An Introduction to Car Hacking

Analyzing Proprietary Automotive Systems with CANalyzat0r

who?

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Thesis: Car Hacking | Bug Bounty

❤️ RE, Exploit Development

@CaptnBanana

github.com/ps1337

(Likes slide effects)

[1]

What Is This?

My journey in car hacking (so far)

Not just CAN hacking

OK But Why?

About Car Hacking

- Car ~ small corporate network
- Interconnected ECUs and sensors
- Proprietary software and services
  - provided by 3rd parties
  - trusted? reviewed? tested?
  - privileges? vulnerabilities?
  - same for ECUs

About Car Hacking

- Variety of interfaces
  - CAN, OBD
  - USB (audio, video, images, vCard, …)
  - GPS, BT, WiFi, …

About Car Hacking

- Car Hacking: Obscure sector
- But also: variety
  - Findings
  - Methodology

schutzwerk / **CANalyzat0r**

Unwatch 43 | Unstar 465 | Fork 88

Main | Sniffer | Sender | Fuzzer | Comparer | Searcher | Filter | Manager | About

CANalyzat0r

Global interface configuration

Global interface name: vcan0

Bitrate (Bit/s): 500000

☑ Virtual CAN interface — VCAN index: 0

Apply | Add vcan0

Check interfaces | Remove vcan0

Current project

Active project: HackingStuff (201

Set active

Logging

Min. Loglevel: INFO

```
INFO: Database.py: CANalyzat0r.Database: connect: 366: Database connection OK
INFO: CANData.py: CANalyzat0r.CANData: checkVCAN: 134: Detected virtual interface for: vcan0
INFO: CANData.py: CANalyzat0r.CANData: rebuildCANDataInstances: 379: New CAN interface added: vcan0
INFO: CANData.py: CANalyzat0r.CANData: checkVCAN: 134: Detected virtual interface for: vcan1
INFO: CANData.py: CANalyzat0r.CANData: rebuildCANDataInstances: 379: New CAN interface added: vcan1
INFO: MainTab.py: CANalyzat0r.MainTab: applyGlobalInterfaceSettings: 407: CAN configuration updated
INFO: SnifferTabElement.py: CANalyzat0r.SnifferTabElement (vcan0): toggleSniffing: 160: Started sniffing
INFO: SenderTabElement.py: CANalyzat0r.SenderTab (Sender 1): sendAll: 145: Packets sent successfully
INFO: SenderTabElement.py: CANalyzat0r.SenderTab (Sender 1): sendAll: 119: Started sender thread
INFO: SenderTabElement.py: CANalyzat0r.SenderTab (sender2): sendAll: 119: Started sender thread
INFO: FuzzerTab.py: CANalyzat0r.FuzzerTab: validateDataMaskInput: 365: Extended data mask to: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
INFO: FuzzerTab.py: CANalyzat0r.FuzzerTab: toggleFuzzing: 184: Started fuzzer thread
INFO: Database.py: CANalyzat0r.Database: saveProject: 663: Project saved
INFO: MainTab.py: CANalyzat0r.MainTab: setProject: 207: Loading project data...
INFO: MainTab.py: CANalyzat0r.MainTab: setProject: 216: Switched project to HackingStuff
```

Fuzzing, Sending (2 Threads), Sniffing (1 Thread) | Global interface: vcan0 | Project: HackingStuff

CANalyzat0r

Cómo analizar protocolos en el CAN BUS para hackear coches

automobile

The list

Home / tools / automobile

Packages that are used for tool or work ow automobile.

Tool count: 3

BlackArch automobile

Name	Version	Description	Homepage
can-utils	433.afb88e9	Linux-CAN / SocketCAN user space applications.	
canalyzat0r	11.ff4132a	Security analysis toolkit for proprietary car protocols.	
cantoolz	424.bc4c2bf	Framework for black-box CAN network analysis.	

Goal

Share details regarding CANalyzat0r

Share knowledge & methodology

Present analysis results

Automotive Networks


Complete CAN Frame
Arbitration Field
11
Control
4
Data
8
CRC Field
15
End of Frame
Start of Frame
ID10
ID9
ID8
ID7
ID6
ID5
ID4
ID3
ID2
ID1
ID0
Requ. Remote
ID Ext. Bit
Reserved
DL3
DL2
DL1
DL0
DB7
DB6
DB5
DB4
DB3
DB2
DB1
DB0
CRC14
CRC13
CRC12
CRC11
CRC10
CRC9
CRC8
CRC7
CRC6
CRC5
CRC4
CRC3
CRC2
CRC1
CRC0
CRC Delimiter
Acknow. Slot Bit
Acknow. Delimiter
EOF6
EOF5
EOF4
EOF3
EOF2
EOF1
EOF0
IFS2
IFS1
IFS0
DATA
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CAN HI
CAN LO

[3]


ENGINE CONTROL
BRAKE CONTROL
RADIO
INSTRUMENT CLUSTER
HIGH SPEED (CAN, FLEXRAY, ...)
GATEWAY
MOST
LOW SPEED (LIN)
DOOR CONTROL
SEAT CONTROL
DIAGNOSTIC BUS
VIDEO DATA
OBD-II PORT
OBD TESTING DEVICE


1
8
9
16

[6]

Automotive Networking

- Gateway interconnects various busses
- IPv6, VLANs
- CAN <-> SecOC
  - Secure Onboard Communication
    - CANFD -> AUTOSAR
      - [...] “aims for resource-efficient and practicable authentication mechanisms” [8]
- Plain CAN:
  - Sniff
  - Replay
    - → Fake messages
  - Inject

Threats in Automotive Networking

- Critical:
  - Attacker controls ECU
    - Is able to send arbitrary CAN messages
      - KeenLab BMW Analysis
  - Plain CAN: No authentication, encryption whatsoever

- MQTT brokers and services
  - Remote access to car network?

Threats in Automotive Networking

- Exposed services via USB ports
  - Attach network interface, set static IP
  - Scan/exploit/read/write
  - See: KeenLab BMW Paper

- Both remote and local attack surfaces
  - privilege escalation
  - hopping on other network nodes

No.	Vulnerability Description	Access	Affected Components	Reference
1	All the detail information has been reserved due to security concerns.	Local (USB)	HU_NBT	CVE-2018-9322
2		Local (USB/OBD)	HU_NBT	
3		Remote	HU_NBT	Logic Issue
4		Remote	HU_NBT	Reserved
5		Local (USB)	HU_NBT	CVE-2018-9320
6		Local (USB)	HU_NBT	CVE-2018-9312
7		Remote (Bluetooth)	HU_NBT	CVE-2018-9313
8		Physical	HU_NBT	CVE-2018-9314
9		Physical	TCB	Reserved
10		Remote	TCB	Logic Issue
11		Remote	TCB	CVE-2018-9311
12		Remote	TCB	CVE-2018-9318
13		Indirect Physical	BDC/ZGW	Logic Issue
14		Indirect Physical	BDC/ZGW	Logic Issue

[2 KeenLab]

Table: Vulnerabilities and CVEs in Our Research Confirmed by BMW

Bus Analysis

- Connect to Bus
  - Twisted pair
  - Tap Wires
    - Reachable from exterior?
      - New fancy rear mirrors?
  - MiTM Devices
    - CANBadger: Remote access to car network

- Get K-Matrix / CAN Matrix
- Do fun stuff with the car
  - Control steering while driving
  - Kill services while driving and see what happens
  - Disable brakes

K-Matrix Example

CAN-Bus

K-Matrix

Byte	1		2		3	
Bit	00000000		00000000		00000000	
Bit Nr.	7	0	7	0	7	0

ID	Byte	Name	Bit	Funktion
2C1	1	Schaltersignale_1	0	Richtungsblinken links betätigt
			1	Richtungsblinken rechts betätigt
			2	Lichthupe ein
			3	Fernlicht ein
			4	n.n.
			5	Parklicht links ein

Analyzing CAN with the CANalyzatOr

Why CANalyzat0r ?

- Needed something as practical part :D
- I wanted to code
- After using various tools: Had new ideas
  - GUI (BOO!!!1!!elf)
  - Simplify common analysis tasks
  - Manage dumps, packets, findings and notes: SQLite/JSON
    - export -> Git
  - Multi interface support
  - Use in combination with can-utils
- sudo make run
- Surprisingly various people needed it too

Sniffing and Fuzzing

Managing and Recognizing Known Packets



Combination with can-utils



Automatic Packet Filtering



Automatic Packet Filtering

Assisted Packet Filtering

- Fuzz -> minimize -> verify -> repeat
  - Answer Yes/No


TEST 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
LEFT
MIDDLE
RIGHT
TEST 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
LEFT
MIDDLE
RIGHT
TEST 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
LEFT
MIDDLE
RIGHT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Build Your Own “Lab”

Required Steps

- Get hardware - instrument cluster (IC)
- Get wiring diagram
- Get ignition packet(s): Turn IC on
- → Do Stuff

OK Cool But I Don't Want To Buy Stuff!!1!



Original Audi A5 8T TDI 8073km Kombiinstrument

Schreiben Sie die erste Rezension.

Artikelzustand: **Gebraucht**

EUR 99,00
(inkl. MwSt.)

Sofort-Kaufen

In den Warenkorb

Preisvorschlag senden

♡ Auf die Beobachtungsliste


RSS070
P05
011


MANY PINS HERE
LAPTOP
USB2CAN
D-SUB BREAKOUT
INSTRUMENT CLUSTER
+
-
POWER SUPPLY
MANY PINS HERE TOO



Ignition Packet(s)

1. Fuzz until it turns on
2. Assisted Packet Filtering
3. Once determined: Send in loop (also with *CANalyzat0r*)
4. Proceed with analysis


PS2002H
11.99
USB2CAN
SAFE
0:04
L3 3/5
EPC


CYBER
CYBER
1/min x 1000
SAFE
km/h
12:37
10.05.2006
°C
130
90
1/1
1/2

Some Tips

---

1. Don’t fuzz in ***YOLO*** mode
2. Make sure to get all ignition packets
3. Extending: Get more hardware

Analysis Results

ps1337 / automotive-security-research

Watch 3 | Star 10 | Fork 5

Code | Issues 0 | Pull requests 0 | Projects 0 | Wiki | Insights

This repository contains reverse engineering results and resources for a few specific car models of a very specific car manufacturer. Please don't sue.

car-hacking automotive-security

README.md

Automotive Security Research

This repository contains reverse engineering results and resources for a few specific car models.

CAN-ID	Data	Description
040	0000000001000000	Belt warning on
040	0000000000000000	Belt warning off
101/308	0000000000000000 / 0000X_1X_2X_3X_400000000	Set speed X1 = 0.5kmh X2 = 0.01kmh X3 = 67kmh X4 = 4.1kmh
30D	0001000000000000	Parking light (green)
30D	0400000000000000	Parking light (red)
363	0000440000000000	Indicator left
363	0000F80000000000	Indicator right
363	FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF	Indicator left and right
363	0000000000000000	Indicators off
397	0000000000000020	Lane assist (yellow)
397	0000000000000050	Lane assist (green)
3C0	00000200	Ignition on
3C0	00000100	Ignition off
3C0	BC204007A5BCB8	Show symbols
585	00020000000000	Show TR
590	00000000000D0000	Show "SAFE"
590	0000000000020000	Show L1
590	00000000000F0000	Show L1 2/2
5F0	222222222222	Dim Display
5F0/662	FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF / 00000F0000000000	Brights on
5F0/662	FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF / 00000000B0000000	Brights automatic on
661	0002000000000000	3 green Arrows
663	0400000X_100000000	Show TR in percent Must be send twice
700 / 714	0210030000000000	Start programming session

Setting Arbitrary Speed Values

```
16  # calculation value and index in packet
17  firstFineTuningCalc = (0.5, 4)
18  secondFineTuningCalc = (0.01, 5)
19  firstByteCalc = (67, 6)
20  secondByteCalc = (4.1, 7)
```

```
67  while True:
68      for i in range(30):
69          kmh = i * 10
70          sleep(0.4)
71          data = kmhToData(kmh)
72          os.system("cansend can0 101#0000000000000000")
73          os.system("cansend can0 308#" + data)
74          os.system("cansend can0 101#0000000000000000")
```

Fuzzing

- Media parsers
  - exotic file formats
  - vCard

  → radamsa

- Open ports: also radamsa
  - Also: Local PrivEsc possible?

- Specialized tools for interfaces
  - USB: Facedancer


Facedancer21
http://goodfet.sf.net/
TARGET
HOST
MAX3421ESMD
U2
U4
0.1µF
C4

[5]

Other Stuff

- Java Services
  - Decompile

- There are web browsers

- Check out software update process
  - signature validation
  - install via USB
  - Check out Subaru Starlink analysis [7]

subarufobrob

Hijack a subaru's key fob and steal all the things

UPDATE

I am hearing claims from multiple dealers/spokes persons (UK, Australia and BeNeLux) that this only affects US models. I have no way of confirming this, but if true, people outside the US are unlikely to be affected. Fabian Schörghofer (https://github.com/schoerg), who lives in Germany, has confirmed that the exploit did not work on a Subaru Forester 2009 he tested the exploit on. He also made avaiable a raw recording of the keyfob (https://pwnhofer.at/tmp/forester.io.bz2) in which he recorded the following sequence: 3x unlock, 3x lock, unlock, lock, unlock, trunk. The recordings are done at a 2.048MHz sample rate. A screenshot of the GNURadio flow-graph he used for capturing can be found here: https://pwnhofer.at/tmp/gnuradio.png Looking at the captured transmission, they do indeed appear to be different from the one found on US models.

Description of the vulnerability

The rolling code used by the key fob and car is predictable in the sense that it is not random. It is simply incremental.

The Future

Future Stuff

- AUTOSAR / SecOC:
  - Analyze things left off in standard that manufacturers build (or let build) themselves
    - e.g. key distribution

- Do even moar ***CANalyzat0r***?

- Containers in cars?
  - least privilege
  - proper isolation of 3rd party blobs

Stuff Worth Checking Out

mhhauto


Dashboard Service Tool v1.8 - (c)2013-2014 SMART-PROG Team.
BRAND NAME
PART NUMBER
CPU
EEPROM
Mileage in
Case JX-60 93C56 Dashboard
Case MX-150 93C46 Dashboard
Case MAGNUM 340 24C16 Dashboard
Case MAXXUM 100 24C16 Dashboard
Case MAXXUM 100 ECU 93C86 ECU
Case MXU-110 24C02 Dashboard
Cherry Acerc 93C66 Dashboard
Cherry Amulet 93C66 Dashboard
Cherry Bosch 797 ECU 95080 ECU
Cherry Cherman 93C66 Dashboard
Cherry Flagcloud 93C66 Dashboard
Cherry Fora 93C66 Dashboard
Forum Support
Search...
dash
Access violation at address 004317E1 in module 'dash.exe'. Read of address 031A6001.
OK
NO IMAGE AVAILABLE
No Remark
New Mileage: 0
[Do It]
Device
#:00000000 00000000
7601 day(s) left
255 unit(s) left
Check new version
Update
0%
Card FW: 0.00
ID:
Registered to:
AirBag Service Tool - Expired! - 0 unit(s) left
Dash Service Tool - 7601 day(s) left - 255 unit(s) left
IMMO Service Tool - Expired! - 0 unit(s) left
EDC17IMMO Service Tool - Expired! - 0 unit(s) left

mhhauto


05-06-2016, 09:26 AM (This post was last modified: 05-06-2016, 10:18 PM by sixcode.)
1
Hi
Workshop manual with wiring diagram and parts list of the Lamboghini Gallardo 2003
Pdf 174 Mo
1397 Pages
Pass = Thanks + rep
pass in PM
Regards
Attached Files
Link Gallardo.txt
153
70 bytes
Download

mhhauto


IMMOTOOLv1.5 Cracked by Luis Andre pushfd@bol.com.br
Options
Help
TLEMCEN-ELECTRONIC
Research laboratorie's (c) 2009 - 2010
BRAND
EDC17 / MEV17
LOAD DUMP
START
MODEL
PSA, VAG, FIAT, HYUNDAI, IVECO, FORD, PORSCHE - IMMO OFF
LOAD DUMP AND PRESS START!
Visit the best forum
Registered to: All mhhauto.com members

Also Interesting

- KeenLab BMW Research
- Miller/Valasek Research
- QNX Security

Also Interesting

- KeenLab BMW Research
- Miller/Valasek Research
- QNX Security
- SCHUTZWERK - We're hiring

References

[1] https://res.cloudinary.com/teepublic/image/private/s--3CAlo5WS--/t_Preview/b_rgb:ffffff,c_limit,f_jpg,h_630,q_90,w_630/v1534119152/production/designs/3012836_0.jpg

[2] https://keenlab.tencent.com/en/2018/05/22/New-CarHacking-Research-by-KeenLab-Experimental-Security-Assessment-of-BMW-Cars/

[3] https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Controller_Area_Network#/media/File:CAN-Bus-frame_in_base_format_without_stuffbits.svg

[4] https://a2-freun.de/forum/forums/topic/27793-liste-can-ids/

[5] https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0244/5107/products/IMG_0012_1024x1024.jpg?v=1371786976

[6] https://www.8devices.com/products/usb2can

[7] https://github.com/sgayou/subaru-starlink-research/blob/master/doc/README.md#harman-and-qnx

[8] https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/user_upload/standards/classic/4-3/AUTOSAR_SWS_SecureOnboardCommunication.pdf

Thanks!

github/ps1337
@CaptnBanana