

# System Security - Attack and Defense for Binaries

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CS 4390/5390, Spring 2026


Instructor: MD Armanuzzaman (*Arman*)

# Agenda

- Background knowledge
  - Compiler, linker, loader
  - x86 and x86-64 architectures and ISA
  - Linux fundamentals
    - Linux file permissions
    - Set-UID programs
    - Memory map of a Linux process
    - System calls
    - Environment and Shell variables
    - ELF files
    - Reverse engineering tools

# Background Knowledge: Compiler, linker, and loader

# From a C program to a process



# A Shell in a Nutshell

```
int pid = fork();

if (pid == 0) {
    // I am the child process
    exec("ls");
}

else if (pid == -1) {
    // fork failed
}

else {
    // I am the parent; continue my business being a cool program
    // I could wait for the child to finish if I want
}
```

# Loading and Executing a Binary Program on Linux

Validation (permissions, memory requirements etc.)

Operating system starts by setting up a new process for the program to run in, including a virtual address space.

The operating system maps an interpreter into the process's virtual memory.

# Interpreter, e.g., `/lib/ld-linux.so` in Linux

The interpreter loads the binary into its virtual address space (the same space in which the interpreter is loaded).

It then parses the binary to find out (among other things) which dynamic libraries the binary uses.

The interpreter maps these into the virtual address space (using `mmap` or an equivalent function) and then performs any necessary last-minute relocations in the binary's code sections to fill in the correct addresses for references to the dynamic libraries.

1. Copying the command-line arguments on the stack
2. Initializing registers (e.g., the stack pointer)
3. Jumping to the program entry point (`_start`)

# Compiling a C program behind the scene (add\_32 add\_64)

add.c

```
#include "add.h"
#define BASE 50

int add(int a, int b)
{ return a + b + BASE;}
```

add.h

```
#ifndef ADD_H
#define ADD_H

int add(int, int);

#endif
```

```
gcc -Wall -fno-stack-protector -m32 -O2 add.c main.c -o add_32
```

```
gcc -Wall -fno-stack-protector -m64 -O2 add.c main.c -o add_64
```

main.c

```
/* This program has an integer overflow vulnerability. */
#include "add.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#define USAGE "Add two integers with 50. Usage: add a b\n"

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int a = 0;
    int b = 0;

    if (argc != 3)
    {
        printf(USAGE);
        return 0; }

    a = atoi(argv[1]);
    b = atoi(argv[2]);
    printf("%d + %d + 50 = %d\n", a, b, add(a, b));
}
```

# Background Knowledge: x86 architecture

# Data Types

There are 5 integer data types:

**Byte** – 8 bits.

**Word** – 16 bits.

**Dword, Doubleword** – 32 bits.

**Quadword** – 64 bits.

**Double quadword** – 128 bits.

# Endianness

- Little Endian (Intel, ARM)

Least significant byte has lowest address

Dword address: 0x0

Value: 0x78563412

- Big Endian

Least significant byte has highest address

Dword address: 0x0

Value: 0x12345678


Address 0	0x12
Address 1	0x34
Address 2	0x56
Address 3	0x78

# Base Registers

There are


- Eight 32-bit “general-purpose” registers,
- One 32-bit EFLAGS register,
- One 32-bit instruction pointer register (eip), and
- Other special-purpose registers.

# The General-Purpose Registers



- 8 general-purpose registers
- **esp** is the stack pointer
- **ebp** is the base pointer
- **esi** and **edi** are source and destination index registers for array and string operations

# The General-Purpose Registers



- The registers **eax**, **ebx**, **ecx**, and **edx** may be accessed as 32-bit, 16-bit, or 8-bit registers.
- The other four registers can be accessed as 32-bit or 16-bit.

# EFLAGS Register

The various bits of the 32-bit EFLAGS register are set (1) or reset/clear (0) according to the results of certain operations.

We will be interested in, at most, the bits

**CF** – carry flag

**PF** – parity flag

**ZF** – zero flag

**SF** – sign flag

# Instruction Pointer (EIP)

Finally, there is the **EIP** register, which is the instruction pointer (program counter).

Register **EIP** holds the address of the **next** instruction to be executed.

# Registers on x86 and amd64

ZMM0	YMM0	XMM0	ZMM1	YMM1	XMM1	ST(0)	MM0	ST(1)	MM1	AL	AH	AX	EAX	RAX	R8B	R8W	R8D	R8	R12B	R12W	R12D	R12	MSW	CR0	CR4
ZMM2	YMM2	XMM2	ZMM3	YMM3	XMM3	ST(2)	MM2	ST(3)	MM3	BL	BH	BX	EBX	RBX	R9B	R9W	R9D	R9	R13B	R13W	R13D	R13	CR1	CR5	
ZMM4	YMM4	XMM4	ZMM5	YMM5	XMM5	ST(4)	MM4	ST(5)	MM5	CL	CH	CX	ECX	RCX	R10B	R10W	R10D	R10	R14B	R14W	R14D	R14	CR2	CR6	
ZMM6	YMM6	XMM6	ZMM7	YMM7	XMM7	ST(6)	MM6	ST(7)	MM7	DL	DH	DX	EDX	RDX	R11B	R11W	R11D	R11	R15B	R15W	R15D	R15	CR3	CR7	
ZMM8	YMM8	XMM8	ZMM9	YMM9	XMM9					BPL	BP	EBP	RBP		DIL	DI	EDI	RDI		IP	EIP	RIP	MXCSR	CR8	
ZMM10	YMM10	XMM10	ZMM11	YMM11	XMM11	CW	FP_IP	FP_DP	FP_CS	SIL	SI	ESI	RSI		SPL	SP	ESP	RSP					CR9		
ZMM12	YMM12	XMM12	ZMM13	YMM13	XMM13	TW																	CR10		
ZMM14	YMM14	XMM14	ZMM15	YMM15	XMM15	FP_DS																	CR11		
ZMM16	ZMM17	ZMM18	ZMM19	ZMM20	ZMM21	ZMM22	ZMM23	FP_OPC	FP_DP	FP_IP	CS	SS	DS		GDTR	IDTR		DR0	DR6			CR12			
ZMM24	ZMM25	ZMM26	ZMM27	ZMM28	ZMM29	ZMM30	ZMM31				ES	FS	GS		TR	LDTR		DR1	DR7			CR13			
											FLAGS	EFLAGS		RFLAGS				DR2	DR8			CR14			
																		DR3	DR9			CR15			
																		DR4	DR10	DR12	DR14				
																		DR5	DR11	DR13	DR15				

# Instructions

Each instruction is of the form

label: mnemonic operand1, operand2, operand3

The label is optional.

The number of operands is 0, 1, 2, or 3, depending on the mnemonic .

Each operand is either

- An immediate value,
- A register, or
- A memory address.

# Source and Destination Operands

Each operand is either a source operand or a destination operand.

A source operand, in general, may be

- An immediate value,
- A register, or
- A memory address.

A destination operand, in general, may be

- A register, or
- A memory address.

# Instructions

**hlt** - 0 operands

halts the central processing unit (CPU) until the next external interrupt is fired

**inc** - 1 operand; inc <reg>, inc <mem>

**add** - 2 operands; add <reg>,<reg>

**imul** - 1, 2, or 3 operands; imul <reg32>,<reg32>,<con>

**In Intel syntax the first operand is the destination**

# Intel Syntax Assembly and Disassembly

Machine instructions generally fall into three categories: **data movement**, **arithmetic/logic**, and **control-flow**.

<reg32> Any 32-bit register (eax, ebx, ecx, edx, esi, edi, esp, or ebp)

<reg16> Any 16-bit register (ax, bx, cx, or dx)

<reg8> Any 8-bit register (ah, bh, ch, dh, al, bl, cl, or dl)

<reg> Any register

<mem> A memory address (e.g., [eax] or [eax + ebx\*4]); [] square brackets

<con32> Any 32-bit immediate

<con16> Any 16-bit immediate

<con8> Any 8-bit immediate

<con> Any 8-, 16-, or 32-bit immediate

# Addressing Memory

Move from **source** (operand 2) to **destination** (operand 1)

Square bracket [] represents memory location.

**mov [eax], ebx** Copy 4 bytes from register EBX into memory address specified in EAX.

**mov eax, [esi - 4]** Move 4 bytes at memory address ESI - 4 into EAX.

**mov [esi + eax \* 1], cl** Move the contents of CL into the byte at address ESI+EAX\*1.

**mov edx, [esi + ebx\*4]** Move the 4 bytes of data at address ESI+4\*EBX into EDX.

# Addressing Memory

The size directives **BYTE PTR**, **WORD PTR**, and **DWORD PTR** serve this purpose, indicating sizes of 1, 2, and 4 bytes respectively.

**mov [ebx], 2** isn't this ambiguous? We can have a default.

**mov BYTE PTR [ebx], 2** Move 2 into the single byte at the address stored in EBX.

**mov WORD PTR [ebx], 2** Move the 16-bit integer representation of 2 into the 2 bytes starting at the address in EBX.

**mov DWORD PTR [ebx], 2** Move the 32-bit integer representation of 2 into the 4 bytes starting at the address in EBX.

# Data Movement Instructions

**mov** – Move

Syntax

mov <reg>, <reg>

mov <reg>, <mem>

mov <mem>, <reg>

mov <reg>, <con>

mov <mem>, <con>

Examples

mov eax, ebx – copy the value in EBX into EAX

mov byte ptr [var], 5 – store the value 5 into the byte at location var

# Data Movement Instructions

**push** – Push on stack; decrements ESP by 4, then places the operand at the location ESP points to.

## Syntax

push <reg32>

push <mem>

push <con32>

## Examples

**push eax** – push eax on the stack

**push [var]** – push the 4 bytes at address var onto the stack

# Data Movement Instructions

**pop** – Pop from stack

Syntax

`pop <reg32>`

`pop <mem>`

Examples

`pop edi` – pop the top element of the stack into EDI.

`push [var]` – pop the top element of the stack into memory at the four bytes starting at location EBX.

# LEA Instructions

**lea** – Load effective address; used for quick calculation

Syntax

```
lea <reg32>, <mem>
```

Examples

**Lea edi, [ebx+4\*esi]** – the quantity EBX+4\*ESI is placed in EDI.

# Arithmetic and Logic Instructions

**add eax, 10** – EAX is set to EAX + 10

**addb byte ptr [eax], 10** – add 10 to the single byte stored at memory address stored in EAX

**sub al, ah** – AL is set to AL - AH

**sub eax, 216** – subtract 216 from the value stored in EAX

**dec eax** – subtract one from the contents of EAX

**imul eax, [ebx]** – multiply the contents of EAX by the 32-bit contents of the memory at location EBX. Store the result in EAX.

**shr ebx, cl** – Store in EBX the floor of result of dividing the value of EBX by  $2^n$  where n is the value in CL.

# Control Flow Instructions

## **jmp** – Jump

Transfers program control flow to the instruction at the memory location indicated by the operand.

### Syntax

`jmp <label>` # direct jump

`jmp <reg32>` # indirect jump

### Examples

**jmp begin** – Jump to the instruction labeled begin.

# Control Flow Instructions

**jcondition** – Conditional jump

Syntax

je <label> (jump when equal)

jne <label> (jump when not equal)

jz <label> (jump when last result was zero)

jg <label> (jump when greater than)

jge <label> (jump when greater than or equal to)

jl <label> (jump when less than)

jle <label> (jump when less than or equal to)

Examples

**cmp ebx, eax**

**jle done**

# Control Flow Instructions

**cmp** – Compare

Syntax

**cmp <reg>, <reg>**

**cmp <mem>, <reg>**

**cmp <reg>, <mem>**

**cmp <con>, <reg>**

Examples

**cmp byte ptr [ebx], 10**

**jeq loop**

If the byte stored at the memory location in EBX is equal to the integer constant 10, jump to the location labeled loop.

# Control Flow Instructions

## call – Subroutine call

The call instruction first **pushes the current code location onto the hardware supported stack** in memory, and then performs an **unconditional jump** to the code location indicated by the label operand. *Unlike the simple jump instructions, the call instruction saves the location to return to when the subroutine completes.*

## Syntax

call <label>

call <reg32>

call <mem>

# Control Flow Instructions

**ret** – Subroutine return

The ret instruction implements a subroutine return mechanism. This instruction pops a code location off the hardware supported in-memory stack to the program counter.

Syntax

```
ret
```

# The Run-time Stack

The run-time stack supports procedure calls and the passing of parameters between procedures.

The stack is located in memory.

The stack grows towards **low memory**.

When we **push** a value, **esp** is decremented.

When we **pop** a value, **esp** is incremented.

# Stack Instructions

**enter** – Create a function frame

Equivalent to:

**push ebp**

**mov ebp, esp**

**sub esp, Imm**

# Stack Instructions

**leave** – Releases the function frame set up by an earlier ENTER instruction.


Equivalent to:

```
mov esp, ebp
```

```
pop ebp
```

# Background Knowledge: x86-64/amd64 architecture

# Registers on x86 and amd64



# x86 vs. x86-64 (code/ladd)

main.c

```
/*
This program has an integer overflow vulnerability.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
long long ladd(long long *xp, long long y)
{
    long long t = *xp + y;
    return t;
}
```

```
gcc -Wall -m32 -O2 main.c -o ladd
```

```
gcc -Wall -O2 main.c -o ladd64
```

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    long long a = 0;
    long long b = 0;

    if (argc != 3)
    {
        printf("Usage: ladd a b\n");
        return 0;
    }
    printf("The sizeof(long long) is %d\n", sizeof(long long));
    a = atoll(argv[1]);
    b = atoll(argv[2]);
    printf("%lld + %lld = %lld\n", a, b, ladd(&a, b));
}
```

# x86 vs. x86-64 (code/ladd)

x86

```
000012c0 <ladd>:  
12c0: f3 0f 1e fb    endbr32  
12c4: 8b 44 24 04    mov  0x4(%esp),%eax  
12c8: 8b 50 04      mov  0x4(%eax),%edx  
12cb: 8b 00          mov  (%eax),%eax  
12cd: 03 44 24 08    add   0x8(%esp),%eax  
12d1: 13 54 24 0c   adc   0xc(%esp),%edx  
12d5: c3             ret
```

x86-64

```
00000000001220 <ladd>:  
1220: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64  
1224: 48 8b 07 mov rax,QWORD PTR [rdi]  
1227: 48 01 f0 add rax,rsi  
122a: c3 ret
```

```
objdump -M intel -d ladd_32  
objdump -M intel -d ladd_64
```

# Background Knowledge: ARM Cortex-A/M Architecture

# Cortex-A 64 bit

X0/W0				
X1/W1				
X2/W2				
X3/W3				
X4/W4				
X5/W5				
X6/W6				
X7/W7				
X8/W8				
X9/W9				
X10/W10				
X11/W11				
X12/W12				
X13/W13				
X14/W14				
X15/W15				
X16/W16				
X17/W17				
X18/W18				
X19/W19				
X20/W20				
X21/W21				
X22/W22				
X23/W23				
X24/W24				
X25/W25				
X26/W26				
X27/W27				
X28/W28				
X29/W29				
X30/W30				
Frame pointer				
Procedure link register				
EL0, EL1, EL2, EL3				

Special registers

Zero register      XZR/WZR

Program counter    PC


Stack pointer       SP\_EL0      SP\_EL1      SP\_EL2      SP\_EL3

Program Status Register      SPSR\_EL1      SPSR\_EL2      SPSR\_EL3

Exception Link Register      ELR\_EL1      ELR\_EL2      ELR\_EL3

EL0      EL1      EL2      EL3

# Cortex-M 32 bit



# Background Knowledge: Linux File Permissions

# Permission Groups

Each file and directory has three user-based permission groups:

**Owner** – A user is the owner of the file. By default, the person who created a file becomes its owner. The Owner permissions apply only to the owner of the file or directory

**Group** – A group can contain multiple users. All users belonging to a group will have the same access permissions to the file. The Group permissions apply only to the group that has been assigned to the file or directory

**Others** – The Others permissions apply to all other users on the system.

# Permission Types

Each file or directory has three basic permission types defined for all the 3 user types:

**Read** – The Read permission refers to a user's capability to read the contents of the file.

**Write** – The Write permissions refer to a user's capability to write or modify a file or directory.

**Execute** – The Execute permission affects a user's capability to execute a file or view the contents of a directory.

# File type

First field in the output is file type. If there is a **-** it means it is a plain file. If there is **d** it means it is a directory, **c** represents a character device, **b** represents a block device.

```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -l
total 80
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman 1401 Jan 13 18:09 auth.py
drwxrwxr-x 15 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 challenges
drwxrwxr-x  3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 conf
-rw-rw-r--  1 arman arman  264 Jan 14 02:18 config.env
drwxrwxr-x  7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 containers
drwxrwxr-x  7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd
drwxrwxr-x  3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd_plugin
-rw-rw-r--  1 arman arman 2526 Jan 17 23:24 docker-compose.yml
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman  771 Jan 13 18:09 enter.py
drwxrwxr-x  2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 home_daemon
-rw-rw-r--  1 arman arman 3074 Jan 13 18:10 README.md
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman 3003 Jan 13 18:31 resetup.sh
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman 1373 Jan 13 18:09 restart.sh
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman 1211 Jan 14 02:07 run.sh
drwxrwxr-x  2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 scripts
-rw-rw-r--  1 arman arman 1986 Jan 13 18:09 script.sh
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman 2996 Jan 14 01:40 setup.sh
-rw-rw-r--  1 arman arman 7196 Jan 13 18:09 tips.md
-rw-rw-r--  1 arman arman     0 Jan 13 18:09 todo-list.md
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman  830 Jan 13 18:09 update.sh
```

# Permissions for owner, group, and others

```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -l
total 80
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1401 Jan 13 18:09 auth.py
drwxrwxr-x 15 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 challenges
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 conf
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 264 Jan 14 02:18 config.env
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 containers
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd_plugin
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 2526 Jan 17 23:24 docker-compose.yml
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 771 Jan 13 18:09 enter.py
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 home_daemon
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 3074 Jan 13 18:10 README.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 3003 Jan 13 18:31 resetup.sh
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-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1211 Jan 14 02:07 run.sh
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 scripts
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 1986 Jan 13 18:09 script.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 2996 Jan 14 01:40 setup.sh
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 7196 Jan 13 18:09 tips.md
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 0 Jan 13 18:09 todo-list.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 830 Jan 13 18:09 update.sh
```

# Link count

```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -l
total 80
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1401 Jan 13 18:09 auth.py
drwxrwxr-x 15 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 challenges
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 conf
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 264 Jan 14 02:18 config.env
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 containers
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd
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-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 2526 Jan 17 23:24 docker-compose.yml
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-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 0 Jan 13 18:09 todo-list.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 830 Jan 13 18:09 update.sh
```

# Owner

This field provide info about the creator of the file.

```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -l
total 80
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1401 Jan 13 18:09 auth.py
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-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 264 Jan 14 02:18 config.env
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 containers
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd_plugin
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 2526 Jan 17 23:24 docker-compose.yml
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drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 scripts
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 1986 Jan 13 18:09 script.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 2996 Jan 14 01:40 setup.sh
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 7196 Jan 13 18:09 tips.md
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 0 Jan 13 18:09 todo-list.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 830 Jan 13 18:09 update.sh
```

# Group

```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -l
total 80
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1401 Jan 13 18:09 auth.py
drwxrwxr-x 15 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 challenges
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 conf
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 264 Jan 14 02:18 config.env
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 containers
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd_plugin
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 2526 Jan 17 23:24 docker-compose.yml
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 771 Jan 13 18:09 enter.py
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 home_daemon
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 3074 Jan 13 18:10 README.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 3003 Jan 13 18:31 resetup.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1373 Jan 13 18:09 restart.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1211 Jan 14 02:07 run.sh
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 scripts
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 1986 Jan 13 18:09 script.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 2996 Jan 14 01:40 setup.sh
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 7196 Jan 13 18:09 tips.md
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 0 Jan 13 18:09 todo-list.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 830 Jan 13 18:09 update.sh
```

# File size

```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -l
total 80
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1401 Jan 13 18:09 auth.py
drwxrwxr-x 15 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 challenges
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 conf
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 264 Jan 14 02:18 config.env
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 containers
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd_plugin
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 2526 Jan 17 23:24 docker-compose.yml
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 771 Jan 13 18:09 enter.py
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 home_daemon
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 3074 Jan 13 18:10 README.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 3003 Jan 13 18:31 resetup.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1373 Jan 13 18:09 restart.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1211 Jan 14 02:07 run.sh
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 scripts
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 1986 Jan 13 18:09 script.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 2996 Jan 14 01:40 setup.sh
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 7196 Jan 13 18:09 tips.md
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 0 Jan 13 18:09 todo-list.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 830 Jan 13 18:09 update.sh
```

# Last modify time


```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -l
total 80
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1401 Jan 13 18:09 auth.py
drwxrwxr-x 15 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 challenges
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 conf
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 264 Jan 14 02:18 config.env
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 containers
drwxrwxr-x 7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd
drwxrwxr-x 3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd_plugin
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 2526 Jan 17 23:24 docker-compose.yml
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 771 Jan 13 18:09 enter.py
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 home_daemon
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 3074 Jan 13 18:10 README.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 3003 Jan 13 18:31 resetup.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1373 Jan 13 18:09 restart.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 1211 Jan 14 02:07 run.sh
drwxrwxr-x 2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 scripts
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 1986 Jan 13 18:09 script.sh
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 2996 Jan 14 01:40 setup.sh
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 7196 Jan 13 18:09 tips.md
-rw-rw-r-- 1 arman arman 0 Jan 13 18:09 todo-list.md
-rwxrwxr-x 1 arman arman 830 Jan 13 18:09 update.sh
```

# filename

```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -l
total 80
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman 1401 Jan 13 18:09 auth.py
drwxrwxr-x 15 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 challenges
drwxrwxr-x  3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 conf
-rw-rw-r--  1 arman arman  264 Jan 14 02:18 config.env
drwxrwxr-x  7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 containers
drwxrwxr-x  7 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd
drwxrwxr-x  3 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 CTFd_plugin
drwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman 2526 Jan 17 23:24 docker-compose.yml
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman  771 Jan 13 18:09 enter.py
drwxrwxr-x  2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 home_daemon
-rw-rw-r--  1 arman arman 3074 Jan 13 18:10 README.md
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman 3003 Jan 13 18:31 resetup.sh
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman 1373 Jan 13 18:09 restart.sh
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman 1211 Jan 14 02:07 run.sh
drwxrwxr-x  2 arman arman 4096 Jan 13 18:09 scripts
-rw-rw-r--  1 arman arman 1986 Jan 13 18:09 script.sh
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman 2996 Jan 14 01:40 setup.sh
-rw-rw-r--  1 arman arman  7196 Jan 13 18:09 tips.md
-rw-rw-r--  1 arman arman     0 Jan 13 18:09 todo-list.md
-rwxrwxr-x  1 arman arman   830 Jan 13 18:09 update.sh
```

# Background Knowledge: Set-UID Programs

# From a C program to a process



# Real UID, Effective UID, and Saved UID

Each Linux/Unix process has 3 UIDs associated with it.

**Real UID (RUID):** This is the UID of the user/process that created THIS process. It can be changed only if the running process has EUID=0.

**Effective UID (EUID):** This UID is used to evaluate privileges of the process to perform a particular action. EUID can be changed either to RUID, or SUID if EUID!=0. If EUID=0, it can be changed to anything.

**Saved UID (SUID):** If the binary image file, that was launched has a Set-UID bit on, SUID will be the UID of the owner of the file. Otherwise, SUID will be the RUID.

# Set-UID Program

The kernel makes the decision whether a process has the privilege by looking on the **EUID** of the process.

For non Set-UID programs, the effective uid and the real uid are the same. For Set-UID programs, **the effective uid is the owner of the program**, while the real uid is the user of the program.

What will happen is when a setuid binary executes, **the process changes its Effective User ID (EUID) from the default RUID to the owner of this special binary executable file which in this case is - root**.

```
arman@aserver:~/STC/software-security$ ls -al --color=always /usr/bin/ | head -n 100
total 407872
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root      36864 Jan 17 23:11 .
drwxr-xr-x 14 root root     4096 Jan 14 22:41 ..
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root    55744 Apr  5 2024 [REDACTED]
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root     94 Nov 12 12:15 2to3
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root   18744 Mar 19 2025 aa-enabled
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root   18744 Mar 19 2025 aa-exec
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root   18736 Mar 19 2025 aa-features-abi
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root    1622 Nov 18 11:26 acpidbg
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root   16422 Feb 18 2025 add-apt-repository
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root   14720 Jun  5 2025 addpart
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root      26 Dec  3 15:01 addr2line -> x86_64-linux-gnu-addr2line
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root   2322 Apr 18 2024 apport-bug
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root   13625 Jul  8 2025 apport-cli
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root      10 Jul  8 2025 apport-collect -> apport-bug
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root   3790 Jul  8 2025 apport-unpack
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root   141544 Apr  8 2024 appstreamcli
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root      6 Aug  5 17:14 apropos -> whatis
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root   18824 Oct 22 2024 apt
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root      18 Feb 18 2025 apt-add-repository -> add-apt-repository
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root   88544 Oct 22 2024 apt-cache
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root   27104 Oct 22 2024 apt-cdrom
-rw xr-xr-x 1 root root   31120 Oct 22 2024 apt-config
```

-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	59912 Apr  5 2024 chcon
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root	72792 May 30 2024 chfn
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	59912 Apr  5 2024 chgrp
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	55816 Apr  5 2024 chmod
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	22912 Jun  5 2025 choom
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	59912 Apr  5 2024 chown
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	31104 Jun  5 2025 chrt
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root	44760 May 30 2024 chsh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	14712 Mar 31 2024 chvt
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	27080 Aug  5 17:14 cifsistat
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	150674 Feb 26 2024 ckbcomp
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	227 Aug  5 17:14 ckeygen3
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	104984 Apr  5 2024 cksum
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	14656 Apr  8 2024 clear
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	14568 Mar 31 2024 clear_console
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	972 Jun 24 2025 cloud-id
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	976 Jun 24 2025 cloud-init
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	2108 Jun 24 2025 cloud-init-per
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	43408 Apr  8 2024 cmp
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	14640 Mar 31 2024 codepage
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	22920 Aug  5 17:14 col
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root	963 Aug  5 17:14 col1
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root	4 Aug  5 17:14 col2 -> col1
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root	4 Aug  5 17:14 col3 -> col1

-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	80408	Apr	5	2024	stty
-rwsr-xr-x	1	root	root	55680	Jun	5	2025	su
-rwsr-xr-x	1	root	root	277936	Jun	25	2025	sudo
lrwxrwxrwx	1	root	root	4	Jun	25	2025	sudoedit -> sudo
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	98256	Jun	25	2025	sudoreplay
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	35240	Apr	5	2024	sum
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	35240	Apr	5	2024	sync
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	1501304	Jul	2	2025	systemctl
lrwxrwxrwx	1	root	root	22	Jul	2	2025	systemd -> ./lib/systemd/systemd
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	14792	Jul	2	2025	systemd-ac-power
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	203624	Jul	2	2025	systemd-analyze
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	19024	Jul	2	2025	systemd-ask-password
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	18896	Jul	2	2025	systemd-cat
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	23112	Jul	2	2025	systemd-cgls
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	39392	Jul	2	2025	systemd-cgtop
lrwxrwxrwx	1	root	root	14	Jul	2	2025	systemd-confext -> systemd-sysext
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	43744	Jul	2	2025	systemd-creds
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	72624	Jul	2	2025	systemd-cryptenroll
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	80840	Jul	2	2025	systemd-cryptsetup
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	27080	Jul	2	2025	systemd-delta
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	18888	Jul	2	2025	systemd-detect-virt
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	22984	Jul	2	2025	systemd-escape
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	60232	Jul	2	2025	systemd-firstboot
-rwxr-xr-x	1	root	root	158456	Jul	2	2025	systemd-hwdb

# Example: rdsecret

main.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    FILE *fp = NULL;
    char buffer[100] = {0};
    // get ruid and euid
    uid_t uid = getuid();
    struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(uid);
    if (pw)
    {
        printf("UID: %d, USER: %s.\n", uid, pw->pw_name);
    }
    uid_t euid = geteuid();
    pw = getpwuid(euid);
```

```
if (pw)
{
    printf("EUID: %d, EUSER: %s.\n", euid, pw->pw_name);
}
print_flag();

return(0);
}

void print_flag()
{
    FILE *fp;
    char buff[MAX_FLAG_SIZE];
    fp = fopen("flag","r");
    fread(buff, MAX_FLAG_SIZE, 1, fp);
    printf("flag is : %s\n", buff);
    fclose(fp);
}
```

# Reading

1. <https://iq.thc.org/how-does-linux-start-a-process>