

Applied Forensics

EHC LVL5 - S02 2021/2022

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INTRODUCTION

As stated by Biscom, more than 25% of employees steal sensitive data when they leave their business. Customer lists, secret formulas, source code, strategy papers, and other trade secrets are among the most regularly taken intellectual property. When an ex-employee leaves to work for a competitor or starts a brand new business, the data is commonly utilized against the company (Opsitnick et al., 2021). Digital forensics is the systematic collection of processes and techniques for extracting evidence from machines and hard disks. This data can then be evaluated for pertinent information, which frequently leads to incontrovertible proof of the accused theft of intellectual property. Therefore even if the data stolen in an IP Theft case is no longer in the victim's hands, evidence remains on the suspect's devices, which can be used to prove what happened (Damon S., 2013).

The purpose of this report is to provide corroborative evidence of the motivation, opportunity and intent leading to the fraud perpetrated by castor troy. The facts presented within this report are those within preparer's own area of expertise and knowledge and do not extend to matters and knowledge outside such expertise

SUMMARY OF CASE

An employee abruptly left my company that he has worked at for the past 5 years. During his tenure, he was involved in a top-secret project and had access to some critical intellectual property. Due to the sensitive nature of the project and his sudden departure, company counsel would like to know if any of that information was accessed or copied. During his tenure, the company gave the employee PC and mobile phone to be used for business purposes. Therefore, a forensic examination was conducted by analyzing the image, looking for critical Intelligent Property and investigating whether these files have been transferred out from the system.

FORENSIC EXAMINATION

I explored in the deep shadows of the Operating System and File System while completing the assessment, examining, theorizing, and verifying the minute minutiae of what gets stored or left behind. You presumably already know that every encounter you have with the gadget is documented in some way. Consider the easy step of placing a new flash drive into a machine running Microsoft Windows' USB port. There is a brief pause, followed by an audible tone and a notification in the Task Bar stating that the drive is now available for usage. The Windows OS is busily collecting down all kinds of facts about the item and storing it away for later use within the fraction of a minute between when it is inserted and when it is made available. What's fascinating is that the Operating System and System Files save thousands of such types of digital trails, all of which are accessible to forensic investigators. (Damon S., 2013).

METHODOLOGY

Employee data theft is most common soon before or shortly after an employee's firing or resignation from a business. Other than text messages on a mobile, on a standard Windows installation, these locations are:

- USB activities
- Accessed or deleted files
- Email accounts
- Internet history report
- Programs installed

As a result, I suspected the employee was engaging in odd behavior, such as:

- Inserting a personal USB or hard drive into a computer.
- Arriving at work at strange hours or setting up remote desktop connections after hours.
- Using the company network to transfer big amounts of data.
- Using cloud storage services such as Dropbox or Google Drive.
- Using personal accounts to send messages with attachments.
- Installing data-copying and data-transfer programs.
- Suspicious communication with third parties..

USB ACTIVITY ANALYSIS

Many USB devices today have sufficient storage capacity to preserve a whole copy of a user's hard disc. As a result, they are one of the most commonly utilised techniques for data theft. As mentioned previously, the great news is that utilising a USB device leaves a data trail that can be quite useful in an inquiry.

I began by looking at the suspect's USB usage, as this can provide various important details about what was attached to the machine and when. I made certain to record the USB device's serial number and/or brand, as well as the first and last times it was attached to the computer. Additionally, confirm that a distinct USB device was attached each time. (Opsitnick et al., 2021).

FILES RECENTLY OPENED

While knowing that a USB device was connected to a computer is crucial, analyzing what files were viewed and potentially transmitted to the device is much more crucial. The Microsoft Windows OS creates numerous artefacts when a user views a file or folder. These artefacts show what's been viewed, when it was viewed, and from where it came. When these artefacts are paired with a USB activity timeline, there's a good chance that content was transferred off the system..

Finally, the artefacts may include data on the location of the file. The artefact will identify if a file was opened from a USB drive, providing verifiable evidence that the suspect has a USB drive containing specified files (Opsitnick et al., 2021).

PERSONAL EMAIL ACCOUNTS

Some employees may send files to their personal email accounts, such as Yahoo or Gmail, using their corporate email. As a result, I made it a point to search through the employee's work email to find and document any proof of misbehaviour (Opsitnick et al., 2021).

INTERNET HISTORY REPORT

A report of recent Internet searches, web sites and pages viewed, cookies from websites, and Internet downloads can be generated. Such data is useful in determining what an individual considered essential or even their mental condition. Analysts noticed, for example, that people searched for ways to secretly erase or copy data and studied websites that were essentially "how to guides" for performing various nefarious behaviours (Opsitnick et al., 2021).

INSTALLED PROGRAMS

Looking at the programmes the suspect installed on their machine helped me figure out how they used it. For example, how did he examine or alter images if he had them? How did he open ZIP and RAR files and extract information if he possessed them? How did he watch digital movies if he had them? (Pixley et al., 2019)

SMS MESSAGES

Since we have the suspect's mobile phone it is crucial to analyze text messages. These messages often contain intimate, revealing material that may be pertinent to a civil or criminal case (Pixley et al., 2019).

WHAT COMPUTER FORENSICS TOOLS WERE USED?

The forensic tools employed in the performance of this investigation were as follows:

- **Magnet Axiom – V4.6**
A GUI tool which can recover and analyze digital evidence from the most sources, such as Windows, Mac, Linux systems, including Android and IOS Mobiles, all in one case file.
- **Autopsy® – Sleuth Kit 4.19**
A graphical interface to **The Sleuth Kit®** and other digital forensics tools, as well as a digital forensics platform. To investigate what happened on a computer, law enforcement, military, and corporate examiners use it
 - **RegRipper** – Used in Autopsy's registry analysis to find documents and USB devices that have been accessed recently

Magnet Axiom is more user friendly than Autopsy however Axiom is a paid software. On the other hand, Autopsy is an open-source software. While investigating with both tools, I personally did not feel much of a difference in the artifacts output between them. The only difference is that Axiom reads and analyzes the software/OS information in more details.

WHAT SYSTEMS/TECHNOLOGIES EXAMINED?

There were 2 systems that were investigated thoroughly which are – Winxp.E01 and Mobile.zip. More information on each device is shown below in tables 1 & 2. All information was extracted mostly from Axiom.

Table 1 Technology #1



Technology #1	Winxp.E01
Type	Image
Image Hash	MD5: 0f2878011ca9f0a06e72cac56dabc443
Operating System	Microsoft Windows XP
Install Date	2008-01-30 13:41:00 EET
Owner	Acme
Account Name	ACME-N6A1H8ZLJ1
Details	

Table 2 Technology #2

Technology #2	Mobile.zip
Type	Fixed Hard Disks Media
Device Name	Hitachi HTS723232L9SA60
Device ID	83edc3b2-3df8-59d9-8465-015bb9b7238f
Install Date	N/A
Owner	N/A
Account Name	N/A



EVIDENCE CLASSES

Table 3 summarizes the important evidences that were discovered in the investigation.

Table 3 Evidence Classes

Evidence Class	Description	Type
1	Winzip installed	Program
2	Ntuser.dat	File
3	system	File
4	Messages	SMS
5	Messages	SMS

EVIDENCE CLASS 1

Table 4 shows information about the installed program “WinZip”.

Table 4 Software Name WinZip 11.1 v 11.1.7466

Item	WinXP.E01
Software Name	WinZip 11.1 v 11.1.7466
Path	/Img_WinXP.E01/vol_vol2/system32/config/software
Hash Value	MD5: bbf3c212333dec3baac154bfaecd74d SHA-256: 13b156f677ba1db0925876f1c48fd4e5009e5e7337f32ee1cea08f0fa3941fd5
Created time	2008-01-30 07:29:12 EET
Accessed time	2008-01-30 16:51:23 EET

Modified time	2008-01-30 16:51:23 EET
---------------	-------------------------

EXHIBIT A

All WinZip's data table 4 are shown in screenshot 1 below with more details.

ANALYSIS

WinZip is a trialware file archiver and compressor, mostly used to compress files and folders before transferring it from one place to another. The fact that Castor Troy did install this software means that he needed it to engage in some activity relating to extracting or compressing data.

EVIDENCE CLASS 2

EXHIBIT B

Table 5 shows information about "NTUSER.DAT", which is found inside the user Castor Troy. This file ensures that any changes made in the user account are saved and loaded when they sign in back again. This file contains very important information that will be discussed below.

Item	WinXP.E01
File Name	NTUSER.DAT
Path	/Img_WinXP.E01/vol_vol2/Documents and Settings/Castor Troy/NTUSER.DAT/
Hash Value	MD5: ea09ed13af1342c6ae345edd39cb5f89 SHA-256: 19a1777a10f121034948966ee30c5b6105004c5447159c7669ea71e13b572b94
Created time	2008-01-31 06:32:20 EET
Accessed time	2008-01-30 16:51:20 EET
Modified time	2008-01-30 16:51:20 EET

Table 5 NTUSER.DAT


1 – COMDLG32

Location: Software/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/Explorer/Comdlg32

By investigation this directory, I found out that there are 2 sub-folders:

1. OpenSaveMRU – Modification time: 2008-01-30 14:27:47 GMT +00:00


Note: The abbreviation MRU stands for "most recently used".




Screenshot 1 OpenSaveMRU

- This key tracks files that have been opened or saved within a Windows shell dialog box, as shown below.

Screenshot 2 OpenSaveMRU Values




2. LastVisitedMRU – Modification time: 2008-01-30 14:27:47 GMT +00:00



Screenshot 3 LastVisitedMRU

- This key tracks the specific executable used by an application to open the files documented in the OpenSaveMRU key



Screenshot 4 LastVisitedMRU Value

ANALYSIS


The WinZip application was used by Troy the same time he accessed secret3.zip, secret4.zip, and secret5.zip. This indicates that these files were compressed using the software, WinZip.

2 – RECENT DOCS

Location: Software/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/Explorer/RecentDocs

By investigating this directory, I found out that there are 2 sub-folders:


1. .zip – modification time: 2008-01-30 14:28:02 GMT +00:00




Screenshot 5 .zip

- This folder contains 6 values – MRUListEx, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. The screenshots shows that secret1.zip, secret2.zip, secret3.zip, secret4.zip, secret5.zip were recently modified.

Screenshot 6 .zip values




2. Folder – modification time: 2008-01-30 14:28:02 GMT +00:00



Screenshot 7 Folder

- This folder contains 2 values – MRUListEx and 0. The screenshot shows that a removable disk was modified.



Screenshot 8 Folder Values


ANALYSIS

The above evidence shows that Troy accessed 5 secret zip files from a different drive, E:\. This drive can be an external drive attached to the device. So far, all findings link to each other making the suspect more doubtful.

3 – DRIVES

Location: Software/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/ CDburning/Drives

By investigation this directory, I found 1 volume with a value of (0x2), which means that this is a removable disk (refer to table):



Screenshot 9 0x2 value


Table 6 Drive Value

Value	Meaning
0 (0 x 0)	Unknown
1 (0 x 2)	No Root directory
2 (0 x 2)	Removable disk
3 (0 x 3)	Local disk
4 (0 x 4)	Network drive
5 (0 x 5)	Compact disk
6 (0 x 6)	RAM disk

4 – WINZIP

Location: Software/NicoMakComputing /Winzip/filemenu

As shown screenshot 12, all secret files were accessed from E:\. This means that Troy accessed the files from another drive than the local one.



Screenshot 10 Winzip filemenu

The values within this subkey will show what ZIP files were created using WinZIP. As you can see, there was only 5 ZIP files that Troy created using WinZIP.

EVIDENCE CLASS 3

EXHIBIT C

Table 7 shows information about “system”. This file contains very important information that will be discussed below.

Table 7 system


Item	WinXP.E01
File Name	System
Path	/Img_WinXP.E01/vol_vol2/WINDOWS/system32/config/system/
Hash Value	MD5: 693f9a21b6552ae94ff6f2f7c8fee0fb SHA-256: e507a8369ba73b46fb4ce2f42924b75c0c6dc30d4f03328e4e9b01b88e9a8062

Created time	2008-01-30 07:29:12 EET
Accessed time	2008-01-30 16:51:23 EET
Modified time	2008-01-30 16:51:23 EET

1 – USBSTOR

Location: ControlSet/Enum/USBSTOR


The USBSTOR key keeps a list of all USB storage devices that have ever been plugged into the system. It shows the USB device name, vendor name (manufacturer name), etc. As shown in screenshot 13, the name of the USB is “USB NAND FLASH DISK USB”, which is the one probably used to transfer the documents on.



Screenshot 11 USBSTOR

EXHIBIT D

In Axiom, more details were given on the same USB, as shown in screenshot 14. It shows that the Last assigned drive letter was E:. As previously mentioned, that the secret zip files were also assigned to the letter E: which proves that Troy did in fact copy these documents.



Screenshot 12 USB Axiom

EVIDENCE CLASS 4

In this section, we'll look at the evidence found in Mobile.zip. Numerous confusing details that I noticed include:

- The time gap is tremendously huge. The actions happened in the year 2008 in WinXP.E01. However, in Mobile.zip it happened in the year 2017.
- The suspicious text messages that will be discussed later are incoming to the device, meaning that it was sent to the suspect not from the suspect.

EXHIBIT D

Table 8 shows information about "smsBackup". This file contains very important information that will be discussed below.

Table 8 smsBackup

Item	Mobile.zip
File Name	smsBackup
Path	/LogicalFileSet1/logical files/apps/com.android.mms/f/smsBackup
Hash Value	MD5: e0f4bf6a55df71ca5504573e0b16317a SHA-256: fd634a421290f3c5ea7154e03437fed2dad71b1976282e46944d6e29ed6a7259

The following screenshots show all incoming and outgoing messages on the phone between the insider and the outsider. Those text messages are explained in detail in the coming section.

Keyword search 3 - sam - Keyword search 4 - castor - Keyword search 5 - rld - Keyword search 6 - qoo - Keyword search 7 - 83edc3b2-3d9f-4000-8000-000000000000

Text Indexed Text

Page: 1 of 1 Page Matches on page: 1 of 1 Match 100% Reset

Text Source: Search Results

7823 have a meeting with some investors coming up soon, give me a call when you can.t
 1505343083178q~
 +15412137637
 66 294, here's my new cell numbers number, 541-213-7637, let me know when you have time to talk.t
 150533612933sq~
 28809090
 568AT&T Free Msg: Your password has been changed to 8557.t
 1505146863412sq~
 28809090
 46AT&T Free Msg: Your password was changed. If this was done in error, please call 611 or 800.901.9878.t
 1505146863796q~
 28838270
 35AT&T Free Msg: Manage your account online at att.com/mypphone data rates may apply.t
 1505146796272sq~
 1111340611
 26AT&T Free Msg: Learn about 3rd party mobile purchases & blocking at att.com/gphonemgt
 1505146797088sq~
 +11113271912
 11 AT&T Free Msg: Welcome to AT&T PREPAID! Make a payment, buy Add-Ons & more at att.com/mypprepaid
 1505146815712sq~
 +15412137637
 Once again been super busy.t
 1506025534901sq~
 +15412137637
 432Hello there. I have super busy. We should talk.t
 150602476343sq~
 +17014841328
 38
 1503779871909sq~
 +15412137637
 344Aight, I'll be looking for them.t
 1503777366752sq~
 +15412137637
 That sounds perfect
 1503771556378sq~
 +14582663432
 PS tomorrow works best
 1503707585932sq~
 +14582663432
 How about an hour from now?
 1503707524658sq~
 1410100011
 Confident
 15035026306004sq~
 +17014841328
 Wow, we dot
 1503399137996sq~
 +15412137637
 BT Thanks. We can talk this evening!
 150338975963sq~

Screenshot 13 smsBackup1

Keyword search 3 - sam - Keyword search 4 - castor - Keyword search 5 - rld - Keyword search 6 - qoo - Keyword search 7 - 83edc3b2-3d9f-4000-8000-000000000000


Text Indexed Text

Page: 1 of 1 Page Matches on page: 1 of 1 Match 100% Reset

Text Source: Search Results

15412137637
 h<I'll be able to get my hands on all of the R&D doc's for us.t
 03788823546q~
 15412137637
 IFFt, there's a new Dept called R&D, I just asked Sam if I can transfer to it. It's run by Bart Jones. t
 037887491576q~
 8090901
 81 Free Msg: Your AT&T PREPAID balance is \$ 27.80 after your recent transaction of \$ 0.20. Manage your account at att.com/mypprepaid or call 611
 037076054926q~
 8090901
 81 Free Msg: Your AT&T PREPAID balance is \$ 28.00 after your recent transaction of \$ 0.20. Manage your account at att.com/mypprepaid or call 611
 037075344576q~
 8090901
 81 Free Msg: Your AT&T PREPAID balance is \$ 28.20 after your recent transaction of \$ 0.20. Manage your account at att.com/mypprepaid or call 611
 037074678746q~
 14582663432
 hen can I call you? Tom
 03681128026q~
 8090901
 81 Free Msg: Your AT&T PREPAID balance is \$ 28.40 after your recent transaction of \$ 0.20. Manage your account at att.com/mypprepaid or call 611
 03502662056q~
 8090901
 81 Free Msg: Your AT&T PREPAID balance is \$ 28.60 after your recent transaction of \$ 0.20. Manage your account at att.com/mypprepaid or call 611
 03502651568sq~
 10100999
 hYour MSG could not be DELIVERED because SmsprionRelyablehogt
 0350265014sq~
 10100011
 01 5863594296@text.com
 50 You must confirm your phone# on Facebook to avoid security risks on your account: https://goo.gl/cVmmFDt
 013746564376q~
 8090901
 81 Free Msg: Your AT&T PREPAID balance is \$ 29.00 after your recent transaction of \$ 0.20. Manage your account at att.com/mypprepaid or call 611
 02447203776q~
 15412137637
 hBT
 00398685700sq~
 8090901
 81 Free Msg: Your AT&T PREPAID balance is \$ 29.80 after your recent transaction of \$ 0.20. Manage your account at att.com/mypprepaid or call 611
 00389046308sq~
 8090901
 81 Free Msg: Your AT&T PREPAID balance is \$ 29.60 after your recent transaction of \$ 0.20. Manage your account at att.com/mypprepaid or call 611
 00389042016q~
 8090901
 81 Free Msg: Your AT&T PREPAID balance is \$ 29.40 after your recent transaction of \$ 0.20. Manage your account at att.com/mypprepaid or call 611
 00388992756sq~
 17014841328
 QI have a meeting with some investors coming up soon, give me a call when you can.t
 003420930176q~
 15412137637
 hNew base64 sms new call to enhance number: 541-213-7637, let me know when you have time to talk.t

Screenshot 14 smsBackup2



Screenshot 15 smsBackup3

EVIDENCE CLASS 5

EXHIBIT E


Table 18 shows information about the file “Message Artifacts”. This file contains very crucial information including incoming/outgoing messages that were on the employee’s device.

Item	Mobile.zip
File Name	Message Artifacts
Path	/LogicalFileSet1/logical files/apps/com.android.providers.telephony/db/mmssms.db
Hash Value	MD5: 67f7380755d7912624b46d9ba4831a56 SHA-256: c0ea5967b1996ac5f1a827b2d4f1b2ac9744f77ab09d5c775efc3818f929a13f

Screenshot 16 Message Artifacts


To obtain all these important SMS messages and its data including – date and time, who sent it, who was it sent to, I executed the following steps:

1. I tagged all message types.



Screenshot 17 Message tags

- I then created a timeline and filtered out all untagged docs.




Screenshot 18 Message timeline

- After that, I extracted and saved the result in an excel sheet. To ease the process, I highlighted all text messages from individuals by green and all text messages from telecommunication companies by yellow.



Since Autopsy could not get the contacts on the mobile, I used Axiom to get the contacts showed in screenshot 22.

Screenshot 20 Contacts



Icon	Date/Time	Description
TRUE	25/08/2017 20:45	Android Message : Incoming Read from 83edc3b2-3df8-49d9-8465-015bb9b7238f : When can i call you? Tom
TRUE	26/08/2017 03:32	Android Message : Outgoing Read to +14582063432 : How about an hour from now?
TRUE	26/08/2017 03:32	Android Message : Outgoing Read to +14582063432 : PS tomorrow works too
TRUE	26/08/2017 20:32	Android Message : Incoming Read from 83edc3b2-3df8-49d9-8465-015bb9b7238f : FYI, there's a new Dept called R&D, I just asked Sam if I can transfer to it. It's run by Bart Jones. I'll be able to get my hands on all of the R&D doc's for us.
TRUE	26/08/2017 20:33	Android Message : Incoming Read from 83edc3b2-3df8-49d9-8465-015bb9b7238f : Hey, here's my new cell numbers number, 541-213-7637, let me know when you have time to talk.
TRUE	18/07/2017 03:00	Android Message : Incoming Read from 83edc3b2-3df8-49d9-8465-015bb9b7238f : I have a meeting with some investors coming up soon, give me a call when you can.
TRUE	18/07/2017 04:58	Android Message : Incoming Read from 83edc3b2-3df8-49d9-8465-015bb9b7238f : That sounds perfect
TRUE	18/07/2017 17:42	Android Message : Outgoing Read to +15412137637 : Thanks. We can talk this evening
TRUE	18/07/2017 22:52	Android Message : Outgoing Read to +15412137637 : Alright. I'll be looking for them.
TRUE	18/07/2017 22:55	Android Message : Incoming Read from 83edc3b2-3df8-49d9-8465-015bb9b7238f : Wow. Will do
TRUE	18/07/2017 23:37	Android Message : Outgoing Read to +17014841323 : Try again
TRUE	21/09/2017 23:22	Android Message : Incoming Read from 83edc3b2-3df8-49d9-8465-015bb9b7238f : Are you around? Haven't heard from you in awhile
TRUE	21/09/2017 23:24	Android Message : Outgoing Read to +15412137637 : Hello there. I have super busy. We should talk.
TRUE	21/09/2017 23:25	Android Message : Outgoing Read to +15412137637 : Oops meant been super busy.
TRUE	21/09/2017 23:26	Android Message : Incoming Read from 83edc3b2-3df8-49d9-8465-015bb9b7238f : I get the idea. Let me know a good time.
TRUE	18/07/2017 18:11	Android Message : Incoming Read from 83edc3b2-3df8-49d9-8465-015bb9b7238f : Good

Screenshot 21 Filtered Messages

As shown in screenshots 23 & 24, the number associated with the suspicious messages is Tom Johnson. For a better view and understanding, refer to screenshot.



Screenshot 22 Axiom Messages

2 – CALLS

As screenshot 25 illustrates the employee had several calls between them, which shows that both parties, the insider and the outsider, are a part of this fraud plan. Since Autopsy could not get the call logs on the mobile, I used Axiom to get the call logs showed below in the screenshot.

Local User	Partner	Partner Name	Direction	Call Status	Call Date/Time	Call Duration...	Source	Reco...	Location
Local User <PhysicalDrive0 Hitachi HTS723232L9SA...	7014841323	7014841323	Outgoing	Unanswered	26/08/2017 21:28:49	0	PhysicalDrive0 - Partition 3 (Microsoft NTFS, 157.25...	Parsing	Table: calls(id: 1)
Local User <PhysicalDrive0 Hitachi HTS723232L9SA...	7014841323	7014841323	Outgoing	Unanswered	26/08/2017 20:32:34	0	PhysicalDrive0 - Partition 3 (Microsoft NTFS, 157.25...	Parsing	Table: calls(id: 2)
Local User <PhysicalDrive0 Hitachi HTS723232L9SA...	7014841323	7014841323	Incoming	Missed Call	26/08/2017 20:31:51	0	PhysicalDrive0 - Partition 3 (Microsoft NTFS, 157.25...	Parsing	Table: calls(id: 3)
Local User <PhysicalDrive0 Hitachi HTS723232L9SA...	5412137637		Incoming	Answered	26/08/2017 20:24:28	5:23	PhysicalDrive0 - Partition 3 (Microsoft NTFS, 157.25...	Parsing	Table: calls(id: 4)
Local User <PhysicalDrive0 Hitachi HTS723232L9SA...	5419758965		Incoming	Missed Call	22/07/2017 01:03:49	0	PhysicalDrive0 - Partition 3 (Microsoft NTFS, 157.25...	Parsing	Table: calls(id: 5)
Local User <PhysicalDrive0 Hitachi HTS723232L9SA...	2066833812		Outgoing	Unanswered	15/07/2017 19:24:35	0	PhysicalDrive0 - Partition 3 (Microsoft NTFS, 157.25...	Parsing	Table: calls(id: 6)

Screenshot 23 Call Logs

ANALYSIS

The evidence found in the Mobile.zip illustrates that the suspect did not only transfer the documents to an external drive (as seen previously), but also was in contact with someone outside the company and was planning to send the sensitive information out to outsiders through an encryption call GPG, which stands for “**Gnu Privacy Guard**.” It is a re-write or upgrade of PGP. It does not use the IDEA encryption algorithm. This is to make it completely free. It uses the NIST AES, Advanced Encryption Standard. All the algorithm data is stored and documented publicly by OpenPGP Alliance (Kaushik, 2012).

CONCLUSION

The theory I concluded after performing this thorough examination is that Castor Troy is the employee that abruptly left the company and he was involved and complicit in accessing, copying, and transferring sensitive information. He performed this by using WinZip to compress the sensitive files from documents on his machine and copying them to a thumb drive and later emailed them, using GPG encryption, to an external individual (most likely working for a competitive company).

The power of forensic tools such as Autopsy and Axiom is tremendous. It's quite amazing all the data stored in a device can be recovered by a Forensics expert. That's the reason everyone should be careful with their responsible data and avoid illegal actions at all times.

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APPENDICES

The following screenshots are MRU Opened Files and MRU Recent Files accessed from Axiom.

File...	File P...	Registry Key...	Regl...	Valu...	Source	Reco...	Location	Evid...
secret4.zip	E:\secret4.zip	2	b		WinXP.E01 - Partition 1 (Microsoft NTFS, 1.5 GB)(Do...	Parsing	Registry Key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV...	WinXP.E01
secret3.zip	E:\secret3.zip	3	a		WinXP.E01 - Partition 1 (Microsoft NTFS, 1.5 GB)(Do...	Parsing	Registry Key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV...	WinXP.E01
secret5.zip	E:\secret5.zip	30/01/2008 14:28:02	1	c	WinXP.E01 - Partition 1 (Microsoft NTFS, 1.5 GB)(Do...	Parsing	Registry Key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV...	WinXP.E01
secret4.zip	E:\secret4.zip	2	b		WinXP.E01 - Partition 1 (Microsoft NTFS, 1.5 GB)(Do...	Parsing	Registry Key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV...	WinXP.E01
secret3.zip	E:\secret3.zip	3	a		WinXP.E01 - Partition 1 (Microsoft NTFS, 1.5 GB)(Do...	Parsing	Registry Key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV...	WinXP.E01
secret5.zip	E:\secret5.zip	30/01/2008 14:28:02	1	c	WinXP.E01 - Partition 1 (Microsoft NTFS, 1.5 GB)(Do...	Parsing	Registry Key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV...	WinXP.E01

Screenshot 24 Axiom MRU Opened

File/Folder...	File/Folder Link	Registry Key...	Regl...	Valu...	Source	Reco...	Dele...	Location
secret5.zip	secret5.link	30/01/2008 14:28:02	1	4	WinXP.E01 - Partition 1 (Microsoft NTFS, 1.5 GB)(Do...	Parsing		Registry Key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV...
secret4.zip	secret4.link		2	3	WinXP.E01 - Partition 1 (Microsoft NTFS, 1.5 GB)(Do...	Parsing		Registry Key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV...
secret3.zip	secret3.link		3	2	WinXP.E01 - Partition 1 (Microsoft NTFS, 1.5 GB)(Do...	Parsing		Registry Key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV...
secret2.zip	secret2.link		4	1	WinXP.E01 - Partition 1 (Microsoft NTFS, 1.5 GB)(Do...	Parsing		Registry Key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV...
secret1.zip	secret1.link		5	0	WinXP.E01 - Partition 1 (Microsoft NTFS, 1.5 GB)(Do...	Parsing		Registry Key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV...
Removable Disk (E:)	Removable Disk (E:).link	30/01/2008 14:28:02	1	0	WinXP.E01 - Partition 1 (Microsoft NTFS, 1.5 GB)(Do...	Parsing		Registry Key: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV...

Screenshot 25 Axiom MRU Recent Files

FORENSICS REPORT GENERATED BY FORENSIC TOOLS

I generated reports with the two tools I used. Kindly find, in the submission link, 2 .rar files attached – Axiom-reports.rar & Autopsy-reports.rar.