

Ransomware Detection using Machine Learning with eBPF

Offensive Technologies Project Presentation

Max Willers

Tomás Philippart

Offensive Technologies MSc Security and Network Engineering University of Amsterdam

Agenda

- Introduction
- Background
 - a. eBPF Recap
 - b. ML Primer
- Related work
- Methodology
- Results
- Discussion & Conclusion
- 7. Further Research

Ransomware Detection using Machine Learning with eBPF

Max Willers Tomás Philippart

Ransomware attacks continue to pose a significant and escalating threat to organizations worldwide, resulting in substantial disruptions and financial losses [17, 28, 25]. Recent reports indicate a worrisome surge in such attacks, with the percentage of organizations directly affected by rana wolfisome surge in such access, with the percentage of digentications directly and some systems have someware rising from 37% in 2020 to a staggering 66% in 2021 [6]. While Windows systems have traditionally been the primary target of ransomware attacks, there has been a concerning uptick in attacks targeting Linux systems [13], which are often utilized for critical business applications

Ransomware, a form of malware designed to extort victims, has gained notoriety due to its ability to encrypt files on compromised systems, holding them hostage until a ransom is paid [11, 17]. To combat this menace, existing ransomware detection methods primarily rely on two approaches: signature-based and behavioral-based techniques. Signature-based detection relies on and infrastructure. predefined patterns or signatures to identify known ransomware samples, while behavioral-based detection focuses on analyzing application behavior, encompassing factors such as API calls and

However, these conventional approaches have their limitations. Signature-based detection struggles to keep pace with the rapid evolution of ransomware variants, rendering it less effective against network behavior [12]. new and unknown threats. Behavioral-based detection, although valuable, may overlook subtle yet crucial indicators of ransomware activity, leading to potential false negatives. Moreover, attackers have become adept at obfuscating malware code, complicating static analysis and evading have garnered attention for their potential in ranless less partithms specifically for ransomware

Introduction - Research questions

How can **eBPF** be integrated with a **Machine Learning** pipeline to accurately **detect ransomware during runtime**?

- 1. How can **eBPF** be used to detect **ransomware?**
- 2. How can it be integrated into a **Machine Learning** pipeline?
- 3. How can this solution **accurately detect ransomware** during runtime?

Background - eBPF Recap

- Roots in BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter) technology
- Run sandboxed programs within the kernel
- Hook anywhere in the kernel to modify functionality
 - Can even attach directly to the NIC
 - JavaScript-like programmability to the kernel


Use cases:

- Kernel performance tracing
- Network security and observability
- Runtime security
- etc.



Background - Machine Learning Primer

- In this project: Supervised Learning Classifiers
 - Support Vector Machine (SVM)




Related work

- Vehabovic et al. Ransomware Detection and Classification Strategies (2022)
 - Categorizes ransomware detection and classification systems into network-based and host-based
- Kharaz et al. UNVEIL: A Large-Scale, Automated Approach to Detecting Ransomware (2016)
 - Dynamic analysis solution based on behavior
 - Able to identify and detect previously unreported ransomware
- Cozzi et al. Understanding Linux Malware (2018)
- Agman, Hendler. BPFroid: Robust Real Time Android Malware Detection Framework (2021)
 - eBPF-based malware detection for Android based on behavioral signature

Methodology - Experimental setup

Goal: isolated environment to experiment with ransomware

- Double-nested isolated virtualized environment
- Virtualized with KVM Hypervisor
- Use snapshots to run experiments under same conditions



Methodology - Ransomware detection techniques

- Static analysis (expensive)
- Fingerprint binary compare hashes to known ransomware
- Analyzing behavioral traits and patterns
 - Host-based: filesystem and memory operations
 - Network-based: C&C communication
- Machine Learning methods:
 - Models trained on features (e.g., system calls, network traffic)
 - Effectively classify and identify in real-time
 - Focus of our paper!


Methodology - Ransomware detection techniques (with eBPF)

Why use eBPF?

- Event-driven nature and direct execution within kernel
- Unified mechanism to intercept and handle events
- Optimizes performance by filtering irrelevant events in user space
- Comprehensive kernel tracing
- Actively maintained
- Port to Windows in progress
 - Can apply same techniques to Windows


Methodology - Our detector (architecture overview)


- eBPF program attached to critical system calls
- Python frontend
 - Communicates back and forth with eBPF + ML pipeline



Methodology - Our detector (bpf.c)


Goal: trace all events and only submit relevant ones








TS,PID,TYPE,FLAG,PATTERN,OPEN,CREATE,DELETE,ENCRYPT,FILENAME


2748377535267,3175,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/syscalls/sys_enter_unlink/id 2748396149305,3175,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/syscalls/sys_enter_unlinkat/id 2748396700388,3175,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.1 2748396841453,3175,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.1 2748396849806,3175,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypto.so.1.1 [...]














 $PID,C_max,C_sum,D_max,D_sum,O_max,O_sum,P_max,P_sum,CCC,CCO,CDD, [...], OOO 3101,1,1,2,2,7,7,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,5 3102,192,1251,0,0,315,3314,0,0,2,7,0,0,1079,162,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,7,0,1235,0,0,162,0,1909 3103,267,1557,0,0,635,4417,0,0,1,4,0,0,1314,237,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,4,0,1548,0,0,237,0,2627 3104,120,619,0,0,351,1985,0,0,0,2,0,0,585,31,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,31,0,1336 3105,177,1450,0,0,448,4074,0,0,4,7,0,0,1255,183,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,7,0,1432,0,0,183,0,2451 3106,139,1000,0,0,587,2921,0,0,3,4,0,0,820,172,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,4,0,989,0,0,172,0,1755 3107,267,1366,0,0,430,4100,0,0,3,5,0,0,1159,198,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,5,0,1353,0,0,199,0,2542 3108,275,1351,0,0,683,4611,0,0,0,7,0,0,1018,325,0,0,0,0,0,0,7,0,1337,0,0,326,0,2940 3109,267,1385,2,2,473,4630,1,1,3,7,1,0,1107,266,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,7,1,1367,0,0,267,0,2987 [...]$

PREDICTION

BENIGN
RANSOMWARE
RANSOMWARE
RANSOMWARE
RANSOMWARE
BENIGN
BENIGN
BENIGN
BENIGN
BENIGN

Results (so far)

- Number of events: ~1M
- Number of processes scanned: 507
- Ransomware families run: 9

Predicted

Actual values

Ransomware

Benign 496 2

Ransomware 0 9

Precision = 99.6% F1 score = 99.80%

Discussion & Conclusion

- Good performance!
- Pipeline still requires heavy manual work
 - Labelling data can be automated
 - All the programs can be unified into a single mechanism
 - Goal is to do all the above
- Imbalanced dataset
 - Need more ransomware/benign runs!
 - How will it react against novel ransomware?

see code @ github (TomasPhilippart/ebpfangel)

Further Work

- Create a larger and more comprehensive dataset
 - More features
 - More runs (more samples)
 - More benign samples
- Implement more detection features and techniques
 - Network traffic to/from C&C
 - Data buffer entropy
- Optimize machine learning pipeline with other models
 - Neural networks
 - Decision Trees