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SafeStreets project
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Requirement Analysis and Specification Document

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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this document is to provide a description of the SafeStreets system. A detailed explanation of the proposed solution is given, along with the requirements and assumptions made to achieve it.

SafeStreets is a crowd-sourced application that intends to provide users with the possibility to notify authorities when traffic violations occur, and in particular parking violations. With the amount of traffic we are seeing nowadays, it is hard to maintain order throughout the entire city, so the help of the community is more than welcome.

The application allows users to report violations by sending pictures, along with important information, like the date, time and position.

Examples of violations are vehicles parked in the middle of bike lanes or in places reserved for people with disabilities, double parking, and so on.

The system also allows both end users and authorities to access the information gathered, with different levels of visibility depending on the roles.

With the information provided, it is then possible for the municipality to integrate it with their traffic ticket system and automatically issue the corresponding ticket to a reported offender. This will accelerate the whole process, saving time and money to the state and could eventually result in a decrease in violations.

At the same time, the ticketing system can provide information to SafeStreets, which presents the possibility of building statistics such as the most egregious offenders and analyse the effect of the application by looking at the trend in violations.

1.2 Scope

1.2.1 General purpose

As already mentioned, the SafeStreets system is designed to provide users with the ability to report and get information of reported traffic violations through an application.

Any user with a device capable of running the application can sign up to the system, which enables them to access its functionalities.

In order to submit a report, the user needs to fill a form. In it, they have to enter the license plate number of the vehicle committing the violation, the type of violation and at least one photo of the scene, where the license plate of the vehicle can be easily recognized. This data, along with metadata retrieved from the user's device (geographical position, date and time) is then sent to the system.

The system is responsible for analysing the validity of the report. To achieve this, a license plate recognition algorithm is utilized. When faced with difficulties in the detection, the photo must pass through community review, in which users reach a consensus on the validity of the report photo.

The data collected by the system in relation to reports is to be queried by its users. There are two distinct targets of this functionality: standard users and the municipality. The main difference between the two is that the municipality can access information that should not be freely accessible to everyone because of security and privacy concerns. Through the application, users are capable of visualizing a city map showing where the violations happened. Furthermore, a public API is made available, facilitating data analysis and system integration.

1.2.2 World and Machine phenomena

To mark the boundaries of the system, here we denote:

- The world phenomena which concern the system (the machine).

- The phenomena internal to the machine from a high level point of view.
- Shared phenomena that cross from the world to the machine or vice versa.

Phenomenon	Shared	Controlled by
A person commits a traffic violation	N	World
User spots a traffic violation	N	World
User logs in	Y	World
User fills a report form	Y	World
User takes pictures of the traffic violation	Y	World
User submits report	Y	World
Machine analyzes the pictures to find a license plate	N	Machine
Machine accepts the submitted report	Y	Machine
Machine rejects the submitted report	Y	Machine
User wants to find information about traffic violations	N	World
User requests report information in a specific area and time	Y	World
Machine receives the request and filters its stored reports according to the query	N	Machine
Machine answers the request for information	Y	Machine
Authority uses report information to generate traffic tickets	N	World
Machine requests information about traffic tickets to an external traffic ticket system	Y	Machine
Traffic ticket system responds to the information request	Y	World
Machine cross references its stored report information with the traffic ticket system response and analyses it	N	Machine

Table 1: World and Machine phenomena

1.2.3 Goals

- [G1] - The user is able to report a traffic violation to authorities.
- [G2] - The user is able to visualize reports in a specified area and time.
- [G3] - It is possible to query report information in an easily parsable format to allow for data analysis.
- [G4] - Only authorities are able to access report pictures and license plates.
- [G5] - Reports are not compromised.
- [G6] - Authorities are able to access a curated list of reports which are considered to have a higher than average level of accuracy and reliability.
- [G7] - It is possible to determine if a particular report contributed in issuing a traffic ticket.

1.3 Definitions, Acronyms, Abbreviations

1.3.1 Definitions

- Traffic violation: An action performed by a driver of a vehicle which is against the local traffic regulations.

- Report: Information submitted by a user to notify the system and, by extension, authorities of a traffic violation.
- Compromised: Information that has been seen or modified by an unauthorized agent outside the system boundaries.
- Authority: A local agency whose purpose is, as indicated by the current law, to enforce traffic rules. For example: the police.
- Ticketing system: A government database containing information about issued traffic tickets.
- License plate registry: A government database connecting a license plate with the car registered to it and information about it such as the make, model and color.
- False-positive report: An invalid report that is considered valid by the system.
- False-negative report: A valid report that is considered invalid by the system.

1.3.2 Acronyms

- GPS: Global Positioning System
- API: Application Programming Interface
- HTTP: HyperText Transfer Protocol
- HTTPS: HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure

1.3.3 Abbreviations

- [Gn]: n-th goal
- [Dn]: n-th domain assumption
- [FRn]: n-th functional requirement
- [SRn]: n-th security requirement

1.4 Revision history

- Version 1.0: First release.
- Version 1.1:
 - Fix document title in document information table.
 - Add missing section 3.4, move misplaced SRs there.
 - Section 3.3: Separate register, login and API key requirements from goal 3 as they concern multiple goals. Add explicit report submission functional requirement.
 - Section 1.2.3 & section 3.4: Make goal 5 stricter.
 - Section 1.3.1: replace “Compromised Report” definition in favour of a more general “Compromised”.
 - Section 3.1.4: change protocol from HTTP to HTTPS
 - Section 1.3.2: add missing acronyms
- Version 1.2:
 - Section 3.3 Update use cases, FR6 and FR22 to reflect changes to UI.

1.5 Document structure

The RASD document is composed of five chapters:

Chapter 1 The problem is introduced. A description of the purpose of the application is given, followed by the scope, where the world and machine phenomena are explained, along with the system goals. Also, definitions are listed to help the reader understand the concepts used.

Chapter 2 An overall description of the product. Including a further detailed description, with the help of class and state diagrams, a description of the main functionalities, the different types of actors that interact with the system, and the domain assumptions considered for solving the problem.

Chapter 3 Specific requirements. This is the main chapter of the document. It includes the external interface requirements, like the user and software interfaces. Scenarios for typical application usage are provided, followed by functional and security requirements, and the constraints under which the system needs to function. Lastly, the system software attributes are discussed.

Chapter 4 In this chapter a documented Alloy model is presented for a formal analysis of the problem, along with a discussion of the purpose of this model and what it proves.

Chapter 5 Shows the effort spent by each member of the group in the development of the document.

2 Overall Description

2.1 Product perspective

SafeStreets is built from the ground up as a new software application, specifically a mobile application, as required by the functionality that is provided. This mobile app communicates with a server, where the data is analysed and stored. External services are also utilized, particularly a government licence plate registry and a maps API.

As for the SafeStreets system, the domain model is described in the diagram shown in Figure 1. Note that the diagram is not a complete description of the system, but rather a simplified version for easier understanding.




Figure 1: Class diagram.

Inspecting the class diagram, we can see that most of the system revolves around the violation reports and their processing, as this is the core functionality of the system. In the state diagram shown in Figure 2,

the process of submitting a report is explained.




Figure 2: State diagram - Report submission.

As observed there, for submitting a report, the user is required to both fill a form with the required information and take photos of the event. After the submission, the SafeStreets system executes an analysis of the data, matching it with the provided image. This can result in either an invalid or a valid report. A valid report is saved and made available for the different users to query, either through the mobile application or through the public API. Invalid reports are still kept to be analyzed and detect any problems with the system, but are not shown to regular users nor authorities.

Further explaining the analysis process Figure 3, the system utilizes a license plate recognition algorithm of which the output consists of possibly multiple license plates (the picture could include more than one car), along with the certainty of the detection. The target of the report is determined by comparing the detections with the license plate manually submitted by the user.

After the target license plate is confirmed, the confidence of the detection is evaluated, if it is below a certain threshold, it must pass through a community review. During this process, multiple users willing to participate are shown a cutout of the license plate in the picture and asked to input what they see. If a consensus is reached, then the report is considered valid.

A valid report is then checked for good car recognition and that the detected car and license plate match with the local license plate registry. If these checks pass, the system is confident enough that authorities could issue a proper traffic ticket based on the report.

Users can access data provided by the system through both the mobile application and the public API. In the second case, as seen in Figure 4, the process is fairly simple. Here, the user asks for reports matching the filters and provides their api key for authentication. The key can be obtained through the application by standard users and its provided by an administrator in the case of authorities. The system uses this key to check if the user has the required permissions to access the data requested.




Figure 3: State diagram - Image validation.




Figure 4: Sequence diagram - API Usage.

2.2 Product functions

The functionality of the system can be divided into three groups. In the following section, these functions are listed and explained, taking into account the already specified goals of the system.

2.2.1 Violation report

The reporting of violations is the main functionality of the system. It allows its registered users to submit a traffic violation report. The user is required to provide data, such as pictures of the violation, the license plate of the vehicle committing the violation and the type of violation. On top of this information, the mobile application will provide the system with metadata which includes the gps location, date and time of the report. After the submission, the system analyses the provided information, checking its integrity. A valid report is shared with the users, and an invalid report is hidden but available internally for analysis and troubleshooting.

2.2.2 Image analysis

In order to confirm the validity of a report, the system performs an analysis of the submitted images. The pictures are expected to show the vehicle committing the violation, with at least one of them providing a clear view of its license plate. The analysis searches the images for this information and matches the detected license plate with the one provided by the user in the report. If the analysis is not certain enough, the system gets support from its users by showing them the photo and asking them to input the license plate being shown.

2.2.3 Data querying

Gathered information by SafeStreets can be accessed by all users. There are two ways in which the data can be accessed, via the mobile application or through the public API.

In the first case, the mobile application provides users with the ability to see violations in a map, allowing the user to also filter these violations by date and type. On the other hand, the API allows for

SafeStreets to be integrated with other third party systems. Users are able to query the available data according to their role and obtain the information in an analysis-friendly format.

The data provided for each violation is the following:

- Report ID: unique reference to each report
- Type of violation
- Date and time
- Location: gps coordinates, approximate street name and number
- Photos
- License plate
- The system's degree of confidence in the report
- Whether the report contributed to issuing a traffic ticket

2.3 User characteristics

The actors identified as the users of the application are:

- User: Also referred to as the “standard user”. A person that has registered to SafeStreets and is capable of reporting violations, seeing the reports map and reviewing photos.
- Municipality system: A system belonging to the municipality that communicates with SafeStreets through the exposed API. Capable of accessing more information than the standard user.
- Administrator: An employee of SafeStreets that maintains and updates the system.

2.4 Assumptions, dependencies and constraints

[D1] - Location obtained from the device running SafeStreets is accurate.

[D2] - Date and time obtained from the device running SafeStreets is accurate.

[D3] - The information provided by the ticketing system is accurate and up to date.


[D4] - The information provided by the license plate registry is accurate and up to date.

3 Specific Requirements

3.1 External interface requirements

3.1.1 User interfaces

The following mockups show an approximation of the mobile application.



SafeStreets


Sign in

Email
email

Password
Password

[Sign up](#)

Figure 5: Mockup - Sign in.



SafeStreets

< Back

Sign up

Name
Name


Surname
Surname

Email
email

Password
Password

Repeat password
Password

Figure 6: Mockup - Sign up.




SafeStreets

Report a violation

Reports map

Figure 7: Mockup - Home.



SafeStreets

< Back

Profile

Name: <Name>

Surname: <Surname>

Email: <Email>

[get API key](#)

Figure 8: Mockup - Profile.




Figure 9: Mockup - Photo review.




Figure 10: Mockup - Report violation.




Figure 11: Mockup - Reports map.

3.1.2 Hardware interfaces

3.1.3 Software interfaces

- License plate recognition: An external library or API is necessary to perform license plate recognition on the photos submitted and determine the validity of a report.
- Car recognition: To determine the legitimacy of a report, a way to detect cars in the photos is essential. Thanks to this, it can be ensured that the license plate is attached to a car. Also, by cross referencing the characteristics of the car with the license plate registry, it can be ensured that there was no swapping of license plates.
- License plate registry: Access to the local government's license plate registry is needed to be able to cross reference the detected license plate and car with a trustworthy source.
- Ticketing system: Provided by the local government. With access to information about traffic tickets, the system can determine how the submitted reports contribute to the issuing of the tickets.
- Maps: An external map service is required to allow showing transport violations to users. Popular and tested options are Google Maps and Leaflet, both allowing easy integration of maps in the application and the possibility to mark events in them.
- GPS: To know the location of a violation report, the mobile application requires an operating GPS. The information is obtained by interfacing with the device's operating system.
- Camera: In order to take photos of a violation scene, the application needs to access the device's camera. This is done by communicating with the device's operating system.

3.1.4 Communication interfaces

Communication between the mobile application and the SafeStreets system is performed through the standard HTTPS protocol. This extension of HTTP provides the needed security to avoid reports and other sensitive data becoming compromised.

3.2 Scenarios

3.2.1 Scenario 1

John has a spot on his street reserved for his garage entrance. During the week, he commutes to work by subway, and leaves the car to his wife, Sarah, who leaves later in the day. It is not unusual for him to find someone blocking the garage when he goes to work in the morning. If the car is still there by the time Sarah needs to leave, she will be late to the office. Before using SafeStreets, he would have to call the police and provide a license plate and address, all while hurrying on his way to work. Now, he can just open the app, take a picture and then finish submitting the report while he is sitting on the subway.

3.2.2 Scenario 2

Marco is a data science student at Politecnico di Milano. As he bikes every day to the university, he is familiar with the problem of cars parking in the bike lane. Thanks to the SafeStreets API, he can easily obtain data about it using Python. So, he decides to base his thesis on this topic and analyzes the patterns in violations throughout all of Italy, comparing different cities and their countermeasures.

3.2.3 Scenario 3

Chad's girlfriend broke up with him last week because he was too jealous and would not let her go out with her friends. He is not over this and is really mad at her. All of the sudden he gets a brilliant idea, he takes a picture of the license plate of the girls car and prints it. Then, a couple days later he finds a double parked car, attaches the printed license plate to it and reports the incident with SafeStreets. The system detects that something is wrong with the picture, as the license plate does not belong to the pictured car. Because of this, the report is not marked as worthy of a ticket against the license plate.

3.2.4 Scenario 4

Sally wants to go to the city centre to buy some groceries, but she is not sure if she should take the car or go by public transport. She grabs her phone, boots up SafeStreets and checks the vicinity to the supermarket. The app shows a high concentration of badly parked cars and she assumes that there is a lot of traffic with nowhere to park her car properly, so she decides to take the bus.

3.2.5 Scenario 5

Jason is on a run and notices a car parked in the bike lane, he takes a picture and submits a report on the go. After analysis the submission, the system cannot determine the license plate number with enough accuracy, so it sends the photo to user review. Mike is bored waiting at the bus stop, he decides to check out SafeStreets to see what's going on around him on the map. When he opens the app, he notices a notification. He touches to see what it is about and a pop up appears asking him to review the photo submitted by Jason. After squinting for a bit, he inputs his best guess and submits the form. Once enough people review Jason's photo, the system acquires a good number of votes to determine the license plate with good accuracy and marks the report as valid, making it available to all users.

3.3 Functional requirements

[G1] - The user is able to report a traffic violation to authorities.

[D1] - Location obtained from the device running SafeStreets is accurate.

[D2] - Date and time obtained from the device running SafeStreets is accurate.

[FR1] - The user is able to take pictures from the mobile application to add to a report.

[FR2] - The user is able to fill out a form providing information about a traffic violation, consisting of:

- Type of violation
- License plate
- At least one photo of the scene

[FR3] - The application can determine date, time and location based on information provided by the device when then pictures are taken and adds this metadata to the report.

[FR4] - The user can submit a full report to the system

[G2] - The user is able to visualize reports in a specified area and time.

[FR5] - The user is provided a map where the location of reports are indicated by markers.

[FR6] - The user can filter the reports shown on the map by date and type of violation.

[FR7] - The user can search for a specific location on the map by inputting coordinates or an address.

[FR8] - The user can select a report on the map and obtain information about it. This information includes:

- Report ID: unique reference to each report
- Type of violation
- Date and time
- Location: gps coordinates, approximate street name and number

[G3] - It is possible to query report information in an easily parsable format to allow for data analysis.

[FR9] - A secured API is provided to obtain and filter report information. The following filters are possible:

- Date and time
- Location
- Type of violation

[G4] - Only authorities are able to access report pictures and license plates.

[FR10] - A secured API accessible only to authorities, provides the following information about reports:

- Photos
- License plate

[G6] - Authorities are able to access a curated list of reports which are considered to have a higher than average level of accuracy and reliability.

[D4] - The information provided by the license plate registry is accurate and up to date.

[FR11] - Detected cars and license plates are cross referenced with the license plate registry to ensure the license plate belongs to the car.

[FR12] - A degree of confidence is assigned to each report, where a high confidence report will have:

- License plate recognition of 80%+ confidence.
- Car recognition of 80%+ confidence.
- The license plate and car pair are found in the license plate registry.

If any of these criteria are not met the report is considered low confidence.

[FR13] - The API includes the system's degree of confidence in the report to the provided report information after a query.

[FR14] - Report information provided by the API can be filtered by their degree of confidence.

[FR15] - Users can review photos with a license plate recognition lower than 80% to adjust the confidence in the recognition.

Motivation behind low-confidence and high-confidence report distinction:

For the general purpose of the application, false-positive reports are not a problem as, in the worst case, they would only add noise to the information provided to the users.

However, if the authorities use the information to generate traffic tickets, great care must be put to limit them. In this case, a greater number false-negative reports is the preferred choice.

Low-confidence reports, while valid, are more relaxed in their constraints in order to catch the majority of reports and, by extension, minimizing the number of false-negatives.

On the other hand, high-confidence reports are very constrained to minimize the number of false-positives and provide the authorities with the most reliable pool of reports possible.

[G7] - It is possible to determine if a particular report contributed in issuing a traffic ticket.

- [D3] - The information provided by the ticketing system is accurate and up to date.
- [FR16] - Information obtained from the ticketing system is used to determine if a report contributed to the issuing of a traffic ticket.
- [FR17] - Whether the report contributed to a traffic ticket is included in the information provided by the mobile application and the API.

Other requirements, needed to identify the users of the mobile application and public API:

- [FR18] - The user can register by inputting his full name and email, and choosing a username and password.
- [FR19] - The user has access to view his full account information.
- [FR20] - The user can edit his email and full name.
- [FR21] - An API key is provided to the user via their profile screen in the mobile application.
- [FR22] - The user can login to the mobile application by providing their email and password.

3.3.1 Use cases

Name	Sign up
Actor	User
Entry condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- The user has installed the application on their device.- The application is running.
Event flow	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The user presses the “Sign up” button.2. The user fills the fields with the required data.3. The user presses the “Confirm” button.4. The system saves the data.
Exit condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- The user is successfully registered in the system.- The user is redirected to the login screen.
Exceptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- The email is already registered in the system. The system warns the user that the email is already in use.- The username is already registered in the system. The system warns the user that the username is already in use.- The user did not fill all the required fields. The system marks the empty fields for the user to fill.- The password does not meet the security requirements. The system asks the user to enter another password.

Name	Sign in
Actor	User
Entry condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The application is running. - The user is signed up.
Event flow	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The user presses the “Sign in” button. 2. The user fills the “Email” and “Password” fields. 3. The user presses the “Sign in” button. 4. The system verifies the user credentials.
Exit condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The user is successfully signed into the system. - The user is redirected to the home screen.
Exceptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The user enters a non matching combination of “email” and “password”. The system shows a warning that “email” and “password” do not match. - The user did not fill all the required fields. The system marks the empty fields for the user to fill.

Name	See profile
Actor	User
Entry condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The application is running. - The user is signed in. - The user is in the home screen.
Event flow	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The user presses the user icon button. 2. The system shows the user information.
Exit condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The user information is displayed to the user.

Name	Edit user information
Actor	User
Entry condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The application is running. - The user is signed in. - The user is in the home screen.
Event flow	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The user presses the “edit” button. 2. The user is redirected to the edit profile screen. 3. The user edits the fields they want to change. 4. The user presses the “confirm” button. 5. The system saves the data.
Exit condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The user information is successfully updated. - The user is redirected to the profile screen.
Exceptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The user did not fill all the required fields. The system marks the empty fields for the user to fill. - The email is already registered in the system. The system warns the user that the email is already in use. - The username is already registered in the system. The system warns the user that the username is already in use.

Name	Submit report
Actor	User
Entry condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The application is running. - The user is signed in. - The user is in the home screen. - The user's GPS is active.
Event flow	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The user presses the "Report a violation" button. 2. The user fills the fields with the required data. 3. The user presses the "Take photo" button. 4. The user takes a photo of the vehicle committing the violation. 5. The user repeats steps 3 and 4 as desired until the amount of photos reaches the limit. 6. The user presses the "Confirm" button. 7. The system prompts the user to select a photo where the license plate is clearly identifiable. 8. The user selects a photo. 9. The user presses the "Confirm" button. 10. The system submits the report
Exit condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The report is successfully submitted.
Exceptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The user did not fill all the required fields. The system marks the empty fields for the user to fill. - The user did not take a photo. The "Confirm" button is disabled.

Name	See reports map
Actor	User
Entry condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The application is running. - The user is signed in. - The user is in the home screen.
Event flow	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The user presses the "Reports map" button. 2. The user fills the "from", "to", "type" and "search" fields. 3. The user presses the "filter" button. 4. The system shows an interactable map with reports that match the filter.
Exit condition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The system shows the reports map.
Exceptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No reports matching the filter were found. The system shows the empty map.

Name	Review photo
Actor	User
Entry condition	- The application is running. - The user is signed in. - The user is in the home screen.
Event flow	1. The user presses the review photo button. 2. An alert with a photo to review and a “license plate” field is shown. 3. The user fills the “license plate” field. 4. The user presses the “confirm” button. 5. The system saves the review.
Exit condition	- The review is saved in the system. - The alert is closed.
Exceptions	- The user did not fill the “license plate” field. The system marks the empty field for the user to fill. - The user presses the “The photo is not clear” button. The system saves the review as unclear.

3.4 Security requirements

[SR1] - Only photos taken through the mobile application are submitted, the user cannot upload a picture previously saved on their device.

[G4] - Only authorities are able to access report pictures and license plates.

[SR2] - Special API keys are generated and provided to authorities

[G5] - Reports are not compromised.

[SR3] - End-to-end encryption is provided for the submission of reports.

3.5 Design constraints

3.5.1 Hardware limitations

For use of the mobile application, a smartphone or tablet with the following specifications is required:

- Internet connection (Wi-Fi/4G/3G/2G)
- GPS
- Camera
- Android or iOS operating system

3.6 Software system attributes

3.6.1 Reliability

The application is expected to run continuously with no downtime. But given that the system is by no means critical to any of its users, exceptions to this requirement are tolerated. In terms of stored data, the system is required to be fault tolerant, which means that the data needs to be replicated and stored in more than one location.

3.6.2 Availability

Although minimal downtime is tolerated, the system is expected to be available 99.9% of the time. Because of this, some redundancy is to be provided in the application servers.

3.6.3 Security

The system manages sensitive user data, which requires confidentiality. Information like passwords is encrypted before being stored in the database. Measures are to be taken for the protection of servers and databases from both external attacks and hardware malfunctions.

3.6.4 Maintainability

The application is meant to be continuously worked and improved upon, possibly by different teams. This means that good design and documentation are required to facilitate its maintainability.

3.6.5 Interoperability

The system both utilizes services provided by other systems and acts as a service provider. It needs to be compliant with standards for information exchange between systems and provide a clear interface for external users.

4 Formal Analysis Using Alloy

The focus of the analysis is the processing of the reports submitted. A diagram of this can be found in [Figure 3 - State Diagram]. By modeling it using Alloy, we can verify the following points:

- All possible scenarios of a report analysis are covered by our established definitions.
- There is no overlap of report definitions. An overlap would make the definitions ambiguous and the final result would ultimately depend on the implementation.
- All definitions of the result of a report analysis are possible with the given assumptions and constraints.

Clarifications

Some aspects of the report are ignored (such as time, location and the user that submitted it) as they are not constrained in any way and do not affect the analysis of the report.

The rest of the system is not contemplated as it is fairly straightforward and its properties can be trivially checked (for example, no two users share the same username/email).

4.1 The model

```
module model

----- DETECTION -----

sig LicensePlate, Car {}

sig Confidence {
    rate: Int
} {
    // Confidence is between 0 and 100%. But not exactly 0.
    rate > 0 and rate ≤ 10
}

sig DetectedLicensePlate {
    licensePlate: LicensePlate,
    confidence: Confidence
}

sig DetectedCar {
    car: Car,
    confidence: Confidence
}

// Detection of a license plate and the car on which it is set on.
sig Detection {
    car: lone DetectedCar,
    licensePlate: lone DetectedLicensePlate
}

fact DetectionsCannotLackCarAndLicensePlate {
    no d: Detection | no d.car and no d.licensePlate
}

fun Detection.getLicensePlateWithCar: set LicensePlate -> Car {
    this.licensePlate.licensePlate -> this.car.car
}

pred licensePlateDetectionIsTrustworthy [d: Detection] {
    d.licensePlate.confidence.rate ≥ 8
}

pred carDetectionIsTrustworthy [d: Detection] {
    d.car.confidence.rate ≥ 8
}
```

```

----- PHOTO ANALYSIS -----

sig Photo {}

/*
    An analyzed photo, where multiple cars and their license plates
    could be detected.
*/
sig AnalyzedPhoto {
    photo: Photo,
    detected: set Detection
}

fact NoCarIsDetectedTwice {
    no disj d1, d2: AnalyzedPhoto.detected |
        some d1.car and
        some d2.car and
        d1.car.car = d2.car.car
}

fact NoLicensePlateIsDetectedTwice {
    no disj d1, d2: AnalyzedPhoto.detected |
        some d1.licensePlate and
        some d2.licensePlate and
        d1.licensePlate.licensePlate = d2.licensePlate.licensePlate
}

fun AnalyzedPhoto.getAnalyzedPhotoLicensePlates : set LicensePlate {
    this.detected.(Detection <: licensePlate).(DetectedLicensePlate <: licensePlate)
}

/*
    Repeating the image analysis over a photo gives the same result.
    There cannot be two analysis of the same photo with a different
    set of detected license plates.
*/
fact ImageAnalysisAlwaysReturnsTheSameResult {
    all p, p': AnalyzedPhoto | p.photo = p'.photo implies p.detected = p'.detected
}

----- REPORTS -----

sig ReportSubmission {
    licensePlate: LicensePlate,
    photos: set Photo,
    licensePlatePhoto: Photo
} {
    licensePlatePhoto in photos
}

sig AnalyzedReport {
    submission: ReportSubmission,
    analyzedPhoto: AnalyzedPhoto
} {
    analyzedPhoto.photo = submission.licensePlatePhoto
}

fun AnalyzedReport.getTargetDetection : set Detection {
    let
        targetLP = this.submission.licensePlate,
        lpDetections = this.analyzedPhoto.detected <: licensePlate {
            lpDetections.(DetectedLicensePlate <: licensePlate).targetLP
        }
    }
}

fun AnalyzedReport.getTargetCar : set Car {
    getTargetDetection[this].car.car
}

----- LICENSE PLATE REGISTRY -----

```

```
// Placeholder for the license plate registration service API.
one sig LicensePlateRegistry {
    registration: LicensePlate -> Car
}

/*
    Every car is registered under at most 1 license plate.
    Every license plate is registered for at most 1 car.

    There could be cases where a car or license plate is not registered:
        - Bad detection
        - Fake license plate
*/
fact NoRepeatedRegistrations {
    all c: Car | lone LicensePlateRegistry.registration.c
    all l: LicensePlate | lone getCarRegisteredUnderLicensePlate[l]
}

fun getCarRegisteredUnderLicensePlate [l: LicensePlate] : set Car {
    l.(LicensePlateRegistry.registration)
}

pred detectionLicensePlateCarMatchIsTrustworthy [d: Detection] {
    let detectedLicensePlateToCar = getLicensePlateWithCar[d] {
        some detectedLicensePlateToCar
        detectedLicensePlateToCar in LicensePlateRegistry.registration
    }
}

pred noCarRegisteredForLicensePlate [l: LicensePlate] {
    no getCarRegisteredUnderLicensePlate[l]
}

----- REVIEWS -----

sig Review {
    detection: Detection,
    matchPercentage: Int
} {
    // Percentage between 0 and 100%.
    matchPercentage ≥ 0 and matchPercentage ≤ 10
}

fact OnlyReviewLowConfidenceLicensePlateDetections {
    no r: Review | licensePlateDetectionIsTrustworthy[r.detection]
}

fact OnlyReviewDetectionsWithLicensePlateAndCar {
    all d: Review.detection | some d.car and some d.licensePlate
}

fact OnlyReviewDetectionsOfTarget {
    Review.detection in getTargetDetection[AnalyzedReport]
}

fact NoRepeatedReviews {
    no disj r1, r2: Review | r1.detection = r2.detection
}

pred badDetectionReview [r: Review] {
    some r
    r.matchPercentage < 6
}

pred acceptableDetectionReview [r: Review] {
    r.matchPercentage ≥ 6 and r.matchPercentage < 8
}

pred highConfidenceDetectionReview [r: Review] {
    r.matchPercentage ≥ 8
}
```

```

----- EXTRA -----

fact NoDanglingData {
    // All reports are analyzed.
    ReportSubmission = AnalyzedReport.submission

    // All photos come from submissions.
    Photo = ReportSubmission.photos

    // LicensePlates are detected, submitted, or in the license plate registry.
    LicensePlate =
        DetectedLicensePlate.licensePlate +
        ReportSubmission.licensePlate +
        LicensePlateRegistry.registration.Car

    // Cars are detected or in the license plate registry.
    Car = DetectedCar.car + LicensePlate.(LicensePlateRegistry.registration)

    // Detections come from a photo analysis.
    Detection = AnalyzedPhoto.detected

    // Confidence is attached to a detection.
    Confidence = DetectedLicensePlate.confidence + DetectedCar.confidence

    // Only photos from a report are analyzed.
    AnalyzedPhoto = AnalyzedReport.analyzedPhoto

    // Detected license plates come from a photo detection.
    DetectedLicensePlate = Detection.licensePlate

    // Detected cars come from a photo detection.
    DetectedCar = Detection.car
}

open model
module reportDefinitions

----- MAIN DEFINITIONS -----


pred reportIsHighConfidence [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    reportHasConfirmedLicensePlate[r]
    reportHasConfirmedCar[r]
    reportHasHighConfidenceLicensePlate[r]
    reportHasConfirmedCarCharacteristics[r]
    detectionLicensePlateCarMatchIsTrustworthy[getTargetDetection[r]]
}

pred reportIsLowConfidence [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    reportHasConfirmedLicensePlate[r]
    reportHasConfirmedCar[r]
    !reportHasBadlyDetectedLicensePlate[r]
    (
        reportHasAcceptableLicensePlateReview[r] or
        !carDetectionIsTrustworthy[getTargetDetection[r]] or
        noCarRegisteredForLicensePlate[r.submission.licensePlate] or
        !detectionLicensePlateCarMatchIsTrustworthy[getTargetDetection[r]]
    )
}

pred reportHasNoDetectedLicensePlate [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    no getAnalyzedPhotoLicensePlates[r.analyzedPhoto]
}

pred reportHasNonMatchingLicensePlates [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    let licensePlates = getAnalyzedPhotoLicensePlates[r.analyzedPhoto] {
        some licensePlates
        ! r.submission.licensePlate in licensePlates
    }
}

pred reportHasBadlyDetectedLicensePlate [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    badDetectionReview[(Review <: detection).(getTargetDetection[r])]
```

```

}

pred reportHasNoDetectedCarForLicensePlate [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    reportHasConfirmedLicensePlate[r]
    no getTargetCar[r]
}

pred reportIsInReview [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    reportHasConfirmedLicensePlate[r]
    reportHasConfirmedCar[r]
    !licensePlateDetectionIsTrustworthy[getTargetDetection[r]]
    !reportHasReview[r]
}

----- UTILITY PREDICATES -----

pred reportHasConfirmedLicensePlate [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    r.submission.licensePlate in getAnalyzedPhotoLicensePlates[r.analyzedPhoto]
}

pred reportHasAcceptableLicensePlateReview [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    acceptableDetectionReview[(Review <: detection).(getTargetDetection[r])]
}

pred reportHasHighConfidenceLicensePlateReview [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    highConfidenceDetectionReview[(Review <: detection).(getTargetDetection[r])]
}

pred reportHasConfirmedCar [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    some getTargetCar[r]
}

pred reportHasHighConfidenceLicensePlate [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    licensePlateDetectionIsTrustworthy[getTargetDetection[r]] or
    reportHasHighConfidenceLicensePlateReview[r]
}

pred reportHasConfirmedCarCharacteristics [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    carDetectionIsTrustworthy[getTargetDetection[r]]
}

pred reportHasReview [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    some Review.detection & getTargetDetection[r]
}

```

4.2 Assertions and checks

```

module assertions
open model
open reportDefinitions

/*
    Report definitions do not overlap, meaning that a given Submission
    can be classified under only one of the established definitions.
*/
assert ReportDefinitionsAreDisjointed {
    all r: AnalyzedReport {
        reportIsHighConfidence[r] implies
            !reportIsLowConfidence[r] and
            !reportHasNoDetectedLicensePlate[r] and
            !reportHasNonMatchingLicensePlates[r] and
            !reportHasBadlyDetectedLicensePlate[r] and
            !reportHasNoDetectedCarForLicensePlate[r]
            !reportIsInReview[r]
        and
        reportIsHighConfidence[r] implies
            !reportIsLowConfidence[r] and
            !reportHasNoDetectedLicensePlate[r] and
            !reportHasNonMatchingLicensePlates[r] and
            !reportHasBadlyDetectedLicensePlate[r] and
            !reportHasNoDetectedCarForLicensePlate[r]
            !reportIsInReview[r]
    }
}

```

```

        and
        reportHasNoDetectedLicensePlate[r] implies
            !reportIsHighConfidence[r] and
            !reportIsLowConfidence[r] and
            !reportHasNonMatchingLicensePlates[r] and
            !reportHasBadlyDetectedLicensePlate[r] and
            !reportHasNoDetectedCarForLicensePlate[r]
        and
        reportHasNonMatchingLicensePlates[r] implies
            !reportIsHighConfidence[r] and
            !reportIsLowConfidence[r] and
            !reportHasNoDetectedLicensePlate[r] and
            !reportHasBadlyDetectedLicensePlate[r] and
            !reportHasNoDetectedCarForLicensePlate[r]
            !reportIsInReview[r]
        and
        reportHasBadlyDetectedLicensePlate[r] implies
            !reportIsHighConfidence[r] and
            !reportIsLowConfidence[r] and
            !reportHasNoDetectedLicensePlate[r] and
            !reportHasNonMatchingLicensePlates[r] and
            !reportHasNoDetectedCarForLicensePlate[r]
            !reportIsInReview[r]
        and
        reportHasNoDetectedCarForLicensePlate[r] implies
            !reportIsHighConfidence[r] and
            !reportIsLowConfidence[r] and
            !reportHasNoDetectedLicensePlate[r] and
            !reportHasNonMatchingLicensePlates[r] and
            !reportHasBadlyDetectedLicensePlate[r]
            !reportIsInReview[r]
        and
        reportIsInReview[r] implies
            !reportIsHighConfidence[r] and
            !reportIsLowConfidence[r] and
            !reportHasNoDetectedLicensePlate[r] and
            !reportHasNonMatchingLicensePlates[r] and
            !reportHasBadlyDetectedLicensePlate[r] and
            !reportHasNoDetectedCarForLicensePlate[r]
    }
}

check ReportDefinitionsAreDisjointed for 6 but 5 Int

/*
Ensure that all possible variations of a report are covered by our
established definitions.
*/
assert AllReportCasesAreCovered {
    no r: AnalyzedReport |
        !reportIsHighConfidence[r] and
        !reportIsLowConfidence[r] and
        !reportHasNoDetectedLicensePlate[r] and
        !reportHasNonMatchingLicensePlates[r] and
        !reportHasBadlyDetectedLicensePlate[r] and
        !reportHasNoDetectedCarForLicensePlate[r] and
        !reportIsInReview[r]
}

check AllReportCasesAreCovered for 10 but 5 Int

```

```
Executing "Check ReportDefinitionsAreDisjointed for 6 but 5 int"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=6 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
23062 vars. 1002 primary vars. 61151 clauses. 227ms.
No counterexample found. Assertion may be valid. 11229ms.

Executing "Check AllReportCasesAreCovered for 10 but 5 int"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=10 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
53086 vars. 2270 primary vars. 142849 clauses. 186ms.
No counterexample found. Assertion may be valid. 2286ms.

2 commands were executed. The results are:
#1: No counterexample found. ReportDefinitionsAreDisjointed may be valid.
#2: No counterexample found. AllReportCasesAreCovered may be valid.
```

Figure 12: Alloy - Assertion results.

4.3 World generation

```
module worldgen
open model
open reportDefinitions

pred ReportWithNoDetectedLicensePlateExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport | reportHasNoDetectedLicensePlate[r]
}

run ReportWithNoDetectedLicensePlateExists for 2 but 5 Int, 1 AnalyzedReport

pred ReportWithNonMatchingLicensePlatesExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport | reportHasNonMatchingLicensePlates[r]
}

run ReportWithNonMatchingLicensePlatesExists for 2 but 5 Int, 1 AnalyzedReport

pred ReportWithBadlyDetectedLicensePlateExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport | reportHasBadlyDetectedLicensePlate[r]
}

run ReportWithBadlyDetectedLicensePlateExists for 2 but 5 Int, 1 AnalyzedReport

pred ReportWithNoDetectedCarForLicensePlateExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport | reportHasNoDetectedCarForLicensePlate[r]
}

run ReportWithNoDetectedCarForLicensePlateExists for 2
    but 5 Int, 1 AnalyzedReport

pred ReportInReviewExists{
    some r: AnalyzedReport | reportIsInReview[r]
}

run ReportInReviewExists for 2 but 5 Int, 1 AnalyzedReport

pred HighConfidenceReportWithoutReviewExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport | reportIsHighConfidence[r] and !reportHasReview[r]
}

run HighConfidenceReportWithoutReviewExists for 2 but 5 Int, 1 AnalyzedReport
```

```

pred HighConfidenceReportWithReviewExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport | reportIsHighConfidence[r] and reportHasReview[r]
}

run HighConfidenceReportWithReviewExists for 2 but 5 Int, 1 AnalyzedReport

pred LowConfidenceReportWithoutReviewExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport | reportIsLowConfidence[r] and !reportHasReview[r]
}

run LowConfidenceReportWithoutReviewExists for 2 but 5 Int, 1 AnalyzedReport

pred LowConfidenceReportWithReviewExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport | reportIsLowConfidence[r] and reportHasReview[r]
}

run LowConfidenceReportWithReviewExists for 2 but 5 Int, 1 AnalyzedReport

pred reportHasMultipleLicensePlates [r: AnalyzedReport] {
    #getAnalyzedPhotoLicensePlates[r.analyzedPhoto] > 1
}

pred HighConfidenceReportWithMultipleLicensePlatesExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport |
        reportIsHighConfidence[r] and reportHasMultipleLicensePlates[r]
}

run HighConfidenceReportWithMultipleLicensePlatesExists for 2
    but 5 Int, 4 LicensePlate, 4 DetectedLicensePlate, 1 AnalyzedReport

pred LowConfidenceReportWithMultipleLicensePlatesExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport |
        reportIsLowConfidence[r] and reportHasMultipleLicensePlates[r]
}

run LowConfidenceReportWithMultipleLicensePlatesExists for 2
    but 5 Int, 4 LicensePlate, 4 DetectedLicensePlate, 1 AnalyzedReport

pred LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfAcceptableReviewExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport |
        reportIsLowConfidence[r] and
        reportHasAcceptableLicensePlateReview[r] and
        carDetectionIsTrustworthy[getTargetDetection[r]] and
        !noCarRegisteredForLicensePlate[r.submission.licensePlate] and
        detectionLicensePlateCarMatchIsTrustworthy[getTargetDetection[r]]
}

run LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfAcceptableReviewExists for 2
    but 5 Int, 1 AnalyzedReport

pred LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfBadCarDetectionExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport |
        reportIsLowConfidence[r] and
        !carDetectionIsTrustworthy[getTargetDetection[r]] and
        !noCarRegisteredForLicensePlate[r.submission.licensePlate] and
        detectionLicensePlateCarMatchIsTrustworthy[getTargetDetection[r]] and
        !reportHasAcceptableLicensePlateReview[r]
}

run LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfBadCarDetectionExists for 2
    but 5 Int, 1 AnalyzedReport

pred LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfNoCarRegisteredForLicensePlateExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport |
        reportIsLowConfidence[r] and
        noCarRegisteredForLicensePlate[r.submission.licensePlate] and
        carDetectionIsTrustworthy[getTargetDetection[r]] and
        !reportHasAcceptableLicensePlateReview[r]
}

run LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfNoCarRegisteredForLicensePlateExists for 2
    but 5 Int, 1 AnalyzedReport

```

```
pred LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfBadCarAndLicensePlateMatchExists {
    some r: AnalyzedReport |
        reportIsLowConfidence[r] and
        !detectionLicensePlateCarMatchIsTrustworthy[getTargetDetection[r]] and
        !noCarRegisteredForLicensePlate[r.submission.licensePlate] and
        carDetectionIsTrustworthy[getTargetDetection[r]] and
        !reportHasAcceptableLicensePlateReview[r]
}

run LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfBadCarAndLicensePlateMatchExists for 2
    but 5 Int, 1 AnalyzedReport
```

```

Executing "Run ReportWithNoDetectedLicensePlateExists for 2 but 5 int, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
3884 vars. 208 primary vars. 10532 clauses. 9ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 22ms.

Executing "Run ReportWithNonMatchingLicensePlatesExists for 2 but 5 int, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
3896 vars. 208 primary vars. 10586 clauses. 9ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 16ms.

Executing "Run ReportWithBadlyDetectedLicensePlateExists for 2 but 5 int, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
4359 vars. 208 primary vars. 12131 clauses. 14ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 24ms.

Executing "Run ReportWithNoDetectedCarForLicensePlateExists for 2 but 5 int, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
3926 vars. 208 primary vars. 10610 clauses. 8ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 17ms.

Executing "Run ReportInReviewExists for 2 but 5 int, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
4390 vars. 208 primary vars. 12174 clauses. 8ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 16ms.

Executing "Run HighConfidenceReportWithoutReviewExists for 2 but 5 int, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
5316 vars. 208 primary vars. 15218 clauses. 15ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 23ms.

Executing "Run HighConfidenceReportWithReviewExists for 2 but 5 int, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
5316 vars. 208 primary vars. 15229 clauses. 10ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 31ms.

Executing "Run LowConfidenceReportWithoutReviewExists for 2 but 5 int, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
4890 vars. 208 primary vars. 13799 clauses. 10ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 17ms.

Executing "Run LowConfidenceReportWithReviewExists for 2 but 5 int, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
4890 vars. 208 primary vars. 13810 clauses. 15ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 25ms.

Executing "Run HighConfidenceReportWithMultipleLicensePlatesExists for 2 but 5 int, 4 LicensePlate, 4 DetectedLicensePlate, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
5885 vars. 240 primary vars. 16504 clauses. 14ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 29ms.

Executing "Run LowConfidenceReportWithMultipleLicensePlatesExists for 2 but 5 int, 4 LicensePlate, 4 DetectedLicensePlate, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
5459 vars. 240 primary vars. 15081 clauses. 11ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 30ms.

Executing "Run LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfAcceptableReviewExists for 2 but 5 int, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
4887 vars. 208 primary vars. 13795 clauses. 11ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 22ms.

Executing "Run LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfBadCarDetectionExists for 2 but 5 int, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
4887 vars. 208 primary vars. 13795 clauses. 12ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 24ms.

Executing "Run LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfNoCarRegisteredForLicensePlateExists for 2 but 5 int, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
4887 vars. 208 primary vars. 13795 clauses. 15ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 27ms.

Executing "Run LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfBadCarAndLicensePlateMatchExists for 2 but 5 int, 1 AnalyzedReport"
Solver=sat4j Bitwidth=5 MaxSeq=2 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=20
4887 vars. 208 primary vars. 10ms.
Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 26ms.

15 commands were executed. The results are:
#1: Instance found. ReportWithNoDetectedLicensePlateExists is consistent.
#2: Instance found. ReportWithNonMatchingLicensePlatesExists is consistent.
#3: Instance found. ReportWithBadlyDetectedLicensePlateExists is consistent.
#4: Instance found. ReportWithNoDetectedCarForLicensePlateExists is consistent.
#5: Instance found. ReportInReviewExists is consistent.
#6: Instance found. HighConfidenceReportWithoutReviewExists is consistent.
#7: Instance found. HighConfidenceReportWithReviewExists is consistent.
#8: Instance found. LowConfidenceReportWithoutReviewExists is consistent.
#9: Instance found. LowConfidenceReportWithReviewExists is consistent.
#10: Instance found. HighConfidenceReportWithMultipleLicensePlatesExists is consistent.
#11: Instance found. LowConfidenceReportWithMultipleLicensePlatesExists is consistent.
#12: Instance found. LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfAcceptableReviewExists is consistent.
#13: Instance found. LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfBadCarDetectionExists is consistent.
#14: Instance found. LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfNoCarRegisteredForLicensePlateExists is consistent.
#15: Instance found. LowConfidenceReportBecauseOfBadCarAndLicensePlateMatchExists is consistent.

```

Figure 13: Alloy - World generation results.




Figure 14: Alloy - World: Report with no detected license plate.




Figure 15: Alloy - World: Report with non matching detected and submitted license plates.




Figure 16: Alloy - World: Report with badly detected license plate.




Figure 17: Alloy - World: Report with no detected car for license plate.




Figure 18: Alloy - World: Report in review.




Figure 19: Alloy - World: High confidence report without a review.




Figure 20: Alloy - World: High confidence report with a review.




Figure 21: Alloy - World: Low confidence report without a review.




Figure 22: Alloy - World: Low confidence report with a review.




Figure 23: Alloy - World: High confidence report with multiple license plates.




Figure 24: Alloy - World: Low confidence report with multiple license plates.




Figure 25: Alloy - World: Low confidence report because of an "Acceptable" review.




Figure 26: Alloy - World: Low confidence report because of a bad car detection.




Figure 27: Alloy - World: Low confidence report because there is no car registered under the detected license plate.




Figure 28: Alloy - World: Low confidence report because the detected car does not match the car registered under the detected license plate.

5 Effort Spent

5.1 Manuel Pedrozo

Task	Hours
Purpose	3
Scope	3
Document structure	2
Product perspective	3
Diagrams	5
Product functions	2.5
Mockups	4
Software interfaces	2
Use cases	3.5
System attributes	2
Latex	5

Table 2: Effort spent by Manuel Pedrozo

5.2 Tomás Perez Molina

Task	Hours
Scope	6
Functional requirements	3
Security requirements	1
Scenarios	2
Image analysis diagram	4
Alloy	16
Latex	5

Table 3: Effort spent by Tomás Perez Molina

References

- “SafeStreets Mandatory Project Assignment”
- “Structure of RASD” slides
- IEEE Software Requirements Specification template
- Alloy tutorial: <http://alloytools.org/tutorials/online/index.html>
- UML diagrams: <https://www.uml-diagrams.org>