases the function frame set up by an earlier ENTER instruction.


Equivalent to:

```
mov esp, ebp
```

```
pop ebp
```

# Background Knowledge: x86-64/amd64 architecture

# Registers on x86 and amd64



<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X86>

# x86 vs. x86-64 (code/ladd)

main.c

```
/*
This program has an integer overflow vulnerability.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
long long ladd(long long *xp, long long y)
{
    long long t = *xp + y;
    return t;
}
```

```
gcc -Wall -m32 -O2 main.c -o ladd
```

```
gcc -Wall -O2 main.c -o ladd64
```

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    long long a = 0;
    long long b = 0;

    if (argc != 3)
    {
        printf("Usage: ladd a b\n");
        return 0;
    }
    printf("The sizeof(long long) is %d\n", sizeof(long long));
    a = atoll(argv[1]);
    b = atoll(argv[2]);
    printf("%lld + %lld = %lld\n", a, b, ladd(&a, b));
}
```

# x86 vs. x86-64 (code/ladd)

## x86

```
000012c0 <ladd>:  
12c0: f3 0f 1e fb      endbr32  
12c4: 8b 44 24 04      mov 0x4(%esp),%eax  
12c8: 8b 50 04         mov 0x4(%eax),%edx  
12cb: 8b 00           mov (%eax),%eax  
12cd: 03 44 24 08      add 0x8(%esp),%eax  
12d1: 13 54 24 0c      adc 0xc(%esp),%edx  
12d5: c3              ret
```

## x86-64


```
00000000001220 <ladd>:  
1220: f3 0f 1e fa      endbr64  
1224: 48 8b 07         mov rax,QWORD PTR [rdi]  
1227: 48 01 f0         add rax,rsi  
122a: c3              ret
```

```
objdump -M intel -d ladd_32  
objdump -M intel -d ladd_64
```




# Background Knowledge: ARM Cortex-A/M Architecture

# Cortex-A 64 bit



# Cortex-M 32 bit



# Background Knowledge: Linux File Permissions

# Permission Groups

Each file and directory has three user-based permission groups:

**Owner** – A user is the owner of the file. By default, the person who created a file becomes its owner. The Owner permissions apply only the owner of the file or directory

**Group** – A group can contain multiple users. All users belonging to a group will have the same access permissions to the file. The Group permissions apply only to the group that has been assigned to the file or directory

**Others** – The others permissions apply to all other users on the system.

# Permission Types

Each file or directory has three basic permission types defined for all the 3 user types:

**Read** – The Read permission refers to a user's capability to read the contents of the file.

**Write** – The Write permissions refer to a user's capability to write or modify a file or directory.

**Execute** – The Execute permission affects a user's capability to execute a file or view the contents of a directory.

# File type

First field in the output is file type. If there is a **-** it means it is a plain file. If there is **d** it means it is a directory, **c** represents a character device, **b** represents a block device.

```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -l
total 80
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1401 Jan 13 18:09 auth.py
drwxrwxr-x 15 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 challenges
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 conf
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 264 Jan 14 02:18 config.env
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 containers
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd_plugin
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 2526 Jan 17 23:24 docker-compose.yml
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 771 Jan 13 18:09 enter.py
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 home_daemon
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 3074 Jan 13 18:10 README.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 3003 Jan 13 18:31 resetup.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1373 Jan 13 18:09 restart.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1211 Jan 14 02:07 run.sh
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 scripts
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 1986 Jan 13 18:09 script.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 2996 Jan 14 01:40 setup.sh
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 7196 Jan 13 18:09 tips.md
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 0 Jan 13 18:09 todo-list.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 830 Jan 13 18:09 update.sh
```

# Permissions for owner, group, and others

```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -l
total 80
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1401 Jan 13 18:09 auth.py
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```



# Link count

```
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```

# Owner

This field provide info about the creator of the file.

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```

# Last modify time

```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -l
total 80
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1401 Jan 13 18:09 auth.py
drwxrwxr-x 15 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 challenges
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 conf
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 264 Jan 14 02:18 config.env
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 containers
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd_plugin
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 2526 Jan 17 23:24 docker-compose.yml
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 771 Jan 13 18:09 enter.py
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 home_daemon
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 3074 Jan 13 18:10 README.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 3003 Jan 13 18:31 resetup.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1373 Jan 13 18:09 restart.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1211 Jan 14 02:07 run.sh
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 scripts
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 1986 Jan 13 18:09 script.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 2996 Jan 14 01:40 setup.sh
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 7196 Jan 13 18:09 tips.md
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 0 Jan 13 18:09 todo-list.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 830 Jan 13 18:09 update.sh
```




# filename

```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -l
total 80
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1401 Jan 13 18:09 auth.py
drwxrwxr-x 15 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 challenges
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 conf
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 264 Jan 14 02:18 config.env
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 containers
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTfd
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTfd_plugin
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 2526 Jan 17 23:24 docker-compose.yml
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 771 Jan 13 18:09 enter.py
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 home_daemon
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 3074 Jan 13 18:10 README.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 3003 Jan 13 18:31 resetup.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1373 Jan 13 18:09 restart.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1211 Jan 14 02:07 run.sh
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 scripts
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 1986 Jan 13 18:09 script.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 2996 Jan 14 01:40 setup.sh
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 7196 Jan 13 18:09 tips.md
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 0 Jan 13 18:09 todo-list.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 830 Jan 13 18:09 update.sh
```

# Background Knowledge: Set-UID Programs

# From a C program to a process





# Real UID, Effective UID, and Saved UID

Each Linux/Unix process has 3 UIDs associated with it.

**Real UID (RUID):** This is the UID of the user/process that created THIS process. It can be changed only if the running process has EUID=0.

**Effective UID (EUID):** This UID is used to evaluate privileges of the process to perform a particular action. EUID can be changed either to RUID, or SUID if EUID!=0. If EUID=0, it can be changed to anything.

**Saved UID (SUID):** If the binary image file, that was launched has a Set-UID bit on, SUID will be the UID of the owner of the file. Otherwise, SUID will be the RUID.

# Set-UID Program

The kernel makes the decision whether a process has the privilege by looking on the **EUID** of the process.

For non Set-UID programs, the effective uid and the real uid are the same. For Set-UID programs, **the effective uid is the owner of the program**, while the real uid is the user of the program.

What will happen is when a setuid binary executes, **the process changes its Effective User ID (EUID) from the default RUID to the owner of this special binary executable file which in this case is - root.**

```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -al --color=always /usr/bin/ | head -n 100
total 407872
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root      36864 Jan 17 23:11 .
drwxr-xr-x 14 root root      4096 Jan 14 22:41 ..
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    55744 Apr  5  2024 [
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root      94 Nov 12 12:15 2to3
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    18744 Mar 19  2025 aa-enabled
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    18744 Mar 19  2025 aa-exec
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    18736 Mar 19  2025 aa-features-abi
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root     1622 Nov 18 11:26 acpidbg
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    16422 Feb 18  2025 add-apt-repository
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    14720 Jun  5  2025 addpart
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root      26 Dec  3 15:01 addr2line -> x86_64-linux-gnu-addr2line
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root     2322 Apr 18  2024 apport-bug
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    13625 Jul  8  2025 apport-cli
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root      10 Jul  8  2025 apport-collect -> apport-bug
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root     3790 Jul  8  2025 apport-unpack
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root   141544 Apr  8  2024 appstreamcli
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root      6 Aug  5 17:14 apropos -> whatis
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    18824 Oct 22  2024 apt
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root      18 Feb 18  2025 apt-add-repository -> add-apt-repository
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root     88544 Oct 22  2024 apt-cache
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    27104 Oct 22  2024 apt-cdrom
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    31120 Oct 22  2024 apt-config
```

```
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    59912 Apr  5  2024 chcon
-rwsr-xr-x  1 root root    72792 May 30  2024 chfn
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    59912 Apr  5  2024 chgrp
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    55816 Apr  5  2024 chmod
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    22912 Jun  5  2025 choom
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    59912 Apr  5  2024 chown
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    31104 Jun  5  2025 chrt
-rwsr-xr-x  1 root root    44760 May 30  2024 chsh
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    14712 Mar 31  2024 chvt
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    27080 Aug  5 17:14 cifsiostat
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root   150674 Feb 26  2024 ckbcomp
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root      227 Aug  5 17:14 ckeygen3
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root   104984 Apr  5  2024 cksum
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    14656 Apr  8  2024 clear
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    14568 Mar 31  2024 clear_console
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root      972 Jun 24  2025 cloud-id
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root      976 Jun 24  2025 cloud-init
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root     2108 Jun 24  2025 cloud-init-per
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    43408 Apr  8  2024 cmp
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    14640 Mar 31  2024 codepage
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root    22920 Aug  5 17:14 col
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root      963 Aug  5 17:14 col1
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root      4 Aug  5 17:14 col2 -> col1
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root      4 Aug  5 17:14 col3 -> col1
```

-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	80408	Apr	5	2024	stty
-rwsr-xr-x	1	root	root	55680	Jun	5	2025	su
-rwsr-xr-x	1	root	root	277936	Jun	25	2025	sudo
lrwxrwxrwx	1	root	root	4	Jun	25	2025	sudoedit -> sudo
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	98256	Jun	25	2025	sudoreplay
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	35240	Apr	5	2024	sum
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	35240	Apr	5	2024	sync
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	1501304	Jul	2	2025	systemctl
lrwxrwxrwx	1	root	root	22	Jul	2	2025	systemd -> ../lib/systemd/systemd
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	14792	Jul	2	2025	systemd-ac-power
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	203624	Jul	2	2025	systemd-analyze
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	19024	Jul	2	2025	systemd-ask-password
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	18896	Jul	2	2025	systemd-cat
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	23112	Jul	2	2025	systemd-cgls
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	39392	Jul	2	2025	systemd-cgtop
lrwxrwxrwx	1	root	root	14	Jul	2	2025	systemd-confext -> systemd-sysext
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	43744	Jul	2	2025	systemd-creds
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	72624	Jul	2	2025	systemd-cryptenroll
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	80840	Jul	2	2025	systemd-cryptsetup
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	27080	Jul	2	2025	systemd-delta
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	18888	Jul	2	2025	systemd-detect-virt
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	22984	Jul	2	2025	systemd-escape
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	60232	Jul	2	2025	systemd-firstboot
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	158456	Jul	2	2025	systemd-hwdb

# Example: rdsecret

main.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    FILE *fp = NULL;
    char buffer[100] = {0};
    // get ruid and euid
    uid_t uid = getuid();
    struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(uid);
    if (pw)
    {
        printf("UID: %d, USER: %s.\n", uid, pw->pw_name);
    }
    uid_t euid = geteuid();
    pw = getpwuid(euid);
```

```
    if (pw)
    {
        printf("EUID: %d, EUSER: %s.\n", euid, pw->pw_name);
    }
    print_flag();

    return(0);
}

void print_flag()
{
    FILE *fp;
    char buff[MAX_FLAG_SIZE];
    fp = fopen("flag", "r");
    fread(buff, MAX_FLAG_SIZE, 1, fp);
    printf("flag is : %s\n", buff);
    fclose(fp);
}
```

Thank you

