Application Security Verification Standards

Report

Gonçalo Lima - 108254
Tiago Fonseca - 107266
Beatriz Ferreira - 107214
Tomás Fonseca - 107245
Francisco Murcela - 108815 **Grupo 10**

Universidade de Aveiro Segurança Informática e Nas Organizações



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Introduction

This report details the outcomes of a comprehensive project centered on developing an online store specializing in memorabilia products from the DETI (Department of Electronics, Telecommunications, and Informatics) at the University of Aveiro. Beyond meeting the standard requirements of an e-commerce platform, this project involves an additional challenge: identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities that might not be immediately visible, potentially compromising the system's integrity and security, meeting the security standards in the industry.

Throughout this report, we meticulously implemented various fixes to meet the *Application Security Verification Standards (ASVS)*, with a specific focus on a designated set of *Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)*, which includes categories such as *CWE-212*, *CWE-285*, *CWE-235*, *CWE-287*, *CWE-319*, *CWE-326*, *CWE-350*, *CWE-400*, *CWE-918*, *CWE-497*, *CWE-548*, *CWE-598* and *CWE-778*.

Our primary aim with this project is to expand our knowledge about vulnerabilities and enhance our capability to identify solutions for them. We strive for a deeper understanding of system weaknesses and the ability to implement effective measures for their protection. We believe that this project will contribute to refining our skills and fostering safer online environments.

The web application (secure version) has been fully implemented and can be found here.





Application Security Verification Standards

ASVS (Level 1) [CWE-212] - Sensitive Private Data (Data Protection)

Previously, users were unable to export their data on demand, but now they have the freedom to do so whenever they choose.

Profile

In the Profile View, you'll find a button labelled "Retrieve My Data". Clicking this button triggers the "Get User Data View". This view generates an Excel file containing all the user data, enabling the user to download it.

Definition of the "Get User Data View":

```
@views.route('/get_user_data/<id>', methods=['GET'])

def get_user_data(id):

   if id == None:
        return redirect(url_for("views.login"))

   current_directory = generate_excel_user_data(id)

# Send the Excel file as a downloadable attachment
   return send_file(current_directory + f"\\database\\user_data\\\{id\}.xlsx",

as_attachment=True)
```

Moreover, within the "Get User Data View", the aim is to utilize the function generate_excel_user_data(id) located in the UserManagement.py file. This function is responsible for creating the Excel file.



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
Definition of the function:

```
def generate excel user data(id):
    data = get_user_data_by_id(id)
    df_personal_info = pd.DataFrame(data.get('personal_info', []))
    df_reviews = pd.DataFrame(data.get('reviews', []))
    df_orders = pd.DataFrame(data.get('orders', []))
    if os.name == "nt":
        current_directory = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
    else:
        current_directory = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
    user_data_directory = os.path.join(current_directory, "database", "user_data")
    if not os.path.exists(user data directory):
        os.makedirs(user_data_directory)
    with pd.ExcelWriter(os.path.join(user_data_directory, f"{id}.xlsx"),
engine='openpyxl') as writer:
        if not df personal info.empty:
            df_personal_info.to_excel(writer, sheet_name='Personal Info',
index=False)
        if not df_reviews.empty:
            df_reviews.to_excel(writer, sheet_name='Reviews', index=False)
        if not df_orders.empty:
            df_orders.to_excel(writer, sheet_name='Orders', index=False)
    return current directory
```



In this manner, the user can ultimately export their data.

Demonstration:



Excel File with User Data



ASVS (Level 1) [CWE-285] - Sensitive Private Data (Data Protection)

Verify that users are provided clear language regarding collection and use of supplied personal information and that users have provided opt-in consent for the use of that data before it is used in any way.

Information Collected View

Previously, users were unaware of the data being collected, depriving them of any choice in the matter. However, following the completion of the signup form, they are now provided with the option to make informed decisions regarding their data.

In the "Validate Consent View" the user can choose to consent or not to the data collection used by the app, if he chooses not to consent, he will not be able to create an account.


Definition of the "Validate Consent View":

```
@views.route('/validate_consent', methods=['POST'])
def validate_consent():
    consent = request.form.get('consent')
    if consent:
        temp_id = str(generate_random_id_totp_temp())
        username = session.get("signup username")
        email = session.get("signup_email")
        hashed_password = session.get("signup_hashed_password")
        secret_key, secret_key_timestamp, qr_code_base64 =
generate totp atributes(username)
        store_totp_stage(temp_id, username, secret_key, secret_key_timestamp,
email, hashed_password)
        session.pop("signup_username", None)
        session.pop("signup email", None)
        session.pop("signup_hashed_password", None)
        return render_template('totp_signup.html', secret_key=secret_key,
qr_code=qr_code_base64, id=temp_id)
    else:
        return redirect(url for("views.signup"))
```



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Demonstration:





ASVS (Level 1) [CWE-235] – Input Validation Requirements (Input Validation)

Verify that the application has defences against *HTTP* parameter pollution attacks, particularly if the application framework makes no distinction about the source of request parameters (GET, POST, cookies, headers, or environment variables).

Applied to all the Views

The Views are restricted to access only the designated methods assigned to them, thereby distinguishing the source of request parameters.

The applied fix involves adding an additional parameter to the *Views* definition. While this parameter existed in some cases, it was missing in others prior to the update.



Definition of the parameters, with a random *View* serving has the example:

```
# This route is used to let the user reset their password
@views.route("/reset-password", methods=["GET", "POST"])
def reset_password():
    if request.method == "POST":
        email = request.form.get("email")
        if is valid input(email) == False:
            return render template("reset-password.html", message="Invalid
email.")
        user = search user by email(email)
        if user is None:
            return redirect(url_for("views.signup"))
        else:
            reset token = generate reset token()
            set reset token for user(user, reset token)
            send_password_reset_email(email, reset_token)
            return redirect(url for("views.login"))
    else:
        return render template("reset-password.html")
```

This fix restricts access to the *Views* solely for the methods they are assigned to, bolstering protection against potential *HTTP* parameter pollution attacks.





ASVS (Level 1) [CWE-287] – Out of Band Verifier Requirements (Authentication)

Verify that the out of band verifier expires out of band authentication requests, codes, or tokens after 10 minutes. Verify that the out of band verifier authentication requests, codes, or tokens are only usable once, and only for the original authentication request.

Reset Password

The password reset process incorporates tokens that must adhere to specific properties in accordance with the ASVS requirements.

To accomplish this, the "Reset Password View" utilized the <code>is_valid_reset_token(reset_token)</code> function within the <code>UserManagement.py</code> file to validate tokens. Additionally, the <code>clear_reset_token(user)</code> function was employed to eliminate tokens from the database upon expiration or usage.

Definition of the Views:

```
@views.route("/reset-password", methods=["GET", "POST"])
def reset_password():
    if request.method == "POST":
        email = request.form.get("email")
        if is_valid_input(email) == False:
            return render_template("reset-password.html", message="Invalid")
email.")
        user = search_user_by_email(email)
        if user is None:
            return redirect(url_for("views.signup"))
        else:
            reset token = generate reset token()
            set_reset_token_for_user(user, reset_token)
            send_password_reset_email(email, reset_token)
            return redirect(url_for("views.login"))
    else:
        return render template("reset-password.html")
```



Definition of the functions:

```
# This function checks if the reset token is valid and not expired.
def is_valid_reset_token(reset_token):
    user = get_user_by_reset_token(reset_token)

if user:
    # Assuming 'reset_token_timestamp' is a field in your User model
to store the token creation timestamp.
    token_timestamp = user[4]

# Define the token expiration time (10 minutes).
    token_expiration_time = timedelta(minutes=10)

# Check if the token is not expired.
    if token_timestamp + token_expiration_time >= datetime.now():
        return True
return False
```

```
def clear_reset_token(user):
    # Build the query to update the reset_token in the user's table
    # Secure Query
    query = "UPDATE users SET reset_token = NULL WHERE username = %s;"
    db_query(query, (user,))
    query = "UPDATE users SET reset_token_timestamp = NULL WHERE username
= %s;"
    db_query(query, (user,))
```

This ensures that the token properties align with the ASVS requirements.



ASVS (Level 1) [CWE-319] - Communications Security Requirements (Communication Security)

Verify that secured *TLS* is used for all client connectivity and does not fall back to insecure or unencrypted protocols.



ASVS (Level 1) [CWE-326] – Communications Security Requirements (Communication Security)

Verify using online or up to date *TLS* testing tools that only strong algorithms, ciphers, and protocols are enabled, with the strongest algorithms and ciphers set as preferred.



ASVS (Level 1) [CWE-350] – Deployed Application Integrity Controls (Malicious Code)

Verify that the application has protection from subdomain takeovers if the application relies upon *DNS* entries or *DNS* subdomains, such as expired domain names, out of date *DNS* pointers or *CNAMEs*, expired projects at public source code repos, or transient cloud *APIs*, serverless functions, or <u>storage buckets</u> or similar. Protections can include ensuring that *DNS* names used by applications are regularly checked for expiry or change.



ASVS (Level 1) [CWE-400] – File Upload Requirements (Files and Resources)

Verify that the application will not accept large files that could fill up storage or cause a denial of service.

Profile Photo and Product Photo

Before, there wasn't a size check for uploaded photos. Now, by implementing a simple file size check, we can prevent this security issue.

To fix the issue, we added a simple solution to check for the size of the file.

Definition of the functions:

```
@views.route('/update_account/<id>', methods=['POST'])
def update account(id):
    if id == None and session.get("id") == None:
        return redirect(url for("views.login"))
    try:
        if os.name == "nt":
            current_directory =
os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(_file__)).split("\\handlers")[0]
        else:
            current directory =
os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(<u>file</u>)).split("/handlers")[0]
        accounts_directory = os.path.join(current_directory, "database",
"accounts")
        os.makedirs(accounts_directory, exist_ok=True) # Ensure the
        file_path = os.path.join(accounts_directory,
f"{id}.png").replace("\\", "/")
```

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```
profile photo = request.files.get("profile photo")
        # If there is an image and the size is less than 5MB
        if profile photo and not profile photo.content length > 5120 *
5120:
            profile photo.save(file path)
        username = request.form.get("username")
        email = request.form.get("email")
        password = request.form.get("psw")
        old_password = request.form.get("psw-old")
        if username != "" and not check username exists(username) and
is_valid_input(username):
            update_username(id, username)
            session["username"] = username
        else:
based on the ID
            username = search_user_by_id(id)[1]
        if email != "" and not check email exists(email) and
is_valid_input(email):
            update_email(id, email)
        else:
```

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```
# If there is a problem with the email, get the email based on nática
            email = search user by id(id)[3]
        if password != "":
            if bcrypt.check_password_hash(search_user_by_id(id)[2],
old password):
                hashed password =
bcrypt.generate password hash(password).decode("utf-8")
                username = search_user_by_id(id)[1]
                update_password(username, hashed_password)
            else:
                return render_template("profile.html", message="Invalid")
password.", username=username, id=id)
        return redirect(url_for("views.catalog", id=id))
    except Exception as e:
        print(e)
        return render_template("profile.html", message="Invalid input.",
username=username, id=id)
```



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```
@views.route('/add product/<id>', methods=['POST'])
def add product(id):
    if id == None:
        return redirect(url for("views.login"))
    if id is not None and is valid input(id) is not False:
        product name = request.form.get("productName")
        product description = request.form.get("productDescription")
        product_price = request.form.get("productPrice")
        product category = request.form.get("productCategory")
        product quantity = request.form.get("productUnits")
        product photo = request.files.get("productImage")
        preconditions = is valid input(product name) == False or \
                        is valid input(product description) == False or \
                        is valid input(product price) == False or \
                        is valid input(product category) == False or \
                        is valid input(product quantity) == False or \
                        product photo and product photo.content length >
5120 * 5120 # Verify that the size of the image is less than 5MB
        if preconditions:
            return redirect(url_for("views.catalog", id=id))
        else:
            create product(product name, product description,
product_price, product_category, product_quantity, product_photo)
    return redirect(url for("views.catalog", id=id))
```



Being the key definitions:

By implementing size restrictions on file uploads, potential denial-of-service issues stemming from uncontrolled file sizes have been effectively mitigated.



ASVS (Level 1) [CWE-918] – SSRF Protection Requirements (Files and Resources)

Verify that the web or application server is configured with an allow list of resources or systems to which the server can send requests or load data/files from.



ASVS (Level 1) [CWE-497] – Unintended Security Disclosure Requirements (Configuration)

Verify that web or application server and application framework debug modes are disabled in production to eliminate debug features, developer consoles, and unintended security disclosures.



<u>ASVS (Level 1) [CWE-548] – Other Access Control Considerations (Access Control)</u>

Verify that directory browsing is disabled unless deliberately desired. Additionally, applications should not allow discovery or disclosure of file or directory metadata, such as *Thumbs.db*, *.DS_Store*, *.git* or *.svn* folders.



<u>ASVS (Level 1) [CWE-598] – Generic Web Service Security Verification Requirements (Web Services)</u>

Verify API URLs do not expose sensitive information, such as the API key, session tokens etc.

Password Breach Check

When utilizing the *API*, the password is transmitted in a hashed format—specifically, only the first half is shared to safeguard sensitive details.

We employed the "Verify Password View" to ascertain whether a password had been compromised. This verification relied on the check_password(password) function contained within the UserManagement.py file.

Definition of the View:

```
@views.route('/verify-password', methods=['POST'])
def verify_password():
    data = request.get_json()
    password = data.get('password')

if not password:
    return jsonify({'error': 'Password not provided'}), 400

# Check if the password has been breached
    count = check_password(password)

if count > 0:
    return jsonify({'breached': True, 'count': count})
    else:
    return jsonify({'breached': False})
```



Definition of the function:

```
def check_password(password):
    # Hash the password using SHA-1
    hashed_password = hashlib.sha1(password.encode('utf-
8')).hexdigest().upper()
    prefix, suffix = hashed_password[:5], hashed_password[5:]

# Make a GET request to the HIBP API
    response =
requests.get(f'https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/{prefix}')

# Check if the suffix of the hashed password exists in the response
hashes = (line.split(':') for line in response.text.splitlines())
for h, count in hashes:
    if h == suffix:
        return int(count)
    return 0
```

This approach ensured that no sensitive data was exposed within the API's URL during transmission.



<u>ASVS (Level 1) [CWE-778] – Defenses Against Session Management Exploits (Session Management)</u>

Verify the application ensures a valid login session or requires re-authentication or secondary verification before allowing any sensitive transactions or account modifications.

Login

When implementing the app's updates, including new features and fixes, it became necessary to revalidate the login session to ensure its continued validity.

Definition of the "Login View":

```
@views.route('/login', methods=['GET','POST'])
def login():
    if request.method == "POST":
        username = request.form.get("username").lower()
        password = request.form.get("password")
        if is_valid_input(username) == False:
            return render_template("login.html", message="Invalid
username.")
        user = search_user_by_username(username)
        id = get_id_by_username(username)
        if user and bcrypt.check_password_hash(user[2], password):
            return redirect(url_for("views.verify_totp_login", id=id))
        # Password is incorrect
        return render_template("login.html", message="Invalid login")
credentials.")
    else:
        return render template("login.html")
```





Definition of the TOTP stage:

```
@views.route('/verify totp login/<id>', methods=['POST', 'GET'])
def verify totp login(id):
    if id == None:
        return redirect(url_for("views.login"))
    if request.method == "GET":
        return render_template("totp_login.html", id=id)
    else:
        username = search_user_by_id(id)[1]
        token = request.get_json().get("token") if request.is_json else
None
        if username is None or token is None:
            return render template("login.html", message="Invalid TOTP
code. Please try again.")
        verified = verify_totp_code(id, token, 'users', username=username)
        if verified == True:
            session["username"] = username
            session["id"] = id
            session["admin"] = get user role(session["id"])
            check database table exists(username.lower() + " cart")
            check_database_table_exists(f"{username.lower()}_orders")
            return jsonify({'message': 'Login successful.'}), 200
        else:
            # Get all the emergency codes
            emergency codes = get user emergency codes(id)
           # Check if the token is an emergency code
```

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This action ensured the maintenance of a valid login session.



Implementation and Deployment

For this project, we opted for a complete production setup, implementing, and deploying it on an *Apache WSGI* server. Acquiring a registered domain and an *SSL* certificate enabled us to establish a secure *HTTPS* connection. As a result, our *ASVS* (*Application Security Verification Standard*) checklist presented increased demands, introducing numerous new security standards that needed fulfilment. After achieving full implementation and deployment, we transitioned to analysing the setup. We utilized tools from reputable websites for this analysis.

- SSL Labs: SSL Labs is an online service that assesses and analyses the security configuration of SSL/TLS implementations on web servers. It evaluates the SSL/TLS certificates, server configuration, and protocol support to provide a detailed security report. It helps identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses in SSL/TLS setups, aiding in improving the overall security posture of websites and online services. The report generated from this website can be found here.
- 2. DNS Spy: DNS Spy is a tool that provides insights into Domain Name System (DNS) configurations. It allows users to analyse DNS records, name servers, and other related information for a given domain. DNS Spy helps identify issues, track changes, and ensure the accuracy and security of DNS settings. It's useful for monitoring DNS health, detecting misconfigurations, and ensuring the reliability of domain-related services on the internet. The report generated from this website can be found here.

In addition to these tools, it was crucial to configure the server accurately. This involved establishing an allow list for necessary resource access, turning off any debug modes, and ensuring directory browsing was disabled.

Apache App Config



References

<u>CWE</u>

CVE DETAILS

OWASP Application Security Verification Standard | OWASP Foundation

Have I Been Pwned API

OWASP ASVS checklist for audits